TOWARDS A COMMON DEFENCE AND SECURITY POLICY IN THE ...

TOWARDS A COMMON DEFENCE AND SECURITY POLICY IN THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY By Hussein Solomon

INTRODUCTION From the 1970s onwards, the primary source of insecurity confronting the Southern African region was the apartheid South African state. In attempting to maintain white minority rule, the apartheid regime brutally crushed internal dissent. Among a litany of massacres, Sharpeville in 1960 and Soweto in 1976 stand out as stark testimony to this brutality. Talk of democracy was treasonous – after all, democracy threatened the very foundations of the racist regime. With the coming to power of the hawkish Prime Minister (later President) PW Botha, the malignant reach of the apartheid state extended well beyond its borders. Convinced that internal dissent was intimately related to the external support provided by neighbouring states to the liberation movements of the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), Pretoria turned its wrath on these states. Independence for Namibia became a far-off dream as the South African Defence Force (SADF) entrenched itself in this country. Namibia was then used as a springboard for attacks into Angola. Bombing raids by the South African Air Force were conducted against several of the region’s capitals – including Lusaka, Gaborone and Maputo. In addition, other more subtle responses were also adopted. Economic blockades against neighbouring states were employed. More destructively, the apartheid regime supported various surrogate forces in neighbouring states – UNITA in Angola, the Mashala Gang in Zambia, Super-ZAPU in Zimbabwe, the Lesotho Liberation Army in Lesotho and RENAMO in Mozambique. By the late 1980s, the cost of apartheid destabilisation in the region was estimated to be between two and three million people dead and US $65 billion worth of damage to the economies of neighbouring states.T1

The doctrine underlying this policy of regional destabilisation was “total onslaught”. According to this doctrine, Pretoria was a pro-Western democracy, which embraced capitalism and was therefore a target of subversion by the Soviet Union, which was using black nationalists inside South Africa and the region to expand communism. Despite the fact

that the doctrine did not make empirical sense, Pretoria succeeded for some time in convincing certain sectors of Western opinion that black nationalism could be equated with communism and that South Africa was the West’s only bulwark against this threat in the region. Certainly, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was happy with such a penetrating analysis and it, together with the SADF, greatly assisted UNITA in its murderous campaign against the Luanda government in Angola.2 Of course, the military assistance granted by the Soviet Union to both the liberation movements and neighbouring states was seen as confirmation of the doctrine of total onslaught.3 During the mid-1980s, history finally caught up with the apartheid regime. Great tectonic changes were affecting the political landscape. With the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev to the premiership of the Soviet Union and the policies of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring), South African policy-makers were placed in a quandary since the total onslaught was rendered superfluous.4 No more could draconian apartheid legislation be justified with reference to a hostile Soviet Union contemplating imperialist designs on South Africa. No longer could South Africa justify its military incursions into neighbouring states as the country for free enterprise and democracy against the pro-Soviet, pro-Communist Southern African states. Apartheid destabilisation was seen for what it was: a desperate attempt by a minority to maintain a brutal racial hegemony over the majority.

While some came to terms with this revelation later, others had seen the light much earlier. The 1950s witnessed the emergence of a global anti-apartheid movement reflecting an international popular consensus around respect for human rights and democratisation. These sought to pressurise their respective governments into placing economic sanctions on the apartheid regime. Initially marginalised, their concerns for human security slowly came to replace the dominant realpolitik concerns of national interests when dealing with Pretoria. To compound matters, Pretoria itself provided the ammunition for these human rights campaigners with each new massacre committed inside its borders being televised to a horrified international audience. South Africa’s international pariah status tended to be further entrenched in the eyes of the international community by the atrocities committed by its surrogate forces. The massacres of innocent civilians committed by RENAMO at Homoine, Manjacaze, Taninga and Molwana were very costly diplomatically for South Africa. In April 1988, an emergency aid donors’ conference was held in Maputo, and at this meeting, Roy Stacey, US Assistant Deputy Secretary of State, accused RENAMO of committing “one of the most brutal holocausts against ordinary human beings since World

War Two”.5 South Africa, by virtue of its support of the bandit movement, was implicated by RENAMO and this reinforced calls in the West, and particularly in the USA, that South Africa be declared a terrorist state.6

In the final instance, the global anti-apartheid campaigners got their way and sanctions were imposed on the apartheid regime. This was in spite of the vociferous protestations of South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha, who argued that sanctions were a violation of South Africa’s sovereignty. This argument the international community was not prepared to buy, and it came out in defence of the popular sovereignty of South Africa’s citizens as opposed to the juridical sovereignty of the apartheid state. Despite the fact that sanctions were imposed from the 1960s onwards, the impact of sanctions was only felt much later when the international community agreed to act in concert against the pariah.7 Thus, although the United Nations (UN) passed its first punitive resolution against South Africa in April 19618 and the UN Security Council passed a mandatory arms embargo in 1977,9 it was only when the United States got into the act by means of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1985 that the screws against Pretoria were well and truly tightened.10 Thus the participation of the US colossus in the South African context proved decisive in persuading the incumbent regime to re-evaluate their options and peacefully accept the principle of majority rule. Changing international circumstances also served to exacerbate the impact of international economic sanctions. The oil crisis of 1970s occurred at the very time when South Africa had begun a large-scale programme of oil stockpiling. Oil imports, which in 1973 had cost R190 million, were by 1975 costing R1 100 million.11 However, Pretoria did seek to bypass international sanctions through sanctions busting and the overt and covert support of certain states. For instance, Israel assisted Pretoria in the development of its defence capabilities.12

Notwithstanding these attempts, sanctions did start to bite and their cumulative impact forced the apartheid regime to reconsider both its domestic and regional policies. Moreover, given that the rationale for sanctions was to modify the behaviour of the South African state, the intensity of sanctions imposed was closely related to the actions of the regime. Thus, the sanctions campaign intensified as internal repression on the part of the apartheid state intensified against the democratic opposition inside the country. Hence, in the shadow of the Sharpeville massacre of 1960, the first sanctions were imposed against the apartheid regime. Following the 1976 uprisings and the killing of Black Consciousness leader Steve Biko in

1977, more sanctions were to follow. Pretoria’s brutal repression of the 1984–1986 uprisings during its State of Emergency drew further sanctions.

The success of the international sanctions campaign against Pretoria lay in the vulnerability of its economy. In the 1980s, South Africa was estimated to have an open economy of between 50% and 60%, with more than half of the country’s GNP dependent on trade with the West. Being such an open economy, South Africa was and is very vulnerable to trade boycotts, sanctions or disinvestments.13 Hence we can conclude that the fact that 90% of South Africa’s merchandise exports were subjected to sanctions of one kind or another, and that one hundred states applied restrictions on trade with the republic, did not do wonders for its economy.14 Neither was the country’s rising inflation rate and stagnating growth rate aided by the R18 billion in private capital disinvestments from South Africa between 1986 and 1988.15 Sanctions and disinvestments were perceived by senior government officials to be hurting the economy, and they were a powerful motivational force for the apartheid state to adopt reform at home and a less bellicose foreign policy towards its neighbours. Foreign Minister Pik Botha publicly declared several times that the only way out of South Africa’s international isolation was through domestic reform. These sentiments also informed President FW de Klerk’s thinking: We realise that credible constitutional reform has a very important role to play in creating a climate which will be conducive to private investment, to the normalisation of South Africa’s international economic relations, and to the development of a strong economy.16 The unbanning of the ANC, the release of Nelson Mandela and the beginning of formal negotiations between the ANC and the National Party government was to begin within months of De Klerk making this statement. The way was thus paved for majority rule and the first democratic elections on 27 April 1994. The success of international sanctions against apartheid South Africa could be seen as a success for the globalising democratic ethos alluded to earlier. It was also a success for a globalisation ‘from below’ as it reflected the popularly-led (as opposed to state-led) global anti-apartheid movement.

If the forces of globalisation had a positive impact on the region in ending apartheid, then apartheid destabilisation contributed to peculiar forms of regionalisation developing in Southern Africa – a form of regionalisation which continues to be the bane of the unhappy

citizens of this, the southern-most tip of Africa. In response to apartheid destabilisation, neighbouring states banded together. In 1979, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was launched. Its primary aim was to reduce neighbouring states’ economic dependence on the apartheid regime. This was in response to South Africa using its economic might to force compliance among neighbouring states to its diktat. Another structure that was created was the Frontline States (FLS). The purpose of this structure was to serve as a loose military/security alliance among neighbouring states against the predatory raids of the apartheid military machine.17 What both these structures had in common was that they existed not to share sovereignty in some collective endeavour; rather they existed in defence of national sovereignty. More to the point, given the African context, these collective arrangements existed to defend state elites. These state elites, while paying lip service to the anti-apartheid cause, were also not averse to collaborating with Pretoria when it suited them. Thus Malawi’s President Hastings Banda forged diplomatic ties with the international pariah in order to extract economic largesse. Similarly, Swaziland’s King Sobhuza II was willing to enter into a security pact with the apartheid regime in exchange for territorial compensation.18 Similarly, despite the obligatory rhetoric on economic independence, cross-border trade between the apartheid regime and its neighbouring states continued apace.

The existence of the apartheid regime, however, served other useful purposes from the perspective of these states. Poor delivery on the part of national governments to provide housing, health or employment to its citizens could always be blamed on apartheid destabilisation that wrecked infrastructure – although this was not equally true in all neighbouring states. The lack of democracy inside these states could be accounted for by the war they were engaged in with the apartheid state. More importantly, the support rendered by the apartheid military to opposition forces in neighbouring states tainted these while at the same time lending legitimacy to incumbent regimes that were deemed to be “progressive”. In the process, their own severe flaws were overlooked.

In a nutshell, then, apartheid destabilisation resulted in a particular form of regionalisation: one which privileged state security over human security, one which stressed solidarity above all else, and one which viewed external intervention as fundamentally hostile to it own interests. This form of regionalisation was fundamentally anti-democratic as it viewed state elites as legitimate on the basis of their historical struggle for independence and their anti-

apartheid credentials (no matter how chequered the latter was). It was this legacy which continued to haunt the region even after the dissolution of the SADCC and its replacement by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992. This legacy was also to haunt the new SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security that replaced the FLS as the premier vehicle for security co-operation in the region.19 So one of the first challenges towards a new security architecture is how to make a paradigmatic shift from state to human security.

A second legacy of apartheid destabilisation was the fact that it reinforced national sovereignty and in so doing stunted the development of a collective regional identity. This, then, is the second challenge for SADC: how does one move from national security considerations towards considerations of common security? Finally, if common defence and security policies are to be realised in the sub-region, we need to give some thought to developing a common military doctrine, common command and control as well as common training. These are some of the issues which this book attempts to address. Whilst acknowledging the immense challenges confronting SADC, the tone of the book is far from pessimistic.

Acknowledging

the

problems,

it

seeks

to

provide

policy-oriented

recommendations to overcome these obstacles at regional security integration.

This book is divided into three parts. The first seeks to provide a historical background to current developments as well as to map out some of the challenges confronting the region’s policy-makers and citizens. In the first chapter, Swart and Du Plessis map out the broad contours of the progression from regional destabilisation to a security community. Crucially, they argue that the political will to implement the necessary steps to realise an effective security community is essential to the functioning of such a community. In the next chapter, Ngubane, utilising the insights of new security thinking, notes that the sub-region faces a number of traditional threats to security as well as new sources of insecurity, including the scourge of HIV/AIDS. On a more pessimistic note, he argues that responses from SADC have been weak, pointing to both a lack of institutional capacity and little policy coherence.

The second part of the book focuses on the nuts and bolts of defence co-operation among SADC states. In their audit of SADC defence policies, Africa Strategic Alternatives focus on national security strategy, threat assessments, defence policy formulation, military doctrine,

force structure and design, civil-military relations (including parliamentary oversight), and defence budgeting. Whilst acknowledging the factors promoting regional security integration in the sub-region, the chapter also acknowledges several obstacles to developing common defence and security policies for the sub-region. These include the following: •

It is difficult to determine exactly how most governments in the region define their security, because most of them do not make their doctrines and calculations public. Instead, it is usually the head of state, the chief of security, army generals and a small number of fellow officers who make calculations and take whatever actions they would consider necessary. This usually implies a narrow definition of security, based on considerations of military defence and regime stability.

•

Parliamentary oversight is visible in the cases of Botswana, Namibia and South Africa but not so visible in other countries.

•

Apart from being influenced by historical events, the strategy and doctrine followed by the countries’ defence forces are influenced by the way the particular government perceives the threats to the country. The resultant differences in doctrine and strategy inhibit the establishment of an effective regional defence capability.

•

The problems of language proficiency among soldiers may also restrict universal training.

The chapter concludes with a number of recommendations to rectify this situation. Thereafter, in his chapter, De Coning puts forth various recommendations for developing a common Southern African peacekeeping system. At the strategic level of the SADC Summit, the OPDSC and the various other decision-making bodies of SADC, and at the level of the national governments, there should be certainty on how the Southern African peacekeeping system operates from the manner of its authorisation to its mandate and leadership. At operational level, he argues for a sub-regional standby arrangement that could be managed by a small but professional permanent headquarters, and will be responsible for mission planning, budgeting, current mission management and the maintenance of the stand-by system.

In the final section, we turn to SADC’s OPDSC. In his chapter, Solomon discusses the institutional problems besetting the OPDSC and sets forth recommendations to correct these. The institutional structures of SADC’s OPDSC are, however, contextualised within both the

geo-strategic considerations being played out in the sub-region as well as within the dominant political culture of state elites. It is a culture that privileges state security at the expense of the security of ordinary citizens. In his sobering analysis of the Organ, Williams notes that, notwithstanding the strategic origins of the SADC as a political entity, the recent attempts at resolving the regional security impasse have focused on organisational rather than strategic solutions. The chapter focuses on recent divisions within SADC and maintains that an essential prerequisite to securing higher levels of regional cohesion will be the identification of those issues and common processes which SADC needs in order to best manage its regional security more effectively. Towards this end, a series of political and military confidence building measures are proposed.

In the final chapter, Hammerstad notes that, on paper, from the signing of a Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation in August 2001 to the Mutual Defence Pact in August 2003, Southern African security looks both strong and impressive. However, in reality practical security co-operation between SADC member states is limited and often bilateral. Often, too, security policies are blatantly unilateral. In her analysis of two forms of regional security integration in the sub-region, Hammerstad argues that if SADC is to attain a future regional order that can reasonably be characterised as a security community, it needs to take the path of common security, rather than focusing narrowly on issues of military defence.

Notes and References 1

D. Cammack, ‘South Africa’s War of Destabilization’, in G. Moss and I. Obery (eds), South African Review 5, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1989; R. Davies, ‘South African Regional Policy Before and After Cuito Cuanavale’, in Moss and Obery 1989. 2 R.J. Jaster, The Defence of White Power: South African Foreign Policy Under Pressure, London: Macmillan, 1988; G Moss, ‘The Frontline: Regional Policy in Southern Africa’, in Moss and Obery 1989. 3 Jaster 1988, p 96. 4 P. Nel, A Soviet Embassy in Pretoria?, Cape Town: Tafelberg, 1990; S. Friedman and M. Narsso, A New Mood in Moscow: Soviet Attitudes to South Africa, Cape Town: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1989. 5 Quoted in The Weekly Mail (Johannesburg), 5 May 1988, p 4. 6 Jaster 1988, p 157; K.W. Grundy, The Militarization of South African Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988, p 127. 7 J. Hofmeyr, The Impact of Sanctions on South African White Political Attitudes, Washington DC: Investor Responsibility Research Centre, 1990, p 1. 8 Africa Research Centre, The Sanctions Weapon, Cape Town: Buchu Books, 1980, p 11. 9 C. Alden, Apartheid’s Last Stand: The Rise and Fall of the South African Security State, London: Macmillan, 1996, p 117. 10 Hofmeyr 1990, p 1.

11

D.J. Goldsworthy, ‘South Africa’, in M. Ayoob (ed), Conflict and Intervention in the Third World, London: Croom Helm, 1980, p 211. 12 Ibid., p 208. 13 V. Razis, The American Connection: The Influence of US Business on South Africa, London: Frances Pinter Publishers, 1986, p 12. 14 D. Geldenhuys, ‘The Crisis in South Africa’s International Relations’, International Affairs Bulletin, vol 13, no 3, 1989, p 93. 15 P.L. Moorcroft, Africa Nemesis: World Revolution in South Africa 1945–2010, London: Brasseys, 1990, p 25. 16 Address by F.W. de Klerk, State President, to the Financial Mail Conference on Investment in 1990, Johannesburg, 6 October 1989, p 3. 17 H. Solomon and J. Cilliers, ‘Southern Africa and the Quest for Collective Security’, Security Dialogue, vol 28, no 2, June 1997, pp 198–200. 18 T.R.H. Davenport, South Africa: A Modern History, London: Macmillan, 1991, pp 473–481. 19 G. Cawthra, ‘Sub-Regional Security: The Southern African Development Community’, Security Dialogue, vol 28, no 2, June 1997, p 208.

Contents List of Abbreviations Map of the Southern African Region Notes on the Contributors Sommaire Exécutif 1.

Introduction Hussein Solomon

2.

From Apartheid Destabilisation to a Southern African Security Community Gerrie Swart and Anton du Plessis

3.

Sources of Southern African Insecurity Senzo Ngubane

4.

An Audit of Southern African Development Community Defence Policies Africa Strategic Alternatives

5.

Towards a Common Southern African Peacekeeping System Cedric de Coning

6.

State vs Human Security: Reflections on the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation Hussein Solomon

7.

Ensuring Strategic and Institutional Inter-Operability: The Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation Rocklyn Williams

8.

Is SADC Heading in the Wrong Direction? Two Approaches to Security Integration for Southern Africa Anne Hammerstad

Appendix 1: Questionnaire

Résumé Exécutif La déstabilisation de l’apartheid a contribué aux formes particulières de la régionalisation qui étaient en train de se développer en Afrique australe : c’était une forme qui donnait plus de priorité à la sécurité de l’état qu’à la sécurité humaine, qui mettait l’accent sur la solidarité avant tout, et qui croyait que l’intervention externe était hostile quand il s’agissait de ses propres intérêts. En réaction à la déstabilisation de l’apartheid, les pays voisins se sont réunis. En 1979, on a lancé la Conférence pour la Coordination du Développement en Afrique Australe (SADCC). Son l'objectif primaire était de réduire la dépendance économique des pays voisins sur le régime d’apartheid. On a créé également une autre structure, les Etats Frontaliers avec l’Afrique du Sud (Frontline States – FLS). Cette structure devrait être une alliance militaire/sécuritaire vague des pays voisins contre les raids prédateurs de la machine militaire de l’apartheid. Ce que ces deux structures avaient en commun n’était pas qu’elles existaient pour partager la souveraineté dans un effort collectif quelconque ; c’était plutôt qu’elles existaient pour défendre la souveraineté nationale. Ce qui était plus pertinent, étant donné le contexte africain, était le fait que ces arrangements collectifs existaient pour défendre les élites des états.

Cet héritage a continué à hanter la région, même après la dissolution de la SADCC et son remplacement par la Communauté pour le Développement de l’Afrique Australe (SADC) en 1992. Cet héritage devrait aussi hanter le nouvel Organe de la SADC pour la Politique, la Défense et la Sécurité qui a remplacé les Etats Frontaliers avec l’Afrique du Sud comme le premier véhicule pour la coopération sécuritaire dans la région. Ainsi, un des premiers défis pour une nouvelle architecture sécuritaire est de décider comment on pourra donner plus d’importance à la sécurité humaine qu’à la sécurité de l’état.

Un deuxième héritage de la déstabilisation de l’apartheid était le fait que celui-ci avait renforcé la souveraineté nationale et avait donc empêché le développement d’une identité collective régionale. C’est donc le deuxième défi pour la SADC : comment peut-on donner moins d’importance aux problèmes de la sécurité nationale et plus d’importance à la sécurité commune? Enfin, pour formuler des politiques communes sur la défense et la sécurité dans la sous-région, il faudra tenir compte du développement d’une doctrine militaire commune, de la commande et du contrôle communs ainsi que de la formation commune. Ce sont quelques problèmes que ce livre essaie de résoudre. Bien que le livre reconnaisse les défis énormes qui

confrontent la SADC, le ton du livre est loin d’être pessimiste. En reconnaissant les problèmes, il essaie de proposer des recommandations orientées vers les politiques pour surmonter ces obstacles à l’intégration régionale sécuritaire.

Ce livre est réparti en trois parties. La première partie essaie de fournir le contexte historique des développements actuels et aussi d’élaborer quelques défis qui confrontent ceux qui formulent les politiques et les citoyens de la région. Dans le premier chapitre, Swart et Du Plessis élaborent les grands contours de la progression de la déstabilisation régionale à une sécurité communautaire. Ils croient que la volonté politique de mettre en œuvre les démarches nécessaires pour assurer la sécurité efficace d’une communauté est essentielle au fonctionnement d’une telle communauté. Dans le prochain chapitre, Ngubane, utilise les idées de la nouvelle compréhension de la sécurité et note que la sous-région fait face à un nombre de menaces traditionnelles à la sécurité ainsi que de nouvelles sources d’insécurité, y compris le fléau du VIH /SIDA. Il affirme que les réponses de la SADC ont été faibles, et croit que ceci indique le manque de capacités institutionnelles et le fait qu’il y a peu de cohérence dans les politiques.

La deuxième partie du livre se concentre sur les aspects fondamentaux de la coopération dans le domaine de la défense entre les pays de la SADC. Dans son audit des politiques de défense de la SADC, Africa Strategic Alternatives se concentre sur la stratégie pour la sécurité nationale, des évaluations des menaces, la formulation de politiques de défense, la doctrine militaire, la structure et le modèle de la force, la relation civile-militaire (y compris la surveillance parlementaire), et la budgétisation pour la défense. Tout en reconnaissant les facteurs qui encouragent l’intégration régionale de la sécurité dans la sous-région, le chapitre reconnaît plusieurs obstacles au développement de politiques communes pour la défense et la sécurité dans la sous-région. Ils comprennent ceux qui suivent : •

Il est difficile de déterminer exactement comment la plupart des gouvernements dans la région définissent leur sécurité parce que la grande majorité de ces gouvernements ne rendent pas publiques leurs doctrines et calculs. Au lieu de ceci, c’est généralement le chef de l’état, le chef de la sécurité, les généraux de l’armée et un petit nombre de leurs collègues qui font les calculs et qui prennent les mesures qu’ils croient sont

nécessaires. Ceci implique généralement une définition restreinte de la sécurité, basée sur des considérations de la défense militaire et de la stabilité du régime. •

La surveillance parlementaire est visible dans les cas du Botswana, de la Namibie et de l’Afrique du Sud, mais elle n’est pas tellement visible dans d’autres pays.

•

A part être influé par des événements historiques, la stratégie et la doctrine des forces armées des pays sont influées par la perception de leur propre gouvernement des menaces pour le pays. Les différences de doctrine et de stratégie qui en résultent empêchent l’établissement d’une capacité efficace régionale pour la défense.

•

Les problèmes de langues parmi les soldats peuvent aussi limiter la formation universelle..

Le chapitre termine en offrant un nombre de recommandations pour rectifier cette situation. Après ceci, De Coning fait des recommandations diverses pour le développement d’un système commun pour maintenir la paix en Afrique australe. Au niveau stratégique du Sommet de la SADC, l’OPDSC et d’autres organes de la SADC pour la prise de décisions par les gouvernements nationaux, Il faut savoir exactement comment fonctionne le système pour maintenir la paix en Afrique australe de son autorisation à son mandat et sa direction. Sur le plan opérationnel, il propose un arrangement sous-régional pour se tenir prêt qui pourrait être géré par un petit siège professionnel permanent. Ce siège serait chargé de la planification des missions, de la budgétisation, de la gestion de la mission actuelle et de la maintenance du système de préparation.

Dans la section finale, on parle de l’OPDSC de la SADC. Dans son chapitre, Solomon discute les problèmes institutionnels de l’OPDSC et fait des recommandations pour les remédier. Les structures de l’OPDSC de la SADC, cependant, sont, contextualisées dans les considérations géo-strategiques qui se développent au sien de la sous-région ainsi que dans la culture politique dominante des élites des états. C’est une culture qui privilège la sécurité de l’état au détriment de la sécurité des citoyens ordinaires. Dans son analyse de l’Organe, Williams note que, malgré les origines stratégiques de la SADC en tant qu’entité politique, les efforts récents pour résoudre l’impasse de la sécurité régionale se sont concentrés sur des solutions organisationnelles plutôt que sur des solutions stratégiques. Le chapitre se concentre sur les divisions récentes au sein de la SADC et affirme qu’une condition préalable essentielle pour assurer des niveaux plus élevés de cohésion régionale sera l’identification des problèmes et

des processus communs qui sont nécessaires pour la SADC pour qu’elle puisse gérer plus efficacement sa sécurité régionale. A cette fin, on propose une série de mesures politiques et militaires pour renforcer la confiance.

Dans le chapitre final, Hammerstad note que, par écrit, depuis la signature d’un Protocole sur la Coopération dans les Affaires politiques, la Défense et la Sécurité en août 2003, la sécurité en Afrique australe semble être forte et impressionnante. Cependant en réalité, la coopération sécuritaire pratique entre les pays membre de la SADC est limitée et elle est souvent bilatérale. En outre, les politiques de sécurité sont souvent ouvertement unilatérales. Dans son analyse de deux formes d’intégration régionale de la sécurité dans la sous-région, Hammerstad affirme qu’il faut choisir l’option de la sécurité commune, plutôt que de se concentrer étroitement sur les problèmes de la défense militaire, pour que la SADC réalise l’ordre régional futur qui pourrait être caractérisé comme une communauté sécuritaire.