The arrival of Europa-TV in 1985 was greeted as a new concept of multilingual broadcasting because of its ambitious plans for a pan-European generalist public ...
Media WOl1llaboo Ausll'alia No 56 May 1990
Towards European Television: The Case of Europa-TV Stylianos Papathanassopoulos The advent of communications sateUites in Europe has given opportUnities 10 broadcasterS to transmit in a European audiovisual landscape rather than to the purely domestic one that they were used to. This intemationalisation of broadcasting bas also given opportUnities 1.0 private an~ public ~ice broadcasters (PSBs) to test thear aaracuveness to an international audience. The arrival of Europa-TV in 1985 was greeted as a new concept of multilingual broadcasting because of its ambitious plans for a pan-European generalist public service channel. It was the successor of the Eurikon Experiment, and was established under the auspices of the European Broadcasting Union ~BU). Europa-TV's broadcasting commenced In OcIOber 1985, transmitting for five hours daily, and in November 1986 me channel closed down. Europa-TV 's failure demonstrates the problems associated with pan-European channels and in particular the need to attract view~rs an~ advertising revenue. As regards the publIC SClVIce channels Ibis venture shows both dle ~ging character of the uadiuonal public service concept and changes in policy with respect to the television 1andscape in Europe. To some extent, this policy has been regarded as a response to the imperatives of the increasing intemationalisatioD of markets, and increasing inrernational competition from domestic and international rivals and newcomers in the broadcasting indusary. This article reviews the history of E~-TV (Europa), with a backwards glance to Its predecessor, &he Eurikon Experiment., and Dies to assess this venture. Tha authoris a RaeaJdl Fellow at Briaain'. BIOlldca.lios Research Unit lIlCI a Vililin. Uccum at Lmdon', Cil)' Univenity.
ProlD the 1982 EurikoD ExperilDeDt... The Burikon Experiment was a historic and perhaps brave experiment in its efforts to find ways ~ programming with a pan-European perspecbve. and to lay emphasis on coUaboration among publicbroadcasrers. In 1982, Ibe EBU ran five weeks of experimental transmission in order to look into the ~bl~s of conleOt, style, organisation, ro-ordina~on, fmancing and legalmatters which would anse (or a truly European television channel. It also marked Ihe beginning of a new level of co-operation among the EBU's members. Five European PSBs formed Ihe Operations Group and undertook the responsibility for planning and testing the feasibility of sueh a venture and co-ordinaling Ihe experiments. The five PSBs were: Radiotelevisione ltaliana (RAJ Italy) Oestereichischet Rundfunk (ORP;' Ausbia): Nederlandse Omroep Stichting (NOS, Netherlands), ARD (AJbeitsgemeinschaft der Offendichrechtlichen Rundfunlcveranstalrer der Bundesrepublik Deutschland) West Germany and Ihe IBA representing the UK. Other members assisted and conlributed programs and received the signal The European Parliament and Commission were represented as observers to this 'strange' collaboration of European broadcasters. During the leSt., they used the
European Space Agency's (ESA) Orbilal Test Sasellite (OTS) for transmissions. Over one thou~d television people were employed, proViding almost 800 hours of broadcasting during the five weeks. Five production centres were converted into Eurikon centresand a small anny of inlelpreter8 and translators was employed to solve lquistic problems. Despite initial diffICulties Ihe encrypted signal was ttansmiued in the ftlteen S7
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participating countries. Additionally, programming was watched by a selected, invited audience. The main objective of Ihe experiment was to adapt PSB's guidelines of education, enleJ1ainment and information to a European perspective. Each week. something new was contributed. Each participating membertried to explore new areas and to find a solution to problems faced by its predecessor. The experiment demonstrated how broadcasters from flfleen different countries were quick 10 respond and co-operate on a European basis with effectiveness and enthllSiasm. According to the EBU's report (1983) the most important outcome was that about 359& of programming was crealed specifically for Eurikon with European audiences in mind. In this respect the experiment was considered successful, since me opinion of the leSt audiencewas positive. They considered that programs had a very European flavour with emphasis on infonnation and culture,focusing on arts) The second area of concern was to fmd politically acceptable and economical solutions to the linguistic problems. Various methods such as dubbing and subtitling were used,2 but in the end it appeared that a large language staff would have to be added to conventional facilities. In financial terms, this is not feasible, though it was argued that every new language couldattractan additional new audience. The third and perhaps the most difficult task was to create a news and infonnation service with a European perspective which would DOt compete with but would supplement the mainstream national news programs. Some argued that like stories of Mark Twain's death, stories of lhe binh of a large-scale program exchange between television broadcasters were greatly exaggerated. The whole attempt did no& seriously take into consideration the changing environment of television in Europe. The closed circuit concept was unrealistic because it involved real programs isolated from the ultimate problems of a real operational service. Moreover, the attempt 10 combine disparate units could create enormous problems in the real world. The federal system adopted in an attempt to co-on1inate different television traditions would create enormous managerial problems. Idealism was the mainstay of the S8
whole effon. A further weak point was whether European public service television of this kind could provide what the viewers would want to watch. On the other hand, many ignored the word 'experiment' and reacted as though the project was an established service. Europa's late failure demonstrated Ihat:, to a certain extent. these criticisms were valid because Eurilcon's experience as reflected in their proposals for a future European channel proved of lil1le help to Europa. Kimmel (1983) argued that to continue along the 'Eurikon road' would lead to a Europe similar to the 'oviparous wooDen daily show', the perfect animal which combined the virtues of all existing animals, with one problem, that it did not exist and could not be made to exist. Perhaps lhe main problem lay in the politics of such a ventare and the reluctance of 'heavyweight' European broadcascers to work on Eurikon's proposals (as Europa was to show). One mustalso considerthat Eurilcon was an auempt to create a European perspective which was not only desirable but also, as it showed, possible. Of course, the question was whecher a European program of the public service type was the only way for European PSBs 10 express themselves on a pan-European level to a pan-European audience. The European Commission supported the Eurikon project for two reasons. First, it was sponsored by the EBU, carried out by its principal members, and tried 10 give the 'foggy landscape' of the changing television world a European dimension .(Froschmeier 1984). Second, it was multilingual, produced by a multilingual editorial staff and intended for a pan-European audience. Beyond these reasons one could argue that the European Community became closely involved in the whole venture as a result of its interest in the creation of a European channel. Eurikon as an outlet for European cultures was successful to a certain extent. but it had to be regarded as an experiment or pilot leading to some proposals which would require further elaboration. ••• to Europa Television Europa was set up under the auspices of the EBU and backed by five of the EBU's PSBs: NOS (the Netherlands), ARD (West Germany), RAJ (Italy), Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE,
Media lnIonnlllion AulUalia
Ireland) and Radiotelevisao Ponuguesa (RTP. Ponugal). Originally it was 10 be named Olympus but its name was changed when the well-known camera manufacturer of the same name objected. The name Olympus was suggested because the channel was to use a ttansponderon ESA's Olympussatellite. Europa was located at &he NOS studios in Hilversum because the Dutch Government offered a transponder on the Eulelsal IF-I commWlications satellite and a financial donation as well as the use of the NOS facilities. The Europa consortium was established under Swiss law, widl its legal headquarters in Geneva. From Oc:lOber 1985 to May 1986, its reach was confined to the Dutch cable nelWOl'ks but during the 14 months before it closed down in November 1986 it gradually built up to a seven-hour daily schedole and it was available to approximately 4.5 million cabled households around Europe., including 1.5 million TV households reached through conventional reception via the second Portuguese network. Before its operational phase, its major objective was to broadcast in English, German and Dulch simullaneousty. It was intended to broadcast in ten languages when fully operational, ie when ttansmiued via the Olympus DBS-satellite. Portuguese was added later as a result of Ponugal t s insistence Ihat it would only join the project if programs were available in Ponuguese. In order to broadcast a service in these languages, Europa had to employ a 'small army' of translators and eventually close to half of its budget was spent on translations. This was not easily available, however, since its character was to be multinational and mullilingual. The programming provided a schedule of general entenainment but had less appeal dian Sky and others. Its programming had 10 be European, complementary, independent, universal and original, reflecting European cultures and conaibuting to them. It used programs from its beckers, some original programs and whatever events it could pick up from Eurovision when prices dipped. The problem was that Eurovision sources were not anraenve for mass audiences without major re-editing. Europa's eventual failure panly resulted from die difficulty of improving its programming and making it more attractive to
No56 Mey 1990
European viewers. Europa's plans were to have in-house production in the future, a project which might have been over-ambitious. Finally, the setting up of a comprehensive news service was one of its priorities. Additional help to Europa was given by the Dutch government's insistence that Dutch cable operalmS 'must carry' Europa. This was a decision which met with the disagreement of both the Dutch advertisers and cable operators. Then six weeks before its closedown die European Commission granted the channel $1,224,000. But when its main creditor, NOS, demanded immediate payments on debts totalling $6.29 million, Europa could not pay. The other shareholders refused to put in any -more money. Moreover, they turned down offers from alternative sponsors and satellite stations which wanted to take over B\1l'Opa's potentially lucrative satellite facilities. So on 27 November 1986 at 11:15pm, Europa - with an audience from Norway to Ponugal - closed down for die last time. 'With it died the dream for a unitedsateUite channel' (Taylor 1986).
Europa TV iD European Media Polltlcs In its pre-operalional phase, Europa's management planned that its revenue would mainly come from advertising. There would be advertising blocks between programs of 3 to 5 minutes' duration, totaUing perhaps 20 minuleS in &he evening. In reality, however, it did not work that way. Most important. perhaps, in the downfall of Europa was its failure to attract advertisers. Initially, it offered commercial spots free of charge to encourage advertisers. In April 1986, it inuoduced its fllSt mte card, but attracted liule funy-paid advenising. Thus, die channel scaled down its advertising expectations for 1986 from $3.3 million to $2 million. The rate card did not change unlil September 1986. This decision was supported by die move by Europa's management to seek an outside company 10 seD its ainime. II UK company, Airtime appointed a Incanational, a subsidiary of Scottish Television (STY). Airtime Inrenwional regarded sponsorship rather than spot advertising as the major source of revenue. This was because Airtime fOWld that Europa's initial advenising revenue projections were at least optimistic, with no room to manoeuvre in such a competitive market.
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The management had already realised that the channel had to depend on other sources of income. The BC was one. Eventually, as noted above, the -European Community gave a grant 10 Europa.3 The other potential source was financial contributions from its backers. This option was a limitedone, owing 10 the financial conscraints which faced PSBs around Europe. It was also said that many European governments were not so keen co see their public broadcasters being involved in an inremationaJ channel which could report on their country's home affairs but withouttheir direct control. At this level, politics will probably always playa major part in any such European auempt or venture. It explains why Europa was a very incomplete grouping of PSBs. From the 'heavyweight' members of the EBU only ARD and RAJ joined the channel. BBC and lTV always denied Europa any programs at all because they argued it could jeopardise their plans for Superchanne1.4 Even though France stayed out as weD, British broadcuters were seen, in a way, as the 'black sheep' for two reasons: firstly, they were vital to the successof Eurikon but were reluctant to participate and secondJy, Europa was an English speaking channel without having any integrated relationship witha British broadcaster. The French were at this time more concerned with their own satelliteventure, TV5, in collaboration with other Frenchaspeaking PSBs. There were not even any plans for the reception of Europa's signal in France. The Germans participated in the channel regardless of their own plans for 3SAT, though it could be argued that they participated in order 10 gain experience for their own venlUl'e. In Italy, RAJ saw an opponunity to compete with Berlusconi via both its own RAJ Uno and Europa. Unfonunately for the Dutch, Europa's accumulated real losses were estimated at around $25 million and the largest single slice of that was owing to NOS. This situation, 10 an extent, reflected the politics of the ESA's Olympus project from which both the Germans and French dropped out, leaving the British and Italians to carry the main burden. The smaller European PSBs stayed out by adopting a 'wait and see' policy in order ID participate in the future if all went well with Europa.
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From its vet)' beginning the whole project can be seen as a political hot potato among the 'heavyweight' European PSBs. If one looks at the exchanges inside the BBU.one will see that it is dominated by the 'Big FoW", the UK. France, West Germany and Italy. According to Eugsrer (1985) they supplied 47% of programs and one-third of all news items. between 1982 and 1984. One could further argue lhat the EBU, as it was in the mid 1980s, was about 10 collapse since the heavyweights were reported to be increasingly reluctant to subsidise smaller members. Their intention was to restructure the EBU into a first and a second division, maintaining fundamental EBU policies by offering favourable programming deals to the second division. Ventures like Europa would make them wary as Europa could increase the EBU's power. Europa's history demonstrates how difficult it was to develop a coherent broadcasting policy in Europe which would encourage highbrow programming and promote or ensure a PSB tradition during the 'changingface' of European television. especially on an international level. It also remained questionable whether the PSBs had any long·term fucure on sateUite television. Given their strength in so many countries, it seemed likely that they would continue to influence satellite television in the foreseeable future. The. French channel TF1 and the BBC are considering broadcasting via TOFI and Olympus DDS satellites respectively. Europa attempted to be the pan-European public service satellite channel par excellence, but it failed 10 achieve its two main targets: audience and advertising. Even though its four million audience estimate proved accurate in the end, it appeared unattractive to advertisers. Other channels such as Sky, TV5, 3SAT. are based more on the continuous backing of their shareholders than on any instant advertising revenue. Furthermore. operational costs such as language conversion proved too high. All of these made its downfall inevitable. The demise of Europa left public broadcasters in general. and the smaller ones in particular, in an environment of commercial pressure without very effective responses. It could be argued that on Emopa the various national broadcasting systems represented their social and cultural traditions. Europa may have reflected what was happening
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in Western Europe: a movement towaJd! political unification within the European Community as well as a tendency towards close co-operaaion and complex interdependence among ElDOpeaIl citizens, institutions and, in the final analysis, scaleS.
The whole issue was further complicated. Apart from the 'big broadcasters', unhappy at seeing a powerful competitor for their own plans for similar projects, news items with an international basis were already being produced by existing international news agencies such as Visnews. UPITN and CBS-News. Both the big ne Cue ror a European News service members and the international agencies The issue of television news in the 1980s has constitute a powerful lobby Which would ramer divided Europe's PSBs in fonnulating their not see the EBU involved in their business. strategies towards cable and satenite television. Moreover, they are major contributors to the Their aim has been to compete with or at least EBU's Eurovision network, providing over half to react to the threat from private channels such of the total number of items transmitted. as Ted Turner's Cable News Network (CNN).5 Eurovision has also been changed from a news As in the case of general entertainment exchange into a technical infrastructure by programming, various strategies have been which the major news agencies distribute their developed by PSBs. Apart from the Eurikon products to European broadcasters. The policy and Europa projects, TVS and Superchannel behind these reactions from established already have a news service, but it is of course providers of international news against a TV a very timid operation. BBC's External Services news service organised by EBU through EW'Opa have considered the possibility of having an TV seems 10 have been an effort to ensure that International News Service. Visnews has made worldwide newscoverage wouldnot come from a newsservice for Superchanne1. any other source than lhe international news After the Erion Experiment and during agencies. Moreover, Europa's downfall the pre-operational phaseof Europa the worries demonsuated that the EBU's powers 10 embark of European PSBs were over how to compete on such ventures are limited. The proposed with the new entrants such as CNN, and Eurosport channel is a shadow of the proposed whether the EBU should produce or sponsor news service. Even this project raises the same news and documenwy programs in order to objections from the same players due 10 its compete with such vencures. This became clear association with Murdoch's Sky Television. On when the EBU members began considering the other hand, the European Community's themselves unable 10 compete individually 'step-by-step' policy towards broadcasting against these lhematic sateUite channels, shows that the Community has become a major especially in the future. The EBU, as their European player in broadcasting. Nevertheless, represenWive body, could take a strong, if lhe EC wishes to promote European pro-acdve line rather than remaining merely a unification, it has 10 finance such ventures and support them against other powerful players. It forum for the exchange of news items. Thus, the EBU could tate responsibility for is also true, as Dyson (1986) argues, that this producing its own news programs in a kind of initiative may complicate matters for multilingual fonn with Europa, and could also states in their attempt to fonnulate coherent and be the vehicle for creating a European appropriate policies with respect to the perspective in news output. The main inlrOduction of new media into their respective arguments against this were that. firstly, such countries. Europa had draft agreements with Visnews programs would take an editorial and political approach which would lead to a series of and World News Network and also had plans 10 dispures: secondly, such a perspective would draw on the newsrooms of national members follow a pre.European Community'S political companies. However, these came to nothing for mou&hpiece. It was argued that the best defence various political, economic and practical against the private chamels was for individual reasons. Examples are high costs, the decision PBSs to improve the quality of their programs, whether to show lIle newscaster on screen, &he through an increase in their national operating language, ttanslation accuracy ee. government funding. 6 News editors were faced with the problem of providing a newsservice on a daily basis which had to be relevant for viewers allover Europe 61
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and to national ones. It became clear to the Operations Group that some kind of infrasttucture was required for the adequate coUection of information on an international level. Any European news service provided by a channel such as Europa will race political. economic, even practical/technical problems; and, most importantly, strong competilion from lhe channels already operating such as CNN, WlN.
ConciusiODS Karl-Gunter Von Hasse, ex-chainnan of the European Institute for the Media, in 1986 pointed out that a multilingual television channel by defll1ition is more manageable by the private sector than by organisations tied directly or indirectly to national governments. This has been proven by the Europa venture and perhaps is relevant for any future pan-European channels aiming to transcend nalional and linguistic barriers in an attempt to create a common market of the airwaves. However, Ibisdoes notseem to be the case with PSBs such as 1VS (a consortium of the French TVI, A2 and FR.3, Belgian RTBF, Canadian Television de Quebec and Swiss SSR) and 3SAT (a consortium of West German ZDF, Swiss SRG and Ausuian ORF) which serve particular language groups and have particular aims, ie the protection of their respective cultures in the satellite era. TVS and 3SAT are supported by public broadcasters and are still successful. What they have, which Europa did not have. is constant financial backing from their owners. The commiunent in the initial operational years, of the backers to finance the venture. is the most important issue for these channels. Europa, which ~ a European 'ideal station' attempting to avoid the type of cultural imperialism resulting from the use of a single language, and attempting to promote European unity, did not have committed financial backers for such a venture. Only the European Community could suppon and finance any future. truly pan-European PSB venture with such principles and resist a return to the ratings war. Finally. it seems that the future of such ventures may be dependent upon a collaboration between public and private broadcasters seeking a share in a market under creation. The
coUaboration between EBU and Murdoch's Sky Television on the Eurosport channel may show the way.
Notes 1
2
3
4 5 6
They also follJld aile programs qui~ different from those of their domestic channels but they critidscd ElJrikon's mullilingual accasibility, especially tho quality of llimultllneous inrapretation and the fast rate of subtiding. Mt»t imporrandy, they noted a lack of 'tigbt' enlcrlBinmcnt overall in favour of infornwivo programs. For the PlUpOscs of lbo experimental lnU1sminions six audio channels were transmined simultaneously and the OpcmtionaGroup agreed 10 a 'core' of five languages (English, French. 1la1ian, German Uld Dutdl). The sixth channel was used 10 ex~ment with other languages on an ad hoc basis. The six audio channels and aile use of sUbading superimposed and via lelete.xt were the lOOts 41 the disposal of the broadcaslUS. The European Commission granled one million ECU for 1986. At one lime there were abortive talks about Supen:hannel aod Europajoining forces. For detail. sec a report by N_ Media Marieta, 19 Mardi 1985. Sec also a repon of N_ Media Marlcell, 29 OclOber 1985.
Rererences Clute, N, 'Emikon Promises a New Program', InlenMma, May 1983,20-30. CIaJke, N, 'The Binh of the Infant Eurikon', bltenMditJ, Mardi 1984, 5M2. Dyson, K. 'The Politics of Cable and Saldlite 8roadcasling: Some Wescern European Companios', in
BT0Qdc4llillg iJ1td P~ilic.r ill Westena Ellrqpe. cd R Kuhn, London,Fnmk Cus, 1986. 152-71. EBU Report, PQ1I·Euro~on Sert1ice Ilia ECS: A FetJSibiliJy SlwIy, October 1983; revised December 1983. European Community, Inlaim Rcpon on The Rea/itieJ tJNl Te~lIcieJ ill EllroptQII Telelli.rioll: PerspecblleJ tJNl OptioM', COM(S3) 229 Final, Bnwcls, 2S May 1983. European Ccmnunil)' Spokesman Service-Information, Tile Comnuwty' J itlidiollilllD1 Policy, Brussels, MlI'Ch 1986. Eugsler. E, Televi.rioll PrOSTQlllllling acros« Nl3titHtal BolDIdari,,: Tlte EBU muI OIRT E%puU7IJ:IS. Denham, Ablex, 1985. Europa TeleviriOill, it PtJ1I·EllropeQII ProgrQnt on SQlUlite' Hilversum, 4 April 1986.
Froscbmcier,
P,
'Creedng a
European Reality'
IlIle"",ma. 3 March 1984, S3-54. G K von, 'Television Witboul Fronliers', Ail'WtJW.f, Match 1986 (separate sectioo). Hindius, F, 'RedlKio& Mech Turmoil in Europe', TTtlIUlUllioMl DQlaReporl4 (3), 1984, IS8-63. Golding, P and Elliot, P, Makillg tlte News, London, Longman, 1979.
"use.
Media Wonnation Australia No 56 May 1990 Kimmel, H, 'Europe ill an OviplllOlII Daily Show', November 1983,22-23.
IfIU~dia,
Murdoch.
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'Nalion-SIaICI
and
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CoIl1plUlic.: The Contradiclions of And-Dirigiam', Paper prescnled in La .'~gle_"lIJIimt du uUCOIMUIIIicotiolu d de rlJeqv;sUIlI', lotemadonlll CoUoquc. Pari', 27-29May 1986. O'Conncx, V, 'Climbing the Buromoulllaio', CIJble IlIUI SQluliU EwO!U, July 1985, 5~55. RAI, EURlKON: UN uperinuftlo di televisione £WDped, Rome, 1983. Richeri, 0, 'Television from Service to Busincaa: European Tendencies and Ihe Italian Case', in Telev;s;on ;" TrtJI/S;liora, cds P DrummondandP PatasoJI, Londoo, BPI,1985,21-35,
Snow, N, 'Europa: End of a Dream', Cele aNJ StJklUte Europe, January 1987,22.--24. Scherer, J, 'Illirorical Analysis of ~8ulalion: the European cue', paper presented in La tMre,l,nwllltJll,m .,I,ltcDnlnllUlictJlio", ,t ik r aw;ljovi.rUll~ Inltroadonal CoUoque. Pari., 27·29 May J986. Sy~.. T, 'Commuc:ial Bre.ab 11', in CabletIIId Saullit, EwtJP', February 1987,34--37. Taylor, J, 'The Dream They Swilched Off', Tiu GlUlrdiolt. 8 December 1986. TUDstall, J, 'Media Pnarnentalion and Convergence', Paper presenled at Annual Mass Communicalioo. Seminar,SOMMATJE 1987, De Koningahof, VeJdhoven. 26 March 1987.
Media Information Australia Index Acumulative index of all articles and major reviews to appear in MIA between July 1976 (Issue 1) and November 1988 (Issue 50) available for just $10. Inetudes an insert which updates the index to November 1989 (Issue 54), To obtain a copy, send a cheque or money order for $10 (plus $2 postage & handling) to Distribution Un~ Australian Film, Television & Radio School PO Box 126, North Ryde 2113 Please make cheques paydlle to Auslrallan Film, Television & Radio School
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