Traits and Social Stereotypes: Efficiency Differences in ... - APA PsycNET

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1990, Vol. 59, No. 2,192-201

Copyright 1990 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0022-35I4/90/J00.75

Traits and Social Stereotypes: Efficiency Differences in Social Information Processing Susan M. Andersen New York University

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

Roberta L. Klatzky and John Murray University of California, Santa Barbara

Research on the associative structure of social stereotypes and trait-defined categories has shown that stereotypes are associatively richer, more visual, and more distinctive (Andersen & Klatzky, 1987). We hypothesized that stereotypes might also operate more efficiently than trait-defined categories in social information processing. Participants were presented with sentences pairing either a stereotype or a trait label with an overt act or an internal state. Participants judged whether or not the designated target person would be likely to do or to experience what was described in the sentence. As predicted, participants judged the stereotype sentences significantly more quickly than the trait sentences. An incidental recall test of memory for the taiget terms, cued by the acts and states, showed that participants were also better able to remember the stereotypes than the traits.

Individuals are thought to categorize others in the social envi-

summarize a wide array of features of categorized persons. The

ronment by assigning them to classes representing types of people, enabling the social world to be understood in relatively

category serves to bind together its potentially disparate attributes and to facilitate the emergence of interattribute links.

simple ways (e.g, Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Higgins & King, 1981; Rosenberg & Sedlak, 1972; Schneider, 1973; Taylor, 1981). Fur-

Thus, we assumed that stereotypes are highly organized social categories that have properties of cognitive schemata. The sim-

thermore, the social categories people use undoubtedly differ in their perceived predictiveness and informativeness, that is,

ple notion that social categories exist that convey greater meaning than simple featural attributes and that are stored separately from them is subscribed to by a number of models of impression formation (Allen & Ebbesen, 1981; Burnstein & Schul.

in the quantity and quality of inferences they allow about potential category members. In this and in previous research (Andersen & Klatzky, 1987; Klatzky & Andersen, 1988), we con-

1983; Ebbesen, 1981; Fiske & Pavelchak, 1986; Pratto & Bargh, 1989; Schul, 1983; Schul & Burnstein, 1985; Wyer & Srull, 1986). It has also been argued that such type-of-person con-

trast two types of categories, stereotypes and traits. It has been suggested that social stereotypes are widely shared assumptions about certain types of people that are repre-

cepts are typically labeled by nouns (Wyer & Srull, 1986). If this is assumed to be true, our designation of stereotypes as noun-la-

sented cognitively as extensive, well-organized categories or schemata (Hamilton, 1981; Taylor, 1981; Taylor & Crocker, 1981). Indeed, it has been shown that social stereotypes are

beled categories follows directly from the assumption that they are, in fact, social categories, although we also argue that stereo-

rather well-articulated conceptions, consisting of many diverse attributes (Andersen & Klatzky, 1987; Brewer, Dull, & Lui,

types are particularly well-organized representations. In keeping with this latter point, it is clear that even nomi-

1981; Cantor & Mischel, 1979). These data suggest that stereo-

nally labeled social categories vary in their power to convey

types are likely to permit extensive inferences about categorized persons (e.g, Ashmore & DelBoca, 1979, 1981; Fiske &

personal attributes; for example, the occupational label librarian presumably carries more descriptive weight than clerk. Because of this, the term stereotype is usually reserved for labels carrying particular consensual weight and meaning, such as

Pavelchak, 1986; Hamilton, 1981; Snyder, 1981; Taylor, 1981; Taylor & Crocker, 1981; Wyer & Martin, 1986). On the basis of this literature, we denned a stereotype as a

redneck, workaholic, politician, or playboy, which are highly spe-

social category labeled by a nominal term (i.e, a noun or noun phrase, e.g, redneck; republican businessman) that functions to

cific (Hamilton, 1981; Taylor, 1981). In an alternative form of social categorization, people may identify others in terms of a single-trait term, such as conservative, conscientious, extroverted, or masculine. Our previous work (Andersen & Klatzky, 1987) indicated that trait-defined catego-

We would like to thank Moy H. Wong and Robert Picardi for designing the computer program for this research. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Susan M. Andersen, Department of Psychology, New York University, 6 Washington Place, 4th Floor, New York, New York 10003, or Roberta L. Klatzky, Department of Psychology, University of California, Santa Barbara, California 93106.

ries are relatively narrow in meaning, typically conveying the specific attribute denoted and closely related states or behaviors. This narrowness is to be expected, if one considers the nature of single traits. It has been argued that a trait is essentially an elemental feature of various persons or person con192


TRAITS AND SOCIAL STEREOTYPES

cepts, and as such, conveys information about a particular dimension of the relevant people or person concepts (Wyer & Srull, 1986). As singular attributes, traits are represented by adjectival labels (Wyer & Srull, 1986; see also Pratto & Bargh. 1989; Wyer & Martin, 1986) and tend to be narrow in meaning, as single attributes are, by not involving many disparate elements (e.g, Buss & Craik, 1980). We denned a trait as an adjectival term that seems to convey information about some single, enduring feature of an individual's personality (Andersen & Klatzky, 1987), Le, about a consistent and stable mode of experiencing or responding (see Allport & Odbert, 1936). Of course, trait adjectives can be incorporated into nominal structures and thus can denote a social category (e.g, conservative type), rather than being used as a single personal attribute. In such cases, traits may come to serve the more schematic, integrative function of nominal social categories.1 In fact, when people are categorized in terms of a single, stable-trait term, they are expected to share various prototypic features in common (Cantor & Mischel, 1979; Schneider & Blankmeyer, 1983), and they may be misremembered as having these characteristics, even if they do not (Cantor & Mischel, 1977). Nonetheless, the attributive view of traits implies that they are more likely to function as featural elements and less likely to function as complex social categories than are stereotypes, largely because they are better descriptions of typical ways of experiencing and responding (i.e., of individual attributes) than of types of persons. Hence, even when they are used in social categorization, traits should not allow multiattribute inferences to be made, whereas stereotypes should allow relatively broad inferences, as research suggests (Andersen & Klatzky, 1987). This does not imply, however, that all traits are alike in their associative structure. For example, traits clearly vary in specificity and complexity (e.g., Hampson, 1983; Hampson, John, & Goldberg, 1986). Furthermore, adjectival concepts applied to people also vary because some represent presumably stable traits (e.g, brilliant), whereas others represent more transient states (e.g, bored; see Chaplin, John, & Goldberg, 1988). We argue that the greater predictive power of stereotypes relative to traits in social categorization should tend to hold despite such variations. Recent research has investigated the specific structure and content of stereotypes and traits as they are represented in memory. A number of interrelated differences between these representations have been suggested, as described next. The present research concerns potential consequences of these differences for the speed and effectiveness with which information about category members is processed.

193

by a stereotype than by a trait (Andersen & Klatzky, 1987, Study 2; Cantor & Mischel, 1979). This suggests that stereotypes readily enable multiple inferences to be made about categorized individuals.

Attribute Quality Social stereotypes are not only well-articulated representations but also highly imaginable, in that they are associated with physical features, typical overt behaviors, and demographic identifications to a greater extent than traits (Andersen & Klatzky, 1987, Study 2; Brewer et al, 1981; Cantor & Mischel, 1979), as well as with more relatively invisible characteristics, such as typical beliefs and internal experiences (Andersen & Klatzky, 1987, Study 2).

Distinctiveness of Associates Concepts designated by a stereotype appear to be more distinctive in memory than those designated by a trait (Andersen & Klatzky, 1987, Study 3). That is, the core attributes of a trait category (its strongest associates) tend to be shared with related stereotypes, whereas the core attributes of a stereotype tend to be more idiosyncratic and unshared with related traits. This asymmetry suggests that stereotypes may be more distinctive, and hence, more salient in memory than are traits. Level of

Specificity

The associative asymmetry of traits and stereotypes also suggests that these representations exist at different levels of categorical specificity in the cognitive system (cf. Hampson et al, 1986; Holyoak & Gordon, 1983; Houston, Sherman, & Baker, 1989; Srull & Gaelick, 1983; Tversky, 1977), with stereotypes being considerably more complex and specific than traits. Stereotypes are associated with a wider array of relatively disparate features linked together within the category than are traits (Klatzky & Andersen, 1988). This might mean that stereotypes are subordinate in a hierarchy including both stereotypes and traits (by being specific and concrete) and that traits are more superordinate (by being abstract and vague; see Cantor & Mischel, 1979; Rosch, 1978; Taylor, 1981). In this sense, stereotypes would constitute a more basic level of social categorization (Brewer et al, 1981; Cantor & Mischel, 1979), and they would convey more information than traits. It should be noted, however, that if traits are conceptualized not as abstract categories in a hierarchy, but rather as featural attributes having few fea-

Differences Between Stereotypes and Traits Richness A number of studies have suggested that people find single, social-stereotype labels to be more informative than single-trait labels, in that the former are associated with a larger set of attributes in memory. That is, in a standard feature-listing task, people list more nonredundant features for others designated

1 As this suggests, it may be that traits can be characterized either as categories or as attributes as a function of context and information processing goals (cf. Srull & Wyer, 1989; Wyer & Srull, 1986). It has been argued elsewhere, in fact, that a descriptor may alternate between functioning as a simple descriptor and functioning schematically (Fiske, Neuberg, Beattie, & Milberg, 1987), although further research is needed to explore this proposition.

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S. ANDERSEN, R. KLATZKY, AND J. MURRAY

Hires of their own, stereotypes would still be expected to be far more complex than traits, but would not necessarily be basic.2

by presenting participants with a series of sentences, each pairing a stereotype or trait label with an action or internal state. The task was to decide whether or not the type of person described in the sentence was likely to engage in the given action

Secondary Versus Primary Association to Attributes

or experience the given state. The predicates in these sentences

Because the central features associated with trait categories tend to be central features of related stereotypes, it is likely that

described a common, mundane event that could apply to virtually anyone. Half described an overt action and half an inner

indirect access to other stereotype attributes may occur on the

experience. We chose common predicates to be able to randomly pair them with either type of subject term (stereotype or

basis of trait activation (Andersen & Klatzky, 1987). That is, when trait categories are predictive of many further associates, it may be because these associates derive from related stereotypes, which permit the further attributes to be accessed.

trait). This procedure effectively controlled for predicate content, length, and frequency in natural language. It also controlled predicate prototypicality relative to specific stereotypes


and traits, at least in the sense that the predicates were widely

Implications for Processing Virtually all of these representational differences support the hypothesis that stereotypes should function more efficiently in social categorization, where efficiency refers to the speed with

applicable.3 Failing to control for these known influences on response latency makes it impossible to draw conclusions about information processing efficiency (Bargh, 1989). In addition, attempting to generate explicit acts and states that are proto-

which internal representations are accessed and used for infor-

typic of stereotypes and traits (and equally of both), while also controlling for content, length, and frequency, is an onerous if

mation retrieval and inference. First, if traits are linked with

not an impossible task (Klatzky & Andersen, 1988).

fewer attributes than stereotypes, they should constrain category membership less effectively, thus slowing both positive and

As indicated, participants were asked to make judgments about potential behaviors or internal states that hypothetical persons identified by either a stereotype or a trait descriptor

negative judgments about potential members (see Rosch, 1978; Smith & Medin, 1981). That is, in terms of the social judgment

might experience. In this context, efficiency does not simply

processes that transpire once a category is activated, the sparser

refer to the speed with which category information is activated,

associative structure of traits should be harder to use in social

but rather to the speed with which activated categorical infor-

judgments that require finding links between categorized individuals and possible overt actions or internal states. Second,

mation is used to interpret events involving an individual. In essence, then, it is efficiency in social inference subsequent to categorization that is of interest in this work.

because stereotype concepts are more visual and more distinctive than traits, they may be more cognitively accessible (cf. Higgins & King, 1981). Finally, if traits obtain much of their predictive power through mediating links to stereotypes, the indirect nature of these associates and the need to traverse extra links in the search for relevant attributes with which to make a social judgment may further slow the operation of traits in social prediction (e.g, Carlston & Skowronski, 1986). All of these

Our predictions are based, in part, on a conception of category-event judgment that derives from comparable models in the general area of text understanding. Current theories of text comprehension stress the importance of integrative processes that enable the perceiver to draw connections between various textual elements. Integration may involve instantiating a relevant schema (e.g, Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978; Sharkey &Sharkey,

potential mechanisms suggest the same hypothesis—that stereotypes will be used more efficiently in social judgment. The greater associative richness and distinctiveness of stereotype categories should also facilitate the effective encoding of information about instances into memory. A large literature on verbal learning demonstrates greater recall of highly meaningful items, that is, those with a large number of associates (see Klatzky, 1980, for a review). When combining two unrelated items, such as construction worker—bought a hat, recall is directly related to the extent to which the items can be tied together by precise, integrative elaborations that meaningfully relate the items (Bransfbrd et al, 1982; Stein & Bransfbrd, 1979; Stein et al, 1982). The associative richness of a category should thus function to promote integrative elaborations, facilitating memory. The greater visual izability of stereotypes should also contribute to their memorability (Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Paivio, 1971). Finally, advantages for stereotype categories in efficiency and memorability might particularly pertain to the processing of visible, behavioral characteristics, because stereotypes differ from traits in conveying concrete, highly imageable attributes (Andersen & Klatzky, 1987). Each of these hypotheses was tested in the present research,

2

It is also worth mentioning that the natureofthe relative distinctiveness demonstrated here is not precisely that predicted by hierarchical models of categorization (Rosch, 1978). From a methodological point of view, studies of hierarchical models have focused on examining within-level category connections among superannuate versus subordinate categories, respectively. Our focus has been the overlap between representations at different levels. Furthermore, from a theoretical point of view, we focus on categories denned by a single attribute (a trait term) in contrast to a multiattribute category (a stereotype label) describing a type of person. For this reason, we focus on attribute concepts versus social categories and on attribute-to-set (Le, attributeto-object) relationships, whereas hierarchical models have tended to focus on differences among multiattribute type-like concepts, and hence, on subset-superset relationships. These various caveats aside, our past data and present predictions can basically be handled by a standard hierarchical model in which stereotypes operate as basiclevel categories relative to trait descriptors, and we do not try to rule out this explanation in the present work. 3 Of course, our random assignment of predicates to subjects would not eliminate an overall difference in the relationship of the predicates (as a group) to stereotypes versus trait terms. However, there is no theoretical reason to assume that such an overall difference would exist, given the banal and heterogeneous nature of our predicates.

195

TRAITS AND SOCIAL STEREOTYPES Table 1 Stereotype and Thiit-Subject Terms Used in Experimental Test Sentences


Stereotype Trait

Setl

Set2

extraverted introverted daring conscientious selfish undisciplined conservative calm masculine feminine temperamental tolerant immature persistent critical reserved

politician wallflower showoff do-gooder penny pincher juvenile delinquent business executive country bumpkin jock housewife maestro pastor daddy's girl nag sergeant prude

class clown brain hero workaholic snob glutton construction worker saint playboy temptress teenager slob spoiled brat underdog expert billionaire

Note. Each test sentence was presented in the format, "The subject type predicate?

1987), establishing a causal relation between the events (Trabasso & Sperry, 1985; Trabasso & van den Broek, 1985), making inferential elaborations from the information given (e.g, Corbett & Dosher, 1978; Thorndyke, 1976), or making necessary bridging inferences (Haviland & Clark, 1974; Kintsch, 1974, Chapter 8; extensive reviews can be found in Just & Carpenter, 1987, and in Garnham, 1985). All of these integrative mechanisms require that events within a text be interrelated by retrieving prior knowledge. Participants in our research were asked to make inferences that presumably involved retrieval of information about the labeled category and a search for knowledge that would permit integration. In essence, our task required participants to seek a plausible linkage between the category and the stated act or experience, one on the basis of which a relationship could be inferred. When a stereotype rather than a trait is activated, inferences about whether or not a connection exists between the designated category and the internal state or behavior ought to proceed more quickly. In addition, those inferences should better support later retrieval of the interconnected information.

Method Overview Participants, seated at a microcomputer terminal, were presented with test sentences to judge as to whether or not the subject of the sentence would do or would experience what was described by the predicate. Each sentence was composed of a noun (or noun phrase) or adjective, followed by the word type, as the subject and, as the predicate, a common, generally applicable overt action or inner experience. The sentences of primary interest (target sentences) were those in which the nouns were selected as stereotypes and the adjectives as trait terms. Filler sentences of the same format were also constructed. Each

consisted of a noun or an adjective as the subject (plus type) and a predicate that was either prototypical or counterindicative. The order of all sentences was randomized for each participant. Participants responded to each sentence by pressing yes or no on is response box to indicate whether a person of the type indicated in the sentence would be likely to engage in the stated behavior or to have the stated experience. Their response latency in making this judgment was recorded. Recall of the target-sentence subjects, cued by the predicates, followed the sentence-judgment task.

Participants Forty undergraduates (24 women and 16 men) enrolled in introductory psychology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, participated in this study in partial fulfillment of a course requirement.

Materials The target sentences paired a social category, i.e, a stereotype or trait term followed by the word type (e.g, politician type vs. extraverted type), with a common, mundane event, either an overt behavior or inner state. In all, 32 target sentences were constructed for each participant. The subject of each sentence belonged to one of 16 content domains; a domain was denned by a particular trait term and included that trait and two related stereotypes. All 16 content domains were sampled twice for each participant, once using a trait term and once using one of the two stereotypes related to the trait term. In terms of syntax, the trait terms were always adjectives and the stereotype terms were always nouns or noun phrases. It should be noted that the occasional use of two words to refer to stereotype terms should have worked against our predicted response time difference. Ultimately, all subject terms were nominalized by adding the word type. To construct each sentence, predicates were randomly assigned to each type of subject term (stereotype or trait) for each subject with the constraint that each type of predicate (act or state) was paired equally often with each type of subject term. By this means, any effects due to predicate content, length, frequency in natural language, and association with the subject term were controlled. The stereotype and trait terms used in the target sentences are shown in Table 1. Table 2 presents the mundane predicates used in the target sentences.

Table 2 Common, Mundane Act, and State Predicates Used in the Test Sentences Act

State

closed the door opened a drawer put on a coat turned on a light sat on a sofa turned around picked up an object got dressed got up from the chair spoke to someone rode in a car ate some lunch dropped some paper walked down the street went to bed walked up the stairs

heard the wind felt a draft saw someone walking tasted the food heard a voice smelled an odor heard the phone ring saw a car became tired looked at a tree listened to a radio viewed a TV program read a sign felt hungry touched a table top heard a loud noise

Note. Each test sentence was presented in the format, "The subject type predicate"


196


Forty filler items were also constructed that served to provide anchor points for subjects' judgments by including either consistent (i.e., highly prototypical) predicates or inconsistent (i.e., highly counterindicative) predicates. Our intention was that subjects would respond with a yes to the consistent sentences and with a no to the inconsistent sentences. With this in mind, we constructed 10 examples of each of four types of filler sentences, by including either a noun or an adjective as the subject of the sentence and either a consistent or inconsistent predicate (e.g., "The beekeeper type moved carefully," "The stockbroker type lived simply," "The tired type yawned," and "The brilliant type did not understand," respectively). It should be noted that, although these filler-sentence subject terms were nouns and adjectives, they were not specifically selected as stereotypes and traits per se. That is, some nouns were obvious stereotypes (e.g., stockbroker) and others were not (e.g, beekeeper); some adjectives were obviously stable traits (e.g., brilliant) and others were transient states (e.g., tired). Furthermore, because the subject-predicate pairing for these sentences was fixed and did not vary over subjects, these sentences did not control for predicate relevance, length, or frequency in natural language, as was the case for target items. Ultimately, 32 filler sentences were randomly interspersed among the target sentences for each subject. One filler of each type was also placed at the beginning and at the end of the session for each subject (to minimize serial position effects).

not done for filler items due to the differing predicates, which may have varied arbitrarily in memorability.

Results Manipulation Check on Predicate Neutrality As a check on the extent to which the predicates of the filler items served as anchor points in participants' yes/no likelihood judgments, we compared the average proportion of each type of sentence to which subjects said no using a one-way repeatedmeasures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with three cells (neutralpredicate targets, consistent fillers, and inconsistent fillers). This analysis was highly significant, F(2, 78) = 329.04, p < .0001, indicating, as expected, that subjects said no more to inconsistent filler items (M = 88.6%) than to neutral target items (M= 36.3%) or consistent fillers (M= 6.1%). A comparable analysis was conducted to examine differences in response latency in judging each type of sentence. Individual response latencies greater than 5 s were excluded (2.46% of the total number of response times) to control for random subject error and lapses of concentration. The analysis was highly significant, F(2, 78) = 48.16, p < .0001, showing as expected, that the neutral target items were more difficult and hence judged more slowly (M = 2.063 s) than were either the

Design

consistent filler sentences (M= 1.553 s) or the inconsistent filler sentences (M= 1.848s).

]n total, participants were exposed to 72 test sentences, each including either a noun-stereotype label or an adjective-trait label, plus type, as the subject term. Target sentences included a stereotype or a trait and a common, banal overt-action or internal-state predicate. Hence, category type and predicate type were manipulated independently in a 2 X 2 (Stereotype/Trait X Action/State) design.

Together, these data clearly show that the filler sentences did function as anchor points in this study, both in terms of the number of no responses given and in terms of the ease with

Procedure

which the judgment was made.

Comparing Stereotypes and Traits Response latency analyses. To determine whether participants processed the target sentences with stereotype subjects more rapidly than the trait sentences, we examined response

Participants took part in the experiment in groups of two to five, with each person seated at a separate IBM-compatible microcomputer connected to a two-button response box (with the buttons labeled yes or no). They were instructed to place the index finger of the left hand on the left button and the index finger of the right hand on the right button. The instructions then informed them that they would be asked to read a series of sentences and, for each sentence, to indicate whether or not it was likely that this type of person would do or would experience what was described in the sentence. Although they were also informed that their responses to the sentences would be timed and that they should respond as quickly as possible, we encouraged them to take enough time to be accurate, by indicating that we were more interested in their responding accurately to each sentence than in their speeding through the task. To control potential reading-time differences between stereotypes and traits, the subject term of each sentence was always presented alone on the microcomputer screen for 1 s before the predicate appeared on the screen. The predicate was presented just below the subject term on the same screen. For each trial, participants read the sentences and pressed the yes or no button on the response box on the table in front of them. Participants' response time was calculated from the onset of the predicate to their yes or no response. Following this portion of the experiment, participants were given a memory test, in which the predicates of the previous target sentences were used as cues for the recall of associated subject terms. This was

latency in judging the 32 target (nonfiller) sentences in a 2 (Category Type: stereotype/trait) X 2 (Predicate Type: behavior/inner state) repeated-measures ANOVA. Again, individual response latencies greater than 5 s were excluded (which involved 3.75% of the items). As shown in Table 3, the results provided strong support for our hypothesis, indicating that participants judged the stereo-

Table 3 Response Latencies to Stereotype and Trait Subject Terms Paired With Common Act and State Predicates Predicate type Stereotype category

Trait category

Sentence type

Act

State

Total

Act

State

Total

All test sentences Yes-rated test sentences

2.036

1.992

2.014

2.144

2.081 2.113

2.034

1.935

1.985

2.120

2:077

2.099

Note. Response latencies are reported in seconds and computed in milliseconds.

TRAITS AND SOCIAL STEREOTYPES

trait sentences (M = 2.115 s), f(l, 39) = 9.57, p< .004. No main

yes/no responses. These data are consistent with the notion that stereotypes place greater constraints on category membership

effect emerged for predicate type, F(l, 39) = 1.97, p = . 17. Nor

than do traits, in that more potential behaviors are rejected.

did an interaction emerge, F < 1. Importantly, the main effect for category type remained highly reliable even when analyzed in an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) controlling for the num-

However, it should be noted that this result was found only for

type sentences significantly more quickly (M = 2.014 s) than the

ber of yes-rated sentences in each condition, F(l, 38) = 8.82, p < .005. The 100-ms magnitude of this effect is comparable to effects attributed to interclause integration by Just and Car-


197

overt actions, not for internal states.4 Overall, the results clearly support the hypothesis that sentences about stereotypes are processed more efficiently than are sentences about traits. That is, participants were able to

penter (1980) and is greater, for example, than the time for

more quickly make the judgment that a particular mundane behavior or state would or would not occur for a person when

simple case (role) assignment. To examine the data more precisely, the ANOVA was con-

trait, even though the particular acts and states used were

ducted using only those sentences to which subjects responded with a yes judgment. Response latencies to say no have been found to differ reliably from those to say yes, indicating possi-

common. It is pertinent to consider the average frequency in natural language of the subject terms in the target sentences. We con-

ble error variance in analyses that collapse across yes/no responses. The findings from this analysis were identical to those

sulted the Kucera and Francis (1967) norms, on the basis of a

just reported. As shown in Table 3, the yes-rated sentences containing a stereotype term were processed about 100 ms more

50,406 district words represented. Because two-word combinations are not counted, we estimated the frequency of the twoword stereotypes as equal to the lesser of the two component

quickly (M = 1.985 s) than were the yes-rated sentences containing a trait term (M= 2.099 s), F(l, 37) = 5.43, p < .03. As before,

the person was characterized by a stereotype rather than by a

corpus of 1,014,232 total words (i.e., graphic strings) with

frequencies; this represents an upper bound on the compound

no main effect emerged for predicate type, F(l, 37) = 2.12, p =

frequency and, therefore, is conservative in testing whether the

.15; nor did a reliable interaction emerge, F < 1. Yes/no response analyses. Participants' yes/no judgments

stereotype terms gain their processing-speed advantage

were examined by comparing the number of target sentences to which they said no across conditions. As shown in Table 4, the results showed that overall, trait sentences were no more frequently endorsed as likely to occur than were stereotype sentences, F(l, 39) = 1.99, p =. 17, supporting our assumption that the predicates would be deemed applicable to any subject term. Similarly, no endorsement differences emerged on the basis of predicate type, F < 1. However, a significant interaction did

through higher frequency. In fact, the average frequency of the present selection of traits (15.12) was greater than that of the stereotypes (10.81), so that word frequency actually favored the greater accessibility of the trait terms. In any event, differences in category-label frequency per se would be expected to affect lexical access only for the subject terms (Just & Carpenter, 1980), and any such effects were minimized in this study by presenting each term for a period of 1 s prior to the presentation of the predicate (and

emerge, F(l, 39) = 5.01, p < .03, suggesting that participants were more likely to say no to acts involving stereotypes than to

therefore prior to the timing of the inferential processing of

acts involving traits, F(l, 39) = 9.27, p < .004, whereas this was not true for sentences involving states (for which there was actu-

Cued recall of stereotypes and trails. The pairing of targetsentence subject terms (stereotypes and traits) with neutral

ally a nonsignificant reversal, F(l, 39) = 1.03, ns). Participants were also marginally more likely to say no to stereotype-act

predicates made it possible to compare the cued recall of stereotypes and traits in an unbiased fashion, using the randomly

sentences than to stereotype-state sentences, F(l, 39) = 3.09, p < .09, which was not true among trait sentences, F < 1. Hence,

called item was first coded as either a same-level recall (recall of

interest).

presented predicates as cues. To examine these data, each re-

overt behaviors were more likely to be discontinued when at-

the same class, i£, of a stereotype or a trait) or a different-level

tributed to stereotypes than when attributed to traits, even

recall (a reversal in the level recalled) and as either related to the

when those behaviors were mundane and seemingly generally

original subject (i.e, exactly accurate or a synonym) or unre-

applicable. As indicated, however, these differences were unrelated to response latency; the relevant analyses controlled for

Table 4 Number of No Responses to Stereotype and Trait Subject Terms Paired With Common Act and State Predicates

lated. The agreement between two independent judges as to these categories (estimated on the basis of their independent judgments of a random selection of 10% of the recall protocols)

was 99%. Our analyses focused only on related (essentially correct) recalls. (Unrelated recalls averaged only two per category type.) The number of related recalls was examined in a 2 X 2 X 2 (Category Type X Predicate Type X Same/Different Level) re-

Predicate type Stereotype category

No

Trait category

Act

State

Total

Act

State

Total

3.28

2.80

3.04

2.63

2.93

2.78

Note. Data reflect the number of no responses out of eight for each combination of predicate and category types.

' It is important to note, however, that many factors other than category structure and efficiency may influence the actual direction of yes/no responses, making such responses a less-lhan-ideal candidate for testing propositions about category structure. Response latencies often do not vary as a function of yes/no responses (Wyer & Gordon, 1984).

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S. ANDERSEN, R. K.LATZKY, AND J. MURRAY

Table 5 Number of Subject Terms Recalled in Predicate-Cued Recall of Stereotype and Trait Subject Terms Paired With Common Act and State Predicates

not only more efficiently in social judgment than do traits, but also as more powerful encoding devices. Although our hypothesis that these information processing differences might be particularly true for visible behaviors in

Predicate type Stereotype category

Trait category

contrast to internal states was not confirmed, in that the advantages for stereotypes were not restricted to highly visible acts, but rather were general across both behaviors and states, one related difference did emerge. That is, there was a greater ten-

Type of

recall


Same-level Different-level

Act

State

Total

Act

State

Total

2.20 .35

2.35 .12

2.28 .24

1.65 .18

1.37 .12

1.51 .15

Note, Data computed as the number of subject terms recalled out of eight for each combination of predicate and category types.

dency to reject mundane, visible behaviors for stereotypes than for traits. This might be explained by the assumption that stereotypes place more constraints on (are more specific about) appropriate responses, but only for overt behaviors. In any event, the efficiency and memorial consequences were reliable even when controlling for this finding. We conclude that the internal representation of stereotypes promotes activation and infer-

peated-measures ANOVA. As portrayed in Table 5, the analysis

ence and facilitates encoding and retrieval of novel associations in memory.

indicated significantly more same-level than different-level recalls, F(l, 39) = 88.57, p < .0001. As predicted, the analysis also

It should be noted that a definitive test of our hypotheses required the use of mundane predicates in the target sentences

yielded a main effect for category type, showing that partici-

of this study, along with counterbalancing in the assignment of predicates to subject terms. Otherwise, biases in predicate

pants recalled significantly more stereotypes than traits, overall, F(l, 39) = 18.15, p < .001. In addition, an interaction between category type and same/different level emerged, F(i, 39) = 8.01, p < .01, showing that stereotypes led to more samelevel (accurate) recall than did traits, F(l, 39) = 14.21, p < .001, but not to more different-level recall, F < 1.90, ns. Although the latter might reflect floor effects, the results certainly do not indicate a general bias toward the output of stereotype terms (which would produce more different-level recall for traits to balance the same-level recall of stereotypes). A true memory advantage for stereotype subjects is thus indicated.

Discussion In this research, we hypothesized that mundane acts or states

memorability could always account for our incidental recall findings, because such differences are nearly impossible to rule out without randomized predicates. Similarly, not only is predicate relatedness to the subject term very difficult to equalize using explicitly related predicates, but also length, exact syntax, and natural-language frequency are virtually impossible to equate. Without controlling these factors, response-latency data cannot clearly be interpreted in terms of efficiency (Bargh, 1989). The use and counterbalancing of mundane acts and states in this study thus served to provide a clean and conservative test of our hypothesis. The reported data are supportive of our conceptualization of traits and stereotypes as relatively narrow featural attributes

judged in reference to a stereotype label rather than a trait label

and integrative social categories, respectively. However, given the multiple differences that exist in the internal structure of

would be judged more quickly and would have more enduring

traits and stereotypes, a number of specific mechanisms may

effects on memory. The results confirmed our predictions. First, participants were able to judge the relation between the subject and the predicate in our randomly constructed sen-

underlie the present findings. First, if stereotypes are more informative, in the sense of having a greater number of associates, they should provide more pathways to use in making a

tences significantly more quickly when the subject term was a

judgment about whether some event is likely for category

stereotype than a trait. Thus, stereotypes do appear to afford faster access to meaningful associations that facilitate subse-

members. This same structural difference plausibly underlies the memory advantage for associates of stereotyped categories.

quent inference than do traits. Because the test sentences

That is, if it is easier to find associates of a stereotype with

paired each subject term with a common, mundane predicate that was randomly assigned to the subject term, any potential

which to make a likelihood judgment, these same associates may provide integrative encodings of the subject-predicate pair

biases in the nature of the predicates and their relatedness to

into memory.

the subject term were controlled. Hence, the data demonstrate that the distinction between stereotypes and traits has consequences for the efficiency with which social constructs operate in social inference processes.5 Second, the data showed that in response to predicate cues, participants accurately recalled stereotype terms more often than trait terms. The fact that traits did not show more semantically related but wrong-level recalls (i.e., recalling a related stereotype instead of the trait actually presented) suggests that the better recall on the basis of the use of stereotypes at encoding cannot be accounted for by a simple response bias favoring stereotypes. Hence, the data suggest that stereotypes operate

Second, the central content difference between traits and ste-

5

The response latency differences found in this research can, in fact, be attributed to between-condition differences in accessibility and efficiency, because known influences on response times that may otherwise have varied across conditions were controlled in this study. Furthermore, although raw response-latency data can be influenced by a variety of strategic influences, such as differences in self-presentational concerns, effort, or search strategies, we have no reason to believe that these influences were not constant across conditions, suggesting that our response-latency findings accurately reflect substantive differences in accessibility (Bargh, 1989).


TRAITS AND SOCIAL STEREOTYPES reotypes, namely, that the associates of stereotypes are more visualizeable, could account for the observed differences in memory and speed, since research has suggested that imagery enhances comprehension, storage, retrieval, and inference (Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Paivio, 1971). However, the present results argue against this particular hypothesis, in showing no advantage for predicates that were overt acts, relative to internal states (see also Taylor & Thompson, 1982). A third difference is that the greater distinctiveness of the associates of stereotypes might facilitate ease of judgment and memorability possibly by making the category more salient in memory and hence more cognitively accessible (e.g., Bargh & Thein, 1985; Hastie & Kumar, 1979; Higgins & King, 1981; Taylor & Fiske, 1978). Two other proposed differences between trait and stereotype representations—that most of the associates of traits are secondary, which we have argued here, and that trait categories are more abstract and superordinate—may also account for our findings. Both suggest that a trait obtains whatever predictive power it has via mediating links to stereotypes and their attributes. Traversing such additional links would be time consuming. It is noteworthy in this context that the magnitude of the present trait/stereotype difference is comparable to effects attributed to interclause integration (Just & Carpenter, 1980), suggesting that traits extract the equivalent of an additional inferential step. Further research will be necessary to gauge the relative importance of each of these factors in the information processing differences reported here. One possible limitation of the present data, it should be noted, concerns our use of mundane predicates. As indicated, this was critical for evaluating the information-processing capabilities of traits and stereotypes without confounding associated information with category type. At the same time, our use of such predicates also denned the participants' task as one of searching for relevant associates with which to make a social judgment that might be considered comparable with, "would this type of person do or experience something that virtually anyone would?" Thus, it could be argued that judgments about the applicability of highly prototypical attributes might proceed rather differently than this type of judgment. Although we cannot address this issue directly with the present data, there are reasons to expect the same results with such stimuli. The principal difference between the present use of arbitrary predicates and the use of highly related predicates (e.g, "voted Republican," for a "conservative" type) is that the latter should be more directly linked to the category in memory, reducing the need for an extensive associative search and rendering the targeted inferential process more similar to direct memory retrieval. We are more interested in inferential processes. Nonetheless, retrieval of category associates should be speeded when the category in question is a stereotype, to the extent that its richness, visualizability, distinctiveness, and salience speed memory access (Higgins & King, 1981). Our pilot work with predicates judged to be strongly associated with traits and stereotypes supports this basic prediction (Murray, Klatzky, & Andersen, 1987). In any event, the present results apply to the case in which the judgment is relatively difficult and involves going beyond retrieving category attributes that are linked to the category a

199

priori. The response latencies, in judging the filler sentences, indicated that our target sentences were relatively difficult to judge, supporting the assumption that an extended inference process was used. Because our principal effects involve response latencies for reading and judging sentences, it is important to consider major variables in the reading-time literature that might account for our results. First, the data argue strongly against a word-frequency artifact, because differences in word frequency in natural language favored traits. In addition, the difference attributable to word frequency should be minimal in our data, given that the effect of a frequency difference of 1 log unit is only S3 ms (according to eye-fixation data; Just & Carpenter, 1980), and we presented all subject terms for a standard 1 s prior to the onset of the predicate (and hence the beginning of the measured interval). In terms of part of speech as an artifactual variable in reading time, the effect in our data should also be small and should favor adjectives (44 ms) over nouns used as agents (5 1 ms; Just & Carpenter, 1980), again giving traits the advantage over stereotypes. Although a simple syllable count slightly favors the stereotypes (M= 2.6) over the traits (M = 3.1), the effect should be small, about 52 ms for a full syllable. Another question that might be raised is whether the present results would generalize to a nonlinguistic context. In response, we would argue that the assumption that linguistic stimuli are meaningfully related to real-life social cognitive processes is widely accepted in the area of social cognition. Furthermore, our theoretical approach does not tie us to a linguistic presentation of either the subject category or the to-be-judged event. In fact, judgments about acts and states of individuals are a part of everyday life, in that they determine which aspects of the social environment we experience as predictable and which, in contrast, merit attention. Having inferred that a person is a redneck (e.g, on the basis of seeing him or her in jeans and cowboy boots, getting out of an old pickup truck with a rifle rack in the back window), an observer who then sees the person stoop down to pick up something may be placed in essentially the same position as one of our subjects, that of judging whether or not the categorized person would actually engage in this behavior, i.e, whether it can easily be subsumed within the category. The observer presumably must search memory and find a way to make the decision. Our data suggest that the judgment will be made more quickly when the individual is categorized as a redneck rather than as a conservative type, meaning that such simple events can more quickly be assimilated into the category. And, in the situation where it is important to recall just who performed a particular act (admittedly, a somewhat unusual circumstance, but one that is required in many eyewitness cases), memory will be facilitated by prior stereotype categorization. Taken as a whole, the reported findings provide converging evidence that the differences between stereotypes and traits in terms of associative structure and content have important consequences for the ease with which these constructs are used in social judgment processes. On the basis of earlier research (Andersen & Klatzky, 1987), we hypothesized that categorization by stereotypes should provide more efficient access to social information and a more robust memory representation. This is precisely what the present studies indicate. The present re-

200


search also extends previous work, by examining multiple stereotypes and traits instead of just a few. In terms of the broader implications of these findings, the response latency data suggest that stereotype descriptors may be experienced as the more meaningful and convincing of the two types of categories. That is, the greater fluidity in information processing associated with these labels may increase the extent to which they are perceived as true and unequivocal (cf. Bargh, 1989; Bargh & Tota, 1988). Such a process would suggest one potential mechanism by which stereotypes gain power in social cognition and warrants further research attention. With regard to our memory data, they suggest that people will re-


member observed events and inferred states better when they are associated with a stereotyped individual. Thus a person's actual responses might play a stronger role in retrospective processing when the individual is designated by a stereotype at encoding rather than by a trait. This possibility would also help explain the power of stereotypes in social cognition and again warrants further research. Finally, it is of interest to note that the greater efficiency of stereotypes may not always lead to more pervasive use in classifying particular individuals. It has been suggested elsewhere (Andersen & Klatzky, 1987; Klatzky & Andersen, 1988) that social information processors may prefer the relatively weak constraints of traits when describing intimates about whom a great deal of complex information is known (e.g, Hampson, 1983; Park, 1986), or when describing strangers about whom virtually nothing is known (Andersen, 1989). In this sense, stereotypes may be overly restrictive both for those we know well and for those we do not know well enough to make highly specific assumptions. In these circumstances, the richness of stereotype categorization may become a drawback in terms of accuracy, and may thus lead to decreased usage, overriding the demands of efficiency. The present data, however, suggest that categorization by stereotype provides a virtually instantaneous, detailed, and memorable portrait of an individual that is likely to affect social prediction to a greater extent than does categorization by a single-trait term.

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