Transcarpathian Oblast and Kaliningrad Oblast - Springer Link

ISSN 20799705, Regional Research of Russia, 2015, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 212–222. © Pleiades Publishing, Ltd., 2015. Original Russian Text © M.V. Zotova, A.B. Sebentsov, E.D. Golovina, 2015, published in Izvestiya RAN. Seriya Geograficheskaya, 2015, No. 3, pp. 57–71.

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Transcarpathian Oblast and Kaliningrad Oblast: Contrasts and Cooperation in the East Borderlands of the European Union M. V. Zotova, A. B. Sebentsov, and E. D. Golovina Institute of Geography, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia email: [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] Received December 26, 2014

Abstract—The ethnocultural, historical and socioeconomic factors of crossborder cooperation in the east ern borderlands of the European Union are analyzed with a case study of two regions: Kaliningrad oblast of Russia and Transcarpathian oblast of Ukraine. They have a number of similar geographical and historical fea tures: both regions are eastern parts of the European Union periphery and the western periphery of the post Soviet space; they are isolated from the main territory of the state, and their state affiliation and administrative boundaries have repeatedly changed until recently. The article assesses the demographic and socioeconomic indicators, analyzes crossborder gradients on the studied borderlands and the practice of crossborder activ ities, and assesses the impact of the border on the everyday life of the population. It was revealed that the main drivers of crossborder cooperation in the studied borderlands are the benefits of using differences in prices for goods and services in different countries, and the ethnocultural closeness of the ethnic groups living on the both sides of the border. It was found that, despite the different approaches of Russia and Ukraine to the integration model, their western regions face similar difficulties and challenges of crossborder cooperation. The essential problem is the asymmetric nature of cooperation, both due to the significant socioeconomic gradients and different levels of development of civil society and the political institutions, the priorities of which are determined by the European Union. Keywords: economy of borderlands, crossborder cooperation, socioeconomic gradients, Russia, Ukraine, European Union DOI: 10.1134/S2079970515030119

FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM In recent years, borders, the status and functions of which changed as a result of major 20th century geo political transformations, including the collapse of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and the formation of the European Union (EU), have become the focus of many researchers. A study of the new bor ders in Eastern Europe and Russia and the evolution of their functions and role in shaping the political agenda in postsocialist and postSoviet states has acquired particular urgency in connection with the tasks of nationbuilding. Modern border studies are conducted on several territorial levels—global, macroregional, national, regional, and local [16]. The focus of such studies is primarily crossborder activities, which are influenced by proximity to the border and related to crossborder traffic; border policy, which means the development of a national and international institutional and legal infrastructure; as well as shifts in identity and change in perception of the border by local residents [8, 25, 29]. The incentives and constraints of crossborder activity

and the processes of internal and external territorial integration are also considered on different spatial lev els. An important aspect of studies is analysis of eco nomic factors, including regional contrasts and struc tural features of the economy of borderlands, which define the existing crossborder ties and prospects of various forms of economic cooperation [1]. Contrast growth between a pair of neighboring regions often hampers to regional development fosters illegal activities (illegal migration, smuggling, etc.) and may destabilize the situation under certain cir cumstances, up to the risk of secessionist sentiment [9]. This problem is particularly acute for territories with close ethnic, cultural, and historical ties with neighboring countries that have a higher level of socio economic development. Shared history and culture are a good basis for crossborder cooperation [5], but in crisis situations, ethnic minorities and their back room leaders form a shadow structure of informal con trol over the territory [12]. At the same time, the closer the level of economic development of neigh

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TRANSCARPATHIAN OBLAST AND KALININGRAD OBLAST

boring regions, the broader the background for successful interaction and cooperation [10]. The main objective of this article is to determine the degree of influence of various factors on the devel opment of crossborder cooperation with a case study of Kaliningrad oblast of Russia and Transcarpathian oblast of Ukraine. The first part of the article substan tiates the choice of these oblasts as pilot regions and analyzes their common characteristics that determine crossborder cooperation. The second part assesses the demographic and socioeconomic indicators and analyzes the crossborder gradients. The third part analyzes the practice of crossborder activities, including assessment of the impact of the border on the everyday life of local residents. The main information base of the study consisted of local statistical data, crossborder cooperation pro 1

grams, and a series of expert interviews conducted with representatives from government, science, busi ness, and nonprofit organizations in Kaliningrad oblast, Transcarpathian oblast and the neighboring Hungarian district (megye) in 2014. ETHNICAL AND HISTORICAL FEATURES OF THE OBLASTS The selection of Kaliningrad and Transcarpathian oblasts is not random. Both regions are parts of the eastern periphery of the European Union and the western periphery of the former Soviet Union. At the same time, each of the countries carries out its own integration policy. Ukraine is an active participant of the Eastern Partnership, which has declared a course of accelerated European integration. Russia is the leader of another integration association—the Eur asian Union. The historical background determines the similari ties and, at the same time, differences between the two oblasts. State affiliation and the administrative borders of both oblasts repeatedly changed [4]. The circumstances of the Soviet Union’s entry in 1945 after WWII predetermined a certain isolation of the oblasts. As regards Kaliningrad oblast, the isola tion due to its exclave position. Its particularities were created during statebuilding in Lithuania and Belarus in 1990, as well as due to accession of Poland and Lithuania to the EU and NATO, which brought about new customs and border barriers in the 2000s [7, 11]. The isolation of Transcarpathian oblast is associ ated both with orographic reasons and with the spe cific regional identity, which formed during constant changes in state affiliation. The historical background of the ethnic structure and specific identity of the population of both regions have a significant impact on the nature of cooperation and the intensity of informal contacts with neighbor 1 In each region the authors conducted about 20 interviews.

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ing countries. Thus, in Kaliningrad oblast in 1946– 1947, the ethnic German and Lithuanian populations were totally replaced with inhabitants from different, mainly rural, areas of the Soviet Union. As a result, the share of ethnic Russians according to the 2010 Census was about 86% of the population, whereas the share of ethnic Germans and Lithuanians did not exceed 1%. Although the population of Transcarpathian oblast has not undergone such a radical change, its ethnic structure has also experienced some transformation: the share of ethnic minorities has decreased signifi cantly as a result of assimilation and emigration, and the share of Ukrainians increased from 78.4% in 1989 to 80.5% in 2001. However, one of the largest minori 2

ties,Rusyns (including Boykos, Lemkos, Hutsuls, and others), has a significant impact on the region’s life. According to the 2001 census, their total number did not exceed 10200 people (less than 1% of the pop ulation), whereas according to estimates by Rusyn ethnic associations and certain experts [6], their num 3

ber is considerably higher—up to 70–80% . Evidence of the particular regional identity was in the regional referendum in 1991, when about 80% of the Transcar pathian population voted for autonomy of the oblast. A large part of the population demands recognition of Rusyns as separate from Ukrainian nationality. Hungarian and Romanian ethnic minorities (respectively, 12 and 2.5% of the total population of the oblast) also play a significant role (especially in communities), demanding autonomy and dual citi zenship. According to the latest population census, Hungarians represent 76% of the population in Bere hove district and 50% in the city of Berehove; Roma nians make up 12.5% in Tiachiv and Rakhiv districts

4

Thus, the crossborder nature of settlement of eth nic groups in Transcarpathia creates a significant potential for private and kin contacts, and has become a basis for crossborder economic and cultural cooper ation. In turn, in Kaliningrad oblast on the Russian– Polish border, cultural and family ties have intensified in the postSoviet period as a result of crossborder cooperation. 2 Rusyns

are a group of the eastern Slavic population of the Car pathians who live in Transcarpathia, Eastern Slovakia, Serbian Vojvodina, southeastern Poland, Hungary, and northwestern Romania. Rusyns are recognized as both Ukrainians (a view widespread in Soviet and modern Ukrainian literature) and as a separate ethnic group. Some researchers have emphasized the gravitiation of Rusyns in the past to Russians and Russia, point ing to the existence of a “Moscophile movement among Rusyns in the 19th century, as well as certain cultural and linguistic characteristics. 3 According to an estimate of the Interregional Public Organiza tion Union of Rusyns, there were 978000 Rusyns at the end of 1979 in Transcarpathian oblast (78.4% of the population.) 4 AllUkrainian Census of 2001. http://2001.ukrcensus.gov. ua/ rus/results/ general/nationality/zakarpatia/ 2015

ZOTOVA et al. Centers of firstorder administrative units Borders State borders Of firstorder administrative units Of secondorder administrative units Population change 2012 to 2002, %

.

KLAIPEDA

.

KLAIPEDA DISTRICT

100–105 105–110 More than 110

95–100

PANEVEZYS DISTRICT

Šiauliai

. ŠIAULIAI DISTRICT Panevezys ^

Less than 90 90–95

.

TELŠIAI DISTRICT

^

214

.

UTENA DISTRICT

.

TAURAGE DISTRICT

L I Taurage T. H U A N I A KAUNAS DISTRICT

B A L T I C

S E A

Kaunas

R U S S I A Kaliningrad

.

MARIJAMPOLE DISTRICT

.

Marijampole Alytus

KALININGRAD OBLAST

Gda’nsk

POMERANIAN

V DI ILN CT IU RI S CT

T H E

ALYTUS DISTRICT

WARMIANMASURIAN

VOIVODESHIP

Olsztyn

BELARUS

VOIVODESHIP

PODLASKIE VOIVODESHIP

P 0

20 40

O 80

120

L 180

A

N

D

km

Fig. 1. Changes in population of Kaliningrad oblast of Russia and neighboring regions of Poland and Lithuania in 2002–2012, %. Calculated by: [2, 14, 18].

SOCIOECONOMIC CONTRASTS Demographic crossborder gradients. In both Tran scarpathian and Kaliningrad oblasts, the demographic situation is quite stable: the two regions have under gone a slight change in population size over the past 10 5

years . However, the factors that determine the popu lation dynamics were different. The increase in migration in Kaliningrad oblast almost completely counterbalanced the natural decrease in population, with an increasing of concen tration of inhabitants in the center of the oblast and the neighboring areas. A compatriot resettlement pro gram had a great influence on the intensity of migra tion flows. In general, the demographic indicators of the oblast are comparable with the neighboring Polish voivodeships, where the population size has also remained relatively stable. In many northern voivode ships, there is still a small increase in population due to the weak natural increase compensating for migration outflow. The neighboring municipalities of Luthuania have a more complicated demographic situation, because the opening of the European labor market after accession to the EU led a mass emigration, which, combined with the natural decrease, has caused a more than 13% reduction in population (Fig. 1). 5 During

1990–2012, the population of Kaliningrad oblast increased by 7%; it decreased in Transcarpathia by 0.3%.

A decrease in population in Transcarpathian oblast was first recorded in 1995 and within 7 years it was 30400 people (–2.4%). The main reason was the migration outflow of the population in the EU and other regions of Ukraine and Russia, which for the 1990–2012 amounted to about 50000 people and was only partly compensated by natural increase. The most (an average of 5–7%) decrease in population was in Uzhhorod, Mizhhirya, and Velykyi Bereznyi districts and the city of Berehove (Fig. 2), in part as a result of emigration, primarily of ethnic Hungarians, which used programs facilitating the acquisition of Hungar ian citizenship. The demographic situation in the oblast has stabilized after 2008, since a substantial increase in the birth rate has started. In 2012, the nat ural increase reached the maximum for the previous 20 years values (3.3‰) while the migration balance was at still negative (–0.4‰). The demographic situ ation in the neighboring regions of Romania, Poland and Hungary is generally similar: most of the neigh boring regions are losing population. The most diffi cult situation is observed in the Romanian jude¸t e of Maramure¸s and Satu Mare, where, along with the natural decrease continues an intensive migration out flow. Slovakia Košice region districts neighboring Transcarpathia oblast are more successful because of a significant share of the Roma population, whose birth rate is still high.


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´ , SLASKIE VOIVODESHIP

TRANSCARPATHIAN OBLAST AND KALININGRAD OBLAST Centers of firstorder administrative units Borders State borders Of firstorder administrative units Of secondorder administrative units

´ SWIETOKRZYSKIE VOIVODESHIP ,

P

O

L

215

A

N

D

Change in population 2012 to 2001, %

Rzeszow

Krakow

Increase of more than 10 5–10 increase

Lviv

PODKARPACKIE VOIVODESHIP

0–5 increase LVIV OBLAST

MALOPOLSKA VOIVODESHIP

0–5%decrease 5–10 decrease Decrease of more than 10

Drohobych

^

ZILINSKÝ KRAJ

KHMELNITSKY

NÓGRÁ D

H

IVANOFRANKIVSK

Prešov

BANSKOBYSTRICKÝ KRAJ

S

OBLAST

PREŠOVSKÝ KRAJ

L

O

V

A

K

I

A

KamianetsPodilsky

IVANOFRANKIVSK OBLAST

Košice

KOŠICKÝ KRAJ

Uzhhorod

U

K

R

A

I

N

Mukacheve

Chop

E

Chernivtsi

TRANSCARPATHIAN OBLAST BORSODABAÚJZEMPLÉN

Salgótarj’án

CHERNIVTSI OBLAST

Berehove

BOTOSANI

Miskolc

SZABOLCSSZATMÁRBEREG Nyìregyháza

Eger

U

N

G

A

R

Botosani ,

Y

Satu Mare Suceava

HEVES JÁS ZN K AG NO YK UN ZOL S PEST

Baia Mare Debrecen

R

HAJDÚBIHAR

Suceava

MARAMURES,

SATU MARE

O

M

A BISTRIÇA NASAUD;

N 0

I 30

60

A 120

km

Fig. 2. Changes in population of Transcarpathian oblast of Ukraine and neighboring regions of Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania in 2001–2012, %. Calculated by: [13, 18, 23, 24, 27].

Economic gradients. Differences in economic development between the two oblasts are more visible. The greatest contrasts are observed in the Transcar pathian part of the borderlands, whose GRP per capita

(in purchasing power parity—PPP) is below the simi lar indicator for the Košice region, 4.5 times; and the Podkarpackie Voivodeship, 3.5 times (Table 1). Con trasts for the Ukrainian–Romanian borderland are

Table 1. Gross Regional Product (GRP) of borderlands, 2011 Region

GRP, national currency, mln

PPP

GRP in PPP, GRP per capita, GRP per capita USD mln national currency in PPP, USD

Transcarpathian oblast (Ukraine) SzabolcsSzatmárBereg medye (Hungary) Prešovský kraj (Slovakia) Košický kraj (Slovakia) Podkarpackie Voivodeship (Poland) Maramure¸s jude¸t (Romania) Satu Mare jude¸t (Romania) Pomeranian Voivodeship (Poland)

18054 817314 5546 7464.2 57028 8483.1 6186.3 86206

3.4 123.7 0.5 0.5 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.8

5263.6 6609.9 10874.6 14635.7 31334.1 5269.0 3842.4 47365.9

14455 1476000 6860.7 9580.6 26801 17722.6 17964.6 37822

4214.3 11936.9 13452.4 18785.5 14725.8 11007.8 11158.2 20781.3

Warmian–Masurian Voivodeship (Poland) Kaliningrad oblast (Russia) . Klaip e da district (Lithuania) . Taurag e district (Lithuania)

41609 230254.5 13117.3

1.8 17.4 1.6

22862.1 13271.2 8355.0

28635 243833.6 38900

15733.5 14053.8 24777.1

1422.2

20400

12993.6

2232.9

1.6

Calculated by: [2, 13, 14, 18, 21, 23, 24, 27]. REGIONAL RESEARCH OF RUSSIA

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Centers of firstorder administrative units Borders State borders Of firstorder administrative units Of secondorder administrative units Industrial output in PPP, USD per capita


P

O

L

A

N

D

Rzeszow

Krakow

More than 20000 Lviv


10000–20000 LVIV OBLAST


5000–10000 1000–5000 Less than 1000

Drohobych

^

ZILINSKÝ KRAJ

KHMELNITSKY

NÓGRÁ D

H

IVANOFRANKIVSK

Prešov


S

OBLAST

PREŠOVSKÝ KRAJ

L

O

V

A

K

I

A

KamianetsPodilsky


Košice

KOŠICKÝ KRAJ

Uzhhorod

U

K

R

A

I

N

Mukacheve

Chop

E

Chernivtsi


Salgótarj’án

CHERNIVTSI OBLAST

Berehove

BOTOSANI ,

Miskolc


Eger

U

N

G

A

R

Botosani ,

Y

Satu Mare Suceava


Baia Mare Debrecen

HAJDÚBIHAR

R

Suceava

MARAMURES,

SATU MARE

O

M

A BISTRIÇA NASAUD;

N 0

I 30

60

A 120

km

Fig. 3. Industrial output per capita in PPP in Transcarpathian oblast of Ukraine and neighboring regions of Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, in 2012. Calculated by: [13, 18, 21, 23, 24, 27].

less significant: Transcarpathia is inferior to the neigh boring Romanian jude¸t e by 2.5 times. At the same time, the absolute values of GRP (in PPP) of Tran scarpathian oblast are comparable with the neighbor ing Romanian jude¸t e and Hungarian megyes. How ever, these areas are among the most economically backward both in the country and in the EU as a whole. The level of industrial development of Transcar pathian oblast is also noticeably inferior to its Euro pean neighbors. The largest gradients are observed on the border with Slovakia: the industrially developed Košice region surpasses Transcarpathian oblast in industrial output by almost 9 times. Even relatively backward in their own countries, the bordering Roma nian jude¸t e and Hungarian SzabolcsSzatmárBereg megye have a three to fourfold advantage over Tran scarpathia (Fig. 3). Only Uzhhorod district looks good in comparison, which produces 50% of regional prod ucts and where the main industrial facilities of the former Free Economic Zone (FEZ) Transcarpathia are concentrated. Kaliningrad oblast, despite Russia’s WTO acces sion and the establishment of the Customs Union of the Eurasian Economic Community, has retained the status of a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) (in full until

2016 and with replacement of customs duties exemp tions on tax benefits up to 2031) and significant invest ments from state and affiliated corporations (Gaz prom, Rosatom, etc.). This ensured a high rate of GRP growth and industrial production in the 2000s and softened the socioeconomic gradients with neigh boring countries. Thus, the level of GRP per capita (in PPP) in Kaliningrad oblast only lags behind the rela tively successful nationallevel Pomeranian Voivode . ship in Poland (1.5 times) and Klaip e da district in Lithuania (1.7 times), comparable to the Warmian– . Masurian Voivodeship and exceeding Taurag e s district in Lithuania (see Table 1). The industrial output in the oblast is higher than in all neighboring regions (Table 2). The social situation in the Russian–Polish and Russian–Lithuanian borderlands is not distinguished by sharp contrasts. The wage level in Kaliningrad oblast. (in PPP) is comparable to the wage level in Klaip e da district and the Warmian–Masurian Voivodeship (Table 3). Pomeranian Voivodeship stands out a bit against this background. On average, Poles are slightly wealthier than Russians and Lithuanians, but the Lithuanian regional community is less segre gated on a property basis than the Polish and Russian communities.


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TRANSCARPATHIAN OBLAST AND KALININGRAD OBLAST Table 2. Industrial output per capita in Kaliningrad oblast and borderlands of Poland and Lithuania in 2011, USD Industril output per capita Territory

Russian Federation Kaliningrad oblast Poland Warmian–Masurian Voivodeship Pomeranian Voivodeship Lithuania

in nationl currency

in PPP

9012 12331 9974 6274 11547 8012

13537 18523 15703 9878 18180 12191

Calculated by: [2, 14, 18, 21].

Differences in income between Transcarpathian oblast and neighboring EU regions are more impor tant. Average monthly wages (in PPP) in Transcar pathian oblast in 2012 amounted to slightly more than USD 720, which is 1.5–2 times less than in neighbor ing regions of Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland (see Table 3). Its level is comparable only with the neigh boring poorest jude¸t e of Romania. Wages in Uzh horod, Chop, and Uzhhorod district are slightly higher than average in the oblast, but intraregional gradients (10–12%) are significantly less than the crossborder ones (Fig. 4). Thus, a common feature of both areas of the east ern border of the EU is the existence of significant socioeconomic gradients with its neighbors, especially

217

in Transcarpathian oblast, which largely determines the practice of crossborder cooperation. CROSSBORDER COOPERATION The practice of crossborder cooperation in both regions was initially considered as a way to compensate for the acute socioeconomic crisis that had enveloped the postSoviet space since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Since the beginning of the 1990s a process of build ing the institutional infrastructure in crossborder coop eration has been running at the regional level under the control of central governments. In Kaliningrad oblast in this period, the Russian–Polish (1992) and the Rus sian–Lithuanian (1999) Border Councils were cre ated, whose activity concerned many topical issues: from demarcation and delimitation of the border to economic cooperation. In the late 1990s–early 2000s, one of the main forms and areas of regional coopera tion were Euroregions. With the participation of Kaliningrad oblast, five Euroregions have been devel oped: Neman (1997), Baltic (1998), Saule (1999), Sheshupe (2003), and LynaLava (2003). The most intensive cooperation has been observed in the first two euroregions. The Neman Euroregion includes the border and coastal areas of Lithuania, Poland, Den mark, Sweden, and Kaliningrad oblast. The Baltic Euroregion includes a part of Kaliningrad oblast and the adjacent Polish, Lithuanian, and Belarusian terri tories. The total amount of grants allocated to the implementation of projects between 1998 and 2005 amounted to EUR 8.9 mln for the Baltic Euroregion and 13.2 mln for the Neman Euroregion. In 2012, in

Table 3. Average monthly wage in 2012 Region

Wage, national currency

PPP

Transcarpathian oblast and its neighbors Transcarpathian oblast (Ukraine) 2351 3.3 SzabolcsSzatmárBereg medye (Hungary) 162259 142.6 Prešovský kraj (Slovakia) 718 0.6 Košický kraj (Slovakia) 853 0.6 Podkarpackie Voivodeship (Poland) 3024.5 1.9 ¸ ¸ Maramure s jude t (Romania) 1389 2.0 1438 2.0 Satu Mare jude ¸t (Romania) Kaliningrad oblast and its neighbors Pomeranian Voivodeship (Poland) 3455.1 Warmian–Masurian Voivodeship (Poland) 2996.2 Kaliningrad oblast (Russia) 21526 . 2163.6 Klaip e da district (Lithuania) . 1737.9 Taurag e district (Lithuania Calculated and compiled by: [2, 13, 14, 18, 22, 23, 24, 27]. REGIONAL RESEARCH OF RUSSIA

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Wage in PPP, USD

721.2 1137.8 1237.9 1470.7 1559 687.6 711.9

1.9 1.9 17.4 1.8

1781 1544.5 1240.7 1208.7

1.8

970.9

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Centers of firstorder administrative units Borders State borders Of firstorder administrative units Of secondorder administrative units Real Wage in PPP, USD per capita


P

O

L

A

N

D

Rzeszow

Krakow

More than 1500 Lviv


1300–1500 LVIV OBLAST


1000–1300 800–1000 Less than 800

Drohobych

^

ZILINSKÝ KRAJ

KHMELNITSKY

NÓGRÁ D

H

IVANOFRANKIVSK

Prešov


S

OBLAST

PREŠOVSKÝ KRAJ

L

O

V

A

K

I

A

KamianetsPodilsky


Košice

KOŠICKÝ KRAJ

Uzhhorod

U

K

R

A

I

N

Mukacheve

Chop

E

Chernivtsi


Salgótarj’án

CHERNIVTSI OBLAST

Berehove

Miskolc

BOTOSANI ,


Eger

U

N

G

A

R

Botosani ,

Y

Satu Mare Suceava


Baia Mare Debrecen

HAJDÚBIHAR

R

Suceava

MARAMURES,

SATU MARE

O

M

A BISTRIÇA NASAUD;

N 0

I 30

60

A 120

km

Fig. 4. Average monthly wage in PPP in Transcarpathian oblast of Ukraine and neighboring regions of Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania in 2012. Calculated by: [13, 18, 22, 23, 24, 27].

6

official documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the work of Euroregions was found to be ineffective due to the following: the lack of financial resources of municipalities for joint initiatives with foreign col leagues; the lack of permanent Russia’s Euroregion secretariats; significant disagreements between part ners on project selection criteria and mechanisms for their implementation. The participation of the oblast in Euroregions has been phased out little by little, new projects have not been implemented, and only a few small international events have remained on a perma nent basis. Transcarpathian oblast in the early 1990s was also involved in European regional construction. In 1993, in Debrecen a cooperation agreement was signed which involved the establishing of the Carpathian Euroregion, which includes borderlands of Ukraine, Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia, as well as Romania in 1997. In 1994, the Fund for the Development of the Carpathian Euroregion was established, the aim of which was to maintain nongovernment contacts between neighboring countries to provide mutual 6 On the activity and prospects of the development of the Eurore

gions with the participation of Kaliningrad oblast // MFA Rus sian Federation. 15.04.2013. http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns dos.nsf/45682f63b9f5b253432569e7004278c8/6f6365d5246c56 8544257a0d0043dc22

technical and financial assistance. However, the effec tiveness of the Euroregion was low. According to Ukrainian experts, the main reasons were legislative inconsistency, poor institutions for Euroregional cooperation, and low involvement of business cooper ation and nongovernmental and public organizations. After expansion of the EU, Kaliningrad and Tran scarpathian oblasts have actively participated in the INTERREG, PHARE, and TACIS CrossBorder Cooperation Programs. Transcarpathian oblast partic ipated in two such programs—Hungary–Slovakia– Ukraine 2004–2006 and Romania–Ukraine 2004– 2006. Kaliningrad oblast participated in the program Lithuania–Poland–Russia 2004–2006. Most of the projects selected under these programs focused on cooperation in environmental protection, develop ment of civil society, and cultural and scientific exchanges. These border cooperation programs were repeatedly criticized by experts. It was noted that the projects had a clear asymmetry: a large part of their funds were spent in the EU to address local problems without causing a significant impact on the socioeco nomic situation in the neighboring regions included in the program. The problem of such warped cooperation was repeatedly raised in the literature [11, 19, 28] and was recorded in one of the programs [17]. It was also noted by the representatives of public authorities and nonprofit organizations interwieved by the authors in


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both oblasts. This asymmetry was primarily caused by strong socioeconomic differences between the neigh boring EU countries, especially in case of Transcar pathia. The first crossborder cooperation programs were financed by the EU, since the coexecutors from Transcarpathia and Kaliningrad oblasts had the status of partners without financial participation in the projects and therefore were unable to lobby for their interests. In addition, the decisionmaking centers for allocating grants and project management were also in the EU. There were also problems common to the entire postSoviet space that had a negative impact, such as lack of development of civil society, lack of professionals able to lead international projects and keep records in English, and a low level of legal com petence. With the transition of financing through the Euro pean Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), both oblasts took part in new crossborder cooperation programs (2007–2013). Transcarpathian oblast became a member of two such programs. The major one among them was Hun gary–Slovakia–Romania–Ukraine 2007–2013 with a total budget of EUR 66.6 mln [15]. In its framework, up to 45 projects should be implemented by 2015, totaling EUR 16 mln. The Poland–Belarus–Ukraine program seems less important in the impact on cross border cooperation, since Transcarpathia is not a “core program area.” However, the oblast managed to be allocated eight projects worth EUR 6.3 mln. Kaliningrad oblast took part in only one crossbor der cooperation program—Lithuania–Poland–Rus sia 2007–2013 [17], which had a much larger budget (EUR 132.1 mln). Despite the different names and number of priorities, both the Kaliningrad and Tran scarpathian programs were aimed primarily at sup porting economic and social development, informal relations, educational and cultural exchange, and environmental protection. With respect to content and implementation tech nique, the ENPI 2007–2013 crossborder coopera tion program was very different from the first INTER REG, PHARE, and TACIS programs (2004–2006). First, the asymmetry in the ENPI crossborder coopera tion programs has become less noticeable, especially in the case of Kaliningrad oblast. This was a result of experience in international projects accumulated by local actors, active lobbying of their interests, and a significant financial contribution from the Russian side to the total budget of the program (EUR 44 mln, or about 25%). Second, crossborder cooperation has become more borderoriented: the new programs have directly affected borderlands to a greater extent than before. Until recently, especially in Kaliningrad oblast, the majority of projects went to the regional capital and one or two major cities. REGIONAL RESEARCH OF RUSSIA

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Third, the relatively small, in terms of funding, soft 7

projects , conducted within the cooperation pro grams, have been increasingly supplemented by large projects aimed at upgrading or creating a modern infrastructure. Thus, in Transcarpathia the construction and reconstruction of checkpoints had significant eco nomic importance both for the oblast and Ukraine as a whole. Other important projects were related to resolving issues relevant to the mountainous border lands, such as floodprotection works, introduction of new water management, and forest conservation. The major projects in Kaliningrad oblast were also aimed at improving transport accessibility, increasing the number of border checkpoints, and protecting transboundary water objects (construction of sewage treatment facilities). The main driving forces of everyday crossborder cooperation on the eastern borders of the EU are eco nomic pragmatism (the benefits of using differences in prices for goods and services in different countries) and the ethnocultural closeness of the ethnic groups living on both sides of the border (in the case of Tran scarpathia). According to many experts, good knowl edge of each other ensures openness to investment and commonality of business models and cooperation. On the Ukrainian–Hungarian sector, informal, kin, and commercial relations are actively encouraged by the Hungarian side and find expression in many state programs supporting compatriots living abroad. There is the Ferenc Rákóczi II Transcarpathian Hun garian Institute, functioning since 1994 in Berehove, sponsored by the Hungarian government. Various projects for development of the Hungarian language and culture are being funded. Since 2001, many resi dents of the borderlands close to Hungary have 8

received a “Hungarian card” or “green passport” , and since 2010, after Hungary simplified the relevant procedures, Hungarian citizenship. Widespread use of Hungarian flags and symbols, the Hungarian lan guage, and even Hungarian time have bred a well known joke in the neighboring Transcarpathian regions: “What borders Hungary? Hungary!” One way or another, the Hungarian–Ukrainian borderland is the zone of a special, privileged crossborder cooperation. 7 Soft

projects in the practice of crossborder cooperation usually involve cultural, scientific, and educational exchanges, forums, round tables, performances by creative groups, etc. 8 The green passport is the informal name for a document that was issued to Hungarians living beyond Hungarian borders. All ethnic Hungarians and their family members were able to obtain one under the condition of knowledge of Hungarian history and language and proof of ancestry in Transcarpathia when it was a Hungarian protectorate. This document gives its holders a slew of advantages: the right to work and live in Hungary without reg istration, free transport, discount tuition in higher education institutes, health care, etc.) 2015

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On the Ukrainian–Romanian border the economy of the cultural region of Maramure¸s is a little different from the rest of Transcarpathia. A source of welfare here is a job in Russia or Europe. Economic weakness of the Romanian border jude¸t e (Satu Mare and Mara mure¸s ) prevents institutionalized cooperation and implementation of large joint projects requiring large highrisk investments (for example, the development of a spa resort in the salt mines of Solotvino, the resumption of local crossborder rail traffic, etc.). Crossborder cooperation is limited primarily by shut tle trade and the cultural and leisure sphere. For many residents of Transcarpathian borderlands with high unemployment and low living standards, shuttle business remains an important sphere of employment. This causes the population to use the slightest price differences on both sides of the border. On both sides of the Hungarian–Ukrainian and Pol ish–Ukrainian borders, there is still an operating net work of contractors and earnings for a shuttle trader may reach USD 50 per border crossing. The main products from the Ukrainian side are gasoline, ciga rettes, alcohol, and sweets; from the EU, a variety of food products, light industrial products, and building materials [26]. Another example of benefits for crossborder Ukrainians is widespread travel by car with Slovak license plates in order to avoid customs duties and additional taxation. This in turn stimulates repeat movement across the border, since a foreign car can not stay on Ukrainian territory for more than a certain period of time. The shuttle trade in Kaliningrad oblast in the early 1990s made it possible to partially offset some of the effects of the exclave location of the oblast. As a result of smoothing of socioeconomic gradients between the oblast and neighboring EU countries, as well as the activity of regional authorities, which revamped cross border trade to more civilized forms, the share of employment in shuttle business significantly decreased. Today, Polish citizens dominate among professional shuttle traders who have remained spe cialized in shipping gasoline, petroleum products, and cigarettes to neighboring regions of Poland. Kalinin grad shuttle traders specialize in a number of food products and some light industry products, but their role in supplying the Kaliningrad goods market has declined significantly. By the mid2000s, the flow of shuttle traders was largely replaced by a flow of area residents who travel on weekends and holidays to neighboring regions of Lithuania and especially Poland for shopping. The shopping in turn is gradually giving way to different types of tourism (wellness, event, entertainment, etc.) Strengthening of the border control between Kaliningrad and Transcarpathian oblasts, on the one hand, and the neighboring regions of Eastern Europe, on the other, following their accession to the EU resulted in the need to introduce specific border cross

ing conditions for borderland residents. The regula tion of the European Parliament and European Coun cil of 20 December, 2006, made it possible for EU Member States to conclude agreements with neigh boring countries, setting specific rules on local border 9

traffic (LBT) on the external land borders. The Ukrainian authorities were the first to use the new opportunity to facilitate movement of their citi zens and so far they have signed LBT agreements with all neighboring countries—Hungary (January 2008), Slovakia (September 2008), Poland (July 2009), and Romania (April 2014). Today, Transcarpathian oblast and Hungary have the most efficient LBT agreement, remarkable in its large coverage (up to 50 km) and ease of obtaining LBT cards. Each year, the Hungarian Consulate in Transcarpathian oblast provides Ukrainian borderland residents about 12000 such cards. According to the State Border Service of Ukraine, in the past six months, there are now about 1.5 mln LBT participants on the Ukrainian–Hungarian border. For Hungary, LBT has become not only a source of additional reve nue by increasing the number of the Ukrainians who come for shopping, but also an important mechanism for maintaining ties with their compatriots. The successes of LBT look much more modest in other areas. In the Slovak border section, the number of border crossings is seven times less, since it is a bureaucratic endeavor to obtain an LBT card, and the permitted coverage area only extends 30 km. In the Polish section, despite the signed agreements, LBT has not yet started yet due to the lack of a necessary crossborder infrastructure in Transcarpathia. LBT was launched for the residents of Kaliningrad oblast of Russia, the Warmian–Masurian Voivodeship, and part of the Pomeranian Voivodeship in Poland in July 2012, which has mainly an economic character. According to Polish experts [30], from July 2012 to July 2014, the Polish Consulate in Kaliningrad issued more than 200 000 permits. During 2013, 6 mln LBT border crossings were recorded on the Russian–Polish border, about 70% of them Poles, and only 30% resi dents of Kaliningrad oblast. Nevertheless, for the first 6 months of 2014, from taxfree reimbursement data alone, the citizens of Kaliningrad oblast spent 92 mln zloty (EUR 22 mln) in Poland (nearly twice as much as for the same period of the previous year); the actual 10

amount of expenditures is significantly higher . 9 Local

border traffic is special regime for borderland residents (up to 50 km from the border), allowing them to obtain a special permit (an LBT card) to visit a neighboring country for a period of no more than 30–60 days per trip and no more than 90 days within 6 months. The reason for the introduction of the local border traffic is close kin and human relations between local res idents on both sides of the border. 10In six months, the citizens of Kaliningrad oblast spent 92 mln zloty in Poland // Russian West. http://ruwest.ru/news/24512/.


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The LBT project has had a particularly positive impact on the development of the Warmian–Masur ian voivodeship, the most depressed region in Poland: as a result of consumption growth due to tourists from Kaliningrad oblast, the unemployment rate signifi cantly decreased over the last year from 21.3 to 18.6%, while retail trade turnover and investments increased. In Kaliningrad oblast, ordinary people became the main beneficiaries of LBT: they obtained access to cheaper and quality goods. Producers and sellers, by contrast, have experienced increased competition from European businesses. The flow of Polish tourists have not met the expectations of the Kaliningrad busi nessmen. According to Polish experts, about 75% of Poles who arrive in Kaliningrad oblast via LBT confine themselves to the travel to the nearest gas station and spend no more than 1–2 h in the oblast. CONCLUSIONS Despite the different approaches of Russia and Ukraine to the choice of integration model, their west ern regions in the daily practice of crossborder coop eration are faced with similar difficulties and chal lenges that, in our opinion, are characteristic of the entire eastern perimeter of European borders. Ukraine’s European aspirations and the crossbor der nature of the settlement pattern of peoples forming the basis of Transcarpathian society, have not become a guarantor of big success in crossborder cooperation with neighboring countries in Transcarpathia. Although ethnic ties may achieve certain results and the emergence of areas of privileged cooperation, at the same time, they facilitate segregation of society along ethnic lines. A participant in the ENPI program, Transcar pathian oblast is gradually moving towards institution alization of crossborder cooperation and its simplifi cation in a civilized framework, but this process is hampered by the limited financial resources of the oblast. Differences in the prices for essential consumer goods remains the main driving force on the western borders of Ukraine, which continues to support differ ent types of crossborder trade, including shuttle busi ness. In the terminology of L.B. Vardomsky [3], this type of cooperation can be called traditional. Kaliningrad oblast has progressed much further in cooperation with neighboring countries (especially Poland). While a traditional model is still preserved there, cooperation is becoming more civilized and tough customs and visa regimes are offset by the devel opment of contacts, by human (social) exchange, and by implementation of joint crossborder projects, the financing of which has an institutional form. As a result, a gradual institutional model of crossborder cooperation has been built. The essential problem is the asymmetry of cross border cooperation (particularly in Transcarpathian oblast). When there are significant socioeconomic REGIONAL RESEARCH OF RUSSIA

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gradients and inadequate development of civil society, it is difficult to create conditions for equal partnership, but it is even more difficult to implement it. Asymmetry lies in the existing models of institu tional cooperation, the general priorities of which are determined by the European Union, while the deci sionmaking centers are in European countries. Only the European side has the right to determine the stra tegic objectives of crossborder cooperation, while the eastern partners only follow in line with EU policy by choosing from a list of priorities already prepared for them. In contrast, even this not quite equal cooperation with all risks and costs is a source of new opportunities for the weaker partners. It makes it possible to signifi cantly change the living standards in borderlands, contributes to the destruction of stereotypes, increases mutual trust, and builds collaborative business pro cesses, which in turn can lead to the formation of crossborder functional regions. In addition, the borderland is a kind of laboratory where promising forms and models of interstate coop eration can be tested. It is remarkable that, despite worsening of relations, neither Russia nor the EU have curtailed cooperation in borderlands; LBT has been retained in the Poland–Kaliningrad area, and at the turn of 2014–2015, development of new programs of crossborder cooperation for the period up to 2020 has been set in motion. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The work was carried out at the Institute of Geog raphy of the Russian Academy of Sciences under project no. 141803621 of the Russian Science Foun dation. REFERENCES 1. Anisimov, A.M., Vardomskiy, L.B., Kolosov, V.A., Hertsen, A.A., Gritsenko, A.A., Zotova, M.V., Sebentsov, A.B., et al., Crossborder cooperation of the regions of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine: state and pros pects, Evraz. Ekon. Integr., 2013, no. 4 (21), pp. 76–96. 2. Federal Statistical Service, Database of the indices of municipal units, 2013. http://www.gks.ru/dbscripts/ munst/munst27/DBInet.cgi#1 3. Vardomskiy, L.B., Rossiiskoe porubezh’e v usloviyakh globalizatsii (Russian Borderlands in Globalization). Moscow: LIBROKOM, 2009. 4. Vegesh, M., Karpats’ka Ukraina. Dokumenti i fakti (Carpathian Ukraine: Documents and Facts), Uzh gorod: Karpati, 2004. 5. Gritsenko, A.A., Ethnocultural gradient and regional identity along the Russian–Ukrainian–Belarusian borderlands, Reg. Res. Russ., 2011, vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 351–362. 6. Dulichenko, A.D., Carpathian Russians today: some ethnolinguistic aspects, Slavyanovedenie, 2005, no. 1, pp. 20–29. 2015

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19. Melnik, A., Institutional aspects of Ukraine and Poland’s transborder cooperation: results and prob lems, in Regional Transborder Cooperation in Countries of Central and Eastern Europe – a Balance of Achieve ments, Warsaw: Pol. Acad. Sci., 2006, pp. 117–137. 20. World Bank Database, Official exchange rate (LCU per US$, period average), 2013. http://search.world bank.org/data?qterm=2263478/ 21. World Bank Database, PPP conversion factor, GDP (LCU per international $), 2013. http://search.world bank.org/data?qterm=2263478 22. World Bank Database, PPP conversion factor, private consumption (LCU per international $), 2013. http://search.worldbank.org/data?qterm=1283456 23. Regdat – Regional Statistics Database, Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, 2013. http://pxweb.sta tistics.sk/PXWebSlovak/index_en.htm 24. Hungarian Central Statistical Office, Regional statis tics, 2013 https://www.ksh.hu/regional_statistics 25. Scott, J.W., Euroregions, governance and transborder cooperation within the EU, Eur. Res. Reg. Sci., 2000, vol. 10, pp. 104–115. 26. Sowa, B., Cooperation between small and medium sized enterprises and other participants of the market in the Carpathian Euroregion, in Regional Transborder Cooperation in Countries of Central and Eastern Europe—a Balance of Achievements, Warsaw: Pol. Acad. Sci., 2006, pp. 159–165. 27. Sustainable Development Indicators at Territorial level for Romania (SDIT), 2013. http://www.insse.ro/ cms/files/IDDT%202012/index_IDDT_en.htm 28. Tanaka, H., Carpathian Euroregion and CrossBorder Governance, J. Comp. Econ. Stud., 2006, vol. 2, pp. 59–80. 29. van Houtum, H., Internationalisation and Mental Bor ders, Tijdschrift Econ. Soc. Geogr., 1999, vol. 90, no. 3, pp. 329–335. 30. Zdanowicz, M., Local Border Traffic on the Polish Sec tion of the European Union External Border, Warsaw: ASPRAJR, 2014.

Translated by A. Kolemesin


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