trois essais sur l'influence des agents externes de ...

AIX-MARSEILLE UNIVERSITÉ Aix-Marseille Graduate School of Management – Institut d’Administration des Entreprises Centre d’Etudes et de Recherche en Gestion d’Aix-Marseille – EA 4225 Ecole Doctorale de Sciences Economiques et de Gestion d’Aix-Marseille – ED 372

TROIS ESSAIS SUR L’INFLUENCE DES AGENTS EXTERNES DE CONTRÔLE SUR LA POURSUITE DU BUT DU CONSOMMATEUR : DE LA RELIGION AUX MARQUES Three essays on the influence of external agents of control on consumer goal pursuit: From religion to brands

THÈSE POUR L’OBTENTION DU DOCTORAT EN SCIENCES DE GESTION DE L’UNIVERSITÉ D’AIX-MARSEILLE Présentée et soutenue publiquement le 10 décembre 2015 par

Jamel KHENFER

JURY Directeurs de recherche :

Madame Elyette ROUX Professeure, Aix-Marseille Université Monsieur Eric TAFANI Professeur, Aix-Marseille Université

Rapporteurs :

Monsieur Michael HAENLEIN Professeur, ESCP Europe Monsieur Bo R. SANITIOSO Professeur, Université Paris Descartes

Suffragants :

Madame Caroline CUNY Professeure, Grenoble Ecole de Management Monsieur Aaron C. KAY Professeur, Duke University (Etats-Unis)

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L’Université n’entend donner aucune approbation ni improbation aux opinions émises dans la thèse, ces opinions doivent être considérées comme propres à leur auteur.

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En mémoire de mon père.

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Contents Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................ viii Extended abstract in French – Résumé en français ............................................................. ix

General introduction ................................................................................................................ 1 Essay 1: Religion and religiousness in marketing ............................................................... 22 Essay 2: The divergent influence of belief in divine control on goal commitment ........... 62 Essay 3: The divergent effect of external systems of control on early stage goal pursuit 81 General conclusion ............................................................................................................... 128 References ............................................................................................................................. 147 Table of Contents ................................................................................................................. 166 List of Tables......................................................................................................................... 170 List of Figures ....................................................................................................................... 171 Appendices ............................................................................................................................ 172

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Acknowledgements Although words are hardly enough, I must express my immense gratitude to the people who have helped me in my journey towards earning a doctorate. To my advisors, Elyette Roux and Eric Tafani, thank you for your constant encouragement and guidance. Thank you for seeing my strengths when I could not and my weaknesses when my ego blinded me. To the other members of my dissertation committee—Caroline Cuny, Michael Haenlein, Aaron Kay and Bo Sanitioso—thank you for accepting the (hopefully, not so much of a) burden of assessing my work and attending my defense. To the wonderful people of the Marketing department of Grenoble School of Management, thank you for being so awesome (and hiring me as a research assistant and thereafter as a postdoctoral researcher). To the wonderful (kind of redundant, but true as a matter of fact) people of the Fuqua School of Business at Duke University. In particular, to Aaron Kay, thank you for giving me a chance and letting me learn among such giants as Jim Bettman, Gavan Fitzsimons, and yourself of course. To my coauthors for all my research projects—notably Steven Shepherd and Kristin Laurin (in addition to Elyette, Eric, and Aaron)—thank you for trusting me and accepting to work with me. Let us not forget Mark Landau and Lucas Keefer, thank you for helping me run with the big dogs. To Mozy Inc., thank you soooo much for helping me recover my research files when my laptop computer crashed out of nowhere in the middle of the fourth year of my doctorate. To my mother, my brother Karim and my sister Anissa, thank you for being there when I need it. To my father, thank you for teaching me to be patient and to endure. I am sorry I was not able to finish before you had to leave.

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Extended abstract in French – Résumé en français

Extended abstract in French – Résumé en français Lors de la poursuite d’un but, les consommateurs s’appuient souvent sur des sources externes de contrôle pour maintenir des niveaux de motivation élevés. Face à un sentiment d’impuissance, leur présence compense le sentiment de ne pas être au contrôle de son existence et permet de nier que les évènements de la vie peuvent se dérouler de manière aléatoire, que les choses peuvent être dues au hasard (Kay, Gaucher, Napier, Callan et Laurin 2008 ; Rothbaum, Weisz et Snyder 1982). En d’autres termes, lorsqu’un individu se sent incapable de contrôler la poursuite de son but, la perception d’ordre et de structure (mis en œuvre par un agent externe) renforce le sentiment que « tout est sous contrôle » et que, par conséquence, toute action produira un résultat attendu (Kay, Laurin, Fitzsimons, et Landau 2014 ; Landau, Kay et Whitson 2015). L’exemple le plus frappant a sans doute trait à la religion. Nombreuses sont celles qui promeuvent l’existence d’une déité toute puissante et omnipotente capable d’influencer favorablement ou défavorablement la vie des individus, et plus largement, le monde dans lequel ils vivent. Par exemple, dans la Bible, il est écrit « L'Éternel est mon berger : je ne manquerai de rien. Il me fait reposer dans de verts pâturages, Il me dirige près des eaux paisibles. » (Psaume 23). S’agissant d’un psaume de l’Ancien Testament, ce texte est susceptible de faire sens tant auprès d’individus de confessions juive que chrétienne. Dans la même idée, les musulmans peuvent lire dans le Coran (4 : 45) « Allah connaît mieux vos ennemis. Allah suffit comme protecteur. Allah suffit comme secoureur. » La référence à une déité omnipotente n’est pas propre aux religions abrahamiques mais concerne également, par exemple, l’Hindouisme où la croyance dans le karma sous-entend l’existence d’une force universelle influençant la vie des individus selon leurs actions passées (Sharma 1991). Si ces exemples ne renvoient qu’à

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quatre religions, ils s’avèrent tout de même pertinents pour plus des deux-tiers de la population mondiale1. Or, malgré les prédictions fondées sur la théorie de la sécularisation (Hirschle 2013), selon laquelle le progrès humain et scientifique supplantera les croyances religieuses, force est de constater que la religion est toujours présente dans la vie des individus. De récentes enquêtes révèlent que 87% de la population mondiale croit en une entité divine2. Si ce nombre peut être plus faible dans des régions du monde où l’athéisme est plus fort (Europe occidentale et Chine, par exemple), il atteint 92% aux Etats-Unis3 et a même augmenté en Russie avec la chute de l’Union Soviétique (de 38% en 1991 à 56% en 2008)4. Au-delà de la force argumentative de ces chiffres, notons que l’exposition au concept de déités omnipotentes est un aspect culturel relativement commun dans le monde d’aujourd’hui. Autrement dit, quelle que soit la disposition des individus à adhérer ou non à l’idée d’un contrôle divin, ils sont exposés au quotidien à une telle croyance. Par exemple, le langage familier est ponctué d’expression comme « Dieu merci » ou « si Dieu le veut » qui impliquent l’appel au contrôle divin. Emissions de télévision, musique et films sont autant de canaux par lesquels les individus sont exposés à des références religieuses dénotant l’existence de déités omnipotentes. Dans la série à succès Game of Thrones de la chaîne HBO, les personnages s’en remettent souvent aux dieux, ou alors les blâment pour s’immiscer dans leur vie. En 2013, le rappeur Eminem sortait un morceau intitulé Rap God – un succès commercial avec trois millions de copies vendues5 et plus de 230 millions de vues sur YouTube. Un dernier exemple de l’exposition fréquente des individus à la notion de contrôle 1

Estimation de Pew Research Center (2010). Global Religious Diversity. Accès le 17 août 2015 depuis http://www.pewforum.org/2014/04/04/global-religious-diversity/ 2 Estimation de Win-Gallup International (2012). Global index of religiosity and atheism. Accès le 17 août 2015 depuis http://www.wingia.com/web/files/news/14/file/14.pdf 3 Pew Research Center. (2012). “Nones” on the Rise: One-in-Five Adults Have No Religious Affiliation. Accès le 17 août 2015 depuis http://www.pewforum.org/files/2012/10/NonesOnTheRise-full.pdf 4 Estimation de Pew Research Center (2014). Russians Return to Religion, But Not to Church. Accès le 17 août 2015 depuis http://www.pewforum.org/2014/02/10/russians-return-to-religion-but-not-to-church/ 5 Recording Industry Association of America (2015). Accès le 17 août 2015 depuis http://www.riaa.com/goldandplatinumdata.php?artist=%22Rap+God%22

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divin peut être l’apposition de la devise des Etats-Unis « In God we trust »6 au dos des billets de la monnaie nationale (le dollar). De la même manière que la religion rappelle souvent aux croyants qu’une déité, une force surnaturelle est à leurs côtés dans tous les moments de leur vie, les marques rappellent souvent explicitement qu’elles sont de véritables partenaires permettant aux consommateurs d’atteindre leurs buts (Fournier et Alvarez 2012 ; Kervyn, Fiske et Malone 2012). Par exemple, en ce qui concerne les buts d’épargne, certaines banques communiquent à partir de messages dont l’objectif est de créer des associations à la marque fondées sur la notion que les clients peuvent se reposer sur la banque en question pour leur permettre d’atteindre leurs buts. En ce sens, il est possible de nommer AIG qui annonce dans un slogan « la force d’être là »7 ou encore Aviva qui clame dans ses publicités qu’« on s’occupe de ce qui est important »8. Dans le domaine du soin du corps et de la beauté, Maybelline (groupe L’Oréal) décrit les personnages féminins de ses publicités avec le message suivant : « peut-être qu’elle est née comme ça, peut-être que c’est Maybelline » 9. L’enseigne The Home Depot, leader américain sur le marché de l’équipement de la maison, promet que « de bonnes choses arrivent quand Home Depot est en ville10 ». L’essence de ces messages consiste à présenter la marque comme un acteur capable d’intervenir dans la vie du consommateur pour permettre à ce dernier d’accomplir son but. Malgré une utilisation répandue, l’efficacité des messages mettant en avant la marque comme partenaire reste une source d’interrogation. Est-ce que rappeler au consommateur que la poursuite du but peut dépendre d’un agent externe de contrôle (l’entreprise, voire une déité omnipotente) a nécessairement un effet positif pour inciter ce dernier à mobiliser des efforts pour atteindre le but en question ? 6

Traduction française : « En Dieu, nous avons confiance ». Traduit de l’anglais : « The strength to be there. » 8 Traduit de l’anglais : « Taking care of what’s important. » 9 Traduit de l’anglais : « Maybe she’s born with it. Maybe it’s Maybelline. » 10 Traduit de l’anglais : « Good things happen when Home Depot comes to town. » 7

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1. EXPOSÉ DU PROBLÈME DE RECHERCHE Des courants de recherche importants en psychologie sociale suggèrent que promouvoir la présence d’agents externes influents est une source de démotivation à l’investissement d’efforts en vue de l’accomplissement d’un but. Par exemple, la recherche sur la réactance psychologique montre que lorsqu’un agent externe manifeste ouvertement sa présence pour inciter l’individu à poursuivre son but, ce dernier peut prendre la direction inverse et abandonner ledit but (Brehm 1966). Même si aucun travail à notre connaissance n’a traité de réactance face à la perception d’une influence d’ordre divin, Laran, Dalton et Andrade (2011) soulignent que la réactance peut survenir vis-à-vis des marques. Plus précisément, Laran et collègues mettent en évidence que les slogans pouvent être perçus comme des techniques de persuasion importunes dans la prise de décision et, par conséquent, conduire à se détourner du but poursuivi. Par exemple, les participants exposés à un message encourageant à l’épargne « Walmart – Epargnez. Vivez mieux »11 exprimaient des intentions à dépenser significativement plus importante que ceux simplement exposés à la marque sans le slogan. La recherche sur la paresse sociale produit des résultats convergents à cet égard (Karau et Williams 1993 ; Laurin, Kay et Fitzsimons 2012). Ce courant de recherche met en avant que la notion d’agence externe peut avoir des effets néfastes sur la motivation à la poursuite d’un but dès lors qu’atteindre le but apparaît dépendre des décisions et des actions entreprises par d’autres personnes. Parce que la responsabilité des résultats semble être partagée avec d’autres parties prenantes investies dans la poursuite du but, les individus tendent à se comporter selon « le principe du moindre effort » (Zipf 1949). En cela, ils sont incités à minimiser la dépense d’efforts, ou en d’autres termes, à choisir la route la plus simple en se reposant sur d’autres pour arriver à leurs fins.

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Traduit de l’anglais : « Walmart – Save money. Live better. »

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Une perspective théorique différente peut toutefois conduire à formuler l’hypothèse opposée, en droite ligne avec celle que nous proposons ici. La théorie du contrôle compensatoire (CCT; Kay, et al. 2008 ; Landau et al. 2015) propose que percevoir des sources externe de contrôle– qu’elles soient de nature religieuse ou commerciale – apporte de l’ordre dans la vie des individus, d’une façon qui leur permet de compenser un faible sentiment de contrôle personnel. Autrement dit, cette théorie postule que lorsque les individus ont le sentiment de ne pas être capables de produire eux-mêmes les résultats désirés ni d’éviter les résultats indésirables, ils s’efforcent de revenir à des niveaux de contrôle perçus inaltérés. Une stratégie permettant cela consiste à se reposer sur des sources externes de contrôle religieux (par une déité omnipotente) ou séculier (par une institution sociopolitique, par un groupe de personnes, etc.). Ces sources externes renforcent en effet le sentiment que le monde est ordonné et prévisible, et qu’actions et résultats sont liés par voie de causalité. Elles rassurent l’individu quant à l’idée que, même la capacité de contrôle de ces sources externes n’est pas absolue, les évènements ne se déroulent pas de manière chaotique (Kay et al. 2008 ; 2010). Selon cette perspective, un agent externe de contrôle – tel qu’une entreprise dont la marque promet de manière crédible de jouer un rôle actif durant l’utilisation du produit ou service – peut garantir un certain niveau d’ordre et de prévisibilité nécessaire à la prise d’action en vue de l’accomplissement du but (Kay et al. 2014; Landau et al. 2015). En somme, alors que bon nombre de recherches établissent que la présence d’agents externes influents affecte négativement la motivation des individus à poursuivre leurs buts, nous faisons ici la proposition inverse. Spécifiquement, nous proposons que rappeler la présence d’agents externes de contrôle rassure les individus sur leurs capacités à atteindre les résultats désirés lorsque le sentiment de contrôle personnel est menacé. Dans ce cas, rappeler une telle croyance constituent une source de motivation parce qu’elle est indicative de la présence d’ordre et de prédictibilité dans la poursuite du but. En l’absence de cette menace,

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cette croyance devrait au contraire inciter l’individu à agir selon « le principe du moindre effort ». Le problème de recherche qui motive la conduite de ce travail de recherche peut être formulé de la manière suivante : dans quelle mesure mettre en avant la présence d’agents externes de contrôle peut être une source de motivation ou de démotivation à la poursuite du but du consommateur ? Afin de répondre à cette question, nous avons conduit trois recherches. La première, purement conceptuelle (Essai 1), propose un cadre conceptuel dans lequel inscrire l’étude de la religion en marketing. La seconde, empirique (Essai 2), démontre que la croyance dans le contrôle divin peut avoir des conséquences radicalement opposés quant à l’engagement envers le but (baisse ou accroit) selon le niveau d’efficacité personnelle (fort ou faible). La troisième, empirique (Essai 3), fait le lien entre religion et marque en développant la notion d’homologie fonctionnelle. Nous démontrons que la croyance dans le contrôle divin et la confiance en la marque se compensent lorsque les individus doivent faire face à une menace sur leur contrôle personnel.

2. VUE D’ENSEMBLE DES ESSAIS DE LA THÈSE 2.1. Essai 1 – Religion et sentiment religieux en marketing : objectifs MacInnis (2011) a proposé une catégorisation des contributions conceptuelles en marketing à partir du principal objectif poursuivi : visualiser de nouvelles idées, lier des idées, débattre d’idées et expliquer des idées. Ce dernier objectif est celui de l’Essai 1. Spécifiquement, cet article propose un cadre conceptuel visant à délimiter les concepts de religion et son pendant psychologique, le sentiment religieux, et d’expliquer comment ils peuvent influencer des construits pertinents dans l’étude du comportement du consommateur. Cet objectif se décline en trois sous-objectifs et permet ainsi de poser les fondements théoriques et méthodologiques des deux essais empiriques qui suivent (Essai 2 et Essai 3). xiv


Le premier objectif consiste à fournir des définitions claires pour les concepts de religion et de sentiment religieux. La littérature sur la religion en marketing a manqué de cohérence à ce sujet. Les auteurs utilisent souvent des termes différents (sentiment religieux, religiosité, etc.) en référence au même concept (l’influence de la religion sur la psyché de l’individu) et des définitions ad hoc dont le but est de servir les besoins de la recherche en cours. Ce manque de clarté a limité la construction d’une littérature cohérente. Considérant ces limites, nous nous appuyons sur les premiers travaux dédiés à l’étude scientifique de la religion (Durkheim 1912, James 1902, Weber 1905) ainsi que sur des travaux récents notamment en psychologie sociale et cognitive (par exemple, Kupor, Laurin et Levav 2015). Le deuxième objectif de l’Essai 1 consiste à organiser la littérature très éparse sur l’étude de la religion en un cadre intelligible. En d’autres termes, il s’agit de fournir un guide, une carte permettant à quiconque intéressé par l’étude de la religion en marketing de se repérer. En plus de cette « carte », présentée à la fois de manière textuelle et graphique, nous illustrons comment des perspectives théoriques différentes permettent d’étudier la façon dont la religion affecte différents construits du comportement du consommateur (poursuite du but, attitude envers la publicité, aversion pour la marque, etc.). A cette fin, nous développons sept propositions de recherche (cf. Tableau 1). 

Le premier ensemble de propositions (P1 et P2) repose sur l’observation que la religion peut influencer le comportement de manière manifeste, c’est-à-dire se traduire par des comportements qui dénotent ostensiblement le suivi de croyances et de rites religieux spécifiques à une religion.

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Le second ensemble de propositions (P3 à P7) reflète l’idée que l’influence de la religion sur le comportement de l’individu peut être perceptible à un niveau plus latent. Cette influence peut s’exprimer à tout moment sans être associée au suivi de croyances et de rites spécifiques à une religion. Nous différencions en cela les

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recherches qui traitent de l’influence du sentiment religieux comme un trait de l’individu (pouvant varier en force) de celles qui traitent de l’influence du sentiment religieux comme un état (pouvant varier en saillance). Nous développons cette dernière perspective afin de nuancer l’idée répandue dans la littérature sur la religion en marketing que le sentiment religieux est une caractéristique stable de l’individu. Nous suggérons plutôt que le sentiment religieux peut être considéré comme une ressource psychologique permettant aux individus de faire face à certains types de menaces pesant sur le besoin de contrôle, de signification, d’estime de soi, ou d’identité. Le troisième objectif est de promouvoir l’usage des expérimentations car, dans l’étude du comportement du consommateur, pouvoir tester des relations causales est crucial afin d’isoler les processus psychologiques en jeu et d’identifier la cause d’un effet. Néanmoins, la recherche en marketing s’étant intéressée à la religion a systématiquement utilisé des analyses corrélationnelles, sauf exception (Kopalle, Lehmann et Farley 2010; Shachar, Erdem, Cutright et Fitzsimons 2011). Considérer le sentiment religieux comme une différence individuelle est certes pertinent pour identifier des relations entre construits, mais s’avère tout de même problématique en une certaine mesure. En effet, exprimer de fortes croyances religieuses a parfois tendance à corréler avec des traits de personnalité comme le conservatisme (McDaniel et Burnett 1990) ou certaines caractéristiques démographiques comme l’âge (Shachar et al. 2011). Manipuler la saillance des croyances religieuses permet ainsi de démontrer l’existence d’un effet causal. Les deux essais empiriques testent spécifiquement l’une des propositions énumérées dans l’Essai 1. Cette proposition (à savoir P4) repose sur la prémisse développée dans l’article de synthèse que le sentiment religieux peut servir, entre autres besoins psychologiques, à pallier une perte de contrôle personnel en faisant appel à la notion de contrôle divin.

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Tableau 1 Synthèse des propositions de l'Essai 1 Type d’influence de la religion

Domaines d’intérêt pour l’étude du comportement du consommateur

En contexte religieux

Choix sous restriction

En contexte séculier

Culte de la marque

Manifeste

Latente

Caractéristique Préférences de l’individu ascétiques

Propositions Lorsque l’obédience religieuse (relative aux interdits et prescriptions) entre en conflit avec le but situationnel du consommateur (commodité, assimilation sociale, etc.) : P1a : Une faible saillance du but religieux et une faible ou forte saillance du but situationnel accroissent la réactance psychologique vis-à-vis de la restriction religieuse et conduisent à son rejet. P1b : Une forte saillance du but religieux et une faible saillance du but situationnel réduisent la réactance psychologique vis-à-vis de la restriction et conduisent à son acceptation. P1c : Une forte saillance du but religieux et une forte saillance du but situationnel situationnels accroissent la réactance psychologique vis-à-vis de la restriction et conduisent à son interprétation pour concilier les deux buts concurrents. P2 : Le concept de culte de la marque peut être défini par celui de religion pour qualifier le lien entre le consommateur et la marque (1) lorsqu’il existe des croyances attribuant une dimension sacrée à la marque (transcendant le soi), (2) lorsque le consommateur entreprend des pratiques visant à manifester son hostilité pour des marques concurrentes et les choses vues comme profanes et (3) lorsque le consommateur entreprend des pratiques visant à manifester son adoration pour la marque. P3 : Le sentiment religieux, en tant que caractéristique individuelle, affecte les variables dépendantes pertinentes à l’étude du comportement du consommateur par une préférence pour l’ascétisme, quelle que soit l’affiliation religieuse. xvii


Ressource satisfaisant un besoin de contrôle

Poursuite du but

Ressource satisfaisant un besoin de signification

Aversion à la marque

Ressource satisfaisant un besoin d’estime de soi

Ressource satisfaisant un besoin d’identité

P4a : Lorsque le sentiment religieux est saillant (en particulier la croyance en une déité omnipotente), planifier un but de manière vague conduit les individus à exprimer des niveaux de motivation plus faibles que lorsque le sentiment religieux est neutre. Un faible sentiment d’efficacité personnelle médiatise cette relation. P4b : Lorsque le sentiment religieux est saillant (en particulier la croyance en une déité omnipotente), planifier un but de manière spécifique conduit les individus à exprimer des niveaux de motivation plus élevés que lorsque le sentiment religieux est neutre. Un fort sentiment d’efficacité personnelle médiatise cette relation. P5 : L’impact de l’échec du but sur l’aversion pour la marque est considérablement amoindri lorsque le sentiment religieux est saillant que lorsqu’il est neutre. La saillance du sentiment religieux réduit l’attribution de responsabilité envers la marque dès lors que la marque n’est pas perçue comme ayant délibérément causé l’échec du but.

Attitude envers la publicité

P6 : L’impact des publicités visant à accroitre l’estime de soi sur l’attitude envers ladite publicité est plus négative lorsque le sentiment religieux est saillant que lorsqu’il est neutre, pour les individus dont le sentiment religieux intrinsèque est élevé. L’inconfort psychologique médiatise cette relation.

Choix de produits

P7a : L’impact d’une menace perçue sur la religion conduit à une préférence pour des moyens directs (versus indirects) pour manifester son soutien lorsque les différences intergroupes sont faibles. Un fort besoin de différenciation médiatise cette relation. P7b : L’impact d’une menace perçue sur la religion conduit à une préférence pour des moyens indirects (versus directs) pour manifester son soutien lorsque les différences intergroupes sont fortes. Un faible besoin de différenciation joue médiatise cette relation.

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2.2. Essai 2 – Effets des croyances dans le contrôle divin sur l’engagement envers le but : objectifs et résultats Dans l’Essai 1, nous utilisons de récents travaux sur l’étude psychologique de la religion afin de développer l’argument que le sentiment religieux peut être mobilisé dans le cadre d’un mécanisme défensif visant à réduire l’anxiété liée à la menace de certains besoins psychologiques. Dans l’Essai 2, nous nous intéressons spécifiquement au besoin de contrôle. Nous étudions dans quelle mesure la notion de contrôle divin (c’est-à-dire la croyance en une déité omnipotente et capable d’agence externe) peut être utilisée par l’individu de manière défensive comme une source de contrôle compensatoire lorsque ce dernier se sent incapable de contrôler la poursuite de son but. Laurin et collègues (2012) montrent qu’en l’absence de menace sur le contrôle personnel, exposer les individus à la notion de contrôle divin peut réduire la motivation à la poursuite active d’un but. Ce résultat est d’ailleurs cohérent avec les travaux sur la paresse sociale qui suggèrent que travailler en équipe avec d’autres personnes réduit l’effort fourni par l’individu (Harkins et Szymansk 1988). Néanmoins, la religion est souvent considérer comme un ensemble de croyances promouvant le contrôle secondaire, c’est-à-dire l’ajustement à une réalité où des agents externes (en l’occurrence, une déité) exercent un certain niveau de contrôle. Croire en une source de contrôle divin permet aux individus de maintenir une sorte de contrôle indirect lorsqu’une situation devient difficilement gérable (Rothbaum, Weisz et Snyder 1982; Sasaki et Kim 2011). Nous proposons donc dans l’Essai 2 que de telles divergences existent dans la littérature parce que le rôle modérateur de la menace sur le contrôle personnel a été négligé. Dans cet article empirique, une telle menace est induite par la manipulation du sentiment d’efficacité personnelle, autrement dit, du sentiment d’être capable par ses propres moyens

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d’atteindre un but (Bandura 1989 ; 1994). Deux questions de recherche motivent la conduite de ces études : 

Est-ce que les individus mobilisent de manière défensive leur sentiment religieux lorsque le sentiment d’efficacité personnelle est affaibli, afin de conserver un engagement élevé envers le but poursuivi?



Lorsque la notion de contrôle divin est saillante, est-ce que la baisse d’engagement envers le but est spécifique à l’absence de menace sur le contrôle personnel ?

Le tableau 2 propose un résumé des études de l’Essai 2. Dans une première étude, nous avons d’abord mesuré le sentiment religieux dans l’idée d’avoir un proxy de la mesure de la croyance que le monde fonctionne de manière ordonnée et prévisible. Ensuite, nous avons manipulé le sentiment d’efficacité personnelle (faible versus élevée) dans le domaine de l’épargne retraite avant de mesurer l’engagement des participants vis-à-vis de ce but. En utilisant le contexte de l’épargne retraite, notre intention était de neutraliser l’effet de la progression vis-à-vis du but. En effet, la recherche sur la poursuite du but a identifié la progression comme un facteur explicatif déterminant (Fishbach, Zhang et Koo 2009; Zhan et Huang 2010). A cette fin, nous avons suggéré aux participants que le but de l’épargne retraite requiert généralement de gérer son argent tout au long de sa vie pour être certain qu’il dure aussi longtemps que nécessaire. Les analyses de cette première étude ont révélé que lorsque la perception d’efficacité personnelle était expérimentalement réduite, le sentiment religieux était positivement associé à l’engagement envers le but. Aucun effet n’a été détecté quand la perception d’efficacité personnelle était expérimentalement élevée. Il apparaît donc à travers ces premiers résultats que le sentiment religieux peut être défensivement mobilisé pour satisfaire un besoin de contrôle lorsque la perception d’efficacité personnelle est menacée.

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Tableau 2 Etudes de l’Essai 2 : échantillons, designs et principaux résultats Etude

Echantillon

Design expérimental

1

164 participants en ligne, Américains Age moyen : 34 ans Femmes : 70.1% Contexte de consommation : épargne retraite.

2 (efficacité personnelle: faible vs. élevée) × un modérateur continu (sentiment religieux) échantillons indépendants.

2

317 participants en ligne, Américains Age moyen : 34 ans Femmes : 78.9% Contexte de consommation : épargne retraite.

2 (efficacité personnelle: faible vs. élevée) × 3 (croyances religieuses: déité omnipotente vs. déité créatrice vs. neutre) échantillons indépendants.

Principaux résultats Le sentiment religieux influence positivement l’engagement envers le but quand le sentiment d’efficacité personnelle est expérimentalement réduit. Le sentiment religieux n’affecte pas l’engagement envers le but quand le sentiment d’efficacité personnelle est expérimentalement élevé. La saillance de la croyance en une déité omnipotente influence positivement (négativement) l’engagement envers le but quand le sentiment d’efficacité personnelle est expérimentalement réduit (élevé). La saillance de la croyance en une déité créatrice n’a aucun effet.

Dans une seconde étude, nous avons testé les hypothèses que la saillance de la croyance en un contrôle divin réduit (accroît) l’engagement envers le but lorsque la perception d’efficacité personnelle est faible (élevée). Nous avons d’abord manipulé la saillance du sentiment religieux à partir de trois conditions en demandant aux participants de lire un article de la revue Science, sous le prétexte d’un test de lecture afin de dissimuler nos hypothèses. Dans une première condition, l’article traitait de récentes recherches montrant qu’il était scientifiquement possible qu’une force surnaturelle (déité omnipotente) intervienne dans les affaires du monde pour mettre de l’ordre dans l’univers. Dans une deuxième condition, l’article traitait de récentes recherches montrant qu’il était scientifiquement possible qu’une force surnaturelle ait créé le monde dans lequel nous vivons ; aucune mention relative à l’omnipotence n’a été faite. Un troisième article a servi de condition neutre et traitait des

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dernières avancées dans le domaine des images de l’espace. L’objectif était d’isoler l’effet identifié dans l’étude précédente et de mettre en avant que cet effet était dû à l’exposition à un agent externe de contrôle et non aux croyances religieuses en elles-mêmes. Nous avons ensuite manipulé le sentiment d’efficacité personnelle et mesuré l’engagement envers le but comme dans l’étude précédente. Les résultats ont confirmé nos attentes et validé les hypothèses testées.

2.3. Essai 3 – Les effets divergents des systèmes externes de contrôle sur la poursuite du but : objectifs et résultats L’Essai 3 se différencie de l’Essai 2 sur trois points. D’abord, dans l’Essai 2, nous avons manipulé directement la perception d’efficacité personnelle dans le but d’induire une menace sur le sentiment de contrôle personnel. Dans l’Essai 3, notre ligne de recherche associe théorie du contrôle compensatoire (Kay et al. 2008) et théorie des niveaux de construit (construal level theory ; Liberman et Trope 1998). Cette dernière théorie suggère que porter son attention sur des détails concrets conduit l’individu à considérer en premier lieu la faisabilité d’un but alors qu’approcher un but de manière abstraite conduit l’individu à s’interroger avant tout sur la désirabilité de ce but (Liberman et Trope 1998; Trope, Liberman et Wakslak 2007). Lorsque l’individu s’imagine les modalités de planification (le « comment », le « quand » et le « où ») d’un but de manière très concrète, il peut en venir à s’interroger sur sa capacité à accomplir toutes les étapes nécessaires pour pouvoir arriver à ses fins, et donc, sur sa capacité à produire les résultats désirés (Dalton et Spiller 2012; Townsend et Liu 2012; Ülkümen et Cheema 2011). En d’autres termes, une planification très spécifique, détaillée peut conduire les individus à douter de leur efficacité personnelle. Ensuite, alors que l’Essai 2 utilisait exclusivement le contexte de l’épargne retraite, dans l’Essai 3, nous avons diversifié les contextes de consommation afin de s’assurer de la xxii


robustesse de nos hypothèses. Spécifiquement, nous avons utilisé le contexte de l’épargne pour des projets personnels et choisis par les participants, ainsi que le contexte de la remise en forme physique (bien-être/santé). L’important était ici de s’appuyer sur des buts à long terme, c’est-à-dire des buts dont l’accomplissement dépend d’un certain nombre d’actions étalées sur une relativement longue période de temps. Nous nous attendions en effet à ce qu’une planification spécifique, détaillée réduise le sentiment d’efficacité personnelle et donc la motivation à la poursuite d’un but seulement dans le cas où le consommateur était loin de l’état final désiré. Des travaux précédents ont effectivement montré que plus l’individu est proche de l’accomplissement du but, plus ses efforts sont importants en raison d’une plus grande confiance, d’une plus grande certitude dans ses capacités à atteindre le but (goal gradient effect ; Kivetz, Urminsky et Zheng 2006). L’Essai 3 teste ainsi la triple interaction entre saillance de la présence d’agents externes influents, le niveau de spécification de la planification et la progression vis-à-vis du but (voir tableau 3). Enfin, l’Essai 3 étend notre champ d’investigation au-delà de la religion vers les marques. Nous proposons en effet que des agents externes de contrôle aussi différents qu’une déité omnipotente et des marques fiables générant de la confiance, peuvent accroître la motivation des consommateurs à poursuivre leurs buts en cas de faible efficacité personnelle. Une marque n’est pas seulement un nom et un logo, mais englobe aussi des croyances et des associations (Keller 1993) qui peuvent lui permettre de présenter le potentiel d’une source de contrôle compensatoire aux yeux des consommateurs. Par exemple, une marque peut apparaître comme ayant un fort pouvoir sur les consommateurs raison de sa capacité à influencer la vie sociale des individus et à exercer une forte pression (lobbying) sur le législateur (Herman 1981; Stevenson, 1985). Par ailleurs, les marques se présentent souvent comme des partenaires de confiance pour le consommateur (Fournier et Alvarez 2012 ; Kervyn, Fiske et Malone 2012; Moorman, Zaltman et Deshpande 1992). Il ne s’agit pas ici

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pour la marque d’afficher des traits relatifs à l’honnêteté ou à l’intégrité mais d’afficher un niveau de fiabilité garantissant l’exécution des promesses annoncées. En d’autres termes, il s’agit de figurer comme une source d’ordre et de structure dans l’élaboration du choix de consommation lorsque celui-ci peut susciter de l’incertitude, du désordre. En somme, nous proposons qu’une marque perçue comme fiable, digne de confiance remplit la même fonction qu’une déité omnipotente. Toutes deux peuvent être conceptuellement définies comme des agents externes de contrôle. Trois questions de recherche sont spécifiquement abordées et adressent plus particulièrement le commencement de la planification d’un but à long-terme : 

Est-ce que l’effet démotivationnel de la spécification de la planification peut-être renversé par l’exposition à la notion d’agence d’externe ?



La perception d’efficacité personnelle médiatise-t-elle cet effet ?



Est-ce que des sources externes de contrôle sont substituables face à la spécification de la planification ?

Le tableau 3 propose un résumé des cinq études de l’Essai 3. Dans une première étude (Etude 1), nous montrons que l’exposition à la notion d’une déité omnipotente, mais pas d’une déité créatrice sans capacité d’agence externe, augmente la motivation à épargner lorsque les participants ont affaire à un plan d’épargne détaillé. A l’inverse, lorsque ce plan est vague, la même manipulation réduit la motivation à épargner. Dans une deuxième étude (Etude 2), nous répliquons ces résultats en nous appuyant sur des buts d’épargne choisis par les participants, alors qu’ils étaient assignés par scénario dans l’Etude 1. Utiliser de la sorte des buts personnels des participants permet d’approcher la réalité des consommateurs avec plus d’exactitude et donc de consolider le caractère généralisable de nos résultats.

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Tableau 3: Etudes de l’Essai 3 : échantillons, designs et principaux résultats Etude

Echantillon

1

204 participants en ligne, Américains Age moyen : 33 ans Femmes : 74.0% Contexte : épargne (scénario).

2

165 participants en ligne, Américains Age moyen : 33 ans Femmes : 74.0% Contexte : épargne.

3

145 participants en ligne, Américains Age moyen : 36 ans Femmes : 75.2% Contexte : bienêtre/santé.

4A

151 participants en ligne, Américains Age moyen : 31 ans Femmes : 75.2% Contexte : épargne.

4B

271 participants en ligne, Américains Age moyen : 31 ans Femmes : 73.4% Contexte de consommation : épargne.

Design expérimental

Principauxs résultats

2 (planification: vague vs. précise) × 3 (système externe : déité omnipotente vs. déité créatrice vs. neutre) échantillons indépendants.

L’exposition à une déité omnipotente accroît (réduit) la motivation des participants à épargner lorsqu’il leur est demandé de faire des plans précis (vague). L’accroissement de motivation parmi ceux ayant planifié de manière précise est dû à l’exposition à la notion de contrôle divin et non à n’importe quelle croyance religieuse.

2 (planification: vague vs. précise) × 2 (système externe : déité omnipotente vs. neutre) échantillons indépendants. 2 (planification: vague vs. précise) × 2 (système externe : déité omnipotente vs. neutre) × un modérateur continu (niveau de progrès) échantillons indépendants. 2 (planification: vague vs. précise) × un modérateur continu (croyance en un contrôle divin) échantillons indépendants. 2 (planification: vague vs. précise) × 3 (système externe : marque fiable vs. marque honnête vs. neutre) échantillons indépendants.

Réplication des résultats de l’étude 1 à partir de buts personnels, choisis par les participants.

Réplication des résultats des études 1 et 2 avec test de la triple interaction entre planification, agence externe et niveau de progrès. Validation du rôle médiateur de l’efficacité personnelle.

Validation de l’hypothèse qu’une marque fiable, digne de confiance peut être perçue comme un agent externe de contrôle. Validations des hypothèses au-delà du domaine de la religion. L’exposition à une marque fiable accroît (réduit) la motivation à épargner lorsqu’il leur est demandé de faire des plans précis (vague). Ces effets sont dus à l’exposition à la notion de marque fiable, digne de confiance et non à celle d’une marque honnête, intègre.

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Dans une troisième étude (Etude 3), nous répliquons ces résultats dans le contexte des buts de bien-être/santé. Nous testons également l’effet de la progression vis-à-vis du but et montrons ainsi que nos hypothèses ne valent que lorsque le consommateur est loin du but. Cette étude teste finalement le rôle médiateur du sentiment d’efficacité personnelle. Dans les études 4A et 4B, nous considérons la possibilité que les marques fiables, digne de confiance peuvent avoir un rôle similaire à celui d’une déité omnipotente quand la planification du but est détaillée. Dans l’étude 4A, nous montrons que les marques fiables peuvent effectivement servir de source externe de contrôle. En l’occurrence, les participants dont le contrôle personnel est menacé par une planification précise considèrent la marque présentée comme étant plus fiable et digne de confiance quand ils ont de faibles croyances religieuses préexistantes. Dans l’étude 4B, nous montrons que l’exposition à la notion d’une marque fiable, digne de confiance accroît (réduit) la motivation à la poursuite du but quand la planification est précise (vague). A cette fin, les participants ont été exposés à des slogans fictifs d’une marque bancaire faisant la promotion de sa fiabilité ou de son intégrité. Nous montrons ainsi que nos effets sont dus à la notion d’une marque fiable et ne s’étendent pas à l’exposition à la notion d’une marque honnête, intègre.

3. CONTRIBUTIONS THÉORIQUES ET MANAGÉRIALES DE LA THÈSE 3.1. Contributions théoriques Les contributions théoriques de la thèse sont triples : (1) contributions à la littérature marketing sur la religion, (2) contributions aux théories des buts et de la planification et (3) contributions aux théories du contrôle.

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Premièrement, l’une des principales limites de la littérature marketing sur la religion réside dans le fait d’avoir essentiellement considéré le sentiment religieux comme une caractéristique stable de l’individu. En cela, et sauf exception (Kopalle, Lehmann et Farley 2010; Shachar, Erdem, Cutright et Fitzsimons 2011), elle s’est essentiellement tournée vers des analyses corrélationnelles. Nous proposons plutôt de nous appuyer sur de récents travaux en psychologie sociale (par exemple, Kay et al. 2008 ; Laurin et al. 2012) pour définir le sentiment religieux comme une ressource que l’individu peut mobiliser en présence d’une menace d’un besoin psychologique élémentaire : contrôle, signification, estime de soi ou identité. Nous proposons de la sorte un cadre conceptuel délimitant le domaine d’étude de l’influence de la religion sur le comportement du consommateur. En découle un inventaire de propositions élaborées à partir de perspectives théoriques différentes, et visant à illustrer comment cette influence peut se traduire sur des construits pertinents pour la pratique du marketing tels que l’attitude envers la publicité ou l’aversion pour la marque Nous insistons néanmoins sur le fait que les deux approches ne doivent pas être comprises comme exclusive. Un chercheur peut par exemple vouloir montrer qu’il existe une relation entre le sentiment religieux et un construit quelconque. Il peut ensuite vouloir démontrer la causalité de l’effet à l’aide d’une expérimentation impliquant la manipulation du sentiment religieux. Utiliser de la sorte des designs expérimentaux peut permettre d’isoler la cause de l’effet et de montrer que ce dernier est spécifiquement dû au sentiment religieux plutôt qu’à des traits de personnalité ou des variables sociodémographiques. Deuxièmement, cette recherche contribue à une meilleure compréhension des effets de la planification des buts. Malgré des décennies d’arguments en faveur des effets positifs de la planification, notre travail s’ajoute à un récent courant en comportement du consommateur s’intéressant aux conditions dans lesquelles la planification est néfaste à la poursuite du but

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(Dalton et Spiller 2012; Townsend et Liu 2012; Ülkümen et Cheema 2011). Nous prolongeons d’ailleurs ces recherches en montrant que la spécification de la planification n’entraîne pas nécessairement un effet démotivationnel au commencement de la poursuite du but. En mobilisant la notion de contrôle compensatoire, nous mettons en évidence qu’une planification précise, détaillée ne se traduit pas par une baisse de la perception d’efficacité personnelle si les individus sont exposés à un agent externe de contrôle. En effet, cela permet de les rassurer quant à l’idée qu’ils vivent dans un monde ordonné et prévisible où action et résultat sont liés l’un à l’autre. Troisièmement, notre recherche contribue à réconcilier des résultats contradictoires vis-à-vis de l’étude des relations entre sentiment de contrôle et processus motivationnel. Les travaux sur la réactance psychologique et la paresse sociale ont par exemple montré que forcer la présence d’un agent externe influent conduisait les individus à fournir moins d’efforts en vue d’atteindre un but. A l’inverse, de récents travaux suggérant que le fait de percevoir ordre et structure facilite la prise d’action en vue d’accomplir un but (Chae et Zhu 2014; Kay et al. 2014), tendent à indiquer le contraire. Dans notre travail de recherche, nous proposons une tentative de réconciliation. Notre travail participe en cela à l’introduction de la notion de contrôle compensatoire en marketing pour mieux comprendre le comportement du consommateur. Cutright et collègues (Cutright 2012 ; Cutright, Bettman et Fitzsimons 2013) ont déjà examiné comment des construits liés aux marques pouvaient permettre aux consommateurs de satisfaire leur besoin d’ordre et de structure. Avec notre recherche, nous ajoutons le concept de confiance en la marque. Nous mettons ainsi en évidence que la confiance en la marque varie avec l’anxiété induite par le manque de contrôle personnel et que la confiance en la marque joue le même rôle que d’autres sources de contrôle externe dans la régulation de soi.

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3.2. Contributions managériales L’étude de l’influence de la pensée religieuse sur le comportement du consommateur est un domaine de recherche gagnant en popularité et dont les implications managériales sont loin d’être négligeables. La preuve la plus parlante en est donnée par les chiffres. La proportion d’individus déclarant être athées (c’est-à-dire n’exprimant aucune croyance dans le divin) ne dépasse qu’à peine les 10% de la population mondiale (13%)12. D’autres enquêtes indiquent que la part des non-affiliés (ceux se déclarant athées ou croyant dans le divin sans revendiquer d’appartenance religieuse spécifique) atteint seulement les 16%13. Certes, la force du sentiment religieux est plus ou moins élevée selon les individus et selon les régions du monde. Néanmoins, à l’heure où la mondialisation et Internet permettent d’accéder à des produits culturels du monde entier, même dans les régions les plus sécularisées, les individus sont souvent exposés à du contenu religieux quelles que soient leurs propres croyances. Il peut s’agir de références clairement associées au domaine religieux (par exemple, les films Noah et Exodus: Gods and Men, d’inspiration biblique), comme il peut s’agir d’expression faisant des références au fait religieux sans véritablement être utilisé en référence à la religion (par exemple, « Oh mon Dieu ! »). Or, nous montrons dans cette recherche qu’exposer les consommateurs à du contenu religieux peut orienter le comportement d’achat en accord avec leur croyances religieuses pour une variété de construits (cf. Tableau 1). En cela, nous mettons en avant que le rôle de la religion en marketing n’est pas seulement de servir d’outil à la segmentation (c’est-à-dire à diviser un marché en groupes de consommateurs homogènes selon l’affiliation religieuse ou la force du sentiment religieux). Sous certaines conditions, utiliser des stimuli religieux dans l’élaboration de politiques marketing peut s’avérer utile aux ventes en incitant le 12

Estimation de Win-Gallup International (2012). Global index of religiosity and atheism. Accès le 17 août 2015 depuis http://www.wingia.com/web/files/news/14/file/14.pdf 13 Estimation de Pew Research Center (2010). Global Religious Diversity. Accès le 17 août 2015 depuis http://www.pewforum.org/2014/04/04/global-religious-diversity/

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consommateur à l’achat (par exemple, l’exposition à la croyance dans le contrôle divin peut inciter les individus à souscrire un contrat d’épargne malgré la complexité de l’offre ; cf. étude 1, essai 3). Une telle pratique doit toutefois être prise avec précaution au risque de se retourner contre l’entreprise. Dans l’Essai 1, nous abordons les conséquences défavorables de l’utilisation de la religion à des fins commerciales en raison d’une marchandisation perçue de la religion et d’un risque de contamination des choses sacrées par le profane (c’est-à-dire l’ordinaire, ce qui n’est pas sacré). Notre recherche met également en avant l’intérêt d’utiliser la notion de contrôle externe dans des messages publicitaires de marques impliquées dans des buts à long terme. Par exemple, en ce qui concerne les buts d’épargne, planifier les choses à faire de manière précise, détaillée alors que la somme désirée est encore loin d’être atteinte peut inciter les individus à porter leur attention sur les difficultés et les obstacles à surmonter (faire et suivre un budget, réduire ses dépenses, etc.). Or, cet effet peut être encore plus dommageable en cas de crise économique où la réalisation d’un budget précis et spécifique est souvent nécessaire aux ménages modestes. De la même manière, les buts liés à la santé et au bien-être physique peuvent être l’objet d’un manque de motivation, en particulier lorsque les individus planifient en détail leurs régimes, leurs habitudes alimentaires, leurs activités sportives et la dépense calorique associée. Toutefois, les bénéfices de ce type de message doivent être nuancés. Nous montrons en effet qu’utiliser des messages publicitaires dépeignant la présence d’agents externes de contrôle conduit à une baisse de motivation à fournir des efforts lorsque les individus ne font pas l’expérience d’une menace sur leur contrôle personnel. Il apparaît en conséquence qu’en élaborant de tels messages, les entreprises (ou les pouvoirs publics ou les associations) doivent tenir compte de la propension du but associé à susciter l’incapacité chez l’individu à produire les résultats désirés et à éviter les résultats indésirables. Ce type de message pourrait

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en effet inciter les consommateurs à se reposer sur la marque (ou l’entreprise de manière générale) pour fournir les efforts à leur place en vue d’atteindre le but qu’ils se sont fixés.

4. CONCLUSION DU RÉSUMÉ Bien que le besoin d’ordre et de contrôle soit souvent considéré comme un aspect élémentaire de la psychologie des individus (Landau et al. 2015; Heine, Proulx et Vohs 2006), la façon dont il se manifeste peut varier sensiblement selon les personnes et les situations. A la suite d’une menace sur le contrôle personnel, les individus à forte sensibilité religieuse seront plus prompts à se fier à la notion de contrôle divin que les non-affiliés, (Atran et Norenzayan 2004; Sasaki et Kim 2011). De la même façon, les conservateurs seront encore plus attirés par les programmes de candidats conservateurs et s’éloigneront d’autant plus des idéologies progressistes (Jost et Amodio 2012). Alors que les cultures occidentales encouragent l’efficacité personnelle, les cultures asiatiques encouragent le contrôle secondaire, c’est-à-dire l’ajustement à une réalité où des agents externes (déités, gouvernements) sont perçus comme étant en contrôle (Wang et al. 2012). Il existe en somme de multiples stratégies sociocognitives permettant de faire face à une menace sur le contrôle personnel (voir Landau et al. 2015 pour une revue). Cela étant dit, l’homologie fonctionnelle que nous proposons entre la religion et la marque apparaît dépendre à la fois de dispositions individuelles et de la saillance de l’une ou l’autre au moment de la menace. Dans l’étude 4B (Essai 3), les participants se sont fiés à une marque fiable, digne de confiance parce qu’ils étaient exposés à une telle cognition avant de planifier leur but de manière détaillée. Dans l’étude 4A (Essai 3), malgré la présence d’une menace induite par une planification détaillée, les participants dont les croyances en un contrôle divin étaient fortes n’ont pas exprimé davantage d’attirance envers une marque fiable que ceux à qui il était demandé de planifier vaguement leur but. En somme, conclure qu’il

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existe une homologie fonctionnelle entre les deux construits n’implique pas de considérer que lorsque les croyances en l’un sont élevées, les croyances en l’autre sont faibles. Tout ce qu’implique cette homologie fonctionnelle est qu’une déité omnipotente tout comme une marque fiable permettent de satisfaire le besoin d’ordre des individus lorsqu’ils doivent faire face à une menace sur leur contrôle personnel. Ces cognitions leur permettent en effet de considérer que le monde dans lequel ils vivent est ordonné, prévisible et compréhensible ; éléments déterminants au sentiment d’être capable de poursuivre un but.

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General introduction

General introduction People are often reminded that influential external entities are by their side while they pursue important personal goals. Perhaps, the most striking example relates to religion. Most faiths promote the idea of an all-powerful, omnipotent deity capable of external agency, that is, capable of influencing outcomes on one’s behalf (Landau, Kay, and Whitson 2015). For instance, in the Bible, Christians can read “Even though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I will fear no evil, for you are with me; your rod and your staff, they comfort me” (Psalm 23). In the Qur’an, it is said that “And Allah is most knowing of your enemies; and sufficient is Allah as an ally, and sufficient is Allah as a helper” (Qur’an 4:45). In Hinduism, the belief in karma implies that some universal force meddles in people’s lives to punish sins and reward virtue (Sharma 1991). While these examples relate only to three religions (namely, Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism) among dozens, they still pertain to twothirds of the global population (31.5%, 23.2, and 15.0% respectively; Pew 2010). In fact, despite predictions based on secularization theory that scientific and human progress will supplant religious belief, religion remains a strong source of influence in people’s lives. Recent polls indicate that 87% of the world population holds some kind of belief in a God-like entity (Win-Gallup International 2012). Even though that number may vary across the globe and in areas where atheism is more prevalent (e.g., Western Europe and China), it reaches 92% in the United States (Pew 2012) and has even increased in fast growing markets such as Russia, with 56% in 2008 identifying as believers, compared to 38% in 1991 (Pew 2014). What’s more, regardless of people’s religious belief, exposure to the concept of an omnipotent, controlling God is a common cultural aspect of contemporary society. Some expressions frequently used by individuals in spoken language such as “Thank God!” or “let

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go, let God,” clearly underlie such a belief. Television shows, music, and movies also frequently use religious references, in accordance with the belief that a God-like entity controls our lives. One may recall how often the characters of the successful HBO drama Game of Thrones call on the gods to help them, or alternatively blame them for meddling in their lives. In 2013, the rapper Eminem released the song Rap God, which was a commercial success with three million copies sold in the United States.14 There, rap enthusiasts can hear lyrics such as “So you be Thor and I’ll be Odin. You rodent, I’m omnipotent.”15 In 2014, two biblically inspired blockbusters were released worldwide: Noah and Exodus: Gods and Kings with gross revenues of $361 million16 and $268 million,17 respectively. A last example of the frequent exposure to the notion of a controlling deity may be the official motto of the United States—“In God we trust”—that anyone who has ever used dollar bills could have read on backs of the bills. As such, people are often reminded that an influential and powerful external entity is keeping a watchful eye over them as they pursue their goals—that is, in spite of their own religious belief or lack thereof. Such a role can also be taken by big businesses and brands. Just as religion often reminds believers that a deity is by their side, brands often explicitly remind their customers of their presence in the goals that the customers are pursuing. For instance, with regard to people’s financial and savings goals, AIG declares in a tagline “The strength to be there,” Aviva reminds us that they are “Taking care of what’s important,” while United FCU announces “We’ll get you there.” In doing so, these brands attempt to emphasize the notion that they can be relied upon to produce the desired outcomes and avoid undesirable ones when it comes to financial and savings goals. However, is stating that a powerful other 14

Recording Industry Association of America (2015). Retrieved July 13, 2015 from http://www.riaa.com/goldandplatinumdata.php?artist=%22Rap+God%22 15 Lyrics from the song Rap God by American rapper Eminem. Retrieved July 13, 2015 from http://www.azlyrics.com/lyrics/eminem/rapgod.html 16 IMDb (2015). Retrieved July 13, 2015 from http://www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=noah.htm 17 IMDb (2015). Retrieved July 13, 2015 from http://www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=exodus.htm

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(ranging from deities to brands) is watching over us a good thing for the pursuit of consumer goals? Addressing this question drives the present dissertation research.

1. Research problem and theoretical positioning This section discusses the research problem of this dissertation in light of recent advances in two bodies of research: the psychology of goals and the threat and defense literature.

1.1. Research problem Prior work has provided extensive evidence showing that promoting influential external agents was detrimental to individuals’ willingness to take goal-directed actions. Impactful bodies of research have documented how feeling the presence of a powerful other exercising control over one’s life undermines people’s willingness to provide effort in service of goal achievement. In particular, research on psychological reactance suggests that imbuing one’s environment with rules and clues of a controlling influence may be perceived as a threat to one’s freedom (Brehm 1966). As a consequence, individuals may be motivated to regain the freedom that has been restricted from them, even though this means they must stop pursuing the goal at hand. While reactance in the context of divine influence has received little attention, consumer research has shown that it can occur with brands. In particular, Laran and colleagues (2011) found that while mere exposure to brand names evoked behaviors consistent with the brand’s associations, brands’ slogans produced reverse priming effects. For instance, participants exposed to slogans that instructed them to save (“Save money. Live better.” Walmart’s slogan), reported that they would spend more money, compared to participants exposed to the sole brand name.

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Another line of research found that reminders of external agency had detrimental effects on motivation for the pursuit of goals, but this was based on the assumption that thinking about the presence of influential external agents encouraged people to behave in accordance with the “principle of least effort.” As such, people strive to minimize the probable average rate of their work-expenditure over time; put differently, people tend to choose the easiest path for goal attainment (Zipf 1949). Cutright and Samper (2014) found that at baseline levels of perceived control, people were more likely to buy a product when they could rely on the brand or the designated product to help them reach their goals. Research in social loafing indicates that when people believe that the outcomes of their goal depend on other’s decisions and behaviors, they invest less effort in its pursuit because they rely on their counterparts for goal attainment (Karau and Williams 1993; Laurin et al. 2012). Notably, Laurin and colleagues (2012) found that when the belief in a controlling, omnipotent God was salient, active goal pursuit suffered. The reason is that thoughts of an omnipotent God lead people to believe that goal attainment is contingent on an external agent’s will, thus eliciting a loafing effect by which effort investment decreases. Nevertheless, emerging research has found that promoting a global sense of control has beneficial effects on the motivation to pursue self-set goals. Kay, Laurin, Fitzsimons, and Landau (2014) found consistent evidence that cues of order and structure promote willingness to invest effort in the pursuit of long-term goals. They argue that even in domains unrelated to the context of goal pursuit, detecting structure in the immediate environment facilitates engagement in goal-directed actions because it promotes the belief that actions and outcomes are interconnected. In the same vein, Chae and Zhu (2014) showed that promoting order through organized environments helped promote self-regulation, while environmental disorder led to self-regulation failures though resource depletion. Such findings are in line with compensatory control research (Kay, Gaucher, Napier, Callan, and Laurin 2008; Landau

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et al. 2015) that suggests that external influential agents—be they supernatural entities or powerful corporations that influence our lives—provide order and structure in our daily lives in a way that can compensate for low feelings of personal control. In sum, on the one hand, some work suggests that external agents of control undermine individuals’ willingness to take goal-directed actions. On the other hand, other work offers the opposite prediction by suggesting that such cues promote the feeling that the world is an orderly and predictable place where actions and outcomes are linked. Therefore, a question arises: To what extent can emphasizing reminders of external agents of control be incentivizing or detrimental to consumers’ willingness to invest effort in pursuit of their goals?

1.2. Theoretically positioning the dissertation research To address this research problem, we will mobilize two streams of research: the psychology of goals and the threat and defense literature.

1.2.1. The psychology of goals By mobilizing the literature on goal pursuit, we will attempt to understand how the interplay between control stimuli and motivation to pursue goals works. This objective involves two basic questions: (1)

What are goals?

(2)

What are the psychological processes underlying the effect of control stimuli on motivation to pursue goals?

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1.2.1.1. Building on a goal systemic perspective As with any other behavior, consumer behavior is goal-oriented (Baumgartner and Pieters 2008). When someone eats an ice-cream, s/he might be seeking to satisfy a state of hunger, to cool down in a hot afternoon, or merely to enjoy him/herself. If we consider this example further, several questions arise. One such question could be the focus of the goal that is being pursued, or put in other words, the desired outcome that the individual is trying to reach through motivated actions (Kopetz, Kruglanski, Arens, Etkin, and Johnson 2012). Accordingly, one could argue that cooling down during a hot afternoon is a sub-goal of the overarching goal of enjoying oneself. Second, one may note that eating an ice-cream is a behavior consistent with the goal of having fun but inconsistent with other goals that individuals may be concurrently pursuing such as dieting or saving money. To better understand the notion of a goal, Kruglanski and colleagues (Kruglanski, Shah, Fishbach, Friedman, Chun, and Sleeth-Keppler 2002; Kopetz et al. 2012) proposed a broad theoretical perspective referred to as goal-system theory. Figure 1 illustrates the notion of goal-system defined as “mental representations of motivational networks composed of interconnected goals and means” (Kopetz et al. 2012, p. 209). Goal-system theory postulates that motivational constructs such as goals and means are represented cognitively and are thus bound to the general properties that govern all cognition. Accordingly, just like one may associate cognitive constructs such as “coffee,” “desk,” and “computer” because they may refer to an office job, goals can be cognitively associated with other relevant constructs (competitive goals, subgoalssub goals, means) (Kopetz et al. 2012; Kruglanski et al. 2002). For instance, let us consider the goal of saving money. One may think of alternative goals that may provoke conflicts (e.g., socializing by going out), just as one may think of the tasks that saving money implies (e.g., budgeting), and the means that saving usually requires (e.g., opening a savings account, taking public transportation rather than spending money on gas).

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Goal 1 Subgoal 1

Mean 1

Subgoal 3

Subgoal 2

Mean 2

Mean 3

Mean 4

Mean 5

Figure 1: A system of goals and means (reproduced after Kruglanski et al. 2002)

This is particularly relevant when it comes to planning long-term goals. While some goals may rely on a single consumption episode (e.g., buying an ice-cream to cool oneself down), long-term goals such as saving or dieting require several (if not many) episodes spread over a relatively long period of time. In regards to goal-systems, the mental representation of such goals can vary dramatically depending on the level of construal that defines the course of action (Liberman and Trope 1998; Trope, Liberman, and Wakslak 2007). People can use concrete, unstructured representations that include many subordinate tasks (i.e., low-level construals). Alternatively, they can rely on abstract, structured representations that include a few superordinate core tasks (i.e., high-level construals). For instance, let us consider the goal of getting a doctorate: Making plans using high-level construals may lead an individual to consider that one needs to read research articles, collect data, and write the final document. However, if this individual uses low-level construals, s/he may deconstruct each of these three features into subtasks. As such, reading research articles might encompass search activities, writing syntheses, building a conceptual framework, and so on. In sum, this dissertation builds on goal-system theory because the cognitive properties of goal systems (especially in terms of goal-directed action categorization) set the constraints

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within which motivational processes occur. Next, we address more specifically the dynamics of self-regulation to sharpen our understanding of how feeling the presence of an external influential entity may affect motivation to pursue goals.

1.2.1.2. Building on the dynamics of self-regulation We acknowledge that the pursuit of a goal does not happen in an isolated fashion but in concert and competition with other goals. Nonetheless, we limit our field of investigation to the pursuit of a single goal (rather than multiple goals) to keep things manageable and tighten the focus of our research. Accordingly, two motivational constructs are particularly important for the study of people’s willingness to take goal-directed actions: commitment and progression (Fishbach and Zhang 2009; Fishbach, Zhang, and Koo 2009; Zhan and Huang 2010). Commitment refers to the extent to which individuals are determined to pursue a goal despite obstacles and barriers (Kopetz et al. 2012; Kruglanski et al. 2002). Kruglanski and colleagues emphasized that goal commitment varies (through subjective utility, or S.U.) as a multiplicative function of the value assigned to the goal (V) and the expectancy of attainment (E) – S.U. = f (V x E). Assuming that the value of a goal remains unchanged during the pursuit of said goal,18 individuals’ perceptions of their ability to exercise control over goal pursuit thus play a critical role in their commitment to take goal-directed actions. Prior research (Bandura 1989; 1994) has suggested that many activities were not pursued despite the guarantee of valued outcomes because such perceptions considerably reduce the motivating potential of desired outcome expectations.

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While we acknowledge that the value of a goal may change during its pursuit (Zhang and Huang 2010) and depending on construal level (Ulkumen and Cheema 2011), we will consider goal value as a constant (i.e., a control variable) to limit the scope of our research. Doing as such will allow us, however, to account for variation across individuals in that regard.

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Progression toward goal attainment refers to the decreasing discrepancy between the current state and the desired end-state. Long-term goals are subject to the goal-gradient effect, which suggests that the longer the delay is between the present and the time by which the goal needs to be accomplished, the fewer people are motivated to pursuit the goal (Kivetz, Urminsky, and Zheng 2006). Recent developments have suggested that goal distance alone may not entirely explain that negative correlation (Townsend and Liu 2012). In the early stages of goal pursuit, it may rather be what distance implies—in terms of effort investment and obstacles to overcome before attaining the ideal goal state—that negatively impacts motivation (Bandura 1997, Huber 1985). It appears, therefore, that commitment and progression, as motivational constructs, are both constrained by the cognitive properties of goal-systems. Imagine that an individual is in a concrete mind-set and thus considers the course of action leading to some savings goal with low-level construals. If progress toward achieving a goal is low, his/her attention might be focused on the feasibility of said goal, whereas the same individual in an abstract mind-set might rather focus on goal desirability (Liberman and Trope 1998; Trope, Liberman, and Wakslak 2007). We suggest, therefore, that when the individual plans his/her goal in a detailed, specific manner, s/he may experience a threat to personal control due to higher perceptions of not being able to produce the desired outcomes. Consequently, goal commitment will suffer. What might help the individual feel that effort investment is worthwhile? Next, we address this question based on compensatory control theory.

1.2.2. The threat and defense literature Before expending on compensatory control theory and explaining how such a perspective is appropriate to investigate the research problem of this dissertation, we elaborate on the larger social psychological literature on threat and defense.

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1.2.2.1. Introduction to the threat and defense literature Over the course of their daily lives, individuals must deal with threats such as a loss of control, as well as others, such as mortality salience and self-uncertainty. These threats can be formally defined as the experience of a discrepancy between an expectation or desire and a person’s current circumstances (Jonas et al. 2014). Jonas and colleagues proposed a framework for the threat and defense literature that integrates different theories of social psychology, all of which share the argument that threats arouse anxiety and elicit defensive reactions, the purpose of which is to relieve that anxiety. Some of them are well known: for instance, terror management theory (TMT; Greenberg, Solomon, and Pyszczynski 1997) posits that cues of death cause both personal and social defenses. Another example might be cognitive dissonance theory (CDT; Festinger 1957) which focuses on the aversive arousal that arises from discrepant experiences that conflict with relevant cognitions (e.g., smoking despite knowledge of its dangers). Although different threats provoke different defensive strategies by soliciting different psychological needs (e.g., meaning in regard with mortality salience, self-certainty in regard with dissonant cognitions), overall, these strategies activate approach-related states in response to the threat-induced anxiety. These approach-related states consist in striving for an effective solution to resolve the discrepancy at hand. As such, to cope with a threat, people endorse socio-cognitive strategies that allow them to compensate for insufficient personal resources. In doing so, they are able to satisfy the psychological need that is depleted by the threat and to assuage the related anxiety (Jonas et al. 2014).

1.2.2.2. Focus on compensatory control theory Compensatory control theory (CCT; Kay et al. 2008; Landau et al. 2015) pertains specifically to personal control threats. Personal control is regarded formally as the extent to 10


which one can intentionally produce the desired outcome and avoid undesired ones (Skinner 1996) and may range from tragic events (e.g., terrorist attacks, natural disasters) to mundane inconveniences (e.g., out of stock products, delays on public transportations) and good surprises (e.g., early delivery of an online purchase). CCT rests on three basic principles: First, individuals have a need to perceive the world as orderly and predictable in order to combat the anxiety-inducing fear of randomness and chaos. Second, personal and external sources of control are capable of satisfying this need because both provide a comforting belief that the world operates in an orderly fashion. Third, in the context of a threat to personal control, external sources of control can compensate for one another. Shepherd et al. (2011) demonstrated that these effects stemmed from the motivation to maintain perceived order and were not related to other types of self-threats such as those related to personal mortality or self-relevant uncertainties. The insight at the heart of CCT is not new. Psychologists have long argued that to compensate for low personal control, individuals attempt to bolster external agency, also known as secondary control (Rothbaum, Weisz, and Snyder 1982). Individuals may adjust themselves to fit in with a situation where powerful entities are deemed to be in control—be they deities, government, or overarching institutions. In doing so, they renounce autonomous control and yield agency to a locus of resources outside of the self that can influence personally relevant outcomes on their behalf (Landau et al. 2015; Rothbaum et al. 1982; Skinner 1996). However, only recently has experimental research shown that when personal control was primed to be low, individuals endorsed to a greater extent external influential agents. CCT has received considerable support by referring to a diverse range of external sources of control: gods and governments (Kay et al. 2008; 2010), superstitious beliefs (Whitson and Galinsky 2008), hierarchical organizations (Friesen, Kay, Eibach, and Galinsky 2014), social

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groups (Fritsche et al. 2013), powerful enemies (Sullivan, Landau, and Rothschild 2010), belief in human progress (Rutjens, van Harreveld, and van der Pligt 2010), and even consumer products (Shepherd, Kay, Landau, and Keefer 2011). Aside from bolstering external agency, individuals may cope with threats to personal control by the affirmation of epistemic structure (Laudau et al. 2015), which refers to causal reasoning (i.e., the perception of clear, reliable action-outcome contingencies within the context of reduced control) and to pattern perception (i.e., the perception of structure in the physical environment, even in domains unrelated to the control-reducing context). In that vein, research has shown that feelings of low personal control can lead to people perceiving patterns where none exists (Whiston and Galinsky 2008), preferring logos with clear boundaries (Cutright 2012), or well-fitting brand extensions (Cutright, Bettman, and Fitzsimons 2013). With such strategies, people seek to feel confident that there is structure and order in the world as a way of coping with the anxiety inducing fear of randomness and chaos. In this research, we will focus on influential external agents rather than epistemic structures. Specifically, our focus will be on two such agents: deities and brands. From early social research (Durkheim 1912) to more recent work (Kupor, Laurin, and Levav 2015), belief in powerful supernatural beings has been shown to be a common phenomenon in folk cultures, even in nondeistic religions (e.g., Buddhism). Specific beliefs in God may vary across religions, but transversal depictions such as omnipotence appear redundant at least in cultural settings where Abrahamic faiths predominate (Armstrong 1993). Regardless, from a psychological perspective, religious belief may serve a basic need for control. Kay and colleagues (2008; 2010) found that when feelings of personal control were experimentally lowered, people perceived God to a greater extent as a controlling entity (capable of agency in the world) than a creating one (at the origins of life).

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Our second focus of interest relates to brands as external influential agents. A brand may be defined by individual components such as a name, a symbol, and so on, but the beliefs that surround it extend to a variety of associations (Keller 1993). These associations may include the notion of corporate power, that is, the ability of corporations to influence people’s lives at a societal level by means of marketing and lobbying on public policies (Herman 1981; Stevenson 1985). Moreover, brands may take on a controlling presence in the consumer’s environment as a way of reducing uncertainty and providing structure in the choice set (Eckert, Louviere, and Islam 2012; Moorman, Zaltman, and Desphande 1993; Swait and Erdem 2007). In sum, building on goal-system theory, we argue that the pursuit of long-term goals may be punctuated by threats to personal control. Therefore, throughout this research, we argue that when individuals feel that they cannot reach their goals alone, reminders of an external agent of control—ranging from deities to brands—may alleviate anxiety and increase motivation for the pursuit of goals. Figure 2 illustrates how this dissertation research positions itself with respect to goal-system theory and compensatory control theory.

Goal-system theory (Kopetz et al. 2012; Kruglanski et al. 2002)

Theoretical positioning of the dissertation research

Compensatory control theory (Kay et al. 2008; Landau et al. 2015)

Figure 2: Theoretical positioning of the dissertation research

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2. Dissertation research built on three essays This section presents how each of the three essays of this dissertation helps to address the research problem. Table 4 summarizes the objectives of all three essays and the research questions that motivate the two empirical essays (Essays 2 and 3).

Table 4 Overall overview of the three essays Essay 1: Religion and religiousness in marketing Delineating a conceptual framework for the study of religion in marketing by: - Providing clear definitions. Objectives - Organizing the existing literature in the study of religion into an intelligible framework. - Promoting the use of religious priming.

Research questions

Contrib.

-

Purely conceptual

Essay 2: The divergent influence of belief in divine control on goal commitment Explaining how belief in divine control can increase or decrease commitment to pursuing long-term goals based on perceptions of selfefficacy.

Essay 3: The divergent effect of external systems of control on early stage goal pursuit Explaining how external systems of control can reverse the negative effect of planning specificity among early stage goal pursuers.

- Do individuals - Can the defensively mobilize demotivational effect their religiousness of planning when feelings of selfspecificity during efficacy are early stage goal experimentally pursuit be reversed lowered to keep by bolstering external committed to desirable agents of control? long-term goals? - Is this effect mediated - When belief in divine by increased selfcontrol is salient, is the efficacy? decrement in goal - Are different external commitment specific sources of control to high perceptions of substitutable in the self-efficacy? context of specific planning? Empirical (2 studies) Empirical (5 studies) 14


2.1. Overview of Essay 1: Religion and religiousness in marketing 2.1.1. Abstract of Essay 1 In light of the increasing interest in the influence of religion and religiousness in consumer behavior, this theoretical paper offers a framework from a perspective anchored in experimental research. In doing so, it promotes the use of religious priming to sharpen our understanding of religion’s causal effect on consumer behavior. After reviewing the very broad and varied literature on religion in the social sciences, we propose a distinction between research that focuses on behaviors that are ostensibly related to the observance of specific religious beliefs and practices on the one hand, and research that studies the pervasive influence of religious thinking on behaviors across religions, on the other hand. Leveraging this distinction, we then put forth seven propositions with implications for consumer research and marketing practices.

2.1.2. Objectives of Essay 1 MacInnis (2011) proposes a categorization of conceptual contributions in the field of marketing based on the main objective that is being pursued: envisioning new ideas; relating ideas; debating ideas; and explicating ideas. Although these goals are not necessarily exclusive, the purpose of Essay 1 is primarily to explicate. Specifically, this paper proposes a conceptual framework that seeks to delineate the constructs of religion and religiousness and to address how they affect other constructs that are relevant for consumer research and marketing practices. Addressing such a goal of delineation lays the groundwork for the two empirical essays that follow via three complementary objectives:

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(1)

Providing clear definitions for religion and religiousness The literature on religion in marketing has been messy in providing clear definitions:

disparate definitions unnecessarily based on the divine, different words (religiousness, religiosity, religious commitment, etc.) to refer to the same construct (the influence of religion on the individual’s psyche), and definitions serving the needs of the research at hand, therefore limiting the possibility of building a consistent body of research. We address this issue by relying on early studies on religion (Durkheim 1912, James 1902, Weber 1905) and on recent work on the psychological study of religion.

(2)

Organizing the existing literature in the study of religion into an intelligible framework This objective is about providing a roadmap. In other words, this paper organizes the

influence of religion in marketing into a delineated framework so that researchers interested in such a topic have at their disposal a clear guideline. The study of religion in marketing has been mostly limited to considering religious affiliation and the level of religiousness as tools for market segmentation, that is to say, dividing a market into homogenous groups. Our framework innovates by emphasizing psychological processes rather than religious demographics. As such, Essay 1 delineates the domain of religion in order to have a clearer understanding of the interplay between religious thinking and consumption. We illustrate how this may affect marketing practice beyond market segmentation using an inventory of propositions built on different theoretical perspectives.

(3)

Promoting the use of religious priming in marketing In the field of consumer behavior, it is important to isolate causal relationships in

order to disentangle the psychological process that is being tested from others that may also theoretically explain the hypothesis at hand. However, most research in marketing

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consistently considers religiosity as a trait, perhaps because social psychology only began to recognize religious priming in the late 2000s (see Shariff, Willard, Andersen, and Norenzayan in press for a meta-analysis on the subject). Yet, presenting a “religious disposition” has been known to correlate with personality traits (e.g., conservatism) and demographics (e.g., education, ethnicity, age). In this paper, we argue in favor of using priming and experimental designs to test the causal effect of religious thinking on consumer behavior.

The two essays that follow empirically test one of the propositions of Essay 1. This proposition, namely P4, is based on the premise that religiousness can serve a need for control when one feels unable to produce desired outcomes and intends to prevent undesired outcomes.

2.2. Overview of Essay 2: The divergent influence of belief in divine control on goal commitment 2.2.1. Abstract of Essay 2 How does belief in divine control influence goal commitment? On the one hand, divine control is supposed to reassure people in times of turmoil, but on the other hand, this reassurance might lead people to neglect their goals by encouraging them to rely instead on a powerful other to make things happen. By examining the moderating role of perceived selfefficacy, two of our studies investigated the extent to which religiosity can increase or decrease goal commitment. In experiment 1, we primed (low vs. high) self-efficacy and measured religiosity. Main results indicated that religiosity positively influenced goal commitment when self-efficacy was primed to be low, whereas religiosity did not affect goal commitment when self-efficacy was primed to be high. In experiment 2, we primed both selfefficacy and the salience of religious belief in a controlling vs. creating God. Findings 17


revealed that belief in a controlling God positively (negatively) influenced goal commitment when self-efficacy was primed to be low (high), while the salience of a belief in a creating God had no effect. These divergent effects of a belief in divine control on goal commitment are discussed with regard to compensatory control theory.

2.2.2. Objectives and research questions of Essay 2 In Essay 1, we argue that religiousness can be mobilized when individuals feel that a psychological need (control, meaning, self-esteem, or social identity) is threatened by their physical or social environment. In Essay 2, we investigate to what extent the belief in divine control (i.e., belief that a God-like entity is capable of external agency) can serve as a defensive source of compensatory control when one feels incapable of exercising control over goal pursuit. Laurin and colleagues (2012) demonstrated that at baseline levels (i.e., when under no threat to personal control), representation of God as a controlling agent in people’s lives decreases motivation when participants were asked to pursue personal goals (e.g., academic, professional). This outcome is consistent with research that showed that reliance on powerful others decreases effort toward goal attainment, leading to a loafing effect (e.g., Harkins and Szymansk 1988). Nevertheless, religion has long been regarded as promoting secondary control. Believing in an intervening supernatural force allows people to maintain an indirect sense of control when situations become unmanageable (Rothbaum, Weisz, and Snyder 1982; Sasaki and Kim 2011). We propose that these divergences can be attributed to the fact that past research has not considered the moderating role of threats to personal control. In this essay, such a threat is induced by manipulating directly perceived self-(in)efficacy, that is, people’s beliefs about their capabilities to produce effects (Bandura 1989; 1994).

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Therefore, the objective of Essay 2 is to explain how a belief in divine control can increase or decrease a person’s commitment to pursuing long-term goals. Two research questions are specifically addressed: -

Do individuals defensively mobilize their religiousness in order to maintain their commitment to desirable long-term goals when feelings of self-efficacy are experimentally lowered?

-

Is the decrement in goal commitment specific to high perceptions of self-efficacy when the belief in divine control is salient?

2.3. Overview of Essay 3: The divergent effect of external systems of control on early stage goal pursuit 2.3.1. Abstract of Essay 3 Consumers are often reminded that the pursuit of their goals occurs in the context of external systems of control—that is, while operating within rule-based systems and under the supervision of powerful entities that provide order and structure in their daily lives. In this article, we highlight a theoretical controversy regarding how these reminders of external systems of control can influence goal pursuit. Then, leveraging Compensatory Control Theory (Kay et al. 2008), we propose and test a theoretical reconciliation. Specifically, across five studies, we test the hypothesis that external systems of control boost motivation among early stage goal pursuers, particularly when they engage in specific planning. In Studies 1 through 3, we test this hypothesis in the context of religious sources of control and consumer-relevant financial and fitness goals. Study 4a demonstrates that brands can be framed as sources of external control that act much like religious sources do, and Study 4b demonstrates their effects on goal pursuit. Thus, these findings suggest that promoting control stimuli in advertisements can incentivize consumer goal pursuit, but only under specific conditions. 19


2.3.2. Objectives and research questions of Essay 3 While Essay 2 establishes that the divergent effect of a belief in divine control can be attributed to variations in perception of self-efficacy, Essay 3 goes a step further in three ways. First, Essay 2 manipulates directly perception of self-efficacy as a way of inducing a threat to personal control. In Essay 3, our line of research builds on construal level theory (a theory derived from goal-system theory), which posits that a focus on concrete details directs people to consider how feasible their goals are, whereas a focus on the object of the goal directs people to consider how desirable their goals are (Liberman and Trope 1998; Trope, Liberman, and Wakslak 2007). Thinking too concretely about how, when, and where to pursue a goal can lead people to question their ability to complete all the necessary steps and thereby control their outcomes, which can undermine motivation. In other words, it can make them doubt their self-efficacy. In sum, in Essay 3, rather than priming self-efficacy, we manipulate specificity of planning and measure to what extent it could affect perceived selfefficacy, (mediator variable) and subsequently, how it affects motivation to pursue goals (outcome variable). Second, Essay 2 uses in both experiments the example of retirement savings. In doing so, we intended to neutralize the effect of goal progress by suggesting that such a goal is, in practice, never ending, since people usually also need to manage their money during retirement to make sure it lasts long as needed. In Essay 3, we test the effect of goal progress and show that bolstering external agency in the context of specific planning increases motivation to pursue goals only when individuals are far away from goal attainment. Third, Essay 2 focuses exclusively on a belief in divine control to bolster belief in external agency. In Essay 3, we propose that external sources of control, which include not only powerful supernatural entities but also trusted, reliable, interventionist commercial

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brands, can enhance people’s motivation to pursue important goals in the context of low selfefficacy. Overall, the objective of essay 3 is to explain how external systems of control can reverse the negative effect of planning specificity among early stage goal pursuers. Three research questions are specifically addressed: -

Can the de-motivational effect of planning specificity during early stage goal pursuit be reversed by bolstering a belief in an external agent of control?

-

Is this effect mediated by increased self-efficacy?

-

Are different external sources of control substitutable in the context of specific planning during early stage goal pursuit?

3. Presentation outline The three essays of this dissertation will be presented successively before concluding with the overall limitations and contributions of this dissertation research. -

Essay 1: Religion and religiousness in marketing: Synthesis of conceptual foundations and research propositions

-

Essay 2: When God’s (not) needed: The divergent influence of belief in divine control on goal commitment

-

Essay 3: The divergent effect of external systems of control on early stage goal pursuit

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Essay 1

Essay 1 Religion and Religiousness in Marketing: Synthesis of Conceptual Foundations and Research Propositions

Only a minority of the world population claims to be atheists – a mere 13 percent, mostly concentrated in Western Europe and China (Win-Gallup International 2012) – meaning that billions of people believe in God or an equivalent abstract representation with omnipotent and omniscient attributes (e.g., Karma or the Universe). Despite predictions based on secularization theory that religion will lose influence in many spheres of social and individual life, the weight of religious belief remains important in today’s world (Hirschle 2013; Norenzayan 2013). From mundane consumption episodes such as purchasing Christmas presents to gigantic demonstrations of religious fervor, such as Muslims’ annual pilgrimage to Mecca or Catholics’ reception of a new pope, we still find strong evidence of the role played by religion in people’s lives. In addition, regardless of their actual belief, people are exposed to stimuli with religious content on a daily basis. One may think of the United States’ motto “In God We trust” on the back of dollar bills, or of the numerous religious references in popular TV shows (e.g., HBO’s Game of Thrones), music (e.g., Eminem’s 2013 Rap God hit), or movies (e.g., the 2014 biblically inspired blockbusters Noah and Exodus: Gods and Men). Though consumer researchers have admitted for decades that religion is a powerful cultural factor influencing decisions and behaviors (Engel, Kollat, and Blackwell 1968), empirical research in marketing remains tenuous on the matter. In a seminal study, Hirschman

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(1982) emphasized that religion is a sensitive subject. Outside of marketing, however, the scientific study of religion is an active pursuit, from the early stages of social science (Durkheim 1912; James 1902; Weber 1905) to the present day (e.g., Kupor, Laurin, and Levav 2015). The theoretical framework we propose returns to the root of this stream of research, and combines it with recent advances in order to achieve three objectives: (1) to provide clear conceptualizations for religion and religiousness, (2) to organize the extant literature in the study of religion in an intelligible framework, and (3) to promote the use of religious priming rather than correlational studies, which are ill-suited to test religion’s causal effect on consumer behavior. Accordingly, we advance specific propositions that describe such effects, and provide guidelines for future research. A limited approach of the very broad and varied literature on the scientific study of religion leads the present paper to distinguish between two types of influences, which are then applied to consumer behavior. The first is that induced by the observance of specific beliefs and practices in terms of rituals and prescribed behaviors within a religious group. From the Christmas season and its shopping custom to the proliferation of halal and kosher certifications, specific religious beliefs and rituals shape the marketplace in undeniable ways (Belk 1987; Hirschman, Ruvio, and Touzani 2011). Because these types of normative beliefs and practices assigned by one’s religion generally have ostensibly easily observable consequences in one’s behavior (e.g., attendance to church and dietary restrictions), this approach is hereafter referred to as the manifest expression of religiousness in behavior. However, the influence of religion on consumption is not restricted to the observance of religious customs. The second type of influence induced by religion is more pervasive and does not relate to specific beliefs. Because it may affect purchases with no apparent link to one’s religion (Hirschman 1983; Rindfleisch, Burroughs, and Wong 2010) and may be awoken by external stimuli (Laurin, Kay, and Fitzsimons 2012; Shariff and Norenzayan 2007;

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Shariff, Willard, Andersen, and Norenzayan in press), this type is hereafter referred to as the latent expression of religiousness in behavior. While acknowledging that religiousness can influence individuals’ behavior as a trait, the primary purpose of this paper is to promote the use of experimental design and religious priming. Accordingly, we will propose a framework to better understand this type of influence by focusing on four kinds of psychological needs that can be satisfied by religion: control, meaning, self-esteem, and identity. First, religions globally appear to fulfill a need for control as each of them provides a set of beliefs in which God or an equivalent omnipotent being is allegedly in charge of the order of the universe and can intervene in individuals’ lives (Kay, Gaucher, Napier, Callan, and Laurin 2008). Second, religion constitutes a source of meaning, allowing the believers to make sense of events occurring around them and beyond the reach of their understanding (Greetz 1993; Silberman 2005). Third, religion facilitates feelings of self-esteem by promoting images of a benevolent, omniscient entity who loves those who worship it (Crocker, Luhtanen, Cooper, and Bouvrette 2003). Fourth, religion satisfies a need for identity via the affiliation with a group to which individuals may identify as a strong component of their culture and social identity (Gebauer and Maio 2012; Hogg, Adelman, and Blagg 2010). Such a functionalist approach is not new to the general study of religion, but has just very recently gained traction in marketing (Kopalle, Lehmann, and Farley 2010; Shachar, Erdem, Cutright, and Fitzsimons 2011). Further, to the extent that marketing researchers have thought about religion, scholarship in this domain has relied almost exclusively on correlational studies (e.g., Bove, Nagpal, and Dorsett 2009; Choi 2010; Delener 1990, 1994; Esso and Dibb 2004; McDaniel and Burnett 1990; Sood and Nasu 1995), leading to an emphasis on demographics rather than psychological processes. In this way, religion has mostly been considered as a tool for segmentation, or dividing a market into homogenous groups based on the religious affiliation or level of religiousness of the consumers. Given

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recent programs of experimental research that have begun to investigate the underlying psychological mechanisms for the influence of religion in human behavior (Kay et al. 2008, 2010; Laurin et al. 2012; Shariff and Norenzayan 2007; Shariff et al. in press), the time is ripe for marketing researchers to experimentally assess the role of religion in consumer behavior. The remainder of this article is organized as follows. First, we provide an overview of the scientific study of religion. In doing so, we draw conceptual foundations of religionrelated constructs (e.g., religiousness and spirituality) that are relevant to qualifying and organizing the impact of religion on human behavior. We then suggest that the various relationships between religion and consumer behavior can be structured by differentiating the manifest and latent expression of religiousness in behavior. Then, we focus on the manifest influence and address the implications of participation in religious activity for marketing practices. Finally, we focus on the latent influence and discuss the limitations of research in marketing that have mostly considered religiousness as a characteristic of the consumer. We provide a set of propositions anchored in experimental research to help elucidate that value of considering religiousness as a resource that the consumer mobilizes (according to context) to fulfill needs for control, meaning, self-esteem, and identity.

1. RELIGION AND RELIGIOUSNESS: SYNTHESIS OF CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS 1.1. Defining religion and religiousness 1.1.1. Defining religion There is not one generally accepted definition or theory of religion, but there are almost as many definitions as there are researchers to elaborate them (Guthrie, 1980; Yinger, 1970). A common denominator of many definitions of religion in marketing (e.g., McDaniel and Burnett, 1990) and other social sciences such as psychology (e.g., Hood et al., 2009) has 25

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been the notion of God and the supernatural. Indeed, in many religions, the idea of one deity or several deities is central to the foundation of the doctrine that establishes what the followers believe. At the same time, others have noted that “religion is a concept stemming from a particular culture at a particular time” (Guthrie, 1996, p. 418); thus indicating that religions are sociocultural (rather than divine) phenomena. In addition, Durkheim (1912) observed in an early study that many major religions such as Buddhism have placed considerably less emphasis on the notion of divinity. Therefore, it appears that although a reference to God, spiritual beings, or the supernatural remains a very common thread across religions, it is not a requisite feature for the definition of religion. Consistent with this, some have noted that the secularization of religion over recent history tends to de-emphasize the role played by traditional deities in religious rituals, something often attributed to marketing practices. For example, Belk (1987) has discussed the secularization of Christmas in the United States wherein Santa Clause has largely become the deity celebrated for that religious holiday. As such, the marketization of such a secular figure by many brands (including Coca-Cola for over a century) has almost supplanted the celebration of genuine religious figures in Christianity such as Jesus Christ. Perhaps noting the inherent difficulty in defining something so broad, others, such as Weber (1905), have suggested that precisely defining religion is less important than exploring the conditions and societal implications of that particular type of social behavior. In a similarly practical vein, Eister (1974) argues that although a perfect definition may be impossible, we should at least strive for an operational definition that is sufficient to guide research in terms of measurement and observation in field studies. Of course, this approach suggests that definitions of religion need to be tailored, or should offer different emphases depending on the type of research being conducted and the research setting (McDaniel and Burnett 1990; Wilkes, Burnett, and Howell 1986).

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Given these aforementioned points, in addition to the fact that “any definition of religion is likely to be satisfactory only to its author” (Yinger 1970, p. 18), we opt in this study to rely on Durkheim’s perspective, which is broad enough to be applied to any culture at any time, and can even be extended to secular contexts (Belk, Wallendorf, and Sherry 1989). This perspective emphasizes three aspects that tend to co-occur in most religions: (1) a system of beliefs and rituals, (2) a distinction between the sacred (i.e., things perceived as not ordinary, which may involve deities as well as objects such as a wooden cross for Christians, or concepts such as the Four Noble Truths in Buddhism) and the profane (i.e., things perceived as ordinary), and (3) a collective organization. This perspective is reflected in Durkheim’s description that “ a religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden – beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them” (1912, p. 46). This definition offers the benefit of defining religion as a sociological phenomenon without relying on strictly psychological states or traits, such as religiousness, that other definitions of religion tend to bleed into.

1.1.2. Defining religious-related constructs: religiousness and spirituality While researchers have been using a plethora of terms to consider religious-related constructs (e.g., religiousness, religiosity, religious orientation, religious involvement), this paper focuses on a single word to prevent any misleading confusion: religiousness. Religiousness, referring to the influence of religion on the individual’s psyche, can be approached in terms of strength as a trait (Emmons and Paloutzian 2003; Hill et al. 2000; Zinnbauer, Pargament, and Scott 1999) or salience as a state (Shariff et al. in press). The concept of religiousness has been defined with a common basis with regard to spirituality. 27

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Hill and colleagues (2000) propose a synonymous definitional criterion that emphasizes the idea that both religiousness and spirituality are “subjective feelings, thoughts, experiences, and behaviors that arise from a search for the sacred” (p. 68). However, the conceptualization of religiousness extends beyond spirituality because the latter does not pertain to an organized church but instead occurs exclusively at the individual level. As such, Hill and colleagues also identify two points of departure: first, in regards to the difference of spirituality, religiousness may imply a search for non-sacred goals (e.g., social identity, self-esteem) in contexts designed by religions to facilitate the search for the sacred. For instance, one may go to a place of worship with the primary objective of making friends. Second, and more importantly, religiousness includes “means and methods (e.g., rituals and prescribed behaviors) of the search for the sacred that receive validation and support from within an identifiable group that is form on the basis of the search itself.” (Hill et al. 2000, p. 69). Religiousness has often been used interchangeably with other words (notably religiosity) with the objective of emphasizing a particular aspect of how religion affects the individual. Hood and colleagues (2009) identify 17 groups of measurement scales that lead to the inventory of over one hundred measures. Religiousness is often understood as a multifaceted construct that incorporates cognitive (religious knowledge and beliefs), affective (feelings towards religious beings, objects, and institutions), behavioral (doing), and motivational (reasons for participating in religious rituals) aspects (Cornwall, Albrecht, and Cunningham 1986; Hackney and Sanders 2003). This multidimensionality reflects the complexity of a single, unanimous conceptualization. Meta-analytic reviews emphasized that depending on the dimension(s) considered for the conceptualization of religiousness, research found different effects in terms of valence and strength on a same outcome variable (see Hackney and Sanders 2003 and Saroglou 2002). Choosing one aspect rather than another must therefore depend on the research questions that are being addressed. For instance, if one

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is interested in the effect of religiousness with an emphasis on the cognitive aspect (religious orthodoxy) or an emphasis on the behavioral aspect (religious orthopraxy), one should use the appropriate (specific) conceptualizations and measures (see Laurin and Plaks 2014 for a relevant example).

1.2. Overview of the relationships between religion and consumer behavior Our analysis of the effects of religion on human behavior leads to a proposal for a basic distinction between the manifest and latent expressions of religiousness in people’s behavior. The following expands on this proposition.

1.2.1. Manifest expression of religiousness in behavior The manifest expression of religiousness in behavior refers to the operationalization of the followers’ religiousness by practicing a religious activity, or the specific beliefs and practices legitimized by the group (Hood et al. 2000). Religious beliefs are organized under a system of normative representations of sacred things (e.g., beings, objects, ideas, rituals). According to Durkheim (1912), such religious beliefs can serve three objectives: (1) determining how and to what extent a thing is sacred, (2) establishing the relations between them, and (3) distinguishing the sacred from the profane. Religious practices constitute the practical extension of religious beliefs into a mode of actions determining how one must behave in accordance with the sacred. Durkheim’s (1912) categorization of these into two types of complementary cults – the negative cult and the positive cult – is especially useful for organizing consumer behavior. The negative cult entails the objective to prevent the “contagiousness of the sacred” by the profane through utilizing a set of ascetic rites mixing

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prescriptions and interdictions19. In contrast, the positive cult organizes the religious life by a set of rites that aims primarily to demonstrate one’s devotion toward the sacred. We suggest that a primary influence of religious activity on human behavior is the organization of one’s life according to the negative and positive cults of one’s religion. In the context of consumer behavior, Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975) have posited afterlife rewards as a primary motive for engaging in religious activity. As such, they propose that households allocate their consumption and time between secular and religious activities for maximization of their lifetime and afterlife utility20. It is therefore suggested that utility is a function of religious concerns, and thus consumers take into account religious prescriptions and interdictions in elaborating the decision-making process.

1.2.2. Latent expression of religiousness in behavior The latent expression of religiousness in behavior refers to the repeated observation that religiousness is not only expressed through observance of religious prescriptions (i.e., how one must behave) and interdictions (i.e., how one must not behave), but can be expressed in a pervasive manner without being related to specific beliefs. In general, there are two traditional approaches to this type of research, whereby some researchers identify religiousness as an individual difference variable – in other words, a trait or a characteristic – whereas others consider it as a resource mobilized to fulfill fundamental human needs. 19

The term “taboo” might be alternatively used without altering the signification in that context (Durkheim 1912). 20 The utility function of the household religious participation model elaborated by Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975) is: U = U (C1, C2,…, Ct,..., Cn, q) where  Ct is the household’s consumption in period t, and depends on a composite market good xt and the time allocation of each member of the household (h1t, h2t, …) to the household consumption into the final commodity Ct, with Ct = C(xt, h1t, h2t) for all of period t; 

q is the expected value of the household’s afterlife rewards, and depends on time spent in religious activities (r1, ..., rn) by the household members for the n periods of their lifetimes: q =q(r1, ..., rn).

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To view religiousness as a characteristic is to believe that religiousness is a stable component that identifies a person and durably influences his or her behavior. This perspective is strongly related to Weber’s (1905) view that religion influences worldviews and personality variables via a broad ethos that can exert profound influences on the formation of social and economic systems (e.g., the rise of capitalism in Protestant nations). Personality psychologists have adopted a similar perspective by considering religion as a strong contributing source of individual differences (Emmons and Paloutzian 2003; Saroglou 2002). Accordingly, they demonstrate that religiousness is a sort of factor related to certain personality traits, though these relationships depend on how it is measured. For instance, intrinsic religiousness (i.e., the extent to which one adopts religious teachings) appears to be positively associated with agreeableness and conscientiousness, whereas fundamentalism (i.e., the extent to which one believes in the correctness of his or her religious worldview) is negatively associated with openness (see Saroglou 2002). On the other hand, to view religiousness as a resource constitutes an alternative perspective that relates to the functionalist approach in the scientific study of religion (Yinger 1970), which finds its roots in the French school of sociology led by Durkheim as well as Marxist schools of thought. From this perspective, religion is viewed as a means for individuals to serve social and psychological needs created by the social system (Durkheim 1912; Marx 1977) and overall human condition (Yinger 1970). Further, this perspective views religiousness as a resource that people mobilize when they experience a discrepancy between an expectation or desire and their current circumstances. Because researchers adopting this approach have identified such a wide range of functions, we have organized the various needs that religiousness may serve into four distinct types: (1) needs for control, order, and certainty, (2) needs for meaning, (3) needs for self-esteem, and (4) needs for identity.

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First, religion serves a need for control, order, and certainty. Theories of control (see Landau, Kay, and Whitson 2015 for a review with recent takes) suggest that personal control can be achieved by relying on the self by personal agency (i.e., beliefs that one can intentionally produce desired outcomes and prevent undesired outcomes) or by relying on external sources such as institutional systems, God, or equivalent omnipotent forces (e.g., chance, fate, Karma) that people can align themselves with (also known as secondary control; Rothbaum, Weisz, and Snyder 1982). Most religions provide a systems of beliefs in the general order of the world by promoting a deity’s omnipotence (e.g., Psalm 23, Qur’an 4:45, Rig Veda 1:154). Belief in powerful supernatural beings is common in folk cultures, even in non-deistic religions such as Buddhism (Durkheim 1912). In this context, religiousness strengthens the belief that “things are under control” when personal control is threatened (Kay, Gaucher, Napier, Callan, and Laurin 2008; Kay, Shepherd, Blatz, Chua, and Galinsky 2010). Kay and colleagues suggest that a compensatory mechanism exists between personal control and order-providing worldviews such as religion. As a way of assuaging the anxietyinducing fear of randomness, when one is threatened, endorsement of the other strengthens. Second, religion serves a need for meaning as it allows followers to make sense of events that are seemingly beyond the reach of their understanding. The attributional properties of religion allow people to imbue any event, however mysterious, with an understandable focal cause: God, or to a larger extent, what is perceived as sacred and transcending the self (Silberman 2005). As such, religion has been recognized as a powerful means for coping with a number of traumatic events that raise existential questions, including death and illness (Hood et al. 2009; Jonas and Fisher 2006). Furthermore, given that religious belief tends to center around propositions that are non-falsifiable (Friesen, Campbell, and Kay 2014), religious belief would seem to offer an especially potent means for preserving feelings of meaning and purpose in the world.

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Third, religion serves a need for self-esteem (or self-enhancement). Religion bolsters feelings of self-esteem because it provides the belief that one is valued and unique in the eyes of a deity (Crocker et al. 2003) that most faiths depict as benevolent and omniscient (e.g., Hebrews 4:13, Psalm 139:1-3, Qur’an 2:115). Notably, intrinsic religiousness has been shown to be positively associated with self-esteem because intrinsically motivated individuals internalize religious teachings at the difference of extrinsically motivated individuals whose participation in religious activity aims to serve personal, self-indulgent goals (Sedikides and Gebauer 2010). Research in terror management theory (Jonas and Fisher 2006; Rothschild et al. 2010) suggests that because religion offers hope of immortality, it can help individuals dealing with the anxiety-inducing fear of death. Self-esteem is then acquired by striving to live up to the standards of the religious worldview. Fourth, religion serves a need for social identity (or belongingness). Religion allows for the establishment of social connections built upon normative beliefs and rituals collectively recognized as a sign of membership. In other words, it can facilitate the sense of “us” and “them” that is so crucial to feelings of identity (Tajfel and Tuner 1979). While explaining why religious beliefs and rituals always appear to accompany the formation of an organized church or group of worship, Durkheim (1912) noted that religion offers “a society whose members are united by the fact that they think in the same way in regard to the sacred world and its relations with the profane world, and by the fact that they translate common ideas into common practices” (p. 42-43). Thus, identifying with a religion is identifying with a group of people who share common representations and behaviors. Consistent with this, more recent research has shown that religiousness can reduce feelings of self- and groupbased uncertainty (Hogg, Adelman, and Blagg 2010) and offer a sense of social connection (Gebauer and Maio 2012).

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Figure 3 presents an overview of the relationships between religion, religiousness, and consumer behavior. Subsequent propositions are organized in accordance to this framework. These propositions are certainly not exhaustive, but their primary objective is to illustrate how religious priming can be used to investigate religion’s causal effect on a number of psychological outcomes that are relevant to consumer behavior.

Figure 3: Overview of the relationships between religion and consumer behavior

2. MANIFEST ASPECTS OF CONSUMER RELIGIOUSNESS 2.1. Religious activity in religious contexts For Durkheim (1912), the main purpose of religious activity is to separate the sacred from the profane, including the merely ordinary and the forbidden.

2.1.1. When the profane refers to the merely ordinary

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When the profane refers to the merely ordinary – that is, anything that lacks religious significance – a question emerges as to what extent the sacred and the profane can interact. That question has important marketing implications for two reasons. First, religious institutions have been encouraging profane ways for people to maintain a religious activity. They have employed marketing practices such as rebranding, new media, and megachurches (e.g., Potter’s House, the Lakewood Church) to increase their efficiency in targeting (potential) worshipers. Second, the religious sphere has been extended to secular aspects of daily life at the initiative of marketers through consumption, particularly at the occasion of holy days (Belk 1987; Hirschman et al. 2011). O’Guinn and Belk (1989) studied the interconnection of the traditionally sacred (religion) and the traditionally profane (shopping and buying) in the context of Heritage Village – an attraction park themed around biblical events. There, consumption is viewed as a means to extend one’s relationship to the sacred by providing a hedonic dimension to religious activity. Research suggests that when marketing strategies (e.g., rebranding, value-based pricing) involving religion are transparent in the purpose of increasing an organization’s efficiency (sales for profitable organizations and worshipers for religious organizations), individuals feel moral distress and anger against the instigators of the commercial marketing campaign, even when they are churches (McAlexander, Leavenworth, Martin, and Schouten 2014; McGraw, Schwartz, and Tetlock 2012). However, when marketing strategies involving religion use a communal-sharing rhetoric and appear to ease the practice of religious activity (or to make it more subtle), individuals tend to perceive an hedonic dimension in both the religious and consumption experience (Belk 1987; Hirschman et al. 2011; O’Guinn and Belk 1989).

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2.1.2. When the profane refers to the forbidden When the profane refers to the forbidden – that is, anything that is specifically forbidden due to its potential to “contaminate” the sacred – the relevant marketing question regards the impact of religious prescriptions and interdictions in choice restriction (defined as “any internally or externally imposed boundary that limits and/or confines choices” [Botti et al. 2008, p. 185]). The impact of religious restrictions in consumer research has mostly been studied in Muslim societies where strong Islamic traditions face globalization and Western consumption trends (e.g., Izberk-Bilgin 2012; Sandikci and Ger 2010). However, other religious affiliations face similar dilemmas because of their tradition of ascetic practices (e.g., Orthodox Jews, Mormons, Amish, and other traditionalist Christian Churches). In a globalized world, secular consumption and religious restrictions often conflict with one another. For instance, Jamal and Sharifuddin (2015) emphasized the interest of halal labeling to enhance the consumption experience of British Muslims so that such a religious minority might enjoy both their faith and a Western lifestyle. Botti and colleagues (2008) suggest that consistency between a restriction and the consumer’s goals determines the cognitive, emotional, and behavioral response to the restriction itself, and as such predicts the valence of the consumer’s reaction. If a restriction is perceived as inconsistent with the consumer’s goal, it should induce a motivational state of psychological reactance (Brehm 1989). This dislike for restrictions on freedom may create negative cognitive and emotional responses, including the rejection of the restriction. However, if the consumer perceives consistency between the restriction and his or her goals, more positive subsequent cognitive and emotional responses should follow, including compliance. Consistent with this, Sandikci and Ger (2010) observed that urban Turkish women who accepted the restrictive practice of veiling did so because they perceived it as enabling (rather than conflicting with) the expression of their identity goals.

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By integrating this basic idea with contemporary psychological models of goal accessibility, it may be possible to offer an even more nuanced way to predict behavioral inconsistencies in complying with religious restrictions. We suggest that Botti and colleagues (2008) fail to fully appreciate the variability in salience of competing personal and situational goals. Goals, religious or otherwise, are not static and ever-present, but fluctuate in relative salience (i.e., accessibility). At times, religious goals may be cognitively dominant (for example, when spending time with friends and family at home), but at other times competing goals may supplant them (for example, when eating lunch with some colleagues and socializing). To predict reactions to restriction in a consumer context, it is therefore important to not just consider whether someone is or is not religious, but also how the current social context may activate (or inhibit) those goals. Note that competition between high religious goal salience and high situational goal salience should not necessarily lead to strict compliance with or rejection of the religious restriction. Rather, the consumer should be motivated to “bend the rules” (Botti et al. 2008) by re-interpreting the religious restriction in a way that allows him or her to compromise between the two highly salient goals. Thus, when considering a specific consumption context, we propose the following21:

P1a:

Lower religious goal salience and high or low situational goal salience should

increase psychological reactance with regard to the religious restriction, and lead to rejection of it. P1b:

Higher religious goal salience and low situational goal salience should reduce

psychological reactance with regard to the religious restriction, and lead to compliance with it.

21

Because reactance is a relatively Western phenomenon that occurs most strongly in cultures (such as in the United States) that promote agency, freedom, and choice, we acknowledge that this proposition may depend on the broader culture in which the religion is embedded.

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P1c:

Higher religious goal salience and high situational goal salience should

increase psychological reactance with regard to the religious restriction, and lead to its interpretation for compromise between the two competitive goals.

2.2. Religious activity in secular contexts An important observation in contemporary consumer culture is the sacralization of the secular. Concomitant with the secularization of the sacred, people seem to seek out the sacred in secular contexts such as politics, music, sports, or any kinds of objects (Belk et al. 1989). A prominent aspect of the sacralization of the secular is “brand cult,” a concept originally proposed by Belk and Tumbat (2005) in an attempt to better understand the extreme devotion consumers have toward certain brands. Consumers can sometimes create strong bonds with brands (Park, MacInnis, Priester, Eisingerich, and Iacobucci 2010). Such bonds can go beyond mere attachment when it comes to certain contemporary phenomena of consumption, such as Apple’s worldwide success (Belk and Tumbat 2005; Muñiz and Schau 2005) and the increasing development of subcultures based on fiction-related franchises (e.g., Star Trek; Kozinets 2001). Using Durkheim’s definition, we consider the ways in which brand cult could be better captured by the construct of religion. First, brand cult relies on a system of beliefs that attributes sacred properties to the brand. A brand is only considered sacred insofar as consumers use them to seek transcendent experiences, thus making the brand not ordinary in the eyes of the consumer. Brands can be seen as more significant, powerful, and extraordinary than the self (Belk et al. 1989). As such, they are sometimes placed at the center of the consumer’s life, the same way deities or religious figures are placed at the center of worshipers’ lives. Further pushing the sacralization process, as is the case with religion, consumers often form beliefs that attribute sacred properties to the brand, mythologizing its history and components (Belk and Tumbat

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2005; Muñiz and Schau 2005). A typical example is Apple’s construction of a “messiah myth” around Steve Jobs – one of the founders who was forced to leave the company only to return and save it. Second, just like with religion, the sacralization process is often maintained through a set of concrete practices (or rituals). In reference to the notion of a negative cult developed by Durkheim (1912), consumers may develop habits and even rules so that the brand may be protected from the profane (that is, anything that might contaminate it and cause it to lose its sacred value). To do so, consumers often develop and maintain strong rivalries with competing brands. Such rivalries can translate into resistance to objectively more appealing products than those made by the worshiped brand, and contempt toward other brands in the same product category as well as their users (Belk and Tumbat 2005; Muñiz and Schau 2005). Third, in reference to Durkheim’s (1912) notion of a positive cult, other rituals allow consumers to express a strong enthusiasm for the brand, and to prevent feelings of boredom or habituation toward it (Belk et al. 1989; Belk and Tumbat 2005). Such acts of worship relate strongly to those of institutional religions: pilgrimages to places associated with the sacred value of the brand (e.g., online or physical special events), proselytism and evangelization of non-users, carrying exterior signs of affiliation (e.g. clothes, stickers), and involving oneself in routine tasks reinforcing the bonds within the community of worshippers (e.g., online assistance and activity in social networks). Insofar as these actions remain sensible (i.e., within the firm’s reach in cases of excesses), acts of devotion might greatly benefit brands through extreme loyalty, positive word of mouth, and defense of their reputation against attackers. The researches cited above are based on qualitative data, which makes their conclusions non-falsifiable. Further research on brand cult could benefit greatly from

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explaining such a phenomenon through testing associations and causal effects; to do so, one must rely first on precise conceptualizations. Thus, we propose the following:

P2:

Brand cult is conceptually captured by religion and better qualifies the

strength of the bond connecting the consumer with the brand 1) when beliefs attribute sacred properties to the brand, 2) when consumers commit to practices aimed at separating the brand from things viewed as profane, and 3) when consumers commit to practices aimed at expressing their devotion toward the brand.

Noticeably lacking from P2 is any mention of the social dimension that constitutes one of the pillars of Durkheim’s definition of religion. We opted to exclude this because, though the social dimensions of brand cult may be as important as they are in institutional religions (Kozinets 2001), an individual can experience or exist within a brand cult without committing to the social experience. One might even prefer to express his devotion outside of brand communities, or one might be the only one to regard a brand as sacred because of a personal significance.

3. LATENT ASPECTS OF CONSUMER RELIGIOUSNESS 3.1. Religiousness as a characteristic of the consumer Weber’s (1905) model left persistent traces in consumer research when it comes to the study of religious studies. Religiousness has long been considered as a consumer’s characteristic, that is, a stable demographic that durably influences the individuals’ behavior (e.g., Delener 1994; McDaniel and Burnett 1990; Sood and Nasu 1995). The first empirical works in the field are attributed to Hirschman (1981; 1982; 1983) who developed a paradigm to study the effects of religious affiliation on consumption processes beyond the observance 40

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of religious rules. Similar to Weber’s conception, religion is seen as a cultural system based on beliefs, values, and expectations shared by a community of individuals, and as different from other communities. Inherited by cultural group, that cognitive system is socially constructed and acts on the behavior in the same way as do personality traits, social economic status, and political ideologies. While this approach is focused on what happens within a religion, subsequent works suggest that religiousness should be viewed as a characteristic whose impact is relevant in and of itself, beyond the role of religious affiliation. Research gathered in Table 5 indicates that consumption behaviors that do not pertain to the observance of religious prescriptions and interdiction are not so much affected by one’s religious affiliation as they are by one’s religiousness. Results regarding the effects of religious affiliations are quite inconsistent: few works show significant effects (Delener 1990; Hirschman 1981), whereas most show otherwise (see Table 5). Moreover, the results from Hirschman (1981) and Delener (1990) are related to a focus on the Jewish subculture in the United States, which might express a stronger religious identity as included in a minority cultural setting (see Hirschman et al. 2011). A high level of religiousness is often associated with personality traits that emphasize a certain austerity or simplicity in one’s lifestyle, such as traditionalism and conservatism (e.g., Choi 2010; Delener 1994; McDaniel and Burnett 1990; Rindfleisch et al. 2010; Wilkes et al. 1986). In the same vein, we find consistent evidence that religiousness is negatively associated with materialism (Burroughs and Rindfleisch 2002; Cleveland and Chang 2009; La Barbera and Gürhan 1997). It appears, then, that consumption behaviors for persons who score high in religiousness scales are characterized by some restraint or even ascetic preferences. Thus, we propose the following:

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Table 5 Synthesis of empirical marketing research with religiousness as a consumer characteristic

Authors

Methods and religious affiliations

Survey, Bove, n=215, Nagpal, and Australia; Dorsett Religious (2009) affiliations: N/A

Product categories

N/A

Survey, n=452, South Korea; Religious Choi (2010) affiliations: N/A Buddhists, Catholics, Protestants, None Delener (1990)

Survey, n=349, US; Religious affiliations:

Automobiles, Microwave ovens

Operationalization of religiousness Eight-item measure of intrinsic religiousness (Gorsuch and McPherson 1989) Six-item measure of intrinsic religiousness (three adapted from Hill and Hood [1999]; one from McDaniel and Burnett [1990]; two from Hoge [1972]) Twenty-item measure of motivational religious

Main results

No significant association between intrinsic religiousness and frugal shopping behavior.

Significant effect of religious affiliation

-

No significant relationship between religious affiliation and product purchase, and store switching behavior. Significant relationship between religiousness and product purchase, and store switching behaviors.

No

Significant association between religious affiliation and perceived risk (higher for Catholic consumers). Significant association between religiousness and perceived risk (higher for high religiousness).

Yes

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Catholics, Jews

orientation (Allport and Ross 1967) Twenty-item measure of motivational religious orientation (Allport and Ross 1967)

Delener (1994)

Survey, n=207, US; Religious affiliations: Catholics, Jews

Esso and Dibb (2004)

Survey, n=600, Mauritius; Religious affiliations: Catholics, Hindus, Muslims

TV sets

Twenty-item measure of motivational religious orientation (Allport and Ross 1967)

Survey, n=661, US; Religious affiliations: Jews (vs. Non-Jews)

Nineteen various consumption domains (e.g., hairstyle, general ideologies, weekend night entertainment)

Single-item measure of the strength of selfdesignated religious affiliation

Hirschman (1981)

Automobiles

No significant relationship between religious affiliation and purchasing roles in the household. Significant relationship between religiousness and purchasing roles in the household (the higher religiousness, the more autonomous the decision in the household).

No

Significant relationship between religious affiliation and seven shopper profiles identified based on a factorial analysis (e.g., demanding shopper, practical shopper). Same conclusion for religiousness.

Yes

Positive relationship between the Jewish religious affiliation and childhood information exposure, adult information seeking, consumption innovativeness, consumption information transfer, active memory capacity, and divergent processing ability.

Yes

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Survey, n=330, US; Religious Hirschman affiliations: (1982) Catholics, Jews, Protestants Survey, n=550, US; McDaniel Religious and Burnett affiliations: (1990) Catholics, Jews, Protestants Surveys: n=363 in the US, and n=300 in Singapore; Rindfleisch, Religious Burroughs, affiliations: and Wong Mainly (2010) Catholic and Protestant for the US survey; Mainly Buddhists

Fifteen various consumption domains (e.g., hairstyle, general ideologies)

Hirschman’s (1981) single-item measure

Significant relationship between religious affiliation and inherent novelty seeking, and information transfer.

Yes

Retail stores

Five-item measure assessing the cognitive and behavioral dimensions of religiousness

No significant relationship between religious affiliation and retail store evaluative criteria. Significant relationship between religiousness and one of the seven retail store evaluative criteria (sales personal assistance).

No

Significant positive relationship between fundamentalism and brand loyalty and self-brand connection (except for automobiles) for both cultures. No significant relationship between spirituality and brand loyalty (except for automobiles and cell-phones: negative relationship) and self-brand connection for both cultures.

Yes

Automobiles and jeans for the US survey Cell phones and watches for the Singaporean survey

Six-item measure assessing fundamentalism (Religious Fundamentalism Scale) Eight-item measure assessing spirituality (Spiritual Transcendence Index)

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and Christians for the Singaporean survey

Sood and Nasu (1995)

Survey, n=330, US and Japan; Religious affiliations: Protestants in the US and Shintos in Japan

Wilkes, Burnett, and Howell (1984)

Survey, n=602, US; Religious affiliations: Mainly Protestants

Relatively expensive radio for home

N/A

Nine-item measure assessing religious activity, perceived importance and confidence of religious values, self-evaluation of one’s religiousness, and belief in the basic tenets of one’s religion Four-item measure assessing church attendance, importance and confidence of religious values, and self-perceived religiousness

No significant relationship between religiousness and consumer shopping behavior for Japanese Shinto. Significant relationship between religiousness and consumer shopping behavior for American Protestant.

No

Strong significant relationship between religiousness and traditionalism and life satisfaction, and weaker (but still significant) relationship between religiousness and opinion leadership. No significant relationship between religiousness and credit usage, and orientation toward store private brands.

-

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P3:

Religiousness as an individual, generic characteristic affects consumption-

related variables by a preference for ascetic tastes, or at least restraint, regardless of the consumer’s religious affiliation.

3.2. Interests and limitations of the view of religiousness as a characteristic Viewing religiousness as a characteristic is not exclusive from a perspective that would consider it as more of a state (or a resource). People are more likely to cope with psychological needs such as control or meaning through utilizing religion if their religiousness is already high. However, that does not mean that people with low religiousness would not cope with such needs through religion, insofar as they do not self-identify as atheist (Inzlicht and Tullett 2010; Shariff et al. 2015). Though mostly relying on correlational studies, consumer research on religious thinking demonstrates at the very least that the influence of religiousness on consumer behavior is not restrained to the observance of specific beliefs within a religious group. This influence actually extends to a wide range of products. For example, Table 5 identifies product categories (e.g., watches, cars, services including retailing) that are not subject to normative beliefs and practices in terms of prescriptions and interdictions for most religions. However, by consistently considering religiousness as a characteristic, research in marketing has reduced its status to a mere demographic. Authors have been arguing that an important property of religiousness is its stability over time (Delener 1994; McDaniel and Burnett 1990). Given emerging works that demonstrate that religious priming affects certain aspects of behavior (e.g., Kay et al. 2008; 2010; Laurin et al. 2012; Shariff and Norenzayan 2007; Shariff et al. in press), and that religiousness can vary according to certain stimuli (Cutright, Erdem, Fitzsimons, and Shachar 2014; Gebauer and Maio 2012; Kay et al. 2008), 46

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we argue otherwise. We contend that depending on the demands of the social and physical environment, individuals may mobilize their religiousness when such environments arouse psychological needs such as control, meaning, self-esteem, and identity. As such, we posit that religiousness can be more or less salient (or accessible) and vary in strength depending on situational cues. In addition to this conceptual limitation, we identify another of methodological nature. Research summarized in Table 5 relies exclusively on surveys that operationalize religiousness using various scales. One may find some inconsistency regarding the effects of religiousness on consumer-related constructs in similar conditions (i.e., same countries and same religious affiliations), and may thus question the operationalization of the construct itself. Wilkes and colleagues (1986) suggest that using items designed to measure religious activity such as church attendance is arguable regarding its weak contribution to the assessment of religiousness. Under the assumption that the psychometric properties of such scales are satisfying, the following question arises: Is it relevant to use measures based on the assessment of religious activity (e.g., prayer frequency, church attendance) when researchers are interested in the effects of religiousness on behaviors that do not pertain to the observance of specific beliefs and rituals? Consider someone who strongly believes in a God-like entity and yet do not attend church or pray frequently. Using such operationalizations of religiousness may dramatically lower the statistical power of hypothesis testing. This may lead to not detecting an effect that actually exists in the population (i.e., a Type II Error). Yet, this kind of profile is not negligible; in the United States, for instance, it represents one in five adults (18% of the population; Pew, 2012).

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Consequently, we suggest that the subsequent propositions (with the exception of P8 that pertains to religious identity) could be applied to non-denominational and agnostic individuals, or theists who do not affiliate with a specific religious denomination.

3.3. Religiousness as a resource of the consumer 3.3.1. Religiousness as a resource satisfying a need for control: Moderating role on goal pursuit Laurin and colleagues (2012) recently suggested that exposure to beliefs in God or any similar spiritual representation such as Karma reduces motivation to active goal pursuit. The rationale behind this proposition is that such representations are associated with omnipotent attributes that lead to perceiving them as controlling forces in people’s lives. According to this view, the negative effect of exposure to the concept of God on active goal pursuit resides in activating the belief that one’s actions might be contingent on the decisions and behaviors of another intelligent entity. A long line of research in social loafing supports such a prediction (e.g., Harkins and Szymanski 1988). Thus, because goal attainment might be perceived as controlled by a powerful other rather than the individual, self-efficacy – the perception of one’s ability to perform the required behavior (Bandura 1994) – might be altered. Consequently, when the thought of a controlling, omnipotent God is salient, people may be less inclined to actively invest efforts. We propose to nuance this finding. While many cultural representations of God are built on omnipotence (Norenzayan 2013), they are often given to the followers as a source of will against adversity (e.g., “The Lord is my shepherd […]” Psalm 23, The Bible). Therefore, we propose that the effect of exposure to the concept of God on goal pursuit depends on the presence or the absence of a control threat. Kay and colleagues (2008; 2010; Landau et al. 48

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2015) identified a compensatory mechanism between personal control and religious beliefs by which people seek to reinforce things are under control even though the source of control is not the self. In doing so, people assuage the anxiety-inducing fear of perceiving their environment as random and chaotic. Cutright (2012) suggests further that when the sense of personal control is threatened, consumers seek structure in their environment (e.g., brand logos with clear boundaries) as a way of preserving the belief that the world is orderly. However, one of Cutright’s studies demonstrates that religious persons do not act accordingly as they are already relying on religion to gain secondary control. Situations leading to lacking personal control are numerous. When it comes to goal pursuit, type of planning might be a potent source of control threat. Consider a consumer confronted with a goal that is difficult to obtain because of the number of tasks necessary to accomplish goal attainment. In comparison to a vague type of planning where, for the same goal, tasks are presented more sparingly (i.e., as a few superordinate core features of tasks), such a challenging goal should lead one to question his or her abilities to perform the requisite behaviors. Recent consumer research has shown that too much emphasis on the specifics of a plan lead to lower motivation in goal pursuit, especially when individuals are far away from goal attainment (Townsend and Liu 2012; Ülkümen and Cheema 2011). In such cases, people tend to focus on goal feasibility to consider whether investing efforts is worthwhile (Liberman and Trope 1998; Trope, Liberman, and Wakslak 2007). Because activating thoughts of a controlling, omnipotent God elicits a sense that the world is orderly, predictable, and understandable, individuals may express a stronger confidence that their actions will reliably produce expected outcomes (higher self-efficacy). Accordingly, they may be more motivated to pursue their goals despite such specific, detailed types of planning involved. Thus, we propose the following:

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P4a:

Under conditions in which religiousness is salient, when the tasks of an overall

goal are presented through a vague type of planning, consumers are less motivated to invest efforts than when religiousness is neutral – especially in the case of the salience of a controlling, omnipotent God. This effect is driven by lower perceived self-efficacy.

P4b:

Under conditions in which religiousness is salient, when tasks of an overall

goal are presented through a detailed, specific type of planning, consumers are more motivated to invest efforts than when religiousness is neutral – especially in the case of the salience of a controlling, omnipotent God. This effect is driven by higher perceived self-efficacy.

3.3.2. Religiousness as a resource satisfying a need for meaning: Moderating role on brand avoidance In many cases, consumers are not able to achieve their goals for reasons that escape their control: for instance, using public transportation and arriving late because of breakdowns or strikes, ordering clothes online and not being able to wear them because of a size error, or even ordering a vegetarian pizza and being delivered a Hawaiian pizza. Do consumers automatically blame the brand for keeping them from attaining their goals, be they respectively arriving on time at a meeting, wearing a new outfit for a date, or relaxing after a day of work? Thereafter, do consumers stop buying the brand? Obviously, it depends on the extent to which the brand appears responsible for such negative outcomes. Past work has shown, however, that when failure is not due to the consumer misuse of the product or service, people tend to antagonize the brand, even when failure is unintentional (Folkes 1984; McGill 1991). To the extent that the brand is not perceived to have volitional control of the negative outcome, we suggest that the salience of 50

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religiousness moderates the effect of failure on brand avoidance to the point of promoting brand approach for future purchases. Although some religions such as Christianity are known to promote forgiveness, such a prescription is not shared by all faiths, or at least not to the same extent (Armstrong 1993; Emmons and Paloutzian 2003). All religions, however, satisfy a need for meaning by promoting worldviews where God (or similar spiritual representations) is the focal cause of any specific event (Hill et al. 2009; Silberman 2005). Therefore, we suggest that when it comes to attributing responsibility, the salience of religiousness may steer attention from the brand toward God. Research has identified responsibility judgments as the driving force between failure and an approach-avoidance relationship toward brands involved in such negative episodes (Klein and Dawar 2004; Puzakova, Kwak, and Rocereto 2013). People’s need to search for causal explanations arises not because of the unsuccessful episode per se, but because of the episode as a deviation from the expected (Weiner 1985). The larger the gap between expectations and performance, the more consumer satisfaction suffers (Mittal, Ross, and Baldasare 1998). For McGill (1991), causal reasoning is not straightforward, but depends on the context in which it occurs, and thus may change across individuals and situations. Responsibility judgments relate as such to background effects such as prior information or the individual’s experience. Following that logic, the salience of religiousness at the time of failure may dilute attribution of responsibility, thereby allowing the brand to be cleared from blame. In the same vein, Kopalle and colleagues (2010) showed that in India, priming belief in Karma entices consumers to set realistic expectations (i.e., those that take into account all contingencies including failure), because such a belief heightens the conviction that every event and thing has a purpose that will eventually come into fruition. To the extent that the brand did not deliberately cause the negative outcome – in which case the brand might receive all the blame regardless of religious priming – the salience of

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religiousness may thus entice people to believe that failure was not so much a deviation from the expected as an outcome of God’s plan. Accordingly, we propose the following proposition with the understanding that it pertains only to contexts of failure where the negative outcomes did not result from the misuse of the product or service by the consumer.

P5:

The impact of goal failure on brand avoidance is considerably weaker under

conditions in which religiousness is salient than under conditions in which it is neutral, as religiousness salience reduces blame attribution toward the brand in a failure context insofar as the brand is not perceived as having volitional control of the negative outcome. This effect should occur independently of dispositional forgiveness that some individuals may be prone to due to the observance of some religious prescriptions.

3.3.3. Religiousness as a resource satisfying a need for self-esteem: Moderating role on ad attitude Consumers are often exposed to advertisements designed to bolster self-esteem. Selfesteem advertising is not new (Durgee 1986) and refers to techniques used to enhance consumers’ evaluation of a product or brand by placing in advertisements features such as phrases designed to stimulate feelings of self-enhancement. This trend has involved a new interest in recent years in response to criticism to advertisements (especially targeting women) designed to threaten the individual’s derived self-worth in terms of, for instance, body-image (Argo and White 2012). As such, Dove launched in 2004 the “Campaign for Real Beauty” in which the Unilever-owned brand of hygienic products displayed non-thin and aging models. In the same vein, L’Oréal has redundantly advertised its products using the slogan “Because You’re Worth It” (with marginal variations regarding the personal pronouns I, you, and we).

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The rationale underlying self-esteem advertising is to challenge the receivers’ positive feelings of self with a conditional linkage to the product – “If you feel good about yourself, then you should use our product” (Durgee 1986). Such a message – used by both Dove and L’Oréal in the aforementioned campaigns – is built on the creation of a discrepancy between two cognitions: first, that the individual has high self-esteem, and second, that the individual does not use the advertised product despite herself positive self-perception. In doing so, the advertisement invites to the resolution of the discrepancy (or dissonance) by changing the second cognition, thus leading to product purchase. Solving such conflicting cognitions assuages the psychological discomfort they created (Festinger 1957). We posit that because self-esteem advertisements offer to resolve the dissonance they implicitly created, they generate positive ad attitude. However, we propose that the salience of religiousness negatively moderates this effect. Extensive research in the psychological study of religion has shown that striving to sustain faith through participation in religious activity bolsters self-esteem (Jonas and Fischer 2006; Sedikides and Gebauer 2010). Based on the premise that both God and brands motivate individuals to feel unique and valued, Shachar and colleagues (2011) show that religiousness (both measured and primed) constitutes a medium for acquiring self-esteem just as much as brands do. Therefore, under conditions of religiousness salience, exposure to self-esteem advertising may not trigger the expected dissonance. Because religion promotes selfenhancement in and of itself – that is, without requiring material accessories – the receivers may consider the advertised product pointless or obsolete. Rather, priming both religion and self-esteem advertising may even trigger an aversive arousal emerging from appealing to spiritual and materialistic self-enhancement, respectively. In line with cognitive dissonance research (Festinger 1957), literature on value conflicts has provided extensive evidence that appealing to both religious and material values leads individuals to realigning their priorities

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in order to reduce a state of psychological discomfort (Burroughs and Rindfleisch 2002; Schwartz 1992). Therefore, the salience of religiousness may have a negative moderating effect on the relationship between self-esteem advertising and ad attitude. Let us, however, consider a boundary condition. Shachar and colleagues (2011) deliberately relied on a broad view of religiousness, regardless of why people are religious. However, past works establishing a relationship between religion and self-esteem emphasized that individuals must be intrinsically (versus extrinsically) motivated – that is, “living” religion and internalizing religious teachings rather than “using” religion to obtain other ends (Crocker et al. 2003; Jonas and Fischer 2006; Sedikides and Gebauer 2010). Therefore, the salience of religiousness may not inherently be a sufficiently powerful trigger. The moderation effect we propose may be self-moderated by dispositional intrinsic religiousness so that it may only be negative for individuals who score high on such a scale. We further expect that because extrinsically motivated individuals do not internalize religious values, religiousness salience does not affect how they respond to self-esteem advertising. Thus, we propose the following:

P6:

The impact of self-esteem advertising on advertisement attitude is more negative under

conditions in which religiousness is salient than under conditions in which it is neutral for individuals with high (versus low) dispositional intrinsic religiousness. This effect is driven by a state of psychological discomfort.

3.3.4. Religiousness as a resource satisfying a need for identity: Moderating role on product choice Some brands are notoriously known to have religious-inspired values and to display such values to the public eye. Some of these include Forever 21, Tyson Foods, In-N-Out 54

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Burger, Marriott Hotel, and perhaps most famously, Chick-fil-A. The chicken fast-food chain was placed in the spotlight in 2012 after a controversy where a high-ranking executive (CEO Dan Cathy) voiced his support of a conservative, biblical approach of family values and samesex marriage. Although Chick-fil-A was in return attacked by protesters and Dan Cathy retracted his comments due to concerns over bad public relations, supporters showed up in masses at several restaurant locations22. In fact, that same year, Chick-fil-A reported a record annual sales growth of $5 billion (a 25% increase relative to 2011), while its direct competitor in the chicken category, Yum!’s KFC, reported $4.22 billion despite having more than twice as many stores23. Other things being equal (e.g., price and communication investments), can this be explained by consumers’ support of their religion when they feel that it is under attack? Cutright, Wu, Banfield, Kay, and Fitzsimons (2011) partially answer this question using system justification theory (SJT). SJT suggests that people are motivated to view the social systems they live in (i.e., the overarching institutions, organizations, and norms within which individuals coexist) as fair, justifiable, and legitimate, and to defend them under conditions of threats or attacks. Because quitting or changing one’s system in regards to, for example, geographical location (e.g., country, town), profession, or religion might be out of the question for various reasons (e.g., feasibility, economic or social pressures), people choose to support the status quo. Without necessarily supporting the system in an open and constant manner, they accept the system, and its defense appears particularly important when it is threatened (Cutright et al. 2011; Jost and Hunyady 2005). Cutright and colleagues (2011) identify system confidence as an important factor determining how people defend the system under threat by using product choice. The authors 22

USA Today. (2014). Chick-fil-A wings in new direction after gay flap. Retrieved July 13, 2015 from http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/04/07/chick-fil-a-fast-food-dan-cathy/7250871/ 23 Bloomberg. (2014). Chick-fil-A stole KFC’s chicken crown with a fraction of the stores. Retrieved July 13, 2015 from http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-03-28/chick-fil-a-stole-kfcs-chicken-crown-with-afraction-of-the-stores

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conclude that consumers with low confidence still support the system under attack, but rely on indirect means – that is, “behaviors that support the system in a subtle way and are ambiguous and noncommittal with respect to one’s beliefs about the systems” (Cutright et al. 2011, p. 65). For example, consumers may buy clothes because they were made in a specific country (e.g., “made in USA”), even though there is no other mention of this anywhere else than on the label. In contrast, those who have strong confidence prefer more direct means such as products with clear and non-ambiguous displays of their support (e.g., I ♥ the USA t-shirts). In the context of Chick-fil-A, the association between the brand and Christianity was made particularly explicit by the media coverage of the Cathy controversy, thus making eating at Chick-fil-A restaurants a direct means of defending the system. Without such great media coverage, patronizing the restaurant could have been considered an indirect means (using pretests or manipulation checks would help disentangle such issues). Yet, when it comes to religion, the relevance of confidence may not be as fitting as for other systems. Systems such as countries, cities, and universities exist solely because of human actions. Thus, although SJT posits that supporting the status quo is absolute, system confidence may vary because it depends on the degree to which people feel that the system is perceived as just, legitimate, and desirable (Cutright et al. 2011). Religions are also organizations built and managed by men (e.g., the Mormon Church, the Catholic Church); yet rely often on a divine component, making their belief systems unfalsifiable in the eyes of the worshipers (Friesen et al. 2014). Any doubt regarding the fairness and legitimacy of religion tends therefore to be discarded24. Rather than system confidence, we suggest that under conditions of threat over one’s religion, individuals’ need to express their religious identity may be a more powerful factor to explain how people use products to defend that particular system. 24

Although some religions such as Judaism and Christianity depict God as a strict and even vengeful omniscient entity, this does not imply a lack of fairness.

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In effect, leveraging ethnographic studies, recent consumer research suggests that consumption choice may be used as a way of (re-)claiming one’s religious affiliation (IzberkBilgin 2012; McAlexander et al. 2014). While religion can be an important part of a person’s self-identity, the salience of religious identity relative to other aspects of the self depends to a great extent on social contexts (Weaver and Agle 2002). In that vein, perception of intergroup distinctiveness, referring to the perceived difference or dissimilarity between one’s own group and another on the relevent dimension (Jetten, Spears, and Postmes 2004), plays a potent role. Lowered intergroup distinctiveness (i.e., too many intergroup similarities) arouses identity concerns and leads individuals to seek differentiation. Such a reaction aims to achieve distinctiveness from other groups (Hosney 2008; Jetten et al. 2004). Consistent with that idea (known as the “reactive distinctiveness” hypothesis, Jetten et al. 2004), under conditions of low intergroup distinctiveness, perceiving a threat over one’s religion should lead to preference for direct means of supporting the system. In doing so, direct means may serve as a medium of communicating to others one’s religious distinctiveness. Conversely, under conditions of high intergroup distinctiveness, perceiving a threat over one’s religion should lead to preference for indirect means to support the system. In such circumstances, high intergroup distinctiveness may not trigger one’s need for differentiation. Thus, we propose the following:

P7a:

The impact of perceived threat over one’s religion leads to preference for

direct (rather than indirect) means of defense under conditions where intergroup distinctiveness is low. This effect is driven by high need for differentiation.

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P7b:

The impact of perceived threat over one’s religion leads to preference for

indirect (rather than direct) means of defense under conditions where intergroup distinctiveness is high. This effect is driven by low need for differentiation.

4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS The goal of this theoretical article was to review the very broad and varied literature on religion, and to suggest a delineated framework to guide consumer research on this topic. Such a goal was divided into three objectives. Our first objective was to lay the conceptual foundations by providing clear definitions for the concept of religion as well as religion-based constructs such as religiousness and spirituality. Our second objective was to review and organize the extant literature based on the sociological and psychological study of religion. Our third objective was to emphasize the interest of studying the effects of religious thinking on consumer-related variables using experimental designs in comparison to past works in marketing that have largely favored correlational studies. Our framework is organized into two broad categories with the concern of approaching the scientific study of religion parsimoniously. As such, we established a difference between the manifest expression of religiousness through the observance of specific religious beliefs within a religion, from more latent and pervasive ways for individuals to express their relationship toward the sacred. Such a perspective presents the benefice of building a synthesis on recent advances regarding the use of religious priming (Kay et al. 2008; 2010; Kopalle et al. 2010; Laurin et al. 2012; Shachar et al. 2011; Shariff et al. in press). One of the main limitations of the marketing literature has been the strict consideration of religiousness as a stable characteristic and the tendency to turn to correlational studies. Rather, we proposed that religiousness might be also viewed as a resource that individuals can

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mobilize in consumption-specific contexts that stimulate psychological needs in terms of control, meaning, self-esteem, or identity. Still, both approaches are not mutually exclusive. For instance, one may want to show that religiousness correlates with some other variable (e.g., ascetic preferences) while subsequently isolating a causal relationship using religious priming. Such an approach can allow researchers to disentangle the effects of religious thinking from other psychological outcomes (e.g., conservatism) as well as from demographics (e.g., income, ethnicity). To limit the scope of this paper, we did not elaborate on how to prime religiousness in practical terms (e.g., religiousness scale given before or after the outcome variable, scrambled sentence task). However, Shariff and colleagues (in press) provide such a synthesis, and organize religious primes depending on their level of obtrusiveness.

4.1. Limitations and future directions One may argue that two notable aspects are lacking from our approach: an emphasis on the relationship between religion and prosocial behaviors, and a sociocultural perspective based on consumer culture theory. A fruitful stream of research in management has empirically demonstrated a positive association between religiousness and ethical judgment (e.g., Vitell, Paolillo, and Singh 2005; Walker, Smither, and DeBode 2012; Weaver and Agle 2002). We chose not to address this issue in depth because this literature has more to do with managerial than consumer decisionmaking. Nevertheless, addressing the question of prosociality and ethics with a religious angle raises the importance of choosing an appropriate (specific) definition of religiousness. We overlooked a definition that is particularly relevant when it comes to considering religiousness as a characteristic, namely the motivational foundation for participating in religious activity (Allport and Ross 1967). As such, individuals who adopt religious values and teachings as

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their own (intrinsic religiousness) are more likely to make ethical decisions than those who maintain some religious activity because it serves their interest (extrinsic religiousness). Future reviews and theoretical works should perhaps take into account the variety of conceptualizations of religiousness, and investigate how different their effects are on identical consumer-related variables. Another noticeable limitation of this theoretical paper is the lack of a sociocultural approach based on consumer culture theory (Arnould and Thompson 2005; Askegaard and Linnet 2011). Such a perspective is particularly relevant to take into account the overall context (historical, social, and economic) where the interplay between religion and consumption occurs. Some key aspects of culture have been shown to affect the way religion affects consumers: socioeconomic status (Izberk-Bilgin 2012; Sandikci and Ger 2010), minority/majority status (Hirschman et al. 2011), and the marketization of ideologies (McAlexander et al. 2014; O’Guinn and Belk 1989). While this approach is best addressed using qualitative methods (e.g., interviews, observations), one of the main objectives of this paper was to promote the use of religious priming in experimental designs. However, the study of psychological processes using such a cultural perspective might be particularly relevant in settings where the religious landscape is heterogeneous, or where the historical context has been turbulent (e.g., religious wars, strong antagonism between religious groups).

4.2. Conclusions The study of the influence of religion and religiousness on consumer behavior is a growing field of research with strong managerial implications. About 87% of the world population holds some kind of belief in God (Win-Gallup International 2012). While this figure may vary across the globe, 56% of Americans consider religion as very important in their lives, and 92% believe in God or some universal spirit (Gallup 2012). In the vast and

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growing market of Russia, this number has increased from 38% in 1991 to 56% in 2008 (Pew 2014). Without even taking into account people’s dispositional religiousness, one may note that exposure to the concept of God and religion occurs on a daily basis through popular expressions (e.g., “Oh my God!” “Thank God!”), the media (e.g., news, TV shows), and the Internet. Yet, while using religious stimuli may help influence consumer behavior, such a practice may backfire if individuals perceive that religion is utilized for the purpose of profitability. The marketization of religion may be perceived as a risk of contamination of the sacred by the profane, and thus as a threat that may strip religion of its properties in terms of such valued facets such as self-transcendence, control, meaning, self-esteem, and identity. That said, consumer research on religion and religiousness should not be viewed as an “exotic” research theme, punctually interesting because of current events. In the same vein, it should not be limited by some dogmatic approach in terms of data collection, whether it is qualitative, correlational, or experimental. While this paper focused on an experimental perspective, all have their merits insofar as they allow a better understanding of the interplay between religious thinking and consumption. With that in mind, we hope our discussion will be of some help in guiding future theoretical and empirical work.

Next, Essay 2 builds on Essay 1 by testing the hypothesis that individuals may mobilize their religiousness in the context of a threat to personal control to maintain high levels of goal commitment. Such a threat will be induced by priming feelings of self-efficacy.

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Essay 2 When God’s (Not) Needed: The Divergent Influence of Belief in Divine Control on Goal Commitment

Only 13% of the world population claims to be atheist (Win-Gallup international 2012). Of the nearly nine-tenths of the population who believe that a God-like entity exists, some people disclaim any affiliation with a religious group but still believe in a higher power that they might call the Universe or Karma. Conversely, some individuals demonstrate a strong attachment to their religious denomination while remaining agnostic with respect to belief in God. In fact, the spectrum of religiousness (i.e., one’s relationship with religion) is broad across individuals and cultural settings. However, the notion of a powerful supernatural force intervening in worldly affairs is a common cultural aspect of any society (Atran and Norenzayan 2004; Kay, Gaucher, McGregor, and Nash 2010). In a much earlier study, Durkheim (1912) emphasized that regardless of how the plethora of religious doctrines depicts their deities, belief in powerful supernatural beings is common in folk cultures, even in nondeistic religions such as Buddhism and Shintoism. Given the continued importance of religiousness – if not organized religion – in the contemporary world, to what extent do these common beliefs in a God-like entity affect people’s daily lives? A fruitful stream of research has identified various ways in which religious belief affects people by serving three basic psychological needs. First, religiousness can serve the need for identity and belonging by allowing followers to identifying with a group who share common representations and behaviors. In that sense, religiousness has been proven to reduce feelings of self-uncertainty (Hogg, Adelman, and Blagg 2010) and to favor 62

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self-enhancement (Sedikides and Gebauer 2010). Second, religiousness can fulfil a need for meaning by providing the means to decode events that lie beyond the reach of people’s comprehension. As such, research has shown that religious individuals can more effectively cope with existential insecurity and tragic events (Jonas and Fisher, 2006). Finally, religiousness can satisfy a need for control by providing a system of beliefs in the general order of the universe, thereby allowing religious persons to cope with the anxiety-inducing fear of randomness (Laurin, Kay, and Fitzsimons 2012; Kay, Gaucher, Napier, Callan, and Laurin 2008). In the present chapter, our focus is on the last psychological need. Specifically, we are interested in how belief in divine control (i.e., belief in a controlling, omnipotent God-like entity) can increase or decrease commitment to pursuing long-term goals. Recent literature reports contrasting results regarding the effect of the controlling properties of religion on the motivation to pursue goals. We propose that these divergences can be attributed to the fact that past research has not considered the moderating role of personal control threat. Laurin and colleagues (2012) demonstrated that at baseline (i.e., under no personal control threat), representation of God as a controlling agent in people’s life decreases motivation when active goal pursuit (rather than temptation resistance) is the salient aspect of selfregulation. This outcome is consistent with research that showed that reliance on a powerful other decreases effort toward goal attainment, leading to a loafing effect (e.g., Harkins and Szymansk, 1988). Nevertheless, religion has long been regarded as promoting secondary control. Believing in an intervening supernatural force allows people to maintain an indirect sense of control when situations become unmanageable (Rothbaum, Weisz, and Snyder 1982; Sasaki and Kim 2011). Accordingly, we argue that the effect of belief in a controlling God on goal commitment is conditioned by the presence or absence of personal control threat. In this

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research, such a threat will be induced by perceived self-(in)efficacy, that is people’s beliefs about their capabilities to produce effects (Bandura 1994). We hypothesize that belief in divine control affects goal commitment in opposite directions depending on whether a high or low level of self-efficacy is associated with goal pursuit. We contend that salience of belief in divine control negatively affects goal commitment when individuals do not question their own ability to pursue a goal (i.e., high self-efficacy). Believing that an all-powerful entity will make things happen may elicit a loafing effect that dilutes people’s motivational resources in commitment to goals concurrently pursued. Conversely, in the context of perceived selfinefficacy, religiousness should serve as a defensive source of compensatory control and should thus increase goal commitment. We build our reasoning on recent developments in the literature on “compensatory control” processes.

1. COMPENSATORY CONTROL AND RELIGIOUS BELIEF Researchers have long held that personal control is a basic psychological need (e.g., Kelly 1955). Formally refereeing to whether individuals believe that they can intentionally produce desired outcomes and prevent undesirable outcomes (Skinner 1996), personal control is deeply rooted in Western cultures (Wang, Whitson, and Menon 2012). Personal control is often the primary means by which people combat the anxiety arising from the uncomfortable reality that the world is random and that events may occur only by chance (Laurin, Kay, and Moscovitch 2008; Kay et al. 2008). Despite a motivation for perceiving the world as an orderly and predictable place, people must respond to control threats of different nature in their lives, either negative (e.g., flight delay) or positive (e.g., early delivery), either mundane or tragic (e.g. terrorist attack). Perceptions of personal control can vary across situations, such that people may perceive that their own resources are inadequate to prevent feelings of randomness in their environment (Fritsche et al. 2013; Laurin, et al. 2008; Kay et al. 2008;

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Rothbaum et al. 1982). Thus, how do people cope with control threats and maintain belief in an orderly, non-random world? Kay and colleagues proposed compensatory control theory (CCT) to answer this question (Kay et al. 2008; Kay, Whitson, Gaucher, and Galinsky 2009). This framework suggests that when individuals perceive a threat to their personal control, they can fluidly turn to external sources of control to maintain the belief that the world is under some sort of control, although the source of control is not the self. Considerable empirical evidence has demonstrated the relevance of CCT to the use of diverse external sources of control, ranging from political and economic systems (Kay et al. 2008; 2010) to social groups (Fritsche et al. 2013) and belief in scientific progress (Meijers and Rutjens 2014). A heightened belief in such external sources of control compensates for low feelings of personal control because this belief assuages the anxiety-provoking perception of randomness in the world (Inzlicht, McGregor, Hirsch, and Nash 2009; Laurin et al. 2008). Thus, it appears that it is not any religious belief but particularly the belief in God as a controlling, omnipotent force that allows the compensatory control mechanism to be effective in the context of control threats (Inzlicht et al. 2009; Kay et al. 2008, 2010; Laurin et al. 2012). From early research (Durkheim 1912) to the present (Atran and Norenzayan 2004), scholars have recognized that belief in powerful supernatural beings is a recurrent cultural aspect of organized societies, regardless of formal religious teachings. Laurin et al. (2012) emphasized that because most people hold some type of religious or spiritual belief, reminders of a controlling God decrease active goal pursuit. Indeed, such reminders activate the belief that goal completion depends on an external force’s will rather than one’s own actions, thus causing a loafing effect that decreases effort investment. Nevertheless, we argue that if such an association exists, goal pursuit might be punctuated by control threats because the pursuit of long-term goals relies on more than a single episode. Hence, activating thoughts

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of a controlling God in such contexts is likely to increase willingness to take goal-directed actions.

2. COMPENSATORY CONTROL AND GOAL COMMITMENT Goal commitment, referring to the extent to which individuals are determined to pursue a goal is a key determinant of motivation in goal pursuit (Kruglanski et al. 2002). Kruglanski and colleagues pointed out that goal commitment varies (through subjective utility) as a multiplicative function of the valued assigned to the goal and expectancy of attainment. Assuming that the value of a goal remains unchanged during the pursuit of said goal, individuals’ perceptions of their ability to produce the desired effects thus play a critical role in their commitment to take goal-directed actions. Prior research (e.g. Bandura 1989; 1994), has suggested that many activities were not pursued despite guarantee valued outcomes because self-perceived inefficacy considerably reduces the motivating potential of desired outcome expectations. Consistent with the definition of personal control, we argue that the interplay between self-efficacy (i.e., the extent to which one feels competent in accomplishing tasks) and outcome expectancy (i.e., the extent to which one believes that the expected results will be obtained) affects motivation in goal pursuit when feelings of personal control are experimentally reduced. Consequently, we argue that reminder of a powerful other in the context of goal pursuit should increase goal commitment when self-efficacy is low. Salience of belief in divine control should heighten expectancy of goal attainment when the individual feel incapable of producing effects. But what may happen when feelings of self-efficacy are high? Research has shown that thinking about the presence of powerful others encourages people to behave in accordance with the “principle of least effort.” People strive to minimize

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the probable average rate of their work-expenditure over time; in other words, people tend to choose the easiest path for goal attainment (Zipf 1949). Literature on social loafing indicates that when people believe that the outcome of their goal depends on other’s decisions and behaviors, they invest less effort (Harkins and Szymanski 1988; Laurin et al. 2012). Notably, Laurin and colleagues (2012) found that when belief in a controlling, omnipotent God was salient, active goal pursuit suffered. Thinking of an omnipotent God led to perceiving goal attainment as contingent on an external agent’s will, thus eliciting a loafing effect by which effort investment decreased. In summary, we propose that belief in a controlling God will have opposite effects on goal commitment depending on the level of perceived self-efficacy (low vs. high). Specifically, we expect that when self-efficacy is low, belief in divine control will increase goal commitment because reminder of a powerful other should assuage the fear of randomness, and thus heighten expectancy of goal attainment (H1). However, given that the absence of a control threat will not raise concerns regarding goal attainability, we expect that in the context of high self-efficacy, salience of belief in divine control will reduce goal commitment because it should induce a loafing effect (H2). In study 1, we test our first hypothesis using a measure of religiousness as an indicator of one’s disposition to believe in divine control. We then provide additional support in study 2 by isolating causal relationships and we test our second hypothesis.

3. STUDY 1: Measure of religiousness In study 1, the participants completed a dispositional measure of religiousness. We predicted that a higher level of religiousness would be associated with greater commitment to retirement savings for individuals experiencing feelings of low self-efficacy. In such a case,

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we expected that individuals would mobilize their religious belief as a defense mechanism in response to a control threat to restore certainty of goal attainability.

3.1. Method 3.1.1. Participants The participants were exclusively American residents (N = 164, age: 18-54, M = 34 years, 70.1% female) who completed a study online using Toluna’s respondent database. We determined sample size by allocating fifty participants per cell. We intentionally overcollected by 50% to increase statistical power given the continuous moderator. The majority identified as Christian (50.6%), followed by those disclaiming any religious affiliation (32.9%), atheists (7.9%), Jews (3.7%), Hindus (1.2%), Muslims (1.2%), Buddhists (.6%) and other denominations (1.8%). Note that because religiousness was being measured rather than manipulated, we decided to retain participants who identified as atheist in the final sample to maximize variability in our measure.

3.1.2. Procedure First, the participants completed a commonly used religiousness measure among filler questions. Next, they completed a priming task before completing a measure of goal commitment.

Measure of religiousness The participants were asked to complete the Religious Commitment Inventory-10 (Worthington et al. 2003). This 10-item scale was designed to measure the extent to which a person adheres to his/her religious values, beliefs, and practices and applies them in daily life (e.g., “Religious beliefs influence all my dealings in life”, and “I often read books and 68

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magazines about my faith”; 5-point scale: 1 = not at all true of me; 5 = totally true of me). The scale reliability was high (α = .96). (See appendix A for the full scale.)

Priming task: Manipulation of perception of self-efficacy The participants were randomly assigned to read one of two pieces of information ostensibly extracted from USA Today. These extracts described the current state of retirement savings in the US and stated that a large majority of Americans either failed (low selfefficacy) or succeeded (high self-efficacy) in accomplishing the necessary steps to save a sufficient amount of money to ensure their financial well-being (see supplementary materials, Appendix B). Pilot testing confirmed the appropriateness of this manipulation in influencing perceptions of self-efficacy with regard to savings behavior. Sixty-one participants were recruited from the same population as the main study and assigned to read either the low selfefficacy or high self-efficacy article. (As a pretest, we determined sample size by allocating twenty-five participants per cell.) Participants were then asked to rate their agreement with the following four statements on a 7-point Likert scale: “I have confidence in my ability to save enough money to make certain of my financial well-being in retirement”; “I do not doubt my ability to save enough money to make certain of my financial well-being in retirement”; “I have excellent skills and ability regarding my retirement savings”; “I am proud of my skills and ability to save money to make certain of my financial well-being in retirement”. These items formed a reliable composite (α = .94). The participants in the low self-efficacy condition reported lower levels of self-efficacy than the participants in the high self-efficacy condition (M Low SE = 3.74, SE = .25, M High SE = 4.84, SE = .29, F(1, 57) = 8.37, p = .005, η²p = .13).

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We chose the economically relevant context of retirement savings by emphasizing that this long-term goal primarily consisted of managing cash flows and assets throughout one’s life to ensure that these funds would last as long as necessary. In doing so, we intended to neutralize the effect of perceived progress towards goal attainment.

Measure of goal commitment The participants were eventually asked to complete the nine-item version of the goal commitment scale designed by Hollenbeck, Klein, O’Leary, and Wright (1989) to measure one’s tendency to demonstrate persistence in goal-directed effort. Example items include the following: “I am willing to put forth a great deal of effort beyond what I’d normally do to achieve this goal” and “Quite frankly, I don’t care if I achieve this goal or not” (reversed) (7point scale: 1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree). The scale reliability was satisfactory (α = .82). (See appendix D for the full scale.)

3.2. Results and Discussion We regressed centered religiousness scores, our manipulation (dummy coded: low self-efficacy = 0, high self-efficacy = 1), and their interaction on our composite measure of goal commitment. Given our dependent measure, we controlled for the effects of income 25 to control for variation in commitment to retirement savings across participants. The covariate exhibited a significant effect (b = .10, SE = .04, t(159) = 2.68, p < .01). While Table 6 provides results with and without covariate, the following partial out the effect of income. Although no main effect was detected for the manipulation of self-efficacy, the analysis revealed that the predicted interaction between religiousness and self-efficacy was marginally significant (b = -.21, SE = .11, t(159) = -1.88, p = .062).

25

We did not find interactions between the covariate, the treatment effect, and the religiousness measure.

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To decompose the interaction (see Figure 4), we conducted the same regression analyses and changed the coding scheme according to the focus of analysis (Hayes 2013): 0 = low (high) self-efficacy and 1 = high (low) self-efficacy for an analysis at the low (high) levels of self-efficacy. When self-efficacy was primed to be low, the analysis revealed that the slope of religiousness was positive and significantly different from zero (b = .23, SE = .08, t(159) = 3.04, p < .01), such that the participants with higher religiousness scores were more committed to retirement savings than those with lower religiousness scores. However, when self-efficacy was primed to be high, we found that the slope of religiousness was nearly flat (b = .02, SE = .09, t(159) = .19, p = .849). Thus, study 1 provided correlational support for our first hypothesis by revealing that holding stronger religious beliefs leads to greater commitment to retirement savings when people are subject to control threats through perceived self-inefficacy. Individuals defensively mobilize psychological resources – such as religiousness – in the presence of self-threats in order to deal with anxious arousal (Inzlicht et al. 2009; Jonas and Fisher 2006; Kay et al. 2008; Laurin et al. 2008). When self-efficacy is high (i.e., under no control threat), no apparent trigger may incite them to mobilize such resources. We predicted, however, that the salience of belief in divine control would negatively affect goal commitment in the context of high self-efficacy. This second hypothesis was tested in study 2 by manipulating religious belief. In doing so, we sought also to obtain additional support by isolating causal relationships and eliminating alternative explanations possibly due to background factors that correlate with religiousness.

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Table 6 Regression analyses for study 1: with and without the covariate Predictor Self-efficacy (s-e) Religiousness (when low s-e = 0 and high s-e = 1)

Religiousness (when high s-e = 0 and low s-e = 1)

With covariate b SE b β -.04 .14 -.02

Without covariate b SE b β -.04 .14 -.02

.23**

.08

.16

.22**

.08

.15

.02

.09

.16

.01

.12

.15

Self-efficacy × Religiousness -.21† .11 -.14 -.21† .11 -.14 ** Income .10 .04 .20 ** * † Note. p < .01, p < .05, p < .07 With covariate: df = 159, R² = .093; Without covariate: df = 160, R² = .052; Increment of change between the model without and the model with covariate: F(1, 159) = 7.18, p < .01.

Goal commitment

7 6 5 4 3 1

2

3

4

5

Religiousness

Low self-efficacy

High self-efficacy

Figure 4: Slopes of the regression of goal commitment on religiousness at high vs. low level of self-efficacy.

4. STUDY 2: Manipulation of religiousness In study 2, we manipulated religiousness by priming the salience of the type of belief in God (belief in a controlling vs. creating God). We predicted that the positive effect of

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religious belief on goal commitment when perceptions of one’s efficacy were experimentally lowered was specifically caused by belief in divine control and not simply by any belief in God. Moreover, we tested the hypothesis that in the context of high self-efficacy, the salience of belief in divine control decreased commitment to take goal-directed actions.

4.1. Method 4.1.1. Participants The participants were again exclusively American residents (N = 317, age: 18-54, M = 34 years, 78.9% female) who completed a study online using Toluna’s respondent database. As with study 1, sample size was determined by allocating fifty participants per cell. We intentionally over-collected by 30% assuming some would be dropped because they were atheists or failed the manipulation check. The participants were Christian (58.0%), nondenominational (30.6%), atheist (4.4%), Jewish (1.6%), Buddhist (1.3%), Hindu (.6%), Muslim (.6%), and other (2.8%). Atheists (N = 14; randomly distributed across conditions) were removed from the sample because (1) a controlling God is de facto an irrelevant external source of control for them and (2) a God-based prime would likely result in an unfavorable attitude in the remainder of the study, as suggested by Inzlicht and Tullett (2010). Note that analyses including atheists produced nearly identical results. This resulted in a final sample of 303 (80.2% female, Mage = 34.2).

4.1.2. Procedure To demonstrate that religious belief pertaining to a controlling God produced the expected effects, study 2 used a 3 (religious belief: controlling vs. creating God vs. baseline) × 2 (self-efficacy: low vs. high) between-subjects design. The procedure was the same as in

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study 1 with one notable exception. The participants began the study by reading an article under the guise of reading a comprehension task for the manipulation of religious belief.

Manipulation of religious belief To manipulate the salience of belief in a controlling God, the participants were first invited to read a brief text (ostensibly from the scientific journal Science) under the pretense of passing a reading test to evaluate the power of concentration. The content of the article (adapted from Kay et al. 2010) argued that recent research had found it scientifically possible for a God-like entity to intervene in the world’s affairs to bring order to the universe (i.e., controlling God condition) or to have created the world in which we live (i.e., creating God condition). This distinction was designed to isolate causal relationships by stressing belief in divine control whereby God is primarily dedicated to agency, in comparison to another widespread depiction in Western cultures whereby God is the ultimate creator. The neutral article concerned recent advances in images of space (see supplementary materials, Appendix E). To test their comprehension, we gave participants four multiple-choice questions about the meaning of four key words in the article. If they failed to answer three or four of these questions correctly, the website terminated the survey. This resulted in the elimination of eighty participants. These individuals are not included in the participants sections of the relevant study, because the website terminated their participation before they completed the demographics form.

Manipulation of self-efficacy Thereafter, the participants were invited to what was presented as the true study. They were then invited to read one of the two extracts that we used in study 1 to prime perceived self-efficacy in the context of retirement savings.

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Measure of goal commitment The participants were then asked to complete the goal commitment scale. As in study 1, the responses were averaged to form a reliable index (α = .80). (See appendix D for the full scale.)

4.2. Results and Discussion We performed a two-way ANCOVA on goal commitment with religious belief and self-efficacy as the independent variables and with income as a covariate. Income was a significant predictor of commitment to retirement savings but did not interact with the selfefficacy manipulation. (The following partial out the effect of the covariate but results reached significance with and without it.) Although no main effects of the experimental factors were detected, the analysis revealed a significant interaction (F(2, 296) = 4.67, p = .01, η2p = .031). Orthogonal planned comparisons revealed that the interaction unfolded as expected (Figure 5, see appendix C for details on the coding schemes). In the low self-efficacy condition, the participants who were reminded of a controlling God (M = 5.35, SE = .14)26 were significantly more committed to retirement savings than those who read the neutral article (M = 4.98, SE = .13), β = .11, t(296) = 1.93, p = .055, Cohen’s d = .22. Notably, we detected no significant difference between the participants who read the article reminding of a creating God (M = 5.02, SE = .13) and those who read the neutral article, β = .01, t(296) = .20, p = .84. These findings indicate that the activation of belief in a controlling God – but not belief in a creating God – increased goal commitment in the context of perceived self-inefficacy. In other words, mentioning any God-related belief is not sufficient to enhance motivation in goal pursuit when self-efficacy is threatened. In fact, we found that reminders of a controlling God increased goal commitment significantly more

26

In experiment 2, we consistently reported means adjusted for the covariate.

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than the averaged effect of the two other conditions (Mcreating God and baseline = 5.00, SE = .09), β = .12, t(296) = 2.11, p = .04, Cohen’s d = .25). Interestingly, supported by Laurin and colleagues’ (2012) findings, the participants in the high self-efficacy condition who were reminded of a controlling God (M = 4.93, SE = .14) were less committed to retirement savings than those who read the neutral article (M = 5.32, SE = .13m), β = -.11, t(296) = -2.02, p = .04, Cohen’s d = .23. The specific role of belief in divine control was again emphasized by the absence of a significant difference between the creating God (M = 5.29, SE = .13) and the baseline condition with respect to goal commitment, β = -.01 t(296) = -.19, p = .85. Moreover, we found that the participants who read the article arguing for the scientific possibility of a controlling God were more committed to retirement savings than the averaged effects of the other two conditions (Mcreating God and baseline

= 5.30, SE = .09), β = -.12, t(296) = -2.20, p = .03, Cohen’s d = .26.

Study 2 provides further evidence that the effect of religious belief on goal commitment depends on 1) whether feelings of self-efficacy are low or high and 2) whether belief in divine control is salient at the time of goal pursuit. Indeed, reminders of a creating God did not appear to produce a significant effect in any direction. Rather, reminders of a controlling God actually decreased goal commitment when people felt competent and increased goal commitment in the face of a control threat (primed self-inefficacy).

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Goal commitment

6 5,6

* 5,2

* 4,8

Low self-efficacy High self-efficacy

4,4 4

Controlling God

Creating God

Baseline

Figure 5: Means of goal commitment as a function of primed religious beliefs and selfefficacy. (Note: * = significantly different from the high self-efficacy condition at p < .05.)

5. GENERAL DISCUSSION In this research, we investigated the divergent effect of feeling the presence of a powerful other in the context of goal pursuit through belief in divine control. Overall, the results provide support for the hypothesis that belief in a controlling God-like entity can stimulate or undermine goal commitment depending on the level of self-efficacy. In study 1, we measured religiousness as a proxy for believing in the general order of the world. We observed that when perceived self-efficacy was primed to be low, religiousness positively predicted goal commitment. No effect was detected when self-efficacy was primed to be high. In that sense, religiousness can be regarded as a resource that one can mobilize as a defensive source of compensatory control in the context of perceived self-inefficacy. Alternatively, when an individual does not face such a threat, the salience of one’s belief in divine control triggers the loafing effect emphasized by Laurin et al. (2012). Accordingly, in study 2, we tested our hypotheses by stressing the controlling vs. creating nature of God. The results indicated that priming the salience of a religious belief that does not ostensibly relate to divine 77

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control had no effect. In contrast, priming the salience of a controlling God increased goal commitment when self-efficacy was low while having the opposite effect when self-efficacy was high. The present research speaks to previous findings regarding the effects of perceived order and control on motivational processes (e.g., Laurin et al. 2012; Kay et al. 2014). In an attempt to bring them together, we used the property of religion as a secondary control. However, religiousness is a complex psychological construct as religion may serve diverse (and cumulative) functions for individuals (e.g., control, meaning, identity). Our samples were derived from an American online panel with all of the Western cultural representations of God that such a sample implies. However, one-third of our participants were agnostics, meaning that their views of God were likely not biased by prior religious beliefs specific to certain denominations. Moreover, because study 2 distinguished between a creating and controlling God-like entity (which are transversal depictions across cultures), we can reasonably assume that our conclusions are accurate. Nevertheless, further research in diverse cultural settings might serve to consolidate the robustness of our hypotheses. An important question left unanswered by the present research relates to the nature of the psychological threat that moderates the effect of feeling the presence of a powerful other on goal commitment. Must it necessarily be a control threat? Shepherd et al. (2011) singled out the effect of compensatory control processes in social cognition relative to other mechanisms that take place under self-threat (e.g., mortality, self-uncertainty). However, we did not manipulate directly personal control. Rather, we induced personal control threat by priming perceptions of self-efficacy. We argued that considering their respective definitions, one could make the argument that personal control is an overarching construct that encompasses self-efficacy. This has already been suggested by Skinner’s (1996) review of control constructs in the sense that priming one’s belief about his/her capabilities to affect

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events necessarily affects one’s overall sense of personal control. Still, by priming selfefficacy in the context of retirement savings, we may have elicited concerns about one’s selfworth and/or personal mortality. Additional research may be of service in specifying the role of self-inefficacy as personal control threat in our theorizing. Furthermore, one could argue that our reading of Laurin and colleagues’ (2012) findings – by which activating thoughts of a controlling God reduces active goal pursuit – is incomplete. Laurin et al. showed also that belief in divine control positively affects selfregulation by increasing people’s willingness to resist temptation. Priming God induces feelings of being watched and thus limits goal-inconsistent behaviors. This is relevant here because the chosen outcome variable of saving for retirement could be framed as either active goal pursuit (i.e., saving money) or temptation resistance (i.e., not spending). Nevertheless, the outcome variable was specifically framed (in both studies) in terms of goal pursuit. Thus, we are inclined to think that under no control threat, the salience of belief in divine control is in fact detrimental to self-regulation. Although religion was an appropriate field of study in which to test our hypotheses, other external sources of control should be considered. We relied on religious belief for two reasons: one’s declared level of religiousness can serve as an indicator of the extent to which s/he perceives the world as orderly and non-random, and religiousness can be mobilized as a resource to compensate for control threats. Nevertheless, “compensatory control” research has found support through a wide range of external sources of control and order beyond religion, such as government (Kay et al. 2008; 2010), social groups (Fritsche et al. 2013), and the use of consumer products (Shepherd et al. 2011). The implications of the compensatory control mechanism for motivational processes still constitute an emerging field of investigation (e.g., Kay et al. 2014) to which this work contributes. Understanding how such mechanisms can be

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employed to maintain one’s motivation to pursue goals therefore remains an important avenue for future research.

Next, to have a better understanding of the psychological process explaining the results of Essay 2, Essay 3 builds on the notion that planning specificity leads to lower levels of motivation in goal pursuit because of lower levels of self-efficacy. In addition to showing that belief in divine control may reverse this effect, we show that brands can be framed as sources of external control that act much like religious sources do.

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Essay 3 The Divergent Effect of External Systems of Control on Early Stage Goal Pursuit

Culture is replete with reminders of powerful external entities that keep a watchful eye over us as we pursue life’s important goals. Religion might be the most notable example of this (e.g., “The Lord is my shepherd […]” Psalm 23, Bible), but big businesses and brands represent another example, especially when it comes to our financial decisions. AIG, for instance, brands itself as having “The strength to be there,” Aviva is sure to remind us that they are “Taking care of what’s important,” and United FCU promises “We’ll get you there.” Although these comforting messages may be a savvy way to attract customers—to a religion or to a bank—we propose that they can sometimes have a salutary effect on consumer goal pursuit: Powerful entities that play a role in the pursuit of goals may, under specific conditions, help galvanize people’s motivation to achieve these goals. This prediction encounters some theoretical resistance. More specifically, some work suggests that the presence of a powerful other exercising control over people’s lives undermines their willingness to invest effort in pursuit of their goals. For instance, research on psychological reactance suggests that a powerful entity that too overtly presses people to pursue a certain goal can backfire, prompting them instead to abandon that goal (Brehm 1966). Although little is known about reactance in the face of the perception of divine influence, we do know that it can occur in response to brands. Participants exposed to slogans that instructed them to spend money (e.g., “Luxury, you deserve it”) said they would spend less money, compared to participants exposed to slogans that instructed them to save money 81

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(e.g., “Saving keeps you going”; Laran, Dalton, and Andrade 2011). Moreover, research on social loafing shows that when people share the responsibility for their outcomes with other entities, they recognize that their outcomes are therefore contingent on not only their own but also others’ decisions and behaviors. Sharing the responsibility in this way makes people invest less effort toward goal attainment (Karau and Williams 1993; Laurin, Kay, and Fitzsimons 2012). In other words, work on both reactance and social loafing suggests that the thought of an external entity that can control one’s outcomes can reduce one’s motivation to pursue goals. According to these ideas, if Taylor, an everyday consumer, thinks about a powerful God, or about her bank’s commitment to being reliably involved with her finances, she may feel less inclined to invest efforts to achieve her financial goals. A different theoretical perspective, though, offers the opposite prediction, in line with the one we make here. Compensatory Control Theory (CCT; Kay, Gaucher, Napier, Callan, and Laurin 2008) proposes that external controlling forces—be they religious institutions or supernatural entities or powerful corporations that influence our lives—provide order and structure in our daily life in a way that can compensate for low feelings of personal control. In other words, this theory posits that when people experience the threat of doubting their own ability to control their outcomes, they can counteract that threat by relying on external sources of control, which promise to ensure that the world is a sensible place where specific actions do in fact lead to predictable outcomes. From this perspective, a powerful external entity— like a controlling God or a company whose brand credibly promises to play an active role in people’s affairs—can guarantee the kind of order and contingency that is a prerequisite for motivation (Kay, Laurin, Fitzsimons, and Landau 2014; Landau, Kay, and Whitson 2015). Based on this research, if Taylor thinks about a powerful God, or about her bank’s commitment to being reliably involved with her finances, she may feel reassured that she lives in a world where outcomes dependably follow relevant actions and investing the time

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and effort required to pursue goals is not a waste of time, and that therefore her efforts can in fact produce desired financial outcomes. Because she feels confident that her efforts will (or have strong potential to) be effective, then, she may feel more inclined to invest these efforts to achieve her financial goals. Thus, whereas most work has taken the perspective that external influential agents interfere with people’s motivation to pursue their goals, here we propose that there is a second, less demotivating way that people can understand external entities. In particular, they can construe external entities as enabling them to control their outcomes, by establishing order and predictability in the world, key cognitions that undergird confident goal pursuit. Moreover, we predict that this understanding of external entities is especially likely when people have made specific plans for their goal pursuit. That is, we propose that being aware or reminded of external agents of control is most likely to help, rather than hinder, goal pursuit when an individual has clearly articulated the specific steps she will take to move from her current state to her desired state. With this research, we hope to make four contributions to existing literature. First, we add to the recent infusion of compensatory control research that seeks to understand consumer behavior (e.g., Cutright 2012; Cutright and Samper 2014). We propose that external sources of control, including powerful supernatural entities but also trusted, reliable, interventionist commercial brands can enhance people’s motivation to pursue important goals. Second, we highlight a theoretical controversy in the literature regarding the effect of control stimuli on motivation in goal pursuit. Although some literature indicates that external controlling entities can obstruct goal pursuit (Brehm 1966; Karau and Williams 1993; Laurin et al. 2012), other research suggests that the order imposed by such entities can instead be crucial to it (Chae and Zhu 2014; Kay et al. 2014). Third, we address the tension between these ideas—and highlight the importance of understanding the meaning that people attach to external agents of

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control—by demonstrating that planning specificity is one of the key factors that moderates the goal-assisting effect. Finally, we build upon existing work that explores the consequences of articulating specific steps to achieving long-term goals (e.g., Dalton and Spiller 2012; Townsend and Liu 2012; Ülkümen and Cheema 2011). The remainder of this article is organized as follows. We first review the relevant literature needed to develop our primary and secondary hypotheses regarding the role of external systems of control in early-stage goal motivation. We begin by describing compensatory control theory, and how its offers a conceptualization of external agents that leads to the prediction that such agents can facilitate, rather than inhibit, goal pursuit. We then discuss planning specificity in the goal pursuit process, and how it might moderate the prediction above. Finally, we present five studies that manipulate both planning specificity and exposure to external systems of control—both religious and commercial—to test our hypotheses about how external controlling can assist consumer goal pursuit. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of this work for consumer research, marketing practice, and basic theories of motivation.

1. EXTERNAL AGENTS OF CONTROL AND GOAL PURSUIT 1.1. External agents provide a sense of order According to Compensatory Control Theory (CCT; Kay et al. 2008; 2009; Landau et al. 2015), people have a basic epistemic need to see the world as a place where things happen not randomly, but with a sensible and predictable order (Kahneman 2011; Laurin, Kay, and Moscovitch 2008). One way in which people satisfy that need is by feeling personal control: by believing that they can produce desired outcomes, prevent undesired outcomes, and achieve goals (Ajzen 1985; Burger 1985; Langer 1983; Landau et al. 2015; Thompson 1991). Indeed, in Western cultures, personal control may be the primary way through which people 84

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satisfy their basic need for order (Kay and Sullivan 2013). But a sense of order can come from other sources as well; in particular, from powerful, controlling entities like gods, governments and hierarchical structures (Friesen, Kay, Eibach, and Galinsky 2014; Kay et al. 2008). These agents, by virtue of their ability to manage the social order, can ensure that the world continues to operate in a predictable, non-random fashion. Because beliefs in both personal and external control can satisfy one’s need to believe that overall things are under some sort of control, and that the world is therefore not ruled by randomness and chaos, these two types of beliefs have a hydraulic relationship with one another. Returning to our example from earlier, if Taylor’s beliefs in personal control fluctuate, as they likely often do (e.g., following extreme events like terrorist attacks or a lottery windfall, or mundane events like delays on public transportation or a surprise discount on a purchase), she can compensate for any temporary dips by turning to sources of external control that reassure her that the world follows predictable rules. Conversely, when her faith in external sources of control are shaken, for instance by instability in her political system, she might compensate by endorsing her own control to a greater extent (Kay et al. 2008; Landau et al. 2015). People’s responses to feeling low control span a range of domains. Threats to personal control can make people choose organized (vs. disorganized) environments (Chae and Zhu 2014), prefer brand logos with clear boundaries (Cutright 2012), and reject brand extensions that confuse normal product categories (Cutright, Bettman, and Fitzsimons 2013). They can also lead people to adhere to conspiracy theories or to see patterns where none exist (Whitson and Galinsky 2008), to attribute power to enemies (Sullivan, Landau, and Rothschild 2010), or to endorse orderly scientific theories (Rutjens, van Harreveld, and van der Pligt 2013). Finally, they can cause people to place their faith in external systems that play the role imbuing or maintaining order and organization in the system, like religions, governments, and

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hierarchical social organizations (Friesen et al. 2014; Kay et al. 2008; 2010). The common thread linking each of these defensive responses is that they help maintain the belief that the world is an orderly, clear place where nothing happens by accident and everything is predictable and understandable.

1.2. Brands can serve as external agents of control In our research, we focus on two particular external systems of control: religions and brands. The idea that religion can provide an external source of control has a long history (Atran and Norenzayan 2004; Durkheim 1912; Kay et al. 2008). Specific beliefs in God may vary across religions, but the notion of omnipotent power prevails in most large-scale societies (Norenzayan 2013), and particularly in cultures where Abrahamic faiths predominate (Amrstrong 1993). The idea that certain brands can provide an external source of control, however, is more novel. A brand is comprised of not only its name and logo, but also of the beliefs and associations that surround it (Keller 1993). These associations are what can imbue some brands with the potential to serve as sources of compensatory control. For instance, brands can be linked to corporate power, or the ability to influence the social order and people’s lives through marketing and governmental lobbying (Herman 1981; Stevenson 1985). Moreover, brands can help people feel a sense of order by imbuing their choice sets with clarity: When choosing between two banking products, for example, the choice can feel a lot less uncertain to a chooser who is familiar with each bank’s brand and can rely on it to convey accurate signals about the products it offers (Eckert, Louviere, and Islam 2012, Swait and Erdem 2007). Past research on this topic has begun to demonstrate that credible or trusted brands play a particularly important role in reducing uncertainty, which is different from providing a

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sense of order, but shares a similarly existential flavor (Swait and Erdem 2007). Here, we build on this research by examining brand trust in more depth. Classic definitions state that people trust a brand to the extent that they can rely on it to perform its stated functions (Chaudhuri and Holbrook, 2001; Moorman, Zaltman, and Deshpande, 1992). To appeal to consumers, most brands promise to improve people’s lives in one way or another. Therefore, a trusted brand is one that not only promises, but is seen as able, to have a real influence on people’s lives. In that sense, trusted brands may bear some resemblance to divine agents: Both are powerful entities that operate in one’s world in a way that can directly influence one’s outcomes, and therefore both can help reassure people that even when they themselves cannot impose order and structure on their worlds, someone or something else out there can.

1.3. External agents may increase self-efficacy External agents—such as Gods, governments, and perhaps even trusted brands—can provide people with a sense that the world is orderly, predictable and understandable, which are critical to an individual’s sense that he or she can pursue self-set goals. In five experimental studies, people invested more effort in pursuit of their goals after thinking about environmental order – even order unrelated to the goals they were pursuing (Kay et al. 2014). According to these authors, the presence of structure in one’s immediate environment promotes the belief that actions and outcomes are interconnected, a belief that is absolutely required for goal pursuit. In a similar line of work, disorganized environments hindered selfregulation, because they threatened self-control, whereas organized environments resulted in better self-regulation (Chae and Zhu 2014). If external agents of control can help restore Taylor’s sense that the world is orderly, and if she must have such a sense before she can be motivated to pursue goals, then these lines of work suggest that external agents of control will facilitate Taylor’s goal pursuit.

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Here, we aim to test this hypothesis. More specifically, though, we also propose to extend it by exploring the novel but theoretically consistent possibility that external agents of control facilitate goal pursuit by increasing people’s self-efficacy. Self-efficacy refers to people’s sense that they can control their outcomes through their own actions (Bandura 1994). By providing people with a sense that the world is orderly, predictable and understandable, we propose that external agents reassure people that their actions are taking place within a system where their actions will have predictable consequences. This boost to people’s selfefficacy should ultimately result in more vigorous goal pursuit. Before we test this hypothesis, however, we introduce a key moderator upon which we expect that this process hinges.

2. PLANNING SPECIFICITY We have hypothesized that external agents of control facilitate goal pursuit by increasing selfefficacy. However, this prediction stands in contrast with existing work showing that external agents of control can inhibit goal pursuit (e.g., Brehm 1966), and with theorizing about how external agents of control decrease, rather than increase, self-efficacy (e.g., Laurin et al. 2012). This conflict suggests there may be some circumstances under which external agents increase self-efficacy, but other circumstances under which they do not, or under which they even decrease it. We propose one such condition, whereby external agents will increase selfefficacy: when individuals have made specific (compared to broad or abstract) plans for how to achieve their goal.

2.1. Making specific plans can challenge self-efficacy and hinder goal pursuit Goals are desired end states that are attainable through actions (Kruglanski et al. 2002). Within that category, there are single-episode goals, which can be completed via just 88

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one consumption choice or behavior (e.g., buying a train ticket), and long-term goals, like saving, dieting, or getting good grades, which require multiple episodes of self-regulation spread out over a relatively long period of time. Lay intuitions would suggest that, when it comes to long-term goals, pursuers might benefit from making a specific plan for each of the steps involved in successfully achieving the goal. For instance, if Taylor aims to save up enough money for a down payment on a home, it seems reasonable to assume it would help her to figure out exactly how much money she needs to save, and to plan out how much she would need to set aside each month, each week, or even each day, to achieve that amount. A long tradition of research on implementation intentions supports this intuition: People perform better when they make plans that specify not only the procedures that will lead to goal completion (i.e., how) but also the precise time (i.e., when) and context (i.e., where) in which these procedures need to take place. Dozens of studies find that, in comparison to merely expressing a goal intention without forming a specific plan, forming this type of implementation intention fosters goal achievement, by providing people with situational cues that remind them to enact goal-relevant behaviors (Gollwitzer 1999). But does this seemingly rational process always benefit goal pursuit? Recent research in the consumer domain has challenged this notion by uncovering circumstances and mechanisms that interfere with, or even reverse, the positive effects of forming specific plans. One line of research builds on construal level theory, which posits that a focus on concrete details directs people to consider how feasible their goals are, whereas a focus on the object of the goal directs people to consider how desirable their goals are (Liberman and Trope 1998; Trope, Liberman, and Wakslak 2007). Consistent with this idea, too much of an emphasis on precise amounts of money can undermine savings intentions, by shifting consumers’ mindset from a “why” mindset (e.g., I am saving money because I want to buy a house, which is very important to me) to a “how” mindset (e.g., I am saving money

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by trying to set aside 10% of every paycheck, and by reducing my spending on fancy restaurants; Ülkümen and Cheema 2011). Other lines of research converge on the notion that specific plans can sometimes interfere with people’s confidence that they can achieve their goals. For instance, when people make specific plans for more than just a single goal, they doubt their ability to execute all the necessary steps, and lose their motivation as a result (Dalton and Spiller 2012). Likewise, when people are far from completing their goals, making a specific plan causes emotional distress, presumably because it makes them feel daunted by the task before them, which reduces their motivation (Townsend and Liu 2012). In all of these studies, thinking too concretely about how, when, and where to pursue a goal can lead people to question their ability to complete all the necessary steps and thereby control their outcomes, which can undermine motivation. In other words, it can make them doubt their self-efficacy, or their ability to bring about their desired end-states (Bandura 1994). Moreover, this seems to be the case especially when people are far from attaining their goals (Townsend and Liu 2012), which is exactly where they find themselves in the early stages of goal pursuit. Thus, if Taylor is an early-stage goal pursuer, making a specific plan might cause her to feel low self-efficacy with regards to her ability to achieve her goals: The more specific her plan gets, the less confident she might be about her capacity to carry it out.

2.2. External agents might bolster self-efficacy specifically when it is threatened We propose that external agents help to bolster people’s self-efficacy, especially when they have made specific plans. This idea is based on the following logic. If planning longterm goals in a specific fashion challenges their self-efficacy (Dalton and Spiller 2012; Liberman and Trope 1998; Scott and Nowlis 2014; Townsend and Liu 2012; Trope et al. 90

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2007; Ülkümen and Cheema 2011), this may lead people to start to feel that the world is random, chaotic and unpredictable (Kay et al. 2008), and to feel anxious as a result (e.g., Laurin, Kay, and Moscovitch 2008). In the context of this aversive state, the palliative function of external systems of control might be especially attractive. If people are thirsting for a sense of order, then they are likely to use any available opportunity to slake that thirst. A key means by which people can do that is to focus on the order-providing properties of external systems (Landau et al. 2015), which can both quell their anxieties and restore their lost motivation. If Taylor has begun making specific plans about how she will reach her savings goals, she may feel unsure of her ability to accomplish each step, and this lack of control may undermine her sense of order in the world. In this scenario, thinking about a powerful external source of control that promises to add order and structure to her environment may, by restoring her faith in those particular building blocks of confident goal pursuit, reassure her that her outcomes will indeed be contingent on her actions, and restore her sense of self-efficacy. Our primary hypothesis, then, is that thinking about external systems of control will increase motivation in goal pursuit when planning is specific. We further hypothesized that this effect would be mediated by increased self-efficacy: Under ordinary circumstances, specific planning should disrupt self-efficacy, but self-efficacy should return to normal among specific planners who think about external, order providing agents. We also formulated a tentative, secondary hypothesis regarding how this process unfolds when planning is vague. We reasoned that when people begin planning long-term goals in a vague fashion, they think only of the eventual outcome and of how desirable it is. In other words, when people make vague plans, nothing prompts them to question their ability to reach their goal, and they can proceed with confidence that they will achieve it. In cases like these, people have not confronted in any concrete way all of the actions they must

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successfully take and contingencies they must depend upon to arrive at the goal. Therefore, the thought that a powerful other is there to influence their outcomes may not contribute to their sense of order, because that sense of order is not in need of a boost. Instead, the thought of an external agent may even serve as a stark reminder that people’s fates are not, strictly speaking, under their own control. That may reduce self-efficacy, and thus motivation. Alternatively, the same effect may occur because, the thought of external agents, particularly benevolent ones, might make people feel protected and cared for (e.g., Kupor, Laurin, and Levav 2015; Laurin, Schumann, and Holmes 2014). If so, they may decide they have no need to invest their resources in pursuit of their goals, because they can rely instead on the external agents to ensure their success. In other words, if Taylor has begun making vague plans about how she will reach her savings goals, she will likely feel confident that she will ultimately reach them. In this case, when she is not confronted with the reality of all the contingencies that need to unfold for her goal to be realized, thinking about a powerful external source of control may simply remind her that she does not have total control, or that kindly forces are on her side guaranteeing her success. If so, then we should see no increase in her motivation, and we may even see a decrease. Thus, while our main prediction and contribution here concerns the context of specific planning, we do offer the secondary (though somewhat speculative) hypothesis that thinking about external systems of control will not increase motivation in goal pursuit when planning is vague, and it instead it may even decrease it. We note that our hypotheses (both primary and secondary) specifically concerns early stage goal pursuit, not goal pursuit at later stages when people are closer to the outcome. The mechanism for our primary hypothesis relies on external agents restoring the self-efficacy, and therefore the motivation, disrupted by specific planning. But self-efficacy is at its most relevant in early-stage goal pursuit; once people near goal attainment, even if they make specific plans, they have been shown to ignore self-efficacy, focusing instead on the goal’s

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perceived value (Zhang and Huang 2010) or how quickly they are making progress (Huang and Zhang 2011). Therefore, we expect that our predicted effects of the thought of powerful external entities will emerge particularly among early-stage goal pursuers. Formally, then, we hypothesize the following: H1: Thinking about external systems of control during early stage goal pursuit will increase motivation in goal pursuit when planning is specific. H2: The effect described in H1 will be mediated by increased self-efficacy. H3: Thinking about external systems of control during early stage goal pursuit will not increase motivation in goal pursuit when planning is vague, and may even decrease it. We test these hypotheses in a series of five studies. In Studies 1 to 3, we seek initial support for our hypotheses by considering the role of powerful, controlling Gods in goal pursuit in consumer-relevant contexts: savings goals (Studies 1 and 2) and fitness goals (Study 3). In Studies 4A and 4B, we establish brand trust as a source of external control and then test our hypotheses again using brand trust as the source of external control.

3. STUDY 1: Effect of a controlling God on assigned savings goals Study 1 seeks to provide initial evidence for our hypotheses in the context of a common consumer goal: to save money. We predicted that when participants imagined a specific plan for saving money, those who first thought about a controlling God would experience more motivation than those who thought about a neutral topic. By contrast, we predicted no such effect when participants imagined a vague plan, and even speculated that we might observe the reverse: That those who first thought about a controlling God would experience less motivation. Moreover, to ensure that any such effects were driven by the thought of God as a controlling agent, specifically, as opposed to by the thought of God or religion more

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generally, we included a set of conditions where we asked participants to think about a noncontrolling, creating God. We predicted that participants in that condition would show results similar to those in the neutral condition, and that only those who thought about a controlling God would show our predicted effect.

3.1. Method 3.1.1. Participants We recruited 204 American residents (74.0% female, median age = 33 [range: 19-54]) who completed a study online using Toluna’s respondent database. The majority identified as Christian (52.5%) or non-denominational (40.7%); the rest were Hindu (2.0%), Jewish (1.5%), Muslim (0.5%), and other (2.9%). We retained non-denominational and agnostic participants, but removed the 15 participants who identified as atheist for two reasons: (a) a controlling God is an irrelevant external system of control to atheists, and (b) a God-based prime might cause atheists to have an unfavorable attitude toward the rest of the study (see Inzlicht and Tullett 2010). We followed the same procedure in Studies 2 and 3 (analyses including atheists produced nearly identical results in all cases).

3.1.2. Procedure Participants first read one of three articles, under the pretense of passing a reading test to evaluate their power of concentration (see supplementary materials, Appendix E). We formatted these articles to seem as if they came from the journal Science, and they constituted our manipulation of external control. In one condition, the article argued that recent research has found that it is scientifically possible for a God-like entity to intervene in the world’s affairs to bring order to the universe. In a second condition, the article was similar, but on the topic of a God-like entity who could have created the world we live in, omitting any mention 94

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of active control; these two articles were adapted from Kay and colleagues (2010). In a third condition, the article was about recent advances in the quality of images of space. To test their comprehension, we gave participants four multiple-choice questions about the meaning of four key words in the article. If they failed to answer three or four of these questions correctly, the website terminated the survey. We followed the same procedure in Studies 2 and 3, which resulted in the termination of 31 (Study 1), 26 (Study 2) and 38 (Study 3) individuals’ participation. These individuals are not included in the participants sections of the relevant study, because the website terminated their participation before they completed the demographics form. Participants then moved on to the ostensible main study, wherein they read one of two scenarios (adapted from Soman and Zhao 2011) before completing a self-reported measure of motivation. The scenario they read constituted our manipulation of planning. Both scenarios asked participants to imagine they had a job with reasonable pay, and that they were beginning to think about trying to increase their meager savings. In both scenarios, they read further that their financial adviser had introduced them to a new savings program that offered a guaranteed annual rate of return of 4%. In the vague planning condition, the program required them to commit in advance to allocating an unspecified portion of their future salary for an unspecified period of time. In the specific planning condition, the program instead required them to commit to a monthly deposit of at least $300 for exactly ten years. Finally, we assessed their motivation to meet the requirements of the savings program. Participants used seven-point scales (1 = not at all motivated / committed, or very little effort; 7 = extremely motivated / committed, or a lot of effort) to answer the following questions: “How motivated would you feel to respect the requirements of this program?”, “How committed would you be to respect the requirements of this program”, and “How much effort would you be willing to invest to respect the requirements of this program?” (α = .95).

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3.2. Results 3.2.1. Pretest We pretested our manipulation of planning type with a separate sample drawn from the same population (N = 45). These participants read one of the two plans and used sevenpoint scales to answer the following questions: “How vague or specific do you think the savings program that has been recommended to you is?” (1 = very vague; 7 = very specific), and “How detailed do you see the actions that will allow completion of the savings program?” (1 = not detailed at all; 7 = very detailed). They also rated 10 words from the PANAS scale (positive mood: alert, inspired, determined, attentive, active; negative mood: afraid, irritable, ashamed, nervous, jittery; Watson, Clark, and Tellegen 1988). We found that our manipulation influenced perceived specificity in the expected direction, t(43) = 1.85, p = .07, M vague = 4.00, M specific = 4.82), but produced no effects on positive or negative mood (ts < 1).

3.2.2. Primary analyses This design allowed us to test H1: that among participants who envisioned a specific plan, those who read about a controlling God would report more motivation than others. It also allowed us to test H3: that among participants who envisioned a vague plan, those who read about a controlling God would report no more – and in fact perhaps even less – motivation than other participants. A two-way ANOVA yielded the predicted interaction between external control system and planning type, F(5, 198) = 2.26, p = .05. Orthogonal planned comparisons revealed that the interaction unfolded as expected (see fig. 1). In support of H1, when participants envisioned a specific plan, reminding them first of a controlling God led to significantly higher levels of motivation (M = 5.27, SD = 1.26) relative to reminding them of neutral topics (M = 4.48, SD = 1.72), β = .13, t(198) = 1.94, p = .05, or of a creating 96

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God (M = 4.50, SD = 1.92), β = .14, t(198) = 2.03, p = .04 (these last two means did not differ, t < 1). In support of H3, when participants envisioned a vague plan, reminding them first of a controlling God made them report significantly less motivation (M = 4.65, SD = 1.31) relative to reminding them of neutral topics (M = 5.39, SD = 1.11), β = -.15, t(198) = -2.12, p = .04. Interestingly, when participants envisioned a vague plan, even a reminder of a creating, noncontrolling God (Mcreating God = 4.80, SD = 1.63) lowered motivation (marginally) relative to the neutral condition, β = -.12, t(198) = -1.73, p = .09. Viewed differently, participants tended to report (non-significantly) lower motivation when they formulated a specific, compared to vague, plan, β = -.17, tneutral(198) = -2.40, p = .02, β = -.06, tcreating God(198) = -.90, p = .39, unless they were reminded of a controlling God, in which case they reported more motivation after making a specific, as opposed to vague, plan, β = .11 t(198) = 1.64, p = .10.

Figure 6: Effects of reminders of external systems of control and planning specificity on motivation for assigned savings goals (Note: † = marginally different from the neutral condition at p < .10; * = significantly different from the neutral condition at p < .05.)

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3.3. Discussion The results of Study 1 provide initial evidence for two of our hypotheses. Thinking about an external system of control—in this case, an order-providing God—caused higher levels of motivation when individuals made specific plans for saving goals, but instead undermined goal pursuit when they instead made vague plans. Moreover, in this design we included a condition where we had participants think about a non-controlling, creating God. Participants in this condition showed no boost to their motivation, in the specific planning condition; thus we can conclude that the boost we observed among specific planners in the controlling God condition was truly because they thought about the controlling properties of religion, rather than just religion in general.

4. STUDY 2: Effect of a controlling God on idiosyncratic savings goals In Study 2, we planned to extend the results of Study 1 by examining participants’ own pre-existing early stage savings goals. The design resembled that of Study 1, with two notable changes. First, we eliminated the creating God condition, focusing solely on the comparison between reminders of a controlling God and a neutral condition. Second, after passing the reading test, rather than ask participants about a goal we imposed on them, participants nominated a savings goal they wanted to accomplish within the next six months. We predicted that if we asked them to make a specific plan, reminders of a controlling God would result in greater motivation but that if we asked them to make a vague plan instead, we would find no such effect. On the basis of Study 1, we expected we might even find the reverse effect among vague planners.

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4.1. Method 4.1.1. Participants We recruited 165 American residents (72.1% female, median age = 33 [range: 19-61]) who completed a study online using Toluna’s respondent database. The majority identified as Christian (56.4%) or non-denominational (37.6%); the rest were Hindu (1.8%), Jewish (1.8%), Buddhist (0.6%), and other (1.8%). As in Study 1, we removed participants who identified as atheist (N = 18).

4.1.2. Procedure Participants first completed an ostensible reading test, which we used to manipulated reminders of a controlling God, as in Study 1. Participants then listed a savings goal they had not started to pursue at the time of survey completion, but which they intended to accomplish within six months, and rated its importance (1 = not very important, 7 = very important). In all studies, we asked for this rating prior to manipulating planning type: We assumed that participants would be more motivated to achieve more important goals, so we planned to control for goal importance to eliminate that extraneous variance and sharpen the precision of our analysis. Four participants indicated that they had no savings goal; analyses exclude these participants. We then asked participants to indicate the amount of money they needed to save. In the vague planning condition, we asked them to simply select the range that approximated the amount they needed to save from among the following options: Less than $500; $500 to $999; $1,000 to $1,999; $2,000 to $4,999; $5,000 to $9,999; More than $10,000. In the specific planning condition, they entered the precise amount of money they needed to save, and indicated how much of that money they would save for each of the next six months 99

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individually. In other words, in both conditions participants planned to save money with a sixmonth deadline, but we varied whether they simply approximated the amount they needed to save (vague planning), or specified the exact amount, and indicated how they would go about achieving this goal during each of the upcoming six months (specific planning). Finally, we assessed participants’ motivation to meet their savings goal. They used seven-point scales (1 = not at all committed, or very little effort; 7 = extremely committed, or a lot of effort) to answer the following questions: “How committed would you be to respect the requirements of this program?” and “How much effort would you be willing to invest to respect the requirements of this program?” (r = .61, p < .001).

4.2. Results 4.2.1. Pretest We pretested our manipulation of planning type with a separate sample drawn from the same population (N = 48). These participants completed the savings task in either the specific or vague condition, read one of the two plans and used a seven-point scale to answer the following question: “How detailed do you see the actions that will allow completion of your savings goal?” on a 7-point scale (1 = not detailed at all; 7 = very detailed). As in Study 1, they also rated 10 words from the PANAS scale (positive mood: alert, inspired, determined, attentive, active; negative mood: afraid, irritable, ashamed, nervous, jittery; Watson et al. 1988). We found that our manipulation influenced perceived specificity in the expected direction (Mvague= 4.32, SD = 2.05; Mspecific = 5.52, SD = 1.24), t( 46) = 2.43, p < .05, but had no effect on positive or negative mood (ts < 1).

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4.2.2. Primary analyses We predicted that among those who made a specific plan, reminders of a controlling God would result in greater motivation, but that we would find no such effect – and perhaps even the reverse effect – among participants who made a vague plan. To test this prediction, we conducted a two-way ANCOVA on savings motivation; we used goal importance as a covariate to eliminate the variance in motivation associated with that variable. (In all studies goal importance was a highly significant covariate; we never found that it interacted with any of our predictors.) The predicted interaction unfolded as expected, F(1, 156) = 7.15, p < .01 (see fig. 2). In support of H1, when participants made a specific plan for their savings goal, they reported higher levels of motivation when the idea of a controlling God was salient (adjusted M = 6.04, SE = .14) than in the neutral condition (adjusted M = 5.56, SE = .14), β = .24, t(156) = 2.40, p = .02. In support of H3, when they made a vague plan, we found no such effect: They reported less motivation, although not significantly less motivation, when the idea of a controlling God was salient (adjusted M = 5.76, SE = .14) than in the neutral condition (adjusted M = 6.02, SE = .15), β = -.12, t(156) = 1.36 p = .17. Put differently, in the neutral condition, participants who made specific plans were less motivated than participants who made vague plans β = -.22, t(156) = 2.22, p = .03; this difference was eliminated and nearly reversed when we had participants think about a controlling God, β = .14, t(156) = 1.52, p = .13.

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Figure 7: Effects of reminders of external systems of control and planning specificity on motivation for chosen savings goals. (Note: * = significantly different from the neutral condition at p < .05;  = significantly different from vague plan format at p < .05.)

4.3. Discussion The results of Study 2 provide evidence for our hypotheses in the context of selfselected personal goals. Thinking about an external system of control increased motivation, but only when participants made specific, as opposed to vague, plans for goal pursuit. Consistent with literature on the negative effects of planning (e.g., Townsend and Liu 2012), in the absence of a reminder that their goal existed within an external system of control, detailed planning of the steps required to close the gap between the current state and a desired end state lead to demotivation. However, thinking about an external system of control eliminated this effect. In Study 2 we also found support for H3 in that external agents did not motivate goal pursuit when participants made vague plans. However, unlike in Study 1, we did not find that external agents significantly decreased motivation in those circumstances. This could have happened because the vague condition in Study 2 was somewhat less vague and more 102

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concrete (Scott and Nowlis 2014, Townsend and Liu 2012) than it was in Study 1— participants still had to select a particular range from the available set. Perhaps if we had not had them think even about that, we would have replicated the effect we found in Study 1. In any case, given the significant effect in Study 1 and the nearly significant effect in Study 2, we proceed with caution when it comes to our expectations for vague planners in Study 3.

5. STUDY 3: Effect of a controlling God on fitness goals In Study 3, we had four primary goals. First, we introduce a new consumer-relevant context to test our predictions: health and fitness goals. Second, we seek to test the mechanism that we proposed for the motivation-enhancing effect of external systems of control for specific planners. In other words we test H2: that when people make specific plans, they doubt their ability to perform the steps required, but that salient external systems of control restore that self-efficacy. Third, we use participants’ willingness to pay for a goalrelevant product as our primary dependent variable. Fourth, we provide a direct test of our presumption that our effects apply specifically to early-stage goal pursuit. Specifically, we measured how far participants were from completing their fitness goals, and then asked them to make either vague or specific plans after reminding them of either a controlling God or a neutral topic. Finally, as our dependent measure, we asked about participants’ willingness to pay for a new mobile phone app designed to help them manage their fitness goal. We reasoned that participants who felt more motivated to achieve their goal would be more willing to invest their (financial) resources in pursuit of this goal.

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5.1. Method 5.1.1. Participants We recruited 145 Smartphone users residing in the United States (75.2% female, median age = 36 [range: 18-70]) from Toluna’s respondent database. The majority identified as Christian (52.4%) or non-denominational (35.2%); the rest were Buddhist (3.4%), Jewish (3.4%), Hindu (1.4%), and other (4.1%). As in Study 1, we removed participants who identified as atheist (N = 13).

5.1.2. Procedure Participants first completed the same reading test as in Study 2, which again constituted our reminder of external systems of control (controlling God versus neutral). Participants then began an ostensible commercial survey designed to help with the marketing of an app designed to help users manage their fitness goals. On the first page, they answered a yes / no question about whether they had a goal for being physically fit; ninety-one participants who indicated that they did not were automatically screened out of the survey at that point; these participants are not included in the sample described above. All remaining participants indicated how important it was for them to reach their fitness goal (1 = not very important, 7 = very important). They then provided some details about their fitness goal (e.g., how much weight they planned on losing, what body shape they were targeting, and when they expected to attain their fitness goal). Participants then read about a non-profit organization called Be healthy, Be happy, which we fabricated for the purpose of the survey (see Appendix F). They saw a sample ad to get a sense of this organization’s advice; this constituted our manipulation of planning type (see appendix). Half of the participants saw an ad that told them that eating healthily and exercising could help their health (vague plan); the other half saw an ad that 104

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further provided five specific tips for accomplishing each of these subgoals (specific plan). In both conditions, to strengthen the manipulation, we forced participants to stay on the page for 60 seconds and think about what they would have to do if they were to follow the recommendations in the ad to achieve their own fitness goal. After 60 seconds, they moved onto the remainder of the survey where they answered a series of fillers questions (e.g., mood) among which was an item measuring self-efficacy, adapted from Bagozzi and Edwards (2000): “How confident are you that you can perform the different activities recommended by Be healthy, Be happy, to attain your fitness goal?” (1 = not very confident; 7 = very confident). Next, we showed participants the said app and reviewed some of its key features, which were the same in both conditions. Participants indicated their willingness to buy the app on a 7-point scale (1 = would never consider buying the app, 7 = would definitely consider buying the app). Finally, along with demographic questions, participants reported how soon they thought they would accomplish their fitness goal (1 = very far, 7 = very soon).

5.2. Results 5.2.1. Pretest A pretest (N = 70) confirmed the expected effect of our manipulation of planning type. All participants identified a fitness goal; then half participants saw the specific ad while the other half saw the vague ad. All participants then answered the following question: “How detailed do you see the actions that will allow attainment of your fitness goal?” (1 = not detailed at all; 7 = very detailed). They also completed the brief version of the PANAS scale (Watson et al. 1988) used in the pretest of Study 1. We found that our manipulation influenced perceived specificity in the expected direction (Mvague= 4.c26, SD = 1.84; Mspecific =

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5.15, SD = 1.47), t(68) = 2.12, p = .04, but had no effect on positive, t(68) = 1.54, p = .13, or negative, t < 1, mood.

5.2.2. Perceived self-efficacy We predicted that among specific planners, the presence of an external agent should strengthen self-efficacy. Conversely, among vague planners, we predicted no such effect, and expected that the thought of an external agent might even hinder self-efficacy. Moreover, we predicted that these effects would be specific to the early stages of goal pursuit. To test these predictions, we regressed our measure of perceived self-efficacy on planning type (vague = 0, specific = 1), our manipulation of external systems of control (neutral = 0, controlling God = 1), mean-centered scores of goal completion level, along with all possible interactions (see table 7). As in Study 2, we controlled for goal importance ,which revealed a significant effect on perceived self-efficacy, b = .31, SE = .10, t(136) = 3.11, p < .01. Importantly, the predicted three-way interaction approached significance, b = -.43, SE = .23, t(136) = -1.90, p = .06 (see fig. 3A). To decompose the three-way interaction, we conducted spotlight analyses at one standard deviation below and above the mean of goal completion (Aiken and West 1991; Spiller, Fitzsimons, Lynch, and McClelland 2013). As expected, among participants who were a long way from completing their goal, we found a significant planning  external systems interaction, b = 1.82, SE = .55, t(136) = 3.29, p < .01; this interaction was not significant among participants who were close to completing their goal, b = .35, SE = .56, t(136) = .64, p = .53. Even more specifically, among participants who were at the early stages of goal pursuit, those who imagined a specific plan felt more self-efficacy when they were reminded of a controlling god than when they were not, b = .96, SE = .34, t(136) = 2.66, p = .01 (predicted valueneutral = 4.83 vs. predicted valuecontrolling God = 5.79). By contrast, when they 106

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imagined a vague plan, being reminded of a controlling God made them feel less selfefficacy, b = -.87, SE = .42, t(136) = -2.05, p = .04 (predicted valueneutral = 5.70 vs. predicted valuecontrolling

God

= 4.83). In other words, reminders of external systems aided self-efficacy

when people made specific plans, but hindered it when they made vague plans. From a different perspective, making specific (versus vague) plans made participants feel less selfefficacy in the neutral condition, b = -.86, SE = .39, t(136) = -2.23, p = .03, while this difference was reversed when they were reminded of a controlling God, b = .96, SE = .41, t(136) = 2.38, p = .02.

Table 7 Regression analyses for the study of the interactional effect of planning type, external system of control and goal completion level on willingness to pay through perceived self-efficacy Mediator: Perceived self-efficacy

Outcome variable: Willingness to pay (direct effect)

Outcome variable: Willingness to pay (total effect)

Predictor Intercept

b

SE

t

p

b

SE

t

p

b

SE

t

4.34

.55

7.92

< .01

.11

.92

.90

1.2

.85

1.42

.16

Goal importance

.31

.10

3.11

< .01

.54

.15

.12 3.5 5

< .01

.65

.15

4.31

< .01

-.78

.29

-2.82

< .01

-.13

.30

-.42

.68

-.58

.43

-1.34

.18

-.42

.29

-1.47

.14

-

-

-

-

-.02

.44

-.05

.96

.13

.11

1.10

.27

-

-

-

-.02

.18

-.11

.91

1.07

.40

2.71

< .01

-

-

-

-

.75

.62

1.22

.23

.04

.16

.27

.78

-

-

-

-

.29

.25

1.13

.29

.26

.17

1.53

.13

-

-

-

-

.45

.26

1.75

.08

-.43

.23

-1.90

.06

-

-

-

-

-.79

.35

-2.23

.03

-

-

-

-

.29

.12

2.4

.02

-

-

-

-

Planning type (vague = 0, specific = 1) External systems (neutral = 0, controlling God = 1) Goal completion (mean-centered) Planning type × External system Planning type × Goal completion External system × Goal completion Planning type × External system × Goal completion Perceived selfefficacy R²

.22 F(8, 136) = 4.70, p < .01

-

.15 F(3, 141) = 4.70, p < .01

p

.19 F(8, 136) = 3.90, p < .01

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Figure 8: Effects of reminders of external systems of control and planning on perceived selfefficacy at low and high progress level. (Note: * = significantly different from the neutral condition at p < .05.)

5.2.3. Willingness to pay We conducted the same analysis described above with willingness to pay as the dependent measure (see Table 7). Goal importance revealed a significant effect on perceived self-efficacy, b = .65, SE = .15, t(136) = 4.41, p < .01. Importantly, the predicted three-way interaction achieved significance, b = -.79, SE = .35, t(136) = -2.23, p = .03 (see fig. 3B). We 108

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decomposed this interaction in the same way as above. As expected, among participants who were a long way from completing their goal, we found a significant planning  external systems interaction, b = 2.12, SE = .86, t(136) = 2.47, p = .02; this interaction was not significant among participants who were close to completing their goal, b = -.57, SE = .86, t(136) = .63, p = .51. Even more specifically, when participants who were far from goal completion imagined a specific plan, being reminded of a controlling God made them feel more motivated, b = 1.31, SE = .56, t(136) = 2.36, p = .02, (predicted valueneutral = 3.54 vs. predicted valuecontrolling God = 4.85). In other words, reminders of external systems increased motivation when people made specific plans. Consistent with previous studies, we found the opposite effect among participants who imagined vague plans, b = -.81, SE = .66, t(136) = 1.24, p = .22, (predicted valueneutral = 4.62 vs. predicted valuecontrolling

God

= 3.80). Viewed

differently, in the neutral condition, participants who made specific plans were less motivated than participants who made vague plans, b = -1.08, SE = .60, t(136) = -1.79, p = .07; this difference was eliminated and reversed when we had participants think about a controlling God, b = 1.05, SE = .63, t(136) = 1.67, p = .09.

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Figure 9: Effects of reminders of external systems of control and planning on willingness to buy at low and high progress level. (Note: * = significantly different from the neutral condition at p < .05;  = marginally different from vague planning condition p < .10.)

5.2.4. Moderated mediation Finally, we tested the role of self-efficacy in explaining the effects on motivation. We expected that, among early-stage goal pursuers who made specific plans, a reminder of an external system of control would make them feel more self-efficacy, which would explain their increased motivation. By contrast, we expected no such effect among early stage vague planners. To assess this moderated mediation model (see fig. 4), we followed Hayes (2013, model 11) and used a bootstrapping procedure based on 5,000 samples to compute estimates for the conditional indirect effects of reminders of an external system of control (independent variable) on willingness to pay (dependent variable) through perceived self-efficacy (mediator) at different levels of both moderator variables (planning type and progress level) while controlling for goal importance. With respect to the first stage of mediation (path a), we established earlier that reminders of a controlling God influenced self-efficacy as expected, among early-stage goal 110

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pursuers who made specific versus vague plans. With respect to the second stage of mediation (path b), we found that self-efficacy positively predicted willingness to buy, b = .29, SE = .12, t(136) = 2.39, p = .02. Finally, a bootstrapping analysis revealed that among early-stage goal pursuers who made specific plans, self-efficacy mediated the positive effect of a reminder of a controlling God on willingness to pay, a×b = .28, 95% CI = .02 to .76). Among early-stage goal pursuers who made vague plans, this effect was not significant, and if anything was negative rather than positive, a×b = -.25, 95% CI = -.89 to .02.

Figure 10: Moderated mediation model. (Note: † p < .06; * p < .05; ** p < .01)

5.3. Discussion The results of Study 3 support all three of our hypotheses. Early-stage goal pursuers who made specific plans reported greater motivation after thinking about an external agent (H1), because they reported greater self-efficacy after thinking about an external agent (H2). We observed no such effects among early-stage goal pursuers who made vague plans: If

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anything, reminders of external agents made them feel less self-efficacy and motivation (H3); the indirect path linking these two effects was not significant. Put differently, under ordinary circumstances, specific planning decreased people’s willingness to invest efforts, because it made them doubt their ability to complete all the necessary steps. But when we made salient the notion of a controlling God, specific planning made people more willing to invest effort, presumably because a controlling God can ensure that the world functions in an orderly fashion, and that efforts are worthwhile. In our two remaining studies, we extend our logic to a different system of external control: brand trust.

6. STUDY 4A: Test of the brand-religion functional homology In our final two studies, we sought to extend our findings to other external agents— namely, trusted brands. A first necessary step, before we can explore whether brands, as external sources of control, can exert similar effects on motivation as we have observed with religion, was to establish that brands can, in fact, function as external systems of control. To do so, we tested the idea that a trusted brand can compensate for other external sources of control—such as beliefs in a controlling God-like entity—in the face of a threat to personal control or self-efficacy. When people question their ability to control their outcomes, they feel anxious, and they turn to external sources of control (e.g., beliefs in powerful Gods or governments) to quell that anxiety (e.g., Kay et al., 2008). Thus, if a trusted brand can serve as an external agent, people may increase the trust they have in a brand when they lack confidence in their ability to control their outcomes. If, however, they have an external source of control ready to compensate, they need not turn to additional sources (e.g., Cutright et al., 2013). For instance, when participants can restore order by appealing to their belief in a controlling God, they have no need to compensate for a control threat by endorsing more powerful governments. Thus, if brand trust plays the role of an external agent, people may

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endorse it in the face of a control threat, but not if they have a pre-existing belief in a powerful, controlling God they can turn to instead. In Study 4A, we test these propositions: We induce people to make specific (versus vague) plans, which we know from Study 3 will undermine self-efficacy and thereby threaten personal control. We then assess their tendency to trust a particular brand to in helping them implement their plan, and predict that they will trust it more when making specific plans, unless they have a strong pre-existing belief in a controlling God. Furthermore, we expect that these processes are mediated by anxiety: Un-dealt with control threats cause people to feel anxious, and it is this anxiety that drives them to endorse external sources of control (Kay et al., 2010; Laurin et al., 2008).

6.1. Method 6.1.1. Participants We recruited 151 American residents (75.2% female, median age = 31 [range: 18-54]) who agreed to complete an online survey on behalf of BNP Paribas, a retail banking institution without an operational network in the United States (only twelve had heard of the brand). The majority identified as Christian (46.5%) or non-denominational (36.1%); the rest were Atheist (6.3%), Jewish (4.9%), Hindu (0.7%), Muslim, (0.7%), and other (4.9%). In this Study, because we assessed pre-existing belief in a controlling God-like entity, we had no reason to exclude atheists, we simply expected them to score low in this belief measure.

6.1.2. Procedure Under the guise of a survey conducted for BNP Paribas, participants first listed three early-stage savings/financial goals they currently planned to pursue. They also indicated the importance they attached to these goals, overall (1 = Not very important, 7 = very important). 113

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In the vague planning condition, they answered no more questions at this stage; in the specific planning condition, participants indicated how much money they needed to save, overall. Participants then saw an ad for BNP Paribas depicting savings advice that we told them came from the winner of the 2001 Nobel Prize in economics, Joseph Stiglitz (see supplementary materials, Appendix G). In the vague planning condition, the ad simply read that “successful financial goals result from saving as much as possible, in other world, saving what is not spent.” In the specific planning condition, the ad was much more precise: “successful financial goals result from saving a predetermined proportion of the household income after taxes by automatic transfers into a well-chosen savings plan or investment portfolio. The rule of thumb is to allocate about 15% of the net salary to savings.” The website forced participants to stay on this page for 90 seconds; while they were on the page they completed an anxiety thermometer (Houtman and Bakker 1989) concerning their response to the ad (0 = not at all anxious, 10 = extremely anxious). Once the survey advanced to the next page, participants answered three questions about how much they trusted BNP Paribas—or how much they felt they could rely on it to perform its functions: “To finance the projects you mentioned earlier, to what extent would you be willing to rely on the brand depicted in the ad?”, “To finance the projects you mentioned earlier, to what extent do you think the brand depicted in the ad is able to get you there?”, and “To finance the projects you mentioned earlier, to what extent do you think the brand depicted in the ad is dependable?”. They answered all questions on seven-point scales (1 = not at all; 7 = completely; α = .89). Finally, participants completed a demographics form, which included a measure of their belief in a controlling God which used three items adapted from Laurin, Shariff, Henrich, and Kay (2012): “The event that occur in this world unfold according to God’s, or some other supreme being’s plan”, “God, or some type of supreme being, is in control, at least in part, of the events within our universe,” and “God, or some type of supreme being, makes

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most events in our world happen”. Participants reported their agreement using five-point scales (1 = strongly agree, 5 = strongly disagree). Their responses formed a reliable composite (α = .94), and did not differ between planning conditions t(149) = 0.68, p = .50.

6.2. Results 6.2.1. Pretest A pretest (N = 94) confirmed the expected effect of our manipulation of planning type. All participants identified three savings goals; then half participants saw the specific ad while the other half saw the vague ad. All participants then answered the following question: “How detailed do you see the actions that will allow attainment of your savings goals?” (1 = not detailed at all; 7 = very detailed). They also completed the brief version of the PANAS scale (Watson et al. 1988) used in the pretest of Study 1. We found that our manipulation influenced perceived specificity in the expected direction (Mvague= 4.29, SD = 1.66; Mspecific = 5.06, SD = 1.63), t(92) = 2.23, p = .03, but had no effect on positive, t(92) = 1.16, p = .25, or negative, t < 1, mood.

6.2.2. Self-reported anxiety We predicted that participants who did not believe in God—i.e., who had no ready method of countering a control threat—would report feeling anxious when we had them imagine a specific plan for achieving their savings goals. To test this prediction, we regressed self-reported anxiety on our planning manipulation (vague = 0, specific = 1), belief in a controlling God (mean centered), and their interaction; we also included goal importance as a covariate. The analysis revealed the predicted interaction, b = -.74, SE = .32, t(146) = -2.34, p = .02. A spotlight analysis revealed that participants who tended not to believe in a controlling God (i.e., who scored one standard deviation below the mean on that measure) felt more 115

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anxious when they planned their savings goals in a specific fashion, b = 2.57, SE = .62, t(146) = 4.12, p < .001 (predicted valuevague = 3.99 vs. predicted valuespecific = 6.56). By contrast, participants who tended to believe in a controlling God (i.e., who scored one standard deviation above the mean on that measure) differed in that same direction, but not significantly so, b = .51, SE = .61, t(146) = .84, p = .40, predicted valuevague = 5.60 vs. predicted valuespecific = 6.11). Although for some reason, less religious people were, overall, less anxious than religious people, this difference was eliminated when participants made specific plans (main effect of planning specificity based on contrast coding where vague = -1 and specific = 1: b = .59, SE = .24, t(146) = 2.51, p = .01).

6.2.3. Brand trust We also predicted that participants who did not believe in God would compensate for their anxiety by trusting the brand more, when they made a specific plan. We first tested this prediction using a similar regression analysis to the one described above, with brand trust as the dependent measure. Once again, we found a significant planning type  belief in a controlling God interaction, b = -.43, SE = .17, t(146) = -2.50, p = .01. The spotlight analysis showed that participants who tended not to believe in God trusted the brand more when they made a specific plan compared to when they made a vague plan, b = 1.18, SE = .34, t(146) = 3.51, p < .001 (predicted valuevague = 3.25 vs. predicted valuespecific = 4.44). By contrast, participants who did believe in a controlling God showed no such effect, b = -.01, SE = .33, t(146) =0.02, p = .99, predicted valuevague = 4.04 vs. predicted valuespecific = 4.03). As in the analysis above, less religious people were on average more skeptical than more religious people (Clark 1963). In accordance with our theorizing, though, they were the ones whose trust increased in the face of specific planning of early-stage goals.

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6.2.4. Moderated mediation Finally, we predicted that specific planners who did not believe in a controlling God reported greater trust as a direct result of their increased anxiety. We ran a moderated mediation model (see fig. 5) following Hayes (2013, model 8). Regression statistics are displayed in Appendix H. We used a bootstrapping procedure that generated a sample size of 5,000 to assess the conditional indirect effects of planning type (the independent variable) on brand trust (the dependent variable) through anxiety (the mediator) at low and high levels of belief in a controlling God (the moderator); we once again controlled for goal importance. Among participants with weak beliefs in a controlling God, specific planners felt more anxious, and as a result trusted the brand more, estimate = .26 [95% CI = 0.016 to 0.601]. Among participants with strong beliefs in a controlling God, this indirect effect did not achieve significance, estimate = .05 [95% CI = -0.054 to 0.267].

Figure 11: Moderated mediation model (Note: * p < .05)

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6.3. Discussion Study 4A provides empirical support for the idea that trusted brands can act as an external system of control: When their personal control is threatened, if they have no readily available source of external control with which to compensate, we found that people instead increase their trust in brands. It was necessary for us to demonstrate this point in order to then test the hypothesis that brand trust could influence motivation in the same way as the salience of a controlling God. Our next and final study tests this hypothesis, and shows that within the construct of trust, it is specifically people’s sense that a brand can reliably follow through on its intentions to change their lives that drives this effect, and not their (related) sense that the brand is honestly conveying its intentions.

7. STUDY 4B: Effect of trusted vs. honest brand on goal pursuit Study 4B had two main goals. First, we sought to test H1 and H3 in the context of brand trust. We predicted that participants who trusted a brand—who felt they could count on it to reliably fulfill its function—would feel more motivated when making specific plans, but no more motivated and perhaps even less motivated when making vague plans. Second, we sought to demonstrate that within the construct of trust, it is specifically the idea that the brand can reliably influence people’s lives that matters, and not other factors. We predicted that seeing a brand as reliably able to follow through on its intentions would result in the effects we predicted, but simply seeing a brand as honest, or as stating its intentions without deception, would not. A brand can only be a source of external control if people believe it can reliably influence their lives and the world around them; the mere fact of not lying, or of sincerely caring and intending to help, cannot. Therefore, a brand that is seen as honest cannot serve as an external agent, but a brand that is trusted can.

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7.1. Method 7.1.1. Participants We recruited 271 American residents (73.4% female, median age = 35 [range: 18-54]) who agreed to complete an online survey using Toluna’s respondent database. We informed participants that we were conducting the survey on behalf of a well-known banking institution located in the United States, but that due to concerns about validity, we could not tell them the bank’s name. We expected that participants would therefore think the bank might or might not be theirs.

7.1.2. Procedure Participants read that the survey was to help the bank rethink its retail division’s communication materials. In the trusted brand condition and the honest brand condition, participants then read three phrases that the bank was ostensibly planning to use for marketing. In the trusted brand condition, all three phrases began, “Our motto is ‘Rely on a bank that makes you reach your goals’ because—”; they continued: “we believe that a bank acts on its clients’ behalf to bring order into their financial life,” “we believe that a bank should intervene in its clients’ financial life and makes things happen for them,” and “we believe that a bank should have a constant presence by its clients’ side.” All these phrases emphasized the ability of the brand to fulfill its function. In the honest brand condition, all three phrases began, “Our motto is ‘Trust a bank that makes you reach your goals’ because— ”; they continued: “we believe that a bank is a partner that does not hide anything from its clients,” “we believe that a bank should be transparent and honest with its clients,” and “we believe that a bank should be trustworthy of its clients’ business.” These phrases instead emphasized the honesty and integrity of the brand and its desire, as opposed to its ability, to follow through. Participants rated all the phrases they say on three dimensions that we 119

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intended to use as a manipulation check. They used nine-point semantic differential scales to rate the mottos on the following dimensions: libertarian/authoritarian, obtrusive/unobtrusive (reversed), and controlling/non-controlling (reversed). Responses formed a reliable composite (α = .80). Participants in the baseline condition skipped this part of the survey, and began directly with the next part. The next part of the survey focused on advertisements; this part of the survey was our advertisement manipulation from Study 4A (though the anxiety measure was excluded this time): In the same vein, participants first listed three early-stage savings/financial goals and indicated the importance they attached to these goals, overall (1 = not very important, 7 = very important). They then saw an ad depicting a quote that gave specific versus vague savings advice. Once they moved on from the ad, participants completed a number of filler questions (e.g., attitude toward the ad), which included a measure of their saving intentions. More specifically, we asked participants how willing they felt to engage in a number of financial activities in the following six months: “paying your bills on time,” “learning about money management regularly,” “saving money on a regular basis (each week/month),” “maintaining sufficient balances in your bank account,” “regularly investing for your longterm financial goals”, and “spending within the budget” (1= very unlikely, 7= very likely). Responses were averaged to form a reliable index of savings intentions (α = .85).

7.2. Results 7.2.1. Manipulation checks Participants in the brand condition saw the bank as more controlling (M = 5.79, SD = 1.15) than participants in the honest brand condition (M = 4.67, SD = 1.62), F(1, 177) = 28.97, p < .001. Note that the same difference was significant for all of the three dimensions (i.e., controlling, authoritarian, and obtrusive). 120

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7.2.2. Savings intentions We predicted that participants who envisioned a specific plan would report stronger savings intentions when they thought about a trusted brand, compared to when they thought about a different type of brand, but that participants who envisioned a vague plan would show no such effect. To test this prediction, we conducted a two-way ANCOVA on saving intentions, including brand condition and planning type as between-subjects variables, and goal importance as the covariate. The analysis yielded the predicted interaction, F(2, 264) = 4.87, p < .01. Orthogonal planned comparisons revealed that the interaction unfolded as expected (see fig. 6). In support of H1, specific planners reported higher levels of savings intentions in the trusted brand condition (adjusted M = 5.74, SE = .16) compared to the baseline condition (adjusted M = 5.32, SE = .18), β = .10, t(264) = 1.75, p = .08, but not compared to the honest brand condition (adjusted M = 5.49, SE = .17), β = .06, t(264) = 1.06, p = .29 (these last two means did not differ, t < 1). In support of H3, vague planners reported lower levels of savings intentions in the trusted brand condition (adjusted M = 5.23, SE = .15), compared to the baseline condition (adjusted M = 5.80, SE =.14), β = -.16, t(264) = -2.79, p < .01, but not compared to the honest brand condition (adjusted M = 5.44, SE = .16), β = -.06, t(264) = -.96, p = .34. Interestingly, when participants envisioned a vague plan, the effect between the last two means was marginally significant, β = -.10, t(264) = 1.70, p = .09. This resembles the pattern of results we found in Study 1: In that study, any mention of God, controlling or not, reduced participants’ motivation when they made vague plans. Similarly here, any mention of a brand, whether trusted or not, reduced participants’ motivation when they made vague plans. Future research might explore whether these reductions are in fact due to these entities’ potential to be external agents, or some other feature. Viewed differently, under no brand prime, participants tended to report lower motivation when they formulated a specific, compared to vague, plan, β = -.13, t(264) = -2.10,

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p = .04. Conversely, when they were reminded of a trusted brand, they reported more motivation after making a specific, as opposed to vague, plan, β = .14, t(264) = 2.34, p = .02. By contrast, reminders of brand honesty resulted in a nonsignificant difference between conditions, β = .01, t(264) = .24, p = .81.

Figure 12: Effects of reminders of external systems of control and planning on savings intentions. (Note: * = significantly different from the baseline condition at p ≤ .05.)

7.3. Discussion This final study provides further evidence to support our hypotheses and extending them beyond the realm of religious beliefs. Participants who thought about a trusted bank brand that could bring order into the world reported greater savings intentions if they made a specific plan, but lesser savings intentions if they made a vague plan. This study further confirms the idea that brands can, so long as they are trusted, play a role similar to that of divine agents of control. Moreover, it demonstrates that merely seeing a brand as honest is not sufficient to allow it to play the role of an external agent; rather, the brand must be trusted: Relied upon to influence people’s lives in accordance with its stated function. Finally, our 122

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findings call for a more nuanced view of the effects of obstrusive, interventionist external agents: Existing research would overwhelmingly suggest that the presence of others who seek to interfere, even in a positive way, with one’s goal pursuit should decrease motivation (e.g., Brehm 1966; Karau and Williams 1993; Laurin et al. 2012). Here, we document conditions under which they instead increase it.

8. GENERAL DISCUSSION External agents of control can exert different influences on people’s motivation to pursue their long-term goals. They can remind people that they are not in complete control of their futures, or that benevolent forces are likely to help them, and thus reduce their motivation (e.g., Laurin et al., 2012). Or, as we show here, they can remind people that the world is an orderly and predictable place, where actions are linked to outcomes, and thus bolster their self-efficacy and in turn their motivation. Critically, we find that this salutary effect only occurs when people make specific plans to begin with: When they plan in detail how they will go about pursuing their goal. In Study 1, we find that reminders of a controlling God, but not reminders of a creating God with no potential to act as an external source of control, increases the savings motivations of people who made specific plans about saving for their retirement. In Study 2, we find that reminders of a controlling God increase the motivation people hold towards their own self-generated savings goals. In Study 3, we extend our findings to the domain of health goals, and show that they can result in people’s willingness to pay for goal-related products. Moreover, we confirm that our effects emerge only among early-stage goal pursuers, and that they are mediated by feelings of self-efficacy. Finally, in Studies 4a and 4b, we consider the possibility that trusted brands can serve a role similar to that of a controlling God. In Study 4a, we find that trusted brands can indeed serve as external sources of control: Participants whose control was threatened by specific

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planning increasingly endorsed brand trust when they didn’t have a preexisting belief in a controlling god that they could use to compensate. In Study 4b, we show that thoughts of a trusted brand, like thoughts of a controlling God, can boost people’s motivation when they make specific plans.

8.1. Implications for Theories of Control Our review of the literature identified a set of contradictory results of past research that has examined the relationship between control stimuli and motivational processes. Work on psychological reactance and on social loafing has found that forcing external control onto people’s lives can lead them to exert less effort. By contrast, recent research on the structure and order offered by external systems of control hints that they can have the opposite effect (Chae and Zhu 2014; Kay et al. 2014). In our work, we provide a tentative resolution to this contradiction: Thinking about external sources of control can boost motivation when they make specific plans to achieve their goals, but can sometimes decrease it when they make vague plans instead. Our findings highlight the importance of a more nuanced understanding of what external agents of control mean to individual perceivers. On the one hand, some of the time, control may seem like a zero-sum game: The more control an external entity has over my outcomes, the less I have. In those cases, external agents of control may serve primarily to remind people that their own personal control is limited, and have a threatening, rather than palliative, effect. On the other hand, other times, particularly when people are already feeling unsure of their sense that the world is overall orderly and predictable, external agents of control can restore that psychologically important sense. In those cases, external agents of control may serve primarily to remind people that the world is orderly and structured, and have a palliative, rather than threatening, effect. Understanding the dynamics of which effect

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dominates is important for advancing compensatory control theory, as well as for guiding methodological approaches in the future. Moreover, our research contributes to the broadening scope of compensatory control research. At least two recent papers have explored the role of brand-related constructs in satisfying people’s need for order and control; here we add the construct of brand trust to this list. We find that perceptions of brand trust vary with the anxiety induced by feelings of low control, and that brand trust can play a role similar to that of other sources of external control in regulating motivation.

8.2. Implications for Theories of Planning Our research also contributes to our understanding of the effects of planning. Standing in contrast to decades of research supporting the beneficial effects of implementation intentions, our work joins a growing number of papers identifying circumstances and conditions in which making specific plans can harm motivation (e.g., Dalton and Spiller 2012; Townsend and Liu 2012; Ülkümen and Cheema 2011). Indeed, in most of our studies, participants in the neutral conditions suffered when they made specific, as opposed to vague plans. However, at the same time our research offers a solution to this problem. Making a specific plan while thinking about an external agent of control may be an especially useful combination, enabling people to leverage the benefits of making specific plan (e.g., less time spent deliberating what to do, more clear linear progression towards the desired end-state) without incurring the cost of lowered self-efficacy.

8.3. Limitations and Future Directions Regarding limitations, one question that still remains is why we sometimes found that external agents of control reduce motivation among vague planners. We identified two 125

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somewhat distinct possibilities. External agents may lead people to sense that their outcomes are not fully under their control, and they may see less value in exerting effort under these conditions. Alternatively, external agents may remind people that a benevolent external force is there to help, and as such may induce social loafing (e.g., Karau and Williams 1993). While we cannot speak to which of these possibilities explains what we have observed, we note that they both ultimately rely on the idea that external agents can make people feel less responsible for their outcomes. The question that remains is whether that feeling is accompanied by a sense of optimism (in the case of social loafing) or by a sense of uncertainty (in the case where people simply feel out of control). This question is one future research should address, should the effects we sometimes found among vague planners prove robust. A second limitation is that we did not explore the effects of external agents on advanced stages of goal pursuit. Building on research on the relationship between goal progress and motivation processes (e.g., Huang and Zhang 2011; Zhang and Huang 2010), we reasoned that external systems could only exert an effect at the early stages of goal pursuit, because at later stages of goal pursuit self-efficacy, the critical mediator, becomes less relevant. However we only tested this idea once, in Study 3. Moreover, we explored only two specific external agents of control—intervening Gods and trusted brands—whereas future research may identify extend our study to other agents of control, and even find that some are more effective than others in boosting motivation

8.4. Conclusions About 87% of the world population holds some kind of belief in a God-like entity (Win-Gallup International 2012). Moreover, people are exposed on a daily basis to the concept of God—either directly or through popular expressions (e.g., “in God’s hand,” “an act of God,” “God willing,” “thank God”), and to the concept of trusted brands (e.g., when AIG

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claims to have “The strength to be there,” or when United FCU promises “We’ll get you there.”). Our research begins to explore the consequences of these reminders, for motivation, and in so doing informs an important theory with implications for consumer behavior.

Next, we conclude on the theoretical and managerial contributions of this dissertation, and we present overall limitations as well as directions for further research.

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General conclusion The purpose of this dissertation has been to sharpen our understanding of the influence that a heightened perception of external agency—ranging from deities to brands—can have on consumer goal pursuit. To this end, we conducted three separate studies (one purely conceptual and two empirical). The conclusion of this work is threefold: First, we present a global overview of the findings. Second, we address the overall limitations of this research by notably putting into perspective compensatory control theory. Doing in so, we provide direction for further research. Third, we address the general contributions of this work at a theoretical and managerial level.

1. Summary of findings Table 8 provides an overview of the three essays relative to their objectives, studies, and main results. It also shows how the research has progressed as a whole to address the research problem given in the introduction.

Table 8 Overall summary of findings Conceptual essay Essay 1

Objectives - Providing clear definitions of religion and religiousness. - Organizing the existing literature in the study of religion into an intelligible framework. - Promoting the use of religious priming in the field of marketing.

Connection with the empirical essays

Establishing the premise that religiousness can be conceptually viewed as a state, a resource that one defensively mobilizes in the context of self-threats (notably control threat).

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Empirical essays Essay 2

Study Sample

Experimental design Main results

1

164 online participants, American residents, Mean age = 34, 70.1% female, Consumption context: retirement savings. 317 online participants, American residents, Mean age = 34, 78.9% female, Consumption context: retirement savings. 204 online participants, American residents, Mean age = 33, 74.0% female, Consumption context: savings.

2 (self-efficacy: low vs. high) × one continuous (religiousness) mixed design.

Religiousness positively influenced goal commitment when selfefficacy was primed to be low, whereas religiosity did not affect goal commitment when self-efficacy was primed to be high.

2 (self-efficacy: low vs. high) × 3 (religious belief: controlling God vs. creating God vs. neutral) betweensubjects design.

The salience of belief in a controlling God positively (negatively) influenced goal commitment when self-efficacy was primed to be low (high), while the salience of belief in a creating God had no effect.

2 (planning: vague vs. specific) × 3 (external system: controlling God vs. creating God vs. neutral) betweensubjects design.

165 online participants, American residents, Mean age = 33, 74.0% female, Consumption context: savings.

2 (planning: vague vs. specific) x 2 (external system: controlling God vs. neutral) betweensubjects design.

Thinking about an orderproviding God—caused higher levels of motivation when individuals made specific plans, but undermined goal pursuit when they made vague plans. The boost among specific planners in the orderproviding God condition is attributable to people thinking about the controlling properties of religion, rather than just religion in general. Replication of Study 1’s findings based on idiosyncratic goals (as opposed to assigned).

2

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1

2

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3

4A

4B

145 online participants, American residents, Mean age = 36, 75.2% female, Consumption context: fitness 151 online participants, American residents, Mean age = 31, 75.2% female, Consumption context: savings. 271 online participants, American residents, Mean age = 35, 73.4% female, Consumption context: savings.

2 (planning: vague vs. specific) x 2 (external system: controlling God vs. neutral) x one Continuous (progress level) mixed design 2 (planning: vague vs. specific) x one Continuous (belief in a controlling God) mixed design.

Early-stage goal pursuers who made specific plans reported greater motivation after thinking about an external agent. This effect was driven by higher self-efficacy.

2 (planning: vague vs. specific) x 3 (external system: brand trust vs. brand honesty vs. baseline) betweensubjects design.

Empirical support for the hypotheses beyond the realm of religious beliefs: Participants who thought about a trusted bank brand that could bring order into the world reported greater savings intentions if they made a specific plan, but lesser savings intentions if they made a vague plan.

Empirical support for the idea that trusted brands can act as an external system of control.

1.1. Summary of findings of Essay 1 The goal of Essay 1 was to delineate the domain of religion with an emphasis on the psychological consequences and the underlying processes by which religion affects consumer behavior. This goal was threefold: Our first objective was to lay the necessary conceptual foundations. We thus provided clear definitions for the concept of religion as well as for religion-based constructs that are relevant for consumer psychology, namely religiousness and spirituality. Our second objective was to review and organize into an intelligible framework the literature on the sociological and psychological study of religion in order to provide a 130

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guideline for research in the field of marketing. Our third objective was to emphasize the interest in studying the effects of religious thinking on consumer-related variables using experimental designs in comparison to past works in marketing that have largely favored correlational studies. Our conceptual framework is organized into two broad categories, with the intent of approaching the scientific study of religion parsimoniously. As such, we established a difference between the manifest expression of religiousness through the observance of specific religious beliefs, from latent to pervasive ways for individuals to express their religiousness. Such a perspective presents the benefice of building a synthesis on recent advances regarding the use of religious priming (e.g., Kay et al. 2008; 2010; Kopalle et al. 2010; Laurin et al. 2012; Shachar et al. 2011; Shariff et al. in press). We proposed accordingly an inventory of research propositions and addressed specifically one of them (namely, P4) in the two empirical essays.

1.2. Summary of findings of Essay 2 In Essay 2, we investigated the divergent effect of feeling the presence of an influential external agent in the context of goal pursuit through a belief in divine control. Overall, the results provided support for the hypothesis that belief in a controlling God-like entity could stimulate or undermine goal commitment depending on the person’s level of selfefficacy. In the first study (see Table 8), we measured religiousness as a proxy for believing that the world operates in an orderly fashion. We observed that when perceived self-efficacy was primed to be low, religiousness positively influenced goal commitment. No effect was detected when self-efficacy was primed to be high. In that sense, religiousness can be

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regarded as a resource that one can mobilize as a defensive source of compensatory control in the context of perceived self-inefficacy. In the following study (see Table 8), we tested our hypotheses by stressing the controlling vs. creating nature of God. The results indicated that priming the salience of a religious belief that does not ostensibly relate to divine control had no effect on the motivation to pursue goals. In contrast, priming the salience of a controlling God increased commitment to goal pursuit when self-efficacy was low. Alternatively, when an individual did not face such a threat, the salience of one’s belief in divine control triggered the loafing effect emphasized by Laurin and colleagues (2012).

1.3. Summary of findings of Essay 3 Essay 3 departed from Essay 2 in several ways: First, rather than priming individuals’ levels of self-efficacy, Essay 3 manipulated specificity of planning. Based on recent advances in theories of planning (e.g., Townsend and Liu 2012, Dalton and Spiller 2012), we proposed that thinking too concretely about how, when, and where to pursue a goal can lead people to question their ability to complete all of the necessary steps and thereby control their outcomes. Second, in order to test the robustness of our predictions, Essay 3 used diverse examples of consumption, namely savings and fitness. Third, Essay 3 tested whether trusted, reliable, interventionist commercial brands could compensate for low self-efficacy in the same way that belief in divine control did in Essay 2. In Study 1, we found that reminders of a controlling God, but not reminders of a creating God with no potential to act as an external source of control, increased the savings motivations of people who made specific plans for scenario-based projects. In Study 2, we found that reminders of a controlling God increased the motivation that people hold towards their own self-generated savings goals. In Study 3, we extended our findings to the domain of

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health goals, and show that reminders of a controlling God can result in people’s willingness to pay for goal-related products. Moreover, we confirmed that our effects emerged only among early-stage goal pursuers, and that they were mediated by feelings of self-efficacy (see Table 8). Finally, in Studies 4A and 4B, we considered the possibility that trusted brands could serve a role similar to that of a controlling God. In Study 4A, we found that trusted brands could indeed serve as external sources of control: Participants whose control was threatened by specific planning increasingly endorsed trust in brands when they did not have a preexisting belief in a controlling god that they could use to compensate. In Study 4B, we showed that thoughts of a trusted brand, like thoughts of a controlling God, could boost people’s motivation when they made specific plans (see Table 8).

2. Overall contributions of the dissertation research 2.1. Contributions to the literature The theoretical contribution of this dissertation research is threefold: (1) contributions to the marketing literature on religion and religiousness; (2) contributions to theories of planning; and (3) contributions to theories of control. One of the main limitations of the marketing literature, when it comes to the study of religion, has been to strictly consider religiousness as a stable characteristic and then mostly turn to correlational studies. Rather, we proposed that religiousness might be also viewed as a resource that individuals can mobilize in consumption-specific contexts that arouse psychological needs for control, meaning, self-esteem, or social identity. However, both approaches are not mutually exclusive. For instance, one may want to show that religiousness correlates with some other variable (e.g., ascetic preferences), while subsequently isolating the causal relationship using religious priming. Doing so can allow researchers to disentangle 133

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the effects of religious thinking from other psychological outcomes (e.g., conservatism) as well as from demographics (e.g., income, age, ethnicity). Second, our research contributes to a better understanding of the effects of planning. Despite years of advocacy for the beneficial effects of implementation intentions, this work adds on to those identifying circumstances and conditions in which making plans leads to lower levels of motivation in goal pursuit (e.g., Dalton and Spiller 2012; Townsend and Liu 2012; Ülkümen and Cheema 2011). Further, this research challenges previous findings that specificity and the concreteness of implementation are detrimental to early stage goal pursuit (e.g., Townsend and Liu 2012). To the extent that specificity of planning affects motivational processes through individuals’ perception of their efficacy, it demonstrates that this must not necessarily provoke a control threat, and in turn, harm goal pursuit. Leveraging research in compensatory control processes, this research proposes a mechanism by which people compensate for such threats by relying on external sources of control—be they relevant (brand) or not (religion) to the context of goal pursuit. Finally, our research contributes to the existing literature by reconciling contradictory results of past research that has examined the relationship between control stimuli and motivational processes. Work on psychological reactance and on social loafing has found that forcing external control onto people’s lives can lead them to exert less effort. By contrast, recent research on the notion that structure and order facilitates goal-directed actions (Chae and Zhu 2014; Kay et al. 2014) indicates that external influential agents can have the opposite effect. In our work, we provide a tentative resolution to this contradiction: Thinking about external agents of control can boost motivation when individuals deal with events and cognitions that reduce control, but can sometimes decrease it, when they do not. Our findings highlight the importance of a more nuanced understanding of what external agents of control mean to individual perceivers. On the one hand, some of the time,

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control may seem like a zero-sum game: The more control an external entity has over my outcomes, the less control I have. In those cases, external agents of control may serve primarily to remind people that their own personal control is limited, and have a threatening, rather than palliative, effect. On the other hand, other times, particularly when people are already feeling unsure of their sense that the world is overall orderly and predictable, external agents of control can restore that psychologically important sense. In those cases, external agents of control may serve primarily to remind people that the world is orderly and structured, and have a palliative, rather than threatening, effect. Understanding the dynamics of which effect dominates is important for advancing compensatory control theory, as well as for guiding methodological approaches in the future. Moreover, our research contributes to the broadening scope of compensatory control research. At least two recent papers have explored the role of brand-related constructs in satisfying people’s need for order and control (Cutright 2012; Cutright et al. 2013); here we add the construct of brand trust to this list. We find that perceptions of brand trust vary with the anxiety-induced feelings of low control, and that brand trust can play a role similar to that of other sources of external control in regulating motivation. Past research has conceptualized brand relationships as driven by the same two overarching dimensions driving social perception: warmth (i.e., holding good intentions) and competence (Kervyn, Fiske, and Malone 2012). In line with Fournier and Alvarez (2012), our research empirically shows that to compensate for low personal control in the context of goal pursuit, a brand does not need to display honesty or positive intentions as long as it displays dependability. The two dimensions do not necessarily depend on one another but can be seen as orthogonal.

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2.2. Contributions to marketing practice 2.2.1. Religion and marketing practice The study of the influence of religious thinking on consumer behavior is a growing field of research with strong managerial implications. About 87% of the world population holds some kind of belief in God (Win-Gallup International 2012). While this figure may vary across the globe, 56% of Americans consider religion as very important in their lives and 92% believe in God or some universal spirit (Gallup 2012). Pools realized by the Pew Research Center revealed that in 2010, the unaffiliated (i.e., atheists and non-denominational) did not reach 20% of the overall population in Europe (18.8%), and did not even go higher than 1% in the Middle East and North Africa (.6%)27. In addition to the argumentative strength of these numbers, one may note that exposure to the concept of God and religion occurs on a daily basis through popular expressions, media (e.g., news, TV shows), and the Internet. Yet, we suggested in this dissertation that such exposures did have an effect on many aspects of consumer behavior, even for behaviors unrelated to the observance of specific religious beliefs and rituals. Therefore, marketing practitioners should not solely be interested in considering religion only as a mere demographic to be used for market segmentation. In certain conditions, taking into account consumers’ religion and religiousness can boost sales by encouraging purchasing behaviors. We have indeed argued that exposure to religious content may lead individuals to behave in accord with religious beliefs that can drive consumer behavior in a particular direction. In the conceptual paper, we suggested for instance that religious priming may considerably reduce brand avoidance in the context of goal failure. We also suggested that religious priming may heighten negative attitude toward self-esteem advertising. In both empirical essays, we actually show that the salience of belief in divine 27

Pew Research Center (2015). The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050. Retrieved July 13, 2015 from http://www.pewforum.org/files/2015/03/PF_15.04.02_ProjectionsFullReport.pdf

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control increases people’s willingness to pay for goal-related products because it boosts motivation among early stage goal pursuers when they engage in specific planning. However, we also noted that such a practice could backfire if consumers perceive that religion was used with the intent of making a profit. The marketization of religion may be perceived as a risk of contamination of the sacred by the profane and thus as a risk of stripping religion of its properties in terms of self-transcendence, control, meaning, etc. Therefore, one may use religious cues in marketing at an unconscious level, so that the consumers do not actively perceive and consciously process the use of religion for commercial purposes. Rather, one may prefer rely on implicit associations so that the consumers do not explicitly realize that they have been led to think about religion. For instance, an advertisement could contain some familiar expression such as “Oh my God!” or “Thank God!” In the same vein, an advertiser may want to pay attention to the programming of his/her advertisement so that it occurs around (or during, if applicable) a TV show, a song, or a movie that has religious references.

2.2.2. Control and persuasion messages Our research highlights the benefits of using a control emphasis in persuasion messages when planning long-term goals, in order to offset control threats. For instance, regarding financial and savings goals, implemental planning may draw attention to constraint of execution, especially in periods of economic turmoil when austerity fosters specificity and concrete implementation in budgeting the household income. State Farm—ranked 41th in the 2015 Fortune 500 list of the largest US companies28—sells insurance and financial services by stating that “Like a good neighbor, State Farm is there.” Prudential Financial—55th in the 2015 Fortune 500—, who provides insurance and investment management, has

28

Fortune 500 (2015) Retrieved July 13, 2015 from http://fortune.com/fortune500/

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communicated with slogans such as “Bring your challenge” and “Growing and protecting your wealth.” The insurer Allstate—89th in the Fortune 500—famously promises that “You’re in good hands.” Brands in domains other than banking and finance have followed that lead. In the domain of home improvement, The Home Depot promises that “Good things happen when Home Depot comes to town” and that “You can do it. We can help.” In the domain of body care, the L’Oréal-owned brand Maybelline suggests “Maybe she’s born with it. Maybe it’s Maybelline.” All these slogans promise that the brand is reliable and trustworthy, and because of that, the customer will be able to achieve his/her goal. However, and importantly, the benefices of such slogans must be contrasted with one’s perceived level of self-efficacy. We showed that emphasizing control in advertising phrases led to lower levels of motivation in goal pursuit when planning did not uncover a control threat. The risk taken by brands in using such messages is that the customer may buy the minimum amount of products or services necessary for goal completion and refuse additional, complementary products. Therefore, in drafting such messages for advertisement campaigns, businesses (or governmental agencies and non-profitable organizations) must take into account the extent to which individuals might encounter a personal control threat. Another interpretation of our research would be to exclusively use such messages with advertisements that emphasize the troublesome nature of pursuing a goal do to the specific planning required.

3. Overall limitations and directions for further research 3.1. Limitations based on compensatory control theory This dissertation research (notably the empirical essays) is built on the proposition that external agents of control do not necessarily interfere with people’s motivation to pursue their 138

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goals. Based on compensatory control theory, we have argued that under specific conditions—namely, in the context of control threat—they help maintain the belief that the world is an orderly, clear place where nothing happens by accident and everything is predictable and understandable. In doing so, the thought of external influential agents, particularly benevolent ones, heightens people’s self-efficacy and thus increases their motivation to pursue their goals. While our findings support this proposition, one could argue that some limitations that are intrinsically due to compensatory control theory may be a cause for caution when it comes to the interpretation and generalization of our results. Compensatory control research is based on the very premise that individuals prefer order and predictability to chaos and randomness. However, is this premise systematically true? It is possible that differences in individual variables predispose certain people to be insensitive to control-reducing events or cognitions, because they do not experience negative arousal in such contexts. Personality research has long suggested that individuals’ disposition to seek control may vary to a great extent across individuals (Kelly 1955; Rokeach 1960). Those with a low (versus high) trait preference for certainty and structure—measured with scales such as “Need for Closure” (Kruglanski, Webster, and Klem 1993) and “Personal Need for Structure” (Neuberg and Newsom 1993), respectively—are more likely to be tolerant of ambiguity, complexity, and disorder. Further work should investigate the moderating role of people’s dispositional motivation to view their world as an orderly, unambiguous place in the model we proposed here. One may find that individuals who score low on such scales are more resistant to control threats (e.g. specific plan format during early stage goal pursuit) and are therefore insensitive to reminders of external influential agents, be they deities or brands. Furthermore, compensatory control theory suggests that to achieve the basic need to perceive the world as orderly, personal control is often the default preference. Nevertheless, recent advances have suggested that cultural factors may play a potent role in compensatory

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control processes (Landau et al. 2015; Kay and Sullivan 2013). Wang, Whitson, and Menon (2012) showed that people in Western cultures prefer primary control methods (i.e., personal agency), but people in East Asian cultures prefer secondary control methods (i.e., adjusting to surroundings). In cultural contexts where belief in external efficacy (i.e., achieving desired outcomes via others, be they divine, governmental, or group-based) is widespread, personal control threat may not affect one’s motivation to pursue goals. Such contexts may prevent individuals from bolstering personal agency. These individuals may instead internalize cultural norms that promote external agency. Consequently, they may be more resistant to the reduction of personal control, such as the manipulation of self-efficacy highlighted in both studies of Essay 2 and the diverse manipulations of planning specificity that was addressed in Essay 3. For instance, research has shown that some cultures (e.g., China) are known to promote collectivism (i.e., acting for the greater good) over individualism (i.e., acting for one’s own interest), and consequently to place less value on personal control (Oyserman, Coon, and Kemmelmeier 2002; Wang et al. 2012). Similarly, the extent of belief in Karma in Hinduism has been shown to give individuals a long-term orientation, and consequently, the tendency to belief that one’s actions, including unsuccessful ones, will eventually come into friction (Kopalle et al. 2010). This is similar to the principle of equifinality in Christianity— that is, to believe that events place no matter what precedes them (Laurin et al. 2012; Norenzayan and Lee 2010). Therefore, the conclusions of the two empirical essays appear to be dependent on the cultural context where the research was conducted. One may indeed argue that our predictions tested well because we collected data for both essays using American samples. Virtually all research in experimental psychology is based on samples drawn from WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic) populations (Henrich, Heine, and

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Norenzayan, 2010; Shariff et al. in press). Yet, this practice limits by default the scope of generalizations about these WEIRD populations. While there is evidence that compensatory control processes occur at a cross-cultural level (Kay et al. 2008; Kay and Sullivan 2013), future research might replicate our findings in different cultural settings and/or take into account the moderating role of preexisting belief in external agency. Next, we address the limitations relative to the psychological processes that drive the effects we tested throughout the empirical essays.

3.2. Limitations based on psychological processes In both empirical essays, we tested whether the idea of influential external agents bolsters motivation to pursue long-term goals. We argued that priming such a belief reminds people that the world operates in an orderly fashion, where actions are linked to outcomes. Nevertheless, this is not demonstrated anywhere in the present research. Additional research might investigate further the psychological processes underlying the aforementioned effect. This could be accomplished by studying the mediating role of the belief that the world is orderly and predictable in the relationship driving the effect of belief in external agency (independent variable) and perceived self-efficacy (outcome variable)29.

29

For instance, an additional study could randomly assign participants to one of three conditions: controlling

God, creating God, and neutral (between subjects). In order to take into account a preexisting belief in external agency, one may use relevant measures to prime the salience of belief in God. Participants in the controlling God condition would complete the following: “To what extent do you think it is feasible that God, or some type of nonhuman entity, is in control, at least in part, of the events within our universe?” and “To what extent do you think that the events that occur in this world unfold according to God’s, or some type of nonhuman entity’s, plan?” Participants in the two other conditions would also complete this scale but only after completion of the dependent variables. Those in the creating condition would complete the following: “To what extent do you think it is feasible that God, or some type of nonhuman entity, created the universe?” “To what extent do you think that it is feasible that God, or some type of nonhuman entity, created all life on the planet?” Finally, participants in the neutral condition would complete the following: “To what extent do you think that meat and other protein-based products such as eggs and fish, are part of a typical breakfast?” “To what extent do you think

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In addition, one may argue that Essay 2 is based on an approach that is too behaviorist. No empirical evidence is provided to explain the mechanism underlying both hypotheses. The first hypothesis tested the positive relationship between the salience of divine control and goal commitment in the context of self-inefficacy. We argued that this could be explained by heightened perceptions that one lives in a predictable world where desired outcomes can be attained through motivated actions. However, we proposed that a different process plays out regarding the second hypothesis. The rationale is the same regarding hypothesis H3 in Essay 3: Thinking of an external influential agent elicits a loafing effect that decreases active goal pursuit. Further research might test this mediational relationship specifically. One might also argue that throughout the set of studies in both essays, we tested our predictions under the assumption that external agents’ influence would be perceived as benevolent, that is, to believe that external agents hold an actual intention of serving people’s best interest. This is particularly relevant for the prediction that bolstering external agency negatively affects goal pursuit at baseline levels (i.e., no control threat). It remains unclear whether control stimuli negatively affect motivation because of a loafing effect or higher that breakfast is a meal that includes meat and other protein-based products such as eggs and fish?” All responses would be measured on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely). The mediator variable—namely, the belief that the world is orderly and predictable—would be measured using two questions adapted from Kay et al. (2014): “How much do you believe that there is a systematic logic to how your world functions?” “How much do you believe that things in your life happen randomly?” (reverse-coded) Both responses would be rated on 7-point scales ranging from 1 (not at all to 7 (very much). The outcome variable—namely, self-efficacy— could be measured using the General Self-Efficacy Scale (Chen, Gully, and Eden 2001). In the context of brands, a similar study could be conducted by randomly assigning participants to three conditions: trusted brand, honest brand, and neutral condition (between subjects). For the brand trust condition, the following two questions would be presented: “To what extent do you think that firms and other organizations producing goods and/or services are in control of people’s lives?” “To what extent do you think that people’s lives unfold according to the agenda of firms and other organizations that produce goods and/or services?” For the brand honesty condition, participants would complete the following: “To what extent do you think that honesty drives the decisions made by firms and other organizations that produce goods and/or services?” “To what extent do you think that the people at the head of firms and other organizations that produce goods and/or services, are honest?” The neutral condition and the dependent variables would be the same as in the previous study.

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levels of reactance. We expect that a benevolent system would lead individuals to believe that goal attainment is contingent upon the decisions and actions of said external agent, while a malevolent external agent would elicit reactance. Then, other questions arise: Can malevolent systems bolster motivation to pursue goals under the threat of control? To what extent would the individuals be willing to accept such an entity (e.g., a punitive God, a deceptive company) so long as it provides a global sense of control? Further research would help to answer such questions.

3.3. Limitations based on the relationship between perceived order and goal progress In this dissertation, but especially in Essay 3, we focused on early-stage goal pursuit. The rational was that specificity of planning negatively affects personal efficacy because the larger the distance toward goal attainment, the less certain individuals felt about their ability to complete all the necessary steps. Regarding the final stages of goal pursuit, we showed (Essay 3, Study 3) that bolstering external agency had no effect when goal progress was high. However, one may wonder whether promoting an orderly worldview may affect the aftermath of goal pursuit, especially when people must deal with goal failure. Goal failure involves a final comparison between the outcome that actually occurred and the outcome that was expected by the individual according to a standard or reference value (Bagozzi and Dholakia 1999; Soman and Cheema 2004). Following such negative episodes, prior works advocate relying on reparation attempts (Folkes 1984; Maxham and Netemeyer 2002; McCollough et al. 2000) or to build strong connections with brands (Aaker, Fournier, Brasel 2004; Cheng, White, and Chaplin 2012; Wiggin and Yalch 2015). Further research might consider the moderating role of the individual’s motivation to restore a sense of control to soften the consequences of goal failure on brand avoidance. 143

General conclusion

Failing to achieve a goal for reasons that are not under one’s control is, in essence, a situation where personal control is threatened because one may feel deprived of the possibility of making things happen despite his/her best intentions. We do not argue that reminders of an orderly worldview will prevent individuals from blaming the brand. We argue that although people might assign responsibility to the brand, promoting such a worldview will entice them to believe that failure is part of the general order of the world they live in. Put differently, even though consumers might blame the brand for goal failure, repeat purchase with said brand will allow them to compensate for the feeling of not having control over the outcome by endorsing a worldview where things are ruled by order rather than randomness. Accordingly, promoting an orderly worldview in the context of goal failure may promote brand approach for future purchases. This proposition is based on a compensatory affirmation of epistemic structures, notably nonspecific epistemic structure formally defined by Landau et al. (2015) as seeking simple, clear, and consistent interpretations of the environment that are superficially unrelated to the control-reducing condition (e.g., pattern perception, organized environments). If motivation to restore a global sense of control is based on bolstering external agency, the result may be the same but the rational might differ. Bolstering external agency implies that an external entity is capable of influencing outcomes on one’s behalf. Then, heightened perceptions of external agency may steer attention from the brand toward other external agents when it comes to assigning responsibility, to the point of promoting brand approach. Several important boundary conditions must be put forth. First, goal failure should occur in contexts where the locus of control is not consumer-related, that is to say, when the cause of the problem lies within the firm. Past work has shown that when failure is not due to the misuse of the product or service by the consumer, people tend to antagonize the brand, even when the failure is unintentional (Folkes 1984; McGill 1991). If goal failure is due to the

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consumer’s misuse of the product or service, consumers are less likely to assign responsibility to the brand. Second, the brand should not be perceived as having deliberately caused the negative outcome—in which case, it might receive all the blame regardless of order-providing primes. Third, because a repetition of failure leads in all likelihood to blame, anger, and enduring satisfaction issues (Folkes 1984, Maxham and Netemeyer 2002), failure must be of temporary (versus stable) nature. The expectation of failure might lead individuals to detect a pattern and to believe that the brand is to some extent in control of the negative outcomes.

4. Concluding remarks Although the need for order and structure is considered to be a common aspect of human psychology (Landau et al. 2015; Heine, Proulx, and Vohs 2006), the way it manifests itself seems to vary considerably across individuals and situations. Following a threat, religious individuals may be more inclined to rely on divine control than the unaffiliated (Atran and Norenzayan 2004; Sasaki and Kim 2011), and conservatives get even more conservative and move further away from liberal ideologies (Jost and Amodio 2012). Individuals socialized in Western cultures often prefer personal control, while East Asian cultures encourage responses that are grounded in secondary control (Wang et al. 2012). There are, in fact, a number of socio-cognitive strategies for coping with deficits in personal control (see Landau et al. 2015 for an inventory). That said, the functional homology we proposed between religion and brands appears to be contingent upon individual dispositions and the salience of one over the other in the individual’s mind at the time of control threat. In study 4B (Essay 3), participants relied on a trusted, reliable, interventionist commercial brand because they were reminded of such cognitions before planning their goals in a specific manner. Yet, in study 4A (Essay 3), despite the presence of a threat to their control, participants did not endorse a commercial

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brand to a greater extent when preexisting dispositional religious belief allowed them to maintain the comforting belief that the world is orderly. To conclude that the two constructs exhibit a functional homology, it is not necessary that when the level of one is high, the level of the other is low. All that is implied by a functional homology is that both an interventionist deity and an interventionist brand serve the basic need for order and structure when people must deal with a control threat. Doing so provides them with a sense that the world is orderly, predictable and understandable, which are critical to an individual’s sense that s/he can pursue self-set goals.

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Table of Contents

Table of Contents Contents................................................................................................................................... vii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................................. viii EXTENDED ABSTRACT IN FRENCH – RÉSUMÉ EN FRANÇAIS ............................. ix 1. Exposé du problème de recherche ................................................................................. xii 2. Vue d’ensemble des essais de la thèse ......................................................................... xiv 2.1.

Essai 1 : objectifs .................................................................................................. xiv

2.2.

Essai 2 : objectifs et résultats ................................................................................ xix

2.3.

Essai 3 : objectifs et résultats ............................................................................... xxii

3. Contributions théoriques et managériales de la thèse ................................................ xxvi 3.1.

Contributions théoriques ..................................................................................... xxvi

3.2.

Contributions managériales................................................................................. xxix

4. Conclusion du résumé ................................................................................................ xxxi GENERAL INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 1 1. Research problem and theoretical positioning ................................................................ 3 1.1.

Research problem ..................................................................................................... 3

1.2.

Theoretically positioning the dissertation research .................................................. 5

2. Dissertation research built on three essays .................................................................... 14 2.1.

Overview of Essay 1 .............................................................................................. 15

2.2.


2.3.


3. Presentation outline ....................................................................................................... 21 ESSAY 1 .................................................................................................................................. 22 1. Religion and religiousness: synthesis of conceptual foundations ................................. 25 1.1.

Defining religion and religiousness ....................................................................... 25

1.2.

Overview of the relationships between religion and consumer behavior .............. 29

2. Manifest aspects of consumer religiousness ................................................................. 34 2.1.

Religious activity in religious contexts .................................................................. 34 166

Table of Contents

2.2.

Religious activity in secular contexts .................................................................... 38

3. Latent aspects of consumer religiousness ..................................................................... 40 3.1.

Religiousness as a characteristic of the consumer ................................................. 40

3.2.

Interests and limitations of the view of religiousness as a characteristic............... 46

3.3.

Religiousness as a resource of the consumer ......................................................... 48

4. Discussion and conclusions ........................................................................................... 58 4.1.

Limitations and future directions ........................................................................... 59

4.2.

Conclusions ............................................................................................................ 60

ESSAY 2 .................................................................................................................................. 62 1. Compensatory control and religious belief ................................................................... 64 2. Compensatory control and goal commitment ............................................................... 66 3. Study 1 ........................................................................................................................... 67 3.1.

Method ................................................................................................................... 68

3.2.

Results and Discussion .......................................................................................... 70

4. Study 2 ........................................................................................................................... 72 4.1.

Method ................................................................................................................... 73

4.2.

Results and Discussion .......................................................................................... 75

5. General discussion......................................................................................................... 77 ESSAY 3 .................................................................................................................................. 81 1. External agents of control and goal pursuit ................................................................... 84 1.1.

External agents provide a sense of order ............................................................... 84

1.2.

Brands can serve as external agents of control ...................................................... 86

1.3.

External agents may increase self-efficacy ............................................................ 87

2. Planning specificity ....................................................................................................... 88 2.1.

Making specific plans can challenge self-efficacy and hinder goal pursuit .......... 88

2.2.

External agents might bolster self-efficacy specifically when it is threatened ...... 90

3. Study 1 ........................................................................................................................... 93 3.1.

Method ................................................................................................................... 94

3.2.

Results .................................................................................................................... 96

3.3.

Discussion .............................................................................................................. 98

4. Study 2 ........................................................................................................................... 98 4.1.

Method ................................................................................................................... 99 167

Table of Contents

4.2.

Results .................................................................................................................. 100

4.3.

Discussion ............................................................................................................ 102

5. Study 3 ......................................................................................................................... 103 5.1.

Method ................................................................................................................. 104

5.2.

Results .................................................................................................................. 105

5.3.

Discussion ............................................................................................................ 111

6. Study 4a ....................................................................................................................... 112 6.1.

Method ................................................................................................................. 113

6.2.

Results .................................................................................................................. 115

6.3.

Discussion ............................................................................................................ 118

7. Study 4b ....................................................................................................................... 118 7.1.

Method ................................................................................................................. 119

7.2.

Results .................................................................................................................. 120

7.3.

Discussion ............................................................................................................ 122

8. General discussion....................................................................................................... 123 8.1.

Implications for Theories of Control ................................................................... 124

8.2.

Implications for Theories of Planning ................................................................. 125

8.3.

Limitations and Future Directions ....................................................................... 125

8.4.

Conclusions .......................................................................................................... 126

GENERAL CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 128 1. Summary of findings ................................................................................................... 128 1.1.

Summary of findings of Essay 1 .......................................................................... 130

1.2.


1.3.


2. Overall contributions of the dissertation research ....................................................... 133 2.1.

Contributions to the literature .............................................................................. 133

2.2.

Contributions to marketing practice ..................................................................... 136

3. Overall limitations and directions for further research ............................................... 138 3.1.

Limitations based on compensatory control theory ............................................. 138

3.2.

Limitations based on psychological processes .................................................... 141

3.3.

Limitations based on the relationship between perceived order and goal progress 143

4. Concluding remarks .................................................................................................... 145 168

Table of Contents

REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................... 147 TABLE OF CONTENTS ..................................................................................................... 166 LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................... 170 LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................. 171 APPENDICES ...................................................................................................................... 172 Appendix A: Religious Commitment Inventory (RCI)-10 scale ....................................... 172 Appendix B: Materials for the manipulation of perceived self-efficacy ............................ 173 Appendix C: Goal commitment scale from Hollenbeck et al.(1989) ................................. 174 Appendix D: Materials for the manipulation of religious belief ........................................ 177 Appendix E: Materials for the manipulation of planning specificity ................................. 183 Appendix F: Materials for the manipulation of planning specificity ................................. 185 Appendix G: Details on regression analyses ...................................................................... 186

169

List of Tables

List of Tables Tableau 1 : Tableau 1 : Synthèse des propositions de l'Essai 1 ............................................. xvii Tableau 2 : Etudes de l’Essai 2 : échantillons, designs et principaux résultats ....................... xxi Tableau 3 : Etudes de l’Essai 3 : échantillons, designs et principaux résultats ...................... xxv Table 4: Overall overview of the three essays ......................................................................... 14 Table 5: Synthesis of empirical marketing research with religiousness as a consumer characteristic............................................................................................................................. 42 Table 6: Regression analyses for study 1: with and without the covariate .............................. 72 Table 7: Regression analyses for the study of the interactional effect of planning type, external system of control and goal completion level on willingness to pay through perceived selfefficacy ................................................................................................................................... 107 Table 8: Overall summary of findings ................................................................................... 128

170

List of Figures

List of Figures Figure 1: A system of goals and means (reproduced after Kruglanski et al. 2002) ................... 7 Figure 2: Theoretical positioning of the dissertation research ................................................. 13 Figure 3: Overview of the relationships between religion and consumer behavior ................. 34 Figure 4: Slopes of the regression of goal commitment on religiousness at high vs. low level of self-efficacy. ......................................................................................................................... 72 Figure 5: Means of goal commitment as a function of primed religious beliefs and selfefficacy. .................................................................................................................................... 77 Figure 6: Effects of reminders of external systems of control and planning specificity on motivation for assigned savings goals ...................................................................................... 97 Figure 7: Effects of reminders of external systems of control and planning specificity on motivation for chosen savings goals. ..................................................................................... 102 Figure 8: Effects of reminders of external systems of control and planning on perceived selfefficacy at low and high progress level. ................................................................................. 108 Figure 9: Effects of reminders of external systems of control and planning on willingness to buy at low and high progress level. ........................................................................................ 110 Figure 10: Moderated mediation model. ................................................................................ 111 Figure 11: Moderated mediation model ................................................................................. 117 Figure 12: Effects of reminders of external systems of control and planning on savings intentions. ............................................................................................................................... 122

171

Appendices

Appendices Appendix A: Religious Commitment Inventory (RCI)-10 scale from Worthington et al. (2003) – Essay 2

1. I often read books and magazines about my faith. 2. I make financial contributions to my religious organization. 3. I spend time trying to grow in understanding of my faith. 4. Religion is especially important to me because it answers many questions about the meaning of life. 5. My religious beliefs lie behind my whole approach to life. 6. I enjoy spending time with others of my religious affiliation. 7. Religious beliefs influence all my dealings in life. 8. It is important to me to spend periods of time in private religious thought and reflection. 9. I enjoy working in the activities of my religious organization. 10. I keep well informed about my local religious group and have some influence in its decisions.

Rated as 1 = not at all true of me, 2 = somewhat true of me, 3 = moderately true of me, 4 = mostly true of me, or 5 = totally true of me.

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Appendices

Appendix B: Materials for the manipulation of perceived self-efficacy – Essay 2

Low self-efficacy condition: Saving for retirement might be a long journey which does not finish when time comes to retire. Planning for retirement consists in managing cash flow (balance between income and expenses) and assets throughout life to make sure they last as long as you live. Unfortunately, recent studies show that a large majority of Americans fails to accomplish the necessary steps to save enough money and assure their financial well-being in retirement.

High self-efficacy condition: Saving for retirement might be a long journey which does not finish when time comes to retire. Planning for retirement consists in managing cash flow (balance between income and expenses) and assets throughout life to make sure they last as long as you live. Fortunately, recent studies show that a large majority of Americans manages to accomplish the necessary steps to save enough money and assure their financial well-being in retirement.

173

Appendices

Appendix C: Details on regression analyses – Essay 2, Study 2

Table C.1 Regression analyses for study 2: with and without the covariate (orthogonal planned comparisons designed to contrast the neutral condition with the controlling God condition) With covariate b SE b β .03 .05 .03 .18* .09 .11 † -.19 .10 -.11 -.05 .05 -.05 .05 .05 .06 .10* .03 .20

Without covariate b SE b β .03 .06 .03 .21 .10 .13* -.21 .10 -.12* -.06 .05 -.07 .04 .05 .05 -

Predictor C1a C2a C3a C4a C5a Income Note. ** p < .01. * p < .05. † p < .07 With covariate: df = 296. R² = .076; Without covariate: df = 297. R² = .038; Increment of change between the model without and the model with covariate: F(5, 296) = 1.99. p = .08. Contrast coding regarding the orthogonal planned comparisons Low self-efficacy High self-efficacy Controlling Creating Controlling Creating Neutral Neutral God God God God C1a -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 C2a 1 -1 0 0 0 0 C3a 0 0 0 1 -1 0 C4a -1 -1 2 0 0 0 C5a 0 0 0 -1 -1 2

174

Appendices

Table C.2 Regression analyses for study 2: with and without the covariate (orthogonal planned comparisons designed to contrast the neutral condition with the creating God condition) With covariate b SE b β .03 .05 .03 .02 .09 .01 -.02 .09 -.01 .12* .05 .12 -.12* .06 -.12 .10* .03 .20

Without covariate b SE b β .03 .06 .03 .01 .09 .01 -.04 .09 -.02 .14* .06 .14 -.13* .06 -.13 -

Predictor C1b C2b C3b C4b C5b Income Note. ** p < .01. * p < .05. † p < .07 With covariate: df = 296. R² = .076; Without covariate: df = 297. R² = .038; Increment of change between the model without and the model with covariate: F(5, 296) = 1.99. p = .08. Contrast coding regarding the orthogonal planned comparisons Low self-efficacy High self-efficacy Controlling Creating Controlling Creating Neutral Neutral God God God God C1b -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 C2b 0 -1 1 0 0 0 C3b 0 0 0 0 -1 1 C4b 2 -1 -1 0 0 0 C5b 0 0 0 2 -1 -1

175

Appendices

Appendix D: Goal commitment scale from Hollenbeck, Klein, O’Leary, and Wright (1989) – Essay 2

1.

It’s hard to take this goal seriously. (recoded)

2.

It’s unrealistic for me to expect to reach this goal. (recoded)

3.

It is quite likely that this goal may need to be revised, depending on how things go. (recoded)

4.

Quite frankly, I don’t care if I achieve this goal or not. (recoded)

5.

I am strongly committed to pursuing this goal.

6.

It wouldn’t take much to make me abandon this goal. (recoded)

7.

I think this goal is a good goal to shoot for.

8.

I am willing to put forth a great deal of effort beyond what I’d normally do to achieve this goal.

9.

There is not much to be gained by trying to achieve this goal. (recoded)

Rated on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree)

176

Appendices

Appendix E: Materials for the manipulation of religious belief – Essay 2 (Study 2) and Essay 3 (Studies 1 to 3)

After reading the article, the participants were asked to choose the closest meanings of four key words in the text among four propositions. Participants with only 0, 1 or 2 good responses were automatically screened out, as the probability that they had passed only the test by chance was 94.9% – P (X < 3) with X following the binomial distribution B(4, .25). This method of elimination on objective grounds and prior to conducting the analysis allowed us to make sure that the participants actually read the article and remained unbiased regarding our research hypotheses.

[Controlling God article] Theoretical physicists have wondered for years why the world functions according to mathematics. Now it appears we know the answer. God is fudging the numbers. A recent paper out of the prestigious scientific journal Nature argues that God is meddling in the universe. The paper, authored by Stern Krisophsen of the Stockholm Institute of Physical Science, reviews three recent findings from three separate laboratories, which compel the conclusion that an intelligent being is altering the laws of physics to make life as we know it possible. The paper also concludes that these findings make religion’s claim that God intervenes in human affairs quite possible. Recent advances in empirical metaphysics out of the CERN lab in Switzerland (the same people who invented the Internet) suggest that around 6.3 billion years ago there was a drastic shift in the maximum temperature at which carbon is formed before destroying itself. Had this change not occurred, carbon (which is the second most common compound in living

177

Appendices

beings) would have formed at a much slower rate. Thus, we would not have the amount of carbon we need to form planets, animals, plants, and humans. The paper notes that the timeline of this shift is remarkably similar to a shift in two other laws of physics. Recent research out of the Theoretical Physics Institute at Cambridge University in England shows that slightly before this change in carbon formation, the temperatures released when energy is converted into mass drastically dropped as well. Similarly, research out of the California Institute of Technology has revealed that slightly after the carbon formation temperature drop, the chemical composition of water (the most common compound in human beings), altered in order to make it a noncorrosive universal solvent, which is necessary for water to carry nutrients, oxygen, and carbon dioxide. Without this advance, life would not be possible. The paper concludes: “Although it appears that these changes in what we once thought were the fundamental laws of physics happened millions of years apart, if you were to take the history of the world and boil it down to one day, all these changes would happen in the same one 20th of a nanosecond. Had any of these three changes not occurred, had they not occurred in the order they did, and had they not occurred at the time they did, we would not be here today. The most logical conclusion of these three findings is that there is a God that is continuously making changes to alter the course of cosmic history.” When asked to comment, Harvard physicist Gael Fitzsimmons said: “If God can change the fundamental laws of physics, who knows what else God can or does change? When religious authorities say that God intervenes in human affairs, they may be right after all. Who knows after all? If everything really is under God’s control, maybe I should start praying for more intervention.” [Questions] 1. The closest meaning of the word “meddling” (paragraph 1) is: intervening, building, enjoying, arriving

178

Appendices

2. The closest meaning of the word “intervenes” (paragraph 1) is: meddles, drinks, watches, prefers 3. The closest meaning of the word “alter” (paragraph 4) is: adjust, eat, claim, awake 4. The closest meaning of the word “control” (paragraph 4) is: influence, smell, table, house

[Creating God article] Theoretical physicists have wondered for years why the world functions according to mathematics. Now it appears we know the answer. It was designed that way. A recent paper out of the prestigious scientific journal Nature argues that God must have set up the fundamental laws of physics to provide the perfect conditions for life. The paper, authored by Stern Krisophsen of the Stockholm Institute of Physical Science, reviews three recent findings from three separate laboratories, which compel the conclusion that an intelligent being created the laws of physics to make life as we know it possible. Hence, the paper concludes that these findings make religion’s claim that God created the universe quite possible. Recent advances in empirical metaphysics out of the CERN lab in Switzerland (the same people who invented the Internet) suggest that around 6.3 billion years ago there was a drastic shift in the maximum temperature at which carbon is formed before destroying itself. Had this change not occurred, carbon (which is the second most common compound in living beings) would have formed at a much slower rate. Thus, we would not have the amount of carbon we need to form planets, animals, plants, and humans. The paper notes that the timeline of this shift is remarkably similar to a shift in two other laws of physics. Recent research out of the Theoretical Physics Institute at Cambridge University in England shows that slightly before this change in carbon formation, the temperatures released when energy is converted into mass drastically dropped as well. Similarly, research out of the California Institute of Technology has revealed that slightly

179

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after the carbon formation temperature drop, the chemical composition of water (the most common compound in human beings), altered in order to make it a noncorrosive universal solvent, which is necessary for water to carry nutrients, oxygen, and carbon dioxide. Without this advance, life would not be possible. The paper concludes: “Although it appears that these changes in what we once thought were the fundamental laws of physics happened millions of years apart, if you were to take the history of the world and boil it down to one day, all these changes would happen in the same one 20th of a nanosecond. Had any of these three changes not occurred, had they not occurred in the order they did, and had they not occurred at the time they did, we would not be here today. The most logical conclusion of these three findings is that there is a God that created the world we live in today. When asked to comment, Harvard physicist Gael Fitzsimmons said: “If an intelligent design is at the origin of the implementation of the fundamental laws of physics that made life possible on Earth, who knows if He didn’t create life elsewhere? I would not concur with religious authorities that say that God created the world in six days, but they may be right after all. Who knows after all? Maybe God really created life as they say.” [Questions] 1. The closest meaning of the word “provide” (paragraph 1) is: give, enjoy, play, sit 2. The closest meaning of the word “implemented” (paragraph 1) is: applied, qualified, arrived, ate 3. The closest meaning of the word “origin” (paragraph 4) is: source, sunset, end, delight 4. The closest meaning of the word “possible” (paragraph 4) is: achievable, invisible, operable, unrealistic

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[Neutral article] Early in July, astronomers confirmed the existence of the first known world beyond the Solar System that exists in a cozy, habitable zone around its sun-like star. It’s too soon to say whether the planet, called Kepler-22b, has a rocky, watery or gassy surface. Nevertheless, NASA used some artistic license to render the planet, casting it in a green-blue with wispy white clouds. Astrobiologist Stern Krisophsen of the Stockholm Institute of Physical Science, who is developing new software to render scientifically accurate images of exoplanets, said NASA’s illustration misses the mark. “I think that the NASA image got the color right,” Krisophsen said, “but I don’t expect clouds like that. It probably will be more featureless like Uranus or Neptune and not so good for a press release.” To Krisophsen, it’s more than an artistic quibble. Since the Kepler telescope launched in March 2009, the space-based observatory has pinpointed a whopping 2,326 exoplanet candidates, and that number is growing by about 70 planets a month. It’s an untenable situation for space artists, whose renderings often lack the accuracy informed by current planet formation theories. More importantly, said Krisophsen, databases of scientifically informed portrayals of unseen exoplanets – including animations – could help make sense of direct future observations. If these portrayals are shrunk to tiny points of light – resembling some of the direct exoplanet images obtained by astronomers so far – the pictures could hint at the planets' conditions. “You could render how the point of light oscillates and changes. When you see the light for the first time, you could know right away what you’re looking at,” Krisophsen said. “You could say, ‘this is a planet with this much cloud cover, is covered by this much ocean and rotates like this.” Krisophsen plans to develop those features in his open source exoplanet-creating program, codenamed the Scientific Exoplanets Renderer. Although he

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hasn't yet imaged Kepler-22b, he has rendered 16 of 48 other potentially habitable exoplanet candidates discovered by the Kepler space telescope and ground-based telescopes. Astronomers need only a few pieces of information to use the software, such as the distance an exoplanet orbits from its star, the temperature and radius of the star and the exoplanet’s radius or mass. The software then uses leading planet formation theories to produce detailed renderings of the distant world. The software can tackle everything from scorching-hot gas giants larger than Jupiter to rocky worlds smaller than Earth and render color-accurate atmospheres, oceans, lakes and land masses. It can even cut animated videos of rotating planets if given ample computer processing time. Krisophsen said the software is an alpha release that’s not ready for public eyes. When Krisophsen’s team of about 10 people release the program, however, he said they’ll start working on a more streamlined version that anyone can use. “Perhaps even Hollywood,” Krisophsen said. [Questions] 1. The closest meaning of the word “world” (paragraph 1) is: planet, rock, sentence, comet 2. The closest meaning of the word “illustration” (paragraph 1) is: picture, paper, pen, book 3. The closest meaning of the word “alpha” (paragraph 4) is: first, dangerous, forbidden, old 4. The closest meaning of the word “streamlined” (paragraph 4) is: simplified, difficult, complicated, honest

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Appendix F: Materials for the manipulation of planning specificity – Essay 3, Study 3

Vague planning condition

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Specific planning condition

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Appendix G: Materials for the manipulation of planning specificity – Essay 3, Study 4A

Vague planning condition

Specific planning condition

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Appendix H: Details on regression analyses – Essay 3, Study 4A

Table 1.G Regression analyses for the study of the interactional effect of planning type and belief in divine control on brand trust through self-reported anxiety Mediator: Self-reported anxiety Predictor Intercept Goal importance Planning type (vague = 0, specific = 1) Belief in divine control (mean-centered) Planning type × Belief in divine control Self-reported anxiety R²

Outcome variable: Brand trust (direct effect)

Outcome variable: Brand trust (total effect)

b 4.27 .09

SE .99 .16

t 4.33 .55

p < .01 .58

b 1.73 .24

SE .56 .08

t p b 3.10 < .01 2.16 2.82 .01 .25

SE .53 .09

t p 4.05 < .01 2.88 .01

1.54

.43

3.55

< .01

.43

.24

1.80

.07

.59

.23

2.51

.01

.58

.21

2.74

< .01

.22

.12

1.93

.06

.28

.12

2.46

.02

-.74

.32

-2.34

.02

-.35

.17

-2.06

.04

-.43

.17

-2.50

.01

.13 F(4, 146) = 5.65, p < .01

.10 .04 2.28 .02 .15 .18 F(4, 146) = 6.62, p < .01 F(5, 145) = 6.49, p < .01

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