Turkish Regionalism: Partnerships, Tactfulness, and ...

Turkish Regionalism: Partnerships, Tactfulness, and National Interests with Europe and Beyond Giuseppe Tommaso Cirella, Free University of Bozen, Italy Abstract: Strategic analysis of Turkey’s national interests is based upon economic, regional, and political options; these choices demand a domestic redesign of policy and decisions in respect to regional partnerships. It is feasible that Turkey will continue to look to the European Union (EU) for future policy reform and standards, while maintaining economic and political links with countries in the surrounding regions. Probable evidence also indicates that Turkey’s economy will reach an acceptable EU standard provided it undertakes precautionary economic reforms, improves regional melding, and undergoes a political clean-up of the factors currently undermining its society. The examination of Turkish society includes its strategic options for economic development and choice for regional partnerships. A focus of the study looks at Europe as a whole, as well as Turkey’s integral part as a Mediterranean-based country. Keywords: Turkey, Regionalism, Eurasian Bridge State, EU Enlargement

Introduction

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he Republic of Turkey, from here on referred to as Turkey, has a national interest in trying to balance varying economic, regional and political options; these choices demand a domestic redesign of policy and decisions in respect to regional partnerships. It is feasible that Turkey will continue to look toward the European Union (EU) for future policy reform and standards, while maintaining economic and political links with countries in the surrounding regions. The last decade illustrated potential factors that currently undermine Turkish society; some key points, however, in reaching an acceptable EU standard are by way of financial restructuring, improved regional melding and minimising political corruption. This paper examines Turkey’s choice for regionalism; it incorporates strategic options for economic development and highlights the country’s varying partnerships in a European-centric outlook. A lack of economic development is one of Turkey’s foremost obstacles; as a secularised nation, it has moved toward developing economic reforms that coincide with the EU and Western-based international organisations. Turkey’s economic shift started from widespread democratisation measures and a movement from an agrarian-based to industrial-led nation. At present Turkey’s economy is unstable; economic reforms are required to reduce high fluctuating inflation rates, irregularity in financial transactions and abandonment of foreign investment (McCrary 1999; Turan 2007). This instability hinders the advancement and development of Turkey’s domestic transactions that are crucial in economic liberalisation and international financing. Turkey’s economy after structural and aid reform continues to attempt to control inflation by regulating cycles of instability. To do so, Turkey gradually will need to look toward returning its inflation rate to a controlled lower level, and thus improve domestic and foreign opportunity. Central to this analysis is Turkey’s choice for regional partnerships; Turkey’s strategic options in Eurasia have primarily focused on standardising itself with the EU. After numerous reforms Turkey’s initial attempts at candidature for full EU membership was blocked due to recent events, including: the global financial crisis, lack of transparency, Eurozone concerns and complexity of the EU legislative process. Turkey’s options for regionalism between west and east can be identified with Europe, the Mediterranean, Russia, Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and to a lesser extent Africa and East Asia (Barchard 1985; Rakhimov 2010; Makarychev 2013). In European terms, Turkey is required to improve its basis for reform, societal standards and political relations. In this sense, Turkey will need to better accommodate societal integration The International Journal of Interdisciplinary Civic and Political Studies Volume 8, 2014, thesocialsciences.com, ISSN 2327-0071 © Common Ground, Giuseppe Tommaso Cirella, All Rights Reserved Permissions: [email protected]

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between Turkish and European communities. Integration with the EU does not seem to be apparent in the near future; thus, its current strategic options have impelled it to look easterly – towards Central Asia. Turkey’s position in each of these regions is distinctly different varying from resource-based politics to economic agreements. Issues relating to historical animosity and religious discord have compelled Turkish authorities to skilled international diplomacy that, regardless of motivation, require plenty of attention. In a Mediterranean context, the EU recognises that Turkey occupies a strategic position within the Mediterranean sphere. The extension of the Black Sea linked through Istanbul is key to Turkish-Mediterranean relations. On this account Russian, Ukrainian and the Caucasian regions, especially in relation to the Caspian Sea, interplay Turkey’s location and affiliation as a Mediterranean link and point of trade. Turkish relations, moving easterly, extend to the newly independent republics of the former Soviet Union (Rakhimov 2010; Vinokurov and Libman 2012). Turkey and Russia have become less influential partners, leaving Russian dependency on Turkey partly more problematic. In spite of this, Turkish relations with ex-Soviet states, which chiefly originate from a Turkic ethnicity, continue to augment their commerce and businessrelated trade. As a result, this increased influence can be seen through Central Asian businesses that utilise Turkey’s economy and linkage with the West. In the Arab community, the Middle East endures an uneasy relationship with Turkey; the continual outbreak of conflict in the Middle East over water resource allocation, historical ideologies and religious affiliation continues to be Turkey’s most challenging regional concern. Still, while the Middle East combats redevelopment and struggles over power and land, Turkey’s Middle Eastern location remains a key frontier for support from the West (Evered 2005). Turkey in this case makes for an excellent, if not key, Eurasian nation when combining regionalism and political tactfulness. The policies for Turkey in and around its regional frontier are limited by political direction and economic potential. The political culture in Turkey faces drastic difficulties, including domestic political corruption, foreign policy and human rights. It can be argued that Turkey needs to reduce or control these conflicts if it is to further develop and take its place as a leading strategic Eurasian bridge state between west and east.

Economic Development Options In recent years Turkey’s economic development has been described as unpredictably inconsistent; the advancement of its current state of affairs requires a broadening of economic enlargement and policy reform. As a semi-developed country, Turkey’s economic instability can be backdated to its first stages of industrialisation in the early 1980s. In the last thirty years, there has been a concrete internal change to harness this development and, more recently, incorporate considerable privatisation reforms. With substantial problems in controlling inflation and instability, its economy has been forced to deal with high interest rates and many tangent related issues (Onder 2007). Some recent examples include: pressures to conform to EU standards, uncontrolled fluctuation of the Turkish Lira, Asian and Russian crises that had major effects in the region, major earthquakes and their reconstruction process, global economic crisis from 2008 and problems with crime and fraudulence in society. Turkey’s economic development can be further detailed by taking into account aspects of its economic framework that assess one key concern: economic instability. Issues focusing on liberalisation of the economy, industrialisation and policies based upon State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) emphasis the need to reduce inflation, monetary control and expanded agronomic production. Tax administration also require major restructuring and implementation, while the breakdown of the banking system demands a better set of management measures if domestic and foreign banking are to grow (Senses 1985; Uzun 1999). An analysis of Turkey’s economic development potential, at an in-depth level, looks at: budget deficits and debt recommendations; credibility in the last decade after its 1998 consolidation process; international

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CIRELLA: TURKISH REGIONALISM

potential and macroeconomic management concerns; and targeted issues regarding public wages, price developments and tax reformation policies (Hershlag 1988; CIDOB 2011). In addition, Turkey’s economic operational functions – that examine development relative to financial openness, inflation and rebuilding implementation – suggest the need for additional revision to allow better state-wide enlargement. External financial liberalisation can be better utilised to extend Turkey’s grip on foreign currency, expanded banking and increased economic flow through borrowing and lending (Kazgan 1993). In turn, economic growth will require structural reform for improved stabilisation and foreign investment since its economy continues to undergo varying states of instability (Yilmaz 1996; Esen 2000). It will require modernised strategic options that bind the overall process of Turkey’s future growth in correlation to its regional position between Europe and the rest of the world.

Strategies for Regionalism World economic integration is rapidly increasing due to the coming together of two unique developments: the trade liberalisation process and a world trading system. The trade liberalisation process is progressing in most developing and transitional countries; this notion is progressively globalising a genuine possibility for a world trading system – in which the liberalising framework is unilateral, regional or multilateral – and world markets become more intertwined (Taniguchi 1996; IMF 2010). In terms of Turkey, its open market system has allowed it to expand its regional options within its trade perimeters; hence, its choice of regionalism is determined by bordering nations and political geography. The geographic location of Turkey places it in one of the most unique strategic positions Eurasia-wide. Turkey’s neighbouring regional options outline a political agenda that gives it a position where it can choose and balance its own regional interests. It is clear that Turkey has chosen to centre its attention on Europe, although other regional interests still pose important linkages that Turkish authorities and society at large cannot ignore. Regionally, value as a strategic pivot nation, in a most threatening part of the world, has rarely been as high as it is today. Turkey is a trusted member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and is respected by Russia, still an assertive military power in the region. This can be seen as a source of stabilisation in the uneasy Caucasus region and as a possible calming effect within the Balkans – where Turkey has historic influence and weight. Most promising, though, is Turkey’s improved relations with Greece, one of its oldest adversaries; nonetheless, it is clear that Turkey’s regional loyalties between west and east are torn. In international trade, Turkey’s regional options for becoming an established power changes among its various geographic competitors. European commerce can be seen as a communion between Turkey and Europe, mostly due to Turkey’s historic efforts, which date back to its 1987 application to join what was then the European Economic Community (EEC), and later its 1997 declared eligibility to join the EU. The European option elicits a high interest since it produces the most economic return, security and stability. There is the Mediterranean, in which further connections to European counterparts exist, essentially involving the extended use of sealinkages and transport. The establishment for related trade and cooperation in the Mediterranean bonds the overall region into a unifying sphere. In this Mediterranean context, international trade links the Black Sea and potential oil pipelines, ending in Turkey, as potential export routes via Turkey’s coastline. In extended entitlements, international trade with Russia via the Black Sea and Ukraine further establishes this accord with the Black Sea Economic Cooperation agreement. Turkey’s viable trade partnerships with Russia and Eastern Europe have altered since the 1991 fall of the Soviet Union, resulting in increased dependency on Russia to invest in Turkish markets. Moving eastward, the Caucasus region and the newly independent states of Central Asia have utilised Turkey’s financial base and historical dependence as a putative nation for potential trade and banking. These regions are important Turkish trade partners mostly since Turkey is

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seen as a comfortable route to Western markets. Most of the Middle East similarly views Turkey with this potential linkage, although, the ancient political grievances regarding the Kurdish dispute and water resource allocation overshadow relations with Syria and to a lesser extent Iraq (Darling 2006). Henceforth making regionalism safe for international trade is definitely one direction Turkey will need to formulate better policy before it can lower barriers rather than increase them. At present Turkey’s future regional options are an open book (Evered 2005); conceivably, the economic and political pressures facing these concerns will be a guide for future strategic behaviour.

Turkish-European Relations Turkish-European relations are once again at a critical point, with Turkey at the turn of the millennium striving for full EU membership and only in recent years taking a much more precautionary stance on the entire EU enlargement process. At length, this relationship has overwhelmed the two parties for over a half a century – leaving the lingering doubt as to whether Turkey will ever join the EU and whether either party even wants to pursue such a path. Europeans may have many reasons for not welcoming Turkey into the EU, however, when security issues arise – like the pillaging from the Kosovo War in 1998-1999, watching over Iraqi skies, persevering refugees within the Caucasus during Russia’s war in Chechnya or meltdown in Nagorno-Karabakh – Europe as a whole has relied on Turkey. Turkey’s relationship with Europe has been long-lived; it is rooted via the history when international relations had been based on trade, military affairs, culture and diplomacy. The transformation of Turkey from a traditional society to a secular one demonstrated the complex relationship involved in economic, political and religious amendment. Turkey is clearly a society that has been forced to change under the stresses of modernisation, forced by its great European geographical neighbours and historical transition from the Ottoman Empire. These intertwined historical affairs have not always been easy to delineate, but have been critical in forming what Europe, individual European states and Turkey itself have become. Turkey’s economic instability, its long standing application for full membership within the EU, developments in Cyprus – a full EU member, Russian and Balkan crises, Middle Eastern conflict and unfolding of political and economic aspects in Western Europe all contribute to Turkish-European relations. In these cases, Europe has good reason to turn its attention to Turkey; it became one of the most dynamic economies in the region, growth in the 1980s averaged 4.7% per annum through increased financial openness in trade, investment and privatisation (IMF 2006; CIDOB 2011). This was highlighted in 1987, by its application for full membership in the EU, a decision that was postponed at the time until 1992; at the end of 2013, Turkey is officially being re-slated for EU enlargement recommendations relating to human rights, justice, freedom and security. In retrospect, Turkey continues to react negatively as its long-standing expectations and commitments have been repeatedly deserted. It should be noted, Turkey’s resentfulness towards the EU could be dangerous. In the post-December 1997 period, Turkey fashioned a political reaction against the EU’s decision not to grant it full membership. At this time, Turkey suspended all political relations with the EU – initiating an uncooperative and difficult TurkishEuropean communion. Currently, there is an urgent need to re-evaluate policies between Turkey and the EU, the root cause of this focus should be on developmental visions for future cooperation. The EU, for its part, should continue to advocate further democratisation and liberalisation in Turkey so it does not run the risk of being caught up in the strain and friction of an amplified undemocratic shift. Dating back to Buzan and Diez (1999), the relationship between Turkey and the EU has always been considered a crucial one. Building such a relationship is not easy, it requires both parties to reflect on the idea of self-definition and entity as a whole – a definition in which was quite comfortably felt throughout the Cold War, but now seems increasingly contradictory. Failure to bridge such a relationship will mean that both parties

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continue to store up a legacy of troubles that may have repercussions far beyond political clout or correlative particulars versus each other.

Turkey and the Mediterranean Context Turkish-European relations are mediated by its location within the indistinct Mediterranean sphere of influence. Williams (1993) elucidates Turkey’s Mediterranean regional position by stating: Turkey is not simply ‘a Mediterranean country’, as is evident by its location within the Middle East and its strategic position with respect to the newly independent republics of the former Soviet Union. However, its relationships with the European Community (EC) [and now the EU], particularly in the past but to a large extent in the present, are coloured by the perception of its Mediterranean features and linkages (Williams 1993, 45). Fundamentally, Turkey’s basis within the Mediterranean has centred on options that deal with the West. Turkey’s European and American relations tend to focus on its capacity for economics and geopolitical positioning. Turkey’s alliance with the West and its relations within the Middle East and beyond, indicate the importance of its Mediterranean regimentation. Indeed, one delicate question for understanding Turkish-Mediterranean relations is the balance between those Mediterranean states within, and those out of, the EU (Oğurlu 2012). Thus, one of the key issues for Turkey’s association with the EU is its attendant condition within the Mediterranean region and its strategic position. [Turkey] is in many ways the hinge between the EU and the eastern MediterraneanMiddle East and is capable of playing an influential regional role with regard to the southern republics of the former Soviet Union. Turkey’s relationships with the EU will continue to be mediated fundamentally by the fact that this is above all a country in the Mediterranean region (Williams 1993, 64).

Turkish-Mediterranean Relations Turkish-Mediterranean relations within the EU are conditional upon Mediterranean dimensions, but, at the same time, has sufficient economic weight and strategic importance to give it a key role in shaping these dimensions. This is true in terms of population, economic dynamism and military strategic roles (Williams 1993; Ozturkmen 2005). During the 1960s and 1970s, the EEC’s Mediterranean drive derived solely from Italy, with France occupying a relatively smaller amount of southern Mediterranean coast. The early unfolding of the EC’s policy in the Mediterranean focused on the development in Italy’s southern half, a program named Mezzogiorno. At this time, the special assistance program awarded Italy the highest level of support, as it was recognised as the poorest state in the EEC, rather than as a specific Mediterranean regional problem. During this time, the Mediterranean countries’ access to the EC market for industrial goods and free trade followed a slow line of progression; up until 1992, the EC’s intentions for economic development within the Mediterranean had mainly been focused on the creation of an economically balanced network with member states (Basile and Kostoris 2002; Garnier 2003). More recently, the EU has re-evaluated its Mediterranean dimension and has looked beyond the economic condition of its member states to problematic issues, including: migration and freedom of movement, removal of labour-market discrimination inside and outside of member states, European globalisation and the balance and elimination of internal barriers. Turkish-Mediterranean relations in the scope of the EU have increased steadily; as of May 1992 the United States and the EC made an agreement in which American ideology pushed for the

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reduction of agricultural protection within Europe in order to reform a common agricultural policy (European Commission 2012). This reform has replaced production incentives with direct income supports, cutting price levels (especially wheat) and eliminating export subsidies (Williams 1993; Barysch 2004). This accord also meant Mediterranean non-member nations, especially Turkey, could now have an intensified and increased opportunity for agricultural competition within European markets. During 1996, [the EU] and the European Investment Bank (EIB) launched the ambitious Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EUROMED). As well as maintaining a dialogue on political matters, the participants pursued a major program of economic and financial cooperation for the establishment of a vast free trade area by the year 2010 and for economic liberalisation measures. The EIB has [also] helped finance long-term water resource and sewage systems in many major cities, as well as irrigation and agricultural development schemes throughout the [Mediterranean] region (EIB 2010). Today, EUROMED has established the Union for the Mediterranean; it includes EU member states, 15 southern Mediterranean, African and Middle Eastern countries. Non-EU member states include: Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey (EUROMED 2013). Under EUROMED, Turkey has been supported by the EIB to assist its economy to better incorporate its Customs Union with the EU (Togan and Ersel 2005). This type of integration allows Turkey to function better within the Mediterranean and the EU. The idea of such a partnership assists in shaping and contributing to the region’s peace and security, and increases its potential within the global community. A key issue that Turkish-Mediterranean relations continue to struggle with is migration. Unregulated migration flow from Turkey into Europe is expected to decrease as a result of the availing impact of trade liberalisation and rising living standards in Turkey. According to the eleven European-based Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development nations, emigration of Maghrebian and Turkish residents to Europe is acutely elevated. The present emigration routes via the Mediterranean run chiefly through Italy, France and Spain. The issues of migration are key to the development of regional economic integration along the Mediterranean – primarily via Portugal, Spain, Greece and Turkey (Eder 2001). According to the economist Michael Emerson (1998), EU interdependence indicates that a wider regional free trade zone will improve the economic conditions not only within the Mediterranean proper but in three overlapping regions – the north (Russia, Ukraine and Belarus), the southeast (the Balkans and Turkey) and the Mediterranean countries of the eastern and southern shores (formerly part of the Barcelona Process and more recently the European Neighbourhood Policy) (Balfour 2009; Johansson-Nogués 2004). One aspect of Turkish regionalism should be the utilisation and benefits from Turkey’s Mediterranean coast which leaves it in an important position for Mediterranean linkages (Ozturkmen 2005).

The Issue of Cyprus Two major Mediterranean stumbling blocks that Turkey has not yet resolved are its historical relations with Cyprus and Greece. As the EU has accepted more members, Turkey has started to become increasingly impatient and its willingness to resolve these disputes strengthened (Emerson 1998). Clearly, the issues between Turkey and Cyprus will need to be resolved before Turkey will ever have the opportunity to join the EU as a full member state. The underlying issue between the two nations is still the issue of Turkish intervention in Cyprus and historical animosity, especially regarding small Greek islands in the Aegean Sea. In 1996, Turkey and Greece came to the brink of war over conflicting claims on a couple of islets inhabited by goats, rabbit, and sheep (Leonard 1998). The two nations have also contested various levels of air space

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and sea rights in the Aegean Sea and to some degree still cannot come to an agreement over Turkey’s 1974 invasion of the northern region of Cyprus. In June 1999, Turkey and Greece, both NATO members, begun improving their strained relations by holding several rounds of low-level talks and the signing of a number of bilateral cooperation pacts, even though Greece has complained that Turkey has not done enough in its efforts to better the bilateral relations between the two countries (Gorvett 1999; Kibaroglu 1999; Oğurlu 2012). For Turkish-Greek relations to improve, it is clear that Greece must see Turkey as a respectable nation that would honour territorial integrity and sovereign rights, respect international law and treaties and repudiate the threat and use of military force. Awkwardly, Turkish opinion over joining the EU and solving the Cyprus issue is often looked upon as two distinct matters; whereas, Greece and Cyprus, alongside the EU, addressed the two issues as intertwined and completely corresponding to the other. In a sense, one problem for relations between the two nations is that both Turkey and Greece define themselves as being in conflict with each other (Barletta 1998). The historical record shows that Greece gained its freedom from the Ottoman Empire, while Turkey achieved its independence essentially fighting off the Greeks in the 1920s, right after World War I. For both nations, these conflicts are a central part of the mythologies they are taught in school; it explains why Turks and Greeks find the past hard to forget and overlook. Recently however Turkey and Greece have entered into reputable talks and have increased international shipping contracts in the Aegean, formulated a tourist ferry agreement between Greece’s eastern islands and the Turkish coast and augmented flights and trains connecting the two countries. Greece has stated its intentions in creating a noble connection between the two nations. In January 2000, agreements by American, Italian, Greek, and Turkish leaders endorsed a pledge that went to see a half a billion US dollars go toward a natural gas power station built on Greek land for the export of electricity to Turkey. To Turkey’s delight, the camaraderie between Turkish-Greek relations greatly improves – even if, on the question of Cyprus their positions are still unclear. On the Cyprus question, Turkey’s Mediterranean stance is illustrated by how it views and justifies its reasons for invading the north-end of the island in 1974. According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, without the United Nations or anyone else prepared to act, on 20 July 1974, Turkey, in accordance with the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, intervened to protect the Turkish Cypriots (Barletta 1998). Turkey moved in, to prevent the threatened occupation of Cyprus by Greece and the annihilation of the Turkish Cypriot population. Since then, the southern Greek Cypriots have formed the Republic of Cyprus, and the northern Turkish Cypriots proclaimed the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus that remains unrecognised by any nation other than Turkey. This division remains problematic and the two Cyprus sides remain divided by the militarised ‘Green Line’ border – however, the Turkish Cypriot side significantly eased travel restrictions in April 2003. If one were to investigate Turkish-Greek defence strategy, Turkey’s military offensive in Cyprus assists its strategic balance of power with Greece and gives the perception of a sturdier security within Turkey. Greece’s obvious strategic compensation is its positioning of small-scale airbases on islands in the Aegean only a few kilometres off the Turkish coast. It is clear that Turkish-Greek relations play an important role in the Turkish-Mediterranean scenario as the two countries attempt to resolve unsettled animosities. One recent diplomatic breakdown occurred from 1997 to late 1998, when Greek Cypriots were waiting on the deployment of Russian S300PMU-1 air-defence missile batteries. In response to this planned deployment, Turkey had threatened to attack any ships that were carrying any missile components and destroy any missiles deployed to Cyprus; meanwhile, a striking retort from Greece guaranteed aid to Cyprus in the event of a Turkish mismatch. This challenging situation has kept the eastern Mediterranean a hot spot for diplomacy between the many parties involved: Turkey, Greece, Cyprus, United States, NATO, Russia, EU and United Nations (Barletta 1998). To date, efforts to resolve this conflict seemed to have matured through various stages of negotiation and dialogue.

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The reunification of Cyprus is toward a federation – a bi-zonal and bi-communal nation, meaning that each community would live more or less separately in its own area but that Cypriots from both backgrounds would be able to move freely throughout the island. A push towards bilateral, European and international cooperation seems to be the current direction the Cyprus issue is headed. As Cyprus works on its relations with Turkey and Greece the entire island was granted full EU membership in 2004 – however, this applies only to the areas under the internationally recognised government, and is suspended in the areas administered by Turkish Cypriots. The EU, in conjunction with the United Nations, has taken the initiative in helping resolve Cypriot reunification (Evriviades 2005) and if successful Turkey’s Mediterranean influence will advance to greater importance in and around the Mediterranean sphere.

Conclusion From Turkey’s initial signs of industrialisation, the outlook to improve its economic framework has been driven by the need for structural reform. Turkey’s position in Eurasia places it in a unique location between domestic economics and regional affairs. Its national interests are based upon economic, regional and political security – comprise mainly of improving civility and societal standards. In doing so, it must first deal with the Kurdish problem that affects Turkey’s candidacy in meeting European Norms and potentially enlargement criteria (Pranger 2003). Much of the international community has closely monitored Turkey’s human rights violations; in effect, its image continues to be tarnished by imperilled acts of violence contrary to international law and EU guidelines. In economic terms, free market liberalisation has not benefited Turkey’s impoverished groups – instead only its elite. Free market economics has allowed Turkey to change its global statue by bettering its SEEs and improving much of its societal infrastructure. Over the past three decades, Turkey has made substantial progress in implementing structural reforms and liberalising its trade and foreign exchange regimes. Turkey’s future economic options will require domestic restructuring, policy reform and centralised regional partnerships. Domestic structural reform is needed to improve economic instability if it is to effectively reduce or eliminate high inconsistent inflation, disproportionate market fluctuations and lack of foreign investment. Any further potential partnership with Europe will affect Turkey’s economic and political policies. A case in point, Turkey’s Customs Union with the EU is potentially the most constructive economic agreement of any EU non-member nation. In political terms, the debate continues between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus on whether all three nations can rest an agreement for stability on that eastern Mediterranean island. Apart from Europe, strategic regional choices in Eurasia formulate Turkey’s secondary regional emphasis. In a Mediterranean context, Turkey occupies a strategic location and point of trade between the Mediterranean and Black Sea. In the Middle East, the Arab community continues to contest problems related to water resource allocation, religious conformity and border disputes. In regional terms, Turkey’s political pliability to adjust to these areas is contingent on European acceptance; therefore, Turkey’s choice for regionalism leaves it pending for EU statehood – something that may not actually be desired if it ever comes to date. Faced with an ever changing and globalising world, Turkey can be seen as Eurasia’s frontier nation. Its major problems remain internal, but it is a country that has experienced remarkable changes over the past century. From its multi-dimensional location, it is attempting to supersede its turbulent antiquity to ascent as a potential bridge state between west and east.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR Dr. Giuseppe Tommaso Cirella: Researcher, Faculty of Science and Technology, Free University of Bozen, Bolzano, Italy

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