Undermining Intrinsic Moral Motivation: External ...

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1983, Vol. 45, No. 4, 763-771

Copyright 1983 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.

Undermining Intrinsic Moral Motivation: External Reward and Self-Presentation Shalom H. Schwartz

Ziya Kunda University of Michigan

University of Wisconsin—Madison, and Hebrew University—Jerusalem

Does paying people for helping undermine an important source of intrinsic motivation to help—the internalized sense of moral obligation? Self-perception theory suggests that individuals paid to help will infer that they have engaged in this behavior for the reward and not for reasons intrinsic to helping. Previous research has failed to find an undermining of intrinsic motivation that could be traced to the perception that helping was overjustified. We hypothesized that people's desire to appear morally motivated may have prevented the detection of overjustification effects. We therefore used a bogus pipeline procedure to convince subjects that we could tap their true attitudes, so that they would refrain from socially desirable but inaccurate self-presentation. The design consisted of two measurement conditions (bogus pipeline and pencil and paper) crossed with three activity conditions in which subjects recorded a text either to help a blind student for pay or with no reward, or to provide material for a study of vocal intonations. As predicted, payment for help undermined the sense of moral obligation only in the bogus pipeline condition. Unpaid helpers in this condition showed enhanced intrinsic motivation.

A great deal has been said over the last decade about "the hidden costs of reward," that is, the power of reward to undermine intrinsic motivation. Numerous studies have demonstrated that rewarding people for engaging in certain activities reduces people's interest in these activities, their self-reported enjoyment of the activities, and their subsequent spontaneous participation in the same activities (for detailed reviews see Condry, 1977; Lepper & Greene, 1978). This effect is referred to as the overjustification effect, and is usually explained in terms of the self-perception that one's behavior is under external rather than internal control (Bern, 1972; Deci, 1975; cf. Fazio, 1981). The self-perception analysis of overjustification suggests that when people perform a behavior in the presence of salient external pressures (e.g., monetary reward, threat), they infer that their behavior was under the control of external pressure rather than motivated by the wish to obtain gratifications This study was supported by National Science foundation Grant BNS 77-23287 to Schwartz. Requests for reprints should be sent to Shalom H. Schwartz, Department of Psychology, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel.

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intrinsic tp the behavior itself (e.g., enjoyment, interest, self-determination, mastery). Thus, offering a person rewards or other external justifications for engaging in an activity is likely to undermine that person's intrinsic motivation for the activity. This is a powerful formulation, one that should apply to any activity that can be intrinsically motivated. It is surprising, therefore, that practically all overjustification research to date has concentrated on a narrow set of activities—puzzles, toys, and games—motivated by a limited type of intrinsic motivation—curiosity, interest, and enjoyment. The most common objects used in overjustification research are puzzles and word games (Deci, 1971; HaracMewicz, 1979; Kruglanski, Alon, & Lewis, 1972; Kruglanski, Friedman, & Zeevi, 1971; Kruglanski et al., 1975; Lepper & Greene, 1975; Porac & Meindl, 1982; Rosenfield, Folger, & Adelman, 1980; Williams, 1980; Wilson, Hull, & Johnson, 1981). Other objects used include magic markers (Fazio, 1981; Lepper, Greene, & Nisbett, 1973), drums (Ross, 1975), listening to songs (Reiss & Sushinsky, 1975), and math games (Greene, Sternberg, & Lepper, 1976). The pursuit of curiosity, interest, and en-

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ZIVA KUNDA AND SHALOM H. SCHWARTZ

joyment no doubt motivates much human behavior, but many social behaviors are at least partly motivated by a different kind of intrinsic motivation: the desire to do the right thing as determined by our own beliefs and values. Such behavior is referred to as moral behavior because it is guided by our sense of moral obligation (Schwartz & Howard, 1982). Our behavior is moral insofar as we base it not on external rewards but on the personal sense of what we ought to do in the situation generated from our internalized values (i.e., on our "personal norms," Schwartz, 1977). When we engage in moral behaviors (e.g., selfless helping), we can infer from our actions both that we hold the internalized values implied by the actions and that we are moral (altruistic) persons. This analysis suggests that moral behavior, like any other intrinsically motivated behavior, should be subject to overjustification. Engaging in moral behavior in the presence of external pressure should lead us to infer that our behavior is motivated by that pressure rather than by the intrinsic motivation to express our values in action. It should therefore weaken these internalized values. In a comparative analysis of the British and American systems for gathering blood, Titmuss (1971) made just such an argument. He reasoned that when blood donors receive monetary payment or insurance for their family's future blood requirements, moral commitment to voluntary donation is undermined. Broadening his argument, Titmuss claimed that by providing external incentives for all types of voluntary moral behaviors, societies weaken the moral fiber of their members. Few attempts have been made to apply the notion of overjustification to the domain of moral behavior, and the findings range from total failure to detect an undermining effect to inconclusive results. Clevenger (1980) induced students to engage in an activity supporting an environmental protection law either voluntarily or for pay. She found that payment did not undermine the sense of moral obligation to support such laws, as measured by personal norms. Batson, Coke, Jasnosky, and Hanson (1978) demonstrated what at first appears to be an undermining effect: Compared with unpaid subjects, those paid to help an experimenter rated themselves as less altruistic

than a person who did not help. This effect, however, was not due to an undermining of the perceived altruism of self. Rather, paid subjects' perceived the nonhelping other as more altruistic than did unpaid subjects. Tho-, mas, Batson, arid Coke (1981) found that helping under little external pressure enhanced self-perception as altruistic, but helping under high pressure did not undermine self-perception as altruistic. The only two studies using subsequent helping behavior as a dependent variable also yielded ambiguous results. In both, the likelihood of helping was increased following freely chosen helping, but it was not reduced following externally justified helping. This failure to detect undermining is difficult to interpret because foot-in-the-door procedures were used in both studies. Undermining may have occurred but may have been offset by the enhancing effects of the foot-in-the-door procedures (Uranowitz, 1975; Zuckerman, Lazzaro, & Waldgeir, 1979). Taken together, these results suggest two conclusions. First, self-perception does affect intrinsic moral motivations and self-conceptions in the helping domain, since people helped more and viewed themselves as more altruistic after helping under minimal external pressure. Second, the overjustification effect common with other types of intrinsic motivation does not appear to occur with moral attitudes and personal norms toward helping. What accounts for this pattern of results? Why are morally relevant self-conceptions that are responsive to enhancement by self-perception not responsive to undermining in the circumstances where self-perception theory predicts they would be? A possible explanation for this pattern stems from one major difference between moral behavior and the activities studied to date in the overjustification paradigm. Unlike the motivations that guide the latter (fun, curiosity, etc.), the internalized values, personal norms, and other moral attitudes that motivate moral behaviors are suffused with social desirability. This may lead people to adopt positive selfpresentation strategies when reporting their motivations for moral behavior. Regardless of their reasons for helping, people may prefer to present their behavior as guided by moral principles, and consequently as indicative of

UNDERMINING INTRINSIC MOTIVATION TO HELP

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their altruism. Undermining of moral values, per and pencil condition will report more personal norms, and attitudes may indeed oc- moral obligation than those in the bogus pipecur, but people may cover up any undermining line condition. Finally, if we have correctly lest their self-reports reveal them to be less interpreted previous research as suggesting that noble and moral than they would like to ap- both overjustification and self-presentation pear. occur, we expect a Measurement X Activity The current study was designed to eliminate interaction: Undermining of intrinsic motisocially desirable false self-presentation as a vation will be detected among externally rebarrier to detecting the possible undermining warded helpers in the bogus pipeline condition of intrinsic motivation for morally relevant only, because self-preservation will be minibehavior. For this purpose, half the subjects mized in that condition. Enhancement of inreported their sense of moral obligation to help trinsic motivation will appear among nonreusing a bogus pipeline procedure. The bogus warded helpers in both measurement condipipeline procedure convinces subjects that a tions. machine to which they are attached successMethod fully reveals their true attitudes (Jones & Sigall, 1971). This procedure has blocked subjects' Overview tendencies to make artificially positive selfSubjects were invited to participate in a study on attitude presentations in many studies. For example, measurement. Under circumstances ostensibly unrelated students responding with a bogus pipeline to the experiment, subjects were induced to read text maprocedure admitted to substantially more so- terial into a tape recorder under one of three conditions: cially undesirable stereotypes of blacks than to help a blind student for payment or for no payment, to provide a sample of reading for use in a study of students responding to a pencil and paper or vocal intonation. Subjects then completed questionnaires questionnaire (Sigall & Page, 1971). Also, sub- in which the personal norm toward reading for a blind jects responding in a bogus pipeline condition student was embedded among seven other helping norms, confessed more readily to the socially unde- and in which reasons for engaging in recent activities were sirable fact of having obtained information ascertained. Half the subjects responded with pencil and and half responded while connected to a bogus illegitimately about how to perform well on paper, pipeline. This yielded a 3 (activity) X 2 (measurement) an experimental test (Quigley-Fernandez & design. Tedeschi, 1978). The current study included three activity conditions: helping with the expectation of ex- Subjects ternal reward (overjustification), helping with Sixty-three Hebrew University students from fields other no expectation of reward (no overjustincation), psychology were recruited in various campus locations and performing the same activity not as a form than for a $2 payment. Two subjects were dropped for suspecting of helping (control). The activity conditions the experimental manipulation and one for failure to comwere crossed with two measurement condi- plete the questionnaires, leaving a total of 60 subjects— tions: bogus pipeline and pencil and paper. 10 per cell. Subjects were randomly assigned to expericonditions. Half the subjects in each cell were male The major dependent index of intrinsic mo- mental and half were female. The experimenter and confederate tivation was the value-based sense of moral were both female. obligation to help, that is, the personal norm to perform the helping act. This design permits us to assess the impact Apparatus both of overjustincation and of self-presenA large construction of electronic equipment, including tation effects on the index of intrinsic motidials, and lights, was arranged on the experimenter's vation. If only overjustification occurs but not desk, meters, with two skin electrodes connected to it. A small self-presentation, we expect only a main effect meter, placed on the subject's table, was connected to the for activity. Moral obligation will be under- electronic apparatus and through it supposedly to a commined for externally rewarded helpers and en- puter in the adjacent room. The experimenter used a hidhanced for nonrewarded helpers. If, on the den rheostat to control the readings on this meter. A rectmetal box, marked with detachable answer scales other hand, only self-presentation occurs but angular for measuring question responses, was set on the table in not overjustification, we expect only a main front of the subject. A sliding pointer could be moved effect for measurement: Participants in the pa- along the scales to indicate responses.

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Procedure On arrival, subjects first signed a consent form. This form described the experiment as concerned with methods of attitude measurement and listed the questionnaires to be used. Next, subjects completed a pencil and paper questionnaire that measured attitudes toward TV programs. The experimenter surreptitiously noted answers to the first three items, a procedure necessary for later "validating" the bogus pipeline convincingly. Next, subjects were told that the machine to which they would be attached was a perfected form of a lie detector. "It measures attitudes by sensing the spontaneous and immediate reactions of muscles in response to a question." Electrodes from the impressive machine were then attached to the subject's nonpreferred arm. Techniques modeled after those detailed in Jones and Sigall (1971) were used to convince subjects that the machine could indeed detect their true attitudes, so long as they concentrated on their response to a question while grasping the sliding pointer on the answer scale. Subjects were told that the researchers were interested in "the extent to which people could report their true attitudes, as the machine measures them." The meter displaying their "true" responses was therefore moved out of their view to the experimenter's desk. The various questions were presented successively on index cards. Subjects were asked to read each question out loud, concentrate on their answer, then move the pointer to the appropriate scale number, then circle the appropriate number on an answer sheet, and finally move the pointer back to zero. After subjects had responded to the first item, the experimenter said that the output meter hadn't moved. She then reiterated the required procedures, checked the electrodes, and suggested a second try. As the subject responded to the second item, a sharp, high noise was heard. The experimenter remarked that this had never happened before, and that something must be wrong with the machine. She then went to check the computer in the next room. Returning 30 seconds later, she reported that there was a problem in the connection to the computer, and said the technician could fix it in about IS minutes. She assured the subject that, in all events, the experimenter would be finished within the hour set aside for it, and removed the electrodes in the meanwhile. At this point the activity manipulation took place. External reward. A female confederate—apparently the experimenter's friend—came to the door, carrying a tape recorder and a book. She asked the experimenter whether she would be willing to record some material. The experimenter demurred, explaining that she was running subjects and had to take care of a problem with the computer. The friend then asked whether she might request the subject's help. The experimenter responded that it was up to the subject and left, saying she had to speed up the technician. The friend then asked the subject to record material for a blind student, for the equivalent of $3 an hour. She explained that the regular reader hadn't come, and that the blind student needed this material urgently, for an exam. After repeating the payment offer, she told the subject that anything recorded, even while waiting for the experiment to resume, would be helpful. When the subject agreed to read, the friend demonstrated the use of the recorder, said she would return to pick up the materials when the experiment was over, and left the room.

No external reward Procedures were identical to those in the external reward condition except for the omission of the payment offer. Since the confederate made this offer after the experimenter had left the room, the experimenter remained blind regarding whether the subject was paid or not.Control. In this condition,no confederate appeared. Instead, the experimenter asked the subject to use the time while waiting for the experiment to resume to record a few pages of text for a different study dealing with the meanings of vocal intonations. When the subject agreed, she demonstrated the use of the recorder, provided the same text for reading used in the experimental conditions, and then left to speed up the technician. All subjects agreed to read, and continued reading until the experimenter returned 10 minutes later. The experiment then continued under one of the two measurement conditions. Bogus pipeline. The experimenter tpld the subject that the machine was fixed, and reconnected the electrodes. She then explained that due to the time lost they would skip the lengthy questionnaire they had started and move on to the next one. Responses to the remaining questions, including the dependent measures, were given using the bogus pipeline procedures described above. Pencil and paper. The experimenter told the subject that there was a short circuit in the connection to the computer. In light of this problem and the time lost, they would move on to the next questionnaire and switch to a different measurement method—using only pencil and paper. Like the bogus pipeline subjects, these subjects received the items one at a time on index cards, but they simply circled their responses on the answer sheets. Personal norms questionnaire. This questionnaire consisted of eight items measuring personal norms in the form of the sense of moral obligation to agree to appeals for eight different helping behaviors. These included collecting clothes for the needy, working with a disadvantaged child, and volunteering for the civil guard. The key dependent variable—the personal norm regarding reading school work to a blind student—was the fifth item. Instructions for this questionnaire read: We would like to know how much of a moral obligation you would feel to agree to each of the following appeals, were someone to request theni of you, We are concerned with obligation based on your own values, regardless of what others might feel or think you should do. We are not asking what you would actually do, but what you would feel you ought to do, based on your values. Responses were made on a 10-point scale anchored by "not relevant to my values" (0) and "a very great obligation" (9). Perceived reasons and mood Questionnaire. Subjects were told that mood sometimes influences attitudes. They were therefore asked to indicate what activity they had engaged in during the hour before the experiment, what mood they were in during that activity, and the reasons they engaged in it. Ten potential reasons for engaging in an activity were rated on 7-point scales ranging from "not a reason at all" (0) to "very much a reason" (6). Reasons measured included, for example, to avoid boredom, to earn money, and to support a goal in which one believes. The printed instructions asked subjects to complete the

UNDERMINING INTRINSIC MOTIVATION TO HELP mood and reasons questionnaire a second time, referring now to their main activity during the first half of the experiment—the lengthy social and family situation questionnaire. Here the experimenter interrupted to remark that since they hadn't completed that questionnaire, subjects should respond in terms of the activity they did perform—reading into the tape recorder. Subjects also indicated how free they had been to choose to engage in the activities. Following completion of the questionnaires, suspicions concerning the machine, the confederate, or other aspects of the study were probed. A full debriefing was then provided, and the reasons for the deception were explained.

Results and Discussion Personal Norms The index of intrinsic motivation of importance here was the personal norm measuring sense of moral obligation to read school work to a blind student. For the sample as a whole, the mean response to this item was 6.48, indicating a fairly strong sense of moral obligation. Mean responses on the seven other personal norms toward helping behaviors ranged from 4.73 to 6.52, with an average of 5,52. The availability of responses on other personal norms made it possible to control the variance due to subjects' general tendencies to report a sense of greater or lesser moral obligation. For this purpose, the subjects' mean response on other personal norms was used as a covariate in an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) performed on the personal norm to read to a blind student. Figure 1 presents the adjusted means obtained from the ANCOVA. The figure reveals that the predicted undermining effect of payment on intrinsic motivation was found only in the bogus pipeline condition. When personal norms were measured in this condition, subjects who had helped for payment reported a significantly weaker sense of moral obligation to read to a blind student than control subjects (5.54 vs. 6.67),7(53) = 4.71, p < .01.' An enhancement effect was also observed in the bogus pipeline condition. Subjects who had helped without payment reported a significantly stronger sense of moral obligation than controls (7.43 vs. 6.67), *(53) = 3.17, p < .01. The presence or absence of payment had no effect on the intrinsic motivation of subjects who responded with pencil and paper. This suggests that self-presentation processes eliminated the effects both of undermining by re-

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ward and enhancement due to unrewarded helping. We had expected positive self-presentation to eliminate evidence of undermining, but the lack of an enhancement effect does not seem to reflect positive self-presentation. |n fact, comparison of unpaid helpers in the paper and pencil condition with those in the bogus pipeline condition suggests that the former were understating their intrinsic moral motivation (6.38 vs. 7.43), f(53) =; 3.52, p < .01. This finding is consistent with the idea we will discuss below that when others already know we have-helped for no reward, social desirability dictates a modest self-presentation. Results of the ANCOVA on the full 3 (activity) X 2 (measurement) design revealed that the planned comparisons had identified all the significant effects. These showed up as an Activity X Measurement interaction, F(2, 53) = 4.70, p < .02, and an activity main effect, F(2, 53) = 5.59, p < .01. The latter was entirely due to the differences in the bogus pipeline condition.2 To determine whether the manipulations had more generalized effects on motivation, 3 X 2 analyses of variance (ANOVAS) were carried out for each of the other personal norms as well as for their combined mean. No significant activity or interaction effects were found, and only one significant measurement effect emerged. Apparently, then, inducing helping with or without external reward influenced only the intrinsic motivation measured by the personal norm concerned with the relevant behavior—reading to a blind student. Differences between conditions for the combined mean, used above as a covariate, were all very small. Moreover, the pattern of differences was such that it could not have contributed to the significance of the effects on the personal norm to read to a blind student.

' All p levels reported in this article are for two-tailed tests. (See, Wiener, 1971, p. 385, for a discussion of the appropriateness of using (tests with a pooled error estimate for the planned comparisons.) Sex of subject had neither main nor interaction effects, so it is not mentioned further. 1 Unadjusted means for the personal norm of interest were as follows: For the bogus pipeline condition: paid, 5.5; control, 6.7; unpaid, 7.9. For the pencil and paper condition: paid, 6.2; control, 6.5; unpaid, 6.1.

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Bogus Pipeline Pencil and Paper

8.0 --

7.5 J7.0

6.5

s.

6.0 5.5 5.0

Paid

Controls

Unpaid

Experimental Condition Figure 1. Personal norm (sense of moral obligation) to read school work for a blind student. (Adjusted using the mean of all other personal norms as a covariate.)

Perceived Freedom Unless people feel some freedom of choice when engaging in an activity, they are unlikely to draw inferences about their own attributes from self-perception of their actions (Bern, 1972). It's therefore important to establish that the level of perceived freedom was high and did not differ across conditions. Responses to the question about freedom to engage in the activity of recording showed that these requirements were met. Feelings of freedom were generally high, and they were no higher in the bogus pipeline condition (M = 4.7 on the 06 scale) than in the pencil and paper condition (M = 4.9). A 3 (activity) X 2 (measurement) ANOVA yielded no significant effects. Reasons for Behavior The reasons subjects gave for their helping behavior corroborated our interpretations of

the undermining, enhancing, and self-presentation effects on intrinsic motivation that were revealed in the personal norm responses. A factor analysis of the reasons yielded two relevant factors. An External Reasons factor included reasons extrinsic to helping itself— earning money, avoiding boredom, and avoiding interpersonal unpleasantness. An Internal Reasons factor included reasons intrinsically tied to helping—supporting a goal one believes in, helping someone, and fulfilling academic requirements. (The latter was apparently interpreted as helping the blind student to meet his academic requirements.) Indexes of external and internal reasons were formed by summing and averaging the item responses for each factor. Recall that undermining occurs when people believe that their behavior has been controlled by external pressures rather than by internal causes. We therefore expect that sub-

UNDERMINING INTRINSIC MOTIVATION TO HELP

jects whose personal norms were undermined would also attribute their behavior more to external factors and less to internal factors than those whose personal norms were not undermined. Furthermore, we expect these attributions to be subject to the same self-presentation processes that affect reporting of personal norms. As shown on the left side of Table 1, results for the external scores followed the expected pattern.3 A 2 (activity) X 2 (measurement) ANOVA on these scores yielded an activity main effect, F(l, 36) = 7.68, p < .01. This main effect shows that externally rewarded subjects did attribute their behavior more to external reasons than did unrewarded subjects. This effect was due primarily to bogus pipeline subjects, as evidenced in a marginal Activity X Measurement interaction, P(l, 36) = 3.05, p = .09, and also in the finding that the planned comparison between paid and unpaid subjects was significant only in the bogus pipeline condition, t(36) = 4.59, p < .01. This finding parallels the observed undermining effect of external reward on intrinsic moral motivation as measured by personal norms, and supports the self-perception interpretation of it. Here, too, in the pencil and paper condition, selfpresentation may have blocked the admission of external reasons by the rewarded group. Results of the ANOVA performed on the internal reasons scores did not follow our expectations quite as nicely. As shown on the right side of Table 1, the effect of external reward was in the expected direction (lower scores for paid subjects), but the main effect for activity was only marginal, F(l, 36) = 2.29, p = .14. One additional, unpredicted, difference was found for the internal scores. Subjects attributed their helping less to internal reasons in the pencil and paper than in the bogus pipeline condition. This was evidenced in a main effect for measurement, F(l, 36) = 12.26, p < .01. This parallels our finding that the unpaid helpers reported significantly lower personal norms in the pencil and paper than in the bogus pipeline condition. The self-presentation explanation suggested for the personal norms finding may well apply here too. When the person to whom we present ourselves has evidence that we are virtuous—as is the case for the unpaid helpers presenting themselves to

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Table 1 Reasons Given for Recording Text Materials for a Blind Student (Factor Means for Experimental Conditions) External reasons Activity condition External reward (paid) No external reward (unpaid)

Internal reasons

BP

PP

BP

PP

1.97

1.17

3.57

2.20

.83

4.30

2.73

.50

Note. BP = bogus pipeline measurement condition; PP = paper and pencil measurement condition. Ratings were made on a 7-point scale. Higher numbers indicate that the type of reason is more important.

the experimenter—it is more socially desirable to appear modest, understating our morality and our praiseworthy motives. Such a tendency toward modesty in self-presentation, when others know of one's virtues, has been observed in several experiments (Baumeister & Jones, 1978; Jones, Gergen, Gumpert, & Thibaut, 1965; Michener, Plazewski, & Vaske, 1979).4 Conclusions and Implications This study has demonstrated that internalized moral norms and values for helping are subject to the overjustification effect. When we eliminate the impact of self-presentation strategies on responses, we find that paying people to help undermines their sense of moral obligation to help in related circumstances. Payment also affects the perceived reasons for having helped. It promotes attribution of the helping behavior to external rather than to internal reasons. Results in the bogus pipeline 3 Control subjects provided reasons for their engaging in the conceptually different behavior of recording for a vocal intonation study. Hence they are irrelevant for comparisons of the reasons for helping a blind student. 4 It should be noted that modesty, like all other impression management strategies, reflects cultural norms concerning appropriate self-presentation. In Israel, where this study was conducted, pressure toward modesty when one is known to be praiseworthy may be particularly strong. For example, a famous recipient of the Israeli equivalent of the Medal of Honor, who had saved the lives of many comrades, became an instant cultural hero by proclaiming: "I don't know why I received this medal. All I wanted was to get home safely."

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conditions of this study parallel the undermining and enhancement findings in research on other types of intrinsic motivation. Consequently, these results reinforce the assumption underlying this study that the value-based, internal sense of moral obligation is a subtype of intrinsic motivation (Schwartz & Howard, 1982). Numerous studies have shown that measured moral obligation to help correlates positively with subsequent actual helping (Schwartz & Howard, 1981). Our findings suggest that external pressures to help may reduce future spontaneous helping, because these pressures undermine and weaken people's sense of moral obligation. These findings offer initial empirical support for Titmuss's (1971) warnings that payment for morally relevant behavior undermines the level of commitment to volunteering in societies. Whether undermining intrinsic moral motivation will reduce overt behavioral helping depends, of course, on other influences in the choice situation (e.g., social pressures and material rewards). The findings imply that appeals for help should consider not only short term effects (external pressure often increases immediate compliance), but also long term effects on the moral values of the individuals addressed and hence on their later propensity to help when external pressure is absent. Our results also shed light on a frequently encountered anomaly in helping research termed the "boomerang effect" (Schwartz, 1977). This is the case where increasing pressure in an appeal reduces rather than increases compliance. Boomerangs typically appear when appeals are made strong by highlighting the target's personal responsibility to help or the seriousness of the victim's need. Boomerangs are most likely when appeals are directed in people who are generally aware of the consequences of their behavior for others and who feel morally obligated to help as an expression of their internalized values. Our data show that external pressure may deny people the possibility of attributing their helping to internal sources. Yet internal attribution is essential to experience helping as an expression and affirmation of internalized moral values. Hence, when people face an appeal so externally pressuring that it precludes self-affirming

internal attributions, they may prefer to forgo the opportunity to help. In sum, increasing external pressures to help is often not the best way to promote helping behavior. Not only is it likely to result in a long-term erosion of values and spontaneous helping, but it may sometimes even cause an immediate reduction in helping responses. References Batson, C. D., Coke, J. S., Jasnosky, M. L., & Hanson, M. Buying kindness: Effect of an extrinsic incentive for helping on perceived altriusm. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 1978, 4, 86-91. Baumeister, R., & Jones, E. E. When self-presentation is , constrained by the target's knowledge: Consistency and compensation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1978, 36, 608-618. Bern, D. J. Self perception theory. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 6). New York: Academic Press, 1972. ' Clevenger, M. Personal norms as a, type of intrinsic motivation. Unpublished master's thesis, University of Wisconsin—Madison, 1980. Condry, J. Enemies of exploration: Self-initiated versus other-initiated learning. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1911,35, 459-477. Deci, E. L. Effects of externally mediated rewards on intrinsic motivation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1971, 18, 105-115, Deci, E. L. Intrinsic motivation. New York: Plenum, 1975. Fazio, R. H. On the self-perception explanation of the overjustification effect: The role of the salience of initial attitude. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1981, 17, 417-426. Greene, D., Sternberg, B., & Lepper, M. R. Overjustification in a token economy. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1916,34, 1219-1234. Harackiewicz, J. M. The effects of reward contingency and performance feedback on intrinsic motivation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1979, 37, 1352-1363. Jones, E. E., Gergen, K. J., Gumpert, P., & Thibaut, J. Some conditions affecting the use of ingratiation to influence performance evaluation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1965,1, 613-626. Jones, E. E., & Sigall, H. The bogus pipeline: A new paradigm for measuring affect and attitude. Psychological Bulletin, 1971, 76, 349-364. Kruglanski, A. W., Alon, S., & Lewis, T. Retrospective misattribution and task enjoyment. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1972, 8, 493-501. Kruglanski, A. W., Friedman, I., & Zeevi, G. The effects of extrinsic incentives on some qualitative aspects of ( task performance. Journal of Personality, 1971,39, 606617, Kruglanski, A. W., Riter, A., Amitai, A., Margolin, B. S., Shabtai, L., & Zaksh, D. Can money enhance intrinsic motivation: A test of the content-consequence hypothesis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1975, 31, 744-750.

UNDERMINING INTRINSIC MOTIVATION TO HELP Lepper, M. R., & Greene, D. Turning play into work: Effects of adult surveillance and extrinsic rewards on children's intrinsic motivation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1975, 31, 479-486.

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Received September 2, 1982 Revision received January 13, 1983 •