Understanding Environmentalism: The Impacts of Cultural Worldview, Party Identification, and Religious Affiliation on Environmental Concern
June 22, 2015
Geoboo Song Department of Political Science J. William Fulbright College of Arts and Sciences University of Arkansas 437 Old Main, Fayetteville, AR 72701, USA Email:
[email protected]
Thaddieus E. Conner Department of Government College of Arts and Sciences New Mexico State University MSC 3BN, PO Box 30001, Las Cruces, NM 88003, USA Email:
[email protected]
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2621626
Abstract Decades ago, Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky suggested that public concern for the environment is shaped, in part, by intrinsic values and beliefs; however, very little research has explored how an individuals’ group affiliations condition the impact of their deep core cultural beliefs on environmental concern. Using original data from a four-year annual nationwide survey of more than 9,000 American adults conducted from 2008 to 2011, this study examines how the effect of cultural predisposition, especially egalitarianism, hierarchism, and individualism, on environmental concern is mediated by an individual’s political party and religious affiliations. This research has broad implications for understanding how cultural worldview, partisanship, and religion collectively contribute to the formation of environmentalism among the general public. Key Words: Environmentalism; cultural theory; partisanship; religious affiliation
1 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2621626
Introduction In recent decades, awareness of environmental issues has increased, influencing numerous sectors of the United States population (Dunlap and Scarce 1991; Kanagy, Humphrey and Firebaugh 1994; Leiserowitz 2006). From church sermons to party platforms, debates on global climate change and environmental policy have influenced public opinion at various levels of society, creating a highly politicized and complex collection of environmental sentiments. As a result, the landscape of public opinion on environmental issues has not been uniform across various subsets of the population, thus complicating our understanding of the nature of environmentalism promoted within society as a whole. A wealth of scholarship has emerged to parse out these various attitudes toward the environment, and there is an established broad consensus regarding the importance of personal belief systems in shaping public opinion on matters of significant political importance, such as spending on social welfare programs or attitudes toward global climate change (Jacoby 2006; Silva and Jenkins-Smith 2007). One such intellectual tradition seeks to understand how core values and beliefs influence environmental issues within the general public (e.g., Jones and Song 2014). Of particular interest is cultural worldview (e.g., egalitarianism, individualism, hierarchism, and fatalism), broadly defined as a predisposition toward a certain “desirable” social order imposed upon social relationships among the members of society (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982). Previous studies suggest that individuals with a strong egalitarian orientation demonstrate higher levels of concern for the environment, perceiving the degradation of the planet as a threat to the wellbeing of all, whereas those with an individualist worldview tend to be less concerned and see the exploitation of the environment as an economic gain (Douglas 1970; Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Thompson et al. 1990; Wildavsky and Dake 1990; Dake 1991; Pendergraft
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1998; Leiserowitz 2006; Kahan et al. 2007a and 2007b; Silva and Jenkins-Smith 2007; Silva et al. 2007; but see Ellis and Thompson 1997). While evidence suggests discernible relationships between cultural orientations and environmental concern, there has been a paucity of research specifically investigating how individuals’ group affiliations condition the impact of their cultural core beliefs vis-à-vis environmental concern. Considering that individual members of society cannot live completely free from any form of social or group-based interaction, ranging from family to greater society, this study seeks to understand how the effect of cultural predisposition, especially egalitarianism, individualism, and hierarchism, on environmental concern is mediated by an individual’s group affiliations, notably party and religious affiliation. Literature suggests that political parties, like religious institutions, send signals to members that can influence their overall policy attitudes and beliefs (e.g., Converse 1964; Jacoby 1988; Zaller 1992). Recent studies show that such group signals interact with an individual’s fundamental core values and beliefs that may collectively influence issue attitudes (Jackson 2014). As discussed earlier, there is broad consensus, for instance, that strong egalitarians are more likely to worry about the environment, while strong individualists are generally less concerned. Would this configuration hold to the same degree for those who are affiliated with different political parties? Also, could the same relationship between egalitarianism/individualism and environmentalism be applied to those with different religious affiliations? In the following, we attempt to answer these questions and explore the mediating impact of group affiliations on the relationship between core values and environmental concern. Using a survey of more than 9,000 individuals in the United States, we explore the impact of partisanship and religious affiliation on the relationship between cultural orientation and environmentalism.
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Theoretical Conjectures Cultural Worldview and Environmental Concern Much of the previous research examining the ways in which individuals’ values and beliefs translate into policy preferences and political behaviors seeks to understand the hierarchically structured nature of personal values and beliefs (Rokeach 1973; Schwartz and Bilsky 1987; Schwartz 1992; Verplanken and Holland 2002; Jacoby 2006; but see Tetlock 1986; Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997; Maio and Olson 1998). In the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), for instance, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith argue that a hierarchical belief system is grounded in an individual policy actor’s enduring deep core beliefs, “foundational normative and ontological axioms” regarding qualities of human nature, priority of ultimate values, and distributive justice (1993, 31). Deep core beliefs manifest themselves in policy core beliefs which are related to “fundamental policy positions concerning the basic strategies for achieving normative axioms of deep core,” such as orientation on substantive policy conflicts (e.g., environmental protection vs. economic development) (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993, 31; Jenkins-Smith, Mitchell, and Herron 2004; Sabatier and Weible 2007). Policy core beliefs, in turn, help structure what are referred to as more specific secondary aspects of issue attitudes, which are associated with the particulars of policy implementation (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993, 31). Of particular interest among the various components of a personal belief system are gridgroup cultural orientations (as deep core beliefs) that have direct bearings on concern for the environment (as policy core beliefs). As presented in Figure 1 (Song, Silva, and Jenkins-Smith 2014, 531), Mary Douglas (1970) argues that an individual’s social relationship can be explained by two conceptual dimensions of sociality: group and grid. Group is conceptualized as “the
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extent to which an individual is incorporated into bounded units” (Thompson et al. 1990, 5) and represents the degree to which “the individual’s life is absorbed in and sustained by group membership” (Douglas and Wilsdavsky 1982, 191). Grid is conceived as “the degree to which an individual’s life is circumscribed by externally imposed prescription” (Thompson et al. 1990, 5), and it characterizes social regulation or existing social institutions that control an individual’s social relationships (Ripberger et al. 2012). Based upon these two conceptual dimensions of sociality, Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) juxtapose four distinct, relatively enduring cultural types: egalitarians, individualists, hierarchs and fatalists. Figure 1. Grid-Group Cultural Orientation Framework Grid Strong
Fatalists (Life is luck!)
Hierarchs (Institutionalized authority)
Weak
Strong Individualists (Liberty)
Group
Egalitarians (Equality)
Weak
Egalitarians possess strong group and weak grid orientations: Fairness and equality is the social norm of pursuit. They conceive that the ecosystem is extremely fragile and are expected
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to worry more about the environment than any other cultural type.1 They are more anxious about the environment not only because of their concern for the planet, but also because strict regulation of businesses will reduce “commercial activities that produce social inequality and legitimize unconstrained self-interest” (Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic and Mertz 2007a, 469). Individualists who have weak group and grid orientations do not consider themselves to be subject to control by others or existing institutional constraints. They are libertarians who prefer contract-based social relations, which is the profound normative principle of the modern free market system. They view the environment to be robust but tend to discount the risks related to their own behavior; hence they consider strict government policies to protect the environment as unnecessarily costly (Kahan et al. 2007b). Strong individualists, therefore, are expected to be less concerned about the environment compared to other cultural types. Hierarchs hold strong group and grid orientations and fear deviation from established rules and social disorder. Although they consider the environment to be relatively robust, they tend to defer to the authority of experts to determine the degree of human exploitation that the planet can endure (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Thompson et al. 1990). When dealing specifically with environmental issues, hierarchs are generally less biased than egalitarians and individualists unless they perceive any significant threat or boon to social order in the introduction of new technology or business activities into the ecosystem. Therefore, we expect hierarchs’ level of environmental concern to be situated between egalitarians’ and individualists’. Fatalists retain weak group and strong grid orientation and choose to cope with erratic events in a random world, instead of trying to manage or learn from them. No previous studies report that cultural biases of this sort have any significant impact on environmentalism (Jones
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For an expanded view of how the different cultural worldviews conceptualize the relationship between human beings and the environment, see the discussion of “Myths of Nature” in Thompson et al. (1990).
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and Song 2014). Therefore, the fatalist worldview will not be included in the subsequent discussion.2 Group Socialization and Transmission of Intergroup Norms When we think about individual life within society, it is hard to imagine that individuals could live without group affiliations, whatever they may be. These may include anything from social groups such as clubs, religious groups of various denominations, or political groups such as political parties. Understanding the influence of these groups on individual members has been the primary focus of research in social psychology (Guimond 2000). In this context, we define group as a social group wherein individuals interact with one another and share similar interests that form the basis for social cohesion and unity. A social group shares common values and motives, and agrees upon a set of norms and attitudes towards matters relevant to the group. These may include setting mutual goals and establishing acceptable punishments and sanctions for violation of group norms. Group influence is a process of socializing members to a common set of norms, attitudes, and behaviors that have been examined across a number of different areas including stereotypes, prejudices, and political beliefs (Turner 1991; Mugny and Perez 1998). According to Guimond (2000), groups are essentially agents of social transmission and send signals to members on how they should react to particular policy initiatives, including environmental issues. Furthermore, an individual’s attitudes and beliefs on particular issues can change as a function of the groups they join.
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Alternatively, Inglehart (1990) suggests two basic cultural orientations – materialist and post-materialist. Materialists are concerned primarily with economic security while post-materialists are more focused on quality-oflife issues. With regard to environmental policy, a materialist prefers less government regulation of business in order to maximize profits. By contrast, post-materialists are willing to sacrifice economic growth in order to protect the environment; this explains their support for environmental activism (Inglehart 1990; Dunlap, Van Liere, Mertig, and Jones 2000; but see Kidd and Lee 1997). Inglehart’s concept of cultural orientation does not account for the hierarchs and fatalists suggested by Douglas and Wildavsky (1982). Also, the materialism–post-materialism belief system does not measure the same dimensions of culture that Douglas and Wildavsky measured.
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Thus, we might expect that the core values of an individual based on their cultural worldview may interact to some degree with the social signals being transmitted by these particular groups. But what happens when an individual’s core values diverge from the group’s position on a particular policy issue such as environmentalism? We investigate this conjecture in the following analysis across two political meaningful groups – political party and religious affiliation – to determine how the relationship between core values and environmental concern change in response to the position of these political and religious institutions. Party Affiliation and Environmental Concern A rich body of literature has focused on the importance of political party identification in shaping attitudes towards policy issues including the environment. According to Liere and Dunlap’s (1980) political hypothesis, Democrats are more concerned about the environment than their Republican counterparts. In the early stages of the environmental movement in the 1960s and 1970s, environmentalism was seen as largely an apolitical issue that enjoyed mass support across partisan lines (Ogden 1971; Dryzek, Downes, Hunold, Scholsberg, and Hernes, 2003). However, consensus on environmental issues is no longer the case due in large part to increasing politicization of the issue and polarization between the two major political parties (Buttel and Flinn, 1976; Jacques, Dunlap, and Freeman, 2008). As Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes posited in 1960, partisanship is a deep psychological attachment to a political party, so Republicans and Democrats could be expected to be rather intractable on their views regarding the environment. Research suggests several reasons for this divide between Republicans and Democrats on the issue of environmentalism and environmental concern. Dunlap (1975) finds that efforts to address environmental conditions require reforms that may be less savory to traditional
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Republican values, including additional costs to business and industry, greater involvement of government in the form of regulation, and the requirement of somewhat drastic and innovative action; hence, it is argued that Republicans will demonstrate less concern for the environment than Democrats. While not anti-business, Democrats prefer significantly more government regulation than their Republican counterparts because they do not trust that businesses will regulate themselves out of concern for the environment. More recent studies have tested this hypothesis and have found significant differences between Democrats and Republicans on a variety of measures concerning attitudes towards the environment (e.g., Leiserowitz 2006; Xiao and McCright, 2007; Kahn and Kotchen, 2010). Republicans and Democrats also receive information from party leaders and other elites via the mass media (Zaller, 1992). Key issues typically “belong” to one party or the other as candidates take strong stances on particular issues and convince the public that their party is better suited to handle certain problems (Petrocik, 1996). With regards to the environment in general and global climate change specifically, Democrats have staked their claim through their campaign rhetoric and policy positions. Based on the different preferences of Democrats and Republicans in relation to the environment, how do the parties’ policy signals interact with the core values and beliefs of individual members? What happens when signals from the party conflict with an individual’s cultural worldview on a particular issue, such as environmentalism? Put differently, how is the relationship between cultural orientation and environmental concern conditioned by this particular type of group affiliation?3 We expect to find the impact of cultural
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Jackson (2014) explores how ideologues and moderates form policy preferences with a particular focus on the influence of core values and beliefs as measured by cultural orientation. The findings demonstrate that those with weaker ties to a particular political orientation tend to rely more heavily on their cultural worldview when forming policy attitudes than those with stronger partisan and ideological orientations. This study provides an interesting foundation in which to explore the interactive effect between core values and group affiliation in ways that literature on political behavior has yet to explore.
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orientation on environmentalism to vary across types of political groups in ways consistent with previous literature. It is conjectured, for instance, that those with a stronger egalitarian bias are more concerned about the environment than those with stronger individualist or hierarchical orientations. Furthermore, we would expect the positive association between egalitarian bias and environmental concern to be stronger among individuals who identify as Republicans, who are predisposed to lower levels of concern, than those who self-identify as Democrats. The reason for this conjecture is that when group norms and positions on particular policy issues such as environmentalism conflict with individual core values such as cultural worldview, individuals will strive to protect these core values in ways that might diverge from the main position of the group (or from other group members) rather than when group signals mirror existing predispositions. Religious Affiliation and Environmental Concern Another group that is argued to leverage considerable influence on concern for the environment in the mass public is religious affiliation.4 Studies on the relationship between religion and environmentalism tend to focus analysis on three subsets of general religious groups, including “non-religious” seculars, Catholics, and Protestants (Biel and Nilsson 2005). The primary focus of our discussion, however, is Protestants and Catholics, mainly because, technically, conceiving of “non-religious” seculars as a religious group is arguable, especially in the context of this research, as members of this secular category do not hold similar settings of formal group socialization and transmission of intergroup norms, when compared with the members of Protestant and Catholic churches. In regards to environmental concern amongst
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Religiosity or religious commitment has also been used to explain environmental concern. This concept includes church attendance and evangelicalism, which are both negatively related to concern (Kanagy and Nelson 1995; Guth et al.1995); however other scholars have determined that environmental attitudes are associated with religious denominations and not related to religious commitment (Hand and Van Liere 1984; Peterson and Liu 2008).
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Protestants and Catholics, studies show that Protestants appear to place a lower priority on environmental issues than their Catholic counterparts for a number of reasons5 (Hand and Van Liere 1984; Greeley 1993; Guth et al. 1995; Dietz et al. 1998; Warner 2008). First, Protestants are often differentiated from other Christian denominations based largely upon the strength of their beliefs. They are often associated with conservative Christian eschatology, evangelicalism fundamentalism, and/or biblical literalism, such as the Old Testament’s post-flood parable in which God gives man dominion over the Earth. Several studies have reported the negative impact of these characteristics on environmentalism (Eckberg and Blocker 1989; Greeley 1993; Guth et al. 1995; Kanagy and Nelson 1995; Schultz, Zelezny, and Dalrymple 2000). Catholics, as we have stated, consistently emerge as the most concerned of the religious affiliations.6 According to Warner (2008), for the past several decades, American Catholicism has successfully embraced environmentalism by broadening a practical theology of social justice and calling for new moral responsibilities for future generations while reinforcing its religious identity by reframing emerging environmental issues into their existing moral worldviews. Pope John Paul II, for example, initiated the emphasis of environmental stewardship in numerous social teachings during the 1980s, and American Catholics organically responded to this initiative by calling attention to a “distinctive Catholic” contribution to environmental ethics through lay civic engagement. How do the different positions of these religious groups with regards to environmentalism interact with the core values and beliefs of individual members? Similar to
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However, studies that indicate Protestants are not as worried about the environment as other religious affiliations, such as Catholics, should not be interpreted as evidence that they are not at all concerned. On the contrary, research has shown that Protestants are more troubled by the direct effects environmental degradation will have on humans rather than on Earth’s plants and animals (Shultz et al. 2000). 6 Studies that have combined Catholics and Protestants into one Judeo-Christian category have reported a negative relationship between environmental concern and religion (Eckberg and Blocker 1989; Kanagy and Nelson 1995).
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the intervening effects of party affiliation, we would expect to find the impact of cultural orientation on environmentalism to vary across different religious affiliations. Again, we argue that when group norms and positions on particular policy issues such as environmentalism conflict with individual core values such as cultural worldview, these attitudes are essentially reinforced to a greater extent when group signals compete with core values rather than when group signals mirror core values. Thus, taking again the example of the egalitarian case, we conjecture that the positive relationship between egalitarian worldview and environmental concern will be strengthened among Protestants, who are thought to be less concerned about the environment, and weaker among Catholics, who are considered to be more pro-environment and concerned about environmental conditions. Data, Variables, and Measures Survey Data To test these conjectures, we use original data collected from a four-year annual nationwide Internet and telephone survey of 9,210 American adults conducted from 2008 to 2011. The Internet survey sample (a total of 7,480) was drawn from Survey Sampling International’s (SSI) regular panel of approximately 400,000 Internet survey recruits whose demographic characteristics approximates national census characteristics. The telephone survey sample consisted of 2,009 individual respondents who were selected from the Random Digit Dialing method. The Institutional Review Board approved the survey and overall research design for human research participant protection. The average age (in years) of survey participants was 47.8. Approximately 53% of total survey respondents were female, approximately 83% were non-Hispanic whites, and 41% had at least a college degree. Survey participants’ median annual household income fell in the range between $40,000 and $50,000.
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Variables and Measures We employed ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to test the aforementioned theoretical postulations in the first part of the data analysis. The variables and associated models are presented in Table 1. Table 1. Variables and Associated Models Dependent variable
Environmental concern
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
Egalitarianism Individualism Independent Hierarchism variable Party affiliation Group affiliation Religious affiliation Knowledge of environmental issues Race Gender Control Demographic ● Age variable characteristics Education Income Survey year Note: Variables specified in each model are marked with a black circle. Cultural orientation
● ●
●
●
●
The dependent variable is the level of environmental concern, and our primary independent variables are cultural orientations and group affiliation. Levels of issue-specific knowledge, demographic characteristics, and survey year were used as control variables in the models. Model 1 consists of the dependent variable on the left side and only knowledge and demographic control variables on the right side of the regression equation. Then, we added cultural orientation variables in Model 2 to test the hypotheses concerning the relationship between cultural orientations and environmental concern while controlling for the influence of other related factors on environmental concern. Model 2 also examines whether cultural orientation variables collectively improve the overall explanatory power of the model in explicating the dependent variable. Then, we added group affiliation variables – party affiliation
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variables in Model 3 and religious affiliation variables in Model 4 – to test the hypotheses regarding whether group affiliations have mediating effects on the relationship between cultural orientation and environmental concern and to assess whether such group affiliation variables add any explanatory power to Model 2. More detailed model specifications can be identified from the regression results presented in Table 7. Table 2. Dependent Variable and Measures Variable
Measure How concerned are you about the quality and the stability of the environment?* (0=Not at all concerned to 10=Extremely concerned) On a scale from zero to ten, where zero means that nature is robust and not easily damaged and ten means nature is fragile and easily Levels of environmental damaged, how do you view nature? (0=Robust and not easily damaged concern to 10=Fragile and easily damaged) On a scale where zero means the natural environment is not at all threatened and ten means the natural environment is on the brink of disaster, how do you assess the current state of the natural environment? (0=Not at all threatened to 10=On the brink of disaster) Environmental concern index Index of above three items (α=0.65) * This question wording was used in 2008 and 2009 surveys and replaced with the following wording in 2010 and 2011 surveys, using the same scale: How concerned are you about the effects of human activities on the environment? (0=Not at all concerned to 10=Extremely concerned) As discussed earlier, the dependent variable of interest in our analysis is the level of environmental concern. This variable is an index measure constructed from the three survey items presented in Table 2. For each of the three questions used in the index, respondents were asked to answer on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 implying the least amount of concern for the stability, fragility, and collapse of the environment, and 10 representing the greatest concern. We created the environmental concern index for each individual respondent by taking the mean of individual scores for these three survey questions. These three measures were fairly reliable with a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.65. It should be noted that the first question’s wording was used in 2008 and 2009 surveys and then replaced with the following wording in 2010 and 2011 surveys,
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using the same 10-point scale: How concerned are you about the effects of human activities on the environment? (0=Not at all concerned to 10=Extremely concerned). Table 3. Primary Independent Variables and Measures Variable
Egalitarianism
Egalitarianism index
Individualism
Individualism index
Hierarchism
Hierarchism index Party affiliation Religious affiliation
Measure What our society needs is a fairness revolution to make the distribution of goods more equal. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) Society works best if power is shared equally. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) It is our responsibility to reduce the differences in income between the rich and the poor. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) Index of above three items (α=0.76) Even if some people are at a disadvantage, it is best for society to let people succeed or fail on their own. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) Even the disadvantaged should have to make their own way in the world. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) We are all better off when we compete as individuals. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) Index of above three items (α=0.70) The best way to get ahead in life is to work hard and do what you are told to do. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) Our society is in trouble because we don’t obey those in authority. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) Society would be much better of if we imposed strict and swift punishment on those who break the rules. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree) Index of above three items (α=0.67) 0=Republican; 1=Democrat 0=Protestant; 1=Catholic
Measures of cultural orientation compose the primary independent variables of interest. Using scales from (randomly provided) nine survey items on cultural worldview presented in Table 3, we asked survey respondents to rate the degree of their agreement with the given statements (related to cultural worldview) on a 7-point scale, with high scores meaning strong agreement. Then, we constructed three respective indices for egalitarianism, individualism, and
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hierarchism by taking the mean of the three respective survey items. We checked the dimensionality of these measures by conducting factor analysis with varimax rotation and found that these nine cultural orientation items loaded into three factors making up the three dimensions of cultural orientation suggested in the literature (Douglas 1970; Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Song 2014; Thompson et al. 1990). Cronbach’s Alpha scores, ranging from 0.67 to 0.76, show that these items are fairly reliable in measuring each cultural orientation of interest. Party affiliation and religious affiliation are the two remaining independent variables of primary concern in this study. Party affiliation is a dummy variable, coded 1 for survey respondents who are affiliated with the Democratic Party and 0 for those affiliated with the Republican Party. As for the dummy variable representing religious affiliation, we assigned 0 for self-identified Protestants and 1 for Catholics. In order to estimate the effect of our primary independent variables on the dependent variable more precisely, several control variables (grounded in competing theoretical explanations) are also included in the model. As presented in Table 4, the first control variable included in the analysis is the individual’s level of knowledge of environmental issues. Although there is a considerable amount of literature on the importance of policy specific information on shaping policy preferences (Jacoby 2006; Kellstedt et al. 2008), there is scant evidence on how environmental knowledge actually shapes an individual’s environmental attitude (O’Connor et al. 1999; Bamberg 2003; Leiserowitz 2006). We believe that the measure has both construct and face validity when included in the overall model. The environmental knowledge index includes a total of 10 yes-no questions in the survey related to the causes and consequences of global climate change, and represents the number of these survey questions each respondent answers correctly. For each individual respondent, a high knowledge index
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Table 4. Control Variables and Measures Variable
Levels of knowledge of environmental issues
Knowledge index Gender Race Age Education Income Year * Correct answer
Measure Do most scientists expect temperatures to rise? (0=No; 1=Yes*) Do most scientists expect ocean levels to drop? (0=No*; 1=Yes) Do most scientists expect more frequent droughts? (0=No; 1=Yes*) Do most scientists expect fewer floods? (0=No*; 1=Yes) Do most scientists expect more severe weather storms, like hurricanes and tornadoes? (0=No; 1=Yes*) Do scientists believe exhausts from cars and trucks cause global temperatures to rise? (0=No; 1=Yes*) Do scientists believe radiation from nuclear power plants causes global temperatures to rise? (0=No*; 1=Yes) Do scientists believe disposal of toxic chemicals in landfills causes global temperatures to rise? (0=No*; 1=Yes) Do scientists believe coal-powered electricity plants cause global temperatures to rise? (0=No; 1=Yes*) Do scientists believe the destruction of jungles and forests causes global temperatures to rise? (0=No; 1=Yes*) Index of above ten items (A total number of correct answers) 0=Female; 1=Male 0=Non-White; 1=White, Not Hispanic Age in years The highest level of education completed (1=Elementary or some high school to 7=Doctorate (of any type)) Total estimated annual income (1=0-$10,000 to 21=$200,000 or more) 0=Year 2008; 1=Year 2009; 2=Year 2010; 3=Year 2011
represents a high level of environmental knowledge. Demographic characteristics of individual respondents constitute other control variables. As previous studies indicate, support for the environment is greater among high income, non-white, female, or more educated people than among poor, white, male, or less educated individuals (Van Liere and Dunlap 1980; Rothman and Lichter 1987; Mohai 1990, Mohai and Bryant 1992, O’Connor et al. 1999; Leiserowitz 2006; Kahan et al. 2007b; but see Wolkomir et al. 1997; Kellstedt et al. 2008). As such, we control for the effects of gender (dummy variable coded 0 for female and 1 for male), race (dummy variable coded 0 for Non-White and 1 for White (not Hispanic)), age (in years), level of
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education (scale of 1 for lowest level of education to 7 for highest), and income (21-point scale ranging from 1 (=total estimated annual household income of 0 through $10,000) to 21 (=total estimated annual household income of $20,000 or more)). Finally, in the following regression analysis, we model a dummy variable for each year from 2009 to 2011, with base category of 2008, in order to take into account any differences that may have occurred between different years within the scope of time in this analysis. Table 5. Descriptive Statistics Variable Environmental concern Egalitarianism Individualism Hierarchism Knowledge Age Education Income
n 6,707 6,620 6,641 6,624 7,357 8,996 9,172 7,282
Mean 6.40 4.26 4.43 4.65 7.21 47.83 3.44 6.20
S.D. 1.92 1.52 1.34 1.30 1.71 16.88 1.30 4.27
Median 6.67 4.33 4.33 4.67 7.00 48.00 3.00 5.00
Min 0 1 1 1 0 18 1 1
Max 10 7 7 7 10 94 7 21
When examining descriptive statistics (shown in Table 5), there are no noticeable statistical problems in the distributional characteristics of the variables in use. Generally, respondents hold a moderate level of environmental concern, with a mean score of 6.4 on the environmental concern index, which ranges from 0 to 10. As for cultural orientation measures, on average, respondents’ hierarch tendency is stronger than individualistic or egalitarian affinities by a very small margin. Respondents possess fairly high levels of knowledge regarding environmental issues while showing typical positively skewed income distribution. Table 6 presents the frequencies of the categorical variables used in the analysis. Out of 4,125 valid respondents who affiliated with a particular political party, 45.24% were Republicans and the remaining 54.76% were Democrats. Among the 2,131 respondents who reported clear affiliation with a Christian church in 2008 and 2009, 60.49% were Protestants, and the remaining
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39.51% were Catholics. It is noteworthy that our survey asked a religious affiliation question in 2008 and 2009, but not in 2010 and 2011. Table 6. Frequency Table Variable Party affiliation Religious affiliation Race Gender Year
n 4,125 2,131 7,486 9,185 9,210
Category 1 Republican (45.24%) Protestant (60.49%) Non-White (16.81%) Female (52.88%) Year 2008 (25.79%)
Category 2 Democrat (54.76%) Catholic (39.51%) White* (83.18%) Male (47.12%) Year 2009 (18.44%)
Category 3 Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Year 2010 (26.26%)
Category 4 Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Year 2011 (29.51%)
* Not Hispanic Empirical Findings Table 7 presents the OLS regression results grounded in the previous discussion. Model 2 (results shown in the second column of the table) is designed to test the relationship between cultural orientation and environmental concern regardless of an individual’s group affiliations, while controlling for other factors based upon competing theoretical claims. When we add three cultural orientation measures to Model 1, which consists of control variables only (i.e., knowledge, demographics, and year dummies) on the right side of the regression equation, the proportion of variance of the dependent variable (i.e., environmental concern) explained by the model increased drastically, as shown in the increase of Adjusted R2 from 0.093 to 0.269 with statistical significance at the level of p < 0.01 on F test. The estimated results of Model 2 indicate that all three cultural orientations are related to environmental concern in directions and magnitudes consistent with the literature (Dake 1991; Kahan et al. 2007a; Kahan et al. 2007b; but see Ellis and Thompson 1997). Egalitarianism (+0.496, p < 0.01) and hierarchism (+0.138, p < 0.01) are associated with higher levels of environmental concern with statistical significance, while the association is stronger in egalitarianism than in hierarchism. As expected, individualism is significantly associated with a lower level of concern (−0.164, p < 0.01).
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Table 7. OLS Regression Result Dependent variable Environmental concern Model 2 Model 3 0.496** 0.540** (0.016) (0.030) −0.164** −0.173** (0.019) (0.036) 0.138** 0.093* (0.019) (0.039) − 0.654** (0.309) − −0.183** (0.043) − 0.083 (0.049) − 0.039 (0.053) − −
Egalitarianism
Model 1 −
Individualism
−
Hierarchism
−
Party affiliation (1=Democrat)
−
Egalitarianism×Party affiliation
−
Individualism×Party affiliation
−
Hierarchism×Party affiliation
−
Religious affiliation (1=Catholic)
−
Egalitarianism×Religious affiliation
−
−
−
Individualism×Religious affiliation
−
−
−
Hierarchism×Religious affiliation
−
−
−
0.178** (0.013) −0.293** (0.061) −0.544** (0.045) −0.004* (0.001) −0.018 (0.019) 0.003 (0.006) −0.762** (0.062) −0.188** (0.063) −0.231** (0.062) 4.062** (0.183) 5594 0.269 173.10**
0.157** (0.018) −0.159* (0.080) −0.388** (0.059) −0.003 (0.002) −0.046 (0.025) 0.015* (0.008) −0.683** (0.073) −0.212** (0.076) −0.338** (0.107) 3.881** (0.309) 3110 0.282 77.54**
Knowledge
0.199** (0.015) Race (1=White, not Hispanic) −0.541** (0.066) Gender (1=Male) −0.664** (0.049) Age −0.011** (0.002) Education −0.054** (0.020) Income −0.024** (0.006) Year 2009 (1=Year 2009) −0.781** (0.068) Year 2010 (1=Year 2010) −0.303** (0.069) Year 2011 (1=Year 2011) −0.416** (0.067) (Intercept) 6.902** (0.141) Degrees of freedom 5772 Adjusted R2 0.093 F statistic 66.64** *p
