Extra-Legal Governance Institute Working Papers
Understanding then responding to Italian organised crime operations across territories
Paolo Campana Extra-Legal Governance Institute and Nuffield College University of Oxford
[email protected]
Extra-Legal Governance Institute | Department of Sociology | University of Oxford www.exlegi.ox.ac.uk
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Abstract
This paper outlines a theoretical framework to assess organised crime activities across territories and their modus operandi. The framework is based on the distinction ‘governing’ vs. ‘trading’, and is then applied to scrutinise Mafia activities across Europe and draw some policy implications at the EU level. The paper argues against the adoption of complex and overarching anti-Mafia legislation in each member state. Instead, a more restrictive set of measures is recommended. These measures should aim at facilitating (a) cross-border arrest and surrender procedures; (b) gathering and sharing of evidence across member states; and (c) freezing and confiscating assets across borders.
Key words: organised crime, diversification, governance, trade, policy implications
Acknowledgments I am grateful to Julian Roberts, Federico Varese and George Wood for their invaluable comments on an earlier version of this paper, and to Raffaele Cantone (former Anti-Mafia Prosecutor) for insightful discussions on the Camorra. Work on this paper has been funded by the European Union / FP7 Framework (Fiducia Project, Grant agreement 290563, FP7-SSH2011-12).
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1. Introduction
Is a new spectre currently haunting Europe? In an important article that appeared in this journal, Allum (2012: 354) suggests that Italian organised crime operating outside its territory of origin is like a ghost, an ‘invisible presence’ that has nonetheless slowly undermined democracy across Europe. Allum maintains that European law enforcement agencies are not wearing the ‘right’ pair of glasses and thus ‘do not perceive this threat that moves in an invisible and silent way’ (p. 355). Scholars and practitioners fare little better in her analysis, since they are ‘subjective and ideological investigators who construct a set narrative’ (p. 357). The same critique applies to Europol and Eurojust which are seen as ineffective structures ‘put into place at the EU level for political motives’ (p. 357). Finally, national authorities across Europe have so far failed to recognise the need to incorporate parts of the Italian antiMafia legislation into their codes, including the crime of ‘Mafia association’, thus jeopardising their fight against Mafia-like organisations (p. 358). While in agreement with Allum on her call for further research into organised crime1, and specifically into how groups operate outside their territory of origin, this essay takes a different approach to the appropriate response to organised crime.
Overview of the essay This article is an attempt to clarify and conceptualise the terms of the debate. It first assesses the activities and modus operandi of a transnational Mafia-like organisation, and then proposes a framework through which we can interpret instances of the Mafia presence throughout Europe. Subsequently, it will provide an analysis of Italian organised crime operations in 110 cities across 22 European countries. Finally, it offers some policy recommendations regarding the most effective strategies to combat Mafia-like organisations within the European Union. The analysis is based on both the evidence and the theoretical insights discussed.
2. Unpacking the operations of a transnational Mafia group The optimal way to devise effective policies against organised crime is to first open the ‘black box’ of these organisations and to fully understand their daily activities. In other words, we 1
On issues related to researching organised crime, see Edwards and Levi (2008). For a broader view on organised crime vis-à-vis transit crime, see Kleemans (2007).
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first have to be precise about what these organisations do, how they do it, and whether they change their modus operandi across territories. Elsewhere (Campana 2011a) I have explored in depth the operations of the La Torre clan, a Neapolitan Mafia group based in Mondragone, some 50 kilometres north of Naples. Its associates managed to set up ‘branches’ in Scotland (Aberdeen) and the Netherlands (Amsterdam), and ran them for a significant period of time. The elderly son of the founder moved to Aberdeen in the early 1980s and was extradited to Italy only in 2005, while another cousin moved first to Milan (Northern Italy) and then Amsterdam in the early 1990s (Campana 2011b). When the police launched an extensive investigation into the group (1998–1999), six members were living and operating abroad.2 Indeed, the La Torre group is an example of a truly transnational criminal enterprise characterised by a lasting presence outside its territory of origin. Does this imply that the Camorra has managed to successfully colonise countries such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands and, thus, that anti-Mafia legislation in these territories is needed? Examining the ‘black box’ of the La Torre clan helps to answer the question.
A systematic content analysis of the phone conversations involving offenders and wiretapped by the police constitutes an empirical way to unpack the mechanisms underpinning criminal organisations (Campana and Varese 2012).3 Following this approach, I constructed a novel data set of 1,824 contacts exchanged by 202 individuals, including 51 clan members, over a seven-month period, recording characteristics of both contacts and individuals involved. The analysis revealed the La Torre clan’s involvement in the illegal protection business, namely as a supplier of protection against competitors and thieves, protection of economic exchanges (violent brokerage), labour racketeering, dispute settlement and debt recovery. Protection was indeed the core business of the group, accounting for some 63% of the ‘strictly economic’ contacts (Campana 2011a: 218).4 However, there is no evidence of such activities being conducted outside the territory of origin. The international hubs were devoted to a set of specific activities other than protection. In Aberdeen the clan laundered its money through investments in the legal economy (food and catering sector, building sector and real estate) while Amsterdam was the hub devoted to drugs trafficking and the sale of counterfeit money. The different modus operandi also influenced the likelihood of the clan resorting to violence (highest in Italy and practically
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This amounts to 12% of the clan associates (51). The limitations as well as issues of validity and reliability of this approach are discussed in Campana and Varese (2012). 4 Some contacts were established to carry out non-economic tasks, such as managing the internal order of the group. 3
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close to zero abroad).5 I labelled this strategy on the part of Mafias functional diversification. By diversification I mean a strategy according to which Mafia-like organisations do not move or expand their core business (protection) outside their territory of origin but instead diversify their activities across territories through investments in the legal and/or illegal economy. When expanding along the lines of functional diversification, Mafia groups tend to remain dependent on their territory of origin. This was also the case for the La Torre clan until their ultimate demise: their international outposts remained highly dependent on resources coming from Southern Italy; in addition, the ‘kitty’ and more than 80 per cent of the associates were still based in Mondragone at the time of the investigation (Campana 2011a and 2011b).6
3. A framework to interpret organised crime activities: governing vs. trading
The La Torre case establishes the importance of understanding the activities and modus operandi of organised crime groups in each territory in which they operate. This, is turn, has important consequences for the response. The concept of functional diversification is premised on the idea that organised crime groups may execute two distinct set of activities at the same time: they can govern markets as well as trade on markets. This distinction has broader implications that are worth discussing at greater length. The distinctive feature of organised crime groups is their provision of private ordering of exchange (Varese 2010: 14). In other words, they are suppliers of market governance (Varese 2010; also Schelling 1971). When acting as providers of illegal governance, organised crime groups seek a monopolistic influence over a given market in the same way that ‘governments have to have an element of monopoly’ (Schelling 1971: 73–74; see also Paoli 2003, Ch. 4). Mafia-like organisations are a subset of organised crime groups specialised in the provision of protection (Gambetta 1993; Varese 2010); therefore, they have a wider scope than organised crime groups since they aspire to ‘protect any transaction, not just those related to, say, drugs in a given domain’ (Varese 2010: 17). Not all the criminal groups seek to govern markets. As pointed out by Schelling (1971: 73), ‘burglars may be in the underworld, but they apparently do not seek to govern it’. Some criminal organisations may just trade on markets without any aspiration to govern them. 5
Violence was carried out almost exclusively in the territory of origin, and there is no evidence of them resorting to violence outside Italy (resorting to violence in Aberdeen would have been greatly detrimental to the money-laundering operations). In one instance, the clan lost an auction in Aberdeen, but they did not manipulate the auction in any way or make any threats. Had the auction taken place in Mondragone, we would have probably witnessed a different modus operandi. 6 This is in line with the remarks made by Gachevska in her critique of Allum’s piece (2012: 361; on this see also Gambetta 1993: 249–251; Hobbs 1998; Varese 2011: Ch. 2 and 7).
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Mafia-like organisations are by definition suppliers of governance. However, this does not imply that they do so anywhere they may operate. Instead, they may well diversify their activities and change their modus operandi across territories. This means that they may provide illegal protection in one location – usually the territory of origin – where they tolerate no competition, and in other locales they may trade on markets, just like every other actor. The involvement of the La Torre clan in the drug market provides an interesting example of this phenomenon. In Mondragone, the clan was the illegal regulator of this market, granting independent groups permission to operate at the street level in exchange for a ‘licence’ fee.7 In Amsterdam, they operated on the wholesale drug market: they would buy shipments of drugs to resell elsewhere in Europe without seeking to monopolise or govern such market. Here they acted just like every other wholesale trader.8 The goods exchanged in Mondragone and Amsterdam are analytically different. In Mondragone, the clan was selling the right to operate in a given market (governance) while in Amsterdam the clan’s associates were involved in (simpler) illegal trade. The same modus operandi is followed by the ‘Ndrangheta in Germany, as explained by a member in charge of the drug trade: ‘We operate like a trading company […]. We buy the merchandise, have it packaged, hire shipping companies to transport it and pay the duty’; the drugs are then sold on to ‘pimps and a large biker gang […] We don't deal drugs on German streets’.9 The framework outlined is rather general and not specific to Italian organised crime. NonItalian Mafias may also adopt a functional diversification model when expanding their activities abroad. For example, this was the strategy underpinning the expansion of the Moscow-based Solntsevskaya Mafia group into Italy in the mid-Nineties. The Rome ‘branch’ never sought to govern any market, but was established to trade in a number of different markets; at the same time, the Solntsevskaya was actively running a protection racket in Russia (Varese 2012).
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Two groups were granted such permission, and each of them exercised a monopoly over a specific segment of the market. The monthly fee for a monopolistic position on the cannabis market was some €2,500 and some €4,000 for the cocaine market (Interview 1; 1999–2000 prices converted to euros). Since Mondragone is a seaside town popular among the Neapolitan vacationers, the clan charged higher fees in summer (up to €4,000/month for the cannabis and €5,000 for the cocaine: Interview 1). The La Torre clan does not appear to be directly involved in street-level dealings. 8 Details on the clan’s involvement in drug trafficking can be found in the Statement of Charges compiled by the Italian Carabinieri (RCC 2000: 838, 855, 842–6, 871, 872). 9 Excerpt from an interview by the journalist Andreas Ulrich with a Germany-based ‘Ndrangheta member identified by the name of ‘Carlo’ (Ulrich 2011; translated from German).
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4. Making sense of Italian organised crime in Europe
In expanding their operations across territories, Mafias follow a strategy of functional diversification. However, this is not the only possible strategy. They may well move or expand their protection activities (core business) into new territories, following a strategy of ‘transplantation’ (Varese 2011).10 There is thus a need to further scrutinise Mafia activities across Europe and beyond based on the ‘functional diversification / transplantation’ framework, and the associated ‘governing / trading’ distinction. This is a task that goes beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, some preliminary insights on Mafia operations outside Italy can be gained through a systematic analysis of the activities recorded by the former chairman of the Italian Parliamentary Anti-Mafia Commission Francesco Forgione, and listed in the Appendix to Forgione (2009 and 2012). This analysis is non-exhaustive since it relies on official documents published only by Italian authorities, such as reports by the Anti-Mafia Investigative Bureau and the national Anti-Mafia Prosecutor Office, as well as reports by Italian law enforcement agencies and court files.11 To limit the impact of potential biases, I decided to use as the unit of analysis for the data set the locale (city) rather than the single crime episode or criminal group. Where possible, the information provided by Forgione is verified against other openly available sources, including newspaper articles in French, English, Italian, Spanish and, in a limited number of cases, German.12 Clearly, inputs from non-Italian sources and a more systematic approach to data collection would constitute a very welcome addition to the analysis.
In its current version, the data set includes information about 110 different cities across 22 European Union member states.13 The countries with a larger presence of Italian Mafias are Germany (36 cities), Spain (20) and France (11)14. At first glance, these figures may appear to
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As described by Varese (2011: 6), transplantation may take place in territories both contiguous with and far away from the original locale. Moreover, it does not imply that the groups stop running the protection business in the territory of origin. 11 Unfortunately no information on the time period is recorded, but it can be safely assumed that all the references are drawn from official documents released between 2000 and 2010 (Forgione chaired the Anti-Mafia Commission between 2006 and 2008, and published his findings in 2009 and 2012). 12 Forgione’s approach to Mafias tends to be rather sensational and alarmist. Therefore I expect the initial coverage to be skewed towards overrepresentation rather than the opposite, other things being equal (e.g. the biases intrinsic to the original sources). The coding scheme devised and the triangulation with external sources should have kept this individual bias to a minimum. In addition, this bias acts in a direction opposite to the argument of the paper, and thus should reinforce its conclusions. 13 The data set is based on the recorded operations of the three main Italian Mafia organisations (Sicilian Cosa Nostra, Calabrian ‘Ndrangheta and Neapolitan Camorra) in the European Union. 14 This finding is consistent with an exploratory analysis carried out by Transcrime (2013: 220–222) which is also based on Italian official sources only.
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be the ultimate proof of an irresistible colonisation. However, a more careful analysis reveals that the reality is quite different.
Of 110 cities showing some Mafia presence, one third of them are either only a refuge for fugitives (22 cities) or a logistic base with no other activity recorded (13). This still leaves 75 cities in which some activity – legal, illegal or both – has been carried out. Table 1 summarises these activities.
Table 1. Type of Mafia activities across EU Member States (excluding Italy) Type of Activity
Number of Cities
Percentage of Cities
Legal businesses
37
33.6%
Counterfeit goods
28
25.5%
Drug trafficking
27
24.5%
Illegal activities other than protection
10
9.1%
Unspecified activity
12
10.9%
When operating abroad, Italian Mafias appear to carry out investments in legal businesses (a way to ‘launder’ their illegal profits) and be involved in some kind of illegal trade, mainly drug trafficking and smuggling of counterfeit goods. Activities change according to the country. Figure 1 shows some clusters of territorial specialisation across Europe based on a correspondence analysis of activities and countries. This technique reveals patterns of association among variables (Greenacre 1984). The procedure adopted here is based on the scalar product; to facilitate the reading I have highlighted the emerging clusters.15
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Simple correspondence analysis, normalisation symmetrical, chi-square distances.
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Figure 1. Clusters of territorial specialisation of Mafia activities across Europe
Notes: Countries: NL+BE (Netherlands and Belgium); SPA+POR (Spain and Portugal); FRA (France); GER + AUS (Germany and Austria); UK (United Kingdom); Eastern Europe (Romania, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary). Activities: Hideouts; Counterfeit goods; Drugs; Other illeg (Other illegal activities: arms trafficking, gambling, usury and frauds); Eco legal (Investments in legal businesses; money laundering). It includes only countries with Mafia presence recorded in more than one city.
Figure 1 reveals that for drug trafficking and hideouts, Italian offenders tend to turn to countries such as Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands and Belgium. The United Kingdom and the Eastern European countries emerge as jurisdictions where offenders launder illegal proceeds through investments in legitimate activities as well as selling counterfeit goods.16 Investments in legitimate business and selling counterfeit goods also cluster around Germany, France and Austria -- together with a series of illegal activities other than protection (e.g. arms trafficking, gambling, usury and frauds).17 Are these activities instances of governance or trade? Given the non-exhaustive nature of the evidence discussed, it is next to impossible to formulate a definitive answer in this paper. However, some references to protection emerge in 16
Camorra groups, notably the Naples-based Di Lauro and Licciardi clans, are particularly active in the trafficking of counterfeit goods, also relying on a network of independent Neapolitan rag traders that dates back to the 1950s (Brancaccio 2011). 17 Correspondence analysis makes apparent the peculiarity of each territory in contrast with a hypothetical ‘average territory’. This does not imply that, say, drug trafficking is not carried out in Germany, but just that drug trafficking is not the distinctive feature of the Mafia presence in Germany.
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only four cities in Germany, mainly involving Italian restaurateurs and workers (labour racketeering).18 This seems to suggest that the diversification model is currently the most common way for Italian organised crime to operate abroad.
5. Policy implications
The idea that to fight the Mafia outside Italy we need Italian-style anti-Mafia legislation is attractive. However, it is based on the fallacious assumption that organised crime groups tend to operate in the same way in every territory. As shown, this is far from true.19 Part of the problem lies with the concept of ‘transnational organised crime’, which encompasses both instances of governance and trade, and therefore bears very little analytical power in explaining how organised crime groups operate across territories.20 Worse, it may lead to ineffective criminal justice policies.
Mafias pose a varying threat to legitimate states, with the greatest threat in places where they act as illegal suppliers of governance and protection. The provision of protection, legal services and services that facilitate exchange and contracts are among the prerogatives of the State (Barzel 2002: 4), and these prerogatives may be weakened or questioned when an illegal yet credible alternative is present. In places where the State is particularly inefficient, the illegal alternative may become rather attractive. However, Varese (2011) has shown that Mafias find it hard to transplant and reproduce themselves in new areas; governance and protection are difficult businesses to move and export.21 In theory, a transition from trading to governing is possible, but it is not an easy one since it takes much more than just a supply of people trained in violence to succeed (Varese 2011: 191). 22 This transition is also costly: the higher the efficiency of a State and its level of policing, the costlier it is to move from diversification to a fully fledged transplantation. Protection tends to be associated with a higher level of violence, which in turn increases the penalties faced by the offenders but also the chances that the trading activities will be terminated by the authorities. In countries with 18
According to the former Germany-based ‘Ndrangheta member, now state witness, Giorgio Basile, interviewed by Andreas Ulrich (2005). 19 Also the few cases presented in Allum (2012) are instances of functional diversification. 20 Campana (2011a and 2011b) and Varese (2012). For a review of transnational organised crime research see von Lampe (2012). 21 For reasons also related to their ability to collect information, to transfer their reputation and to monitor agents in territories far away as well as the cost of using violence in the new locales (Reuter 1985; Gambetta 1993; Varese 2011; Campana 2011a and b). 22 Nonetheless, authorities should be most aware of early signs of this transition, and act swiftly whenever they may manifest themselves.
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high efficiency and effective policing, it is plausible that the more profitable the trading activities are, the less likely it is that a group will make a transition into protection. 23
The evidence discussed in this paper suggests that Mafias operating abroad tend to be involved in trading rather than governing. Still, Italian Mafia groups have been recorded in at least 110 cities across Europe. How can we best combat this phenomenon? Instead of introducing overarching provisions along the lines of the Italian anti-Mafia legislation in each EU member state24, a more effective approach would entail a combination of much simpler, more focused measures. These would include:
A: Measures to facilitate cross-border arrest and surrender procedures; B: Measures to facilitate the collection and sharing of evidence during both the investigation phase and the trial phase; C: Measures to combat money laundering and facilitate assets seizure and forfeiture across the member states. The European Union has already formalised – and its member states adopted – some of the Type A and B tools. In some cases they need to be amended or enhanced, but they are already a reality. The European Arrest Warrant (EAW) is an important tool to facilitate cross-border arrests and surrenders (Type A). It came into force in 2004. In the La Torre case, the extradition procedure of the members operating in Aberdeen faced a decade-long standstill as a consequence of the non-recognition of Mafia association as a crime in Scottish criminal law (Campana 2011b). It was the implementation of the EAW in Scottish legislation and not the introduction of any specific anti-Mafia provision that brought the standstill to an end, and allowed the handing over of the Aberdeen-based members to the Italian authorities. Extradition procedures usually require an offence to be alleged as crime in both jurisdictions (the double criminality requirement). The EAW abolishes this double criminality requirement for 32 categories of serious offences.25
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The opposite may be true in countries with ineffective law enforcement and low levels of efficiency. I am grateful to Federico Varese for discussion of this point. The transition from diversification to a fully fledged transplantation is an issue that merits further research. 24 As also noted by Gachevska (2012: 363), anti-Mafia provisions should be handled with extreme care, since they may have perverse effects on the quality of democracy and the rule of law. 25 These include participation in a criminal organisation, various types of trafficking offence and the laundering of proceeds of crime. On the EAW, see Spencer (2005) and Pérignon and Daucè (2007). Some of the issues arising from the application of the EAW, including that of proportionality of the offence, are described in EC (2011).
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Eurojust and, to some extent, Europol have been established with the purpose of fostering Type B measures (e.g. setting up joint investigation teams and coordination meetings among prosecutors and law enforcement agencies across Europe; Eurojust now offers a 24-hour assistance for coordination and transfer of knowledge on urgent cases). Better and swifter procedures can certainly be devised in gathering and sharing evidence across countries: for instance, a European Evidence Warrant (EEW) has been devised along the lines of the EAW (see Murphy 2011). 26 However, the number of cases dealt by Eurojust is steadily increasing, and actions are being taken to address operational weaknesses.27 Type C measures remain largely undeveloped. A number of Framework Decisions on freezing and confiscation of assets have failed to achieve the expected results28, as acknowledged also by the European Commission (EC 2012). In some 33% of the cities analysed, Mafia groups were involved in investment in legal businesses via money-laundering procedures: a better tool to target these investments and make more costly for criminals to enter the legal economy is therefore necessary.29 A step in this direction is the new directive on the freezing and confiscation of proceeds of crime drafted by the European Commission in March 2012 (EC 2012).30
6. Conclusions
The key to devising effective policies to fight organised crime operations across territories is to fully understand their activities and modus operandi in each locale, and then to tailor response strategies accordingly. This paper has shown that the modus operandi change significantly across territories. Thus, it is crucial to draw a distinction between instances in which organised crime groups govern markets from those in which they are involved in trading in legal and/or illegal markets. Provision of governance and protection are the distinctive features of Mafia organisations (Schelling 1971; Gambetta 1993; Varese 2011), and yet this is a difficult business to expand or relocate (Reuter 1985; Gambetta 1993; Varese 2010 and 2011; Campana 2011a). A preliminary analysis of Mafia activities in 110 cities across Europe suggests that a diversification model is the most frequently adopted modus operandi abroad. Clearly, this does not necessarily imply that a transition to a fully fledged 26
This directive has yet to be adopted. E.g. see Eurojust (2012) on issues related to drug trafficking cases. 28 FD 2001/500/JHA; FD 2003/577/JHA; FD 2005/212/JHA; 2006/783/JHA; in part also CD 2007/845/JHA (more in EC 2012: 7–8). 29 For a comprehensive view on money laundering and regulations, see Savona (1997) and Levi and Reuter (2006). A detailed analysis on the EU approach as well as country profiles is in Savona (1999). 27
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transplantation cannot take place, and early signs of this transition should be carefully monitored by the authorities and swiftly acted upon. Some Mafia members perceive the lack of an anti-Mafia legislation as an attractive feature of a foreign territory (Allum 2012: 358). However, contrary to what Allum argues, it is a mistake to conclude that implementing such legislation is necessarily the best way to fight Mafia-like organisations outside their territory of origin. Relying on the evidence discussed, the article has argued against the need to implement overarching Italian-style anti-Mafia legislation in all the EU member states. Instead, a more pragmatic, jurisdiction-specific approach is needed. This should be based on a combination of cross-border measures specific in scope and easier to implement in a European legal space populated by several dozen different legal systems.31 These measures should complement the domestic provisions that each member state already has at its disposal (e.g. against illegal weapon possession, drug trafficking, the use of violence or arson, and so on). Indeed, some of the measures discussed (e.g. European Arrest Warrant) have already proven to be rather effective in tackling crossborder crimes, including Italian organised crime. Finally, contrary to Allum’s view, the paper supports a more central role for Eurojust and, to some extent, Europol.
References Allum, F. (2012). ‘Italian Organised Crime in the UK.’ Policing, 6(4): 354-359. Barzel, Y. (2002). A theory of the state: economic rights, legal rights, and the scope of the state. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brancaccio L. (2011). ‘Magliari, imprenditori e camorristi: il mercato del falso a Napoli’. In: R. Sciarrone (ed), Alleanze nell’ombra. Rome: Donzelli, pp. 433 – 479. Murphy C. (2011). ‘The European Evidence Warrant: Mutual Recognition and Mutual (Dis)Trust?” In C. Eckes and T. Konstadinides (eds), Crime within the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: A European Public Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 224-247. Calderoni F. (2012). ‘A definition that does not work: The impact of the EU Framework Decision on the Fight against Organized Crime.’ Common Market Law Review, 49(4): 1365– 1394. Campana, P. (2011a). ‘Eavesdropping on the Mob: the functional diversification of Mafia activities across territories.’ European Journal of Criminology, 8(3): 213-228.
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On the different legal approaches to organised crime in the EU and the problem of harmonising them through a Framework Decision (2008/841/JHA), see Calderoni (2012).
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Campana, P. (2011b). ‘Assessing the movement of criminal groups: some analytical remarks.’ Global Crime, 12(3): 207-217. Campana, P. and Varese F. (2012). ‘Listening to the wire: criteria and techniques for the quantitative analysis of phone intercepts.’ Trends in Organized Crime, 15(1): 13-30. EC (2011). European Commission. Report on the implementation since 2007 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States. Brussels. EC (2012). European Commission. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the freezing and confiscation of proceeds of crime in the European Union. Brussels. Edwards A. and M . Levi (2008). ‘Researching the organization of serious crimes.’. Criminology and Criminal Justice, 8(4): 363-388. Eurojust (2012). Strategic project on: “Enhancing the work of Eurojust in drug trafficking cases”. The Hague. Forgione F. (2009). Mafia Export. Milan: Baldini e Castoldi. Forgione F. (2012). ‘L’altra faccia della globalizzazione.’ In: E. Ciconte, F. Forgione e I. Sales (eds), Atlante delle mafie. Soveria Mannelli: Rubettino, pp. 59-116. Gachevska, K. (2012). ‘On the Persistence of the Mafia ‘ghost’: A Reply to Felia Allum’. Policing, 6:4, 360-364. Gambetta D (1993) The Sicilian Mafia. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Greenacre, MJ (1984). Theory and Application of Correspondence Analysis. London: Academic Press. Hobbs, D. (1998). ‘Going Down the Glocal: The Local Context of Organised Crime.’ The Howard Journal 37(4): 407–422. Kleemans, E. R. (2007). ‘Organised Crime, Transit Crime, and Racketeering’. Crime and Justice, 35(1): 163-215. Levi M. and Reuter P. (2006). ‘Money Laundering.’ Crime and Justice, 34(1): 289-375. Paoli L (2003) Mafia Brotherhood. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pérignon I. and C. Daucè (2007). The European Arrest Warrant: a growing success story. ERA Forum, 8: 203-214. Reuter P (1985) The Organization of Illegal Markets: an Economic Analysis. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice. Savona E. (1997). Responding to Money Laundering. International Perspectives (ed). Amsterdam: Harwood. Savona E (1999). European money trails. Amsterdam: Harwood.
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Schelling, TC (1971). ‘What is the business of organized crime?’ Journal of Public Law 20: 71–84. Spencer, JR (2005). ‘The European Arrest Warrant.’ In: J. Bell and C. Kilpatrick (eds), The Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 2003-2004, Oxford: Hart, pp. 201-217. Transcrime (2013). Gli investimenti delle mafie. Rome: Ministero dell’Interno. Ulrich A. (2005), ‘Tödlicher Auftrag’, Der Spiegel, 12 September. Ulrich A. (2011). ‘Das Kartell’. Der Spiegel, 23 December. Varese, F. (2010). ‘What is organized crime?’ In: Varese F (ed.) Organized Crime. London and New York: Routledge. Varese, F. (2011). Mafias on the Move. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Varese, F. (2012). ‘How Mafias Take Advantage of Globalization: The Russian Mafia in Italy.’ British Journal of Criminology, 52(2): 235-252. Von Lampe, K. (2012). ‘Transnational organised crime challenges for future research.’ Crime, Law and Social Change, 58: 179-194.
Interviews Interview 1. Prosecutor in charge of the case La Torre case, Anti-Mafia Prosecutor Office, Naples. Court file references RCC (1999). Regione Carabinieri Campania. Comunicazione di notizia di reato circa la denuncia di La Torre Antonio + 29 [Offence notice against La Torre Antonio + 29] RCC (2000). Regione Carabinieri Campania. Denuncia a carico di Antonio La Torre (1956) + Altri. [Statement of Charges against Antonio La Torre + Others]
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