Undoing Theory/Practice Dualism - American Psychological Association

Undoing Theory/Practice Dualism: Joint Action and Knowing From Within Darryl B. Hill

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Concordia University and Martin E. Morf University of Windsor Abstract The relation between theory and practice is the object of a central debate in the history of science. In a recent contribution to the issue, Sandelands equates practice with Ryle's "knowing how" and theory with Ryle's "knowing that," arguing that practice and theory are incommensurate forms of knowing such that theory cannot be translated into practice. Craig took issue with Sandelands' position, pointing out that it reflects an academic approach removed from everyday social behavior in which problem solving is always both practical and theoretical. We agree and take this blurring of the theory/ practice dichotomy as our cue to deconstruct the conception of two ways of knowing. Shotter's concepts of "joint action" and "knowing from within" suggest a third type of knowing which develops between knowers in particular contexts or circumstances. This third way of knowing has important implications for psychological training and inquiry. The relation between theory and practice is a central issue in the history of science. In the social sciences and humanities, debates on the relation between theory and practice have taken place over the last 30 years in organizational theory (e.g., Argyris & Schon, 1976), social work (e.g., Goldstein, 1986), education (e.g., Hallinan, 1996), and sociology (e.g., Bourdieu, 1977). In psychology, discourse on theory and practice centers on training models (e.g., Barlow, Hayes, & Nelson, 1984; Frank, 1984; Kanfer, 1990; Peterson, 1985, 1991), and more recently, the development of disciplinary specializations in theoretical psychology (Slife & Williams, 1997). In this discourse, practice usually implies problem solving (the "doing" or the application of theoretical


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knowledge) whereas theory implies abstract explanation (usually some form of contemplation from a vantage point somewhat removed from everyday life). All too often in psychology the scientist and the practitioner are two different people with little interest in the activities of each other. Many psychologists theorize without giving much thought to practical implications, and as many probably practice without conscious reflection on theory. A few value theory/practice integration and reflect on whether their practice has any theoretical basis or theory has any practical use. Under these conditions, the integration of theory, research, and practice occurs in the activities of those few individuals who feel obliged to be consciously aware of both theoretical and practical knowledges (e.g, Fisher, 1982). In an important contribution to the debate, Sandelands (1990) contends that theory and practice comprise two forms of knowing which are incommensurable. In response to Sandelands, Craig (1996) takes issue with the separation of theory and practice. Craig argues theory and practice are interrelated, but stops short of conceptualizing a relation between the two concepts. This paper will show that: (1) the distinction between theory and practice made by Sandelands is equivalent to a Rylean "category mistake" and that theory and practice are deeply interrelated; (2) that the relationship between theory and practice can be conceptualized using Shotter's concepts "joint action" (e.g., Shotter, 1980) and "knowing from within" (e.g., Shotter, 1984); and (3) this reconceptualization of activity within psychology has implications for training and research. That is, an examination of problem solving in everyday life reveals a slippage in the theory/practice dichotomy, ignored by Sandelands, into which "joint action" and "knowing from within" fit. Resolution of this issue is key to understanding how theoretical and practical endeavors in psychology impact each other. Two FORMS OF KNOWING?

Sandelands (1990) begins his examination of the theory/practice problem with Lewin's famous dictum "there is nothing so practical as a good theory" (Lewin, 1951, p. 169). Lewin offered this statement in the conclusion of a paper describing his action research approach to social psychology. While this truism has been used primarily to exhort practitioners to use theory, a closer examination of the context of Lewin's quote shows he might have meant that practice and theory are interdependent tasks pursued by theorists and practitioners sharing common interests (Cartwright, 1978; Fisher, 1982a). Lewin felt practitioners should use theory to help them avoid the painstaking process of figuring out "what works," yet theorists should also devise theory that can apply to practical problems.


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Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psy. Vol. 20, No. 2, 2000

In response to Lewin, Sandelands (1990) rightly asks: what is so practical about theory? Theory, he writes, is "the knowledge that explains things" and practice is "the knowledge that gets things done" (p. 235). He draws this distinction from Ryle (1949), who describes two forms of knowing: "knowing that" and "knowing how," or theory and practice respectively (see Figure 1). Expanding on his definitions, Sandelands notes: "theory involves knowing that certain things follow from other things.... This is knowledge in the form of explanation. In contrast, practice involves knowing how to make certain things happen. . . . This is knowledge in the form of understanding" (p. 237). Further differentiating the two types of knowing, Sandelands asserts that explanation is "a process of inductive generalization whereby events are analysed into parts and generalized to abstract types related by universal laws" (pp. 238-9). In contrast, understanding—which is "completely different from explanation" (p. 239)—"corresponds to any process that exhibits an ability to do something" (p. 240). That is, understanding is a "process of particularization whereby diffuse actions or action tendencies are progressively narrowed and refined to produce expertise" (p. 240). Crucial to Sandelands' view is the notion that understanding precedes explanation. That is, practice comes first, then theory. He writes "all knowledge, including that of explanation, begins with and presupposes understanding" (p. 241). Thus: "Understanding furnishes explanation its basic concepts and logic, and. . .the background necessary to make sense of what it says" (p. 247). Having determined that there are two distinct forms of knowledge, Sandelands (1990) reviews three basic solutions to the problem of theory and practice in psychology. Believing each is unsatisfactory, he concludes that theory and practice differ in "essential and insurmountable ways" (p. 253) such that: Between them is an unbridgeable gulf. Theory is of the mind, practice is of the body, and the problem of relating them recapitulates the problem of relating mind and body. . . .This problem of moving between the two, between mind and body and theory and practice, has been the main philosophical problem since Descartes and remains unsolved, (p. 249) Sandelands thus draws a parallel between the theory/practice problem and the mind/body problem. Moreover, he proposes that practice can be translated to theory, but theory cannot be applied to practice because "theory and practice are logically incommensurable, and consequently, not intertranslatable" (p. 258). Theories only refer to practice as "an abstraction in the mind of the practitioner" (p. 254). Lastly, Sandelands concedes that theories can be practical when they draw attention to some previously ignored aspect of reality. He concludes with his own version of Lewin's famous advice: "There is nothing so



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practical about theory (but it may be good to have around)" (p. 259). Thus, practice and theory are two distinct categories of knowledge, as intractable and incommensurate as mind and body, destined to remain two solitudes forever.1 In his response to Sandelands, Craig (1996) worries that if theory cannot be translated into practice, then much of the human sciences, especially that of theoretical psychology, is largely trivial. If theory cannot be translated into practice, then theory can not suggest changes to practices, and ultimately never help us out of the many dilemmas of the human condition that psychologists study. So Craig rejects Sandelands' artificial dichotomization of theory and practice as "essentially logical" whereas in the everyday social world, theory and practice are "at once theoretical and practical" (p. 66). For instance, Craig (1990) points out that Sandelands defines theory according to the principles of logical positivism, which are premised on distinct differences between theory and practice. In contrast, Craig contends that some theories are more practical than theoretical because they are discursive rather than formal, situated in specific as opposed to general contexts, and function to change practices instead of explaining them. According to Craig's logic, if there are fuzzy boundaries between theory and practice, theory may be an elaborate practice. Craig examines Sandelands' definitions of theory, practice, and application, and finds them to be highly overlapping categories of action. His analysis challenges the polarization of theory and practice into either/or categories, but he does not re-conceptualize theory and practice comprehensively. If theory and practice are highly overlapping categories of social action, how are we to conceive of them? Is there anything distinct about them at all? Moreover, if there is not anything distinct, are they one in the same? Or if there is something distinguishing them, how can they be conceptualized in a way that does not preclude their intertranslation? *We wonder about Sandelands' proposition that mind/body dualism equals theory/practice dualism. On one hand, they are similar because they are both dichotomies. One might even say theory is of the mind and practice is of the body. Theory and mind are subjective, while practice and body are objective. On the other hand, they are different kinds of dichotomies. One is largely epistemological, the other ontological. Theory and practice may be more epistemological—related to how we come to know, what kinds of knowledge are there, and how are they related?—and mind/body is more ontological—what kinds of things are there in the world? Certainly ontological and epistemological issues are interrelated, for what exists has implications for how things are known and vice versa.


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As a beginning answer to these questions, we return to the source of Sandelands' distinction between "knowing how" and "knowing that": Ryle's (1949) Concept of Mind. A reexamination of Ryle's work shows just where Sandelands went wrong and suggests how to conceptualize the distinction between theory and practice. We begin with the observation that Sandelands (1990) begins his analysis by admitting that according to Ryle "understanding and practice are exercises of the same frade-understanding a performance being an aspect of the competence to execute that performance" (p. 237, emphasis added). From here, Sandelands argues that it is impossible to translate understanding into explanation (practice into theory) and vice versa. Sandelands loses Ryle's main point, and the reader is left with a contradiction: how can theory and practice be "of the same trade" yet incommensurable? This contradiction is the starting point of our analysis. What Ryle had to say on the topic is central to our undoing of Sandelands' theory/practice dichotomy. Ryle's Concept of Mind is a challenge to what he calls "the official doctrine." The official doctrine is Cartesian dualism, that "every human being has both a body and a mind" (p.ll) and there are two distinct kinds of existence, physical and mental. Ryle's central point is that dualism is a category mistake because it represents two different species of existence when they actually are quite related. He contends that the principle upon which dualism rests is false because of a category mistake. The mistake is that dualism assumes all mental life belongs to one logical category, the mind, and all bodily life belongs to another category, the body, such that there are "two different kinds of existence" (p. 13), physical entities and mental entities. Mind and body are not two different categories but two parts of the same thing. Ultimately, Ryle is interested in a new theory of mind, but to get there he has to dispel some myths. The first myth he seeks to undo is the distinction between "knowing how" and "knowing that." He distinguishes between these two forms of knowing, as already described by Sandelands, by attributing the differences of these two forms of knowing to the "the official doctrine." Seeing the distinction between "knowing how" and "knowing that" as another category mistake, Ryle proceeds to undo the difference. Ryle's thesis is that when people exercise the capacities of their mind, commonly understood as "knowing that," they also commit overt acts and action, usually understood as "knowing how." He demonstrates this in several ways. First, he points out that while mental acts are often considered theorizing (the necessary pre-cursor of intelligent practice), theory (knowing that) is not necessary for intelligent practice (knowing how). In psychology, we know this because a clinician may be effective without knowing theory. So-called "natural" or "organic" therapists may be excellent at their craft without knowledge



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of propositions, variables, and their relations. And there are psychologists, well-versed in theories of clinical practice, who encounter situations for which there are no rules, yet perform effectively. Thus, theory may be unnecessary for intelligent practice. Moreover, theoretical knowledge (knowing that) is not a sufficient condition for successful practice (knowing how). A respected theorist of psychotherapy could be a bad therapist. One could have a great deal of theoretical knowledge, but fail in its implementation. Another myth that Ryle undoes is the idea that theory is first and practice is second. He contends that if a precondition of intelligent action is prior theoretical consideration, no one would ever be able to act without reflection. It would be tempting, at this point, for Ryle to propose that we act first, and upon reflection, come up with the theory of our actions. But Ryle goes in an unexpected direction. He dismisses the idea that intelligent actions involve two sequentially distinct processes-doing and theorizing-as this would support "the official doctrine" and be a category mistake. He argues that when we consider practice, we also consider theory. His classic example is a clown tripping to make the audience laugh. Ryle asserts that the clown tripping "is both a bodily and a mental process, but it is not two processes, such as one process of purposing to trip and, as an effect, another process of tripping" (p. 33). Action is both the result of thought and action, mind and body, one process, at once mental and bodily. There are many examples of this in psychological practice. A therapist may sense the time is right to confront a client. The confrontation is not just an idea in the therapist's head, but it is also the elocution, timing, and emphasis that combine to make the action of confrontation. Like a clown making us laugh, or confrontations in therapy, most actions are the result of simultaneously knowing how and knowing that. With the example of the clown, Ryle establishes that the operations of thought are but one phase of the management of conduct. Therefore, action does not consist of two processes in different places (i.e., body and mind), but there is one activity. Ryle contends that both "knowing how" and "knowing that" are simultaneously present in even the most minimally complex action. For Ryle there is no practice without thought and no thought without practice. He concludes: "Understanding [knowing that] is a part of knowing how. The knowledge that is required for understanding intelligent performances of a specific kind is some degree of competence in performances of that kind" (p. 54). Thus, "execution and understanding are merely different exercises of knowledge of the tricks of the same trade" (p. 55). The point to this review of Ryle's analysis is that Sandelands' separation of "knowing how" and "knowing that," into incommensurable ways of knowing is a category mistake. Theory and practice are not


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two distinct categories of knowing, like mind and body are not two entity categories. It should also be noted that theory and practice are not one and the same. Ryle is clear that theory and practice are different parts of the same whole connected by a range of action that is both theory and practice. They may be macro- and micro-level events of the same phenomena, happening in parallel, just as sensation and perception, top-down and bottom-up processing occur simultaneously. Neither "knowing that" nor "knowing how" exists solely in isolation— there is a circular relationship, constantly emerging in iteration. Like Craig (1996), we believe that theory and practice are interrelated, not incommensurable. Indeed, it is likely most psychologists agree that there is a range of action in the continuum between theory and practice. Many may agree that theories and practices are distinct only in the most abstract sense. Moreover, many accept that there is a wide range of phenomena described by the terms "theory" and "practice," each showing the fuzziness of the boundary between the concepts. For instance, theories can be implicit (informal) or explicit (formal), simple propositions or elaborate models. Implicit theories, for instance, are probably closer to the practice end of things because they are situated within specific domains and not laden with abstract concepts. A psychologist's "theory" that clients depressed about their successes may not benefit from introspection is an example of a framework that is closer to a reflection on practice. Similarly, one can imagine the range of actions which constitute practice. Some practices are driven by theoretical propositions; therefore some practices are both practice and theory. The researcher who, in the derivation of a scale to assess shyness consults theories of shyness for items, engages in practice that is partly theoretical. As much as Ryle helps undo the theory/practice dichotomy, he fails to provide all the answers to the conceptualization of the interrelatedness of theory and practice. Ryle mistakenly presents his argument in terms of the abstract individual mind, and in doing so, ignores the reality that theories and practices exist in a social and concrete world. Ryle is too much "in the mind" with his concepts of knowing. Sandelands, too, fails to consider problem solving in everyday life or activity as social action. He cannot account for those actions in everyday life which are neither absolute theory nor practice. To address these inadequacies, we propose a conceptual framework to understand the interrelation of theory and practice in everyday social action. RECONCEPTUALIZING THEORY AND PRACTICE AS SOCIAL ACTIONS IN EVERYDAY LIFE

Ryle leaves us with the sense that theory and practice are "of the same trade," and yet how are we to conceptualize this interrelatedness in everyday social action? We contend that theory and practice over-



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lap in the region of social action Shotter calls "joint action" and are subsumed under the form of knowing he calls "knowing from within." Joint action facilitates the conceptualization of the overlap between theory and practice, and knowing from within emphasizes a third type of knowing which is a background or context to all activity (see Figure 2). Joint Action. Shotter (1980) borrows the term "joint action" from Blumer (1969), a Chicago school symbolic interactionist who extends the idea of social acts in the work of George Herbert Mead. Mead (1938) claims that acts are the basic units of goal-directed behavior. According to Mead, even the most rudimentary elements of action involve the consideration of the impulse to act, the perception and definition of the situation, and expectations for the outcome of a series of actions. Most acts are social because most action involves thought, and thought is simply an internalization of language, a symbolic process dependent upon social process. Social acts, then, are goal-directed activities, involving two or more people or patterns of activity coordinated by language and gestures. Blumer (1969) defines joint action as "a larger collective form of action that is constituted by the fitting together of lines of behavior of the separate participants" (p. 70). In social actions, each participant occupies a different position and acts from that position. The resulting interaction is not a simple composite of separate lines of action—it is a merged collaboration that has a distinct history and trajectory. Joint actions are carried out by persons in coordination with, and intelligible to, others. Thus, it is the "fitting together" of these acts, characterized by an interactive and ongoing interpretation and definition of each others' acts, which constitutes joint action. Simply put, actions are usually based on some form of consideration of what others are doing. An individual's actions are coordinated with the actions of another through a social process of interpretive interaction. Blumer cautions that joint action is not only the "interlinkage of the separate acts of the participants" (1969, p. 17), rather it is often the result of an individual's reaction to traditional rules, norms, and values, institutions and social networks, and the individual's own personal history of previous actions. Shotter's joint action is a refinement of Blumer's joint action. Although Blumer assigns an ontological importance to joint action, in Shotter's hands joint action is both about ways of knowing and what exists in the world. Shotter (1980) argues that social action is partially constrained by context—the actions of others and the nature of situations. Social actions are joint actions because we consider others and others influence our actions (Shotter, 1984). Joint actions are constrained, yet they are unplanned and emergent. They are like utterances in a dialogue, moves in a game, making love or fighting, or


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basically "any action in an interaction in which an individual must interweave his actions with the unpredictable actions of others" (Shotter, 1980, p. 32). Thus, in joint actions we are ignorant of what it is we are doing, partly because of the unpredictable actions of others (Shotter, 1980,1995a). Additionally, the reasons behind actions may not be readily available because sometimes: "people act spontaneously, without being conscious while acting or having any particular reasons for their conduct" (Shotter, 1984, p. 103). Despite this, we may have an implicit theory about the kind of situation we find ourselves in, the roles of others, and the function of the actions of others. Shotter (1993b) asserts that these joint actions both constrain and enable, invite and inhibit, because "joint action always creates that third entity—the context, situation, circumstance, etc., that the action is 'in' and must 'fit in' with" (Shotter, 1993b, p. 110). This most commonly occurs in dialogue with others where utterances are related to each other since "the actions of others are just as determinative of our conduct as anything within ourselves" (Shotter, 1993b, p. 4). Knowing From Within. Joint action is important to Shotter's theories of communication and social action because it points to a third type of knowing. There are hints of this in his early work. For example, in 1980 he describes a "synchronic understanding" that develops in social interaction in which all forms of knowing are "simultaneously present" (Shotter, 1980, p. 30). A few years later, he alludes to a third type of knowing when he explains that part of what influences joint action is that people know what it is to be a person (Shotter, 1984). This third knowing is an "insider's knowledge" (Shotter, 1984, p. 130) or a knowledge "from the inside" (Shotter, 1984, p.130). More recently, Shotter (1993b) links joint action and this third type of knowing by focusing on how we relate to each other, how knowing changes, and how the methods of knowing become diverse. Based on the writings of Vygotsky, Mead, and Vico, Shotter describes "knowing from within" as a knowledge grounded in being a particular kind of person, a living and embodied knowledge. Thus knowing of the third kind is sensitive to the "enablements and constraints" (Shotter, 1993b, p. 6) of our circumstances. Interestingly, Ryle figures in Shotter's work also. Shotter presents "knowing from within" as a supplement to Ryle's two forms of knowing. Shotter (1993b) explains that his third kind of knowing is not a "knowing that" or a "knowing how," but "a knowing 'from within' a situation or circumstance" (p. xiii). The third knowledge is not "knowing that" because it is relevant only in specific and concrete situations. It is not "knowing how," because it derives its meaning in relation to others. It is a knowledge that is prior to and determines the other two kinds of knowledge, a moral kind of knowledge dependent on, and considerate of, other persons. Therefore:



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Knowing of the third kind is not theoretical knowledge (a 'knowing-that' in Ryle's (1949) terminology) for it is knowledge-in-practice, nor is it merely knowledge of a craft or skill ('knowing how'), for it is joint knowledge, knowledge-held-in-common with others. It is a third kind of knowledge, sui generis, that cannot be reduced to either of the other two, the kind of knowledge one has from within a situation, a group, social institution, or society. (Shotter, 1993a, p. 19) "Knowing from within" is an interpretive understanding, a middle path between theoretical and productive knowledge. It is knowing not just within a situation, but also within a person, and it is "prior to both theoretical and merely technical knowledge" (Shotter, 1993a, p. 40). This is a knowledge of being a particular person interacting with others who is differently positioned or situated at different times (Shotter, 1995b). As implied by Figure 2, "knowing from within" is knowledge of context, a background to all knowing. Theory/Practice in Everyday Social Life. Sandelands sees theory as something formulated in isolation, in one's mind, and practice as something done out there in the world. In contrast, Shotter's concept of joint action suggests that both theory and practice are social behaviors. The theorist is constantly aware of others' positions, and the practitioner is always interacting with others. Moreover, joint actions, as practice and theory, occur within a context against a background of "knowing from within." Theory and practice occur simultaneously, jointly, a form of action that includes "knowing how,", "knowing that," and "knowing from within." How do we apply these concepts to the theory/practice problem? Surprisingly, Shotter reinforces the importance of practice and seemingly conflates the concepts. He, like others, believes practice comes before theory, theories are subservient to practices since theories are "both after the fact and beside the point" (Shotter, 1997, p. 351). His recent work suggests he is heading towards an account of "practices of practices" (Bayer & Shotter, 1998), and a notion of "practical-theory," a partial and practical knowing. (It is important to note that the relationship between theory and practice is not Shotter's main concern. Thus, there is some disjunction between our interpretation of the import of these concepts for the theory/practice problem and his own.) Of course there are others who contend that the opposite relation between theory and practice is true; that is, theory comes before practice. Robinson (1997), for example, in an analysis of psychological therapy argues that therapy "instantiates a theory; a theory about the forms of life worth living" (p. 675). Therapy is theory not in the sense of a formal school of thought, but a civics, a set of moral principles about how one should live. Robinson asserts that without theory, psy-


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chological practice would be simply habit or caprice. He concludes that "The therapeutic act is but a theory in practice" (p. 678) and therapy is "the derivative of an abstract theory of human nature" (p. 680). Both Robinson and Shotter's positions are tempting, but we feel that a dialectical approach to the theory/practice dichotomy is necessary. We do not want to simply privilege practice over theory, as Sandelands and Shotter suggest, or theory over practice, as Robinson would have it. We wish to "see beyond" or undo the dichotomy. We believe that the concepts of "joint action" and "knowing from within" deconstruct theory/practice dualism and show that any absolute separation between theory and practice is a mistake. We believe there are several ways in which "joint action" and "knowing from within" can be used to understand the notion of theory and practice as "tricks of the same trade." In one sense, joint action highlights how both theory and practice are constrained and enabled by the actions of others and the context. Ryle (1949) uses the example of two people playing chess to illustrate how our actions are often dictated by rules and conventions, and although we may have the autonomy to act independently, our actions ultimately affect the actions of others. Thus, in a chess game, as in psychological practice, the actions of others and the context are conceptual guides or frameworks that "inform" the actions of persons. Both enable people to see a world they might have missed before, and both constrain conceptions, preventing people from seeing other worlds. As Gergen and Basseches (1980) argue, both theory and practice may alter or perpetuate patterns of social activity by transforming "modes of conceptual organization and their related social activity," and "the social structures that organize their activity" (p. 37). Therefore, in any given context, there are certain actions which are possible and others which are not. Previous theories and practices are the structures for each other. Both are limited by the overarching paradigms on the issue in question and the realities of action in the lived world. Yet these constraints are also flexible and dynamic because as joint action tells us, there is something new or unintended that emerges when theory and practice are integrated. Sandelands admits some overlap between theory and practice when he writes "theory can be practical: eg., when it draws attention to some aspect of reality previously ignored, just as art can reveal 'new ways of seeing or feeling'" (p. 254). We may act differently when theory highlights unactivated tendencies in the practitioner, and these effects may change practices. Is that where the inter-relation of theory and practice ends? What happens when a clinical psychologist, such as Carl Rogers or George Kelly, reflecting upon their practice, develops a theory? Moreover, to say that there is no translation of theory into practice, as Sandelands' does, is to dismiss those who use the basic



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problem-solving model dominant in the social sciences. In the scientific problem-solving process, as aptly stated by Craig (1996) "neither theory nor practice can be understood coherently except in relation to the other" (p. 77). The process of science to many is a never-ending hermeneutic of theories, hypothesis, research, and evaluation of theory, and applications of theories in laboratories and real world contexts. Psychologists will often modify theories because of unsuccessful or successful practice, and this modification becomes the basis for new research and perhaps practices. Thus, most activity in psychology is jointly theory and practice. Using Sandelands' framework, however, a hybrid conceptualization of theory and practice is inconceivable. "Knowing from within" is helpful to articulate what happens when the practitioner and theorist interact with others in everyday problem solving. Practitioners of psychology know only too well how unanticipated events often arise (often as a result of the unexpected actions of others), and they have to act without any theoretical guidance. In choosing such emergent actions, the practitioner considers actions appropriate for the given context, by relying on heuristics, intuitions, or implicit theories. Practitioners choose actions based on their understanding that the situation comprises a set of actions developed in conjunction with others against a background that has defined their joint actions. Thus they are acting on an implicit theory, or at the very least they are acting on their knowledge of actions within a particular context. For instance, many Western psychologists take for granted the notion of an autonomous self, and this informs their practices. However, psychologists practicing in other cultures, especially non-Western cultures, may not rely on this notion simply because it is not part of their background of knowing. "Knowing from within" dominates psychological theory and research, suggesting significant overlap between the concepts. An illustration of this is the way theoreticians in psychology, in order to make their thoughts intelligible to their colleagues, rely on concrete examples to illustrate their argument. Examples often based on "real world" problems suggest that theoreticians are mindful of practical concerns, situating their theories within particular circumstances. Indeed, researchers in psychology often note the importance of "knowing from within" when they limit the generalizability of their studies because of idiosyncratic characteristics of their sample. IMPLICATIONS FOR TRAINING AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INQUIRY

We have argued that distinctions between theory and practice, scientists (theorists) and practitioners, are category mistakes. These activities and roles are not completely distinct; nor are they one and the same. As we argued above, their relation is paradoxical: they are distinct, and yet they are deeply interrelated activities, activities of the


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"same trade." Their interrelatedness becomes most obvious when considering problem solving in everyday social life. As noted earlier, most inquirers iterate through theory and practice. These iterations are driven by scientific or hermeneutic methods whereby a model is proposed, tested or interpreted, and then re-evaluated. However, in most cases iterations are unaccounted for in reports of empirical studies-the theoretical base of research is only tangentially explored and reflections of investigators on the iterative nature of their work is all too often absent. Critics of the preceding analysis may retort that we are proposing psychologists should not worry about the whole practice/theory debate because there really is no difference between theory and practice. No need to worry, they may say, because if they are interrelated theorizing is practice and practicing is theory. It's all a little bit of theory or practice, whatever you do. Those who are even more cynical may say there has always been an overlap between theory and practice in psychology. So why all the fuss? The fuss is that conceptualization of the theory/ practice debate suggests important changes to training, the relationship between researchers and participants, and the way psychologists conduct their inquiries. The conceptual framework presented in this paper emphasizes models of training in psychology which encourage the development of theory in the context of real world problems. Moreover, once researchers document the cyclical nature of their studies, the synthesis of theories and practices will become more apparent. Optimally, in this model distinctions between theorists and practitioners, commonly made in psychology, will be eliminated such that each psychologist is working with theory in practice or practical theories. Scientists, researchers, therapists, practitioners, and consultants will ascribe to and understand the interrelatedness and connectedness of their efforts. The concept of joint action suggests yet another change to the way contemporary psychology operates. While joint action implies the simultaneity of theory and practice as emphasized above, it also points to increased attention to the interactions between researchers and participants. If we conceive of researchers as testing theories in practical contexts with participants in their lived worlds, it is crucial to understand the influence of researchers on participants and vice versa. That is, this analysis renews the call for understanding how researcher theories influence participant practices and vice versa. Moreover, what new or unintended practices or explanations emerge in the integration of theory and practice or in the interaction of researcher and researched? These elements of psychological investigation are the new horizon of psychology as the two communities, investigator and investigated, come to terms with their potentially incongruent languages and models.



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Lastly, attention to "knowing from within" radically shifts psychological inquiry. Theories and practices exist within, and are bound by, a knowledge context. This leaves many investigators in psychology with unanswered questions. What knowledge contexts do they bring to their studies? What contexts govern the knowledge of their research participants? How does this knowledge enable or constrain their understandings? Ultimately, these questions will lead inquirers to both the indigenous meanings and knowledges held by both researchers and participants, within a particular context, and perpetuated by their social institutions. Such a move may force investigators to examine how their theories play themselves out within particular contexts, to develop "knowledge from within," constructing more subtle and complex theories. At the very least, this may help all understand how the theory can be used and for what interests or effects. These new potentials for undoing theory and practice dichotomization will be best realized through renewed attention to the interpretive frameworks, the ideological and paradigmatic knowledges, which govern psychological inquiries. Seeking understanding within a particular context, from an "ethnopsychological point of view" (Sampson, 1991, p. 280), directs investigators to indigenous formulations, the ways in which communities organize and explain events, and the ways in which knowledge functions within a particular context. Such a reliance on "situated knowledges" (Haraway, 1991) is clearly not positivist science, but proponents claim such an approach may lead to emancipatory or democratic knowledges (Lather, 1991; Sampson, 1991). Thus, in psychological practice there is nothing so practical as good theory and nothing so theoretical as good practice. References Argyris, C , & Schon, D.A. (1976). Theory in practice: Increasing professional effectiveness. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Barlow, D. H., Hayes, S. C , & Nelson, R. O. (1984). The scientist practitioner: Research and accountability in clinical and educational settings. New York: Pergamon Press. Bayer, B., & Shotter, J. (1998). Reconstructing the psychological subject: Bodies, practices, and technologies. Thousand Oaks: Sage. Blumer, H. (1969). Symbolic interactionism: Perspective and method. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Bourdieu, P. (1977). Outline of a theory of practice (R. Nice, Trans.). New York: Cambridge University Press. (Original work published 1972) Cartwright, D. (1978). Theory and practice. Journal of Social Issues, 34, 168-180. Craig, R. T. (1996). Practical theory: A reply to Sandelands. Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior, 26, 65-79.


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Fisher, R. J. (1982a). Social psychology: An applied approach. New York: St. Martin's Press. Fisher, R. J. (1982b). The professional practice of applied social psychology: Identity, training, and certification. In L. Bickman (Ed.), Applied Social Psychology Annual (Vol. 3, pp.25-55). Beverly Hills: Sage. Frank, G. (1984). The Boulder model: History, rationale, and critique. Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, 15, 417-435. Gergen, K., & Basseches, M. (1980). The potentiation of social knowledge. In R. F. Kidd & M. J. Saks (Eds), Advances in Applied Social Psychology (Vol. 1, pp. 25-46). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Goldstein, H. (1986). Toward the integration of theory and practice: A humanistic approach. Social Work, 31, 352-357. Hallinan, M. T. (1996). Bridging the gap between research and practice. Sociology of Education, 69, 131-134. Haraway, D. (1991). Simians, cyborgs, and women. New York: Routledge. Kanfer, F. H. (1990). The scientist-practitioner connection: A bridge in need of constant attention. Professional Psychology Research and Practice, 21, 264-270. Lather, P. (1991). Getting smart: Feminist research and pedagogy with/ in the postmodern. New York: Routledge. Lewin, K. (1951). Field theory in social science: Selected theoretical papers. New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers. Mead, G. H. (1938). The philosophy of the act. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Peterson, D. R. (1985). Twenty years of practitioner training in Psychology. American Psychologist, 40, 441-451. Peterson, D. R. (1991). Connection and disconnection of research and practice in the education of professional psychologists. American Psychologist, 46, 422-429. Robinson, D. N. (1997). Therapy as theory and as civics. Theory & Psychology, 7, 675-681. Ryle, G. (1949). The concept of mind. New York: Barnes & Noble. Sampson, E. E. (1991). The democraticization of psychology. Theory & Psychology, 1, 275-298. Sandelands, L. E. (1990). What is so practical about theory?: Lewin Revisited. Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior, 20, 235-263. Shotter, J. (1980). Action, joint action and intentionality. In M. Brenner (Ed.), The Structure of Action (pp. 28-65). New York: St. Martin's Press. Shotter, J. (1984). Social accountability and selfhood. New York: Basil Blackwell. Shotter, J. (1993a). Conversational realities: Constructing life through language. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.



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Shotter, J. (1993b). Cultural politics of everyday life: Social constructionism, rhetoric, and knowing of the third kind. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Shotter, J. (1995a). In conversation: Joint action, shared intentionality and ethics. Theory & Psychology, 5, 49-73. Shotter, J. (1995b). A 'show' of agency is enough. Theory & Psychology, 5, 383-390. Shotter, J. (1997). Dialogical realities: The ordinary, the everyday, and other strange new worlds. Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior, 27, 345-357. Slife, B. D., & Williams, R. N. (1997). Toward a theoretical psychology: Should a subdiscipline be formally recognized? American Psychologist, 52, 117-129. Notes FIGURE 1: TRADITIONAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE

Theory Explanation "Knowing That"

\

Practice Understanding "Knowing How


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FIGURE 2: A N ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTION OF THEORY AND PRACTICE

Knowing From Within

L P^\ f Joint L J Action JPradce