learned much from his kind criticism. I am also indebted to professor. Edwin M.
Curley (University of Illinois at Chicago) for his suggestions to improve this book.
Reports from the Department of Theoretical Philosophy No 20, 1991
On the Metaphysics of Spinoza's Ethics by
om Koistinen
Turku 1991
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
My most sincere thanks are due to professor Risto Hilpinen and professor Juhani Pietarinen. Without their support this work would never have been completed. I have benefited not only from their invaluable advice but also from their encouragement during the past few years.
Associate professor Seppo Sajama has read my thesis with care and I have learned much from his kind criticism. I am also indebted to professor Edwin M. Curley (University of Illinois at Chicago) for his suggestions to improve this book.
My friends and colleagues at the Department of Philosophy, University of Turku, have helped me in various ways.
Mrs. Ellen Valle has kindly revised my English.
This work has been financially supported by the Academy of Finland, the ISSN 0359-6575
Kone foundation and the Emil Aaltonen foundation.
ISBN 951-642-977-7 Finally, I want to thank my wife Sari for her patience. My children, Laura, Kyosti and Lotta, have made it necessary to complete this work. PAINOSALAMA OY
TURKU 1991
CONTENTS
Introduction
1
I Substance and Attribute
9
1. Descartes on Substance
9
2. Substance and Attribute in Spinoza
12
2.1. Preliminary Considerations
12
2.2. Spinoza's Theory of Conceiving
18
2.3. Jarrett's Argument Revisited
22
2.4. Curley on the Distinction between Attribute and Substance
24
2.5. Substance Monism
30
2.5.1. Problems for Curley
30
2.5.2. On the Conceivability of God
38
2.5.3. On the Demonstration of Substance Monism
40
2.5.4. Essential Predication and Substance Monism
45
2.6. Thought and Extension as Attributes of God
48
II Modes
57
1. Preliminary Considerations
57
2. Curley's Interpretation
59
3. Problems in Curley's Interpretation
61
3.1. Facts and Propositions
61
3.2. On the Dependence of Modes on Substance
68
4. Bennett's Interpretation
69
4.1. Field Metaphysics
69
4.2. Modes as Properties
71
4.3. Identity between Modes of Thought and Modes
Concluding Remarks
159
of Extension
74
Appendix: A List of Key Passages from the Ethics
160
4.4. Modes and the Essence of Substance
75
Notes
164
80
Bibliography
176
5. Modes as Particular States of Substance 5.1. On the Concept of a Particular State
80
5.2. Qualifications and Virtues
83
5.2.1. Identity Theory and Ideas about God's Essence
86
5.2.2. Bayle-Joachim Interpretation and Its Problems
89
III On the Necessity of All Truths
95
1. Preliminary Considerations
95
2. Spinoza's Ontological Argument
96
3. Modes and Necessity
101
3.1. Problems
101
3.2. Donagan on Unrealized Possibilities
107
3.2.1. Problems in Donagan's Argument 3.3. On God's Causality
112 115
3.3.1. The Problem
115
3.3.2. Curley's Solution
116
3.3.3. Wilson's Solution
122
3.3.4. Friedman's Solution
127
4. Towards a New Interpretation of Spinoza's Modal Theory 4.1. EIP16 and the Necessity of All Truths 4.1.1. A Note on Thought and Extension
136 136 147
4.2. On EIP16 and EIP28
148
4.3. On EIIA1 and EIIP8
152
4.4. God and Finite Modes
156
INTRODUCTION This thesis is a study of the metaphysics of Spinoza's Ethics. My aim is to show that Spinoza's metaphysics and especially his modal theory is much more coherent than has previously been supposed and that Spinoza did in fact accept two theses which have been traditionally attributed to him. These two theses are:
(Tl) Substance is the thing which has properties but is not itself a property. There is only one substance - God. (1'2) All truths are absolutely necessary.
A. SUBSTANCE AND MODES The common view involved in principles (Tl) and (T2) is the one that the reader of the Ethics most easily forms. But it is also very problematic. If by substance Spinoza means what Aristotle, Descartes and his scholastic predecessors thought it to be - namely, the thing in which properties inhere - then Spinoza faces the following difficulty: If there is only one substance and all other things are properties which inhere in that substance, then individual things such as saucers and churches ought to be properties. But is that a tenable position? Isn't it a category mistake to treat individual things as properties? To this it might be replied that Spinoza's ontology
2
3
could be saved if individual things could be treated adjectivally; i.e. if
Curley, that modes causally depend on God; i.e. causally depend on God's
statements that seem to be about substantial individual things could be
attributes. Curley argues for his view at length and not without success. For
translated into statements about the only substance. This would be one
example, Alan Donagan 2 in his new book seems to accept the main
way of trying to avoid the absurdity that seems to arise from the view that
structure of Curley's interpretation.
individual things are properties. In the first chapter of this study I try to show that the arguments which However, there is another way out of the difficulty. The problems that arise
purport to show that the identity of substance and its attribute follows from
from the supposition that individual things are properties are not problems
Spinoza's most fundamental assumptions are fallacious, and that this fallacy
for Spinoza because he did not accept the traditional view of substance. For
is due to a misunderstanding of Spinoza's theory of conceiving. I also try
Spinoza substance is not that thing in which properties inhere and which
to argue that substance monism is a direct consequence of substance-
itself is not a property. This view does not come out of the blue. There are
property ontology, even if Spinoza may not have realized this.
passages in the Ethics where Spinoza seems to think that his only substance is an aggregate which is formed of an infinity of attributes. Thus the
The problem discussed in the second chapter is what does Spinoza mean
relation that God has to its attributes would be the relation that a whole has
by modes and by saying that they are in God? I shall evaluate Curley's3
to its parts. Spinoza's modes which are commonly interpreted as properties
view, according to which Spinoza believes that individual things are akin
of God are said to be in God. Now, there is also some evidence that in
to facts and that by saying that modes are in God, Spinoza means that they
saying that modes are in God Spinoza does not mean that they inhere in
are causally dependent on God. I try to show that Curley's view is not
God. Thus there is room for alternative interpretations of the key terms
well-founded. I also consider Jonathan Bennett's4 effort to argue for the
"substance" and "mode". And this would be a good thing because then one
view that individual things are properties. I give reasons for not accepting
could not reject the metaphysics of Spinoza by appealing to its initial
Bennett's view.
implausibility. In my interpretation modes are particular states of Spinoza's substance. By That Spinoza gave a new meaning to the term substance has been argued
a particular state of a substance I mean the exemplification of a property
by Edwin M. Curley. I According to Curley, Spinoza's God really is an
by the substance. Thus once we grant that any world is necessarily a world
aggregate of attributes, and attributes are what could be called the most
where at least one substance and one property possessed by that substance
pervasive features of reality: basic laws of nature and what is described by
exist, we are also committed to the existence of exemplifications of
them. By saying that modes are in God Spinoza means, according to
properties by the substance. Particular states are ontological parasites; their
4
5
existence depends on the existence of other things. My interpretation of
textual evidence for the view that Spinoza both accepted and did not accept
modes as particular states of God has the following virtues compared with
the necessity of all truths.
alternative interpretations: (i) With the help of the undefined notion of a property's being in a substance we can explain, without identifying modes
One way to make Spinoza's necessitarianism consistent with the passages
with properties, what Spinoza means by a mode's being in a substance: a
from EIIAl and EIIP8 is to suppose that Spinoza derived the necessity of
is in a substance if and only if the property, whose exemplification
all truths from causal determinism. Thus we could say that all truths are
is, is in that substance. (ii) Spinoza's claim, according to which each idea
according to Spinoza at least hypothetically (or relatively) necessary, and
involves an essence of God, now becomes intelligible. (iii) A plausible
that this relative necessity is consistent with contingency. Or it could also
interpretation can be given of Spinoza's identity theory, according to which
be insisted that in saying that all things are necessary Spinoza means
the mental and the physical realms are identical. I also show that in my
nothing more than that all things are caused; thus when Spinoza is
interpretation the problems of the so called Bayle-Joachim interpretation
attributing necessity to all things in the world his words should be read as
can be avoided.
speaking about de re necessity, and when he allows contingency he means
mode X
X
that not all statements are necessarily true.
13. NECESSITY In the third chapter I shall consider Spinoza's modal theory. Spinoza's
What I believe is the most widely accepted view among leading Spinoza
modal theory seems to be very easy to state: All truths are necessary,
scholars is that Spinoza allowed some contingency into his system - either
because they all are logically equivalent to the necessarily true statement
deliberately or accidentally. The principal concern of the third chapter is to
that God exists. Spinoza argues for the necessary existence of God in
argue against those interpretations and to present a new interpretation,
EIPll and that all truths follow from the statement that God exists is
showing that Spinoza accepted the absolute necessity of all truths and that
confirmed by EIP16. 5 In EIPl7 he rephrases the content of EIPl6 by saying
his argument for the necessity of all truths is much subtler than has hitherto
that everything follows from the nature of God by the same necessity as it
been realized. My argument shows, I hope, that Leibniz' idea of a complete
follows from the nature of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two
individual concept was anticipated by Spinoza. To put it very briefly,
right angles.
Spinoza's argument for the necessity of all truths is the following: (i) Only one substance is possible; (ii) if there were unrealized possibilities, there
However, Spinoza's modal theory appears to be inconsistent. In EIIAl he
would be many substances; therefore, (iii) there are no unrealized
seems to say that the existence of finite things is contingent, and in EIIP8
possibilities. I also show that Spinoza could argue for the necessity of all
he speaks about ideas of non-existent individuals. Thus there seems to be
truths without appealing to the principle that God is the only possible
7
6 substance. The fault of Spinoza's argument for the necessity of all truths is
arguments of the first and second chapter as follows: The argument for the
that it is dependent on his ontological argument which is not sound because
necessity of all truths is dependent on the view that by substance Spinoza
the principle of sufficient reason is implicitly contained in it. However,
means that thing in which qualities inhere. Thus this argument can be seen
Spinoza fails to show that the principle of sufficient reason is a necessary
to confirm the principal thesis of the first and second chapters. Moreover,
truth.
the solution to the problem of God's causality presupposes my interpretation of Spinoza's modes as particular states of God.
In the third chapter I also consider the problem of the causality of God, because that problem seems to present difficulties for my view. The problem of the causality of God is as follows: Spinoza wants to say (i) that God is the cause of all things and that (ii) God is the cause of all things in the same sense as he is the cause of himself. But being a reasonable man he does not want to claim that change is impossible. Now, the conjunction of (i) and (ii) entails the impossibility of change as follows: By saying that God is the cause of all things in the same sense as he is the cause of himself Spinoza means that all individual things follow from the essence of God. But because God is a necessary existent, his essence is eternally exemplified and therefore everything that follows from that essence must be eternal. I shall show that the problem of the causality of God can be solved if my interpretation of Spinoza's basic concepts, i.e. of the concepts of substance and mode, is accepted.
C. ON THE RELATION BETWEEN CHAPTERS I, II AND III At first glance the reader may get the impression that chapters I, II and III are rather loosely related to each other. However, the second chapter is based on the assumption that Spinoza accepted the principle that substance is that thing in which qualities inhere - and in the first chapter I try to defend that view. The arguments of the third chapter are related to the
9 I SUBSTANCE AND ATTRIBUTE
1. DESCARTES ON SUBSTANCE
As we shall see, Spinoza's views were greatly influenced by Descartes' notion of substance. Descartes defines substance in two different ways:
[Rl] Substance. This term applies to every thing in which whatever we perceive immediately resides, as in a subject, or to every thing by means of which whatever we perceive exists. By 'whatever we perceive' is meant any property, quality or attribute of which we have a real idea. The only idea we have of a substance itself, in the strict sense,
is
that
it
is
the
thing
in
which
whatever
we
perceive...exists....For we know by the natural light that a real attribute cannot belong to nothing. 6
[R2] By substance we can understand nothing other than a thing which exists in such a way as to depend on no other thing for its existence. 7
In (Rl) substance is defined to be that thing in which properties or qualities exist. Thus (Rl) can be read as saying that substances are subjects of predication.
11
10 In (R2) Descartes emphasizes that substances must be independent entities
Moreover, for Descartes modes are accidental to their bearers, which means
but he subsequently points out that only God meets (R2), because the
that for every x, if X is a mode of substance ~, then ~ can exist without
existence of each created substance is dependent on the will of God.
having x. 9
Descartes argues in (R1) that from the definition of substance as that in
For Descartes there are two principal attributes, namely thought and
which qualities inhere, it follows that substances cannot be perceived or
extension:
conceived; the only entities which can be perceived and conceived are properties. Substances are such that we cannot form ideas of them, i.e.
A substance may indeed be known through any attribute at all; but
conceive them. Their existence must be inferred from the f! priori truth that
each substance bas one principal property which constitutes its nature
properties must inhere in something. Descartes' view of substance as an
and essence, and to which all its other properties are referred. Thus
entity that cannot be conceived was later adopted by John Locke:
extension in length, breadth and depth constitutes the nature of corporeal substance; and thought constitutes the nature of thinking
The idea then we have, to which we give the general name substance,
substance. Everything else which can be attributed to body
being nothing but, the supposed, but unknown support of those
presupposes extension, and is merely a mode of an extended thing;
qualities, we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist, sine re
and similarly, whatever we find in the mind is simply one of the
substante, without something to support them, we call that support
various modes of thinking. For example, shape is unintelligible except
substantia, which according to the true import of the word is, in plain
in an extended thing; and motion is unintelligible expect as motion
English, standing under, or upholding. 8
in an extended space; while imagination, sensation and will are intelligible only in a thinking thing. By contrast, it is possible to
Descartes divides attributes (i.e. properties) into principal attributes and
understand extension without shape or movement, and thought
modes. Principal attributes are the essences of their bearers, which means
without imagination or sensation, and so on; and this is quite clear to
that if E is the principal attribute of ~, then
anyone who gives the matter his attention. 1O
~
cannot exist without having
E.;. and that every other property of ~ presupposes
E, whereas E presupposes
no other property. To say that property E presupposes property Q means
Given that thought and extension are principal attributes and that principal
E without conceiving Q or that one cannot think
attributes are essences, it follows that a thinking substance cannot lose
of E without thinking of Q. Thus it follows that the modes of a given
thought without ceasing to exist and that an extended substance cannot lose
substance are conceived through the principal attribute of that substance.
extension without ceasing to exist. Descartes thinks that it is impossible for
that one cannot conceive
13
12 a thinking substance to lose thought and for an extended substance to lose
EIPlO Each attribute of a substance must be conceived through itself.
extension because it is not conceivable that a thinking substance exists without thought and an extended substance without extension.
Moreover, in EIP2SC Spinoza says that modes express attributes. Now, if
It follows from the considerations above that principal attributes are general
this expressing is interpreted as saying that, for every
essences which determine substance-kinds but not individual things. For
then there is an attribute Y.. such that the idea of X presupposes the idea of
Descartes, all thinking things are separate substances which share the
Y.., then Spinoza's theory of substance and attribute seems to diverge in no
attribute of thought and all bodies are separate substances which share the
way from the theory of Descartes. Modes as well as attributes are in a
attribute of extension. 11
substance and hence they are properties of a substance. These properties are
x,
if X is a mode,
further divided into essences (attributes for Spinoza; principal attributes for Descartes) which are conceived through themselves and into those properties ( modes for both) which are conceived through essences. 12 2. SUBSTANCE AND ATTRIBUTE IN SPINOZA
Finally, the passage from EIPlOS seems to imply that substances are necessarily conceived through their attributes and not through themselves.
2.1. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS The biggest difference between the views of Descartes and Spinoza lies in The following passages from the Ethics give the reader the impression that
the concept of essence. For Descartes, as we have seen, essences are
Spinoza's theory of substance rests on a Cartesian foundation:
general properties, shared by several substances. Spinoza, however, thinks that there cannot be two individuals having the same essence; this becomes
EID4 By attribute I understand what the intellect perceives of a
evident from his definition of essence:
substance, as constituting its essence. EIID2 I say that to the essence of any thing belongs that which, EIDS By mode I understand the affections of a substance, or that
being given, the thing is necessarily posited and which, being taken
which is in another through which it is also conceived.
away, the thing is necessarily taken away; or that without which the thing can neither be nor be conceived, and which can neither be nor
[N]othing in nature is clearer than that each being must be conceived under some attribute...(EIP10S).
be conceived without the thing.
14
15
Since attributes are properties and essences of their bearer, this definition
necessarily conceived through their attributes, which are said to be
says that an attribute E of a substance
cannot
conceived through themselves. That substances are not conceived through
exist without E and (ii) it is not possible that there is an entity distinct from
themselves also seems to follow from the definitions of essence and
which has E. This entails that for Spinoza two substances cannot share
attribute; in his definition of attribute Spinoza suggests that attributes are
X
X
is a property such that (i)
X
an attribute.
essences, and the definition of essence implies that if X is an essence of Y-, then Y- cannot be conceived without x·
Given the above characterization of substance and attribute, Spinoza's definition of substance is somewhat surprising:
One way to rescue Spinoza from inconsistency is to claim that he rejected Descartes' and Locke's view that qualities necessarily need some substratum
EID3 By substance I understand what is in itself and is conceived
in which they inhere. Strictly speaking, attributes and substances are
through itself, i.e., that whose concept does not require the concept
identical, and for this reason all substances are conceived through
of another thing, from which it must be formed.
themselves; i.e. substances are conceived through themselves because they are attributes.
In saying that substances must be in themselves, Spinoza means, as I interpret him, that substances are things that have properties but are not
It might also be claimed that the identity of a substance and its attribute is
properties. It has been argued by some Spinoza scholars, e.g. by Edwin
the only way to rescue Spinoza here, because the theses
Curley and Alan Donagan, that Spinoza in saying that substances must be in themselves is emphasizing the independence of substances. 13 But it seems to me that they cannot be right, because the independence of substances (EIP6) is a theorem in Spinoza's system, and in the proof of that
(1) If .s is a substance, then
.s is conceived
through itself,
(2) If .s is a substance, then
.s is conceived
only through its attribute,
and
theorem Spinoza is relying on the condition that substances are things that are conceived through themselves.
can both be true (and substances possible) only if a substance is identical with its attribute. This argument is presented by Charles Jarrete 4 , and I will
The unfamiliar element in Spinoza's definition lies in its second condition; besides being a thing which is in itself, a substance must be conceived through itself. But given the considerations above, it seems impossible that substances could be conceived through themselves, since substances are
therefore call it 'Jarrett's argument'.
17
16 Jarrett's argument is valid if we assume that by (1) and (2) Spinoza intends
I think that Jarrett misconstrues the logical forms of (1) and (2) in thinking
to express the thoughts that are more explicitly presented by (3) and (4),
that (1) says the same as (3) and (2) the same as (4). In EID3 Spinoza
respectively:
explains that to say that substance is conceivable through itself means that the concept of substance does not presuppose the concept of any other
(3) For every x, if X is a substance, then X is conceived through X and
thing. The same thought is also present in EIP2D where Spinoza writes:
there is no y such that y is not identical with X and X is conceived [E]ach [substance] must be in itself and be conceived through itself,
through y.
or the concept of the one does not involve the concept of the other. (4) For every X, if X is a substance and E its attribute, then X is conceived through E.
Given these explications of the logical form of any sentence of the form "x is conceived through itself" , we have good grounds for giving the
Given our previous considerations about the nature of a substratum-
following definitions:
substance, it might be held that the identity between a substance and its attribute is a welcome result. If substances turn out to be inconceivable entities, then one should get rid of them, because if something is
(IC) X is conceived through itself= df The concept of X involves no
inconceivable, then it cannot exist. In effect, this suggestion was later
other concept.
adopted by David Hume
15
,
who claimed individual things to be bundles of
qualities: qualities do not inhere in individual things, but individual things
(OC)
consist of qualities.
concept of y and the concept of y is not identical with the concept of
X
is conceived through y= df The concept of
X
involves the
x· Even if Jarrett's argument is persuasive, any argument which purports to show that Spinoza accepted the identity between substance and its attribute must be wrong. I will give the reasons for this view later
16
,
but in what
With the help of these definitions, the logical forms of (1) and (2) are revealed by (3') and (4'):
follows I try to show that there is a Spinozistic reading of (1) and (2) which reconciles them.
(3') For every X, if X is a substance, then the concept of X involves no other concept.
18
19 (4') For every
x, if
X
is a substance and E its attribute, then the
concept of X involves the concept of E.
At various passages Spinoza warns the reader not to confuse ideas with images or pictures of things. Those who do not make the distinction between ideas and images think that
(3') and (4') entail that any substance must be such that the concept of itself and the concept of its attribute must be identical. I accept the
...an idea is something mute, like a picture on a tablet, and not a
conclusion, but it still remains to be explained how the identity of the
mode of thinking, viz. the very act of understanding. (EIIP43S).
concepts of substance and its attribute fail to entail the identity of substance and its attribute. At first sight, this lack of entailment to which Spinoza is
That distinction is also emphasized in EIIP48S:
committed seems to be a mystery. If the concept of X is identical with the concept of Y-, can it be accepted that X is not identical with y-? In order to
[B]y ideas I understand, not the images that are formed at the back
solve this problem we have to take a look at Spinoza's theory of concepts
of the eye (and, if you like, in the middle of the brain), but concepts
or conceiving.
of Thought.
What is common to all ideas is that they are affirmative:
2.2. SPINOZA'S THEORY OF CONCEIVING
[T]he will is something universal, which is predicated of all ideas, and which signifies only what is common to all ideas, viz. the
For Spinoza concepts are ideas. He defines the notion of idea as follows:
affirmation, whose adequate essence, therefore,... must be in each idea. (EIIP49S).17
EIID3 By idea I understand a concept of the Mind that the Mind forms because it is a thinking thing.
Spinoza's theory of conceiving seems to be this: To conceive a thing is to have an idea of it and ideas are affirmations, i.e. statements or propositions
In the explication to this definition Spinoza writes:
with truth-values. Stuart Hampshire writes of Spinoza's ideas in the following way:
I say concept rather than perception, because the word perception seems to indicate that the Mind is acted on by the object. But concept
The word 'idea' is used so widely in Spinoza as to include what we
seems to express an action of the Mind.
would normally call an 'assertion' or 'proposition'.... So an idea in his
21
20
sense may be qualified as true or false, and one idea may be said to
Spinoza's view of ideas as necessarily involving affirmation comes up
follow from another; in normal usage we speak only of propositions
against the following objection: One can have an idea without believing
as true or false, or as following logically from each other.
18
that it is true. It is perfectly possible to imagine that an old man is climbing up the hill and to suspend judgment as to whether there really is an old
Why does Spinoza insist that ideas must involve an affirmation? I presume
man climbing up the hill. But if all ideas involve affirmation, then one
that the reasoning at the back of Spinoza's mind is the following. Ideas are
cannot have an idea of an old man climbing up the hill without at the same
necessarily representative entities: an idea is always an idea of something.
time believing that he is climbing up the hill. This difficulty could be
What a picture represents depends, however, on what it is taken to
avoided by making a distinction between what the idea affirms and what
represent. Therefore, ideas are not identical with pictures.
the person who has the idea affirms (or between predicating and asserting). We could say that the person having an idea 1 affirms what 1 affirms, if he
That pictures are not essentially representative is emphasized by
accepts 1. 20
Wittgenstein, whose argument is presented and commented on by Simon Up to this point, I have tried to make sense of Spinoza's thesis that ideas
Blackburn as follows:
necessarily involve what Spinoza calls affirmation. I defended this thesis [T]here is bound to be a gap between having an image on the one
with the example of someone's idea of an old man climbing up the hill. But
hand, and taking it to represent one or another feature of the world
now someone might insist that this idea is an idea of a state of affairs
on the other. Wittgenstein makes the point with a pithy example:
which consists of an individual thing and a property, and even if it is
imagine an old man climbing up a hill. Concentrate upon your image
granted that this idea involves an affirmation, it does not follow that there
carefully. Now, might it not be an image of an old man sliding
cannot be ideas which are in some irreducible way about properties or
backwards down a hill? That it was an image of one and not the
individual things. For example, the idea of Jones climbing up the hill
other is not a matter of anything intrinsic to it, guaranteed by the
certainly involves the idea of Jones, and it is natural to ask what is the
image, but is a matter of the way it is taken ....The point is that
affirmation involved in the idea of Jones. It is not, however, hard to find
however naturally it comes to regard a picture in one way or another,
an answer that is consistent with the previous considerations. We could
as a picture of this, or a sample of that, or as representing one kind
say that if someone has the idea of Jones then he must have in mind a
of thing and not another,this is in effect adopting one "method of
property that no one else besides Jones possesses, and the idea of Jones is
projection" rather than another.
19
the predication of this property of something. 21
23
22 Spinoza's thesis of ideas as affirmations presupposes that one cannot have
be maintained, the idea "s is E" must involve the idea of s. Thus it might
an idea of a property without predicating that property of something. But
be claimed, the ability to conceive this proposition presupposes that one
is it really impossible to think of, say, redness without attributing it to
already has the idea of s to which E is attributed, and so the idea "s is E"
anything? At least the affirmative answer is not counterintuitive. When I
involves another idea.
think of redness my thought seems by necessity to turn into a thought of a red substance. I may try, so to speak, to fill my mind with redness, but
If (ICl) is what Spinoza intended by substance's conceivability through
the result seems to be an idea of some object being red, and, as I have
itself, then the proposition "s is E" cannot involve another idea of the
argued above, the idea of some object being red is identical with the
substance s. This, I think, is possible only if the idea "s is E" is identical
attribution of redness to something. Thus I think that Spinoza has good
with the proposition "Something is
reason for holding that ideas are affirmations or propositions.
proposition a proposition about S must be a feature of the predicate "is E".
E".22
But now, what makes this latter
Since attributes are essences, the proposition "Something is E" cannot be about any other individual but S, and for this reason it is natural to say that the proposition "Something is E" is about S or is an idea of s. Instead of 2.3. JARRETT'S ARGUMENT REVISITED
(ICl), the conceivability of substance through itself could thus be defined as follows:
From premisses (i) substance is conceived under its attribute, and (ii) concepts or ideas are affirmations, it follows that (iii) the idea of a
(ICl *) The substance whose essence is constituted by the attribute E
substance S whose essence is constituted by the attribute E is a proposition
is conceived through itself = df The proposition that something is E
which predicates E of s. (iii), together with the principle that substance is
involves no other proposition. 23
necessarily conceived through itself, entail that But we see now that the proposition, "Something is E", besides being the
s whose essence is constituted by the attribute E is
concept of the substance whose attribute E is, is also the concept of the
conceived through itself = df The proposition that S is E involves no
attribute E. This is because, as we have earlier seen, Spinoza thinks that we
other proposition.
cannot have an idea of a property without predicating it of something. Thus
(ICl) Substance
we have reached the conclusion that the idea or concept of a substance is (ICI) cannot be quite correct. Earlier I argued that the idea "Jones is
identical with the concept of its attribute, without being forced to accept
climbing up the hill" involves an idea of Jones. In the same way, it might
that substance and its attribute are identical. Moreover, it should be noted
25
24 that the identity between the concepts of substance and its attribute entails that the attribute of a substance is conceived through itself.
24
What Curley is trying to show by this argument is that any attribute meets the definition of substance and hence is a substance. From the definition of substance it follows that an entity is a substance if (i) it is conceived through itself and if (ii) it is in itself. Attributes meet the first condition because, as we have seen, their conceivability through themselves is an
2.4. CURLEY ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ATTRIBUTE AND
above Curley claims that EIPIO together with EIA4:
SUBSTANCE Likewise Edwin Curley considers that Spinoza identifies substance with its
The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the knowledge of its cause
attribute: Spinoza,
explicit theorem of Spinoza's system (EIPlO). In the argument presented
unlike Descartes,
does identify substance with its
imply that attributes must be in themselves. Curley's argument for the "initselfness" of attributes is thus the following:
attribute... 25 Curley gives evidence for his view by presenting the following argument
(5) An attribute is conceived through itself. (EIPlO). (6) The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the
for it:
knowledge of its cause. (EIA4). Because Spinoza does not distinguish attribute from substance, he will allow that his attributes possess the defining characteristics of
Therefore, (7) Each attribute is in itself.
substance. That "every attribute...must be conceived through itself" is explicitly a theorem of Spinoza's system (EIPIO). And it is not
Without further qualifications this argument is not valid. As an implicit
difficult to construct a proof that what is conceived through itself
premiss it contains the following principle:
must exist in itself. For if it existed in something else, knowledge of it would depend on knowledge of that in which it existed (by EIA4),
and it would not be conceived through itself.
(C) If X is in Y.., then x is caused by Y...
26
If (C) is added to (5) and (6), these together with the supposition that an attribute is in something else entail that the attribute is conceived through
27
26 the thing in which it is, or that the knowledge of the attribute depends on
say that they are in substances, i.e. that their existence is in some way
the knowledge of the thing in which it is27 • But this contradicts (5), which
dependent on the existence of substances.
means that the premisses can be saved only if it is admitted that besides being conceived through themselves, attributes are in themselves.
I think that there is something wrong with any reasoning leading to the conclusion that if attributes were self-caused, they could not be in their
Given the above considerations, it follows that (C) together with the
substances in the same way as properties are said to be in their bearers. To
principle that substances are not identical with their attributes creates an
say that attributes are self-caused means, roughly, that they necessarily
inconsistency in Spinoza's system. Thus the principle (C) threatens my
exist, and for Spinoza, since he makes no distinction between the
interpretation of the substance-attribute relation in Spinoza, and I must try
exemplification of a property and its existence29 , this means that their
to find a way of rejecting it.
exemplifications are necessarily existing states of affairs. This entails that an attribute E is self-caused if and only if the proposition "Something is
There is, however, good reason for maintammg (C). Spinoza seems to
E" is a necessary truth. But because attributes are essences, it follows that
accept a version of the principle of sufficient reason, according to which
there is a determinate substance £ which exists if and only if the
for everything that exists there must be a sufficient reason or cause. Every
proposition "Something is E" is true. This means that what is needed for
substance, Spinoza says, is a cause of itself; by this he means that the
E to be exemplified is what is needed for £ to exist. This something that is
existence of every substance is a necessary state of affairs (EIP7). All
needed is, of course, the existence of the state "Something's being E", and
modes of a substance follow from its essence, which means that a
thus the existence of the substance £ is necessary (and £ is a self-caused
substance is the cause of all its modes. 28
entity) if and only if the proposition "Something is E" is a necessary truth. This implies that we can say that both a substance and its attribute are
From the principle of sufficient reason it follows that for the existence of
self-caused without at the same time accepting that there are two different
the attribute of a given substance there must be a sufficient cause. Thus the
self-causings. And I see no reason to deny that the state that something is
attribute is either caused by its substance or it must be its own cause. As
E, whose necessary existence guarantees both the self-causedness of £ and
we have seen, an attribute cannot be caused by its substance, because that
E, could not consist in E's being in £. Therefore principle (C) can be
would deprive it of its conceivability through itself. If attributes were self-
rejected without violating Spinoza's basic views. Attributes are in
caused, then, it might be claimed, their existence could not be dependent
substances but are not caused by them. We can even say that by causing
on the existence of anything else, and for this reason it would be absurd to
itself a substance causes its attribute, once we keep in mind that in so
28
29
saying we are not committed to holding that a substance's causing itself is
By substance I understand what is in itself and is conceived through
distinct from its causing its attribute.
itself, i.e., whose concept does not involve the concept of another thing. I understand the same by attribute, except that it is called
That the self-causedness of a substance and that of its attribute are one and
attribute in relation to the intellect, which attributes such and such a
the same thing can be seen more directly from the fact that the ideas of a
definite nature to substance. 31
substance and its attribute are identical. We know from EIA4 that if the idea of X involves no other idea, then X is a self-caused entity. But if E is
It is relatively easy to show that the passage from the Ethics is consistent
an attribute of S, then the idea of S is identical with the idea of E. It is also
with the supposition that a substance is not identical with its attribute. The
natural to say that
identity statement involved in EIP40 is as far as I understand the
X
is a self-caused entity if and only if its idea describes
something that exists necessarily. But both the idea of S and the idea of E
following: to say that two substances
describe the state of something's being E. Thus their self-causedness
say that there is a property E (either an attribute or a mode) such that X and
simply means that it is a necessary truth that something is E.
y- do not share it. What is being claimed here is that substances are not pure
X
and y- are distinct is the same as to
individuators; the distinctness of two substances cannot be a brute fact but The textual evidence Curley offers for the identity between substance and
must be grounded in their properties. I admit that the passages from
its attribute consists of the following passages from the Ethics and from
Spinoza's correspondence seem to be inconsistent with the supposition that
Spinoza's correspondence:
an attribute does not meet the definition of substance. At least the passage from the ninth letter supports Curley's interpretation. However, because
[T]here is nothing outside the intellect through which a number of
Spinoza believes that the idea of an attribute is identical with the idea of
things can be distinguished from one another except substances, or
substance, then it is not surprising that in many passages of the Ethics he
what is the same (by 04), their attributes, and their affections.
seems to identify substance with its attribute. 32
(EIP40).
By attribute I understand whatever is conceived through itself and in itself, so that its concept does not involve the concept of another thing. 30
31
30
This definition favours Curley's interpretation of God as the totality of
2.5. SUBSTANCE MONISM
attributes because Spinoza clearly says that God is a substance which consists of an infinity of attributes. I would like to suggest, however, that
2.5.1. PROBLEMS FOR CURLEY
in EID6 nothing is lost if "consisting of' is replaced by "having". 35 Besides My main reason for trying to show that Spinoza makes a distinction
EID6 there is a number of other passages which seem to favour Curley's
between substance and its attribute is that the distinction is needed in
interpretation of God as the totality of its attributes. Curley cites the
giving an intelligible account of Spinoza's thesis that only one substance
following ones:
with more than one attribute exists. EIP19 God is eternal, or all God's attributes are eternal. According to Curley, as quoted above, Spinoza identified substance with its attribute. 33 In its entirety the sentence where Curley proposes that
God or all of God's attributes are immutable. (EIP20C2).
substance and its attribute are identical runs as follows: I do not believe that EIP19 confirms Curley's interpretation. The Spinoza, unlike Descartes, does identify substance with its attribute, or rather, with the totality of its attributes.
34
demonstration of EIP19 consists of two parts. In the first part, Spinoza makes use of his identification of necessary existence with eternity as follows: God is a substance. Therefore, God is a necessary existent, and
In this passage Curley is making two different suggestions. First, in the
necessary existents are by definition eternal. The second part, even if its
case of one-attribute substance, the substance is identical with its attribute.
content is more obscure than that of the first part says, roughly that because
Hence there are no one-attribute substances in which an attribute inheres.
each of the attributes is an essence of God, God cannot exist without any
Second, several attributes together can form a substance. In Curley's
of its attributes and therefore because God is eternal all his attributes are
interpretation the totality of attributes forms Spinoza's only substance, God,
eternally exemplified or are eternal. Thus it seems that Spinoza is
which Spinoza defines in the following way:
demonstrating the proposition
EID6 By God I understand a being absolutely infinite, i.e., a
(IP19*) God and all God's attributes are eternal.
substance consisting of an infinity of attributes, of which each one expresses an eternal and infinite essence.
It is, I believe, of some interest to be aware of the fact that in EIP20
Spinoza expresses the content of EIP19 with (IP19*). It can, however, be
33
32
argued that EIP19 simply says that the sentences "God is eternal" and the
decision one has to be able to see Spinoza's metaphysical system as a
sentence "The totality of God's attributes is eternal" have the same
whole.
meaning. Now, these two sentences do not mean the same if "God" and "The totality of God's attributes" refer to different things. But if we bear in
There are however some cornerstones of Spinoza's metaphysical system
mind that Spinoza makes no distinction between the existence and the
that Curley's interpretation seems to violate. First, Spinoza is a substance
exemplification of a property, EIP19 can be read as follows:
monist. He believes that only one substance exists. Second, Spinoza emphasizes that substances are necessarily indivisible or that they do not
God is eternal, or all God's attributes are eternally exemplified.
consist of parts:
This way of formulating EIP19 no more commits us to holding that by God
EIP12 No attribute of a substance can be truly conceived from which
Spinoza means the totality of its attributes.
it follows that the substance can be divided.
In EIP20C2 Spinoza is, it seems to me, just telling us in what sense God
EIP13 A substance which is absolutely infinite is indivisible. 38
can be called immutable. God is a substance and substances are centers of change. Now a change in a substance is possible only if the substance
Now, it might be claimed that Curley's interpretation is inconsistent with
which endures the change does not cease to exist. When a change in a
substance-monism because if Curley were right, then all attributes would
substance happens, the substance remains numerically one and the same.
be substances and the total number of substances would be the number of attributes plus one (the totality of one attribute substances). 39 Curley is well
Bennett has written about the textual situation as follows:
aware of the second objection already in his Spinoza's Metaphysics. He writes:
All in all, the textual situation on this matter is difficult, forcing us to take some passages more literally than others: the disagreement concerns which to give most literal weight to.
36
[W]hen Spinoza is arguing that substance, as such, is indivisible (EIP12, IP13, IP15S), he appears to be thinking of substance in a way far more Cartesian than I have been willing to allow. And though
As Curley 37 himself admits, Bennett is here right. Whether Spinoza
there may not be anything in the passages mentioned which is flatly
identified substance with its attribute is problematic. In order to reach a
inconsistent with my interpretation, it is not easy to see how they could be treated in my terms. 40
34
35
Curley also thinks that one cannot separate the two objections from each
Thus Curley interprets EIP12 as saying that no substance can be divided in
other. In his Behind the Geometrical Method he tries to reconcile EIP12
such a way that it ceases to exist. And Curley's interpretation saves this
and EIP13 with his view that Spinoza's God is an aggregate of one attribute
feature of Spinoza's substance theory. Attributes are necessary existents and
substances. Curley writes:
therefore each part of the absolutely infinite substance is a necessary existent. If we furthermore accept the following principle
The problem is this: how can we remain true to Spinoza's language, which regularly speaks of substance as a complex, in which each of
(AP) If X and y- necessarily exist then the aggregate consisting of
the attributes is an element, without suggesting that substance could
and y- necessarily exists
X
somehow be decomposed into its various elements, or that some of these elements might exist apart from the others? The solution, so far
it follows that God (i.e. the totality of the necessarily existing one-attribute
as I can see, consists in recognizing that this particular complex is a
substances) is a necessary existent.
complex of very special elements. If each of the attributes not only is conceived through itself, but also exists in itself, then it exists
It seems to me, however, that Curley's interpretation of EIP12 and EIP13
without requiring the aid of any other thing. If it exists in that way,
is mistaken. In the demonstration to EIP12 Spinoza considers two
then its existence is necessary. But if the existence of each of the
alternatives. He reasons as follows: If a substance, say
attributes is necessary, then it is not possible that one of them should
can be divided either into substances or non-substances. If the first
exist without the others. For if we said it was possible that one
alternative is realized, then
should exist without the others, that would imply that it was possible
necessary existents. But Spinoza wants to deny that a substance could be
for the others not to exist. And that isn't really possible, not if each
divided into parts which are substances, and this is evidence for the view
of the others exists in itself and is conceived through itself. The very
that he wants to say by EIP12 not only that no substance can be divided
self-sufficiency of each of the attributes, the fact that it is true of
into parts in such a way that it ceases to exist, but also that it is not
each of them that it does not need the others in order to exist, implies
possible that any substance consists of parts - no matter whether the parts
that there is no real possibility that at any time anyone of them does
are necessarily existing substances or not.
~
~
can be divided, it
will not cease to be, because the parts of ~ are
exist without the others. The existence of each one of the attributes implies the existence of all the others. 41
Spinoza proves in EIP12D that a substance cannot be an aggregate of substances in two ways of which I shall consider the second:
36
37 [T]he parts (by P2) would have nothing in common with their whole,
[I]f [a substance which is absolutely infinite] were divisible, the parts
and the whole (by 04 and PIO) could both be and be conceived
into which it would be divided will either retain the nature of an
without its parts, which is absurd, as no one will be able to doubt.
absolutely infinite substance or they will not. If the first, then there will be a number of substances of the same nature, which (by P5) is
This demonstration seems to proceed as follows: Let us suppose that an aggregate of two substances q and I. From EIP5 it follows that
~,
~
is
absurd.
q and
have wholly distinct attributes. But substances having different attributes
In the proof Spinoza argues as follows:(i) If an absolutely infinite substance
have nothing in common with each other. Therefore, one could have the
(i.e. a substance having all possible attributes) consists of parts which are
idea of ~ without having the idea of its parts I and .q. But Spinoza accepts
substances, then the whole and each part of it must be of the same nature.
the following principle as self-evident in the demonstration:
Now (ii) two substances are of the same nature if and only if they share an
I
attribute. (i) If
X
is a part of y., then the idea of y. involves the idea of x. (A
42
But from (i) and (ii) it follows that (iii) if an absolutely infinite
substance consists of parts which are substances, then the whole and each part of it must share an attribute. But because it impossible that two
whole cannot be conceived without its parts.)
substances share an attribute, it is impossible that the absolutely infinite For that reason it is absurd to suppose that a substance could consist of
substance consists of parts which are substances. The proofs of EIPI2 and
parts which are substances. What is crucial and, I believe, very difficult for
EIP13 thus suggest that Spinoza thinks that the relation which holds
Curley's interpretation is the following: Spinoza clearly requires that the
between substance and its attribute is that of inherence.
whole ought to have different attributes than its parts. This gives good ~
Another problem that emerges from Curley's view of God as the totality of
is a substance with several attributes) if and only if A is a part of
attributes, i.e. as the totality of one-attribute substances, is to account for
reason to reject Curley's claim, according to which A is an attribute of (here
~
~.
Spinoza's assumption that we have ideas of God. What follows from Curley's interpretation is that in having an idea of an attribute, one is
That Spinoza does not think that the relation of an attribute to its substance
having an idea of a part of God. On the other hand, Spinoza thinks that
is the part-whole relation becomes evident also from the demonstration of
there are attributes that no human mind is able to conceive. But because
ETP13. There Spinoza writes as follows:
Spinoza thinks that a whole cannot be conceived without its parts, it follows that no one can have a conception of God. This same result can, also be reached in the following way: (i) Substance is necessarily conceived
38
39
under some attribute 43 ; (ii) substance is necessarily conceived in itself
What Spinoza says about the nature of ideas entails that a proposition
(EID3). (ii) implies that the idea of a substance does not involve the idea
which predicates an attribute of substance is the idea of that attribute. Thus
of any other substance. But if attributes are substances, then one cannot
it follows that the concept or idea of a given attribute of a substance
have an idea of God by having an idea of one of its attributes because this
involves no other concept, which means that all attributes of a given
would not be consistent with the thesis that substance is conceived through
substance are conceived through themselves. For these reasons (IC3) holds:
~
itself. (IC3) A substance
~
is conceived through itself if and only if all
attributes of ~ are conceived through themselves. 2.5.2. ON THE CONCEIVABILITY OF GOD
But because God has every possible attribute (by EI6), his conceivability through himself can also be characterized as follows:
In section 2.3. I supposed that attributes are possessed by distinct substances and that each attribute is the essence of only one substance. We
(lCG) God is conceived through himself if and only if every attribute
reached the conclusion that if E is an attribute, then the proposition or
is conceived through itself.
affirmation "Something is E" is the idea of a substance, and that this idea is identical with the idea of E. As Spinoza's only substance has all possible
Given the definitions above we can give an answer to the puzzle involved
attributes, it follows that every proposition of the form "Something is X",
in the proof of EIPlO. The proof runs as follows:
where X is replaced by a term which refers to an attribute, is an idea of God. This means that the definition (IC! *) presented in section 2.3. cannot
For an attribute is what the intellect perceives concerning a substance,
quite capture the meaning of substance's being conceived through itself, and
as constituting its essence (by 04); so (by 03) it must be conceived
I suggest that the following definition is what is needed to account for
through itself, q.e.d.
God's being conceived through himself: From this proof it is easy to get the impression that Spinoza is saying that (lC2) A substance ~ which has attributes E\,...,E. is conceived through
attributes are conceived through themselves because they are substances.
itself = df Any proposition which predicates any of the attributes
This is what Jarrett writes of the proof:
E\,...,E.
of ~ (or of something) is such that it involves no other
proposition.
41
40
thing to which he applies the definition of attribute. In this
.s exists. Because .s is a substance and attributes are essences of substances it follows that in Y{' .s has at least one attribute. In Y{ God, however,
demonstration, then, Spinoza maintains that each attribute is
exemplifies this same attribute, because God exists in wand has all
conceived through itself because each is a substance. 44
attributes in
Here Spinoza applies the definition of substance (EID3) to the very
Y{.
Let us now suppose that the attribute shared by God and
is E. It follows from the definition of attribute that in
Y{,
.s
E is an essence
But as we have seen, it follows from substance's conceivability through
of God. But from the definition of essence it follows that it is not possible
itself that all its attributes are conceived through themselves, without the
that there are two substances which share an essence or attribute. Thus the
additional assumption that substances are attributes. Thus even if it is true
supposition that E is an essence of God in
that attributes are conceived through themselves because substances are
possible world where something distinct from God has E. We can, then,
conceived through themselves, Jarrett is not right in arguing that, according
conclude that if God is a possible substance, God is the only possible
to Spinoza, attributes are conceived through themselves because they are
substance. 45
Y{
entails that there is no other
substances. Of the possibility of an all-attribute substance (i.e. God or a being absolutely infinite) Spinoza writes in ElPlOS the following:
2.5.3. ON THE DEMONSTRATION OF SUBSTANCE MONISM
[I]t is far from absurd to attribute many attributes to one substance. Indeed, nothing in nature is clearer than that each being must be
Spinoza's substance monism, by which I mean the principle that God is the
conceived under some attribute, and the more reality, or being it has,
only possible substance, is a direct consequence of the definition of essence
the more it has attributes which express necessity, or eternity, and
and the supposition that a being which has all attributes (i.e. God) is
infinity. And consequently there is also nothing clearer than that a
possible. Let us suppose that
being absolutely infinite must be defined (as we taught in D6) as a being that consists of infinite attributes, each of which expresses a certain eternal and infinite essence.
(8) It is possible that God exists
where the all-attribute
The most interesting statement of this passage is expressed by the first
substance, God, exists. Let us now suppose that besides God another
sentence: "It is far from absurd to attribute many attributes to one
.s is possible. This means that there is a possible world Yi' where
substance." It is also noteworthy that this sentence occurs in the scholium
is true. This means that there is a possible world
substance
Y{
43
42 to EIP10 which says that each attribute of a substance must be conceived
The more reality or being each thing has, the more attributes belong
through itself. One of the implications of EIPlO is that if E and I are
to it.
attributes, then the idea of E does not involve the ideas of I or of not-I and the idea of I does not involve the ideas of E or of not-E. This
And in EIID6 he identifies reality with perfection:
implication could also be presented by considering the following propositions (9)
s is E
By reality and perfection I understand the same thing. These passages imply that in EID6 God is defined as being the perfect being. In the alternative demonstration to EIPl1, Spinoza writes:
(10)
s is I [I]t is absurd to affirm [that the nature] of a being absolutely infinite
(11) sis not-E (12)
s is not-I
and supremely perfect [involves a contradiction].
If we add that
and by saying that (9) does not entail (10) or (12), and that (10) does not
the nature of X involves a contradiction if it is not possible for that
entail (9) or (12). This means that simply by attending to the attributes
nature to be exemplified
themselves, we cannot say either that many-attribute substances are possible or that they are impossible.
then we can conclude that it is possible for all attributes to be exemplified by the same substance, because otherwise the nature of a perfect being
Given Spinoza's premisses, a choice has to be made between the possibility
would involve a contradiction which is absurd. A perfect being is by
of an all-attribute substance and the possibility of substances having fewer
definition also a possible being.
than all attributes. Spinoza's substance monism tells us that he chose the first alternative. But what are his reasons in favour of this choice? An easy
In objection to this, it might be maintained that it really is possible that
but unsatisfying answer is this. In EIP9 Spinoza writes:
there are one attribute substances, hence concluding that an all-attribute substance is impossible. If it were objected that this would make a perfect being an impossible being, the supporter of one-attribute substances could
44 reply that in the way Spinoza defines a perfect being it is impossible and
45 2.5.4. ESSENTIAL PREDICATION AND SUBSTANCE MONISM
hence that the notion of the perfect being should be defined in some other way.
We might try to demonstrate that there are many things possessing individual essences by the following argument. The sentence
What Spinoza says in the scholium to EIPlO is that, from the fact that each attribute is conceived through itself, we cannot conclude that each attribute
(13) Plato is identical with Plato
belongs to distinct substances; and hence that it is possible that they belong to one substance only. As we have seen, Spinoza's position in the scholium
predicates of Plato the property of being identical with Plato (or Platonity,
to EIPlO can be represented by saying that EIPlO is consistent with the
for short). Intuitively it is clear that being identical with Plato is a property
supposition that an all-attribute substance is possible and with the
Plato necessarily has, and moreover it is clear that nothing else but Plato
supposition that substances not having all attributes are possible. Additional
could have that property. In a similar way it could be shown that being
premisses are needed to establish the conclusion that only an all-attribute
identical with Socrates (or Socrateity, for short) is the essence of Socrates.
substance is possible. If the argument from the possibility of a perfect being is rejected, it seems very hard to defend the possibility of an all-
But if a distinction is made between an individual thing and its properties,
attribute substance. In what follows, I try to show that an intelligible
what makes the having of Platonity (Socrateity) by Plato (Socrates)
account of essential predication requires the acceptance of substance
necessary? Similar questions bother also Hector-Neri Castaneda, who
monism. I am not claiming that Spinoza himself presents the argument that
makes some sceptical remarks concerning the necessary connection
I put forward. The argument purports to show that there is another route of
between a thing and its essence:
establishing the possibility of an all-attribute substance. I intend to show that there is a way of defending Spinoza's substance monism. Maybe that
But what is there to Socrates beside Socrateity? A substrate especially
argument is not Spinozistic, but in spite of that I think it is worth some
fabricated for Socrateity, a matter specially suitable for its form, as
attention. Spinoza is a monist, and any argument which supports monism
an Aristotelian would say? Is the necessity of the having a certain
supports what I believe is the most startling thesis of the Ethics part one.
individual essence by an individual, which is itself not necessary, the suitability of the substrate to its essence?46
47
46 If we want to answer Castaneda's questions in the affirmative, we face a new problem. Let us suppose that a is the substrate especially fabricated for Socrateity and
12 the substrate especially fabricated for Platonity. Let us
claimed to be impossible? Why couldn't a be Q and
12 be £?
It is hard to
see how these skeptical questions can be avoided, if individual things are supposed to be substrates which possess essences.
now consider the sentences We can also approach these problems from another angle. The view we are (14)
a is the
considering presupposes that what accounts for an individual's being the
substrate for Socrateity
individual it is the fact that it possesses an essence, which is a property
and (15)
which it necessarily has and which no other individual could possibly have.
12 is the substrate for Platonity.
But that only individuals can possess properties is emphasized by It can be argued that (14) is true, because
a possesses
the property "being
the substrate for Socrateity" (= f), and (15) is true, because
Castaneda in the following passage:
12 possesses the Instantiation, which is an external connection between a property and
property "being the substrate for Platonity" (= Q). But £ and Q must be essences of
a
and
12 respectively. a is necessarily the substrate for
Socrateity, because if it were the substrate of another essence, then Socrateity would not be a necessary property of
a
Socrateity is the essence of a. Moreover, nothing else besides a can possess
a could possess £,
then someone else
could be Socrates which is also inconsistent with the supposition that Socrateity is the essence of
a.
By parallel reasoning it can be shown that
Q must be an essence of 12. One who is skeptical about essences might now ask: what is the ground for the essencehood of £ and Q? Why, for example, are the propositions
subject is already constituted. 47
and hence not a
necessary property of Socrates which contradicts the assumption that
£, because if something distinct from
what instances it, presupposes that a ful[I]-fledged entity fit to be the
This suggests that a distinction must be made between the factor which accounts for the individuality of a given thing and that which accounts for its thisness or haecceity. But this distinction is just the source of the troubles which threaten the claims of essentialism, if it is combined with the view that essences are properties of individual things. If Socrates is the individual thing
a and
Plato the individual thing
Socrates is the fact that it possesses the property of Socrateity and what makes
12 Plato is the fact that it possesses Platonity, then one could argue
that Plato would have existed if (16)
a is Q
(17)
12 is £
a
had possessed Platonity and Socrates
would have existed if 12 had possessed Socrateity; i.e. in that counterfactual situation the individual
and
12, and if what makes a
a would
become Plato and the individual
12 would
become Socrates. But, if this is possible, then Socrateity and Platonity are
49
48 no longer essences, because the individuals who are, in the actual world,
At first sight, Descartes' suggestion that thought and extension are common
the referents of the names "Socrates" and "Plato", could exist without
essences seems to be more plausible than the alternative proposed by
Socrateity or Platonity.
Spinoza. Both you and I are thinking beings, and what can this mean except that both you and I possess the property of thought. Both the ball
The above considerations suggest that it cannot be true both that (i)
that lies on the floor and the book that is on my desk are extended. Thus
essences are properties of individual things, and that (ii) there are many
there are at least two things which are thinking - you and I - and two
individual things, each possessing an essence. One way to avoid this
things that are extended - the ball and the book. One might, then, conclude
unwelcome result would be to deny that there are essences. Spinoza,
that Spinoza cannot be right in maintaining that thought and extension are
however, would not accept this. But the supposition in EIPlOS that it is
attributes or individual essences.
possible that all essences can be possessed by the same substance seems to save the notion of essence from the problems characterized above, because
What, then, does Spinoza mean in insisting that only one substance exists,
it implies that only one substance is possible. From this it clearly follows
which is thinking and extended? Is he saying that my senses, when they
that the question whether an attribute or essence could be possessed by a
report to me the existence of more than one extended thing, are necessarily
different substance receives a negative answer.
deceiving me? Or is he saying that even if I may be right in saying that I see a ball and a book, I am not right in saying that they are extended? Neither of these alternatives is in accordance with Spinoza's cast of mind. That there are many bodies as well as several thinking subjects, is
2.6. THOUGHT AND EXTENSION AS ATTRIBUTES OF GOD
something that Spinoza definitely would not deny (cf. EIP28; EIIA2).
As we have seen above (2.1.), the greatest difference between Spinoza's
For a consistent reading of Spinoza, then, a reasonable interpretation must
and Descartes' conceptions of essences (attributes for Spinoza; principal
be found for the following two apparently contradictory propositions:
attributes for Descartes) is that for Descartes essences are common whereas for Spinoza they are individual. Descartes allows that several substances
(18) There is only one thing that has extension as an attribute, but
may share an attribute, whereas Spinoza maintains that there cannot be two
many extended things.
substances with an attribute in common. Given this difference, it seems rather odd that they both consider that thought and extension are essences. 48
(19) There is only one thing that has thought as an attribute, but many thinking things.
50
51
The key to understanding why (18) and (19) are not contradictions is to see
way as we are inclined to think of ocean waves as being modifications of
that the truth conditions of the sentences, which are of the form
the ocean, we should think of all bodies as being modes or modifications of the one extended substance. This could also be expressed by saying that
(20) X is I
Spinoza makes no distinction between space and the material things which it contains. To remain at the level of metaphor, bodies are 'thickenings' or
where I can be replaced by an attribute, are not in all cases of the form
in a way 'chunks' of the extended substance, and to say that bodies are extended is to say that bodies are modifications of an extended substance
(21) X has the property of being I.
without which they cannot be conceived. These points, then, tell us that (18) is not a contradiction, because (18) says that there is only one
The truth-conditions of (20) are given by (21) only if X is replaced by a
substance which has extension as an attribute, but many things which
term that refers to a substance. But when X is replaced by a term that refers
involve extension.
to a mode, then the truth-conditions of (20) are of the form (22) X involves the property of being I. 49
From the above considerations, it follows that one's idea of body involves the idea of an extended substance. A similar principle for ideas would be
And (22) means for Spinoza that
that one's idea of a thinking thing that is not a substance involves the idea of a substance which possesses the property of thought. Because for
(23) The idea of X involves the idea of something being I.
Spinoza men are not substances, it follows that no one can have an idea of himself that does not involve an idea of some other thing (i.e. an idea
To see the difference between (21) and (22), let us consider the following
of a thinking substance). At this point Spinoza differs radically from the
analogy: The waves of the ocean as well as the ocean itself are
thoughts of Descartes. Put in Spinoza's terminology, Descartes claims that
undoubtedly extended. But it is not natural to think of the waves and the
every thinking being can have an idea of himself that does not involve the
ocean as different substances which share the attribute of extension. We
idea of any other thing. Descartes tries to prove this by insisting that he can
cannot think of a wave of the ocean without thinking of the ocean and we
conceive of himself as being the only thing that exists. Even if there were
cannot think of the ocean without thinking it as extended. In thinking of a
no other thinkers, no bodies at all, he could prove his own existence simply
wave of the ocean, it is natural to say that we are not thinking of two
by doubting it, because he could not doubt his own existence without, at
substances having extension as an attribute, but only of the ocean as
the same time, existing. 50 Descartes' argument can be seen as having two
modified in a certain determinate way. According to Spinoza, in the same
conclusions:
53
52 (i) For all
x,
if
x is
a being capable of doubt, then X can be certain
that he himself exists
entails that the content of the proposition "I am thinking" is the same as the content of the proposition
and (ii) For all X, if X is a being capable of doubt, then X can identify himself without referring to any thing distinct from himself, (Le.
Something is thinking.
X
can have an idea of himself which involves no idea of any other
This, however, entails that the words "I am thinking" express the same
thing).
proposition for every thinker, namely the proposition "Something is thinking". But that must be false, because the words "I am thinking"
It is the latter conclusion that Spinoza must reject in order to rescue his
express different propositions to different persons. Thus it can be concluded
substance monism.
that Descartes failed to show that the proposition "I am thinking" involves no reference to other individual things besides the referent of the word "I".
Descartes' argument clearly presupposes that one cannot be mistaken about the proposition "I doubt". That is, if someone doubts, and considers the
According to Spinoza, minds are composed of distinct ideas and the
proposition "I doubt", then he knows that it is true. Moreover, because for
identity of a given mind is determined by a certain relation holding
Descartes doubt is a mode of thougheI, he finds that the idea or proposition
between these ideas. 52 Now, given this model of mind, the proposition, "I am thinking", can be interpreted as saying nothing over and above the fact
I am thinking
that my mind exists, and to say that I am thinking that 12, where 12 is some proposition, is to say that one constituent of my mind is the thought 12.
is such that it involves a reference only to the thinking self, or that it
Substance comes into the picture once it is granted that ideas cannot be
presupposes the idea of no other individual besides the referent of the word
conceived to exist without conceiving some substance that possesses them.
"I". But now the following problem arises. As we have seen, Descartes
This substance that has thoughts must presumably be a thinking substance,
considers that we cannot have any ideas of substances as they are in
and so we can say that all my thoughts are possessed by a thinking
themselves, and that substances are necessarily conceived through their
substance. But, because I am not a substance, it follows that there is no
attributes. This means that in being aware of the proposition "I am
contradiction in supposing that all the thoughts there are, i.e. all the
thinking" one is aware only of the attribute of thought. This, however,
thoughts of different thinkers, are in the same thinking substance. We can, then, say that even if Spinoza does not accept that the mind of a thinking being is a substance which has the property of thought, it does involve the
55
54 idea of a thinking substance, because we cannot think of the human mind without thinking of something that has the property of thought.
This additional requirement means among other things that we cannot prove that extension is an attribute of God by claiming that for Spinoza bodies are modifications of space, and that there is no possible world where
So far we have reached the conclusion that it is possible that there exists only one thinking substance and only one extended substance. But from this we cannot conclude that thought and extension are attributes, any more than we can infer from the possibility of there being only one island that
two spaces exist. It is also required that it does not make any difference to their identity how the spaces are modified. But if the spaces of 'li and
WI
are differently modified, there seems to be nothing preventing us from saying that the space of the possible world 'li is different from the space of the possible world 'lit. A similar problem also arises for thinking
"islandness" is an essence.
substances. If Spinoza somehow succeeded in showing that there is no As we have seen from Spinozats definition of essence, EIID2, it follows
possible world where two thinking substances exist, he would still have to
necessarily has E and (ii) it is not
show that if there is a thinking substance in the possible world 'li and a
X
and has E. The
thinking substance in 'lit, then these thinking substances must be identical.
cannot exist without being
E; the second
But if modes are accidental to their bearers, we might suppose that the
condition says that if something has E, then that thing is x. It is plausible
thinking substance of'li shares no idea with the thinking substance of 'lit.
that if E is an essence of x, (i) then
X
possible that there exists an entity y- that is distinct from first condition states that
X
to maintain that thought and extension fulfill the first requirement. If an extended substance lost its extension then that substance would cease to
To call two possible substances identical for the sole reason that they possess the property of thought is, however, intuitively implausible.
exist, and if a thinking substance ceased to think, then that substance would cease to exist.
At this stage of the inquiry I must leave it undecided how Spinoza comes to the conclusion that thought and extension are attributes. But I think that
The second condition imposed by the definition of essence, however, is much more problematic. To prove that extension and j:hought meet it, it is not sufficient to show that there is no possible world where two extended substances exist, and no possible world where two thinking substances exist. It must be also shown that if there are possible worlds wand 'li', in which a thinking (extended) substance exists, the thinking (extended) substance in 'li is identical with the thinking (extended) substance in 'lit.
there is an answer to this problem, which I shall present in the final chapter of this study.
57 II MODES
1. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
In the demonstration to EIP15, Spinoza says that except for substances and modes there is nothing; i.e. of every existent it is true that is either a substance or a mode, and given that only one substance exists, it follows that of everything that exists it is true that it is either God or its mode. From the definitions of substance (EID3) and mode (EID5), it follows that modes are in substance and they are conceived through it. In interpreting Spinoza, it is a hard problem to give an intuively plausible reading of the relation of being-in. It is natural to suppose, as I did in the first chapter, that modes are properties of a substance and that the relation of being-in is the primitive relation of inherence. But as we shall soon see, this interpretation conflicts with our intuitions about the distinction between an individual thing and a property.
Spinoza divides modes into infinite and finite ones. Infinite modes exist always and everywhere, whereas finite modes have both spatial and temporal limitations; i.e. they come into being and cease to exist and they do not exist everywhere (EIP21-23, EIP28). The familiar things of our everyday experience such as tables and chairs are reduced in Spinoza's monistic system to finite modes (ElID7). The distinction between the attributes is also reflected at the level of modes. When a given mode is conceived under the attribute of thought, it is conceived as an idea, and if
59
58 it is conceived under the attribute of extension, it is conceived as a body
substance. This interpretation borrows elements from both Curley's and
(EIIP7S).
Bennett's theories.
Given the suppositions that (i) singular things are modes and (ii) modes are properties, it follows that singular things are properties of substance. This conclusion is hard to accept. Curley, for example, rejects it in the following
2. CURLEY'S INTERPRETATION
way: As we have seen above, Curley does not accept the thesis that by "being Spinoza's modes are, prima facie, of the wrong logical type to be
in" Spinoza means inherence in substance. His substitute for inherence is
related to substance in the same way as Descartes' modes are related
causal dependence. 56 In Spinoza's system every mode is caused by God and
to substance, for they are particular things not qualities. And it is
what is caused by God must be in God, Curley argues. So, the predicates
difficult to know what it would mean to say that particular things
"is in God" and "is caused by God" are at least extensionally equivalent.
inhere in substance. When qualities are said to inhere in substance,
And this seems to be his motivation for saying that by "being in" Spinoza
this may be viewed as a way of saying that they are predicated of it.
really intends causal dependence. In short, Curley thinks that for Spinoza
What it would mean to say that one thing is predicated of another is · 53 a mystery that nee ds so Ivmg.
the following holds: (A) "x is in
i'
means "x is caused by
i '·
In this chapter my aim is to present Curley's theory of modes and criticize it. Moreover, I shall consider Jonathan Bennett's54 view that, in spite of
According to Curley57, finite modes of extension are facts. This is a natural
Curley's arguments, modes can be held as properties of Spinoza's only
claim, because in Spinoza's system finite modes exist in infinite causal
substance. Bennett's contention is that his interpretation of modes sheds
series of finite modes (EIP28), and it is plausible to hold that facts stand
light on many difficult passages in the Ethics, most notably on Spinoza's
in causal relations, whereas it would be odd to say that properties could be
identity theory between mind and body and on the definition of attribute.55
the relata of causal relations.
I will try to show that Bennett's solution to the mystery posed by Curley cannot be accepted and that his interpretation does not succeed in
The distinction between ideas and bodies is preserved in Curley's
explaining the above mentioned difficulties in Spinoza's metaphysics.
interpretation in the following way: As we have seen, Spinoza thinks that
Finally, I will give a new interpretation of modes as particular states of
ideas are necessarily affirmative. From this Curley 58 concludes that ideas
61
60 are true propositions and bodies are the facts which are presupposed by the
3. PROBLEMS IN CURLEY'S INTERPRETATION
correspondence theory of truth, which seems to be endorsed by Spinoza in EIA6 where he says that a true idea must agree with its object. Thus
3.1. FACTS AND PROPOSITIONS
Curley thinks that I shall start my criticism by considering the principle (B). According to (B) Modes of extension (i.e. bodies) are facts, and modes of thought
Curley 59, the propositions which describe finite modes of extension are
(i.e. ideas) are true propositions.
singular propositions. Given this interpretation doubts begin to creep in. Curley would say that the proposition
That ideas must be true propositions is required by Spinoza's parallelism thesis between ideas and bodies which finds its expression in EIIP?:
This watch is made of gold
The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and
is a finite idea. Now its object, or that which makes it true, is not, strictly
connection of things.
speaking, my watch but the fact that my watch is made of gold. Facts, however, are not simple but have constituents that are not facts. The
It ought to be noted that Spinoza really left no room for false ideas,
constituents of the fact which correspond to the proposition that this watch
because in ElIP32 he says that all ideas in so far as they are related to God
is made of gold involve at least the following: (i) the watch and (ii) the
are true, and in the demonstration of this proposition he is appealing to
property of being made of gold. 60 Curley's position therefore entails that my
EIIP? and EIA6.
watch and the property of being made of gold are not facts and so they cannot be modes at all. This is against Spinoza's thesis that nothing except substance and its modes exist.
Curley himself takes notice of the following difficulty: causes and effects can be described in different ways. But, if we suppose that (i) the signs which describe or refer to facts are propositions and that (ij) propositions are identified with Spinoza's ideas and that (iii) there is, according to the parallelism thesis, a one-one correspondence between ideas and facts, then
63
62 facts cannot be described in the same way as we are inclined to say that
rotating the dial (if the circuit had been closed, say, by her activating
causes and effects can be described. Curley writes:
a photoelectric cell as she approached the stove). So it is not clear to me that the truth-conditions of (1) are the same as the truth-
[N]ormally we should wish to say that one and the same fact might
conditions of (2). (1) is rendered true by something she did to the
be truly described by a number of distinct propositions. For example,
dial. (2) is rendered true by the fact that when she did this to the dial, something else happened - namely, the circuit was closed. 62
at one stage during the process of Mary's making her pies, it was true that (1) Mary is rotating the dial on the stove and,
Even if Curley's criticism against the identity of the objects of (1) - (3)
(2) She is turning on the electricity in the oven and,
were accepted, there is something odd here. To concentrate on one case
(3) She is starting to heat the oven.
only where the thesis
These sentences are not logically equivalent and, so express different propositions. But many people would have a strong temptation to say
(F) There are just as many facts as there are true propositions
that they are all true in virtue of one and the same fact. 61 is threatened, does not give good reasons for believing (F) because it is not One could insist that (1) - (3) are made true by one event or one action
difficult to find examples which give a more serious challenge to it than the
performed by Mary: In order to turn on the electricity and to start to heat
example considered by Curley.63 Let us suppose that the Mary of Curley's
the oven in the given circumstances, Mary does not need to do anything but
example is the girl who murdered Olof Palme. It follows from this that the
rotate the dial on the stove.
proposition (1) in Curley's example and the proposition
It is, however, in no way self-evident that (1) - (3) are made true by one
(4) The murderer of Olof Palme is rotating the dial on the stove
and the same event or fact. Curley argues against the identity of these facts or events in the following way:
are not identical, because one can believe (4) without believing (1) and vice versa. It seems obvious to me, however, that (1) and (4) are made true by,
In this case I am not sure that our instinct to speak of three different
or describe, the same event or fact.
descriptions of the same fact is correct. Mary might have rotated the dial without turning on the electricity (if there had been a faulty
There are still other problems in Curley's interpretation. From the
connection); and she might have turned on the electricity without
parallelism between ideas and their objects, it follows that if X is a mode
64
65
of extension and I(x) the idea of x, then X exists only at the times when
In this quotation Curley seems to accept the following principle
I(x) exists. This entails that finite ideas, if true, are not always true, but that they are true only when the corresponding facts exist. However, in 1900
(I) For every
when Mauno Koivisto did not actually exist, the proposition
X
(5) Mauno Koivisto will exist
E, if E is a property of X, then the idea (or all ideas) of
involves E
because I am unable to see how one can without endorsing (I) infer from the proposition that all ideas of extended objects are ideas of things that are
was true. It seems to be the case that even in 1900 (5) said something
E the proposition that every idea of any extended object involves E.
about Mauno Koivisto, but it cannot be the case that in 1900 (5) was made true by a fact which involved Mauno Koivisto, because this would entail
If we admit that we have ideas about some entities existing outside our
that Mauno Koivisto existed in 1900 which is false.
minds, (I) cannot be right. Because it would say the same as
One of the most problematic issues in Spinoza's theory of modes is his
For every
claim that every idea involves the eternal and infinite essence of God
property of X
E, if the idea of
X
does not involve
E, then E is not a
(EIIP45). Curley interprets this in the following way: and it cannot be demanded that in order to have an idea which is about The key proposition is EIIP45, according to which "every idea of
you, my idea has to involve every property you have. Fortunately, there is
every body, or of every singular thing actually existing, necessarily
evidence that Spinoza rejects this principle. In EIPlO Spinoza says that
involves the eternal and infinite essence of God". I think we can
every attribute of one substance must be conceived through itself and that
easily say why this is so. The common properties which appear on
every existing entity must be conceived under some attribute or other. As
an analysis of the nature of extension are called common because
I have argued in the previous chapter, these principles entail that one can
they are present in every body. Hence every idea or every affirmation
have an idea of a substance without having ideas of all of its attributes.
will involve them. That is, every idea of every body will involve the affirmation that body has common property X. And this affirmation
For Spinoza, the occurrence of the parallelism between the mental and
is simply an instance of the general proposition that every extended
physical realms is not a brute fact but finds its explanation in the thesis that
thing is an X, which is one of the propositions describing the nature
mental and physical entities are identical:
of the attribute of extension.
64
\
66
67 [T]he Mind and the Body are one and the same thing, which is
a proposition or idea, bearing logical relations to other propositions,
conceived now under the attribute of Thought, now under the
is to conceive the mode under the attribute of thought. To talk about
attribute of Extension. The result is that the order, or connection, of
it as a fact, having causal relations with other facts, is to conceive it
things is one, whether nature is conceived under this attribute or
under the attribute of extension. 65
that.. ..(EIIIP2S). This interpretation of the identity between ideas and bodies is problematic.
[A] circle existing in nature and the idea of the existing circle, which
In arguing for his view, Curley first makes a distinction between entities
is also in God, are one and the same thing, which is explained
capable of possessing truth values and entities which make these
through different attributes. Therefore, whether we conceive nature
propositions true, and then he surprisingly goes on to say that there is no
under the attribute of Extension, or under the attribute of Thought, or
such distinction. Moreover, there is this problem: Spinoza says that a mode
under any other attribute, we shall find one and the same order, or
of extension and the corresponding mode of thought are one and the same
one and the same connection of causes, i.e., that the same things
mode conceived in two different ways. But in conceiving a mode X in some
follow one another. (EIIP7S).
way, one is having an idea which is in some sense about x. However, if we accept what Curley seems to maintain, namely that no distinction is to be
Given what Curley says about modes, the identity between ideas and modes
made between the expressions "The idea I is about x" and "x is the object
of extension must be interpreted as saying that true propositions and the
of I", then one and the same mode cannot be conceived in different ways.
corresponding facts are in some sense identical. Curley writes:
That this implication holds can be seen as follows. To say that a mode
X
is conceived in two different ways is to say that there are two distinct ideas I want to suggest that we can do reasonable justice to Spinoza's
which are about x. From the parallelism between ideas and their objects it
concept of the relation between thought and extension if we think of
follows, however, that if ideas I and 1* are distinct, they must have
the relation between thought and extension as an identity of true
different modes as their objects. Thus there cannot be different ideas about
proposition and fact. It is misleading to say, even though Spinoza
the same mode, if "The idea I is about x" means the same as "x is the
himself says it, that a true idea agrees with the object (read "a true
object of I".
proposition agrees with the fact"), because the mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing expressed in two different ways. The fact and the true proposition are the same thing, expressed or viewed in two different ways. To talk about a mode as
69
68 3.2. ON THE DEPENDENCE OF MODES ON SUBSTANCE
[T]he identity of being in and being caused by, requires, I think, that we suppose Spinoza conflated the object-property and cause-effect
As we saw in the previous chapter, Curley's thesis, according to which by
distinctions. For if x is caused by y, x is in y, and hence it is a mode,
"being in" Spinoza means causal dependence, entails in Spinoza's
and a property, of y. 67
metaphysics that a substance must be identical with its attribute. This entailment holds because Spinoza thinks that both a substance and its
I think that the first and second comment hit their target whereas the third
attribute are conceived through themselves. So, if we suppose that attributes
is somewhat odd. If Spinoza really had intended that "X is in
are in their substances, we have to conclude that they cannot be caused by
same as "x is caused by 'i', then it cannot be said that he had conflated the
their substances because the knowledge or concept of an effect involves the
object-property and cause-effect distinctions.
'i' means the
knowledge or concept of its cause. But as we saw, the thesis that attributes are not caused by their substances does not conflict with Spinoza's fundamental views, and for this reason we can reject the implausible view that Spinoza identified substance with its attribute and still believe that
4. BENNETT'S INTERPRETAnON
attributes are in God without being caused by him. 4.1. FIELD METAPHYSICS Charles Jarrett
66
has made three critical comments on Curley's thesis that
by "being in" Spinoza means "being caused by". First, "cause of itself" is
Bennett attempts to meet Curley's objection, according to which modes are
not defined in terms of "in itself", nor vice versa. Second, in EIP15 Spinoza
of the wrong type to be related to substance in the way properties are
says that everything is in God, whereas EIP16 says that everything is
related to their bearers, by trying to show how bodies (i.e. modes of
caused by God. These propositions are, however, demonstrated differently
extension) can be treated as properties.
and used in different ways in subsequent propositions. But if "being in" means "being caused by" then the propositions EIP16 and EIP15 should
Bennett 68 attributes to Spinoza a thesis which he calls field metaphysics. In
have identical proofs and they should play the same role in the other
what follows I will give a rough characterization of this theory: Spinoza
demonstrations. Jarrett's third critical comment is as follows:
thinks that there is only one extended substance and this substance is the infinite Euclidean space. Spinoza makes no distinction between matter and extension which gives us the reason to say that there is matter everywhere and that particular things are modifications of this matter. 69 When we say
71
70 that a particular mode of extension exists, our sentence can be reduced to
interpretation of how ideas can be treated as modes of one substance. He
one whose logical subject is God and which predicates a property of God:
writes:
The field metaphysic does, in a fairly clear sense, make particular
My account applies only to extended things. As for Spinoza's thesis
extended things adjectival on regions of space. A blush is adjectival
that all particulars - minds as well as bodies - are modes: I have to
on a face because the existence of the blush is the face's being red;
suppose that he started with a sound doctrine about the modal nature
and a pebble is adjectival upon space because the existence of the
of extended particulars and then stretched it over mental ones as well
pebble is space's being thus and so. More specifically, it is space's
on the strength of a general thesis that the extended world is mirrored
containing a connected sequence of regions belonging to a string of
in detail by the mental world....[I]t is indubitable that he did most of
place-times which satisfy certain conditions. 70
his metaphysical thinking in terms of extension, and was willing to reapply his results to thought without working out the details. 72
So far, I agree with Bennett's theory. A similar account of extension and of its relation to particular material bodies is also present in Descartes' writings. John Cottingham writes about Descartes' views as follows: 4.2. MODES AS PROPERTIES Descartes
offers
a
radically
monistic
view
of
corporeal
substance...The physical universe is a single indefinitely extended
Bennett is keen on insisting that modes are properties and that properties
thing: 'The world, that is the whole universe of created substance, has
must be regarded as 'honest universals' and not as particularized universals
no limits to its extension'; 'the matter whose nature consists simply
which he thinks are nonsense:
in its being an extended substance occupies all imaginable space' (Principles II 21 and 22). Individual items - planets, horses, trees -
If I am right that Spinoza espoused the field metaphysic...then he
are thus construed simply as local modifications of the single
could say that the relation of particular extended things to the one
extended substance. 71
extended substance is enormously 'like the relation of a subject to its predicate' or (to move out of Curley's linguistic idiom) the relation of
We can then say that the novelty of Spinoza's monism lies in the view that there is only one thinking substance. But Bennett does not give any
a property to its possessor. 73
73
72
Some philosophers have postulated items - which might be called
The suppositions that modes are honest universals and that honest
'states' or 'modes' - which are at once particular and universal. As
universals can be multiply exemplified entail that it is possible that a given
well as this box and the property of cubicness which it shares with
mode begins to exist after it has ceased to exist - a conclusion Spinoza
other things, they have thought, there is the cubicness of this box. It
hardly would have accepted. What, I think, is still a more problematic
is not the box, but only an aspect of it; but it is an aspect of this box,
consequence is this: It would be possible that a given mode would have
and is not to be identified with the cubicness of anything else... J am
several instances at the same time. It would be possible for me to exist at
glad there is no direct evidence that Spinoza did believe in these
the same time in London and in New York. This is, however, an absurdity
particularized universals, for I think they are nonsense. I cannot prove
Spinoza would not have accepted.
him to be innocent of them; but I am willing to suppose that he was, since I can explain all the texts through an interpretation which allows modes and states to be honest universals.
74
We could try to repair Bennett's theory by denying that modes can have various instances. This, however, would turn modes into entities that bear a close resemblance to particularized universals. Moreover, in order to get rid of the necessary existence of individual things, it ought to be denied
To say of some entity X that X is a universal is commonly thought to lay
that modes are necessary existents. But if these two corrections are made,
two requirements on it: (i) X is a necessary existent; and (ii) X is capable
it hardly makes sense to say that modes are "honest universals".
of having various instances. These points tell that a distinction has to be made between the existence of a universal and its instantiation. For
Before considering the virtues that Bennett thinks his interpretation of
example, all red objects exemplify or instantiate the property of redness
modes has, I will take one point in which his theory meets with an initial
which is a necessary existent. 75
difficulty. At various places Spinoza makes a distinction between the essence of a mode and the mode itself. 76 Now, if modes were properties, we
The most obvious difficulty in Bennett's views is this: From the premisses
would be forced to claim that properties can have essences. I am, however,
(i) all modes are properties; and (ii) all properties are necessary existents;
inclined to say that properties do not have essences, but that they are
it follows that (iii) all modes are necessary existents. Spinoza, however,
essences of individual things. Maybe we could say that properties are
explicitly denies (iii): individual things are finite modes which come into
identical with their essences, but it would be very odd to suppose that
being and cease to exist.
properties possess essences.
74
75
4.3. IDENTITY BETWEEN MODES OF THOUGHT AND MODES OF
room for Spinoza's claim in EIIP7 and EIIIP2S, that there is only one
EXTENSION
entity, which can be conceived either as my mind or as my body.
According to Bennett, the identity between mind and body or between ideas and their objects is best explained by interpreting it as a thesis about the identity of properties:
4.4. MODES AND THE ESSENCE OF SUBSTANCE
If my mind is a mode and my body is a mode, and my mind is my
In the previous chapter I deliberately omitted to say that Spinoza's
body, it follows that my mind is the same mode as my body. I submit
definition of attribute, EID4, "By attribute I mean that which the intellect
that this is Spinoza's doctrine: his thesis about the identity of physical
perceives of substance as constituting its essence", is ambiguous. This is
and mental particulars is really about the identity of properties. He
because the English word "as" is a translation from the Latin word
cannot be saying that physical P = mental M; that is impossible
"tanquam", which could as well be translated to "as if". So EID4 seems to
because they belong to different attributes. His thesis is rather that if
be consistent with the reading that the intellect makes a mistake when it
P is systematically linked with M, then P is extension-and-F for
takes attributes to be essences.
some differentia F such that M is thought-and-F. What it takes for an extended world to contain my body is exactly what it takes for a
Bennett insists that Spinoza does not think that attributes are essences.
thinking world to contain my mind; just as what it takes for a two-
Astonishingly, he says that they are the modes which constitute the essence
dimensional figure to be a circle is exactly what it takes for a three-
of a substance. Bennett's argument consists of the following premisses: (i)
dimensional figure to be a sphere - namely being bounded by a set
in EID4 Spinoza is using the term in the sense Descartes used it; i.e. an
of points equidistant from one point. 77
essence is the most basic property (or a fundamental property); (ii) modes are the most basic properties (or fundamental properties).
Bennett's view is problematic, because it makes the supposed identity between mind and body disappear. If my body is the property, "Extension-
As we have seen, Descartes thinks that properties can be divided into two
and-E", and my mind the property "Thought-and-E", then my body is not
groups, into those which presuppose extension and into those which
identical with my mind because "Extension-and-E" is not identical with
presuppose thought. Thought and extension are essences for Descartes
"Thought-and-E".78 From this it follows that Bennett's view leaves no
because they can be conceived through themselves, which means that they
77
76 presuppose no other property. So, from Descartes we get the following
Spinoza rightly won't say that an attribute is an essence = most
principles concerning properties:
fundamental property, but only that it must conceived or perceived as basic, since to get deeper we would have to think of finite modes
(P) The property f is more basic than the property Q if and only if
in abstraction from either attribute, which is impossible. In short, Id4
Q cannot be conceived without f and f can be conceived without Q.
is perfect. 79
(F) The property f is a fundamental property if and only if it can be
In this passage Bennett argues as follows: The modes of thought and the
conceived through itself (i.e. the idea of f involves the idea of no
modes of extension are identical. This means that the property needed for
other property).
a given mode of thought to exist, is what is needed for the corresponding mode of extension to exist. These properties, which are combinable both
It is hard to see how (P) and (F) can be taken to support Bennett's view
with thought and with extension, are modes. But every mode must be
that because modes are fundamental properties, they are essences. As we
conceived either with the help of the attribute of thought or with the help
have seen, it follows from the definitions of substance and mode that
of the attribute of extension; hence these modes are inconceivable in
modes are conceived through substance, which for Spinoza means that they
themselves, and the fact that they are combinable with all attributes is what
are conceived through the attributes of substance. But Bennett offers a new
makes them fundamental properties. I do not, however, see how this is in
and, I think, un-Cartesian characterization of what it means for a property
accordance with the Cartesian notion of essence as the most basic property.
to be fundamental:
For Descartes that which is conceived as the fundamental property lli the fundamental property, and I cannot understand what other sense could be
In [EID4] the term 'essence' is being used in the Cartesian sense of
given to the expression "fundamental property". In what sense are
a fundamental property of a thing, not a special case of something
properties which cannot be conceived at all but are combinable with all
deeper and more general. Now, according to my 'mode identity'
attributes more basic than the attributes themselves? This question is left
interpretation, there is a good sense in which the most basic
unanswered by Bennett.
properties of the one substance are not the attributes but the modes, since they lie deep enough to combine with both attributes. Of course
I cannot help feeling that Bennett's claim that modes form the essence of
extension is more basic than squareness; but to be square is to be
substance is somewhat artificial, and it seems to have no textual evidence.
extended and F, for an F which does not entail extension because it
Bennett BO , however, defends his thesis by insisting that there are no
is also combinable with thought. Given that there are such Fs,
78
79
passages in the Ethics where Spinoza says that attributes are essences.
express attributes Spinoza is making a slip. Moreover, in the second
What Spinoza does say, according to Bennett, is that
demonstration to EIIPl Spinoza identifies God's nature with its attributes because in that demonstration he says that it follows from EIP25C that
(i) Attributes express the essence of substance. (cf. EID6, EIP16D,
particular ideas (i.e. modes of thought) express God's nature in a certain
EIP19D).
and determinate way. Thus also EIIPID is inconsistent with Bennett's interpretation because Spinoza thinks there that (i) modes express God's
Moreover, Bennett maintains that it is natural to say that
nature and do not form God's nature and that (ii) they express God's nature by expressing the attributes of God.
(ii) Attributes express modes. Bennett's view that the essence of substance consists of totally Now, (i) and (ii) together give good reason for believing that modes form
inconceivable modes is at odds with Spinoza's fundamental view that we
the essence of Spinoza's only substance.
have adequate knowledge of the essence of God:
Even if Spinoza does not explicitly state the thesis that attributes express
EIIP45 Each idea of each body, or of each singular thing which
modes, Bennett thinks that the thesis is supported by Spinoza's view that
actually exists, necessarily involves an eternal and infinite essence of
modes cannot be conceived through themselves. Because modes can be
God.
conceived only with the help of some attribute, it is attributes, Bennett says, that makes modes accessible to the intellect and hence they express
EIIP46 The knowledge of God's eternal and infinite essence which
them. 8 !
each idea involves is adequate and perfect.
Bennett's interpretation, according to which attributes express modes, is
EIIP47 The human mind has an adequate knowledge of God's eternal
threatened by EIP25C where Spinoza says that modes express attributes.
and infinite essence.
Bennett
82
,
however, thinks that in EIP25C Spinoza makes a slip; instead of
saying that modes express attributes, Spinoza should say that attributes
The knowledge that we have of the essence of God plays a very important
express modes. I think that Bennett's view is not well-founded. As far as
role in Spinoza's system. Intuitive knowledge of the formal essences of
I know, Spinoza nowhere says that attributes express modes, and for this
things has its starting point in the knowledge of God's essence:
reason alone it becomes suspicious to insist that in saying that modes
81
80 EIIP40S2 [Intuitive knowledge] proceeds from an adequate idea of
that they are exemplifications of properties by God, i.e. particular states of
the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate
God. A particular state is an entity which consists of a substance and a
knowledge of the essence of things.
property, and for every particular state X of substance
s there
is a property
E such that X exists if and only if s exemplifies E. The identity criterion of Moreover, in the scholium to EIIP47 Spinoza maintains that this knowledge
particular states is given by the following principle:
of God's attributes, i.e. of his essence, is important for men: (IC) States [W]e see that God's infinite essence and his eternity are known to all.
~
and b. are identical if and only if they are
exemplifications of the same property by the same substance.
And since all things are in God and are conceived through God, it follows that we can deduce from this knowledge a great many things
Thus (IC) says that two states are identical if they have identical
which we know adequately, and so can form that third kind of
constituents. If we forget for a while Spinoza's monism and assume that
knowledge [i.e. intuitive knowledge]. ..of whose excellence and utility
individual things are substances, then in our ontology the statement, "My
we shall speak in Part V.
pen is red", if true, commits us, in addition to the existence of my pen and the property redness, to the existence of a particular state "My pen's being
These passages give, I think, rather strong textual evidence that Bennett
red". This state is the exemplification of redness by my pen, and if my pen
cannot be right both in holding that modes cannot be conceived at all and
happens to be the pen that I found yesterday, then (IC) entails that "My
that they constitute the essence of God.
pen's being red" is the same state as "That the pen that I found yesterday possesses the color of the Soviet flag".
The idea that modes are particular states of God, Spinoza's only substance, 5. MODES AS PARTICULAR STATES OF SUBSTANCE
implies that every mode is an exemplification of a property by God. For example, my body's being a mode of extension is identical with God's
5.1. ON THE CONCEPT OF A PARTICULAR STATE
having a certain determinate property, and similarly, because for Spinoza my mind is identical with my body, my mind is identical with God's having
In this chapter my aim is to give a new interpretation of modes that
that same property. From Spinoza's belief that all singular things are finite
explains the texts better than the alternatives proposed by Curley and
modes of God, it follows that, for a given individual thing X, there is a
Bennett. Instead of holding that Spinoza's modes are properties, I suggest
property E such that X exists if and only if God has E. In what follows, I
83
82
will call the property whose exemplification is needed for a state to exist
5.2. QUALIFICATIONS AND VIRTUES
the constitutive property of that state. Curley's and Bennett's interpretations share many shortcomings. One of the The suggestion that modes are particular states of God is in accordance
problematic issues, as we have seen, is that, according to Bennett, modes
with our intuitions that singular things cannot be treated as properties of
are honest universals and thus necessary existents. This, however, is
God. It also follows that by saying that modes are in God, Spinoza cannot
rejected by Spinoza, because finite modes or singular things have a
mean that they are properties possessed by God or that they inhere in God.
determinate existence. Now, this same problem also besets Curley's
Did Spinoza then think that there are two relations of "being in", one
interpretation, because he wants to say that modes of thought are true
obtaining between God and his properties and the other obtaining between
propositions and modes of extension are the facts that make them true. But
God and his states? A negative answer to this question is, of course,
from the parallelism between modes of thought and modes of extension it
preferable, because I am inclined to think that we have an intuitive notion
follows that the fact which makes a proposition true must prevail exactly
of what it is for a property to inhere in a substance, but do not have a
at the times when the proposition is true. If propositions are treated as
similar notion of a state's being in a substance which is not explicable in
entities which, if true, are always true, then no change would be possible
terms of the first sense of "being in". Fortunately, it is quite easy to reduce
and nothing would be count as a finite mode or a singular thing. 83 But if
all sentences which report a mode's being in God to sentences in which the
modes are interpreted as exemplifications of properties, then even if the
relation of being-in obtains only between properties and God. That is, if
constitutive property
we say that a mode
K
is in God then this means nothing else but that the
property that is needed for
K
to exist is in God. Thus my interpretation
of a mode were
a necessary
existent, its
exemplification would not be because the exemplification of a property exists only at those times when the property is possessed by God.
does not, at least detrimentally, multiply the senses of "being in". The second problem involved in Bennett's interpretation was that, if modes are "honest universals", then it is logically possible for a given singular thing to exist at several distinct places at the same time, and for a mode to begin to exist after it has ceased to exist. This problem also threatens my interpretation, because if modes are exemplifyings of properties by God, then this characterization as such does not rule out the possibility that one
84
85
property is exemplified at distinct times or in distinct places at the same
There are at least two points which make Kim's account of states
time.
inapplicable for my purposes. First, Spinoza does not think that places and times are irreducible ontological categories. This suggests that we must
There are at least two ways of trying to sidestep the problem of multiple
analyze them by using the concept of mode, which would make the
existence of particular states. The first solution consists in holding that the
definition circular. Second, Kim's definition of state implies that the time
time when and the place where a substance exemplifies a property must be
at which a particular state exists belongs to the essence of the state, which
thought of as constituents of a particular state. The second way out of this
in turn entails that, if ~ is a particular state which exists at 1, then
problem is simply to deny that properties can have several instances.
not have existed at any other moment than 1. This entailment may seem
8
~
could
Jaegwon Kim 4, whose concept of a particular state I have used as a model,
counter-intuitive. It ought, however, to be noted that Spinoza thinks that
does think that the time when a property is exemplified is a constituent of
everything exists necessarily when it exists. But, according to Spinoza,
a particular state. According to Kim, a particular state consists of the
this necessity stems from the common order of nature (EIPl102), and by
following three elements: (i) a substance (ii) a property and (iii) a time. In
simply looking at the essence of a finite mode we cannot tell when and
Kim's interpretation, states can be characterized by saying that they consist
where it exists (ElP24C).
in the exemplifying of a property by a substance at a given time. This definition of state guarantees that it is impossible for any given state to
If we want to retain our initial idea of modes as property exemplifications,
exist after it has ceased to exist. Kim could, I think, avoid the problem of
we must, then, suppose that properties cannot be multiply instantiated.
simultaneous multiple existence of a given state by defining substance such
This supposition, however, is consistent with Spinoza's nominalism.
that it would be conceptually impossible for the same substance to possess
Bennett and Curley do not distinguish between a mode and its essence.
the same property at the same time in various places. Spinoza's substance
This is a weakness because, as we have seen, Spinoza makes that
monism, however, entails that this way is not open for him.
distinction. The constitutive properties of particular states clearly fulfill the conditions of essencehood laid down in EII02, because if the constitutive
One could try to modify Kim's account of a particular state by saying that
property of a given state
a particular state consists of four elements: (i) a substance, (ii) a property
then
which the substance exemplifies, (iii) a time, and (iv) a place. Then it could
longer exists.
X
X
is E, then when E is given, i.e. is had by God,
exists; and when God loses E, i.e. when E is taken away,
X
no
be said that a particular state is the exemplification of a property by a substance at a given time in a given place.
Spinoza's theory of the essences of singular things has fascinating consequences when compared to theories held by certain contemporary
87
86 essentialists, according to whom the essence of a thing is a property it
the indirect object of an idea. Thus only true ideas have indirect objects. In
possesses. 85 As we have seen in connection with the problem of attributes,
the second sense the object of an idea means the physical counterpart of
the claim that the essence of a thing is a property of that thing is
that idea. This object could be called the direct object of an idea. 86 It
problematic, because the necessary tie between the substance and its
follows from EIIP7 that in Spinoza's system all ideas have direct objects.
essence cannot have any foundation if we suppose that there can be many substances possessing essences as their properties. But interpreting modes
The distinction between direct and indirect objects becomes clearer, I hope,
as particular states of substance disposes of that problem, since the
from the following example: Let us suppose that both Jones and Smith
constitutive properties of states need not be and are not essential to their
believe that Jupiter is a planet. This entails that there are two non-identical
bearer, that is to God.
ideas, the one that is in Jones' mind and the one that is in Smith's mind , whose content can be expressed by the proposition that Jupiter is a planet. Now, these ideas have distinct direct objects; the direct object of Jones' idea is a certain physiological state of Jones' brain and the direct object of
5.2.1. IDENTITY THEORY AND IDEAS ABOUT GOD'S ESSENCE
Smith's idea is some state of Smith's brain. But even if they have distinct direct objects they have the same indirect object; i.e. the fact that Jupiter
Curley's and Bennett's interpretations do not give satisfactory accounts of
is a planet.
Spinoza's theses that the modes of extension and the modes of thought are identical entities conceived in different ways, and that every idea involves
Now, we have seen that two true ideas which have the same content can
an eternal and infinite essence of God. I believe that in my interpretation
have the same indirect object. But this is not enough to make it possible
these theses are not problematic.
that one and the same mode can be conceived in different ways. If one and the same mode is conceived in different ways, then two ideas with distinct
For Spinoza to say that a mode X is conceived in two different ways cannot
contents must have the same indirect object.
mean anything else but that there are two ideas 1 and 1* which have X as their common object. Spinoza's basic views seem to be inconsistent with
However, in my interpretation of modes as particular states of God, the
his thesis that one and the same mode can be conceived in different ways
following holds: if the proposition that.!! is E is true and.!! is identical with
because there are at least two different senses of the phrase "the object of
.12, then the state that makes ".!! is E" true is identical with the state that
an idea". In the first sense that is present in IA6 Spinoza means by the
makes ".12 is E" true. From this it follows that the ideas which are expressed
object of an idea that which makes the idea true. We could call this object
88
89
by "i! is E" and
"n is E"
have the same indirect object. Thus it is possible
5.2.2. BAYLE-JOACHIM INTERPRETATION AND ITS PROBLEMS
that two ideas with distinct contents have the same indirect object. One of the main virtues of Curley's interpretation of Spinoza's metaphysics From the above considerations it follows that if m is a mode whose
is that it avoids the problems of the so-called Bayle-Joachim
constitutive property is E (i.e. m is the exemplification of E by God), then
interpretation. According to this interpretation Spinoza believes that (i)
in Spinoza's metaphysics it is true that the propositions
modes are properties of the only substance and that (ii) if a predicate is true of an individual thing then that predicate expresses a property of God.
(7) Extended substance is E
Thus the Bayle-Joachim interpretation resembles very closely the interpretation offered by Bennett. 87
and The Bayle-Joachim interpretation, according to which Spinoza's thesis that (8) Thinking substance is E
there is only one substance entails that the properties of finite things are properties of God, involves three problems. 88 First, God ought to have
both refer to or describe m. Now, I would like to suggest that if one has an
properties that are unworthy of him. From "that puddle is slimy" we could
idea whose content is expressible by (7), then one is conceiving m as a
conclude that "God is slimy". Second, God ought to have contradictory
body and if one has an idea whose content can be expressed by (8), one is
properties. From "Jones is wise and Peter is not wise" , we could conclude
conceiving m as an idea. Thus there is no inconsistency in EIIP7 where
that "God both is wise and is not wise". Third, we ought to think that God
Spinoza claims that a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one
is changeable because every change in a finite particular would be a change
and the same thing, expressed in two ways.
in God.
I believe that it is rather easy to see why Spinoza does hold that every idea involves an eternal essence of God. Because Spinoza believes that the
Now, I believe that these objections are not objections to my theory of
world (i.e. God) is the ultimate subject of all our thoughts it follows that
modes. Tn my interpretation modes are particular states of God. They are
all ideas are about God. Thus every idea involves an idea of God. But
ontological parasites whose existence depends on the existence of God.
because God must necessarily be conceived under some attribute and
Before giving answers to the problems invoked by the Bayle-Joachim
attributes are essences it follows that every idea involves an essence of
interpretation we should first investigate the concept of dependent being
God.
without making the assumption that there is only one bearer of properties.
90
91
In pluralistic ontologies where the existence of several substances is
(A2) If S. Y-s not f-ly then it is not the case that S. Y-s f-ly.
allowed, there are also dependent beings such as sneezes and smiles. A sneeze cannot exist if no one sneezes and a smile cannot exist if no one
That (A2) does not hold can be seen with the help of the following
smiles. It is natural to suggest that the ontological dependence of states on
example: [I]f Alice is gesturing energetically with her right hand, and
their substances is reflected at the linguistic level by the fact that
languidly with her left hand, then "Alice is gesturing not-languidly" is true,
everything that can be said about states can be expressed by sentences
even though "It is not the case that Alice is gesturing languidly" is false. 89
which do not contain terms referring to states (or do not quantify over states). For example, to say that
In Spinoza's ontology all particular things are dependent beings. They exist
in God and are, as I interpret him, particular states of God and belong to (9) Someone's smile was beautiful
the same ontological category as sneezes and the like. However, because our language is suited for pluralistic ontologies, no ready made way of
is to say that
analyzing statements which quantify over particular things into statements about God is available. Thus we have to enlarge the language by inventing
(10) Someone smiled beautifully.
new predicates. For example, instead of saying that there are puddles we should
say
that God
puddlesizes,
where
the
invented
predicate
Thus our language contains devices which make it, at least in certain cases,
"puddlesizes" expresses the property whose exemplification by God is
possible to paraphrase statements which seem to predicate properties of
needed for the existence of puddles, and instead of saying that there are
states to statements which predicate properties of the corresponding
slimy puddles we should say that God puddlesizes slimily.
substances. Given this rough characterization of the theory, the first two problems of
It is important to see that (9) does not entail "Someone smiled and was
the Bayle-Joachim interpretation can be met: (i) We do not have to
beautiful" . Thus the following principle is not valid:
predicate properties of God which are unworthy of him. Even if it is true that there are slimy puddles and only one property bearer, we do not have
(AI) If S. V-s f-ly then S. is f.
to say that God is slimy. That is because there are slimy puddles just in case God puddlesizes slimily, and from "God puddlesizes slimily" one does
For our purposes it is also important to recognize that the following principle concerning adverbial negation is likewise not valid:
not have to infer that "God is slimy" (see principle (A 1) above). (ii) That
92
93
there are slimy puddles and non-slimy puddles does not require that God
is true if and only if
has contradictory properties. That there are slimy puddles says that God puddlesizes slimily and that there are non-slimy puddles says that God
(12) Among the objects of the world there is one that has a (complex)
puddlesizes non-slimily. But principle (A2) tells us that "God puddlesizes
property whose exemplification is necessary and sufficient for the
slimily" and "God puddlesizes non-slimily" may be consistent with each
existence of Socrates and that object is wise.
other. This suggests that what (10) says can be expressed with the help of However, I must admit that in my interpretation Spinoza's God is not
predicates and a term to the world. But what is the property whose
strictly speaking immutable. But I agree here with Bennett 90, who seems to
exemplification guarantees the existence of Socrates? It seems that we do
think that by calling God immutable in EIP20C2 and EVP20S Spinoza is
not know, but if (12) is true if and only (11) is true, we do know that there
just saying that God cannot undergo changes which would result in his
is some property that does the required job. And it seems that nothing
non -existence.
prevents us from inventing a predicate, say "socratizes", which expresses the needed property. Thus (11) and
In trying to avoid the problems of Bayle-Joachim interpretation I deliberately used as examples general statements quantifying over modes
(13) There is in the world something that both socratizes and is wise
or states of God. Let us now see whether singular statements about modes can be translated into statements about God. The analysis of singular
mean the same.
statements is in general a difficult philosophical question, and not only in Spinoza's philosophy. However, it seems to me that some insights of the
Spinoza's monism requires that we cannot think that the predicate
contemporary semantics of proper names were anticipated by Spinoza.
"socratizes" has the following feature:
I believe that the following view about proper names in pluralistic
x socratizes
if-if X is identical with Socrates.
ontologies would not be absurd; in fact it has some points of contact with the works of Russell and Quine91 • The view I have in mind says that for
Instead, we should treat the predicate "socratizes" as expressing a property
example the statement
of God, viz., the property whose exemplification Socrates actually is.
(11) Socrates is wise
94
95
We can now see how the proposition "Socrates is wise" can be expressed
III ON THE NECESSITY OF ALL TRUTHS
without using terms which refer to other particulars besides God. In this interpretation "Socrates is wise" has as its analysans the following: God socratizes wisely.
1. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS According to Spinoza, as I interpret him, all truths are necessary. Spinoza proves the necessity of all truths by proving (i) that the proposition "God
It may be of some interest that the above analysis of sentences containing
exists" is a necessary truth and (ii) that all true propositions follow from the
terms which refer to particular things in terms of sentences which are about
proposition that God exists. (i) and (ii) entail the necessity of all truths
God (or about the world) has some virtues in dealing with some well-
because what is entailed by a necessary truth is itself necessary. Spinoza
known puzzles concerning the semantics of proper names.
expresses his belief in the necessary existence of God in EIPII where he writes:
One of the puzzles is this: If we think that the meaning of a proper name is its referent, then there cannot be any meaningful negative existentials;
God, or a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which
i.e. true singular statements of the form "x does not exist". For example,
expresses eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists.
the sentence "Pegasus does not exist" must lack meaning because the term "Pegasus" has no referent (i.e. no meaning) and a sentence is meaningful
That Spinoza wants to say that all truths follow from the proposition that
only if all its constituents mean something.
God exists is confirmed by EIP16 which reads as follows:
However, Spinoza, who needs only the noun "God", can give an analysis
From the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinitely
of "Pegasus does not exist". For Spinoza "Pegasus does not exist" would
many things in infinitely many modes, (i.e., everything which can fall
mean the same as "God does not pegasize". The truth of "God does not
under an infinite intellect.)
pegasize" does not presuppose that there are things which do not exist. And he combines EIP16 with EIP11 in EIP35 where he writes: Whatever we conceive to be in God's power necessarily exists. 92
97
96 (A) A Substance cannot be produced by anything else.
In this chapter I shall first evaluate Spinoza's ontological argument and after that I will give a detailed investigation of the way Spinoza's God is
Therefore,
(B) A Substance is the cause of itself.
related to his modes.
Thus Spinoza claims that the necessary existence of any substance follows simply from the fact that no substance can have any external cause. 2. SPINOZA'S ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT Spinoza proves the causal independence of substance by appealing to EIA4: Spinoza proves the existence of his God in the demonstration to EIP11. He gets the premisses needed for his ontological argument from The knowledge of an effect depends on, and involves, the knowledge EIP7 It pertains to the nature of a substance to exist
of its cause.
and from the definition of God (EID6), where God is said to be a substance
From this together with the definition of substance, where Spinoza says that
which consists of infinite attributes. Thus God necessarily exists because
substance is conceived through itself, he infers that substance cannot be
God is a substance and every substance necessarily exists.
produced by anything else. It is, however, rather hard to understand what Spinoza means by EIA4 and hence it is difficult to decide whether it is
On the assumption that Spinoza's definition of God is not contradictory, the
true. 93
validity of his ontological argument depends only on the proof of EIP7. Spinoza proves this proposition as follows:
In what follows I try to avoid the difficulty posed by EIA4 by showing that Spinoza could have proved the causal independence of God without EIA4.
A substance cannot be produced by anything else (by P6C); therefore
What Spinoza implicitly accepts in EIP70 is the following principle:
it will be the cause of itself, i.e. (by 01), its essence necessarily involves existence, or it pertains to its nature to exist, q.e.d.
(P) For all
x,
if X cannot be produced by anything else, then X is the
cause of itself. The structure of the proof is very simple:
99
98 If the demonstrations of EIPll and EIP7 are combined, Spinoza's argument
must be the cause of himself, because for everything that exists there must
for the necessary existence of God can be presented as follows:
a sufficient cause, and God cannot have any external cause.
(1) No substance can be produced by anything else.
It is, no doubt, true that Spinoza accepts the principle of sufficient reason.
(2) God is a substance.
For example, in EIPllD2 Spinoza explicitly says that a cause or reason
(3) God cannot be produced by anything else.
must be assigned for each thing, why it exists or why it does not. However,
(4) For all x, if X cannot be produced by anything else, then
X
is the
cause of itself.
Spinoza does not include the principle of sufficient reason among his axioms and he uses the principle as an explicit premiss only in EIPllD2
Therefore,
after having reached the desired conclusion without the principle. 95 But it
(5) God is the cause of himself; i.e. it is necessary that God exists.
seems to me that there is no reason to accept (P) as it stands. Thus I agree with those authors who believe that the principle of sufficient reason is an
We have seen earlier that it can be demonstrated from Spinoza's principles
implicit premiss in Spinoza's ontological argument.
that God is the only possible substance. From this together with the principle that besides substances nothing but their states can exist, it
According to R.J. Delahunty, even the principle of sufficient reason does
follows that nothing external to God can cause God's existence. Thus the
not guarantee the success of Spinoza's ontological argument. Delahunty
proof of God's causal independence is not necessarily dependent on EIA4.
presents his argument as follows:
We can then say that whether Spinoza succeeds in showing that his God is a necessary existent depends on the truth of the principle (P).
'Even if substance is neither caused by another nor uncaused, it does not follow that it is self-caused; for it might not exist at all.' That, I
A natural reaction against (P) is to say that if a thing has no external cause, 94
think, hits the nail on the head. There is an ambiguity in the notion
then its existence is a contingent fact. Some writers suggest that, in order
of 'being self-caused' which Spinoza appears not to have noticed. To
to meet this objection, it has to be assumed that the principle of sufficient
say of X that it is self-caused might be to say that it exists and is the
reason, according to which for everything that exists there is a sufficient
cause of its own existence, or it might mean only that if X exists it
reason or cause, is an implicit premiss of Spinoza's ontological argument.
is the cause of its own existence. Even if we grant that Spinoza has
This suggests that (P) is a derivative principle, which must be accepted
shown that a substance is neither caused by another thing nor yet
because Spinoza believes in the principle of sufficient reason. Thus God
uncaused, it wiII follow that it is 'self-caused' only in the weaker sense, which leaves the question open whether any substance exists.
101
100
Only by assuming the existence of substance or substances from the
(6) God does not exist
start can he reach the conclusion that substance is self-caused in the first and stronger sense. What he is entitled to is: for any X, if X is
cannot be true. If (6) were true, then there ought to be a cause for the non-
a substance, then X causes its own existence. But it does not follow,
existence of God. But because Spinoza believes that the existence of
and he has no right to assume, that for some actual X, X is a
everything depends on the existence of God, the truth of (6) implies that
substance. The demonstration is either worthless or otiose - either it
nothing exists. But if nothing exists God's non-existence cannot have an
does not prove that there is a substance, or it assumes that there is
external cause. Therefore, the cause of God's non-existence is internal to
from the start. 96
God which means that God's nature involves a contradiction. But it would be absurd to say of God that his nature involves a contradiction, i.e. that
What Delahunty is here saying is that it makes sense to say only of existent
it is impossible that God exists.
entities that they are self-caused or externally caused; hence prior to the demonstration of God's self-causedness it ought to be demonstrated that
Thus Spinoza's ontological argument is valid, if the principle of sufficient
God exists. No contradiction arises even if the principle of sufficient reason
reason is added to it. But because the principle of sufficient reason is itself
is accepted and God's existence is denied, because from the non-existence
in need of justification the argument ought to be rejected.
of God it follows that nothing exists, and thus there cannot be any cause for God's existence or his non-existence.
I believe that Delahunty is mistaken. In EIPllD2 Spinoza accepts the
3. MODES AND NECESSITY
following principles: (i) for the existence as well as for the non-existence of any thing a cause must be assigned; (ii) if a thing does not exist, the
3.1. PROBLEMS
cause of its non-existence is either external or internal; (iii) if a thing is possible but does not exist the cause for its non-existence is external; (iv)
I suggested earlier 97 that by EIP16 Spinoza wants to express his belief in
the cause of the non-existence of a thing is internal to it if and only if the
the principle
definition of that thing is contradictory. (N) All truths are necessary Now, it can be shown that the proposition which can equally well be read as saying either that
102
103 (OP) The actual world is the only possible world
follows from the absolute nature of an attribute of God is eternal and infinite (by P21).
or Even if this is surprising, it is perfectly natural, because the proposition (PP) Everything that is possible is actual.
EIP28, to whose demonstration the above cited passage belongs, runs as follows:
Besides EIP16 itself, my interpretation of its meaning is also confirmed by the following passages:
EIP28 Every singular thing, or any thing which is finite and has a determinate existence, can neither exist nor be determined to produce
I think I have shown clearly enough (see P16) that from God's
an effect unless it is determined to exist and produce an effect by
supreme power, or infinite nature, infinitely many things in infinitely
another cause, which is also finite and has a determinate existence;
many modes, i.e., all things, have necessarily flowed, or always
and again, this cause also can neither exist nor be determined to
follow, by the same necessity and in the same way as from the nature
produce an effect unless it is determined to exist and produce an
of a triangle it follows, from eternity and to eternity, that its three
effect by another, which is also finite and has a determinate existence,
angles are equal to two right angles. (EIP17S).
and so on, to infinity.
[F)rom [EIP16] it follows that from the given divine nature both the
Given that there are finite modes, they must have causes. A finite mode
essence of things and their existence must necessarily be inferred; and
cannot follow from God's essence, because if it did, its existence would be
in a word, God must be called the cause of all things in the same
necessary. That this must be so is plain from the fact that to say that some
sense in which he is called the cause of himself. (EIP25S).
thing
X
follows from God's essence is to say that if God's essence is
instantiated, then X exists. But because God's essence is necessarily Given these passages, it is rather surprising to find Spinoza writing that
instantiated, then if finite modes followed from it, they would be necessary existents and for this reason they would have no temporal (or spatial)
...what is finite and has a determinate existence could not have been produced by the absolute nature of an attribute of God; for whatever
limitations and would be infinite. Thus Spinoza writes in EIP21:
104
105
All the things which follow from the absolute nature of any of God's
then, be interpreted as meaning that "It is necessary that if X exists, then
attributes have always had to exist and be infinite, or are, through the
Y- exists"; which must be firmly distinguished from "If X exists, then it is
same attribute, eternal and infinite.
necessary that Y- exists". From this it follows that causal determinism alone does not entail (N). Instead of causal determinism the needed premiss
EIP28 and its demonstration pose difficult problems for a consistent
would be that the existence of every infinite causal series is necessary.
interpretation of Spinoza's metaphysics. The most serious problem is whether a consistent interpretation of EIP16 and EIP28 threatens (N). Some
According to Bennett it would have been no surprise if Spinoza had made
philosophers, most notably Bennett and Curley 98, claim that EIP28 is an
the mistake of inferring from causal determinism the necessity of all truths:
implicit premiss of Spinoza's argument for (N). Bennett
99
draws attention
to EIP33S1, where Spinoza says that "a thing is called necessary either
I suggest that Spinoza tended to think that something whose necessity
from its essence and definition or from a given efficient cause". Spinoza
is not inherent but only conferred by something else is still as
seems to think that if X is the cause of Y-, then X makes is existence
strongly, completely, absolutely necessary as something inherently
necessary. This suggests that Spinoza considers causal determinism to
necessary....Spinoza was no logician, his modal thinking seems to
imply that all those things which have a sufficient cause necessarily exist
have been neither skilful nor knowledgeable; and it would not be
when they exist. But, because from EIP28 it follows that every finite mode
surprising if he flirted with the notion of acquired necessity and failed
has a sufficient cause, it follows that the existence of every finite mode is
to grasp that it could not meet his needs. 101
necessary. There is, however, textual evidence for a more charitable view, according lOO
points out, if Spinoza uses causal determinism as an implicit
to which Spinoza realizes that his system leaves room for unrealized
premiss in the argument for the necessity of all truths, he is committing a
possibilities. In EIP8S2 as well as in EIIP8 Spinoza commits himself to the
simple logical mistake: Let us suppose that a finite mode g exists. It
existence of ideas whose objects are non-existent:
As Bennett
follows from EIP28 that there is some infinite causal series A in which g exists. This entails that, if A could have failed to exist, then
could have
This is how we can have true ideas of modifications which do not
failed to exist. But the causal determinism which is supposed to hold
exist; for though they do not actually exist outside the intellect,
between finite modes does not entail the necessary existence of A. Thus if
nevertheless their essences are comprehended in another in such a
A's existence is not necessary, then g'S existence is not necessary. To say
way that they can be conceived through it. (EIP8S2).
g
that the existence of y-'s cause, X, makes the existence of Y- necessary must,
107
106
EIIP8 The ideas of singular things, or of modes, that do not exist
3.2. DONAGAN ON UNREALIZED POSSIBILITIES
must be comprehended in God's infinite idea in the same way as the formal essences of the singular things, or modes, are contained in
Spinoza demonstrates EIIP8 simply by saying that it follows directly from
God's attributes.
the preceding proposition, EIIP7, where he claims that there is a perfect parallelism between ideas and their objects. That he demonstrates EIIP8 in
It is relatively easy to give these passages a reading that makes them
this way is very problematic, because it is at first sight plausible to suppose
consistent with (N). It could be argued, first, that by the ideas of non-
that from EIIP7 it follows that there cannot be ideas whose objects do not
existent singular things Spinoza means ideas of things that do not exist
exist. If .a is the object of the idea l(.a), then from EIIP7 it follows that if
now, but do exist at some time or other, and second, that from (N) it
l(.a) exists then .a has to exist. 103 Thus it might be thought that the
follows that when they exist they exist necessarily. But because our only
hypothesis that there are ideas of non-existent individuals is inconsistent
reason for attributing (N) to Spinoza is EIP16, which he seems to reject in
with EIIP7.
EIP28D, the alternative view must be taken seriously. According to this alternative interpretation, by ideas of non-existent singular things Spinoza
Donagan sets out to show that EIIP8 can be seen to follow from EIIP7 by
means ideas of things which never exist. In what follows, I first present
trying to show that EIIP7 really implies that there are ideas of non-existent
Alan Donagan's argumene02, according to which the demonstration of EIIP8
individuals. He begins his long argument as follows:
can be understood only if this alternative is accepted. After that, I will consider some recent attempts to make EIP16 consistent with EIP28. After
To understand what Spinoza had in mind, we must go back to what
having rejected those attempts I present a new interpretation of EIP16 and
he wrote about nonexistent individual things in his proof that an
of its relation to (N) and EIP28. I argue against Bennett that Spinoza did
infinite being exists. There, it will be remembered, he maintained
not commit himself both to the denial of all contingency and to the
that, if an essence is intrinsically possible, then its nonexistence must
principle that there are contingent truths - the evidence Bennett offers for
be explained by the existence of other things incompatible with it
his view can be explained away, if my interpretation of EIP16 is accepted.
(E..I, xi Oem.). Consider the essence of a nonexistent individual, say
In the final section of this study, I show that a full understanding of God's
of a volcano like Vesuvius in all respects, except that its long
causality in Spinoza's metaphysics presupposes my interpretation of modes
quiescence in the pre-christian era was disturbed, not by the eruption
as particular states of God.
of A.D. 79 described in a letter of the younger Pliny, but by a nonexistent earlier eruption in 45 B.C., described in a nonexistent
108
109
letter of Cicero. Spinoza held that this intrinsically possible
In order to elucidate (B), let us take a closer look at the passage quoted
counterpart Vesuvius does not exist only because its existence is
above. In that passage Donagan maintains that there are two intrinsically
incompatible with that of the actual Vesuvius. Yet this counterpart
possible essences f and r* such that (i) f is the essence of actual
Vesuvius, and innumerable other counterparts, are "contained in" the
Vesuvius, and (ii) f* shares all other properties of the actual Vesuvius
divine attribute of extension as formal essences: that is they are
except that f* involves the property, lacked by the actual Vesuvius, of
intrinsically possible finite modes of extension.
104
erupting in 45 B.C. That these essences are distinct entails that it is impossible that the actual Vesuvius erupted in 45
B.c.
because if it had,
Before proceeding, the assumptions made in this passage must be
then erupting in 45 B.C. would have belonged to f; but f, by definition,
explicated. First, Donagan maintains that
lacks erupting in 45 B.C. On the other hand, erupting in 45
B.c.
would, I
think, be offered by many as an example of a property which is accidental. (A) If an essence is intrinsically possible, then why this essence is not
So Donagan wants to say that Spinoza is best interpreted as holding that all
actual, must be explained by the existence of other things
properties of a thing are essential to it, i.e. properties a thing cannot fail to
incompatible with it.
have without ceasing to exist.
The second point, which he makes implicitly by means of the notion of
Finally, (C) follows from (A) and (B) in the following way: Actual
"counterpart", is that
Vesuvius and the merely possible Vesuvius described by Donagan cannot co-exist (i.e. they are not compossible), because if they did, they would
(B) All of a thing's properties are essential to it.
have to share all their properties up to 45
B.c.
Among these shared
properties would be identifying properties, i.e. properties which only one Third, Donagan interprets Spinoza as saying that
thing can have at a time, such as spatio-temporal location. But it is impossible for there to be two different mountains at the same time
(C) If .!!* is the counterpart of an actually existing entity.!!, then if .!!
occupying the same portion of space. This means that f and f* are
had not existed, .!!* would have existed.
incompatible essences and the non-existence of f* follows from the existence of f.
(A) is Donagan's version of the principle of sufficient reason which, according to Donagan, says that the only reason why a possible mode does not exist is that this possible mode and actual modes are not compossible.
Given Donagan's interpretation, it undoubtedly follows that
111
110 (7) That actual Vesuvius exists implies that a Vesuvius erupting in
Both ideas are actual, although the ideatum of one of them is the
45 B.C. does not exist.
nonexistence of something. And since the actual idea of the nonexistence of a Vesuvius erupting in 45 B.c. includes as a part the
Next Donagan thinks that all he has to do is to apply EIIP7 in order to get
idea of the formal essence of such a Vesuvius, the idea of that formal
the desired conclusion that there are ideas of non-existent individuals:
essence must also be actual. 106
[I]t is no less true that just as any finite mode of extension excludes
So, when someone has an idea of a non-existent individual, the object of
the existence of incompatible finite modes, so the idea of such a
this idea cannot be the individual itself, because if it were, the individual
mode implies the idea of the nonexistence of modes incompatible
would have to exist. Donagan avoids this absurdity by saying that, strictly
with it. Hence the true idea of a Vesuvius quiescent in the
speaking, the object of the idea of a non-existent individual is the formal
circumstances of 45 B.c. implies the idea of the nonexistence of a
essence of that individual which is somehow contained in God's infinite
Vesuvius erupting in those circumstances. lOS
attributes:
What Donagan is saying is that EIIP7 and (7) imply that
[Formal essences] are neither among [God's] finite modes, nor part of either its infinite modes...for both finite and infinite modes are
(8) The idea of the actual Vesuvius implies the idea of the nonexistence of a Vesuvius erupting in 45 B.c.
But because there is an actual Vesuvius, there is by ElIP7 an idea of this Vesuvius. But the existence of the idea of the actual Vesuvius and (8) imply that
(9) The idea of the non-existence of a Vesuvius erupting in 45 B.C. exists.
Of the actuality of these ideas and their objects, Donagan writes as follows:
actual
existents, 7
possibilities.10
and
our
counterpart
Vesuviuses
are
mere
113
112
3.2.1. PROBLEMS IN DONAGAN'S ARGUMENT
are not permitting them to be actual, he called them "formal essences" ("essentiae formales") (E., II, viii).
109
(A) EXISTENTS AS ACTUALIZED FORMAL ESSENCES In explicating Spinoza's notion of essence, Donagan writes:
From these quotations it follows that for Spinoza, as Donagan interprets him, the only distinction between a merely possible and an actual entity is
[E]ssences are individual. Nothing but confusion can result from
that the former is an unactualized essence (formal essence), whereas the
interpreting Spinoza according to the Aristotelian-Scholastic notion
latter is an actualized essence. The picture that emerges from this is that
that, for example, Socrates and Plato are individuated by their matter,
actuality is something that can be added to the existing formal essence. But
and share a common essence, humanity. He held that, as existing
what can that mean? One answer would be to say that formal essences are
individuals, Socrates and Plato are distinct actual essences or conatus.
necessarily existing properties, which are actual when they are had by
A living individual man is identical with his actual essence.
substance; i.e. when they are in substance. However, this answer cannot be
Furthermore, since the only difference between an actual essence and
the right one, because in EIP15 Spinoza writes:
the essence of a nonexistent individual is that the latter is merely a conditional power of existing, of which the condition is unfulfilled,
Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without
the essence of a nonexistent is also individual. 108
God.
The concept of formal essence is characterized by Donagan as follows:
Thus if there are formal essences they must all be in God, and for this reason they should all be actual. In response to this it could be claimed that
Since the very same essence (for example, that of Socrates' body)
EIP15 does not cause any difficulty for Donagan, because he says that
may be actual at one time (say, 424 B.c.) but not another (now), it
formal essences are contained in the divine attributes and hence they are in
is useful to have an epithet to indicate when an essence is being
God. But what is that intended to mean? In which different way are actual
spoken of with no implication that it is actual. Spinoza used
essences contained in God? I do not want to say that these questions cannot
"formalis" ("formal") for this purpose. Hence, in speaking of essences
be answered or that they make Donagan's interpretation wrong. My opinion
of individuals as they are merely contained in the divine attributes,
is that, for Spinoza, being in God and being actual mean the same thing,
without any implication as to whether the divine finite modes are or
and, given EIP15, it follows that there are no possible but unactual entities. For this reason I reject Donagan's idea of actual existents as actualized formal essences.
114
115
Donagan's view of formal essences also involves the suggestion that formal
erupting in 45 B.c. is possible, a substance containing a Vesuvius that
essences are not modes or affections of God. But as we know, Spinoza
erupts in 45 B.C. must also be possible. Hence there would be two possible
thinks that besides God and its modes nothing exists. This seems to imply
substances: The actual substance containing a Vesuvius that is quiescent in
that every idea must be an idea of God or of some mode. That the
45 B.c. and the other, merely possible substance containing a Vesuvius that
implication really holds for Spinoza is confirmed by EIP30, where he
erupts in 45 B.C. But as we have seen, Spinoza thinks that every possible
writes:
substance necessarily exists; which entails that the merely possible Vesuvius of Donagan's argument would have to be actual. But this is
An actual intellect, whether finite or infinite, must comprehend God's
absurd, and the absurdity is due to the supposition that Spinoza would have
attributes and God's affections, and nothing else.
accepted alternative possible individuals to his ontology. That there cannot be alternative possible substances also follows from Spinoza's fundamental
Donagan's thesis that there can be actual ideas of merely possible entities
view that besides God no substance can be or be conceived. 110
is also very hard to make compatible with EIIP7S, where Spinoza introduces his identity theory between ideas and their objects. If the identity theory is taken seriously, then to say that the object of an actual idea is not necessarily actual implies the contradiction that one and the same thing
3.3. ON GOD'S CAUSALITY
both is and is not actual. 3.3.1. THE PROBLEM (B) COUNTERPARTS It can be shown that the counterpart theory introduces an inconsistency into
As we have seen earlier, Spinoza seems to adopt two inconsistent
Spinoza's metaphysics. As we have seen, Spinoza thinks that there is only
principles:
one substance which is the logical subject of every thought. Thus the idea of the actual Vesuvius is the idea of the actual substance containing a
(Sl) Everything follows from the essence of God (i.e. God is the
Vesuvius which is quiescent in 45 B.C. But given that Spinoza thought
cause of himself and of his every mode). (EIP16).
that all properties of a thing are essential to it, the non-existence of a substance containing a Vesuvius that erupts in 45 B.C. follows from the
(S2) Everything that follows from the essence of God is infinite.
existence of the actual substance which contains a Vesuvius that is
Therefore, no finite mode follows from the essence of God. Finite
quiescent in 45 B.C. But because Donagan wants to say that a Vesuvius
117
116
modes exist in infinite causal series consisting only of finite modes.
corresponding nomological facts forming the attribute of extension. 1ll The
(EIP21; EIP28 and its proof).
derivative laws of nature are infinite modes of thought, and they describe derivative nomological facts which form the infinite mode of extension. 112
Moreover, we saw that if we focus on (S2), then Spinoza's system is
Where the infinite modes of thought follow logically from the attribute of
consistent with the denial of the principle that the actual world is the only
thought, Curley says, the infinite modes of extension follow causally from
possible world. But if we forget (S2) and concentrate on (Sl), then it seems
the attribute of extension; and he gives grounds for this by interpreting the
to be the case that Spinoza thought that the actual world is the only
parallelism between ideas and their objects as follows:
possible world. A consistent interpretation of Spinoza, then, requires that (Sl) and (S2) be so formulated as to reveal Spinoza's intentions in holding
[W]herever there is a logical dependence among propositions, there
them and remove their apparent inconsistency.
is a relation of causal dependence among the corresponding facts. 113 Singular propositions are tied to the laws of nature in the following way:
3.3.2. CURLEY'S SOLUTION [Every singular proposition] will follow from a law, or set of laws, We have previously considered two suggestions which Curley makes in his
together with a statement of antecedent conditions. 114
interpretation of Spinoza's metaphysics. The first was that God consists of all possible attributes, of which each is a substance. The second suggestion
Thus it follows from Curley's interpretation of the parallelism between
was that finite modes of extension are singular facts and that finite modes
ideas and their objects that every finite mode of extension is caused by a
of thought are true singular propositions which describe singular facts.
composite fact, consisting of two parts: (i) The singular fact described by the statement of antecedent conditions and (ii) the fact described by the
The proposition-fact distinction does considerable work at the level of
relevant laws of nature. In more modern terminology we can say that,
attributes, too. The attribute of thought, Curley thinks, is constituted by the
according to Curley, the sufficient causal condition of a finite mode is
fundamental laws of nature, which are universal propositions. The
necessarily formed by a part which is finite and by one which is infinite.
fundamental laws of nature are like axioms; they are not entailed by other
Curley justifies his view in the following way:
laws, but they entail other laws which Curley calls derivative laws (Le. theorems). Rather than being inductive generalizations, the fundamental
To use a distinction that Spinoza introduces later (EIIIDl), neither the
laws of nature are necessarily true propositions, which are made true by the
infinite modes nor the finite modes are by themselves adequate
118
119 causes of finite modes. Taken separately, they are only partial causes;
is described by the laws of nature contributes causally to the fact described
the existence and actions of a particular finite mode cannot be
by the explanandum.
understood either by reference to other finite modes alone or by reference to infinite modes alone, but only by reference to both
It is easy to see that Curley's interpretation is in accordance with Donagan's
infinite and finite modes. 115
claim that Spinoza's metaphysics does not rule out unrealized possibilities.
As we have seen, if a finite mode.!! exists in an infinite causal series A, the This, Curley thinks, provides the equipment needed to reconcile EIP16 with
existence of.!! is a necessary state of affairs only if it can be shown that A
EIP28. By saying that everything follows from the nature of God, Spinoza
itself exists necessarily. But in Curley's interpretation all existents are either
means only that some law of nature is necessary for the deduction of a
singular facts or general facts described by the laws of nature, which
statement describing some given finite mode and that a fundamental
suggests that infinite causal series are logical constructions. This means that
nomological fact is a necessary causal condition for the existence of a
the question of the necessary existence of an infinite causal series can be
given singular fact. On the other hand, in EIP28 Spinoza emphasizes the
reduced to the question of the necessary existence of the parts of that
role of finite modes as necessary conditions of other finite modes. Curley
infinite causal series. But because Curley believes that from propositions
writes as follows:
which describe God's infinite nature alone no proposition affirming the existence of a finite mode can be deduced, Curley must admit that the laws
To say that the infinite and finite modes are separately necessary and
of nature could regulate the actions of other finite modes.
only jointly sufficient conditions of finite modes does, I think, give us a plausible way of reconciling what looks like an outright
Before discussing Curley's solution of the apparent inconsistency between
contradiction in Spinoza's metaphysics. 116
EIP16 and EIP28, it should be noted that it is not as dependent on his interpretation of Spinoza's metaphysics as my presentation of that solution
This interpretation of Spinoza is rather natural if we recall that Spinoza
seems to suggest. What is needed is to say that there are laws which govern
believes that there must be a sufficient reason for every fact. The sufficient
the modes and that these laws are or describe infinite modes. We could,
reason can also be thought to constitute the explanans of a given
for example, insist that a world which did not obey the prevailing laws of
proposition. In Curley's interpretation the explanans would consist of laws
nature would not be extended, without further suggesting that extension
of nature together with statements describing antecedent conditions. In
consists merely of the nomological facts described by the fundamental laws
short, Curley insists that Spinoza committed himself to the deductive-
of nature. This is what Bennett writes about the relation that obtains
nomological model of explanation, with the additional assumption that what
between extension and the laws of nature:
121
120 The laws of physics are supposed to be part of the 'extension' package
everything follows from the laws of God's nature alone, without the help
- an extended world must obey them - and since every possible
of finite modes, is confirmed by the demonstration to EIP17, where
world is extended it follows that our physics is true at every possible
Spinoza says that
world....[Spinoza's] point is that a proper metaphysic needs a richer conception of extension than Descartes's - one which includes not
[w]e have just shown (P16) that from the necessity of the divine
merely geometry but also physics, and a dynamic principle ensuring
nature alone, or (what is the same thing) from the laws of his nature
that any extended world bowls along for ever without outside
alone, absolutely infinite things follow .... 1l9
help....That enriched concept lets him say that necessarily any extended world involves motion and obeys the actual laws of physics,
These passages demonstrate, to me at least, that a given finite mode can be
but by the same token it makes it harder to argue that necessarily any
seen either as following solely from God's nature or solely from some other
world is extended. 117
finite mode or singular thing, which can have other finite modes or singular things as its parts.
There are, however, some shortcomings which make Curley's solution unacceptable. It is very hard to find textual evidence for Curley's
Moreover, it can be argued that Curley cannot be right because his
interpretation according to which Spinoza thought that the sufficient cause
interpretation implies that God cannot act (in the sense of causing finite
lIB
modes) without some contingent fact being true. This is because in Curley's
It is true that Spinoza thought that finite modes can be parts of sufficient
interpretation the existence of the totality of finite modes is a contingent
causes:
fact. But Spinoza thinks that
of a given finite mode consists necessarily of a finite and an infinite part.
EIID7 By singular things I understand things that are finite and have
It is as impossible for us to conceive that God does not act as it is to
a determinate existence. And if a number of Individuals so concur in
conceive that he does not exist. (EIIP3S).
one action that together they are all the cause of one effect, I consider them all, to that extent, as one singular thing.
But I think that it is not natural to say that in EIID7 Spinoza is presupposing that all causes necessarily have a part which is infinite. That
122
123
3.3.3. WILSON'S SOLUTION
apparent conflict with EIP16 is eliminated. In trying to give her bold thesis plausibility, Wilson lays heavy weight on the role that Spinoza assigns to
In elucidating the meaning of EIPI6, where Spinoza says that all things
the infinite intellect in EIP16 and on the demonstration of EIPI6. The
that can fall under the infinite intellect must follow from the necessity of
demonstration runs as follows:
the divine nature, Margaret Wilson 120 argues for the thesis that the quantifier "all" does not range over actual finite modes. Rather, EIP16
This proposition must be plain to anyone, provided he attends to the
should be taken to say that all essences of finite modes follow from the
fact that the intellect infers from the given definition of any thing a
necessity of the divine nature. Moreover, Wilson believes that the essence
number of properties that really do follow necessarily from it (i.e.,
of a finite mode can exist even if that finite mode does not exist. Thus
from the very essence of the thing); and that it infers more properties
EIP16 and the supposition that there are possible but non-existent modes
the more the definition expresses reality; i.e., the more reality the
are mutually consistent. Wilson writes:
essence of the defined thing involves. But since the divine nature has absolutely infinite attributes (by 06), each of which also expresses an
[A]ccording to my reading of 1.16, nothing about existence at a
essence infinite in its own kind, from its necessity there must follow
certain time or place (or about "actual" being in the corresponding
infinitely many things in infinite modes (i.e., everything which can
sense) is supposed to be established by 1.16. If this reading is correct,
fall under an infinite intellect), q.e.d.
then, the proposition does not establish quite as complete and direct an opposition between Spinoza's metaphysics and, say, Leibniz's as
In this proof Spinoza is saying that what follows from God's essence are
might be supposed. Spinoza need not - indeed cannot - be construed
the objects of the ideas that are inferred by the intellect from the idea of
as saying that everything that falls under the divine understanding
the essence of God. But in characterizing intuitive knowledge in EIIP40S2
exists in the sense of being instantiated at a time and place or of
Spinoza writes:
"having duration." Rather, he holds that everything that falls under the infinite understanding has some sort of being in the divine h as extension . ) .121 attn'b utes (suc
[T]his kind of knowing proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things.
If Wilson is right, then Oonagan's view that Spinoza consciously allows the possibility of unrealized essences, is made more credible because its
Wilson goes on to argue that the reference to intellect in EIP16 is intended to show that in inferring properties of substance from its essence the
125
124 intellect knows things intuitively. If Wilson is right, then what follows from
and place can be inferred from God's essence. In this scholium Spinoza
the necessity of the divine nature are not actually existing things but their
writes:
essences. That EIP16 concerns adequate knowledge follows from the following premisses which are explicitly accepted by Spinoza: (i) Ideas of
By existence here I do not understand duration, i.e., existence insofar
God's essence are necessarily adequate and (ii) if an idea is inferred from
as it is conceived abstractly, and as a certain species of quantity. For
an adequate idea, then the inferred idea is adequate (EIlP40). But for this
I am speaking of the very nature of existence, which is attributed to
form of adequate knowing to be intuitive knowledge as well, Wilson ought
singular things because infinitely many things follow from the eternal
to demonstrate something that she does not, namely that the ideas of the
necessity of God's nature in infinitely many modes (see IP16). I am
existence of things cannot be deduced from God's essence. I suppose that
speaking, I say, of the very existence of singular things insofar as
Wilson is taking for granted that if the ideas of the existence of things
they are in God. For even if each one is determined by another
could be inferred from God's essence, then, due to the atemporal nature of
singular thing to exist in a certain way, still the force by which each
logical entailment, everything should exist eternally.
one perseveres in existing follows from the eternal necessity of God's nature.
Wilson points out that her interpretation meets with difficulties because in many propositions Spinoza seems to say that the infinite intellect infers not
Wilson takes this passage to confirm her views, because in it Spinoza says
only the essences but also the existence of modes. For example, in EIP25S
that the force by which each thing perseveres in existence follows from
Spinoza writes that
God's essence and in EIIIP7 Spinoza characterizes the force by which a thing perseveres in existence as the essence of that thing. Wilson continues:
...from [EIP16] it follows that from the given divine nature both the essence of things and their existence must necessarily be inferred ....
This characterization suggests that "the existence itself of singular things, insofar as they are in God" may be identified with the
Wilson
122
tries to reconcile this with EIP16 by claiming that Spinoza has
essences of things (in a certain special sense). And this is just the sort
two senses for existence, one of which is identical with essence (or the
of "existence of things" that 1.16 asserts to follow from the attributes
existence of essence) and the other with existence at a certain time and
of God. 123
place. She insists that the distinction is made in the scholium to EIIP45, where Spinoza, according to Wilson, denies that existence at a certain time
The most conspicuous flaw in Wilson's interpretation is that the distinction she makes does not answer her needs; the reasons for this negative
127
126 appraisal resemble the weaknesses of Donagan's account. To say of a thing
3.3.4. FRIEDMAN'S SOLUTION
that it is actual, or that it exists, is to say that its essence is instantiated or exemplified or had by God. "I say that to the essence of any thing belongs
I think that Friedman is right in claiming that in EIP16
that which, being given, the thing is necessarily posited...", Spinoza writes in EIIP2D, which I interpret as entailing that if something has the essence of a finite mode, then that mode exists. But if the demonstration of EIP16 is taken to say that each essence follows from the essence of God, then this means that there is something (namely God) that has or exemplifies the
Spinoza means to include finite things in the range of the quantifier, omnia, indeed infinitely many finite things, mutable and otherwise. If so, then infinitely many finite mutable things (and otherwise) follow from God's nature, that is, follow from the attributes of God. 124
essence of every possible mode, because God's essence is necessarily exemplified. And so (by EIP21) every mode has to exist always and as infinite, because what is needed for a mode to exist is that its essence is had by God. A distinction between actual and non-actual essences must in
Friedman 125 proposes that not all things follow from God's nature in the same way, but that a distinction must be made between the following expressions:
some way be made in order to make EIP16 consistent with the existence of finite modes. Another problem is that those interpretations of EIP16
(LF)
X
follows logico-metaphysically from God's nature.
(CF)
X
follows causally from God's nature.
which say that it is silent about the existence of singular things are all extremely artificial in the light of the textual evidence to the contrary. If Wilson's interpretation is correct, then in EIP25 the reference to the existence of things is superfluous; and it implies that Spinoza presented his doctrines in a very misleading way.
According to Friedman 126 , all infinite modes and formal essences of finite things follow logico-metaphysically from God's nature, whereas finite things merely follow causally from God's nature. By EIP21 Spinoza intends to say that everything that logico-metaphysically follows from God's nature is infinite and eternal, but that a thing which follows with causal necessity from God's nature need not be infinite.
Friedman characterizes the sense of "logico-metaphysically follows from" as follows:
129
128 transit~vity,
the
[A] thing that follows from the absolute nature of an attribute of God
logically-metaphysically determined by it. Thus by
or from an eternal and infinite mode of God is a thing that follows
infinite causal series of finite physical things follows with logico-
with logico-metaphysical necessity or which deductively follows in
metaphysical necessity from God or his attributes. So it is with any
a finite number of steps from God's nature. Of course, something may
infinite
follow from God immediately, in a single intuitable glance, so that
attribute....Hence, to say that a finite thing necessarily follows from
it can be formally deduced in one step, but most things require more
God or his essence, in this second sense, is to say that the finite thing
than one step in a formal deduction. In any case, I am convinced that
occurs in an infinite causal series of finite things, such that the entire
formal derivability is implied by Spinozistic logico-metaphysical
series follows with logico-metaphysical necessity from God or His
necessity. 127
essence. For brevity's sake, we may say that the finite thing follows
causal
series
of
finite
things
under
any
other
with mere causal necessity, or causal necessity only, from God or His Here Friedman's account is similar to Curley's, who thinks that every
essence. 128
proposition which describes an infinite mode can be deduced in a finite number of steps from propositions describing the essence of God.
Of the sense of the expression "causally follows" Friedman writes:
Thus Friedman suggests that (CF) says the same as
K exists
in an infinite causal series which follows logico-
metaphysically from God's essence. Consider, for example, a finite physical thing such as a tree. According to (P28, EI), this tree must occur in an infinite causal
But because all finite things exist in infinite causal series, which due to
series of finite physical things. Moreover, in Spinoza's system, one
their infinity follow logically from the essence of God (EIP23), all finite
may justly assert that this infinite causal series follows with logico-
things follow from the essence of God.
metaphysical necessity from the entire physical world (even if each finite physical thing in the series does not so follow), since the one
There are, I think, serious problems in Friedman's solution. EIP21 entails
infinity is contained in the other, and for Spinoza matters of infinity
that, if infinite causal series follow from the essence of God, then they exist
are logically-metaphysically necessary. Moreover, the physical world,
always and necessarily. But what does it mean to say of an infinite causal
which for Spinoza is an infinite mode under Extension, follows with
series, A, that it always exists? It cannot mean that all of its members that
logico-metaphysical necessity from the attribute of Extension, and is
are causally related always exist, because this would imply that finite modes cannot have determinate existence, which would make all change
130
131
apparent. Another alternative is that the sempiternal existence of A means that at all moments of time some temporal part of A exists. According to Jaakko Hintikka, Aristotle considered infinity to have this kind of existence or actuality:
accepted this. As we have seen in Chapter I, in EIP12D Spinoza comments on parts and wholes that it is absurd to say that a whole could be conceived without its parts. l30 In terms of our example, this would mean that the idea of g is involved in the idea of A, which entails that A cannot exist if g does not exist in it. But if this is the case, then the distinction between logico-
In what sense, then, does the infinite exist? It exists, Aristotle says, in the sense in which a day 'is' or the Olympic Games 'are'. These are not actualized in their entirety at any given moment of time in the wayan individual is. Rather, their parts come to existence successively one by one. As Aristotle says, 'one thing after another is always coming into existence'.129
metaphysical necessity and causal necessity fails. If by Q(A) we mean the proposition which describes the existence of A and by Q(g) the proposition which describes the existence of g, then Q(A) follows logically from the essence of God. But because g is a necessary part of A, then Q(g) follows logically from Q(A). From EIP21, however, it follows that g must be infinite and sempiternal, which is inconsistent with the supposition that there are finite modes.
I think that this is a plausible interpretation of the existence of an infinite causal series. But if we take this view, then an entire infinite causal series, say A, does not exist in its entirety at any moment of time. This means that we cannot, literally, say that at a given moment the entire causal series, A, follows from the essence of God, because this would imply that all the parts of A exist at that moment as well as at all other moments. So to say that the infinite causal series, A, follows from the infinite essence of God at all moments of time should be taken to mean that at each moment of time some part of A follows from the essence of God. But given EIP21, this makes the existence of finite modes impossible.
Friedman 131 has responded to these critical comments by saying that infinite causal series have infinite structures which always exist, though the terms of the series come into and go out of existence. This means that, according to Friedman, the infinite structures of infinite causal series fall under the quantifier of EIP21. What makes this response inadequate is that Friedman does not say what he means by infinite structures of causal series. He seems to think that corresponding to any causal series there is an infinite structure. Moreover, if A is an infinite causal series and g one of its members, then the structure of A could have existed without g. This must be so because otherwise the existence of g follows logically from the
Closely related to the previous problem, there is an additional one: it seems to me that each part of some infinite causal series is essential to that series. This means that if g is part of an infinite causal series, A, then A is necessarily such that g occurs in it. There is also evidence that Spinoza
existence of A. Thus the structure of A individuates A. But if the members of A do not necessarily belong to A, then what content can be given to Friedman's view that they follow from it? For Spinoza, that X follows from
132
133
y entails that K cannot exist if y does not exist, and this entailment does not
Friedman's thesis, that Spinoza used the phrase "folIows from" in EIP16
hold in Friedman's interpretation.
ambiguously, meets with textual difficulties. We have seen that in EIP17S Spinoza says that alI things flow from God's essence by the same necessity
We saw that, according to Spinoza, parts are prior to wholes, in the sense
and in the same way as from the nature of a triangle it folIows that its three
that a whole cannot be conceived without its parts. It is evident that
angles are equal to two right angles; and in EIP25S he says that God is the
Friedman's account is not in accordance with this. This objection is not
cause of alI things in the same sense in which he is calIed the cause of
fatal to Friedman's views because there are places where Spinoza speaks of
himself. It seems plain that in these passages Spinoza is emphasizing the
the form of an individual which may remain constant even if the individual
logical necessity by which alI things folIow from God. Friedman considers
changes. If we think that it is the form of an individual that individuates it,
only the passage from EIP17S and writes:
then we can understand how an individual can lose parts and gain new ones and still remain the same. Spinoza writes in the fourth lemma of the second
It must be admitted this is a very difficult passage for my dualistic
part of the Ethics as follows:
interpretation of Spinozistic necessity. So how can the two be squared? One answer is that though we may separate out the two
If, of a body, or of an individual, which is composed of a number of
kinds or species of necessity (and indeed should do so), Spinoza
bodies, some are removed, and at the same time as many others of
probably intended "necessity" in a generic even if disjunctive sense,
the same nature take their place, the individual will retain its nature,
so that for him, it is still the case that a finite mutable thing follows
as before, without any change of its form.
from God's nature by the same necessity as the two-right-anglesproperty folIows from the nature of a triangle.... 132
This lemma seems to say that different things can at different times constitute the same individual. Thus Friedman suggests that the structure
If I understand Friedman's point correctly, he is saying that Spinoza held
of an infinite causal series is its form. But it is hard to see how this
the following to be true:
suggestion helps Friedman: If the structures of infinite causal series follow follows necessarily from y =Df
from the essence of God then at a given moment any part of an infinite
K
causal series has to have the form of an infinite causal series; and without
logically from y.
K
follows either causally or
further explication this is unintelligible. But if all finite modes follow causally from God, and if the essential properties of a triangle follow logically from the nature of a triangle, then,
134
135
according to the above definition, they follow by the same necessity from
nature....Hence, Reagan exists with logico-metaphysical necessity,
their grounds.
as a bare existent individuated by his formal essence. 134
I think this is artificial. The texts clearly indicate that Spinoza wants us to
Here Friedman is following Margaret Wilson's interpretation rather closely.
believe that between God and his modes there prevails some kind of
The main difference between them seems to be that Wilson is saying that
conceptual or logical necessity.
EIP16 concerns only the essences of finite things, whereas Friedman claims that the existence of finite modes must be excluded only from the
Even Friedman himself does not seem to be entirely satisfied with his first
formulation of EIP16 in EIP17S. For this reason, the criticism that was
suggestion of reconciling the passage from EIP17S1 with his dual notion
directed at Wilson's interpretation concerns Friedman as well. Friedman
of necessity, and he offers an alternative interpretation:
thinks that what distinguishes a bare existent from an actual existent is that an actual existent is an actualized bare existent. As I have previously
On the other hand, another answer may be given. Spinoza may be
argued, if bare existents (or formal essences) are in God, then they are
referring only to the bare being (essendi) of the finite mutable thing
actual, and hence if the formal essence of Reagan follows from the essence
subtracting its temporal properties. In that case, there is good reason
of God, then Reagan must be an eternal actual existent, which is contrary
to
to the facts. But bare existents or formal essences must be in God, because
interpret
"same
necessity"
as
"same
logico-metaphysical
necessity". Thus according to this second answer, [the passage from
Spinoza thinks that everything that there is, is in God.
EIP17S1] does not require a disjunctive notion of necessity, since a finite mutable thing, minus its temporal properties, can (and does)
Friedman's interpretation aIIows the existence of unrealized possibilities,
follow from God's nature in a finite number of steps. 133
because he thinks that the time and place at which a particular mode exists are accidental characteristics. Even though all possible modes are
Friedman explicates the bare being of finite modes with the help of an
actualized, they could have been actualized at different times in different
example:
places. This interpretation, however, is inconsistent with the principle of sufficient reason, because it leaves room for propositions whose truth has
Consider any finite mutable mode whatever, say Reagan. As I
no ultimate reason, i.e. propositions which ascribe the time and place of a
interpret Spinoza, the formal essence of Reagan is eternal and follows
mode's existence to that mode. Since Spinoza wanted to present his system
with
with no contingency I would like to reject this interpretation.
logico-metaphysical
necessity
from
God's
infinite
136 4. TOWARDS A NEW INTERPRETAnON OF SPINOZA'S MODAL THEORY
137 Perhaps someone will say that, indeed, something contingent has no determinate and certain cause, but a contingent cause. If that were so, it would be either in a divided sense or in a
4.1. EIP16 AND THE NECESSITY OF ALL TRUTHS
composite one, viz. either the existence of that cause is contingent (but not its being a cause), or it is contingent that thing (which itself
The odd feature shared by the interpretations of Curley, Wilson and
would necessarily exist in Nature) should be a cause of the
Friedman is that they do not attempt to show how EIP16 follows from
production of contingent thing. But in either sense, this is false.
Spinoza's basic principles. All these philosophers also interpret EIP16 as
For as the first is concerned, if the contingent thing is contingent
leaving room for contingency because they seem to think that only in that
because its cause is contingent [with respect to its existence], then
way it can be reconciled with EIP28 and its demonstration. The problem
that cause must also be contingent because the cause that produced
with EIP16 is its importance in Spinoza's system and its somewhat casual
it is also contingent [with respect to its existence,] and so on, to
demonstration. One cannot fully understand what EIP16 means, if one is
infinity. And because we have already proven that everything depends
unable to derive it from the basic principles of the Ethics. The tendency is,
on one single cause, then that cause would also have to be contingent.
to put it roughly, to read and prove EIP16 with the help of the subsequent
And this is plainly false.
propositions and not with the help of the preceeding propositions. The crucial question is: "How does Spinoza prove EIP16?".
As for the second, if that cause were no more determined to produce the one rather than the other, i.e., either to produce this something, or to omit producing it, then it would at the same time be
The textual evidence favouring the hypothesis that Spinoza accepted the
impossible both that it should produce it and that it should omit
absolute necessity of all truths is abundant and it seems to me that it is
producing it. This is an outright contradiction. 135
impossible to explain it away. That Spinoza realizes that causal determinism does not eliminate contingency from the world becomes
In the passage quoted Spinoza plainly says that if ~ is the effect of ~, then
evident from the Short Treatise (1/41-42) where Spinoza tries to prove that
~ is contingent if (i) ~ exists necessarily but contingently causes ~ or (ii) ~
there is no contingency in the world. In this passage Spinoza deals with the
exists contingently but cannot exist without causing ~. However, both (i)
possibility that there are entities which are caused but contingent. He writes
and (ii) must be false, because everything depends on one single
as follows:
necessarily existing cause. Thus Spinoza clearly sees that even if the laws of nature were necessary that alone would not eliminate contingency from the world.
139
138 The argument just presented occurs in a condensed form in the Ethics
believes that EIP16 entails that the necessarily existing God is absolutely
EIP29D where Spinoza demonstrates that there is no contingency in the
the first cause of everything. The structure of EIPI6D is very simple:
world as follows:
everything that is possible must be actual because God is infinite. Here I am willing to accept what Diane Steinberg writes:
Whatever is, is in God (by PIS); but God cannot be called a contingent thing. For (by PII) he exists necessarily, not contingently.
[I]n [EIPI6] Spinoza is telling us something important about his
Next, the modes of the divine nature have also followed from it
notion of God as the most perfect being. God, by definition, is 'Being
necessarily and not contingently (by P16) - either insofar as the
absolutely infinite, that is to say, substance consisting of infinite
divine nature is considered absolutely (by P2I) or insofar as it is
attributes, each one which expresses the eternal and infinite essence'
considered to be determined to act in a certain way (by P28). Further,
(EI,dfn. 6). As he stated in a letter to Hudde: "...since the nature of
God is the cause of these modes not only insofar as they simply exist
God...does not consist of a certain kind of being but of absolutely
(by P24C), but also (by P26) insofar as they are considered to be
unlimited being, His nature also requires all that perfectly expresses
determined to produce an effect. For if they have not been determined
being; otherwise His nature would be limited and deficient (Letter
by God, then (by P26) it is impossible, not contingent, that they
36)." In other words, all possible attributes must in fact belong to
should determine themselves. Conversely (by P27) if they have been
God or He would not be perfect, hence would not be God. What is
determined by God, it is not contingent, but impossible, that they
true at the level of the attributes is also true of the modes of each
should render themselves undetermined. So all things have been
attribute: God consists of infinite attributes each one of which
determined from the necessity of the divine nature, not only to exist,
expresses eternal and infinite essence. That each attribute must
but to exist in a certain way, and to produce effects in a certain way.
produce every possible mode (i.e., every mode which is conceivable in terms of that attribute) is what Spinoza is saying in EI,16. If it
I believe that this proof bears a striking similarity to the passage quoted
were otherwise God would not be perfect. 136
from the Short Treatise. The message of the proof is clear: There is no contingency in the world because everything that there is follows from one
In this passage Steinberg argues that because God is perfect he must (i)
necessarily existing cause - God.
have an infinity of attributes and (ii) every mode of any attribute must be actual. I think that Steinberg gives an accurate account of EIP16 and its
1 shall now try to give a reconstruction of EJPI6D which explains why Spinoza thinks that there is no contingency in the world; i.e. why Spinoza
proof, but she shares the defects with the previously considered writers in
140
141
not showing how EIP16 follows from Spinoza's fundamental principles.
(12) An attribute X of ~ is infinite if and only if it is not possible that
Now, if we think that Spinoza's proof of EIP16 should be read as follows,
there is another substance which is X and whose X-ness exceeds that of ~.138
God is perfect --> God is infinite --> Every possible mode must be That all God's attributes must be infinite in this sense, follows directly from
actual,
EIPS where Spinoza says that two substances cannot share an attribute. In as Steinberg suggests, then it is still an open question whether there exists
the proof of EIPI6, Spinoza must then be saying that from the fact that all
a being that is perfect in the sense of the word "perfect" which implies
God's attributes are infinite in the sense of (12), it follows that they are
God's infinity and the actualization of every possible mode.
infinite in the sense of (11), too. But because the infinity of God's attributes in the sense of (12) follows solely from the impossibility of there being
The key concept in the proof of EIP16 is that of infinity. There is a sense
another substance which shares an attribute with God, the statement that all
of infinity in Spinoza which entails that if C. consists of an infinite number
God's attributes are infinite in the sense of (11) should follow from that
of E things, then
C. consists of all possible E things
137 •
It is natural to take
this as entailing the following principle:
same impossibility. In other words, Spinoza thinks that the following principle holds:
(11) If an attribute X of ~ is infinite, then all possible modes of X
(PO) All possible modes of God's attribute X must exist because only
exist.
God can have X.
Given that every mode is necessarily a mode of some attribute, the
In what follows, I try to show that Spinoza is right in thinking that (PO)
necessity of all truths follows if Spinoza succeeds in showing that all
follows from his basic assumptions.
attributes of God are infinite in the sense required by (11). Unfortunately, Spinoza does not directly prove that the attributes of God are infinite in the
Let us suppose that m is a possible mode of an attribute X. 139 From this it
sense of (11). But he proves that all of God's attributes must be infinite in
follows that m is possibly had by some substance which is X. But because
at least apparently different sense of the expression "infinite attribute",
God is necessarily the only substance which is X, it follows that m cannot
which occurs in EIP80 and reads as follows:
be had by anything else but God. Thus the following holds:
(10) God can have all possible modes of X.
143
142 It is natural to infer from (10) to
(11) It is possible that God has all possible modes of X, and from (11) it follows that
But in my interpretation it is not because (15) implies that
(16) A God which lacks a possible mode m is possible
and (16), together with the necessary existence of all substances, implies that the existence of a God which lacks m is necessary. Thus there would be two Gods, viz., the one that follows from the truth of (12) and the other
(12) A God which has all possible modes of X is possible.
that follows from the truth of (16). But in Spinoza's system only one God is possible.
(12) and the necessary existence of all substances, however, imply that To this it might be objected that (11) and (15) are both true because even (13) A God which has all possible modes of X necessarily exists.
though the actual God can have all possible modes, it could exist without having at least one of them, and so (11) and (15) are about the same God.
But because only one God is possible (13) implies that
Thus my reconstruction of the proof of EIP16 presupposes that Spinoza adopted a principle that has been adopted by several philosophers after him,
(14) God has all possible modes of X.
e.g., by Leibniz and David LewiS. 14O Leibniz and Lewis could express this principle by saying that no substance or individual thing can exist in
Thus we have succeeded in showing that if an attribute X of God is infinite
different possible worlds and Spinoza could express the principle by saying
in the sense of (12), it is infinite in the sense of (11), and this is what
that if there were unrealizable possibilities, then there were possible but not
Spinoza needs to prove EIPI6.
actual Gods. Following Plantinga, I will mean by the theory of worldbound substances (=TWS) the principle that no substance can exist in different
What is crucial in the argument I have attributed to Spinoza is the move
possible worlds. 141
from (11) to (12). It might be thought that (12) is consistent with (15): The fact that by attributing TWS to Spinoza one can make sense of the (15) It is possible that there is a possible mode m such that God lacks
demonstration of EIP16 gives a good reason to believe that Spinoza
it.
accepted it. 142 However, the way Spinoza demonstrates EIP33
145
144 Things could have been produced by God in no other way, and in no
Bennett were right in saying that according to Spinoza there exists some
other order than they have been produced
kind of conceptual connection between the attributes of God and the laws of nature, then the absurdity of the supposition that the laws of nature differ
gives additional evidence for the view that Spinoza accepted TWS. EIP33D
from the actual ones would not be that it would entail the existence of
runs as follows:
several Gods but that it would make God an impossible being. If the "way and order" really refers to the laws of nature, then Spinoza in EIP33D
For all things have necessarily followed from God's given nature (by
proves the necessity of the laws of nature with the help of the theory of
PI6), and have been determined from the necessity of God's nature
world-bound substances.
to exist and produce an effect in a certain way (by P29). Therefore, if things could have been of another nature, or could have been
If the theory of world-bound substances is added to Spinoza's premisses
determined to produce an effect in another way, so that the order of
his argument for the necessity of all truths seems to be valid. But there is
Nature was different, then God's nature could also have been other
still one problem about the compossibility of modes. It might be argued
than it is now, and therefore (by Pl1) that other nature would also
that (10) does not entail (11) because (10) only states that every possible
have had to exist, and consequently, there could have been two or
mode is possibly had by God, whereas (11) expresses the additional
more Gods, which is absurd (by PI4Cl). So things could have been
requirement that it is possible that God has every possible mode. The
produced in no other way and no other order, etc., q.e.d.
difference between these two cases can be illustrated as follows: (10) says that if X and y- are possible modes of God, then it is possible that God has
There has been some speculation about what Spinoza means by the way
X and it is possible that God has y-. (11) shares that assumption, but in
and order in EIP33. According to Curley and Bennett 143, Spinoza is here
addition to this, it also asserts that it is possible that God has both X and
only saying that all change happens in accordance with the laws of nature
y-. Spinoza might, however, deny that
that are necessary truths. Thus the proof of EIP33 would go as follows: (i) If the laws of nature were different, there would be several possible Gods.
(17) It is possible that God has
X
and it is possible that God has y-
(ii) Only one God is possible. Therefore, the laws of nature cannot be different from the laws of the actual world. Now, it may be that part of
could be true and
what is intended by EIP33 is just what Bennett and Curley say it means. 144 But the way it is demonstrated supports my hypothesis. If Curley and
(18) It is possible that God has both X and y-
146
147
false by appealing to the theory of world-bound substances as follows:
Spinoza's proof for the necessity of all truths are (i) the conclusion of his
From (17) it follows that a God having X and a God having y- are both
ontological argument (i.e. EIP7) and (ii) the theory of world-bound
possible. But from EIP7 it follows that both a God having X and a God
substances. However, as I have argued the first premiss is false, and
having y- must exist. Now, because only one God is possible in Spinoza's
therefore Spinoza fails in his ambitious attempt to prove the necessity of
system, the God having X and the God having y- must be identical.
all truths.
Therefore (17) cannot be true and (18) false in Spinoza's metaphysics.
Without using the concept of infinity Spinoza's proof of the necessity of all truths can be presented as follows: In order to prove that the actual world
4.1.1. A NOTE ON THOUGHT AND EXTENSION
is the only possible world, Spinoza after having shown that God is a necessary existent, ought to show that God could not be differently
In the first chapter we were not able to give a plausible account of why
r at 1, then it is
Spinoza holds that thought and extension are attributes or essences of God.
at 1. Let us now suppose that (i) a
We said that even if Spinoza could show that thought and extension are
r at 1 could have failed to exist at that time. Given
identifying properties (i.e. even if it were true that there is no possible
that Spinoza accepted the theory of world-bound substances (i) entails that
world where there are several thinking and extended substances), it would
modified. Thus he ought to show that if a mode exists in necessary that that mode exists in mode m which exists in
a God lacking m in
r
r
at 1 is possible. But because all substances are
necessary existents, all Gods lacking m in
r
at 1 should exist. That,
stilI be odd to call two possible thinking (extended) substances the same for the sole reason that they possess thought (extension).
however, is absurd because Spinoza thinks that only one God is possible. Hence our hypothesis that God could be differently modified is not possibly
I do not see any other way out of the problem sketched above than to
true, and therefore its negation expresses a necessary truth. Finally, I
suggest that Spinoza is relying on EIP16 in arguing that thought and
believe that it may be of some interest to see that Spinoza's proof of the
extension are essences. Because EIP16 entails that everything that is
necessity of all truths is not dependent on his substance monism. Spinoza
possible must be actual, and because only one substance is possible, it
could prove the necessity of all truths just by appealing to the substance-
follows that the only possible substance must be modified in every possible
property ontology, as follows: (i) If there are unrealizable possibilities, then
way in every possible world. From these considerations it follows that there
there are possible but non-actual substances. (ii) There are no possible but
is no possible world where a thinking and extended substance could be
non-actual substances (EIP7). Therefore, (iii) there are no unrealizable
modified differently. Thus the question whether two possible substances
possibilities; i.e. all truths are necessary. Thus the crucial premisses in
148
149
that exist in different possible worlds and are modified differently, are the
conclusion is that all truths are necessary in Spinoza's metaphysics. And,
same does not arise in Spinoza's metaphysics.
as we have seen, (NO) holds in Spinoza's metaphysics, because the proposition that God exists entails all propositions which describe the
Given the considerations above, Spinoza needs only to assume that it is
existence of modes. In the interpretation proposed all finite modes with
possible that there is a being which has all possible thoughts and bodies in
their times and places follow from the essence of God. That, I believe, is
order to show that thought and extension are attributes or essences. But as
in accordance with EVP29S where Spinoza writes as follows:
we have seen in the first chapter, that is not an implausible assumption. It is worth noting that in EIIP1D2 Spinoza says that the proposition
We conceive things as actual in two ways: either insofar as we conceive them to exist in relation to a certain time and place, or
EIIP1 Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing
insofar as we conceive them to be contained in God and to follow from the necessity of the divine nature. But the things we conceive
follows from the fact that we can conceive a being that can think all that
in this second way as true, or real, we conceive under a species of
is possible.
eternity, and to that extent they involve the eternal and infinite essence of God. Here Spinoza says that finite modes under a species of eternity follow from
4.2. ON EIP16 AND EIP28
the necessity of the divine and the text also suggests that those modes which exist in relation to a certain time and place do not follow from the
The conclusion of the section 4.1. was that in Spinoza's system the
necessity of the divine nature. Moreover, by supposing that a finite mode
actualization of all possibilities follows from the infinity of God. Thus
under a species of eternity is that mode with its time and place of
according to Spinoza the following principle holds:
occurrence, EVP29S says that if m is a mode which exists in £ at 1, then the fact that m exists in £ at 1 follows from the necessity of the divine
(NO) If X is a mode which exists in £ at 1, then it is necessary that X
nature. Thus Spinoza's views lead him to the thesis that finite modes with
exists in £ at 1.
their times and places are infinite modes. Now, the problem is whether my interpretation of EIP16 is inconsistent with EIP21 according to which
When this principle is added to the Spinozistic premisses that besides God and its modes nothing exists and that God is a necessary existent, the
nothing finite follows from the essence of God.
150
151
Let us first try to make sense of EIP21. Why does Spinoza say that all
But because entities which exist always and everywhere are for Spinoza
things that follow from the essence of God must be infinite and always
infinite, it follows that the following principle holds:
exist? I believe that it is because the following argumentation seems intuitively plausible: All things that follow from the essence of God are
(N4) If X is a necessary existent, then X is infinite.
caused by God. However, a cause cannot exist without causing its effect (see EIA3). But because God is a necessary existent it follows that all
Thus we can say that everything that follows from the essence of God must
God's effects must exist by necessity, too. However, it seems to me that the
be infinite because everything that follows from the essence of God must
principle
exist by necessity. Now, the problem is whether (NO), (N4) and the existence of finite modes
(N1) If X is a necessary existent, then X exists always
form an inconsistent triad. One could argue that they form an inconsistent triad as follows: In your interpretation (NO) holds because it is absolutely
is true. If someone were to say that m is a necessary existent which does
necessary that God exists, and if X is a finite mode which exists in r at 1,
not exist at 1, then he would be contradicting himself, because in saying
then if X had failed to exist in r at 1, God would not have existed.
that m does not exist at 1 he would be granting the possible non-existence
Therefore, x's existing in r at 1 is a necessary state of affairs which entails
of m. Moreover, a similar reasoning supports the view that necessary
that x's existing in r at 1 is an infinite mode of God, i.e. a mode which
existents must exist everywhere; if someone were to say that m is a
always and everywhere exists. However, X's existing in rat 1 cannot be an
necessary existent which does not exist in r, then he would be granting that
infinite mode of God, because it has the finite mode X as its constituent and
it is possible for m not to exist. So the following principle seems to be true:
all constituents of an infinite mode must be infinite. 145
(N2) If X is a necessary existent, then X exists everywhere.
To meet the objection presented above we must bear in mind that in my interpretation modes are exemplifications of properties by God. For
But the conjunction of (N1) and (N2) says the same as the principle
example, corresponding to the finite mode m there is some property E such that m exists if and only if God exemplifies E. Moreover, m exists in r at
(N3) If X is a necessary existent, then X exists always and
1 if and only if God exemplifies E in r at 1. From this it follows that the
everywhere.
mode "m's existing in r at 1" is the exemplification of the property "being
E in r at 1". But it is of course possible that God has the property "being
E in r at 1" without simultaneously possessing the property of being E.
153
152 Therefore, m's existing in f at 1 (i.e. God's being E in f at 1 ) does not
as follows: Let us suppose that m is a finite mode which exists at 1 in f.
have m (i.e. God's being E) as its constituent. Moreover, it seems to involve
As we have seen, m's existing in f at 1 is an infinite mode of God and
no absurdity to suppose that if at 1 in f God exemplifies the property of
therefore an everlasting entity which follows from the essence of God.
being E, then God exemplifies the property of being E in f at 1 as long as
Thus it follows that m's existing in f at 1 is possibly the object of some
he exists and everywhere where he exists; that is, always and everywhere.
idea. But what is possible must exist (by EIPI6). Therefore, there is
Thus finite modes with their times and places are infinite modes in
necessarily in God a sempiternal idea which has m's existing in f at 1 as its
Spinoza's metaphysics.
object. But it is intuitively plausible to say that the idea which has m's existing in f at 1 as its object is an idea of m. Thus even at those times when m does not exist there is an idea of m; i.e. an idea of a non-existent individual which necessarily exists when it exists. Now, because the objects
4.3. ON EllA! AND EIlP8
of the ideas of non-existent individuals are infinite, the ideas themselves must be infinite (by EIIP7). For that reason the ideas of non-existent
As we have previously seen, Spinoza speaks in EIlP8 about ideas of non-
individuals are comprehended in the infinite idea of God.
existing individuals. He says that the ideas of non-existent individuals are comprehended in the infinite idea of God in the same way that the formal
EIlP8 gives a gloss of the term "formal essence". By formal essences
essences of singular things are contained in God's attributes. This suggests
Spinoza seems to mean the essences of finite things with their times and
that by ideas of non-existent individuals Spinoza means ideas which have
places; i.e. the essences of finite things under a form of eternity. Thus if m
infinite modes as their objects. 146
is a finite mode whose essence is E and which exists in f at 1, then a formal essence of m is the property of being
E in f at 1. What Spinoza
EIlP8 is a problematic proposition because it seems to entail that there are
means by saying that all formal essences are contained in the attributes is
unrealized possibilities. This is because in EIlP8 Spinoza says that there are
that God cannot exemplify the divine attributes without exemplifying each
ideas of non-existent individuals. Now, if there are ideas of non-existent
one of the formal essences. Thus we could say that for Spinoza the actual
individuals then non-existent individuals are conceivable. But if non-
world is the only possible world because the ideas of the formal essences
existent individuals are conceivable, they are possible.
of finite modes necessarily exist in God. My interpretation is, I think, strongly supported by EIPI7S, where Spinoza writes:
I believe that in speaking about non-existent individuals Spinoza does not have in mind individuals which never exist. Rather, Spinoza is arguing here
154
155 [T]he truth and formal essence of things is what it is because it exists
all contingent states of God because each finite mode is such that God can
objectively in that way in God's intellect. So God's intellect, insofar
exist without it. This follows simply from the fact that finite modes have
as it is conceived to constitute God's essence, is really the cause both
a limited duration. Thus every finite mode is such that there is a time at
of the essence and existence of things.
147
which it does not exist. Hence all finite modes are contingent existents. This also entails that if X is a finite mode then both (19) and (20) are true:
We are finally in a position to answer Bennett's criticism, according to which Spinoza in some way commits himself both to the thesis that all truths are necessary (e.g. in EIPllD2) and to the opposite principle, according to which there is real contingency in the world (e.g. in EIIAl).
(19) It is possible that
X
does not exist
(20) It is possible that
X
exists.
and
Bennett justifies his view as follows: That they are both true is due to the fact that they can be interpreted as In plld2 we have seen [Spinoza] say that 'from the order of Nature
having the same meaning as (19') and (20'), respectively:
it must follow either that the triangle necessarily exists now or that it is impossible for it to exist now', yet in 2al he says that 'from the
(19') It is possible that at some time or other X exists,
order of Nature it can happen equally that this or that man does exist, or that he does not exist'. The two cannot be reconciled by any
(20') It is possible that at some time or other X does not exist.
supposed difference between triangles and men. The only escape for Spinoza that I can see is to say that in the former passage he is
These are both true in Spinoza's philosophy, because EIP16 entails that if
speaking about the triangle's being necessary by reason of its cause,
X is a finite mode then there is a time 1 such that the proposition
while in the latter his point is that no man's existence is necessary by reason of the man's own inherent nature. 148
X
exists at 1
I think that we can make sense of the seemingly inconsistent passages cited
is necessarily true. Moreover, because
by Bennett in a way that makes no reference to the notion of a thing's
exist, and hence there is some other time
being necessary by reason of its cause. To say that something is a necessary existent means that its existence is a logically necessary state of affairs. Now, no finite mode has that kind of necessary existence; they are
X does not exist at
r
X
is a finite mode, it does not always
r such that the proposition
156
157
is a necessary truth. But because the first of these propositions implies
God cannot properly be called the remote cause of singular things,
(19') and the second (20'), ElIA1 is not inconsistent with the supposition
except perhaps so that we may distinguish them from those things
that all truths are necessary. What Spinoza says in EIPllD2 is that if a
that he has produced immediately, or rather, that follow from his
triangle exists now, then it is necessary that it exists at the present moment.
absolute nature. For by a remote cause we understand one which is
But, as we have seen, it follows from EIP16 that every finite mode exists
not conjoined in any way with its effect. But all things that are, are
necessarily when it exists, and this is not inconsistent with the principle
in God, and so depend on God that they can neither be nor be
that no finite mode as such has necessary existence, or that from the order
conceived without him.
of Nature it can happen equally that this triangle exists or that it does not exist.
In this passage Spinoza clearly presupposes that finite modes (i.e. singular things) are caused by God. What he denies is that God is their remote cause. Thus it is plausible to hold that by EIP18 Spinoza intends to say that God is the immanent cause of finite modes, too.
4.4. GOD AND FINITE MODES The problem is that in EIP28 Spinoza says that finite modes of God can be In the preceding discussion I have deliberately avoided one difficulty. From
caused only by other finite modes and in the scholium to that proposition
my interpretation it follows that all finite modes under a form of eternity
he gives the reader to understand that finite modes are caused by God, too.
(i.e. with their times and places) follow from the nature of God. This is
Now, there is nothing inconsistent in these passages once my interpretation
consistent with EIP21 and EIP28 because, as I have argued above, finite
of modes as particular states of God is accepted. The crucial point to note
modes under a form of eternity (or with their times and places) are infinite
is that substances enter into causal relations via their states. In pluralistic
modes. Thus Spinoza's argument for the necessity of all truths is not
ontologies this is reflected at the level of language as follows: Let us
inconsistent with his principle that nothing having a determinate existence
suppose that it is true that
follows from the nature of God. However, the story told above needs to be supplemented. In EIP18 Spinoza says that God is the immanent cause of
(21) Jones raises his arm.
all things. And that in EIP18 Spinoza does not mean by "all things" only all infinite modes but wants also to say that God is the cause of all finite
Now, it is plausible to say that (21) is true only if Jones causes the rising
modes becomes evident from EIP28S where he writes as follows:
of his arm. But in saying that Jones causes the rising of his arm we are not committed to saying that there holds a causal relation between Jones ( a
158
159
substance) and the rising of Jones' arm (a state or event) which is not
CONCLUDING REMARKS
reducible to a causal relation which holds between states or events. What the truth of (21) requires is that some state of Jones (for example, a want)
The necessity of all truths is a cornerstone in Spinoza's philosophy - his
causes the rising of Jones' arm. Another example would be the following:
theory of human freedom and moral responsibility are based on that
If a stones hits the window and causes the breaking of the window, it is
principle. Therefore, it is a bit annoying that he has been criticized for
perfectly natural to say that the stone caused the breaking of the window.
making a logical mistake in the argument which purports to prove that
However, in saying that the stone caused the breaking of the window we
principle. However, I hope to have shown that if a Cartesian reading is
are not committed to saying that there exists a causal relation between the
given to Spinoza's key terms, then Spinoza's argument for the necessity of
stone (a substance) and the breaking of the window. What we are saying
all truths is valid. Thus I have defended a conservative reading of the
in saying that the stone caused the breaking of the window is that some
Ethics.
state of the stone caused the breaking of the window. Thus the following principle seems to be true:
There is still much that remains obscure in the metaphysics of Spinoza. Many of his axiomatic principles are question-begging. Consider, for
s. causes the state I of substance £ if and only if a state of s. causes I.
(AC) A substance
example, the principle of sufficient reason and the principle that a whole cannot be conceived without its parts. These principles play important roles in his proofs but they are not self-evident. Thus I believe that Spinoza fails
But because Spinoza believes that (i) God is the only possible substance
in his ambitious attempt to show that his metaphysical system is necessarily
and (ii) all finite modes are particulars states of God and (iii) all finite
true. But that does not make it worthless.
modes are caused by other finite modes, it follows that in Spinoza's monistic ontology God is the cause of all his finite modes.
160
161
APPENDIX: A LIST OF KEY PASSAGES FROM THE ETHICS
Axioms
Definitions
EIA4 The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the knowledge of its cause.
EID3 By substance I understand what is in itself and is conceived through itself, i.e., that whose concept does not require the concept of another thing,
EIA6 A true idea must agree with its object.
from which it must be formed. EIlA1 The essence of man does not involve necessary existence, i.e., from EID4 By attribute I mean that which the intellect perceives of substance as
the order of nature it can happen equally that this or that man does exist,
constituting its essence.
or that he does not exist.
EID5 By mode I understand the affections of a substance, or that which is in another through which it is also conceived.
Propositions
EID6 By God I understand a being absolutely infinite, i.e., a substance
EIP5 In nature there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature
consisting of an infinity of attributes, of which each one expresses an
or attribute.
eternal and infinite essence. EIP7 It pertains to the nature of a substance to exist. EIID2 I say that to the essence of any thing belongs that which, being given, the thing is necessarily posited and which, being taken away, the
EIPlO Each attribute of a substance must be conceived through itself.
thing is necessarily taken away; or that without which the thing can neither be nor be conceived, and which can neither be nor be conceived without
EIP11 God, or a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which
the thing.
expresses eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists.
162
163
EIP16 From the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinitely
ElP33 Things could have been produced by God in no other way, and in
many things in infinitely many modes, (i.e., everything which can fall
no other order than they have been produced.
under an infinite intellect.)
EIP33D For all things have necessarily followed from God's given nature
EIP16D This proposition must be plain to anyone, provided he attends to
(by P16), and have been determined from the necessity of God's nature to
the fact that the intellect infers from the given definition of any thing a
exist and produce an effect in a certain way (by P29). Therefore, if things
number of properties that really do follow necessarily from it (i.e., from the
could have been of another nature, or could have been determined to
very essence of the thing); and that it infers more properties the more the
produce an effect in another way, so that the order of Nature was different,
definition expresses reality; i.e., the more reality the essence of the defined
then God's nature could also have been other than it is now, and therefore
thing involves. But since the divine nature has absolutely infinite attributes
(by Pll) that other nature would also have had to exist, and consequently,
(by D6), each of which also expresses an essence infinite in its own kind,
there could have been two or more Gods, which is absurd (by P14Cl). So
from its necessity there must follow infinitely many things in infinite
things could have been produced in no other way and no other order, etc.,
modes (i.e., everything which can fall under an infinite intellect), q.e.d.
q.e.d.
EIP21 All the things which follow from the absolute nature of any of God's
EIIP7 The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and
attributes have always had to eJ.
