Using the Viable Systems Model to examine multi ... - SSRN papers

Journal of the Operational Research Society (2012) 63, 418–430

© 2012 Operational Research Society Ltd. All rights reserved. 0160-5682/12 www.palgrave-journals.com/jors/

Using the Viable Systems Model to examine multi-agency arrangements for combatting transnational organised crime J Brocklesby Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand Traditionally, most operational research applications in the area of law enforcement and criminal justice have used quantitative techniques to forecast patterns and levels of offending and to optimise various police, judicial and prison processes. This paper seeks to examine the role that more qualitative modelling approaches might contribute in this important application area. Specifically, the paper examines the role that cybernetic theory and viable systems modelling can contribute in helping government bodies and law enforcement agencies to think through how, organisationally, they can best respond to the increasingly complex problem of transnational organised crime. Focussing on new multi-agency collaborative arrangements, the paper argues that there is a need for more informed debate that can account for the complexity of the challenge and point towards more holistic and integrated solutions. Against this background, the paper argues that the viable systems modelling approach has much to offer because it is theoretically grounded in the management of complexity; because its flexibility allows it to accommodate the trend for law enforcement agencies to work more closely with partner agencies, and to do so at multiple organisational levels; and because its user-friendly annotated diagramming conventions allow stakeholders to focus discussion and work towards outcomes that make sense in particular settings. Journal of the Operational Research Society (2012) 63, 418–430. doi:10.1057/jors.2011.43 Published online 8 June 2011 Keywords: cybernetics; management; modelling; viable systems; policing

Introduction For many decades operational research (‘OR’ hereafter) has made a substantial contribution across the policing, courts, and correctional areas of the law enforcement and criminal justice systems. By and large most modelling occurs to support two main activities. The first is to provide information as an input to higher level policy discussions, for example in forecasting recidivism, criminal hotspots, crime rates and prison populations (eg, Saladin, 1983; Coupe and Girling, 2001; Cummings, 2010). The second deploys mathematical/statistical models and simulation techniques to automate routine decision making, optimise the allocation of resources such as police officers and patrol vehicles, and to streamline control room, courts and correctional processes (eg, Gross and Nussbaum, 1978; Lewin and Morey, 1982; Gunal et al, 2008). Generally, projects such as these involve coming up with robust solutions in both one off and recurring situations where it is reasonably clear what needs to be done and how it should be done.

Correspondence: J Brocklesby, Victoria University of Wellington, PO Box 600, Wellington, New Zealand. E-mail: [email protected]

There is little doubt that this kind of modelling work has been, and continues to be, of immense value, both in OR in general and law enforcement/criminal justice in particular. Every so often however, voices are raised to remind the OR community that it might be doing more, both in terms of having a more influential role in helping people to improve the way organisations work, and relatedly, in protecting and enhancing its standing both as a discipline and as an area of professional practice. More often than not the argument has been that while the role of operations and process decision support modelling is well established, historically OR aspired to take a more holistic and systemic approach (see Ackoff, 1969, 1974, 1979; Churchman et al, 1957; Pidd, 2010), and had a broader aspiration in tackling major strategic issues not only of organisations (Eden, 1989; Eden and Ackermann, 1998; Dyson and Eden, 2000; Pidd, 2004), but also of society as a whole (Ackoff, 1974; Rosenhead, 1987, 1989). With these higher level aspirations in mind, the primary objective of the paper is to show how one such holistic and systemic modelling approach might contribute in a criminal justice context that is both topical, and of widespread societal concern. The context in question is global criminality. Here government bodies and law

J Brocklesby—Using the viable systems model to examine multi-agency arrangements

enforcement agencies are coming to the conclusion that new organisational arrangements are necessary in order to address the problem of escalating transnational organised crime (Levi, 2004; Cockayne, 2007; Segell, 2007; Jacobs and Hough, 2010). In many parts of the world what once were localised and hierarchically organised groups operating in particular areas of criminality are now being transformed into, or superseded by, sophisticated, flexible network-based structures that can hide their leadership and financial assets in one place while moving quickly across regions and international borders in response to perceived new market opportunities and threats (Klerks, 2003; Williams, 2006; Dobovsek, 2008; Glenny, 2009) Such developments are posing major challenges to government agencies that have classically existed in vertical silos which accentuate accountability, departmental efficiency and structural clarity at the expense of communication and collaboration, and to traditional methods of policing carried out by the local area command. Against the background of this apparent mismatch between organised criminal activity and traditional policing methods and structures, and in the search for more efficient and effective mechanisms for dealing with the problem, many countries have sought to promote coordination among domestic and national law enforcement agencies. One of the early movers was Great Britain which, in the 1960s, introduced Regional Crime Squads to combat multi-jurisdictional crime. Around the same time, a US Presidential Commission on law enforcement led, in that country, to a system of formal and informal multi-agency taskforces focusing on illegal commodities, criminal groups and high risk areas such as cities, borders and ports. Hundreds of these taskforces have been in operation since then. Similarly, in Canada, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police has provided secondments to permanent and temporary ‘Joint Force Operations’. More recently, countries such as the UK through its ‘Serious Organised Crime Agency’; Italy through the ‘Direzione Investigitiva Antimafia’; Australia through the ‘Australian Crime Commission’; and New Zealand through its ‘Organised and Financial Crime Agency’ have created new national cross-agency institutions dedicated to organised crime. Since, logically, the transnationality of organised crime demands an international response, in addition to these domestic arrangements similar collaborative structures have been introduced through agencies such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the Organization of American States, Interpol and Europol. This paper is about the role that systemic and holistic modelling might play in helping stakeholders better understand and deal with the challenges faced by these new collaborative structures. The challenges are formidable, because when independent agents or organisational units that have previously operated in a silo fashion are brought together in some sort of collaborative relationship,

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it would be unwise to assume that there will be a synergistic relationship. The relationships between the participants and the new ‘systemic whole’ has to be worked upon and carefully managed. The paper frames the discussion using W Ross Ashby’s (1952) cybernetic concept, the ‘Law of Requisite Variety’, and one of its derivative modelling tools, the Viable Systems Model (VSM) (Beer, 1972, 1979, 1984, 1985; Harnden, 1989; Espejo and Schwaninger, 1993; Espejo and Schuhmann, 1996; Espejo, 1989). The Viable System Model is reasonably well known in OR and systems modelling circles and it has been used successfully in a variety of organisational contexts. Examples include commercial broadcasting (Leonard, 1989), entertainment (Flood and Jackson, 1991a), hospitals and manufacturing (Hoverstadt, 2008), telecommunications (Brocklesby and Cummings, 1996), national innovation systems (Devine, 2005), tourism services (Flood and Zambuni, 1990), information systems (Schuhmann, 1990), control and performance measurement (Bititci et al, 1997; Gregory, 2007), knowledge management (Leonard, 2000) and business process engineering (Vidgen, 1998). In what follows, the paper begins by providing some background comment on the nature of the problem with which government bodies and law enforcement agencies are currently grappling. It then introduces relevant theory and the aforementioned modelling tool. Thereafter, the paper examines and illustrates the value of this modelling tool using, as an illustration, the recent experiences of the UK’s Serious Organised Crime Agency. Finally the paper comments on the nature of the distinctive contribution that the VSM can make not only in the law enforcement/ criminal justice context, but also in OR more generally.

Background on the current state of transnational organised crime For some years now transnational organised crime has been on a sharp upward trend. Most commentators (see, eg, Moore, 1996; Saviano, 2006) agree that the origins of this escalation in activity can be traced back to globalisation trends that began during the late 1980s and early 1990s, a period that witnessed a significant increase in economic growth in Asia and other developing regions and a geographical freeing up of the movement of people, money, products and services. On the supply side, this motivated traditional criminal groups to seek new opportunities, to extend their reach across national boundaries and in many cases globally. In addition, new criminal groups, often emerging out of what were national military and security services and warring militia in countries such as Mexico, Russia, the Balkans, Central Asia, South Africa and Northern Ireland, began to enter the picture. On the demand side, in both developed and developing nations, a seemingly insatiable demand for counterfeit goods, cheap

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Journal of the Operational Research Society Vol. 63, No. 3

labour, drugs, sex, body parts, online financial transactions, protection and weaponry has continued to gain momentum. Although the criminal groups responsible for these kinds of activities do not in any way conform to a single universal structure and/or modus operandi, there are some common themes. For example, there is an increasing predilection for such groups to interweave and conceal criminal activity within legitimate business structures; to extend their reach, facilitate their operations, and acquire influence and protection by co-opting individuals in positions of power; to develop ‘strategic’ alliances with other criminal groups; and, importantly, to develop fluid, and often transient, network structures that affords superior organisation performance through a flexibility and ‘fleet-footedness’ that allows the group to respond quickly to environmental threats and opportunities. Hierarchical structures such as those typically associated with family-based criminal groups still exist, however these are increasingly becoming embedded in more network-type arrangements. Such is the case, for example, with the Sicilian, Neapolitan, and New York Mafia, and the Japanese Yakuza (Saviano, 2006; Glenny, 2009). Such developments are not entirely new. However, their recent escalation is now posing major challenges to government agencies that have not always operated collaboratively, and to traditional methods of policing based primarily on an hierarchically organised area command. When there is a shift to more transient organisational arrangements, when criminal leadership is dispersed or physically distant, when criminal connections and relationships are constantly been formed, disbanded and then reformed as new opportunities are presented, and when the proceeds of crime are spirited away either to distant countries or cleansed through money laundering schemes into and/or through legitimate businesses, the law enforcement task is made infinitely more difficult. Williams (2006, p 79) captures the point succinctly: . . . criminal networks are smart, future oriented organizations locked in combat with governments that by contrast . . . still operate along hierarchical lines and are further hindered by bureaucratic rivalry and competition, interagency antipathies and a reluctance to share information and coordinate operations.

In recognising this apparent mismatch between organised criminal networks and traditional policing methods and structures, a view is emerging that law enforcement needs to be more flexible, innovative, and that there must be more collaboration between and across law enforcement agencies and experts from different areas of the public sector. This is prompting governments around the world to establish various structures that broaden policing capability and seek to transcend the normal bureaucratic way of doing business.

Typically, these new law enforcement agencies work alongside rather than replace the traditional area command; they also operate at numerous ‘levels’. These range from temporary ‘operational taskforces’ that might be charged with gathering intelligence on, and/or bringing to justice and prosecuting a particular criminal group, to permanently staffed national cross-jurisdiction agencies that seek to provide an integrated response by combining specialist input from areas such as law enforcement, coastguard, customs, cyber-crime, immigration, taxation, fraud. Beyond that, there are international cooperative agencies that establish ‘joint investigation teams’ to coordinate law enforcement activity internationally and provide analytical, technical and logistical support to national police bodies.

Theoretical perspective—the law of requisite variety and the theory of viable systems It is one thing, as the aforementioned quote by Williams suggests, that law enforcement agencies need to match the complexity and variety of the criminal organisations that they seek to bring to justice, it is another thing entirely knowing how, within the bounds of democratic and legal processes, this might best be achieved. Turning to relevant theory can suggest some possible answers. W Ross Ashby’s (1952) so-called ‘Law of Requisite Variety’ is well known in OR circles, as well as in some areas of the more systems-inspired areas of organisation theory. Here, the term ‘variety’ is used as a proxy for complexity; it refers to the number of possible states that a system or its ‘environment’ might exhibit in relation to defined purposes. The ‘law’ itself states that the environment can only be ‘controlled’ if the ‘controller’ can match its variety. This idea is nicely captured through Ashby’s maxim only variety can destroy variety. In the social world, systems can be highly complex and change rapidly; they exhibit high variety. Hence, the ‘controllers’ or ‘managers’ of such systems have to strike a balance by simultaneously increasing the variety of their own system (known as amplification) and reducing the variety of ‘the environment’ (known as attenuation). Potentially, the transient, unpredictable, fleet-footed, technologically sophisticated and well-resourced criminal networks described above embody extremely high variety, and, as a result, they present major challenges to those who are looking to curtail their activities. In this sense, (and relative to the stand-alone vertical department) the enhanced and integrated capabilities of the new organisational and multi-agency arrangements just described represent an amplification of variety. At the same time, the targeting of particular types of criminal activity, for example drugs or human trafficking, or particular groups, for example Asian crime syndicates, mafia families and clans, or ‘outlaw motor cycle gangs’ represents an attenuation strategy.


Building upon the law of requisite variety, this particular stream of systems thinking has developed a number of potentially powerful tools and models to enable an effective design, control and transformation of organisations and organisational systems operating under conditions of high variety and complexity (for an integrating perspective on these, see Schwaninger, 2001). The best known of these, Stafford Beer’s ‘Theory of Viable Systems’ is used here (1972, 1979, 1984, 1985). This particular tool, a simple representation of which appears below, can be taken to represent what this way of thinking about managing complexity might mean in organisational terms. The result: the ‘VSM’ presents the main elements in the form of a diagnostic/methodological tool that is designed to assist stakeholders in better understanding and, through discussion and debate, ‘improving’ complex organisational systems. Looking at the structure of the VSM, Beer found that all viable systems share a number of basic properties. They all exhibited, in some shape or form: autonomous operational elements that directly interface with the external environment, that enact the identity of the system (‘System 1’); coordination functions, that ensure that the operational elements work harmoniously (‘System 2’); control activities that manage the operational system and allocate resources to it (‘System 3’); audit functions that monitor the performance of the operational elements (‘System 3’); intelligence functions, that consider the system as a whole—its strategic opportunities, threats, and future direction (‘System 4’); and, finally, an identity function, that, in conjunction with its various components and other systems to which it might be taken to belong, conceives of its’ purpose or raison d’eˆtre, its ‘soul’, and place in-the-world (‘System 5’). It is important to remember that the focus of this model is explicitly on activities; it does not make any assumptions about how these activities might translate into roles. In some organisational systems, particular roles might be associated with particular activities. Under a matrix structure, for example, a committee might be given responsibility for coordinating across operational areas (S2); a board of directors might be primarily responsible for policy-formation (S5). Elsewhere, however, these activities might be dispersed across a range of different roles, and in most organisational systems there are many people whose role traverses two or more systemic activities. Moreover, the model does not make any presumptions about the nature of the mechanisms that might realise these activities. Formal performance appraisal systems often perform an audit (S3 ) role. However, informal mechanisms including the self-monitoring of performance can, in certain circumstances, be equally if not more effective. Likewise, the ‘shared understandings’ and daily physical interactions that occur in some organisations can, in themselves, provide a highly effective coordinating function (S2), as can specific structures or written operational manuals.

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Another example might be how formal ‘intelligence’ (S4) activities such as environmental scanning and strategic planning might work very effectively in one context, whereas in others, having operational personal (S1), simply ‘keep their ears to the ground and eye to the future’ might work better. This important feature of the model allows stakeholders to bring the personal, political and cultural aspects of organisational life into consideration, as well as the bureaucratic, structural and technical aspects. Following the logic of the law of requisite variety, and relative to purposes worked out within the system and ‘managed’ through System ‘5’, the level of autonomy ceded to ‘System 1’ and its various units is commensurate with the level of variety that is perceived to exist in the environment. Thereafter, Beer’s main thesis is that the conditions outlined above: the various systemic elements and the communication channels running between them, and between them and the environment, must be present, working effectively and, importantly, ‘in balance’ through the whole system. If these conditions are not met, then viability is jeopardised. The law of requisite variety clearly bears directly on the proposition that policing and law enforcement agencies need, as far as is possible, to match the complexity and variety exhibited by criminal organisations. Of course, this is much easier said than done. Considering the mobility and transient nature of many criminal groups, the ‘invisibility’ of leadership, the inter-weaving of licit and illicit activity, the technological sophistication, and in many cases the massive resource base and covert political influence, it is self-evident that this represents a significant ‘variety’ challenge to cash-strapped, highly bureaucratic and regionally focused law enforcement agencies. Beyond that, since the ‘pooling’ of law enforcement capabilities and knowledge occurs at multiple levels the socalled ‘recursive’ nature of the VSM offers clear analytical advantages in this application context. This feature refers to the ‘containment’ of the whole system within each of the operational elements. On this basis, each System 1 unit (ie, 1a, 1b, 1c etc in Figure 1) can be conceptualised as a system in its own right. Equally, any particular ‘system-in-focus’ can be conceptualised as a S1 operational component of a higher level system. This means that the basic proposition, to be considered shortly, of that having a clear sense of identity, thinking strategically, planning, controlling and coordinating operations and having an appropriate information flow around these activities applies irrespective of whether the focus is on temporary local taskforces, permanent national agencies or global organisations.

Modelling the law enforcement response to the problem of organised transnational crime Building upon these theoretical propositions, the remainder of this paper seeks to make the case for a more systemic

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'The Environment'

A 'System-in-Focus'

the future

3* ‘Audit’

5

‘Identity’

4

‘Intelligence’

3

‘Control’

Key proposition: all elements need to be present, working effectively, and ‘in balance’ across the system

2 ‘Coordination’ ‘Local’ environments 1a

‘Operations’

1b

1c, etc.

1c, 'magnified' at a higher level of resolution

Figure 1 The main elements of the Viable System Model showing key activities, information flow and relationships.

and holistic perspective to be taken in debates about how collaborative ‘joined-up’ arrangements might best work in relation to this particular problem. By way of introduction, and using the viable systems concept as a theoretical lens, this next section takes a quick look at what has already been said about collaborative arrangements in general. The intent here is to gain a sense of how this particular juxtaposition of theory with practice works, and, perhaps more importantly, to develop some initial appreciation of how a single model can help people think much more systematically about the range of barriers that individually and in combination can make collaboration difficult. Despite the advantages of currently popular concepts such as ‘joined-up government’, the ‘whole-of-government’ or ‘integrated government’ approach, these arrangements are clearly not infallible and there is now a burgeoning literature covering some of main pitfalls (see, eg, Ling, 2002; Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998; Peters, 1998; Pollitt, 2003). When interpreted within a VSM frame these difficulties include defining, instigating and disseminating an overall defining sense of identity and core values for the integrated system (S5); ambiguity over accountability (who takes the lead with S3 or is it a shared arrangement?); difficulties in measuring the effectiveness and impact of performance (unclear and/or underdeveloped S3 ); opportunity costs of management and staff time spend ensuring

integration (resourcing the ‘meta-system’ that is S2–S5 and its associated information requirements); budget silos creating difficulties as agencies can fight over ‘who pays’? (How to do contributions to S3 work?) In addition, in some areas, cooperation has proven to be difficult due to a lack of trust, or has fallen foul of the personal interests of bureaucrats, politicians and professionals who might be judged more on their individual role or that of their department and not necessarily outcomes focused (S1 conflict). In some cases, these arrangements can turn out to be more costly than beneficial due to higher risks of failure as a result of disagreements, complexity and ambiguity over accountability. Given these basic cooperation difficulties, putting in place adequate S2 mechanisms is critical. Other problems with collaborative arrangements include allegations of empire-building, elitism, inter-agency rivalries, dumping of unqualified personnel, a lack of intelligence sharing between partners (only partly due to lack of IT integration) and conflict due to conflicting objectives. How then do these kinds of issues play out in the law enforcement context? In the next section, some of the commentary is reproduced using annotated drawings or diagrams. This is a very important aspect of the overall systems modelling approach, which the paper will say more about later. In arguing the merits of this particular modelling tool, the paper focuses at the level of the


national multi-agency body, and illustrates through reference to the UK’s ‘Serious Organised Crime Agency’ (‘SOCA’ hereafter). It is important to note that a similar case could have been made by illustrating at a lower systemic level, for example, the local operational taskforce, or at a higher level, for example a regional cooperative agency such as Europol. Since there is a limit as to what level of detail can be included in a single paper, and in particular, shown in a drawing, the paper focuses on some of the more interesting aspects that arise out of this particular theoretical lens. Just enough information is presented to highlight the potential value and flexibility of the VSM modelling technique when used in this context; no attempt is made to provide a comprehensive and/or objective account.

SOCA—the national multi-agency law enforcement system Prior to 2006, policing in the UK was mainly a local affair with organised crime being fought mainly by area commands with assistance provided by various national intelligence agencies and regional crime squads (Hobbs and Dunnighan, 1999; Levi, 2004). Traditionally, the area command has been ceded significant autonomy and subject to limited central direction. This has enabled it to focus efforts on dealing with ‘Level 1’ crime, that is, both organised and committed in its own region (for more details on the National Intelligence Crime Classification Model, see John and Maguire, 2004). Although the autonomy ceded to the area command allows it to develop high S1 variety in relation to level 1 crime, the situation is somewhat different from the perspective of more serious crimes committed across regions and internationally (ie, ‘levels 2 and 3’ crime, respectively). Well before the establishment of SOCA, there was growing recognition within the UK that the traditional local area command was becoming ill-equipped to deal with criminal activity conducted in its region but planned and managed elsewhere, that inadequate intelligence was flowing from higher sources, that it was ill-equipped in terms of surveillance and bugging technology, had limited expertise in fraud, customs and immigration and ultimately had limited powers in working with criminals (see, eg, Dunnighan and Hobbs, 1996). These issues are highlighted and interpreted in systemic terms in Figure 2. Interpreted theoretically, this represents a massive S1 variety deficiency relative to that possessed by the area command’s criminal adversaries. Other systemic deficiencies included poor communication, inadequate coordination and even competition across area commands (S2), and inadequate resourcing (S3). In addition to this, and at the higher systemic level, national law enforcement agencies such as the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS), National Crime

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Squad (NCS), and National Hi-Tech Crime Unit were restricted in their actions due to bureaucratic struggles between them, difficulties in the sharing of information and intelligence and the large amounts of time taken to implement any actions or changes. There was also a perceived duplication of work across these agencies and lack of accountability (Harfield, 2006; Wright, 2006; Segell, 2007). In recognising these sorts of issues, it was decided that there was a need to replace the various individual agencies with a single body focusing its combined resources on a single strategy designed to operate more effectively in a less organisationally fragmented manner. To better equip the UK in dealing with an increasingly borderless criminal world. SOCA was established in 2006. Although SOCA is clearly central to the UK’s strategy for dealing with transnational crime, the system of which it can be seen to be a part itself contains other important elements (see Figure 3). Not surprisingly the area command, now operating according to a more centrally prescribed agenda, and more closely incorporated into the governance of police at a national level, continues to play an important role. Moreover, the formal introduction of plea bargaining for criminals and an explicit strategy of working with so-called ‘supergrasses’, partner agencies and community stakeholders, further represents the extension of the national ‘transnational crime fighting system’ beyond the boundaries of the new organisation. SOCA itself subsumes the NCIS, the NCS, and has taken over the investigative and intelligence responsibilities held by HM Revenue and Customs, and the organised immigration responsibility of the Immigration Service. Organisationally, it is divided into four specific groups each specialising in a separate area. Three of these directly enact the official purposes of the new system, and therefore in VSM terms can be designated as S1 units. These are ‘Intelligence’ which is responsible for gathering and analysing information and building alliances with other agencies, ‘Enforcement’ which provides an operational response to identified threats and builds cases against targets, and ‘Intervention’ which focuses on asset recovery and international work. The other key organisational unit, ‘Corporate Services’ is responsible for resourcing and capability-building (S3). In aggregate, these groups contribute to the S5 Mission of SOCA which is to: ‘reduce the opportunities for organised criminals to make money, disrupt and dismantle their enterprises, and raise the risks they run by more successful and targeted prosecutions of the major figures’ (SOCA, 2009). In theoretical terms, the consolidation of previously fragmented investigative and intelligence activities in the new organisation represents a signification increase or amplification of (S1) operational variety. This is further enhanced since SOCA’s law enforcement officers are now endowed with increased authority and can be granted the powers of a police constable, a customs officer and an

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no clear TNCrime policy crimes planned by regional, national or international group

weak/underdeveloped TNC ‘meta-system’

NCIS

TNC limited resourcing

high variety

no clear TNC outcome expectations

inadequate intelligence ‘flowing down’

poor communication and competition across area commands

NCS weak relationships

local criminal act

46 relatively autonomous Area Commands

local criminal act

local criminal act

Variety ‘balance’ heavily stacked in favour of criminal groups due to area command’s: inadequate resourcing, main focus on ‘level 1’ crime, limited powers to work with criminals, limited technology and bugging capability, immigration/customs/tax/fraud handled by other departments

Figure 2 Pre 2006—the UK’s notional transnational organised crime fighting system.

immigration officer. These powers are in addition to new prosecution structures, which include being able to offer criminals reduced sentences in return for cooperating with the investigation and testifying against fellow criminals, and compelling witnesses to answer questions valuable to an investigation. Moreover, the enhanced ‘meta-systemic’ management of the new system offers significant theoretical advantages over its predecessor. The merging of previously fragmented intelligence and investigative activities allows for economies of scale, particularly in ‘back office’ (S3) functions, and the whole system now has a much clearer focus (S5). Under the new system, the national strategy for dealing with organised crime is harmonised with the National Policing Plan, and the Chair, Director General and majority of the SOCA board members are appointed directly by the UK’s Home Secretary. The thinking behind this is that it allows the system to move much faster in relation to rapidly changing political and security concerns. Although the enhancement of S1 operational variety coupled with a more formalised S2–S5 ‘meta system’ makes a good deal of sense, the presence of these activities

and capabilities does not guarantee ongoing viability. In particular, as was said earlier, the balance of activities across a system is just as important as are the activities themselves, and in relation to that issue criticisms of SOCA have been strident. Some of these are reproduced in Figure 4. Even SOCA employees have accused it of being too focussed on the gathering and processing of intelligence, building up a never-ending criminal intelligence picture and, in spite of having more than 4000 officers and an annual budget of £400 million, failing to stem the flow of drugs into the country (Laville, 2009). In response, SOCA (2009) claims that its operation has led to drugs shortages in some parts of the UK, and claims that since it is still a relatively new organisation, it cannot be expected to gain impressive results immediately. This seems reasonable; however even if one were to accept the claim that under the circumstances SOCA is doing the best it can, important questions remain. One of these concerns the relationship between SOCA and the area command. Almost certainly, the national level changes in law enforcement governance represent something of a ‘reining-in’ of local police by the State and provides a reminder


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clear directives from Home Office ‘higher level system’ SOCA BOARD more formalised TNC ‘metasystem’

forecasting projected TNC futures

SOCA CORP SERVICES

specific performance criteria and targets INTELLIGENCE (SOCA)

formal processes for coordination within SOCA; less clear between SOCA and Area Commands

TN criminal groups ENFORCEMENT (SOCA)

high variety

committed criminal acts

ENFORCEMENT (Area Police Commands)

enhanced variety through broadening capabilities e.g. incorporating NCIS/NCS, asset recovery, customs, immigration, tax; enhanced legal powers to work with criminals, high technology/bugging, ‘supergrasses’ and informants ‘inside’ the system, stronger international links

Figure 3 2006—the UK’s notional transnational organised crime fighting system including SOCA.

that the area command must work with SOCA to combat transnational crime. Despite this, when it comes to the daily business of policing, area commanders are no less subject to local pressures than was the case previously, so when ‘push comes to shove’, it is perhaps unlikely that there will be any significant shying away from the traditional focus on level 1 crime. In addition to this, questions remain as to how the new system is supposed to handle the ‘level 2 gap’ that exists between the local force on the one hand and SOCA at the other. SOCA’s S2 and S3 have also come under attack. Critics accuse the organisation of being beset by cultural clashes between members of the now integrated investigatory arms of different departments, and a ‘top-heavy’ organisation with many complaints that it has been wasting money on unnecessary layers of senior managers, and spreading its international resources too thinly across too many countries (120 personnel across 40 countries). Critics further portray it as an organisation which is cautious

and bureaucratic, overburdened with managers and inexperienced at the sharp end (O’Neill, 2008; Laville, 2009). Moreover, there are questions about the balance between S3 and S4. A recent 2008 external review of SOCA arose out of claims that there is too much forward thinking, too much strategising and planning (S4), and not enough activity to support current operations (S3). Others draw attention to the overall lack of resources allocated to SOCA, and point to the relative funding allocated to fighting organised crime and terrorism (in 2008, £457 million and £2500 million, respectively) as symptomatic of the fight against organised crime being subordinate to the effort to combat global terrorism (Edwards, 2008). The argument seems to be that because terrorism is a highly visible threat, it tends to receive a well-resourced response. Meanwhile, organised crime operates in an ‘under the radar’ fashion and therefore acquires less attention. Turning now to S3 , evaluating the performance of SOCA is by no means easy. SOCA itself claims that this is

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perceived political interference and excessive central control may have negative impact on grass roots policing

forecasting projected TNC futures

3!

‘top heavy’ management; inadequate resourcing; resources ‘spread too thinly’?

unclear/ill-defined performance criteria

TN criminal groups high variety criminal acts ‘out of control’

SOCA intelligence and enforcement ‘out of balance’.

org ‘cultural clashes’ within SOCA, and tensions between SOCA and area commands

Area Police Command – large ‘level 2 ‘gap

Figure 4 Post 2006—some systemic issues with the SOCA system.

particularly challenging in key, but often ill-defined performance areas such as the quality of the intelligence it is collecting, and evidence of changes occurring in criminal markets that might indicate that criminals are finding the UK a more hostile environment in which to operate (SOCA, 2009). Adding to the difficulty SOCA’s stated aim of reducing harm is a difficult concept to measure compared to the usual means of measuring crime figures to judge the effectiveness of certain crime fighting initiatives. Still with S3 , questions are also being asked about which body should be given responsibility for SOCA’s performance monitoring. To date, the organisation itself has been responsible for its own assessment. In the operational areas of law enforcement this was always going to present challenges. As Eades (2007, p 11) notes: Public confidence was expected to be difficult to capture (due to the) weak mechanisms of accountability and oversight, far-reaching powers, and politically appointed leadership of this criminal justice organisation. The British Government is now saying that due to its low public profile and perceived

lack of results it is necessary for SOCA to be policed by a body other than itself. It is also concerned that SOCA is not as liable in day-to-day situations as are other law enforcement agencies such as the police.

Discussion Thus far, the paper has used the VSM in text and annotated diagramming form to illustrate how it can be used to map out some of the more important organisational questions that arise with these new collaborative crime fighting agencies. In doing so it provides a means by which those who are responsible for the functioning of these systems to examine their own operations and activities, so as to ensure that there are no ‘missing links in the chain’ that might undermine otherwise sensible and innovative strategies. This feature of the model is very important since identifying missing or suboptimal links presupposes that key stakeholders have a clear sense of what questions should be asked, and given the complexities


involved, this may not always be the case. From a VSM perspective the key questions revolve around issues such as the degree to which operational units have sufficient variety to deal with the challenges they face, whether there is clarity over identity and purposes, knowing who and/or what is responsible for coordination, knowing how resources are managed, strategy developed, performance assessed, and having effective and efficient processes that govern the flow of information around the system. Beyond helping to identify ‘gaps’ or ‘missing links’, using the VSM forces consideration of how component activities, individuals, groups and organisations ‘fit together’ as part of a balanced, synergistic and coherent whole. This systemic feature involves moving beyond seeing things in isolationist terms towards analysis that is based more on ‘whole system’ thinking. For example, when looked at in isolation, it makes a good deal of sense for SOCA and similar agencies to enhance surveillance techniques to obtain better information on the activities of criminal gangs, (S1 amplification); however, if this information is not communicated through the right channels to the right people (S4–S1 information flow), or if longstanding historic, cultural and operational tensions are stifling cooperation (S2 deficiency), its impact is seriously curtailed. Equally, when looked at solely in relation to the size of the problem with which it is required to deal, it is hard to avoid drawing the conclusion that SOCA is (S3) under-resourced. However, the question of whether more resources should be committed becomes more of a moot point if there are unresolved ambiguities in relation to performance evaluation and/or the overall strategic direction of the organisation. In addition to helping to identify potentially important gaps and missing or poorly performing links, the VSM also encourages consideration of the extent to which component activities are working ‘in sync’ and ‘appropriately balanced’ across the systemic whole. As we have seen, some of the preceding discussion about SOCA can be interpreted not only as being about missing links, but also about imbalances. For example, having criminal informants working ‘inside’ the SOCA system makes sense from a variety amplification perspective; however, if it undermines the work of the local area command (S2 conflict), then potentially there are negative system-wide ramifications. Another example is that because it has its genesis in separate organisations, it is vital that SOCA establishes a sound management structure; however, such development ought not to be at the expense of ongoing operations (out of balance S3/S1). Similarly, there needs to be an appropriate balance across S1 units. Today, ‘intelligenceled’ policing is an important catch-cry, not only for SOCA, but also for law enforcement agencies world-wide. However, if the emphasis on intelligence gathering proceeds at the expense of enforcement, then there are potentially serious social and political consequences.

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If one accepts the argument that the VSM can help to organise stakeholders’ thinking about the organisational challenges of collaborative law enforcement, and to identify ‘missing links’, and system-wide ‘imbalances’, the next question that logically arises is whether it can and should be used to develop an organisational blueprint of an effective anti-organised crime fighting system. There are two sides to this argument. The answer to the question of whether the VSM can be used as a design blueprint is clearly yes. Beer’s landmark ‘Project Cybersyn’, which was a serious attempt to re-envision the social and economic infrastructure of Allende’s Chile, bears testimony to this. Moreover, when examined through the VSM lens, some propositions can appear to be so blindingly obvious that incorporating them as part of a blueprint design might seem to be relatively uncomplicated. In the SOCA illustration, the relationship between organised crime and terrorism might provide a case in point. In the UK, although the fights against crime and terror are being waged by independently separate and autonomous organisations, the convergence of crime and terror is clearly understood. It is widely known, for example, that terrorist groups turn to criminals to supply and distribute the tools they need for their operations, while criminal groups often turn to terror groups for enforcement capacity (see Bjornehead, 2004; Hamm and Van de Voorde, 2005; Cockayne, 2007). The fact is that terror and serious crime are inextricably intertwined, and on that basis one could argue that it makes little theoretical and/or practical sense in having the main agencies operating independently, or at best at arms length. One could readily envisage therefore, how anti-crime and anti-terror (S1) units might co-exist within a new envisioned system where the advantages of better communication, economies of scale, and a unity of purpose could be fully realised. Even a cursory VSM analysis would point to some degree of convergence as being a glaringly obvious design improvement. On the other side of the argument, one very simple observation might be that since the basis for OR involvement is nearly always problem-centred, the benefits of developing a blueprint are unclear. However, there are more fundamental objections. One is that although things may appear to be glaringly obvious from a modelling point of view, they do not always make sense when wider considerations are brought into play. It is one thing to use a model as the basis for identifying issues for stakeholder consideration, it is another matter entirely to use a model independently of such consideration, to identify supposedly optimal solutions. Irrespective of how they might be portrayed, all models embody a particular worldview, hence their insights are never sacrosanct (see, eg, Davies, 1990 ; Gass, 1994; Brocklesby, 2009). Another difficulty is that it is impossible to produce a design blueprint without making some fundamental assumptions about system purposes and boundaries, and

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without wider stakeholder debate, one never be entirely sure what these might or should be (Ulrich, 1982; Midgley et al, 1998; Gregory, 2007). This is especially true in highly complex situations with multiple stakeholders, where boundaries shift over time and where the distinction between ‘what should be in’ and ‘what should be out’ may not be entirely clear. This latter issue is particularly salient in public sector domains such as law enforcement where partner agencies, community groups and the general public, are playing increasingly important roles in service delivery (see, eg, Newsome, 2008; Gill et al, 2010).

Conclusion The main argument of this paper has been the debate about the functioning of collaborative law enforcement efforts in combating organised crime can benefit through the application of modelling techniques that can point a way towards more holistic and integrated organisational solutions. Using the UK’s SOCA as an illustrative case study, the paper has sought to show that the law of requisite variety and the VSM have much to offer: (a) because dealing with complexity, which is at the heart of the organised crime problem, is a central concern of both; (b) because the recursive feature of the modelling tool enables application at any level of law enforcement collaboration from temporary operational taskforces at one extreme to global agencies such as Europol and UNODC at the other; and, last but certainly not least; (c) because this modelling approach can help to organise consideration of a broad array of issues that research has indicated can mitigate against successful collaboration. Using the VSM to provide what amounts to a broad synthesising perspective in relation to what is clearly an important aspect of organisational performance, raises some other interesting thoughts about the role that it might play in relation to other law enforcement/criminal justice modelling work and in OR more generally. From time to time, systems concepts have made a brief appearance, mainly in the law enforcement context (eg, Flood and Gaisford, 1989; Flood and Jackson, 1991b; Green, 1992, 1993; Newsome, 2008; Kinloch and Francis, 2009). However, most OR activity in this application context has tended to reflect the predilections and priorities of the discipline more generally. If we look at these through a VSM lens, they align closely with particular components of the VSM. Decision automation processes, for example, can be interpreted as being geared towards S1 ‘variety attenuation’, resource allocation optimisation is the work of S3, performance evaluation modelling and constraints management is S3 , and forecasting S4. The same can be said of much OR modelling that occurs under the banner of what is now commonly known as ‘Soft OR’ work (see, eg, Ackoff, 1969, 1974; Dyson, 1998;

Dyson and Eden, 2000; Eden and Ackermann, 1998; Friend and Hickling, 1987; Howick and Eden, 2011). In VSM terms, much of this work is essentially S4 and S5 activity, that is, it is geared towards helping people plan, develop strategy and formulate policy. From a purely technical standpoint, many of the processes that occupy the attention of OR analysts need to be treated as independent entities. Organisationally, however, it makes no sense treating them as such, since these processes are nearly always related; they are pieces in a much larger jigsaw puzzle. Based on that, the value of the VSM is that it provides a broader context within which to locate particular modelling work. In doing so, it allows OR analysts and their clients to fully appreciate that individual organisational problems, especially under conditions of complexity, always exist within a larger adaptive system whose challenges need to be confronted holistically. In addition, using the VSM in this manner opens up space for OR practitioners to better understand how their work intersects with others, to extend their professional influence within organisations, and potentially to have greater impact. If there is any validity to the claim that OR is basically about helping people to make organisations work better, anything that can contribute to OR having greater impact has major spin off benefits for the standing and status of OR as a discipline. There is one other distinctive contribution of the VSM, which deserves further comment is the annotated diagramming approach. This is a key feature of the whole VSM approach. Here, the real benefit is that diagrams or maps are a good way of presenting complex ideas and data, especially when there is a need to see the ‘big picture’ without being distracted by too much detail. Using this approach a wide range of individual issues can be highlighted, always though, with an eye on the whole. The theory behind this is that when people are discussing complex issues such as reflecting on the effectiveness of organisational structures and processes, drawings can be an extremely useful ‘variety reducer’ (Checkland, 1981; Mintzberg and van der Heyden, 1999; Cummings et al, 2009). The VSM lends itself to this approach. Using the diagrammatic techniques in this conversational, or what Harnden (1989) refers to as a ‘hermeneutically enabling’ way, marks a major shift away from thinking about organisations in hierarchical and boxes/lines organisation chart terms, and towards a more organic approach that shows how organisations actually work, instead of how they are supposed to work. One final, but important point, is that when complexity leaves people feeling confused and unsure of how to proceed, drawings can ‘get people moving’. Karl Weick, the famous social psychologist, tells the story of how a platoon of soldiers, lost in the Alps and on the point of death, discovered a map which highlighted a route to safety. Later, having successfully reached their base camp,


the soldiers discovered that the map was not of the Alps, but of the Pyrenees. The moral of the story is that when people are unsure how to proceed, the VSM, which is not unlike a ‘map’, can animate them; it can give them the confidence to move forward. As Weick (1983) says: . . . maps animate people . . . this is the most crucial thing they do.

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Received April 2010; accepted January 2011 after one revision