Peter van Inwagen, “The Powers of Rational Beings”. This selection is a chapter
excerpt from a larger book by van Inwagen (PVI), who is one of the most ...
Peter van Inwagen, “The Powers of Rational Beings” This selection is a chapter excerpt from a larger book by van Inwagen (PVI), who is one of the most important philosophers working today. He is an Upstate New York native, and he did his PhD at the University of Rochester before starting his career at Syracuse University. He specializes in metaphysics (the philosophical study of what reality is like) and philosophy of religion. In this chapter, PVI does two things. He explains the two questions that need to be settled before you can understand what you think about free will—whether you think determinism is true, and whether you think it’s being true would make a difference to free will and moral responsibility—and he argues that every way of answering these questions has problems.
Notes: • p. 400: Notice the definition of free will near the top of the second column. This is crucial for what follows. • p. 400: I don’t know why PVI thinks there are six different reasons for this. Even though he’s probably right about this, it would be nice if he told us what the six reasons are. • p. 400: People often express the point PVI is making toward the bottom of the second column with the maxim ought implies can. Take a moment to think about that. Do you think it’s true? • p. 401: Take special note of the phrase “requires alternate possibilities.” This will be important when we read Frankfurt. • p. 401: Pay close attention to the way PVI characterizes determinism. This is also important for what happens later. • p. 402: The “rolling history back” scenario PVI describes is part of a thought experiment. Even though this situation is probably impossible, considering what you think would happen in a case like this is a good test for determining whether you’re more sympathetic with determinism of indeterminism. It’s helpful to think of of the “rolling back” not as a rewind, but as a reset to the conditions on 11 March 1893. • p. 402: PVI is being a little duplicitous in the second column. He says it’s nearly impossible for intro philosophy students to take compatibilism seriously, but then he goes on to ask you to take it seriously. Ignore his pessimism—everyone is capable of taking compatibilism seriously as an idea. • p. 403: Remember as you read on that PVI says these responses to the two problems are just possible things compatibilists could say. They don’t need to give these specific responses.
• p. 404: The italicized p’s and q’s in the No Choice Principle (NCP) are variables, just like in math. The difference with these variables is that where variables in math can stand in for any number you choose, the p’s and q’s in philosophy can stand for any sentence you choose. • p. 404: Following the Plato example, see if you can figure out how the bulleted sentences at the bottom of the page can be substituted in place of p and q in the NCP. Ask yourself: what result does the NCP yield in this case? And what would that show about determinism? • p. 405: PVI uses “underwritten” here to mean “guaranteed.” • p. 406: It might sound strange for PVI to sidestep the question of whether a person is identical to a human organism, but there is a long-standing debate in philosophy about whether this is true, with good reasons to choose either side. • p. 406: Pay special attention to the “plausible idea” PVI mentions in the second column. This is the key to understanding the mystery for incompatibilists who believe in free will. • p. 406: The term “Humean” refers to the ideas of David Hume, a tremendously influential 18th Century philosopher. We’ll talk about him a bunch in the next unit. • p. 407: PVI is using the terms “person” and “agent” equivalently. We’ll see the same thing when we read Chisholm. • pp. 407-8: The claim not to understand what’s going on is a classic PVI move. Do you share his confusion? What might that show? • p. 409: “Dr. Johnson” refers to Samuel Johnson, the great 18th Century writer and literary critic. I’m no expert here, but I take it the ”there’s an end on’t” stuff means that Johnson is not open to further debate about whether he has a free will. • pp. 409-10: PVI raises an intriguing question here. If it turns out that there’s no free will, what does that mean for our practices of praise and blame, or of reward and punishment?
2
Questions to think about: Do you accept PVI’s arguments for the claims that 1. indeterminism seems to threaten free choice? 2. it’s implausible that there is no free will? 3. the mystery of indeterminism is “smaller” than the others?
Extras: Determinism Dinosaur Comics
3
