Venture Capital, Ownership Concentration and ... - ScienceDirect

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ScienceDirect Procedia Computer Science 91 (2016) 519 – 525

Information Technology and Quantitative Management (ITQM 2016)

Venture capital, Ownership concentration and Enterprise R&D investment Hongxing Wena, Kui Xiaa,* a

School of Business, Sichuan University, #24 South of the ring road, Chengdu 610064, P.R. China

Abstract We empirically examine the relationship among venture capital (VC), ownership concentration and enterprise R&D investment. Drawing on the data of China’s GEM from 2010 to 2014, we find that VC and enterprise R&D investment are significantly positively correlated while ownership concentration and enterprise R&D investment are significantly negatively correlated. Further research shows that in the VC-backed companies ownership concentration has no significant impact on R&D investment. © 2016 Published by Elsevier B.V. This © 2016The TheAuthors. Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/). Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of the organizers of ITQM 2016 Peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing Committee of ITQM 2016 Keywords: VC; Ownership concentration; Enterprise R&D investment

1. Introduction GEM (Growth Enterprises Market) has been playing an important role in China's capital market since it was officially launched in October 30, 2009. Companies listed on the GEM are mostly engaged in high-tech business with high growth potential. For these enterprises, technological innovation capability is the core competitiveness and is essential to the growth and development of the enterprises [1]. R&D (research and development) investment is the key factor to improve the technological innovation capability, so R&D investment decision is one of the most important decisions for high-tech enterprises. Most of the GEM listed companies are small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Their performance is not outstanding, and it is difficult for them to get the funds by traditional financing methods such as bank loans to support their R&D investment. As a new way of financing, venture capital (hereafter VC) can provide R&D investment funds for GEM companies, and the professional management experience of venture capitalists is helpful to improve the value of the company through technological innovation [2]. The largest shareholder generally has a great control over the company and is able to affect the company's R&D decisions through the form of the general meeting of shareholders. Can VC effectively promote the R&D investment of GEM listed

* Corresponding author. Tel.: +8615828062455. E-mail address: [email protected] .

1877-0509 © 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/). Peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing Committee of ITQM 2016 doi:10.1016/j.procs.2016.07.133

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Hongxing Wen and Kui Xia / Procedia Computer Science 91 (2016) 519 – 525

companies? What is the impact of ownership concentration on enterprise R&D investment? How the interaction between VC and ownership concentration affect R&D investment of GEM listed companies? These are the issues to be studied in this paper. 2. Literature Review And Hypotheses 2.1. The influence of VC on enterprise R&D investment VC can not only provide financial support for innovative SMEs, but also bring internal and external oriented value-added services, such as the company's standardization, business expansion, development strategy, supervision, consultation and so on [3]. VC pays more attention to the construction and maintenance of longterm competitiveness of enterprises, and focuses on investment and quality of innovative activities [4], which is conducive to the development of entrepreneurial firms to improve R&D investment [5-6]. Using data from 20 US industries from 1983 to 1992, Kortum and Lerner [7] demonstrated the relationship between VC and innovation. The results showed that: in terms of the proportion of patents, VC-backed enterprises were higher than the non-VC-backed ones. Chesbrough [8] found that the existence of VC and enterprise R&D investment had a very significantly positive correlation. Gou and Dong [9] empirically studied the listed companies of China’s SME board and found that in terms of technological innovation, the performance of VC-backed enterprises was significantly better than the enterprises with no VC participation whether from the perspective of R&D investment or from the perspective of the number of patents. Xie [10] drew a similar conclusion based on the sample data of 189 IPO companies listed on the China’s GEM. Accordingly, the following hypothesis is presented: H1: VC is significantly positively related to enterprise R&D investment. 2.2. The impact of ownership concentration on enterprise R&D investment Due to the difference of research method, perspective and data, research conclusions of the existing literature differ greatly when it comes to the relationship between ownership concentration and R&D investment. The main relationships between the two include positive correlation [1], negative correlation [11], U type relationship [12] and inverted U type relationship [13]. However, the technological innovation projects of the enterprises are often risky and innovative investment has the characteristic of irreversible. From the perspective of risk aversion, the more concentrated ownership, the greater special risk the major shareholders of the company will bear, the less they are willing to invest in technology innovation projects [14]. In addition, with the increase in the proportion of the shares of large shareholders, when making decisions, they will have more decision-making power. Thus, large shareholders are likely to take advantage of their agent identity for minority shareholders to infringe the interests of small shareholders. The infringement will lead to the loss of efficiency of the company's decision-making which has an adverse effect on R&D investment [15]. Suk Bong Choi et al. [16] found when a country was in the economic transition, the high degree of ownership concentration was not necessarily a positive effect on the innovation behavior through empirical study. OrtegaArgilés [17] pointed out that high ownership concentration hindered companies to improve R&D investment and was not conducive to the development of R&D output. Therefore, we put forward the following hypothesis: H2: There is a significant negative correlation between ownership concentration and enterprise R&D investment.

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2.3. The impact of the interaction between VC and ownership concentration on enterprise R&D investment VC emphasizes the high growth of entrepreneurial enterprises and pays attention to the innovation of the enterprises. VC is willing to supervise the enterprises to carry out R&D investment. Xiong and Chen [18] pointed out that high-tech enterprises had special corporate governance structure due to VC accounted for a considerable proportion of equity. The special governance mechanism could better deal with conflicts and interests of all stakeholders so that high-tech enterprises could get the driving force for sustainable development. Thus, it can be predicted that compared to non-VC-backed companies, in the VC-backed ones ownership concentration has a smaller negative impact on enterprise R&D investment. So we put forward the following hypothesis: H3: The participation of VC can significantly reduce the negative impact of ownership concentration on enterprise R&D investment. 3. Research method 3.1. Sample and Data Collection This paper selected 2010-2014 China’s GEM listed companies as the initial sample, and selected samples in accordance with the following standards: (1) excluded the companies of financial industry; (2) removed the samples of ST or data with missing key values. Ultimately we got 458 observation values, and the observed values for each year were shown in table 1. Table1. The number of observations in each year Year Observed number

2010 51

2011 79

2012 94

2013 107

2014 127

For the definition of VC, we referred to Wu [19], Fu [20], Wang [21], and define it according to the following steps: (1) if the names of the company's shareholders contained venture capital, then the shareholders were taken as VCs; (2) if the names of the company's shareholders did not contain venture capital, then we referred to the 2012 edition of the "China venture capital and private equity investment institutions" compiled by the Zero2IPO database and the directory of VC included in "Chinese venture investment development report 2013", if any of the shareholders of the company entered any one of these two lists, then it was considered as VC; (3) if the shareholders’ names were not in the above lists, then we consulted the company's shareholders and if the main business of the shareholder of the company was venture capital business, then the shareholder was recognized as VC. If any of the company's shareholders was VC, then we took the company as a VCbacked company. All the financial data were collected from the CSMAR database. 3.2. Variable definition 3.2.1ˊDependent variable Draw lessons from Yang and Yuan [22], we use the ratio of natural logarithm of R&D expenditure to natural logarithm of the main business income to measure the enterprise's R&D investment. 3.2.2ˊIndependent variable In order to measure whether the enterprise is VC-backed enterprise or not, this paper introduces VC as the

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explanatory variable; In order to explain the impact of ownership concentration on enterprise R&D investment, we set up the explanatory variable of ownership concentration and use the proportion of the first largest shareholder to measure it. Table2. Variable definition

Variables

symbol

R&D investment

R&D

VC participation

VC

Ownership Concentration Company size Asset liability ratio

Variable definition The ratio of natural logarithm of R&D expenditure to natural logarithm of the main business income If VC participates in a company, then the value of VC is 1, otherwise the value is 0

TOP1

The proportion of the first largest shareholder

SIZE

Natural logarithm of total assets

LEV

The Ratio of total assets to total liabilities

CEO duality

DUAL

Industry

∑IND

Year

∑YEAR

When the chairman is also the CEO, the value of DUAL is 1, otherwise the value is 0 According to the 2012 industry classification made by the China’s Securities Regulatory Commission and combined with the actual situation, we set 10 industry dummy variables We set 4 annual virtual variables

3.2.3ˊControl variables According to previous literature, we select the company size, asset liability ratio, whether CEO separates from chairman (CEO duality), the year and the industry as control variables. The definition of the above variables is shown in table 2. 3.3. Regression model In order to test the hypothesis 1, we construct the following regression model: R&D = β0 + β1 × VC +β2 × SIZE +β3 × LEV + β4 × DUAL + ∑IND + ∑YEAR + ε

(1)

If the coefficient of β1 is significantly positive, then the VC participation is conducive to the development of enterprise to increase R&D investment. In order to test hypothesis 2, we establish the following model: R&D = β0 + β1 × TOP1 +β2 × SIZE +β3 × LEV + β4 × DUAL + ∑IND + ∑YEAR + ε

(2)

If the coefficient of β1 is significantly negative, then it shows that ownership concentration is negatively related to the R&D investment of enterprises. That is, the increase of ownership concentration is not conducive to the enterprise R&D investment. In order to test the hypothesis 3, the following model is established: R&D = β0 + β1 × VC +β2 × TOP1 +β3 × VC × TOP1 + β4 × SIZE + β5 × LEV + β6 × DUAL + ∑IND + ∑YEAR + ε (3)


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We judge whether VC can able to regulate and how to regulate the impact of ownership concentration on enterprise R&D investment by the coefficient of VC×TOP1. 4. Empirical analysis result 4.1ˊDescriptive statistical analysis Table3. Descriptive statistics of the main variables Variables

Min

Max

Mean

Std. dev.

R&D

0.5542

1.0119

0.7997

0.0743

VC

0.0000

1.0000

0.4100

0.4920

TOP1

0.0496

0.6150

0.3030

0.1204

SIZE

19.3913

23.1543

20.9356

0.6433

LEV

0.0110

0.6875

0.2059

0.1492

DUAL

0.0000

1.0000

0.4300

0.4960

Table 3 lists the descriptive statistics for the main variables. As we can see from the table 3, the standard deviation of R&D is 0.0743, which shows that R&D investment of the GEM listed companies is relatively uniform; The mean value of VC is 0.41, which indicates that VC has participated in about 41% of the GEM listed companies; The mean value of TOP1 is 0.303, which indicates that the ownership concentration of the GEM listed companies is high, and the standard deviation of it is 0.1204, indicating that there is a small difference between companies; The mean value of DUAL is 0.43, which means that about 43% of the GEM listed companies’ chairmen are also CEOs. 4.2ˊRegression analysis Table 4 summarizes the regression results of the above 3 models. From the regression results of the model (1), the coefficient of VC is 0.0205 with a significant level of 1%. This shows that companies involved in VC pay more attention to R&D investment, hypothesis 1 is validated. The coefficient of TOP1 in the model (2) is 0.0581 at the 5% level of significance which shows that ownership concentration and enterprise R&D investment are significantly negatively correlated. That is, with the increase of ownership concentration, companies will reduce R&D investment, which is consistent with the hypothesis 2. Model (3) introduces the cross terms of VC and TOP1 to explore the impact of the interaction between VC and TOP1 on R&D investment. The empirical result shows that the coefficient of VC×TOP1 is -0.0167 but not significant. This shows that ownership concentration has no significant impact on R&D investment, which is not consistent with the hypothesis 3. The possible reason is that the ownership concentration of the GEM listed companies is generally high, coupled with the largest shareholder in part of the companies is VC, which leads to the limited moderating effect of VC on the impact of ownership concentration on R&D investment. Moreover, in terms of control variables, the regression coefficients of DUAL, LEV and SIZE of the three models are significant at 1% level. In the above three models, the coefficients of SIZE are all positive which shows that the larger the scale of the company is, the more R&D investment will be. The coefficients of LEV are all negative, which indicates that with the increase of the level of debt, companies tend to reduce R&D investment. The coefficients of DUAL are all positive. This shows that in China’s GEM listed companies CEO duality is conductive to the R&D investment of the enterprises.

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Table4. Summary of empirical results Variables

Model(1)

VC

0.0205*** (2.9964)

Model(2)

0.0157*** (2.7074) -0.1371*** (-5.5974) 0.0280*** (4.1464) YES

0.0170*** (2.9371) -0.1378*** (-5.5984) 0.0313*** (4.5926) YES

0.0232 (1.2087) -0.0366 (-1.0269) -0.0167 (-0.2795) 0.0151*** (2.5706) -0.1368*** (-5.5852) 0.0293*** (4.2848) YES

YES

YES

YES

-0.0581** (-2.1105)

TOP1 VC×TOP1 SIZE LEV DUAL IND YEAR Adj-R

2

F Value

Model(3)

0.1575

0.1489

0.1583

5.7478***

5.4434***

5.2983***

**Significant at the 0.05 level, ***Significant at the 0.01 level. The values in the brackets are t values

5. Conclusions In this paper, we use the China’s GEM listed companies from 2010 to 2014 as the research sample to investigate the impact of VC and ownership concentration and their cross terms on enterprise R&D investment. The empirical results show that: R&D investment in VC-backed companies is more than non-VC-backed ones. There is a significant negative correlation between ownership concentration and R&D investment, that is, with the increase of ownership concentration, the investment of R &D becomes less. VC has not yet played a significant role in the impact of ownership concentration on R&D investment. These findings indicate that the GEM listed companies should introduce VC, in order to promote enterprises to devote more R&D investment and enhance the R&D capability of enterprises. Enterprises should avoid high degree of concentrated ownership, so as to prevent the adverse effect of ownership concentration on R&D investment. Moreover, the conclusions of the study have some implications for the further understanding of the R&D behavior of enterprises.

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