Volume 1, Issue 1: Winter 2016
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JOURNAL OF GENIUS AND EMINENCE Editor Mark A. Runco Distinguished Research Fellow, American Institute for Behavioral Research and Technology Editorial Board Selcuk Acar International Center for Studies in Creativity, Buffalo State, State University of New York
James C. Kaufman University of Connecticut, Storrs, Connecticut Arthur I. Miller University College, London, England
Andrei Aleinikov International Academy of Genius, Monterey, California
Robert Root-Bernstein Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan
Giovanni E. Corazza University of Bologna, Marconi Institute for Creativity, Bologna, Italy
Dean Keith Simonton University of California, Davis
David Galenson Professor, University of Chicago Fellow, John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation Academic Director of the Center for Creativity Economics, Universidad del CEMA
Harriet Zuckerman Senior Vice President, Andrew W. Mellon Foundation Professor Emerita, Columbia University.
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Journal of Genius and Eminence (ISSN: 2334-1130 print, 2334-1149 online) is published semi-annually by ICSC Press, International Center for Studies in Creativity, Buffalo State, State University of New York, 1300 Elmwood Avenue, Chase 244, Buffalo, NY 14222. Email:
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JOURNAL OF GENIUS AND EMINENCE Volume 1, Issue 1: Winter 2016
Contents Inaugural Editorial Mark A. Runco. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Scientific Genius in Islamic Civilization: Quantified Time Series from Qualitative Historical Narratives Dean Keith Simonton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Assessing Psychological Complexity in Highly Creative Persons: The Case of Jazz Pianist and Composer Oscar Peterson Gary Gute, Deanne Gute, and Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Toward a Geography of Scientific Discovery: Economic Implications of Understanding Where U. S. Nobel Laureates and National Academy of Sciences Members Get Trained Robert Root-Bernstein and Kendell Pawelec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Assessing Eminence in the Lyrics of The Temple: Quantifying George Herbert’s Lightning Strikes Jeffrey P. Beck, Donald R. Marks, and Jillian Plescia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Changes in Reputation and Associations with Fame and Biographical Data Mark A. Runco, Selcuk Acar, James C. Kaufman, and Lindsay R. Halladay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 High-Level Creativity for Nonprofit and For-profit Organizations: Inspiration or Perspiration Leslie A. Hennessy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 Nothing But Time: Bergson’s Duration, Systems Theory, and Musical Creativity Matthew Bannister . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 Creativity and Confucius Charlene Tan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 Research Note: The Personality and Creative Potential of Eminent Spanish Chefs Ana Colomer Sanchez and Ivan Herrera-Peco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
JOURNAL OF GENIUS AND EMINENCE, 1(1), 1-5, 2016 Issue Copyright 2016 International Center for Studies in Creativity Article Copyright 2016 Mark A. Runco ISSN: 2334-1130 print/2334-1149 online DOI: 10.18536/jge.2016.01.1.1.01
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Inaugural Editorial Mark A. Runco Distinguished Research Fellow American Institute for Behavioral Research and Technology La Jolla, California
Why study genius and eminence? There are numerous reasons. The most obvious reason is probably that which holds genius and eminence as indicative of the highest level of human functioning. That in turn implies that geniuses and eminent individuals may serve as models or even ideals. This reasoning quickly leads to various questions. Consider the fact that eminence is sometimes acquired, not from a lifetime of achievement, but from one major breakthrough. Along the same lines, luck is sometimes implicated in major breakthroughs and creative discoveries, and this begs the question about the role of chance. There are other questions as well, such as: How is creativity related to genius? How do different domains and disciplines differ from one another? Is there a universal basis for genius? How does genius fluctuate from era to era? What are the key sociocultural, historical, and contextual influences on the development and expression of genius? Several of these are discussed in this inaugural issue of the Journal of Genius and Eminence. All in all, the best answer to the query, “Why study genius” may in fact be “because genius has such enormous impact on society and culture, and yet there are so many unknowns.” What better way to address these unknowns than by applying the scientific method? Part of the scientific method is gatekeeping and the dissemination of sound research, which is why the JGE was founded. Note: The editor would like to acknowledge the International Center for Studies in Creativity at Buffalo State, State University of New York, the publisher of both Journal of Genius and Eminence and Business Creativity and the Creative Economy, which have their inaugural issues published under the Center’s imprint, ICSC Press. Correspondence should be sent to Mark A. Runco, email:
[email protected].
The phrase “the highest level of human functioning” was used above instead of “optimal human functioning.” It could be that development and education can be optimized in order to fulfill the potentials that underlie genius, but that is very different from the claim that genius is indicative of optimal human functioning. As a matter of fact, biographical and autobiographical material suggests that, some of the time, the life of a genius is not to be envied nor recommended. There are various indications that genius and eminence are sometimes associated with psychopathology (Ludwig, 1995) and that, even when the processes are subclinical, they are shared by both creative geniuses and disturbed persons. The relationship of genius and eminence with psychopathology and other observed problems and disturbances is by no means fully understood, which is another reason to devote more attention to the topic(s)–and another reason for the inauguration of this journal. Scientific study should also put and end to some of the biases and myths surrounding genius and eminence. Consider in this regard the bias toward men, all too obvious in Galton’s (1869) otherwise remarkable work, or the cultural biases toward certain domains. Gardner (1983) described how Western culture values mathematics, logic, and verbal ability above all other domains (e.g., art, naturalistic thinking). Tan’s (2016) article in this inaugural issue of the JGE points to the Eastern view that a genius might have exceptional selfunderstanding. Yet another problem is the art bias that may plague both implicit and explicit theories (i.e., lay and scientific views) (Cropley, in press; Rocavert, in press; Runco, 2007) . It may even be that the relationship between psychopathology and genius, mentioned above, is in part a reflection of bias. Eysenck (1995, p. 116) summarized research suggesting that eccentricities associated with disturbance are sometimes
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exaggerated by creative individuals so they will in fact be attributed with genius (cf. Becker, 1978; Gedo, 1972; Kaun, 1991; Lenneberg, 1983/1980). This probably occurs because there are common stereotypes suggesting that geniuses tend to be a few bubbles off plumb. Creators may attempt to take advantage of these stereotypes and earn the label “genius” by simply behaving like a genius is supposed to behave. Admittedly some stereotypes are consistent with fact, and indeed there is a distinct possibility that some characteristics of at least mild disturbance (e.g., overinclusive thinking, cognitive disinhibition, persistence) are functionally related to the attainment of high achievement. The point is that there seem to be biases and myths—about art, psychopathology, gender, and so on—that underscore the need for rigorous scientific study of genius and eminence. Several new methodologies are described in the articles within this inaugural issue. Runco, Acar, Kaufman, & Halladay (2016, this volume) report analyses of reputational paths (see also Runco, 1993; Runco, Kaufman, Halladay, & Cole, 2010). These utilize archival data in order to compare changes in reputation that occur from era to era. This work uses a new or at least uncommon unit of analysis (cf. Walberg, Rasher, & Hase, 1983). Then there is Simonton’s (2016, this volume) work on Islamic genius and eminence which demonstrates how qualitative data can sometimes be converted to quantities that can then be analyzed with time-series statistical methods. Such data conversion is of enormous importance for studies in this field, given that so much of the information we have about eminence is not initially in numeric form. Related to this are other important findings from Simonton, which he presented as methodological precautions that should be recognized when qualitative information is in fact converted to quantitative data. Additional methodological considerations were presented by Simonton (1999, 2003). Beck, Marks, and Plescia (2016, this volume) also offer an illustration of how qualitative information can be analyzed. Their work illustrates what has been called the digital humanities movement. Beck et al. begin with the work of George Herbert, the 17th century lyric poet. They examined Internet poetry archives, MLA citations, collections of quotations, and anthologies to quantify Herbert’s continued influence. Interestingly, Beck et al. found that the aesthetic qualities of Herbert’s work had an impact on the likelihood of eminence and influence. They also found indications of “changing fortunes,” which was their way of describing how reputations change as time passes. Such changes may parallel the reputational paths, mentioned earlier in this JGE Editorial (also see Runco, 1991). Note that unlike Runco et al. (2016, this volume) and Simonton (2016, this volume), Beck et al. (2016, this volume) examined one individual, and indeed one poem (The Tempest). Simonton has also reported
historiometric analyses of single individuals and works, including Shakespeare (Simonton, 1999, 2004) and Picasso (Simonton, 2007). Gute, Gute, and Csikszentmihalyi’s (2016, this volume) contribution to this inaugural issue of JGE is also idiographic. They examine the eminent Jazz musician Oscar Peterson. This article is one report from the Creativity in Later Life (CLL) Project. As such, Peterson was interviewed and received various standardized personality inventories (e.g., NEO, Q-Sort). Significantly, Gute et al. found that the standardized measures “fell short of capturing Peterson’s complexity” (p. 16). This is not really surprising, given Csikszentmihalyi’s (1996) interest in the paradoxes of creativity and personality (also see MacKinnon, 1960/1983, p. 125; Runco, in press). Gute et al. pointed to the paradoxical presence of both introversion and extraversion, for example, which allowed Peterson to meet challenges, adapt, and evolve. Peterson was certainly successful: he won eight Grammy awards, was given 16 honorary degrees (and once served as a university chancellor), in addition to composing some 400 songs. Bannister’s (2016, this volume) contribution to this inaugural issue starts with the ideas of eminent French philosopher, Henri Bergson (1859–1941). This was an excellent choice for Bannister, and for JGE, because Bergson had so much to say about creative evolution (the title of one of his books) and the creative mind (the title of another). Indeed, Bergson was interested in the most important question there is for creativity studies, central as well to studies of genius, namely, “is anything new actually possible?” In other words, is it possible to be original? This is central in part because all creativity depends in part on originality (Runco & Jaeger, 2012), so if originality is not possible, creativity might be questioned. Bannister outlines Bergson’s thinking quite well and applies it to several assumptions made in studies of creativity and genius, including that of originality, but also that of mechanism. As he puts it, Traditionally creativity has been explained as a mysterious force issuing from a deity, or, in the case of artistic creation, from the intuitive “genius” of the human mind. More recently it has been demystified and theorized as a mechanism— ranging from materialist accounts of evolution in science to theoretical reflections on art and culture as the product of complex cultural systems—creative systems theory.... Bergson can be used to argue that neither model is adequate, because both assume that “all is given”—i.e., either that there is a first cause or author, or that phenomena can be adequately understood as determined by a set of mechanical laws that arise from scientific observation. What both accounts omit, according to Bergson, is
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time. Time means that all is not given: the future is unknown, which is both frightening (because human knowledge is not absolute) and exciting, because it makes novelty possible. (p. 72) Bannister goes into some depth about Bergson but brings these ideas to the present, both by applying them to current studies of creativity and genius and to popular music. Root-Bernstein and Pawelec (2016, this volume) approach the topic of eminence by investigating National Academy of Sciences members and American Nobel laureates. Root-Bernstein and Pawelec start with a very practical question, namely, how should resources be distributed in order to best fulfill scientific potentials? They were particularly interested in examining the tendency to devote resources only to the small number of proven institutions and centers and ask if it makes more sense to distribute key resources more broadly. The results from analyses of Root-Bernstein and Pawelec suggest that the training of elite scientists is not concentrated, as might be expected. The undergraduate education of elite scientists is often in the liberal arts and by no means always only at top notch universities. Graduate training is also disbursed and is not concentrated at elite graduate schools, and many highly talented scientists graduate and join moderate laboratories or universities rather than committing to an elite university. It is interesting to relate the findings regarding the liberal arts education of future scientists to previous research on the diverse avocations and artistic interests of scientists (RootBernstein, Bernstein, & Garnier, 1992, 1995), and to the hypothesized benefit of cross-disciplinary thinking or even marginality (Runco, 2014, p. 155; Simonton, 1984). It is also interesting to relate these new findings to Zukerman’s (1978) research on Nobel Laureates (and their education and mentors) and to Simonton’s (1984) report of elite scientists often not completing the requirements of a Ph.D. The diverse avocations of scientists just mentioned was found in Root-Bernstein’s previous research with MacArthur Foundation Award winners (Root-Bernstein, Bernstein, & Garnier, 1992, 1995). This same group is also represented in the present volume, in the research reported by Hennessey (2016, this volume). Her sample is not large, but it represents a few disciplines and domains not otherwise mentioned herein, including environmental policy, physics, agriculture, computer technology, human rights, conservation, and pharmaceuticals. Most important is that each of the MacArthur Foundation award winners in this sample had founded a nonprofit or for-profit organization. Hennessy concluded that each participant was open to combining widely disparate ideas and capable of standing back to see the “big picture.” She also found the participants to be capable
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of living with the ambiguity that so often characterizes the creative process.
The research contained in this inaugural issue samples a variety of domains and disciplines. Colomer Sanchez and Herrera-Peco (2016, this volume) insure that the culinary arts are represented in this issue of JGE, as they well should be. Colomer Sanchez and Herrera-Peco’s sample was only moderate in number, but many of the participants of the research were head chefs in restaurants which had been awarded a Michelin Star. Colomer Sanchez and HerreraPeco compared these award-winning chefs with students of the culinary arts, as well as with norms from the 16pf, a common personality inventory which includes traits previously associated with creative potential. This article therefore adds the personality angle to the present issue of JGE, as well as a cultural and domain specific one (Spanish chefs). The goal of the JGE to publish papers on the full range of domains of genius and eminence is exemplified by Colomer Sanchez and Herrera-Peco’s study of high level chefs and the culinary arts. Another goal is also satisfied, at least in an initial fashion, in this issue of JGE. This is the goal to publish research on both current (Colomer Sanchez and Herrera-Peco, 2016) and historial (Runco et al., 2016; Simonton, 2016) genius. Studying both will surely offer a useful perspective and bring any historical biases or Zeitgeist idiosyncracies to light. Simonton’s article on Islamic genius and eminence covers the the 8th through the 13th centuries, and Runco et al. collected data from 1911, 1929, 1986, 2002 Encyclopedias. No doubt many articles in the JGE will similarly touch on history and historical changes, given that genius and eminence are often not adequately appreciated until some time has passed. Admittedly, there are questions in the research about potential genius (which would be someone who has the talent but has not yet performed at a high level) and a related question concerning what Albert (1975) called genius ahead of its time. Certainly potential genius is a crucial question because information about it might be used to insure that the relevant potentials are fulfilled and, as a result, we have more geniuses to solve societal problems and to entertain and challenge the rest of us! Then again, Albert’s (1975) conclusion was the there is no genius ahead of his or her time. This conclusion follows from his behavioral definition which requires that genius be socially recognized. An alternative view is that eminence is the manifestation of genius, but genius may indeed be defined such that it is mere potential. Clearly these issues and definitions should be explored further, which is yet more reason for the introduction of the JGE.
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It is no doubt apparent that various key questions in studies of genius and creativity are addressed in this inaugural issue. In addition to genius ahead of its time (Albert, 1975) there is Bannister’s (2016, this volume) exploration of the possibility of actual originality and creativity. These and the other questions posed herein may be viewed as important directions for future research. Additional questions may be suggested by the popular press. These might be important considerations, given what was said above about common myths and misunderstandings about genius. One function of the JGE is to bring data to bear on, and correct, the misunderstandings of the popular press and media. Consider in this regard the claim from an article in the 2014 Nautilus Magazine that the concept of genius is no longer useful. It might be best to put that position aside for, say, one to two years, and then review what has appeared in the JGE! The same magazine also claimed that “geniuses transcend the time in which they live, contributing insights that allow future scientists to be smarter than the geniuses of the past” (Siegfried, 2014, para 4). That takes us right back to the genius ahead of its time because it implies that, although genius may not be recognized in its own time, it will eventually be recognized. One problem with that view is that little information may be recorded about the genius, if it is not recognized, in which case historical records will not have anything to go on (Runco, 1991)! This idea is actually part of a criticism of judgments of genius (and high level creativity) that rely on reputations (Runco, 1995; Runco et al., 2010, 2016). A third claim made by Nautilus is also consistent with some sound research. This is the claim that scientific breakthroughs are the result of a conceptual blending and analogical thinking process (cf. Miller, 1992a, 1992b). By way of summary, the JGE will address the important questions about genius and eminence. It should help bust various myths about genius and inform such that misunderstandings are avoided. It will publish papers demonstrating new methods and analyzing reliable data about genius, domain differences and universals, culture, history, and the bases for genius and eminence. You might say that various levels of analysis will be used, at least in the sense that culture (Simonton, 2016), organizations (Hennessey, 2016), and individuals (Beck et al., 2016) are each examined. The inaugural issue touches on many of the goals set out here, and even offers concrete practical suggestions, such as those presented by Root-Bernstein and Pawelec (2016) concerning the distribution of resources. The JGE is off to a good start. The JGE may in fact contribute to the demand for rigorous research on genius and eminence, or at least insure
that the demand is widely known. New journals do this: they introduce an outlet for research, which once recognized, signals to scientists that their work in that area will be published and recognized. The JGE will make the demand for reliable research on genius and eminence more visible and, at the same time, increase the supply of the same. The benefits may very well be apparent in the solving of societal problems, improvements to education and the allocation of resources, and even improvements in the quality of life.
Albert, R. S. (1975). Toward a behavioral definition of genius. American Psychologist, 30, 140-151. Beck, J. P., Marks, D. R., & Plescia, J. (2016). Assessing eminence in the lyrics of The Temple: Quantifying George Herbert’s lightning strikes. Journal of Genius and Eminence, 1(1), 43-51. Becker, G. (1978). The mad genius controversy: A study in the sociology of deviance. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Gedo, J. E. (1972 ). On the psychology of genius. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 53, 199-203. Colomer Sanchez, A., & Herrera-Peco, I. (2016). The personality and creative potential of eminent Spanish chefs. Journal of Genius and Eminence, 1(1), 85-91. Gute, G., Gute, D., & Csikszentmihalyi, M. (2016). Assessing psychological complexity in highly creative persons: The case of jazz pianist and composer Oscar Peterson. Journal of Genius and Eminence, 1(1), 16-27. Bannister, M. (2015). Nothing but time: Bergson’s Duration, Systems Theory, and musical creativity. Journal of Genius and Eminence, 1(1), 72-78. Hennessy, L. A. (2015). High-level creativity for nonprofit and for-profit organizations: Inspiration or perspiration. Journal of Genius and Eminence, 1(1), 61-71. Kaun, D. E. (1991). Writers die young: The impact of work and leisure on longevity. Journal of Economic Psychology, 12, 381-399. Lenneberg, H. The myth of unappreciated genius. In R. S. Albert (Ed.), Genius and eminence: The social psychology of creativity and exceptional achievement (pp. 40-43). Oxford, England: Pergamon Press. Originally published 1980. MacKinnon D W. (1983). The highly effective individual. In R. S. Albert (Ed.), Genius and eminence: The social psychology of creativity and exceptional achievement (pp. 114-127). Oxford, England: Pergamon Press. Originally published 1960. Miller, A. (1992a). Metaphors in creative scientific thought. Creativity Research Journal. 9, 113-130.
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Miller, A. I. (1992b). Scientific creativity: A comparative study of Henri Poincare and Albert Einstein. Creativity Research Journal, 5, 385-418. Root-Bernstein, R. S., Bernstein, M. and Garnier, H. (1993). Identification of scientists making long-term highimpact contributions, with notes on their methods of working. Creativity Research Journal, 6, 329-343. Root-Bernstein, R. S., Bernstein, M., & Garnier, H. (1995). Correlations between avocations, scientific style, work habits, and professional impact of scientists. Creativity Research Journal, 8, 115-137. Root-Bernstein, R., & Pawelec, K. (2016). Toward a geography of scientific discovery: Economic implications of understanding where U.S. Nobel Laureates and National Academy of Sciences members get trained. Journal of Genius and Eminence, 1(1), 28-42. Runco, M. A., & Jaeger, G. (2012). The standard definition of creativity. Creativity Research Journal, 24(1), 92-96. Runco, M. A. (1993). On reputational paths and case studies. Creativity Research Journal, 6, 487-488. Runco, M. A. (1995). Insight for creativity, expression for impact. Creativity Research Journal, 8, 377-390. Runco, M. A., Acar, S., Kaufman, J. C., & Halliday, L. R. (2015). Changes in reputation and associations with fame and biographical data. Journal of Genius and Eminence, 1(1), 52-60. Runco, M. A., Kaufman, J. C., Halladay, L. R., & Cole, J. C. (2010). Change in reputation as index of genius and eminence. Historical Methods, 43, 91-96.
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Siegfried, T. (2014, October 16). Top 10 unsung geniuses: For these scientists, success and fame did not come in equal measure. Nautilus Magazine. http://nautil.us/ issue/18/genius/top-ten-unsung-geniuses. Simonton, D. K. (1984). Genius, leadership, and creativity: Historiometric inquiries. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Simonton, D. K. (1999). Significant samples: The psychological study of eminent individuals. Psychological Methods, 4, 425-451. Simonton, D. K. (2003). Qualitative and quantitative analyses of historical data. Annual Review of Psychology, 54, 617-640. Simonton, D.K.(2004).Thematic content and political context in Shakespeare’s dramatic output, with implications for authorship and chronology controversies. Empirical Studies of the Arts, 22, 201-213. Simonton, D. K. (2007). The creative process in Picasso’s Guernica sketches: Monotonic improvements or nonmonotonic variants? Creativity Research Journal, 19, 329-344. Simonton, D. K. (2016). Scientific genius in Islamic civilization: Quantified time series from qualitative historical narratives. Journal of Genius and Eminence, 1(1), 6-15. Tan, C. (2016). Creativity and Confucius. Journal of Genius and Eminence, 1(1), 79-84.
JOURNAL OF GENIUS AND EMINENCE, 1(1), 6-15, 2016 Issue Copyright 2016 International Center for Studies in Creativity Article Copyright 2016 Dean Keith Simonton ISSN: 2334-1130 print/2334-1149 online DOI: 10.18536/jge.2016.01.1.1.02
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Scientific Genius in Islamic Civilization: Quantified Time Series from Qualitative Historical Narratives Dean Keith Simonton Department of Psychology University of California, Davis
It has long been known that genius is not randomly distributed across the history of any given civilization. Instead, genius clusters in Golden and perhaps Silver Ages, separated by apparent Dark Ages in which the highest order geniuses vanish altogether. The methodological question then arises regarding how to quantify the time-wise distribution of genius using historical data that are explicitly qualitative in nature. The potential of narrative-to-number translations was first demonstrated by Sorokin and Merton’s (1935) conversion of Sarton’s (1927-1931) pioneering history of Islamic science into numerical and graphic representations. These qualitative-to-quantitative translations were here subjected to new statistical analyses that address both the internal consistency of the measures and their external relation to comparable but independent assessments based on Kroeber’s (1944) treatment of the same source. Although certain methodological precautions became evident, it also became apparent that the conversion of qualitative narrative to quantitative measures enjoys appreciable justification. This finding is important in those areas where quantitative researchers lack appropriate biographical dictionaries, encyclopedias, chronologies, or award compilations. Then the resulting quantified time series can still be used to study the sociocultural factors underlying rise and fall of genius in world civilizations.
One of the oldest issues in the study of genius concerns its appearance over the course of history. Geniuses are not randomly distributed over historical time, but rather tend to cluster into times and places (Kroeber, 1944). These socalled Golden Ages are separated by Silver and even socalled Dark Ages. Thus, the history of Western civilization is punctuated by the Golden Age of Ancient Greece, the Silver Age of Ancient Rome, and the Dark Ages that preceded the Renaissance and later Scientific Revolution in modern Europe. The question that immediately arises, then, is what factors predict the fluctuations of the geniuses who define human civilization (Murray, 2003, 2014; Simonton, 2003). The answer to this question presupposes that it is possible to quantify the rise and fall of civilizations or cultures as manifested in the appearance and disappearance of those geniuses. But how can this quantification be carried out? What sources should be used? How should the data be tabulated? Should the most eminent geniuses in the annals of Address correspondence to Dean Keith Simonton, Department of Psychology, One Shields Avenue, University of California, Davis, California 95616-8686, USA. Email:
[email protected].
history get more weight than their less illustrious colleagues, and if so, how should this weighting process be executed? An early attempt to address some of these measurement questions is to be found in Cattell’s (1903) “A Statistical Study of Eminent Men” (cf. Whipple, 2004). Cattell defined “eminence” in terms of having a separate entry in several biographical dictionaries and encyclopedias published in European languages. He then tabulated the number of eminent figures born in each half century, breaking the figures down by nationality (Greeks, Romans, French, British, German, Italian, etc.) as well as by domain of achievement (politics, war, religion, science, philosophy, poetry, art, etc.). He was thereby able to graph the peaks and troughs in the emergence of genius in Western civilization from the ancient Greeks to 19th-century Western civilization (see also McGuire, 1976; Schneider, 1937; Simonton, 1997; Yuasa, 1974). Although Cattell did not weight his tabulations according to the degree of eminence—Napoleon counting the same as Quintus Sertorius and Shakespeare as much as Petronius—subsequent researchers have shown how biographical dictionaries and encyclopedias can provide
ISLAMIC SCIENTIFIC GENIUS
weighted tabulations (e.g., by counting the amount of space devoted to the geniuses in their respective entries or by counting the number of separate sources in which they appear; e.g., Simonton, 1975b, 1988; Sorokin, 1937-1941). However, the foregoing method suffers from a serious limitation: It necessarily presumes the existence of the necessary reference works—the biographical dictionaries and encyclopedias. Sometimes these references have not yet been compiled, and perhaps never will be. Instead, the only sources available are historical narratives recounting the “names, dates, and places” for a given civilization or achievement domain within that civilization. Furthermore, these qualitative data will contain implicit judgments about the relative merits of the historic figures who populate the annals. A given figure might be the “greatest,” “among the best,” or a just “minor epigone.” These evaluations can then provide the basis for a weighted tabulation of the fluctuations in the appearance of genius across the course of human civilization (cf. the “adjective method” in Woods, 1911). But how? An early attempt at devising a workable method can be found in a study conducted by two sociologists, Sorokin and Merton (1935). Their specific goal was to translate the historical narrative found in the first two volumes of Sarton’s (1927-1931) now-classic Introduction to the History of Science.1 More specifically, according to the article’s main title, their purpose was to quantify “the course of Arabian intellectual development” from the 8th to the end of the 13th century (C.E.). To accomplish this task, Sorokin and Merton devised three separate measures of scientific achievement. In the first, they simply counted the number of historical notables Sarton mentioned who were active in each consecutive 50-year period. In the second translation, the same scientists were weighted along a 1-3 point scale according to Sarton’s statements regarding the individual’s historical impact. Hence, a historical figure rated with a weight of 2 counted twice as much as someone getting only a weight of 1. In the third translation, the scientists were more finely differentiated along a 1-15 point scale, again using Sarton’s verbal evaluations. Thus, “a weight of 15 ‘points’ was assigned to each individual who was designated as, say, ‘one of the greatest physicians of all times’” (Sorokin & Merton, 1935, p. 518). In contrast, a personage who was only mentioned in passing without any judgment of impact was merely assigned 1 point. Between these extremes, a historic figure who Sarton identified as “one of the greatest of Islam” would receive 7 points, or less than half as much. 1 To conduct the primary research for his landmark work, Sarton learned Arabic and traveled to the Middle East to study original manuscripts, thereby making himself into “the outstanding historian of Islamic science” (Nasr, 1968, p. 170).
7
Sorokin and Merton (1935) then presented a graph (their Chart I, p. 521) showing how Islamic achievement fluctuated from 700 to 1300 C.E. according to the three alternative translations. For the most part, the three curves yielded the same historical trends. It did not matter much whether the greatest luminaries counted 15 points, 3 points, or only 1 point relative to their more obscure colleagues. The only conspicuous exception was that the curves for the unweighted or minimally weighted translations “reach their peak in the second half of the tenth century, while the third curve—which represents the widest range of values—finds its climax a half century later” (p. 522). Sorokin and Merton noted that this discrepancy reflects the fact that the genuine “intellectual giants” like Ibn Sīnā, al-Bīrūnī, ibn Yunus, ibn al-Haytham, and ‘Alī ibn ‘Īsā concentrated in the first half of the eleventh century. Quality could thus override mere quantity. Although Sorokin and Merton’s (1935) empirical demonstration can be considered an important contribution to the question driving this article, it also was incomplete in three major ways. First, despite emphasizing the role of quantifying history, Sorokin and Merton failed to quantify the degree to which the three translational measures agreed with each other. Was the correlation high, medium, or low? Instead, the investigators just scrutinized the graph comparing the three alternative assessments. To be sure, one could argue that for that time (the 1930s) and discipline (sociology) such calculations would not be expected. Yet Sorokin did incorporate correlation coefficients only a few years later in his magnum opus, Social and Cultural Dynamics (Sorokin, 1937-1941; cf. Simonton, 1976). Although subsequent research would suggest that the weighted and unweighted measures should be highly correlated (e.g., Simonton, 1975b, 1988), it would still be useful to see how well Sorokin and Merton’s three measures specifically correlate with each other. Are they in any sense interchangeable? Or is one method clearly superior? Second, the two researchers apparently carried out the quantitative conversions on their own, without any independent corroboration (Sorokin & Merton, 1935). Admittedly, both investigators were no doubt highly competent social scientists of high integrity: the senior author had already founded the Department of Sociology at Harvard University and the junior author was an advanced Harvard graduate student only a year away from his Ph.D. (and very soon to become a pioneer in the sociology of science). Nevertheless, they apparently did not sense the necessity of producing two or more independent quantifications based on Sarton’s (1927-1931) historical narrative that could then be scrutinized for consensus. Fortunately, it is possible to remedy this omission via the data presented in Kroeber’s
8 SIMONTON
1944 Configurations of Culture Growth. Although Kroeber also used Sarton as his source for examining the cultural configurations of Arabic science, he did so without any awareness of the work of Sorokin and Merton’s (1935) work (who were uncited even though highly relevant to his hypothesis). That independence was possible largely because Kroeber was a cultural anthropologist rather than a sociologist, and admitted that he did not even become aware of Sorokin (1937-1941) until after he had completed most of his manuscript (Kroeber, 1944, p. 879). Hence, Kroeber can provide an independent check on the qualitative-toquantitative translations in Sorokin and Merton (1935). Third and last, the two researchers rather surprisingly concentrated their analyses solely on the overall or combined measures of Arabic intellectual contributions (Sorokin & Merton, 1935). This exclusive focus is surprising because they originally tabulated the three narrative-to-numerical translations for seven separate but inclusively defined domains, namely, mathematics (including astronomy and even “astrology”), physics (including meteorology, optics, and music theory), chemistry (encompassing alchemy), natural history (including mineralogy, zoology, and botany), medicine (encompassing anatomy, physiology, ophthalmology, surgery, and therapeutics), geography (which sometimes included geology and travel accounts), and “humanistics” (a mostly non-scientific miscellany consisting of theology, philosophy, law, historiography, sociology, psychology, and philology). The incorporation of this last measure was no doubt why they referred to their study as concerning generic “intellectual development” despite the fact that (a) their raw qualitative data came exclusively from Sarton’s (1927-1931) narrative on the history of science and (b) their results were published in Isis, a journal specifically devoted to the history of science (actually founded by Sarton himself, who then still served as its editor). In any case, an obvious question they never addressed is whether it was even justified to sum these seven separate indicators into a single measure. In doing so, they were implicitly assuming that the historical trends for the seven indicators were basically the same (cf. Simonton, 1975a). The primary goal of the current empirical study is to address each of the above deficiencies.
Sorokin and Merton (1935) report their three qualitativeto-quantitative translations in Tables I, II, and III (pp. 520521). These numbers are adopted unaltered. The occasional blanks are treated as zeroes, following Sorokin and Merton’s own procedure. For example, according to Sarton’s (19271931) account, the latter half of the 10th century evidently
contained not a single major contributor to physics. The data span the dozen half-century periods from 700 to 1300 (in C.E. rather than A.H.). Besides a total score for each period, Sorokin and Merton provide the separate scores for mathematics, physics, chemistry, natural history, medicine, geography, and humanistics (as described above). Polymaths such as Omar Khayyám could therefore count in more than one domain, albeit not necessarily with the same weight. In contrast, Kroeber (1944) did not actually quantify the information obtained from Sarton’s (1927-1931) narrative. Instead, he just reduced the discursive narrative to chronological listings of the contributors Sarton discussed (pp. 127-131, 133-134). In addition, a select number of the listed geniuses were assigned one or even two asterisks to indicate their greater importance, based on Kroeber’s reading of Sarton’s qualitative evaluations. Thus, when converted into a quantified measure the result should be roughly comparable to the 1-3 point scale used in Sorokin and Merton’s (1935) second translation. Unfortunately, because Kroeber did not always provide sufficient information to determine the specific area or areas of achievement, the sciences could not be distinguished into separate domains, such as Sorokin and Merton were able to do. The current investigator carried out these straightforward conversions, tabulating Kroeber’s chronological lists of eminent scientists into the corresponding half-century periods according to each contributor’s “floruit” or “acme” (cf. Murray, 2003; Naroll et al., 1970). The assignments to each period never violated his chronological ordering. Two sets of tabulations were generated, one unweighted (each genius counts once) and weighted (according to the number of assigned asterisks). These two quantified measures were confined to just the sciences (mathematics, physics, chemistry, medicine, etc.). Although Kroeber did supply and rate major figures in Arab-Muslim philosophy (pp. 45-46) and Arabic philology (p. 228), two domains included in humanistics, he did not do so for the other humanistic domains, leaving the treatment incomplete. Besides, the focus of this article is on scientific history in particular rather than intellectual history in general. That emphasis naturally follows from the fact that all measures were ultimately derived from Sarton’s (1927-1931) history of science in which its author was under no obligation to provide adequate narratives about nonscientific genius. Before proceeding to the results, two clarifications are in order. First, although the span of the historical coverage must begin in the 8th century, when world-class intellectual contributions first began to emerge in Islamic civilization, the termination at 1300 is totally arbitrary. Sorokin and Merton (1935) and Kroeber (1944) only had access to the first two volumes of Sarton (1927-1931). Consequently, many illustrious Muslim scientists are omitted from the
ISLAMIC SCIENTIFIC GENIUS
9
Variable
Period
Total 1
Total 2
Total 3
Period Total 1
.649*
Total 2
.626*
.949***
Total 3
.564
.877***
.941***
Statistic M
975.000
42.500
79.167
122.500
SD
180.278
17.997
32.830
53.512
Min
700.000
3.000
6.000
6.000
Max
1250.000
60.000
121.000
196.000
Note: Translations by Sorokin and Merton (1935) from Sarton (1927-1931). Period is the date of the onset of the half-century, and Total 1, 2, and 3 represent unweighted, moderately weighted, and strongly weighted measures. See text for details. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
analysis, such as the sociologist and economist Ibn Khaldūn, who was active in the latter part of the 14th century. In truth, scientific geniuses appeared well into the 15th century (Nasr, 1968). That said, the data suffice to examine the questions raised in the introduction. Second, I have deliberately chosen to refer to the data as pertaining to Islamic civilization. The term “Islamic” is more inclusive than the designation “Arabic” used by Sorokin and Merton (1935) and the outdated “Arab-Mohammedan” used by Kroeber (1944). During the period under consideration, Islamic civilization encompassed many different languages, ethnic groups, and even religious faiths. Although Arabic was the dominant medium for intellectual communication, having a role analogous to Latin in Medieval Europe, many of the key figures were non-Arabs and not all were even Muslim. Yet eminent non-Muslims were often full participants in Islamic intellectual history. A well-known example is Moses Maimonides (Mosheh ben Maimon), the Sephardic Jewish philosopher, physician, and astronomer who was active in the latter half of the 12th century in Spain, Morocco, and Egypt.
The analyses that follow address three separate but related questions. First, do Sorokin and Merton’s (1935) three alternative qualitative-to-quantitative translations agree with each other? Second, do their quantifications of the history of Islamic scientific genius concur with quantifications obtained from Kroeber’s (1944) independent translation
from the same source (Sarton, 1927-1931). Third and last, were Sorokin and Merton justified in consolidating measures of genius in mathematics, physics, chemistry, natural history, medicine, geography, and even humanistics into a single composite indicator? In brief, below I examine mutual agreement, external validation, and internal cohesion.
To address the first question, the analysis began by simply calculating the Pearson product-moment correlation among the three total measures. Also included in the correlations is historical period, defined as the onset of the half-century period in which Sorokin and Merton (1935) tabulated the contributors. This enables us to see whether the three measures exhibit the same linear trends. Finally, the basic statistics for these four measures were also computed. The statistics are shown in Table 1. It is quite evident that the three measurement translations yield very different means, standard deviations, and minimummaximum values. In general, going from unweighted (Total 1) to moderately (Total 2, with 1-3 points) and then highly weighted (Total 3, with 1-15 points) greatly increases the variation in the scores, which is to be expected. Even so, the three translations exhibit similarly strong positive linear trends, indicating that Islamic civilization was still ascending at the time that the data cease. Yet, the trend is weakened for the more heavily weighted indicators. The reason for this latter attenuation is that the third translation has a far more pronounced peak in the first half of the 11th century.
10 SIMONTON
Kroeber (1944) Period
!
"
Sorokin and Merton (1935)
Science 1
Science 2
Science 1
Science 2
Science 3
700-750
0
0
0
0
0
750-800
11
12
11
17
30
800-850
14
16
40
57
95
850-900
15
19
35
73
119
900-950
12
12
26
51
88
950-1000
25
30
39
78
107
1000-1050
24
35
34
74
140
1050-1100
8
11
14
37
45
1100-1150
7
10
33
60
79
1150-1200
5
5
31
51
92
1200-1250
7
8
30
49
74
1250-1300
3
3
38
65
99
M
10.917
13.417
27.583
51.000
80.667
SD
7.704
10.396
12.645
23.378
39.081
Note: All measures focus on scientific geniuses only. Science 1 measures are unweighted, Science 2 moderately weighted, and Science 3 heavily weighted. See text for details.
Most striking, however, is the fact that all three qualitativequantitative translations correlate very highly with each other. The highest correlation was between unweighted Total 1 and the moderately weighted Total 2, albeit the correlation between the two weighted measures Total 2 and 3 is almost as large. So far, the three methods seem practically equivalent. This equivalence is likely made possible because the greatest geniuses are more likely to appear in periods that contain an abundance of lesser contributors (see, e.g., Simonton, 1988).
Because the two measures based on Kroeber (1944) both exclude “humanistic” contributions, the three measures published by Sorokin and Merton (1935) had the humanistic measures subtracted to produce pure science measures as well. The resulting scores are shown in Table 2. The two Science 1 measures are simple unweighted counts (i.e., each genius counts only once in the tabulation). The two Science 2 measures are moderately weighted (i.e., each genius can receive between 1 and 3 points). And the single Science 3 measure, for Sorokin and Merton only, is heavily weighted using a 1-15 point scheme. The means and standard deviations are also indicated in the Table. These statistics reveal that despite the fact that Kroeber (1944) used the same historical narrative, he ended
up counting much fewer scientific geniuses than did Sorokin and Merton (1935). The mean for his Science 1 is almost one third as small as the mean for their Science 1. Multiplying these two means by 12 yields 331 scientists collected by Sorokin and Merton versus 131 scientists gathered by Kroeber—exactly 200 scientists are missing in the latter. Besides this big quantitative difference, Kroeber seems to have been rather less liberal in assigning asterisks than were Sorokin and Merton: their Science 2 measure’s mean is almost four times larger than the mean for his Science 2 measure. Apparently, Kroeber imposed much higher standards both for inclusion in his lists and for assigning extra points. This contrast should be kept in mind as we turn to Table 3, which shows the Pearson product-moment correlations among the five measures. The first point to observe is that the Kroeber’s two measures correlate rather highly with each other, so high as to be practically equivalent. This near equivalence again implies that he was not very generous with assigning asterisks, making the weighted measure not that different from the unweighted measure. With respect to the three Sorokin-Merton measures, they also are highly correlated, and to about the same degree as in Table 2. Hence, stripping away the humanistic contributions from the tabulations did not undermine their concordance.
ISLAMIC SCIENTIFIC GENIUS 11
"
$PSSFMBUJPOTBNPOH4DJFOUJmD(FOJVT.FBTVSFTBOEXJUI)JTUPSJDBM1FSJPEJO*TMBNJD$JWJMJ[BUJPO Kroeber (1944) Measure
Science 1
Sorokin and Merton (1935)
Science 2
Science 1
Science 2
Science 3
Kroeber Science 1 Science 2
.982***
Sorokin and Merton Science 1
.483
.457
Science 2
.629*
.630*
.936***
Science 3
.651*
.661*
.899***
.955***
Period
-.195
-.149
.474
.458
.377
Note: All measures focus on scientific achievement only. Period is the date of the onset of the half-century, Science 1 measures are unweighted, Science 2 moderately weighted, and Science 3 heavily weighted. See text for details. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
The most interesting correlations are between the two Kroeber measures and the three Sorokin-Merton measures. Here the correlations are considerably smaller, especially with respect to the Sorokin-Merton unweighted Science 1 measure. Surprisingly, the highest correlation is between Kroeber’s Science 2 and Sorokin-Merton’s Science 3 rather than the latter’s Science 2, which is supposedly weighted the same. This discrepancy can be interpreted as suggesting that Kroeber only assigned an asterisk or two to a scientific genius to whom Sorokin-Merton would have assigned a dozen or more points—once more implying Kroeber’s somewhat stingy selectivity. Table 3 also includes the correlations between the five measures of scientific genius and the historical period. Here it is fascinating that Kroeber’s measures both have negative correlations while Sorokin-Merton’s measures all have positive correlations. This contrast in trends certainly attenuated the correlation between the two sets. To obtain a better idea of the difference, Figure 1 graphs the scores on Kroeber’s Science 2 and Sorokin-Merton’s Science 3 as a function of period. This particular pair was chosen because these two measures were the most highly correlated and thus their graphic congruence should be the most conspicuous. On the one hand, the Kroeber and Sorokin-Merton measures initially exhibit very similar period-to-period trends. Both start with zero contributions in the first half of the 8th century and then rise to an early peak in the second half of the 9th century. After a slight dip in the first half of the 10th century, scientific achievement ascends to its alltime peak in the beginning of the 11th century—the Golden Age of Islamic science. Then both curves show a precipitous
decline in the second half of the 11th century, the biggest drop in both measures. Yet after this low point the two measures display very discrepant trends. For the SorokinMerton indicator, Islamic civilization experiences a revival, ascending to some secondary peaks in the second half of the
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