What Are We Fighting For?: The Effects of Framing on

The Journal of Social Psychology, 2013, 153(1), 25–37 Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

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What Are We Fighting For?: The Effects of Framing on Ingroup Identification and Allegiance INMACULADA ADARVES-YORNO Exeter University JOLANDA JETTEN University of Queensland TOM POSTMES University of Groningen S. ALEXANDER HASLAM Exeter University University of Queensland

ABSTRACT. Two studies were conducted examining the impact of framing on ingroup identification and allegiance in the context of international conflicts. The first study was carried out among British students at the beginning of the war in Afghanistan (N = 69). Perceptions of the war were manipulated by varying the frame that determined whether the war was perceived as positive and just or negative. Participants provided with a positive frame on the war identified more with their ingroup (Britain), and displayed higher allegiance to the United States than when given a negative frame. These findings were replicated in a second study conducted in the context of the second Iraq war (N = 51). Discussion focuses on the way in which framing affects perceptions of intergroup relations and the relationship between self, ingroup and out-group(s).

We are grateful to Andrew Livingstone, Lucy O’Sullivan, and Louise Humphrey for their help in the data collection. We would also like to thank Michelle Mahdon for her comments and suggestions on an earlier version of the manuscript. This article was made possible by support of the Economic and Social Research Council in the forms of a research fellowship awarded to the first author (Ref: PTA-026-27-0116), and a research grant to the second, third and fourth author (RES-062-23-0135). Address correspondence to Inmaculada Adarves-Yorno, Exeter University, Centre for Leadership Studies, STC, 1.39, Rennes Dr., Exeter EX4 4ST, UK; i.adarves-yorno@ ex.ac.uk (e-mail). 25

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The Journal of Social Psychology


Keywords: allegiance, framing, identification, social identity

FRAMING IS THE PROCESS by which communicators define a social or political issue for their audience. It is an essential component of political persuasion campaigns and mass media communication and lies at the heart of public opinion formation (Chong, 1993). Framing can be used to present either the positive or negative side of an event or issue, or to lead people to focus on a subset of concerns, often at the expense of other considerations (Duckman, 2001; Nelson, Oxley, & Clawson, 1997). When competing beliefs and values underlie attitudes, a particular frame can make certain aspects of the attitude more salient and important and in that way reduce people’s ambivalence (Nelson & Oxley, 1999). This is particularly crucial when communicating about unpopular issues or matters that are perceived as ambiguous, complex and multi-faceted—for it is then that framing has the capacity to substantially affect people’s attitudes on the matter (Allen, O’Loughlin, Jasperson, & Sullivan, 1994). Framing affects opinion content (e.g., Kinder & Sander, 1990, 1996; Nelson & Oxley, 1999), the importance of opinions (Nelson & Oxley, 1999) and perceptions of outgroups relevant to the opinion (Reicher, Haslam & Hopkins, 2005; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996). In the present research, we draw on social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). Social identity theory suggests that people are motivated to see their ingroup as positively distinct from relevant outgroups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). When the actions of an ingroup are framed as positive and legitimate (compared to when its actions are perceived as having negative consequences), framing facilitates the achievement of a positive identity. According to social identity theory, the self is defined in important ways by the groups to which we belong. It is therefore not surprising that when we think of ingroup actions, we try to frame these actions in such a way that they reflect positively on the group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Successes of the group reflect positively on the self. Group members bask in the reflected glory of the successes of their groups (Cialdini et al., 1976), they emphasise the dimensions of comparison on which they are superior to other groups (Lemaine, 1974; Lalonde, 1992; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), and group members typically identify with groups that perform well (see Ellemers, 1993; Haslam, 2001). Therefore, we expect that frames that allow for a positive evaluation of ingroup actions will further legitimize group actions and enhance group identification. However, inevitably there are events that can be framed in ways that lead group members to perceive their group’s actions as negative and unjust (e.g., discriminatory treatment of other groups). Particularly when the group is of some self-importance to them, it is psychologically costly for group members to be confronted with the negative consequences of their groups’ actions (e.g., Branscombe, 1998; Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003; Powell, Branscombe, & Schmitt, 2005). Group members can easily take the ingroup perspective and identify with their


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group when their “group does good,” but this position is more difficult to maintain when the ingroup engages in actions that have detrimental outcomes for others. Such actions harm the perception of the ingroup as good and are likely to damage perceptions that the ingroup is fighting a just cause. In sum, even though ingroups are usually perceived in a more positive light than outgroups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), negative framing of ingroup actions can undermine claims that the ingroup is superior and taint the positive image of the group. In order to gain the required public support, politicians must frame conflict as a response to a grave injustice that can only be restored by means of force against the other country. In these contexts, framing and construal processes become important not only in the mobilization of others (see Dumont, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003; Reicher & Haslam, 2006), but also in predicting the extent to which group members will align themselves with group actions and identify with the group. The Current Research In this research, we explore the implications and consequences of framing in the context of two armed international conflicts—British troops fighting in Afghanistan following the attacks on the World Trade Centre in 2001 and British Army deployment during the second Gulf War. In particular we examined the consequences of positive and negative framing of these conflicts on identification and the allegiance between the ingroup (Britain) and its closest ally in both international conflicts—the United States. We predicted that when group members were exposed to a positive frame (justifying the armed conflict), identification with the ingroup would be higher than when they were exposed to a negative frame (highlighting the negative consequences of the conflict) because the self would be distanced from the ingroup in the latter case. In addition to group identification, perceptions of the relations between the ingroup and its close ally (the United States) were measured along with participants’ support for this close ally (Study 1) and this extended ingroup (Britain and its allies, Study 2) were also assessed. We predicted that a positive frame for ingroup actions will not only determine ingroup identification but also the relationship between the ingroup and an important ally in the fight. In particular, we predict a “halo” effect such that when ingroup actions are framed in a positive light, group members are not only more likely to identify with the ingroup but are also more likely to extend their commitment to the actions of allies that fight for the same cause. Study 1 The first study was conducted in the context of the “war on terror” in Afghanistan following the attack on the World Trade Center. The United States had a number of close allies in the war, among them the British. The British government had sent military troops to Afghanistan and emphasized its support


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for the war initiated by the United States. Support among the British public to send troops was initially relatively high, but it dropped once it became clear that the situation was more complicated and problematic than initially envisaged. In the positively framed condition, the conflict (justifying the war) was construed as one that focused (a) on the injustice of innocent victims being killed in the September 11 attacks and (b) on the evil nature of those who committed those terrorist acts. In the negatively framed condition, participants were led to construe the conflict in terms of (a) the danger of military action on the part of the ally and the ingroup in Afghanistan (e.g., the danger of escalation) and (b) the negative effects for the outgroup (e.g., in which innocent Afghanis were killed). We predicted that this manipulation would affect ingroup identification, levels of perceived unity with the U.S. ally, and support for the United States in the war against terrorism. Specifically, we predicted UK identification, unity with the ally, and ally support to be higher in the positive frame than in the negatively framed condition. Method Participants and Design A total of 69 undergraduate students (18 male and 51 female) at a British university took part in this study. Their ages ranged from 17 to 55 years, with a mean of 20 years. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions (positive frame, negative frame) in a between-subjects design.1 Procedure The study was conducted five weeks after the September 11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon. At this stage, an active military campaign against terrorism had just begun. The news in the UK was dominated by reports of American and allied forces fighting a “war against terror” in Afghanistan. At the same time, though, there had been some reports of civilian casualties in Afghanistan. Respondents were recruited at the beginning of a psychology lecture and were told that the study would examine people’s opinions about the World Trade Centre terrorist attack and related issues, including reactions to terrorism. First, framing was manipulated experimentally by making participants commit themselves to a series of specific statements (see Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1997, for a similar procedure). Participants were asked to tick which of the six statements they endorsed or to leave blank those they did not endorse. The six statements were different in each of the two conditions in order to frame the conflict differently for participants by encouraging them to think of the conflict as either (a) a justified war against terrorism (positive), or (b) as an activity with adverse humanitarian consequences (negative). For example, in the positive condition,


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statements framed the war as a fight against global terrorism (e.g. “Force is needed to combat terrorism and this may involve the use of military actions”). In the negative condition, statements framed the conflict in terms of its negative consequences (e.g., “I am worried that innocent people may get killed in the war on terrorism”). After completing the dependent variables, participants were thanked for their participation and fully debriefed.


Identification, Perceived Unity, and Ally Support All items were scored between −4 and +4, with higher scores indicating greater agreement with the statement. Identification with Britain was measured using three items adapted from Doosje, Ellemers and Spears (1995). Items were: “I feel connected with British people”; “I identify with British people”; and “I feel solidarity with British people.” Perceived unity between the UK and the U.S. was measured with two items: “How united do you think the UK and the U.S. are in their military interest?” and “How united do you think the UK and the U.S. are in their political climates?” Support for the U.S. was assessed with two items: “To what extent would you be willing to sign a petition in support for the people of the U.S.?”; and “To what extent would you be willing to sign a petition in support for the U.S. government?” Correlation analyses revealed that the perceived unity and identification scales and the perceived unity and ally support measures were moderately correlated (r(67) = .34, p < .01, r (67) = .39, p < .01, respectively). The identification and ally support measures were strongly correlated (r(67) = .52, p < .01). Results Identification t-tests revealed that participants in the positive condition identified more with Britain than did participants in the negative condition. See Table 1 for details of results. Perceived Unity and Ally Support A significant effect also was found on the measure of perceived unity between the United Kingdom and the United States. Finally, an effect was found on the measure of support for the United States. Discussion The results provide support for the role of framing in shaping group identification and allegiance (unity perception and support). Participants who were

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TABLE 1. Study 1. Mean Scores and Standard Deviations for Identification With Britain, Perception of Unity Between the UK and the US, and Support for the US as a Function of Framing Framing Measures


Identification with British people Perception of unity Support for the U.S.

Negative

Positive

t

d

6.83 (1.53) 5.18 (1.50) 5.06 (1.89)

7.62 (1.27) 6.05 (1.54) 6.31 (1.86)

2.47∗ 2.40∗ 2.74∗

0.60 0.59 0.67

Note. Analyses revealed a negatively skewed distribution for each scale and therefore square root transformations with reflection were performed (see Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). Transformations improved the normality of distribution. For ease of interpretation untransformed data are reported. Higher scores indicate higher levels of identification, perception of unity and support. Standard deviations are in parentheses. t-test results reflect transformed data. ∗ p < .05 df 67.

provided with a positive frame which allowed for justification of the war identified more strongly with their ingroup than those who were provided with a negative framing perspective. In addition, the effects of framing were not limited to identification with the ingroup but also affected allegiance. We found that when the issue was framed as positive, participants perceived more unity between the ingroup and its ally. Moreover, those participants were more willing to support the ally than participants in the negatively framed condition. The results provide support for our prediction that while participants in the positive condition perceived that their “group did good,” these perceptions were challenged in the negatively framed condition. Here the ingroup and its close ally appeared to engage in actions that were not unequivocally positive and that cast a cloud over the justification for those actions. Such undermining threatened participants’ sense of positive ingroup identity and had the effect of (a) reducing identification with the ingroup, and also (b) reducing perceptions of unity between the ingroup and the close ally and (c) reducing general support for the ally. In sum, framing effects were found on social identification with the in- and out-groups involved, such that when the frame highlighted the negative outcomes of an ally’s actions, participants sought not only to distance the ingroup from the outgroup, but also to distance themselves from both groups. Study 2 To test the robustness and generalizability of the findings of our first study, we conducted a second study, testing our predictions in relation to a different international conflict: the second war in Iraq (2003). For our British participants, the main three active military parties in this conflict were Iraq, the United States



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and Britain. The study was conducted on April 28, 2003, a couple of days before the war was officially declared to be “over” by President Bush. The news broadcasts at the time were highly divided. On one hand, the media emphasised the successes of the war in liberating Iraq. On the other hand, they noted that weapons of mass destruction (the key argument used to justify a war characterized as a “preemptive strike”) had not been found. Indeed, public opinion about the legitimacy of a war against Iraq was more divided than it was for going to war in Afghanistan. Mass demonstrations were held in London and the media broadcasted heated debates between supporters and opponents of the war. This diversity and heterogeneity of opinions surrounding the second Gulf War provided a fertile ground for framing issues regarding the war (Entman, 1993; Dorman & Livingston, 1994). The procedure and framing manipulation were similar to Study 1. The second study differed in four key respects from Study 1.2 First, we included a manipulation check directly assessing the extent to which our framing manipulation affected perceptions. Second, we included a measure of ally identification (i.e., identification with the United States) to assess whether effects resulting from framing on allegiance (as observed in Study 1) would also translate into ally identification. Third, we extended our measure of perceptions of unity, by including items on perceived unity between the ingroup and the ally in terms of moral and social values. And fourth, because the nature of the conflict was different (i.e., involving a stronger coalition of U.S., British, and other forces rather than just U.S. troops), we changed our support for the U.S. measure to one assessing support for military action taken by the United Kingdom and the United States. To summarize our predictions, we hypothesized that identification with the ingroup would be higher in the positively framed condition than in the negatively framed one. In addition, we predicted higher perceived unity between the United Kingdom and the United States, and higher identification with the United States in the positive condition than in the negative condition. Finally, we expected that participants in the positively framed condition would support more extended-group actions (UK and U.S. actions) than those in the negative condition. Method Participants and Design A total of 51 undergraduate students (14 male and 37 female) at a British university participated in this study. Their ages ranged from 18 to 35 years, with a mean of 20 years. Manipulation Check The manipulation check of framing effects was composed of one item that assessed to what extent participants considered military actions in Iraq to be justified. This item was scored on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much).

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Identification, Perceived Unity, and Support for Military Action Identification measures were the same as in Study 1. Perceived unity between the United Kingdom and the United States was measured using three items: “How united do you think the UK and the U.S. are in (a) their political climates?; (b) their moral values?; and (c) their social values?” Support for military action was measured with three items: “To what extent do you agree with U.S. military action in Iraq?”; “To what extent do you agree with British military action in Iraq?”; and “to what extent do you endorse military action in Iraq?” Correlation analyses revealed that the four scales were positively correlated with correlations varying from r(49) = .35, p = .02 to r(49) = .51, p = .001. Results and Discussion Manipulation Check Framing manipulation affected the perceived justification of the conflict, t(49) = 2.86, p < .01, d = 0.82 . Participants in the positively framed condition considered the war to be more justified (M = 5.96, SD = 1.6) than participants in the negatively framed condition (M = 4.42, SD = 2.1). Ingroup Identification, Ally Identification, Perceived Unity, and Support for Military Action t-tests revealed that participants in the positive condition identified more strongly with British people, and with people from the United States, perceived greater unity between the United Kingdom and the United States, and expressed more support for military action in Iraq (see Table 2) than those in the negative condition. Results of Study 2 replicate and extend those of Study 1. Study 2 found a classic framing effect, with a negative versus positive frame affecting support for the war. However, it also showed that parallel effects occurred for participants’ affiliation with groups involved. Thus, when the war was framed as positive and just, participants (a) identified more strongly with their ingroup, (b) were more highly identified with the ally in the war on terror and (c) perceived more unity between the ingroup and its ally. General Discussion The present research illustrates how the framing of a military conflict impacts not only attitudes toward it, but also on individuals’ affiliation with the groups involved and the perceived allegiances between them. In both studies we obtained similar findings. As predicted, ingroup identification and support for a close ally were higher when the conflict was framed as positive and legitimate (fighting for


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TABLE 2. Study 2. Mean Scores and Standard Deviations for Identification With Britain, Identification With U.S. People, Perception of Unity Between the UK and the U.S., and Support for Military Action as a Function of Framing Framing Measures


Identification with Britain Identification with U.S. people Perception of unity Support for military action

Negative

Positive

t

d

6.1 (1.55) 3.06 (1.36) 4.43 (.97) 4.83 (1.49)

7.00 (1.76) 3.81 (1.77) 5.50 (1.10) 5.76 (1.69)

2.54∗ 2.27∗ 3.51∗∗ 3.80∗∗

0.73 0.65 1.01 1.09

Note. Analyses revealed a negatively skewed distribution for 3 scales and a positive skew for support of military action. Therefore square root transformations for the negative skew and adjusted square root transformation for the positive skew were performed (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). Transformations improved the normality of distribution. For ease of interpretation untransformed data are reported. Higher scores indicate higher levels of identification, perception of unity and support. Standard deviations are in parentheses. t-test results reflect transformed data. ∗ p < .05 ∗∗ p < 0.001 df 49 (perception of unity df 48).

a just cause against an evil enemy) than when the conflict was negatively framed (highlighting negative outcomes for the outgroup caused by ingroup actions). These findings demonstrate that relatively subtle alterations in framing can have marked effects not only on the way in which an intergroup conflict is perceived (i.e., the classic framing effect) but also on the social identification with parties involved. In line with our predictions, we found that some frames legitimize ingroup actions and allow for the construction of a positive ingroup identity. When a positive view of the ingroup can be maintained, the willingness to align the self with that group is strengthened. However, other frames encourage group members to question ingroup actions and lead to the perception that these actions should not be supported. Under such conditions, ingroup members disidentify with the group because it does not contribute to positive self-definitions. These results are related to the well-known finding that identification affects our perceptions of the ingroup and relevant outgroups (Hodson & Esses, 2002; McCoy & Major, 2003; Postmes, Branscombe, Spears, & Young, 1999). Interestingly, though, our results reveal that there is also a reverse effect whereby affiliation with our ingroup depends on our perceptions of its actions. This would suggest that identification may, in part, be used as a strategic resource—a finding which resonates with a wider literature acknowledging the importance of identification as a response to socio-structural relationships and the treatment received at the hands of in- and outgroups (Postmes & Branscombe, 2002; Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002; Smith, Tyler & Huo, 2003). The finding that framing affects not only intergroup perceptions but also identification with allies is interesting and provides new insights into the importance


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of framing in the construction of intergroup relations. Indeed, regarding intracoalition relations, it could be argued that in the positively framed condition, participants perceived the United Kingdom and the United States as a superordinate ingroup with a common enemy. This finding is in line with research by Haslam and colleagues (1992; see also Haslam & Turner, 1992), demonstrating that stereotypes of an ally are dependent on the frame of reference. Yet while Haslam and colleagues (1992) studied these processes by restricting or extending the range of countries in the comparison frame (e.g., including or excluding Iraq when Australian participants were evaluating Americans), in the present studies, we examined altering the frame associated with the ingroup actions. Moreover, it should be noted that our manipulation was relatively subtle. Rather than providing direct feedback about the negative or positive aspects of ingroup actions, participants were merely asked to indicate endorsement (or nonendorsement) of statements that would subtly lead them to accept a particular perception on the intergroup conflict. This procedure was designed to reflect the typically passive relationship between the public and the media or government information campaigns. Self-generated frames of reference of this form are likely to lead to less reactance on the part of participants and, indeed, we would expect such construal effects to be stronger when participants take an even more active part in this process. The value of this research with regard to the framing literature is that it broadens discussion by encouraging consideration of additional psychological processes that may play a role in (and potentially explain) known framing effects. Traditional analysis of such effects is typically couched in terms of their impact in (a) making salient particular attitudes or values (e.g., Nelson & Kinder, 1996), (b) affecting the subjective utility of inputs or outcomes (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984) or (c) stimulating particular kinds of social attributions (e.g., Iyengar, 1991). The present results give rise to a different proposition: that frames affect the perceived (self-) categorical relationships between the social actors involved. In line with the known effects of categorization on social influence and social valuation (e.g., Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, 2005; Turner, 1991), such self-categorization effects are also likely to play a role in the known effects of framing on attitudes (e.g., see Terry, Hogg, & White, 1999, for further conceptual work on the relationship between attitudes and social identity). Thus, the effects of frames on perceived social relationships and on social values and attitudes can be closely related. In sum, our findings demonstrate that framing impacts group members’ selfdefinition and allegiance to close outgroups. Indeed, the lenses we use to define ourselves and to observe reality determine not only our attitudes and values, but also our commitment to social groups and our definitions of them (Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). Frames can be used as powerful tools by politicians to shape people’s perceptions of the ingroup as well as their commitment to its actions (Hopkins & Reicher, 1997a, 1997b). Our daily perception of reality and the intergroup


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conflicts we are involved in is shaped by the framing of those running and influencing production of the news. We are all under the influence of such framings when we read newspapers, watch TV channels, and listen to radio stations. Whether we perceive a conflict as a “war on terror” or “terror of war” is not merely determined by the “reality” of the conflict but by how that reality is constructed and framed.


NOTES 1. A control condition, with 44 participants, where no framing statements were given, was also included in Study 1 but is excluded from the paper for brevity and clarity as results followed predictions. 2. Due to limited access to participants, we did not include a control condition in Study 2 in order to guarantee sufficient participants in the experimental conditions. AUTHOR NOTES Inmaculada Adarves-Yorno is affiliated with Exeter University. Jolanda Jetten is affiliated with the University of Queensland. Tom Postmes is affiliated with the University of Groningen. S. Alexander Haslam is affiliated with Exeter University and the University of Queensland. REFERENCES Allen, B., O’Loughlin, P., Jasperson, A., & Sullivan, J. L. (1994). The Media and the Gulf War: Framing, priming, and the spiral of silence. Polity, 27, 255–284. doi: 10.2307/3235175 Branscombe, N. R. (1998). Thinking about one’s gender group’s privileges and disadvantages: Consequences for wellbeing in women and men. British Journal of Social Psychology, 37, 167–184. doi: 10.1111/j.2044-8309.1998.tb01163.x PMid:9639862 Chong, D. (1993). How people think, reason and feel about rights and liberties? American Journal of Political Science, 37, 867–899. doi: 10.2307/2111577 Cialdini, R. B., Borden, R. J., Thorne, A., Walker, M. R., Freeman, S., & Sloan, L. R. (1976). Basking in reflected glory: Three (football) field studies. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 34, 366–375. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.34.3.366 Doosje, B., Ellemers, N., & Spears, R. (1995). Perceived intragroup variability as a function of group status and identification. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 31, 410–436. Dorman, W. A., & Livingston, S. (1994). The news before the storm. In W. L. Bennett & D. L. Paletz (Eds.), Taken by the storm: The media, public opinion, and U.S. foreign policy in the Gulf War (pp. 63–81). Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press. Duckman, J. N. (2001). The implication of framing effects on citizen competence. Political Behaviour, 23, 225–256. doi: 10.1023/A:1015006907312 Dumont, M., Yzerbyt, V., Wigboldus, D., & Gordijn, E. (2003). Social categorization and fear reactions to the September 11th terrorist attacks. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 1509–1520. doi: 10.1177/0146167203256923 PMid:15018682 Ellemers, N. (1993). The influence of socio-structural variables on identity management strategies. In W. Stroebe & M. Hewstone (Eds.), European review of social psychology (vol 4., pp. 27–57). New York, NY: Wiley.


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Received February 21, 2012 Accepted June 7, 2012