What determines a feeling's position in affective space? - CiteSeerX

COGNITION AND EMOTION 2006, 20 (1), 92±113

What determines a feeling's position in affective space? A case for appraisal Klaus R. Scherer, Elise S. Dan, and Anders Flykt University of Geneva, Switzerland The location of verbally reported feelings in a three-dimensional affective space is determined by the results of appraisal processes that elicit the respective states. One group of participants rated their evaluation of 59 pictures from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS) on a profile of nine appraisal criteria. Another group rated their affective reactions to the same pictures on the classic dimensions of affective meaning (valence, arousal, potency). The ratings on the affect dimensions correlate differentially with specific appraisal ratings. These results can be interpreted as showing that the reactions to the IAPS pictures are predictably produced through appraisal of picture content. The relevance of the findings for emotion induction paradigms and for emotion theory in general is discussed.

Ever since Wundt's (1896) pioneering effort, based on introspection, to map feelings into three dimensions (pleasantness vs. unpleasantness, excitement vs. depression, and tension vs. relaxation; see Reisenzein, 1992), dimensional models of affect have dominated the grey area between what philosophers call the ``garden variety'' of emotions (generally referred to as basic emotions by post-Darwinian theorists) and vague sensations with uncertain affect pedigree. An extraordinary number of empirical studies have demonstrated that preferences, attitudes, moods, emotions, and many other feeling states, as represented by lexical labels or facial and vocal expressions, can indeed be conveniently mapped into a two-dimensional valence by activation space and reliably distinguished by their relative position (Abelson & Sermat, 1962; Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994; Davitz, 1964; Ertel, 1964; Fillenbaum & Rapaport,

Correspondence should be addressed to Klaus R. Scherer, Department of Psychology, University of Geneva, 40, Bd. du Pont d'Arve, CH-1205 Geneva, Switzerland; e-mail: [email protected] This research was supported by grant FNRS 11-61659.00 of the Swiss National Science Foundation to Klaus Scherer and Anders Flykt. The authors thank Tanja BaÈnziger, Dajana Kapusova, and Didier Grandjean for their precious contribution. # 2006 Psychology Press Ltd http://www.psypress.com/cogemotion DOI:10.1080/02699930500305016

POSITION OF FEELING IN AFFECTIVE SPACE

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1971; Osgood, May, & Miron, 1975; Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1967; Russell, 1980; Traxel, 1961). Yet, it seems that, theoretically, there has been little advance over Wundt's original conceptualisation. Although many journal pages have been devoted to issues concerning the nature of affective space, most of this work has been narrowly focused on the polarity of the valence dimension or the arrangement of verbal labels in valence by activation space (Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1999; Feldman Barrett & Russell, 1999; Russell & Carroll, 1999; Watson & Tellegen, 1985; Watson, Wiese, Vaidya, & Tellegen, 1999). In this article, we ask a more fundamental theoretical question: What factors determine the position of a feeling in affective space? Although there is abundant evidence that people will readily rate a momentary affect state with respect to its relative positive and/or negative valence and the degree of felt arousal or activation, there has been relatively little concern with how this particular feeling quality has been produced. In addressing this issue, we return to Wundt, highlighting two specific issues: (1) the distinction between emotion and feeling; and (2) the number of dimensions of affective space. As to (1), Wundt (1896) suggested: ``An emotion is a unitary whole which is distinguished from a composite feeling only through the two characteristics that it has a definite temporal course and that it exercises a more intense present and subsequent effect on the interconnection of psychical processes'' (p. 170). Although Wundt proposed the classic dimensional space as the organising principle (quality) for feelings, he assumed a classification based on quality, intensity, and form of occurrence (sudden-gradual) for emotions. Although his model has been surpassed by the theoretical and empirical development of psychology in the last century, the distinction between feelings and emotions remains important. In his component process model of emotion (Scherer, 1984a, 2001), the senior author has suggested that emotions are a special class of affective phenomena characterised by their episodic character (Wundt's ``definite temporal course'') and a synchronisation of the changes in all constituent components of the emotion process (reminiscent of Wundt's idea of intense effects on the interconnection of psychical processes). In this model, feeling is seen as a component of the emotion process, serving a monitoring function and constituting the basis for emotion regulation. Concretely, Scherer (2004a) has proposed that feelings integrate the central representation of appraisal-driven response organisation in emotion in the form of highly differentiated qualia, unique forms of subjective experience that reflect the configuration of component changes during the emotion episode for the individual. He has suggested that these qualia form the primitive organisation of feeling, which can then be mapped into languagespecific semantic fields or into a dimensional affective space of the kind suggested by Wundt (Scherer, 2004b, 2005). This model contrasts with Russell's (2003) claim that the position in valence-arousal space constitutes primitive core affect, which is only subsequently differentiated by perception and causal

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attribution [``These basic processes spawn a broad framework that includes perception of the core-affect-altering properties of stimuli, motives, empathy, emotional meta-experience, and affect versus emotion regulation; it accounts for prototypical emotional episodes, such as fear and anger, as core affect attributed to something plus various nonemotional processes'' (p. 145)]. Although the issue is difficult to settle through experimentation, we hold that the position advocated by Scherer would be supported by evidence showing that the location of feelings in affective space (which are primitive and irreducible for Russell) can in fact be predicted by specific appraisal profiles. The study reported here was designed to provide some first evidence for this theoretical position. As to (2), Wundt suggested that three dimensions were needed to exhaustively map the varieties of feeling. However, his third dimension, tensionrelaxation, has fared less well than valence and activation in subsequent empirical work. Schlosberg's (1954) proposal of attention-rejection as a third dimension did not do much better. However, there is a sizeable literature suggesting, often based on empirical evidence, that a third dimension conceptualised as potency or dominance may well be a reasonable assumption. Osgood (1969) defended such a three-dimensional evaluation, potency, activity (EPA) model. Mehrabian and Russell also suggested, and found evidence for, a three-dimensional model of emotion with dominance-submissiveness as the third factor (Mehrabian & Russell, 1974; Russell & Mehrabian, 1977). Similarly, Bradley and Lang (1994) and Hamm and Vaitl (1989) endorsed a 3-dimensional model including dominance. It has been suggested repeatedly (see also MacKinnon & Keating, 1989; Morgan & Heise, 1988) that a third dimension is necessary to disambiguate the negative emotions. In this article, we advocate to continue the effort directed at the identification of a third dimension of affective space, even though it is likely to be less homogeneous than valence and arousal and to explain only a small proportion of the variance. What are the determinants of the position of a feeling state (as defined above) in a three-dimensional affective space? An early suggestion was made by the first author in a textbook chapter on the role of emotion in aggression (Scherer, Abeles, & Fischer, 1975, p. 138; summarised in Scherer, 1984b, p. 38): ``Specifically, the positive/negative dimension was seen to result from the intrinsic or inherent pleasantness or unpleasantness of a stimulus, the activity dimension from a mismatch between goal-/plan-related expectations and the actual state (requiring action), and the potency dimension from the organism's estimate of how well it would be able to cope with the particular stimulus event and its consequences''. Later, this suggestion played an important role in the development of the first author's component process theory of emotion (see Scherer, 1984b, pp. 38±42), which was developed during the period of renewed interest in the determinants of emotions, such as anger, sadness, fear, or joy, in the early 1980s (when mainstream research was focused almost exclusively on emotional response patterns). The simultaneous development of several theories


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on the pioneering work by Arnold (1960) and Lazarus (1968) led to the advent of appraisal theory (for overviews, see Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; Roseman & Smith, 2001; Scherer, 1999), which predicts that emotions are elicited and differentiated on the basis of the subjective evaluation of an event on a set of standard criteria. Empirical research has confirmed many of these predictions and there is emerging evidence that appraisal outcomes might be the key to the prediction of emotional response patterns, including feeling states (see contributions in Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001). So far, most appraisal theorists have focused on the prediction of basic or modal (Scherer, 1994) emotions rather than more diffuse feeling states as characterised by the position in a multidimensional affective space. In one of the few studies trying to link appraisal theorising to dimensional models of affect, Gehm and Scherer (1988) found empirical support for the notion that appraisal criteria can predict the dimensional mapping of German affect words. On the basis of extensive nonmetrical cluster analyses of their similarity data, they suggested a tetrahedral model of affective space formed by the dimensions of hedonic valence, activation, and control/power (see Figure 1). The label of control/power, rather than potency or dominance, as suggested in

Figure 1. Tetrahedral model of the emotional space. From Factors determining the dimensions of subjective emotional space. (From T. H. Gehm and K. R. Scherer, in Facets of Emotion: Recent Research (p. 112), edited by K. R. Scherer, 1988, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. Reprinted with permission.)

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earlier studies, was chosen for the third dimension because it seemed to best reflect the mapping of the affect words used in the study along this dimension (as well as being in line with the suggested appraisal framework). In this work, we want to examine the utility of adding this third dimension for locating feeling states in affective space. In examining the two questions outlined above, we focus on the feeling states that are induced through presentation of a set of colour slides published as the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1999). Because this photo series is freely distributed, it has known an unprecedented success as affect-inducing stimulus material (e.g., Ito, Cacioppo, & Lang, 1998). In addition, the developers of the series have provided normative material (in the form of mean ratings on valence, activation, and dominance for each picture), which conveniently allows researchers to choose stimulus sets likely to induce states that will be localised in specific quadrants of a multidimensional affective space. So far, researchers who use the IAPS to plot participants' reactions into (generally two-dimensional) affective space have shown little interest in the mechanisms that produce these states. They seem content to be able to produce states that participants reliably characterise by positive and/or negative valence and a variable degree of arousal. It is interesting to ask what mechanism underlies the production of such highly predictable feeling states (at least in terms of their position in twodimensional affect space), as indicated by verbal report, through exposure to the objects or scenes depicted in these pictures. For some pictures, one can assume È hman and the existence of evolutionarily old schemata, such as postulated by O È hman, 1988; O È hman, his collaborators for snakes and spiders (e.g., see O Esteves, Flykt, & Soares, 1993). Other pictures may elicit deep-seated disgust schemata (Rozin & Fallon, 1987). For the baby pictures, one can assume the operation of a Kindchen-Schema, as postulated by Lorenz (see Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1989). However, such explanations do not work for many of the photos, such as those showing interpersonal threat with or without weapons. Research comparing skin conductance responses to biological and cultural threat directed toward the viewer (i.e., pictures of snakes and guns) suggests that there may only be minor differences between these kinds of threat stimuli with respect to processing (Flykt, 1998/1999). It is not unreasonable to suggest, then, that the feeling state that is supposedly produced by exposure to a picture is due to the viewer's interpretation of the meaning of the objects or scenes depicted in the photos, in other words, an appraisal of the pertinence and significance of the content (in general or by imagination of potential implications). Such interpretations by the viewer seems to need no, or only a minimum of, conscious resources, and could well be processed on the schematic level in the hierarchy proposed by Leventhal and Scherer (1987). Thus, preconscious appraisal of intrinsic pleasantness (see Scherer, 1988) would correspond to what Zajonc (1984) ascribed to valence detection by a primary, noncognitive affect system.


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In the present study, we propose to explain the position of self-reported feelings in three-dimensional affective space, produced by systematically selected IAPS pictures, through appraisal profiles that are based on a standard set of criteria (or ``stimulus evaluation checks''; Scherer, 1984a, 2001) postulated by many appraisal theorists. We used two groups of participants. One rated their evaluations of the content of a subset of IAPS pictures on nine appraisal criteria. The other rated their affective reactions or feelings produced by the same set of pictures on the classic three affect dimensions (valence, activation/ arousal, and power/control). The question was whether profiles of appraisal criteria can statistically predict the position of verbally reported feeling states in three-dimensional affect space. We made the following predictions (translating the senior author's earlier suggestions into current appraisal criteria): (1) the intrinsic pleasantness of certain objects and/or the goal conduciveness of certain scenes should determine the valence of the affective response; (2) the unexpectedness of the depicted scene and the perceived importance of further consequences of viewing the scene should determine activation or arousal; and (3) the degree of perceived coping potential (implying both control and power) should determine the position on the power/control dimension.

METHOD Participants Appraisal rating group. A total of 16 psychology students (2 M, 14 F), mean age 24.8 (SD 8.92), with a median of 21.5 and a range of 18±50 years, participated in fulfilment of a course requirement. Affect rating group. A total of 16 psychology students (4 M, 12 F), mean age 22.3 (SD 2.57), with a median of 21.5 and a range of 19±29 years, participated in fulfilment of a course requirement.

Stimulus selection and presentation A total of 59 pictures were selected from the IAPS CD (Lang et al., 1999) in such a fashion as to represent the four quadrants of the two-dimensional Valence 6 Activity (i.e., Arousal) space in as pronounced a fashion as possible (i.e., pictures which, according to the standardisation ratings made available by the developers, had the most extreme scores on both dimensions defining each quadrant). It was decided to work with pictures characterised by relatively extreme positions, with either low or high valence and either low or high arousal. A selection procedure based on the published arousal and valence ratings yielded 12 images for each combination of the two variables. For ethical reasons, erotic and mutilation pictures were excluded from the selection. An

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effort was made to include pictures representing a wide variety of themes. Apart from the 48 selected pictures (12 for each of the four quadrants), 4 anchor pictures (to serve as reference points) with moderate scores on one of the two variables and extreme scores on the other variable were selected, as well as one further anchor picture with moderate scores on both variables. In addition, 6 thematically ``neutral'' pictures with moderate to high valence and low or moderate arousal were included, yielding a total of 59 stimulus pictures. The dominance dimension was not included in the selection, as the IAPS material is not ideally suited for obtaining stimuli that vary relatively independently on the arousal and dominance dimensions (the normative valence and dominance IAPS ratings correlate with r = .82, p < .001) The pictures, imported as BMP files into a computerised rating program (written in Authorware) were presented on a 17-inch screen in such a way that the largest possible area of the screen was filled (using a PC running under Windows 98). The rating program randomised the order of presentation of all stimuli for each individual participant.

Instructions and rating scales On a first screen in the rating program, participants in both rating conditions were given the following instructions (translated from the French original): In this study we are interested in the ways in which people are affected by visually presented scenes. We will show you a number of photographs that are part of a series that is frequently used in psychological experiments. There are all kinds of scenesÐlandscapes, objects, people, behaviors, events, situations, etc. We ask you to view each photo attentively as it appears on the screen and to let you become involved in what you see. Following each photo presentation we will ask you to respond to a series of questions concerning your reaction to each photo.

Each photo was shown for 5 s (the exposure time having been chosen on the basis of the literature and the results of a pilot study). Following each full-screen photo presentation, participants were shown a screen with the response scales specific to the respective rating group. On the screen showing the rating scales, a miniature image of the respective stimulus picture was shown on top of the page to remind participants of the picture content during the rating process. In each case, and for each scale, they were asked to respond on bipolar scales by moving a slider to the desired position on the scale. The midpoint of the scale was indicated and the poles were labelled. The scale position chosen with the help of the slider was converted to a number ranging from 0 to 100 according to the distance to the left scale pole. Appraisal rating group. The instructions given to this group were as follows (labels in brackets provide variable names used in the Results section


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and the direction of polarity of the ratings; labels in parentheses provide the label for the corresponding appraisal criterion or stimulus evaluation check according to Scherer, 2001, pp. 94±99): The questions we ask you for each photo concern the process of mental evaluation which occurred while you were looking at the scene shown in a photo. In order to analyse your evaluation in a detailed manner, we will provide you with the following nine scales: Novelty/Familiarity: Is the scene presented in the photo familiar to you, that is, have you already frequently seen it before, or is it rather novel, that is, you have seen this only rarely or never at all? [Novel/familiar] (Novelty) Unpleasantness/Pleasantness: Do you consider the scene shown as pleasant or as unpleasant? [Unpleasant/Pleasant] (Intrinsic pleasantness) Presence/Absence of an effect: To which extent has the scene had an effect or impact on you? Did it produce only a very small effect, that is, the photo did not affect you much at all, or did the photo have a strong effect on you? [Has no/strong effect] (Goal relevance) Cause/Responsibility: Did the photo show an object that exists in nature or a situation that can occur by chance, or was it an event that had been caused by an intentional action of one or several persons? [Chance/human agency] (Causal attribution) Consequences: Is it likely that the scene shown will produce important further consequences or does it represent a stable state that is unlikely to change further? [No/further consequences] (Outcome probability) Expectations: Were you prepared to see a scene like this (that is, you had expected to see something like this) or did you not at all expect to see such a scene (that is, it did not correspond to your expectations)? [Expected/unexpected] (Discrepancy from expectation) Effect on your well-being: Do you have the impression that the effect of the photo tends to increase or decrease your well-being at that moment? [Decreases/ increases well-being] (Goal/need conduciveness) Coping with the effect: Do you think that you can easily cope with or live with the effect of the photo or do you have the impression that you may have difficulties in dealing with the effect produced by the photo? [Low/high coping potential] (Coping potential) Acceptability: Is the scene shown in the photo acceptable from the point of view of social norms and morality or do you think that the acts or events shown are due to unfair or even immoral acts? [Acceptable/unjust, immoral] (Normative significance).

These appraisal criteria and the questions used to tap them correspond to those suggested by most appraisal theorists (see Scherer et al., 2001), except for the goal relevance criterion, in which the question asks about the presence or absence of a strong effect of a picture. It is implicitly assumed that if a picture has a strong effect, its contents have strong significance to the viewer with respect to needs, desires, preferences, values, and norms, as well as with respect

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to instrumental goals (the term ``goal relevance'' being used here as a shorthand, as is often the case in appraisal theory). This implicit approach was chosen because it is difficult, if not impossible, to ask participants which of the motivational factors listed above is addressed by the content of a picture, because desires, values, norms, and so forth are generally not salient and available to consciousness. In addition, when confronted with ``goal'' questions, participants have a tendency to focus only on the immediate task (see Scherer, 1997a, 1997b; in this case, responding to pictures). For the same reason, ``goal conduciveness'' was operationalised as ``increase/decrease in well-being''. Affect rating group. The instructions specifically given to this group were as follows (original French scale designations given in parentheses): We ask you to describe the feeling state that the respective photo induced in you with the help of the following six scales: happy-unhappy (content/meÂcontent), calm-excited (calme/exciteÂ), having-losing control (sous controÃle/perte de controÃle), negative-positive (neÂgatif/positif), weak-strong (faible/fort), arousedrelaxed (stimuleÂ/deÂtendu).

Procedure Participants came to a laboratory equipped with six computer workstations in groups of two or four and were placed in front of the computer by an experimenter. They were told that all instructions would be given on the screen. Although the presentation of the photos was timed, participants could perform the ratings at their own pace. After the end of the ratings, participants were thanked. No debriefing was necessary, because the instructions corresponded exactly to the aims of the study.

RESULTS Agreement Between Participants Appraisal rating group. Three participants showing mean intercorrelations of r < .05 with all other participants were excluded from further analysis, because we assumed that they might not have understood or followed the instruction. However, their exclusion did not affect the stability of the average ratings (mean ratings based on 16 participants were perfectly correlated with those based on 13 participants). The mean intercorrelations between the 13 participants retained (across all nine rating scales over 59 stimuli) reached r = .58 (corresponding to an effective reliablility of .95). The mean intercorrelations for each affect scale were as follows: novel/familiar 0.45, unpleasant/pleasant 0.82, has no/strong effect 0.33, chance/human agency 0.66, no/further consequences 0.51, expected/unexpected 0.44, increases/decreases well-being 0.70, high/low coping potential 0.65, acceptable/unjust, immoral 0.69.


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Affect rating group. As the average interrater correlations were of comparable size for the 16 participants, all data were used. Across all six rating scales, the mean intercorrelations between participants over 59 stimuli reached r = .52 (corresponding to an effective reliability of .94; see Rosenthal, 1987, pp. 9±14). The mean rater intercorrelations for each affect scale were as follows: happy-unhappy 0.77, calm-excited 0.53, having-losing control 0.34, negative-positive 0.76, weak-strong 0.31, and aroused-relaxed 0.41. As expected, there was greater agreement for the valence scales compared with the scales for activation/arousal and power/control.

Composite scales and intercorrelations Because the stimuli (N = 59 pictures) were used as units of analysis, the raw ratings were aggregated over participants to compute values for each stimulus and each of the scales. Appraisal rating group. The intercorrelations between the appraisal scales, shown in Table 1, are uncommonly high as compared with earlier studies (see Scherer, 1997a, 1997b). This is explained by the nature of the IAPS photo rating task and the selection of extreme representatives of the four quadrants of affective space. Thus, most negative, high-arousal photos show violence or physical deformation, and most positive, low-arousal photos show nature landscapes or coloured patterns. Not surprisingly, the appraisal patterns for these scenes are likely to be highly similar within a quadrant and diagonally opposite among quadrants, tending to produce the very high correlation coefficients shown in Table 1. However, if one disregards absolute size and looks at the pattern of the intercorrelations, these seem highly appropriate to the stimuli and tend to replicate the general patterns found in other studies of appraisal (see Scherer, 1997a; Scherer & Wallbott, 1994). From these intercorrelations (and an exploratory factor analysis forcing the extraction of four factors) and the content overlap between items, we computed two composite appraisal scales: an agreeable/well-being composite (the mean of intrinsic pleasantness and increasing well-being) and a novel/unexpected composite. Apart from the high statistical dependence of these variables, their combination is also justified by the fact that they are not differentiated in the predictions. Affect rating group. The two scales that had been originally chosen to represent each of the three affect dimensions were averaged to provide a composite scale for each dimension, as they correlated very highly with each other (valence r = .99, p < .001; arousal r = .95, p < .001; control/power r = .88, p < .001). The correlations of these three composite scales with the pictures' standardisation scores on the three dimensions (valence, arousal, dominance, as

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* p < .01; ** p < .001.

Unpleasant/pleasant Has no/strong effect Chance/human agency No/further consequences Expected/unexpected Decreases/increases well-being Low/high coping potential Acceptable/unjust, immoral

0.75** 70.19 70.51** 70.62** 70.82** 0.75** 0.77** 70.76**

Novel/ familiar

70.25 70.53** 70.86** 70.95** 0.99** 0.95** 70.92**

Unpleasant/ pleasant

70.16 0.45** 0.15 70.24 70.46** 0.37*

Has no/strong effect

0.57** 0.62** 70.52** 70.48** 0.62**

Chance/ human agency

0.80** 70.85** 70.88** 0.87**

No/further consequences

TABLE 1 Intercorrelations among the appraisal scales

70.94** 70.89** 0.90**

Expected/ unexpected

0.95** 70.89**

Decreases/ increases well-being

70.93**

Low/high coping potential


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TABLE 2 Intercorrelations among composite affect scales and International Affect Picture System (IAPS) standardization ratings

IAPS arousal IAPS dominance Valence Arousal Power

IAPS valence

IAPS arousal

IAPS dominance

70.22 0.87** 0.96** 70.56** 0.91**

70.51** 70.31* 0.82** 70.50**

0.85** 70.65** 0.91**

Valence

Arousal

70.65** 0.94**

70.77**

* p < .05; ** p < .01.

given by Lang et al., 1999) and their respective intercorrelations are shown in Table 2. The internal intercorrelations between the affect dimensions in this study are comparable in their overall pattern and size to the intercorrelations between the standardisation ratings (except for a somewhat lower correlation between arousal and valence in the standardisation ratings). The correlation coefficients between the corresponding dimensions in the two sets of ratings are very high, demonstrating that the participants in the current affect rating group reproduced the affective structure of the standardisation group almost perfectly. This result confirms the stability of the results obtained with the IAPS picture series in different laboratories in different cultures (Lang et al., 1999). As for the normative dominance ratings, the correlation between the power and the valence dimensions is very high (r = .94), raising the issue of the independence of the two dimensions.

Patterns of correlations between affect and appraisal Ratings The intercorrelations between the affect and the appraisal measures are shown in Table 3. The generally inflated size of the correlations, explained by the nature of the IAPS photos and the selection of extreme cases from the four quadrants, makes it difficult to interpret differences in the size of the respective coefficients. However, if the high level of the coefficients is disregarded, there does seem to be a pattern that confirms, at least partially, the expectations outlined above. Below, we briefly comment on the correlations that are pertinent to the predictions (all coefficients reported in parentheses are rs and all are significant at p < .001). Although the valence dimension is highly correlated with nearly all appraisal criteria, the highest correlations were found with the agreeable/wellbeing composite (.99). For the arousal dimension, we found, as predicted, the

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SCHERER, DAN, FLYKT TABLE 3 Intercorrelations between the composite affect and the appraisal scales

Agreeable/well-being composite Has no/strong effect Chance/human agency No/further consequences Novel/unexpected composite Low/high coping potential Acceptable/unjust, immoral

Valence

Arousal

Power

0.99** 70.22 70.52** 70.85** 70.86** 0.93** 70.90**

70.67** 0.15 0.72** 0.65** 0.72** 70.68** 0.69**

0.95** 70.32* 70.53** 70.85** 70.87** 0.95** 70.89**

* p < .05; ** p < .01.

highest correlation with the novel/unexpected composite (.724). However, an almost equally high correlation was found for human agency (.718), whereas the correlation with importance of consequences was lower (.654). The power/ control dimension, as predicted, correlated most highly with coping potential (.951), but the agreeable/well-being composite was at the same level (.950), again demonstrating the generally high correlation between valence and dominance in the IAPS set. In order to control for the multicollinearity in the correlation matrix, we ran multiple regressions, using a stepwise criterion, to determine the appraisal factors that account most strongly for the variance in affect ratings. The results, shown in Table 4, confirm the pattern described above. The valence variance is completely explained by the agreeable/well-being composite. The arousal variance is jointly explained by the novel/unexpected composite and human agency, with the latter adding about .13 to the cumulative R2. Given the high correlation between the valence and the power dimension, the results of the latter must be viewed with caution particularly because the variable that entered the regression equation first as a result of the highest zero-order correlation (coping potential) had only a very small advantage over the next highest correlation. Yet, it is interesting that both coping potential and the agreeable/wellbeing composite enter the model under the stepwise criteria (even though the increase in cumulative R2 due to the latter is minimal). The impression that the power dimension, despite its high correlation with valence, may reflect some unique variance is supported by the significant correlation with the relative effect that the individual photos had on participants (r = 7.32, p < .05). This variable correlates significantly with consequences, coping potential, and immorality appraisal (see Table 2). In other words, affective state is lower on the power dimension when participants are strongly affected by immoral scenes and expect further consequences that are difficult to cope with.


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TABLE 4 Stepwise linear regressions of appraisal ratings on composite affect scales Affect scale

Predictor(s)

Standardised b

t

p

Cumulated adjusted R2

45.75

< .001

.974

5.69 < .001 74.938 < .001

.525 .653

Valence

Agreeable/well-being composite

.987

Arousal

Novel/unexpected composite Chance/human agency

.461 .445

Power/control

Low/high coping ability Agreeable/well-being composite

.499 .475

4.73 4.56

< .001 < .001

.903 .923

Note: Inclusion criterion for entering additional variables into the model = R2 increase > .05.

Contrary to what one may expect, the reported effect of a photo does not correlate linearly with reported arousal (r = .15, n.s.). Figure 2 shows a scatter plot of the composite arousal scale and the effect rating. The arrangement of the photos suggests that there may be a curvilinear relationship between reported effect and judged arousal, in that very low arousal photos (such as a mother with her baby) and highly arousing photos (such as a starved child) can provoke a strong affective impact. A regression analysis with curve estimation showed that a quadratic model provided a very good fit to the data (F = 14.31, df = 56, p < .001).

DISCUSSION The major aim of this study was to explore the feasibility of using appraisal profiles to explain the position of feeling states in three-dimensional affect space. Expectations as to which specific appraisal criteria (or stimulus evaluation checks) should determine the position on particular dimensions of affect were based on a pattern suggested earlier by the first author. On the whole, the results obtained in this research seem to encourage the pursuit of these ideas. We chose a particularly tough paradigm to examine the theoretical proposal, in that a photo-viewing paradigm is not the best context for the use of appraisal criteria, which are generally based on an individual's goals and plans in a given situation. Furthermore, the selection of stimuli on the basis of valence and arousal only (as dominance is not independent of valence in the IAPS) limits the possibility to compare two-dimensional vs. three-dimensional paradigms. Finally, the selection of relatively extreme exemplars tends to increase multicollinearity in the data and makes it difficult to examine subtle effects.

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Figure 2. Scatter plot for the effect appraisal variable and the composite arousal scale.


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Despite these difficult conditions, the data tend to confirm prior expectations that are based on appraisal theorising. It is not surprising to see the suggestion that valence is determined by the appraisal of intrinsic pleasantness and that goal conduciveness is strongly supported. The same underlying mechanism, pleasantness or desirability evaluation on some level of information processing, is assumed by both dimensional affect theorists and appraisal theorists. To our knowledge, dimensional affect theorists have not ventured any predictions that go beyond pleasantness or agreeableness perception. In our data, the variable we intended to measure, goal conduciveness (which we phrased in terms of decrease or increase of well-being because participants often have problems understanding the psychological goal concept), correlated very highly with the intrinsic pleasantness variable, and thus a composite variable was formed. However, we expect that in other types of situations in which an individual's concrete needs or goals play a more central role than in a picture rating experiment, goal conduciveness will predict valence responses. Scherer (1988, p. 93) suggested the need to conceptualise these two types of ``positive'' appraisals in an orthogonal fashion and experimentally determine main and interaction effects on response domains other than verbal report (because lay people have difficulties of understanding the difference). Some recent studies show the promise of this approach (van Reekum et al., 2004) The arousal dimension, in line with prediction, was determined in large part by novelty and unexpectedness. In addition, human agency added importantly to the explanation of the variance. Both of these predictors correspond to the spirit of our original proposal: Arousal should be high when action is needed unexpectedly. Action is appropriate when human agency has produced events the consequences of which one may attempt to change (which is not true for events produced by chance). Finally, as expected, the composite control/power scale can be accounted for by coping potential appraisal. Although this third affect dimension is difficult to establish on the bases of factor analyses or multidimensional scaling (as is again demonstrated in this study), the finding that it is the appraisal criterion that predicts this dimension best does speak to the necessity to conceptually distinguish it. The high correlations with valence that are generally found and confirmed in this study may reflect an ecological covariation (one generally feels powerful in positive situations) that may not hold under all circumstances. Unfortunately, an indiscriminate use of factor analysis may blind one to the multiple relationships between causal factors. The fact that different variables load on the same factor is often taken to indicate that they are not distinguishable. However, in certain contexts, there may be strong habitual associations between conceptually clearly separate variables. One could argue that the results reported above are tautological, as they are based on correlations between self-reports (albeit by different groups). We do not agree. It is certainly true that correlational analyses cannot be used to

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demonstrate causality. However, we used two clearly different instructions and very different scales for the rating tasks of the two groups, the appraisal criteria scales clearly referring to how the participants evaluated or appraised the content of the pictures, and the dimensional affect scales clearly asking about the feeling state that had been produced by the picture. Thus, we measured two different variables and two different underlying concepts. Theoretically, we postulate that feeling integrates all other components of the affective process, including the appraisal results. Thus, there is a clear prediction that appraisal should determine feeling. We agree with Lewis (1996, 2005) and Frijda and Zeelenberg (2001) that there are recursive effects (i.e., feeling being able to affect subsequent appraisal). However, we do not believe (and so far there is no empirical evidence) in a complete circular causality that would make it impossible to argue that appraisal determines feeling (see Sander & Scherer, 2005). It seems likely that there is a strong and immediate effect of appraisal (and the consequent physiological and expressive changes) on feeling, which is then followed by a weaker but more continuous tuning of appraisal by feeling in the course of emotion regulation. As to the interpretation of the data, specifically the regression analyses, it is standard practice to use a large predictor set (as the appraisal criteria) to predict a small criterion set (the affect dimensions), whereas it seems problematical to want to predict a large set of criterion variables (appraisal criteria) by a small number of predictors (e.g., valence and arousal). In fact, there are many IAPS pictures in our selection that do not differ much on valence-arousal coordinates but that have different appraisal profiles. Clearly, plausibility does not constitute evidence of causality, but it seems to us that strong empirical proof requires experimental studies using brain imaging of appraisal and feeling processes to examine sequence and cause (see Grandjean & Scherer, 2003, for first efforts in this direction). On the whole, then, it seems reasonable to expect that any induction of an affective state that can be described by a Valence 6 Arousal coordinate can also be explained as the result of an appraisal operation. However, under certain circumstances, the affective significance of a stimulus or event might be better described by an appraisal profile than by a coordinate in a multidimensional affect space. This consideration is motivated by the fact that arousal ratings have a curvilinear relationship with the reported affective impact that the photos had on the participants. This finding may have important methodological implications. If researchers interested in inducing physiological responses choose photos that are high on the arousal dimension, they may miss many photos that might have a strong impact on participants in experiments and thereby produce sympathetic activation. In short, the current findings challenge the frequently made assumption that the rated arousal dimension is directly and linearly linked to the rater's level of sympathetic activation.


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This raises a more general issue. Appraisal is a cognitive evaluation process that can produce affect and emotion because the evaluation is based on criteria that reflect personal relevance of needs, goals, and values. This relevance ``heats up'' what is otherwise a cold cognitive process. As mentioned above, in the case of the IAPS picture series or other stimulus material used in affective dimension research, the extent to which personal relevance plays a role is often not clear. It is possible that affect ratings produced on the basis of such stimuli are basically just products of ``cold'' appraisal processes, yielding the predicted positions in affective space because of the links between appraisal criteria and affect dimensions suggested in this paper. In other words, participants may produce an affect rating that corresponds to an underlying appraisal process without actually feeling the corresponding state. Although this may not be a very serious problem for the valence dimension that seems very stable and consensual, it may render the arousal ratings less useful for the measurement of felt affect. For the latter, it may be necessary to focus more on pertinence appraisal and the affective impact that is likely to follow. One important aspect is that pertinence/effect is likely to vary much more across participants than other appraisal ratings. For example, the average rater intercorrelation for the strength of effect/pertinence ratings in this study was .33, which is much lower than the level of agreement found for most other scales. This result is as it should be according to appraisal theory: Individuals differ widely in their assessment of what is pertinent to them. With respect to photos, snake phobics should be more affected by photos of snakes than persons indifferent to these animals, whereas individuals who like babies should be greatly affected by photos of babies. It is not unreasonable, then, to assume that real affect is only induced when the stimulus is appraised as pertinent by the individual and the process goes beyond cold evaluation, that is, really has an affective impact. Future research should try to disentangle the results of fairly simple, stereotyped, cold evaluation processes and how these differ from cases in which real affect is produced because of the perceived pertinence and consequent involvement of the individual. We submit that standard two-dimensional affect ratings are not sufficient to disambiguate these cases. As intimated above, these deliberations have important methodological implications. Researchers wanting to induce real affect may need to select stimuli in a highly sophisticated fashion in order to maximise their chances. For example, it may be necessary to run preliminary studies, using an appraisal framework that can help to predict what factors are likely to have an affective impact on many different individuals. This approach is all the more important, as ethical considerations bar researchers from using strong manipulations that would have a better chance of producing similar reactions in different individuals. The results of this study could also help to unify the different research strands on affect and emotion. So far, there seems to be a cleavage between

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affect researchers, mostly interested in valence (and sometimes arousal), and emotion researchers, focused on more or less basic discrete emotions (the demonstration, based on Wundt's theorising, that discrete emotions can be represented in two- or three-dimensional affect space has not much furthered integration). If it can be successfully shown that appraisal processes underlie all affective phenomena, from weak and unspecific feeling states to highly patterned emotions, research on affect and emotion should adopt a unified framework, permitting the prediction of response patterning on the basis of the antecedent appraisal processes. Finally, with respect to theoretical issues, the current findings challenge Russell's (2003) claim of core affect, consisting of primitive valence-arousal feelings that are further differentiated by causal attribution and appraisal in a second step. As described above, one can statistically predict a small set of outcome variables (e.g., valence and arousal) from a larger set of predictor variables (e.g., appraisal criteria), whereas the opposite is impossible. Thus, it seems more plausible and parsimonious to assume that feeling represents complex appraisal outcomes (as well as proprioceptive feedback from physiological reactions and motor behaviour) and can subsequently be mapped into a Valence 6 Arousal 6 Potency space, as suggested by Scherer's component process model. Manuscript received 11 June 2003 Revised manuscript received 14 December 2004

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