Why arguments against infanticide remain convincing

Received: 12 August 2017

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Revised: 15 November 2017

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Accepted: 11 December 2017

DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12423 bs_bs_banner

DEBATE

Why arguments against infanticide remain convincing: A reply to Räsänen Daniel Rodger

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Bruce P. Blackshaw

Correspondence Daniel Rodger, School of Health and Social Care, London South Bank University, London SE1 0AA, United Kingdom. Email: [email protected]

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Clinton Wilcox

Abstract In ‘Pro-life arguments against infanticide and why they are not convincing’ Joona Räsänen argues that Christopher Kaczor’s objections to Giubilini and Minerva’s position on infanticide are not persuasive. We argue that Räsänen’s criticism is largely misplaced, and that he has not engaged with Kaczor’s strongest arguments against infanticide. We reply to each of Räsänen’s criticisms, drawing on the full range of Kaczor’s arguments, as well as adding some of our own. KEYWORDS

abortion, after-birth abortion, infanticide, persons, substance view

1 | INTRODUCTION

Here we reply to each of Räsänen’s objections, drawing on the full range of Kaczor’s arguments, as well as adding some of our

Giubilini and Minerva’s well-known article ‘After-birth abortion: why

own.

should the baby live?’ presents a case for their view that ‘killing a newborn could be ethically permissible in all the circumstances where abortion would be’.1 They label infanticide as ‘after-birth abortion’ to

2 | FIRST OBJECTION: CONTROVERSIAL PREMISES

emphasize the moral equivalence between it and abortion, based on their belief that fetuses and infants have similar moral status, lacking

The first objection to infanticide that Räsänen4 critiques is Kaczor’s

the cognitive properties necessary to be regarded as persons with an

claim that Giubilini and Minerva argue from controversial practices to

accompanying right to life.

support even more controversial practices. The moral permissibility of

An early chapter in Kaczor’s most recent edition of his book ‘The Ethics of Abortion’2 addresses infanticide, and in it he briefly offers four objections to Giubilini and Minerva’s arguments. Räsänen’s paper3

embryonic stem cell research, abortion, and capital punishment is still debated, and so to draw the conclusion from this that ‘after-birth abortion’ is morally permissible is all the more controversial.

consists of a detailed examination of each of Kaczor’s objections, but

Räsänen’s5 response to Kaczor is that first, Giubilini and Minerva

Räsänen seems unaware that Kaczor is not mounting a comprehensive

do not believe that embryos and fetuses do not have a right to life

attack on Giubilini and Minerva in the few pages of this short critique.

because of legalized abortion and embryonic stem cell research. These

Kaczor provides additional support for his objections later in the same

are examples of how society has implemented the view that not all

chapter, but Räsänen does not address the points raised. Additionally,

human beings have a right to life. Second, these examples are merely

many of the detailed arguments Kaczor subsequently develops against

put forth to show that simply belonging to the human species is not

abortion are equally applicable against infanticide, and so his four

enough for it to be impermissible to kill a human. Third, Giubilini and

objections taken in isolation are not representative of the true strength

Minerva are not presupposing the moral acceptability of these prac-

of his case against infanticide.

tices, they are showing that infanticide is not unique in regarding species membership as being insufficient to ascribe an individual a right to

1

Giubilini, A., & Minerva, F. (2013). After-birth abortion: Why should the baby live? Journal of Medical Ethics, 39, 261–263.

life. Conversely, Giubilini and Minerva argue that infanticide is permissible because embryos and fetuses are not persons, and they are not

2

Kaczor, C. (2015). Ethics of abortion (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Routledge.

3

Räsänen, J. (2016). Pro-life arguments against infanticide and why they are not convincing. Bioethics, 30, 656–662.

Bioethics. 2018;1–5.

4

Räsänen, op. cit. note 3, pp. 656–657.

5

Ibid: 656–657.

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persons because they are incapable of valuing their own life. It is there-

your existence because you came to be some time later, following the

fore not a serious harm to deprive them of their life.

onset of some psychological property or properties. This is because on

It is true that Giubilini and Minerva seem to be listing these as

body-self dualism you ‘. . .are your aims, desires, awareness and your

examples. However, as Kaczor6 rightly points out, these are controver-

body is not you’.9 Instead, Kaczor, as we do, argues in favor of the sub-

sial examples of humans without a right to life that are still widely dis-

stance view (SV). Räsänen10 presents several objections to the SV that

puted. Giubilini and Minerva may not be using them as grounds for

we will argue can be countered. Firstly, Räsänen argues that the SV contradicts the ‘widely held

their views, but they are still being used to persuade. Additionally, capital punishment is an odd example because it does not necessarily imply

belief’ that abortion is worse the longer pregnancy continues, stating

no right to life, and still involves a person under Giubilini and Minerva’s

that ‘according to SV, abortion is equally as wrong just one day after

definition.

conception as it is just one day before birth’.11 The SV does imply that

Räsänen’s second point seems to implicitly concede that the exam-

the intentional killing of all innocent human life is inherently wrong.

ples comprise an argument after all, as he claims they demonstrate that

However, it does not entail that there are no moral differences

belonging to the human species ‘is not sufficient reason to claim that it

between early and late abortions. Kaczor12 explores this objection mak-

is impermissible to kill one (or it)’. More importantly, he replaces ‘right

ing reference to Peach,13 who outlines five differences that can explain

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to life’ with ‘killing’, and Kazcor notes that even if we regarded the

why ceteris paribus, late-term abortions can generally be considered

examples as morally permissible, they do not imply a denial of the right

worse than earlier ones without denying that all human beings share

to life, only that in some circumstances it may be permissible to kill

equal moral value. These include the fact that later-term abortions are

another human being. Many, if not most people, would be willing to

more likely to involve fetal pain, which arguably cannot be the case in

concede this point. For example, they might allow that killing in self-

at-least first-trimester abortions.14 The addition of pain to the act of

defense is permissible.

killing therefore provides an additional reason to consider a late-term

Räsänen’s third point continues with this confusion between the

abortion to be worse than an earlier one, without needing to concede

right to life and killing. He states that ‘infanticide cannot be condemned

that the intuition is based on differences in the fundamental moral sta-

simply because it is an act where one kills a member of the human spe-

tus of the prenatal human.

cies’.8 This is correct, but as we’ve noted, killing a human being does

The intuition that late-term abortions are worse than earlier ones

not necessarily imply a denial of a right to life. However, Räsänen also

may also be due to increased maternal-fetal attachment (MFA). MFA

states that people who believe the three examples are morally permis-

describes the relationship between a mother and her developing

sible usually accept that species membership does not confer a right to

fetus.15 The increase in gestational age is strongly correlated with an

life. Perhaps they do, but this is hardly surprising, and does nothing to

increase in MFA16 which helps to explain why miscarriages later in

demonstrate that this is so. After all, many of those who do not believe

pregnancy are seen as being more traumatic than earlier ones. Because

the examples are morally permissible do believe species membership

the MFA between a mother and her child increases throughout preg-

can confer a right to life.

nancy it may be considered morally worse to intentionally end a rela-

Finally, Räsänen reiterates that Giubilini and Minerva’s controver-

tionship with a greater degree of attachment than it would have been

sial examples are not meant as grounds for their primary position: to be

to do so earlier. Kaczor17 gives the example of the more serious loss

a person means you have to be able to value your own life. This itself is

associated with ending a marriage after four decades compared with

a controversial view, and Giubilini and Minerva provide very little justi-

ending it after four weeks.

fication for it, despite the critical implications for some human beings.

Nevertheless, the presence or absence of a degree of attachment

Although Räsänen provides a valid criticism of Kaczor’s first objection,

does not justify killing another human being. Therefore, there are plau-

he fails to engage with Kaczor’s arguments against this claim, despite a

sible reasons to conclude that the intuition that a late-term abortion is

considerable portion of Kaczor’s book being dedicated to critiquing this and similar definitions of personhood.

9

Kaczor, op. cit. note 2, p. 18.

10

Räsänen, op. cit. note 3, pp. 657–659.

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3 | SECOND OBJECTION: INFANTICIDE, BODY-SELF DUALISM, AND THE SUBSTANCE VIEW Kaczor argues that Minerva and Giublilini’s case for infanticide rests on a false view of personal identity called body-self dualism, which he argues leads to some absurd conclusions. These include being committed to the metaphysical belief that your human organism preceded 6


7

Räsänen, op. cit. note 3, p. 657.

8

Ibid: 657.

Ibid: 658.

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13

Peach, A. (2007). Late-vs early-term abortion: A thomistic analysis. The Thomist, 71(1), 113–141. 14 Bellieni, C. V. (2012). Pain assessment in human fetus and infants. The American Association of Pharmaceutical Scientists Journal, 14(3), 456–461. 15

Salisbury, A., Law, K., LaGasse, L., & Lester, B. (2003). Maternal-fetal attachment. Journal of the American Medical Association, 289(13), 1701. 16 Tsartsara, E., & Johnson, M. P. (2006). The impact of miscarriage on women’s pregnancy-specific anxiety and feelings of prenatal maternal-fetal attachment during the course of a subsequent pregnancy: An exploratory follow-up study. Journal of Psychosomatic Obstetrics and Gynaecology, 27(3), 173–182. 17


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worse than an earlier one is predicated on extrinsic differences that can

Nevertheless, there may be other prudent or pragmatic reasons that

be embraced by proponents of the SV, without compromising the equal

would warrant choosing to save either in the ERA. For instance, if a

moral status of all humans throughout their developmental journeys.

doctor at the burning clinic is the mother of the 10-year-old or the

Using a similar line of argument supported by ‘usual belief’

embryos, it does not seem at all immoral, or unreasonable for the

Räsänen18 claims that the SV also contradicts the belief that rape pro-

mother to save her own progeny.22 Similarly an expert in reproductive

vides moral justification for abortion. However, this claim is not

technology working at the burning clinic strongly suspects that the

obvious since this ‘usual belief’ is not shared by everyone, especially by

embryos have little chance of surviving once removed from the clinic

most pro-life advocates. The SV implies that the means of someone’s

and so opts to save the 10-year-old.

conception has no bearing on their status as a human person and thus

This demonstrates that other intrinsic goods, instrumental goods,

rape does not in itself provide moral justification for killing a prenatal

and agent-relative reasons can also inform ethical decision making.

human, or any human for that matter. Furthermore, Räsänen seems to

Regardless, the example is disanalogous to infanticide because the

be contending that arguments that challenge widely held moral intu-

embryo rescue case is a dilemma where one is choosing whom to save.

itions ought to be rejected; consistency would commit him to reject

Whereas with infanticide one is choosing who it is permissible to kill.

any view that provides moral justification for infanticide, because of

Choosing either option in the embryo rescue case therefore does not

the more widely held belief that killing infants is considered morally

entail that one would be justified in killing whomever one chose not to

abhorrent. All Räsänen has demonstrated is that there is moral dis-

save. Neither choice undermines the SV that all humans have equal

agreement on this point; we do not consider that an objection to the

intrinsic value, and so Räsänen is mistaken to claim that proponents of

SV or justification for infanticide.

the SV are committed to only saving the embryos in the ERA.

According to Räsänen19 the SV also implies that we ought to cele-

We have responded to each of Räsänen’s arguments against the

brate ‘conception days’ instead of birthdays because we came to be at

SV, and concluded that they cannot be sustained. We also note that

conception, which he argues is as absurd as Kaczor’s claim that body-

Räsänen does not respond to Kaczor’s criticism that body-self dualism

self dualism implies that you or I were never born. There are several good reasons that this claim is not a challenge to the SV. Celebrating birthdays is a cultural and social convention and in some traditional East Asian cultures newborns are credited with being 1-year-old.20 Would Räsänen consider this support for the SV? Birthdays rather than conception days are chosen for pragmatic reasons; conception is hard to measure accurately, whereas birth is tangible and easy to record; a birthday also signifies survival of the inherent risks associated with pregnancy and birth and is unrelated to the ontological nature of the pre/post-natal human. Rather than being ‘ludicrous’, stating that ‘I was never born’ remains a legitimate reductio of body-self dualism. Räsänen then appeals to a modified formulation of the embryo rescue argument (ERA) employed to demonstrate that the SV leads to odd conclusions. Given the choice between saving a 10-year-old boy and 10 frozen human embryos from dying, the proponent of the SV, he says, is committed to saving the 10 frozen human embryos and letting the 10-year-old die. This he argues is ‘at least as odd a conclusion as accepting infanticide’.21 It does not seem a strong argument to claim that an opposing view entails a position as odd as your own. In any case, we reject his assertion that the SV commits us to saving the 10 frozen human embryos instead of the 10-year-old, even though we agree with Räsänen that under the SV that it is better to save 10 human persons than one, ceteris paribus. The SV does entail that all human persons have equal intrin-

leads to absurd conclusions, preferring to attack the SV. We conclude that Kaczor’s second objection to Giubilini and Minerva’s defense of infanticide remains legitimate.

4 | OBJECTION 3: EQUAL MORAL WORTH AND THE DEVELOPMENTAL PROCESS Kaczor’s third objection to Giubilini and Minerva’s arguments is that our moral value cannot be based on degreed characteristics. If it were, then people with more of that characteristic would have more moral value and people with less of that characteristic would have less of that value. Giubilini and Minerva’s arguments for infanticide are based on degreed characteristics so they cannot account for why human beings have equal value. Räsänen’s23 response to Kaczor’s objection is that we can consider personhood to be a threshold concept. Even if it is based on a degreed property, once the human crosses the right threshold and has the right amount of that property, it can be considered a person. Räsänen gives an analogy to illustrate this: anyone taking an entrance exam to study at the university must pass a certain threshold in order to get into the college. It doesn’t matter if one barely passes or if one excels in the test and so any student who passes the right threshold will get in to the college. Kaczor24 has considered this argument, raised by Donald Marquis.

sic value, which is the value something has for its own sake.

Firstly, an academic threshold is not arbitrary—it is based on the level of attainment required for further study. Similarly, a rational basis is 18


required to decide which characteristic is required to confer moral

19

Ibid: 658.

Tegethoff, M., & Meinlschmidt, G. (2015). How life before birth affects human health and what we can do about it. European Psychologist, 20(2), 85–89.

22 George, R., & Tollefsen, C. (2008). Embryo: A defense of human life (p. 140). New York: NY: Doubleday Books.

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24

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23

Räsänen, op. cit. note 3, pp. 659–660. Kaczor, op. cit. note 2, p. 103.

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worth, and what degree is necessary for personhood.25 Giubilini,

points out that a consequence of this view is that if someone is pain-

Minerva, and Räsänen do not provide one, and Kaczor examines com-

lessly murdered, they are also not in the condition to value the differ-

monly suggested characteristics and explains why each is unsuitable.

ent situation (being dead), and so the victim is not harmed by depriving

Räsänen considers the exam analogy sufficient to demonstrate his

them of their right to life.29

point. Deciding the criterion for passing an exam, however, is not a

Räsänen counters by explaining that Giubilini and Minerva’s defini-

moral decision, and is vastly different to requiring humans to reach a

tion of harm requires that an individual must be ‘in a condition to value

threshold to be entitled to a right to life. A better justification than a

different situations before that harm occurs, not after’.30 Giubilini and

poor analogy is required for such a serious moral decision.

Minerva do not explicitly state this, but they do say that if ‘an individual

Secondly, Kaczor notes that if a characteristic is used to measure

is capable of making any aims (like actual human and non-human per-

moral worth, then even if a threshold is used for personhood, the impli-

sons), she is harmed if she is prevented from accomplishing her aims by

cation is that human beings with a greater degree of the characteristic

being killed’,31 so it is a reasonable interpretation. It follows that

are of greater moral worth. It means that morally, we are not equals,

because an infant or fetus is not able to value situations, it cannot be

even if we are all persons and choose to grant rights to persons.

harmed by depriving it of its right to life.

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then anticipates another objection, which is the diffi-

Räsänen is correct that Kaczor’s scenario is not applicable to this

culty of determining when a human being has reached the personhood

understanding of harm, but fails to realize that in subsequent chapters

threshold. It is enough to know that the fetus and infant are not even

Kaczor presents much more substantial objections. Räsänen32 asks

close to that threshold, and others such as normal healthy adults are

what the moral difference is between what he calls have-been-conscious

clearly beyond the threshold. He is correct in that if a threshold such as

substances and pre- or never-been-conscious substances, and concludes

self-awareness is chosen, we can use very conservative limits to ensure

that the former, if killed, has had their desire to live frustrated. Essen-

that only infants who are definitely not self-aware are not granted a

tially, he is arguing that the capacity for conscious desires confers moral

right to life.

status and consequently rights. Räsänen then restricts this definition of

Räsänen

There is an issue, though, with using such a characteristic. There is

harm to allow that brain-dead humans do not suffer harm if killed. He

little empirical evidence of self-awareness before 18 months of age,

suggests an additional requirement to that of being able to value situa-

especially not to the degree required by Giubilini and Minerva. Children

tions prior to harm: ‘if there is a possibility that in the future she could

commonly do not pass the mirror self-recognition (MSR) test until

be in the condition to value different situation over another if not

which means a conservative limit

harmed’.33 Permanently brain-dead humans do not have this possibility

for infanticide could easily be set at 12 months of age, even for healthy

and so cannot suffer harm. Kaczor notes that as well as being ad hoc,

infants. Although the MSR test has come under scrutiny in recent years

this second requirement implicitly states that potentiality for future

it remains extremely unlikely that any child under 18 months of age can

consciousness is morally decisive.34 This is contradictory, because

demonstrate the degree of self-awareness to value their own existence;

Räsänen’s first condition denies the future potentiality of the human

or understands that they have a continuous existence over time. For

infant or fetus as a factor in determining if harm has been done.

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between 18 and 24 months of age

There is an additional problem with this requirement. Räsänen

most people, permitting infanticide at 12 months of age is disturbing. As with Kaczor’s previous objections, Räsänen does not engage

states that ‘someone could try to contest this view by giving an exam-

with the full range of Kaczor’s arguments, confining himself to respond-

ple where someone seems to be harmed although only the second cri-

ing to the very brief discussion addressing Giubilini and Minerva’s

terion is met’.35 He provides the example of someone given a sum of

views early in Kaczor’s book. He does not mount a persuasive critique of Kaczor’s position on using degreed characteristics for personhood.

money at birth who never receives the money, and concludes that failing to benefit is not necessarily harming them. Räsänen does not appear to consider the situation where a fetus is harmed by actions

5 | OBJECTION 4: CAN A FETUS OR INFANT BE HARMED? Giubilini and Minerva hold that a subject can only have a right to X if ‘she is harmed by a decision to deprive her of X’.28 Moreover, an indi-

such as maternal consumption of alcohol during pregnancy. This can result in fetal abnormalities, leading to permanent intellectual deficits that are entirely preventable.36 A related example is third party involvement in harm, such as the manufacturer of the antinausea drug thalidomide that led to horrific fetal deformities. It seems clear that a person

vidual can only be harmed if she is in the condition to value the differ-

29

ent situation that would have resulted if she had not been harmed. In

30

this context they are referring, of course, to the right to life. Kaczor

31

Kaczor, op. cit. note 2, p. 20. Räsänen, op. cit. note 3, p. 660. Giubilini and Minerva, op. cit. note 1, p. 262.

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25

33

26

34

27

35

Ibid: 103. Räsänen, op. cit. note 3, p. 660.

Morin, A. (2010). Self-recognition, theory-of-mind, and self-awareness: What side are you on? Laterality: Asymmetries of Body, Brain and Cognition, 16(3), 367–383, 369. 28

Giubilini and Minerva, op. cit. note 1, p. 262.

Ibid: 661. Kaczor, op. cit. note 2, p. 32. Räsänen, op. cit. note 3, p. 661.

36

Ornoy, A., & Ergaz, Z. (2010). Alcohol abuse in pregnant women: Effects on the fetus and newborn, mode of action and maternal treatment. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 7(2), 364–379.

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has been harmed, even though they could not value one situation over

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6 | CONCLUSIONS

another at the time of the harm. Kaczor also has much to say about conscious desires as the basis for

Räsänen has criticized four objections Kaczor offers to Giubilini and

harm. He clarifies that for those who hold Räsänen’s position, these

Minerva’s defense of infanticide. We have argued that these objec-

desires must be dispositional, rather than actual or potential, so that

tions, taken in isolation, do not comprise a full representation of

whether in sleep or a coma, we retain our dispositional desires. Again,

Kaczor’s case against infanticide. Although Kaczor is primarily develop-

this seems ad hoc, but is a necessary distinction as we would not want to

ing a case against abortion, the majority of his arguments are also appli-

deny a person’s desire to live just because they are asleep or in a tempo-

cable to infanticide, and when combined with his four objections,

rary coma. Kaczor raises Beckwith’s scenario of two patients in tempo-

present a powerful case for it being morally impermissible. Räsänen

rary comas, one of whom, Bob, must relearn everything when he

concludes by stating ‘if we want to reject the permissibility of infanti-

emerges from the coma because of brain trauma. Bob has no disposi-

cide, we must find better arguments for it’.41 We disagree strongly on

tional desires to live, and so according to Räsänen’s criteria, has no right

several points. We have explained in detail how Kaczor in fact provides

to life. Kaczor points out that the ‘distinction between a human being in

excellent arguments for rejecting infanticide, contrary to this claim.

a temporary coma who will recover old desires, and a human being in a temporary coma who will acquire new desires is of no real importance’.37 This casts doubt on dispositional desires being morally decisive.

Additionally, permitting infanticide is a hugely controversial position that is against the status quo. The burden of proof is on proponents such as Räsänen to find better arguments in favor of it.

There is a further issue with a desire-based account. Unless we are to consider that a heart-broken teenager who no longer wants to live has no right to life, our criteria must be based on ideal desires, not

CON FLICT OF INT E RE ST

actual desires. But Kaczor notes that this distinction is morally impor-

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

tant, ‘because it relies on a distinction between what appears to be good and what is actually good’ . . . ‘an ideal desire is nothing other than a desire for what is actually fulfilling and good’.38 But surely the

ORC ID

harm is ‘the loss of the good of life, not the interference with the desire

Daniel Rodger

for that good’39—and that good can be lost by an infant as well as a

Bruce P. Blackshaw

http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2121-7167 http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9115-582X

human being with conscious desires. This is a significant issue for Räsänen, Giubilini, and Minerva’s account of harm. Kaczor concedes that it might be that the harm suffered by a fetus or infant from loss of life does not matter morally unless some actual desires are possessed. But as Kaczor puts it, ‘the point is simply that emphasis on desire as the key element of having rights is misplaced’.40

AUT HOR B IOGRAP HIE S DANIEL RODGER is a lecturer in Perioperative Practice at London South Bank University. His research interests include perioperative death, moral distress, and the debates surrounding the ontological status of human beings.

He strengthens his argument by various thought experiments. Perfect beings may not possess any desires, and Buddhists strive to extinguish

BRUCE P. BLACKSHAW is a philosophy PhD student at the University of

all desire. A ‘Nirvana Now’ drug that permanently eliminates all desires

Birmingham with interests in bioethics, philosophy of science, and

is conceivable. In all these cases, we would not consider that people

information ethics. He is also a software entrepreneur specializing in

without desires have lost their right to life. There is also the issue of

encryption technologies.

differences among people’s desires. Is it worse to kill people with a

CLINTON WILCOX is an educator, public speaker, and writes on a wide

strong desire to live, compared to people with only a weak desire to

range of bioethical issues, and has a particular interest in applied ethics,

live? Or do we not have an equal right to life? Kaczor acknowledges

personal identity and the philosophy of religion.

that a reply could be that these are actual desires, not ideal desires. But again, ideal desires are desires for the good of life, and harm is the loss How to cite this article: Rodger D, Blackshaw BP, Wilcox C.

of that good, not the thwarting of desires.

Why arguments against infanticide remain convincing: A reply

It should be clear, then, that although Räsänen successfully counters Kaczor’s fourth objection to infanticide, this is a minor point at

to Räsänen. Bioethics. 2018;00:1–5. https://doi.org/10.1111/

best. Kaczor’s arguments against Giubilini and Minerva’s account of

bioe.12423

harm are far more substantial, and Räsänen has not addressed them.

37


38

Ibid: 61.

39

Ibid: 61.

40

Ibid: 62.

41
