Why art is not a spandrel Stephen Davies ...

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15 Karolina Kurkova, a Czech supermodel, has an indentation rather than a navel, most likely as a result of surgery, but a navel is frequently airbrushed into ...
  Why  art  is  not  a  spandrel   Stephen  Davies,  Philosophy,  University  of  Auckland     Important  note:  This  is  a  final  draft  and  differs  from  the  definitive  version,   which  is  published  in  the  British  Journal  of  Aesthetics,  50  (2010):  333-­‐341.  I   have  been  assured  by  the  University  of  Auckland's  research  office  that  if  they   have  made  this  publicly  available  then  it  does  not  violate  the  publisher's   copyright  rules.       ABSTRACT   If  one  views  humans'  creation  and  appreciation  of  art  as  grounded  in  our   biological  nature,  it  might  be  tempting  to  see  art  as  a  spandrel,  as  an  adventitious   by-­‐product  of  some  adaptation  without  adaptive  significance  in  itself.  Such  a   position  connects  art  to  our  evolved  human  nature  yet  apparently  avoids  the   demands  of  demonstrating  how  art  behaviors  enhanced  the  fitness  of  our   ancestors  in  the  Upper  Paleolithic.  In  this  paper  I  explore  two  arguments  that   count  against  the  view  that  art  is  a  spandrel.  The  first  rejects  the  idea  that  the   spandrel  option  is  somehow  less  demanding  or  controversial  than  the   alternative  view  according  to  which  art  is  an  adaptation.  The  second  argues  that   if  art  behaviors  came  to  us  as  spandrels,  they  would  not  remain  so;  their   occurrence  in  the  usual  manner  would  become  normative  because  they  would   come  to  provide  honest  signals  of  fitness.      

Davies    

Why  art  is  not  a  spandrel  

Why  art  is  not  a  spandrel     Suppose  one  thinks  that  the  creation  and  appreciation  of  art  is  pan-­‐cultural,   indeed,  that  such  behaviours  are  almost  universal  in  humans  and  emerge   spontaneously  as  part  of  our  normal  development.  And  suppose  one  believes,  in   addition,  that  this  was  so  from  deep  into  our  prehistory,  and  not  the  result  of   datable  acts  of  invention  the  products  and  practices  of  which  were  taken  up  and   disseminated.  Admittedly,  such  ideas  presuppose  a  conception  of  art  more   modest  than  that  invoked  under  the  rubric  of  Fine  Art,  but  this  seems  reasonable   if  we  see  the  latter  as  an  elite,  arcane  institutionalisation  arising  out  of  but  not   displacing  its  more  quotidian  predecessor.  Given  all  this,  one  will  be  inclined  to   view  humans'  creation  and  appreciation  of  art  as  grounded  in  our  biological   nature,  and  thereby  as  shaped  by  natural  selection.  According  to  the  standard   view,  there  are  then  two  main  possibilities:  (1)  art  behaviours  are  adaptations,   which  is  to  say  they  emerged  as  transmissible1  capacities  that  increased  the   ecological  fitness  of  those  who  displayed  them,  so  that  their  possessors  parented   more  extensive  and  far-­‐reaching  lineages,  or  (2)  art  behaviours  are  spandrels,   that  is,  adventitious  by-­‐products  of  adaptations,  without  adaptive  significance  in   themselves.2   1    

In  evolution  theory,  "transmissible"  usually  equates  to  "genetically  heritable".  Alternative   views  are  possible.  Meme  theory  allows  for  cultural  transmission;  see  S.  Blackmore,  The   Meme  Machine  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  1999).  Developmental  systems  theory   suggests  that  what  matters  for  evolution  is  the  availablility  of  relevant  resources  to  each   generation,  not  whether  those  resources  are  biological  or  cultural  in  origin;  see  Paul  Griffiths   and  Russell  Gray,  'Developmental  Systems  and  Evolutionary  Explanation',  Journal  of   Philosophy,  vol.  91  (1994),  pp.  277-­‐304.  Multilevel  selection  theory  argues  that  the  units  of   selection  can  be  groups  rather  than  individuals,  which  again  gives  a  significant  role  to  social   transmission  in  evolution;  see  Peter  J.  Richerson  and  Robert  Boyd,  Not  By  Genes  Alone:  How   Culture  Transformed  Human  Evolution  (Chicago:  University  of  Chicago  Press,  2005)  and   David  Sloan  Wilson,  Mark  Van  Vugt,  and  Rick  O'Gorman,  'Multilevel  Selection  Theory  and   Major  Evolutionary  Transitions:  Implications  for  Psychological  Science',  Current  Directions  in   Psychological  Science,  vol.  17  (1)  (2008),  pp.  6-­‐9.  I  do  not  consider  the  debate  between  such   theories  here.  

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A  third  possibility  is  that  art  behaviours  are  vestiges,  that  is,  former  adaptations  that  have   lost  their  original  adaptive  function.  Both  G.  W.  F.  Hegel  and  Arthur  C.  Danto  have  produced  

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Davies    

Why  art  is  not  a  spandrel  

In  this  paper,  I  consider  the  second  option.  At  first  glance  it  is  an   attractive  hypothesis,  in  that  it  connects  art  to  our  evolved  human  nature  yet   apparently  avoids  the  demands  of  demonstrating  how  art  behaviours  enhanced   the  fitness  of  our  ancestors  in  the  Upper  Palaeolithic.  The  point  is  not  merely  that   the  art-­‐as-­‐spandrel  position  comes  cheap,  because  it  requires  less  argument.  It  is   that  arguments  in  favour  of  the  alternative  art-­‐as-­‐adaptation  hypothesis  are   inevitably  controversial  and  inconclusive.  In  considering  which  current  features   of  human  behaviour  are  outcomes  of  prehistoric  adaptations,  evolutionary   psychologists  speculate  about  challenges  faced  by  our  prehistoric  ancestors  and   about  how  these  could  have  been  answered  by  the  emergence  of  such   behaviours.  It  is  alleged  that  this  sort  of  "reverse  engineering"  results  in  the   production  of  "Just-­‐so"  stories.3  

accounts  of  art  according  to  which  contemporary  art  is  vestige-­‐like.  They  suggest  that  art  had   an  historical  function  that  it  has  now  discharged,  so  that  it  persists  in  a  post-­‐historical  phase.   Nearer  to  the  view  that  art  behaviours  are  vestiges  left  via  biological  evolution  –  in  other   words,  that  they  hang  on  (and  perhaps  wither),  despite  no  longer  serving  their  original,   adaptive  function  –  is  the  position  of  Ellen  Dissanayake  in  What  Is  Art  For?  (Seattle:   University  of  Washington  Press,  1988).  She  maintains  that  post-­‐eighteenth-­‐century  Fine  Art   no  longer  builds  community,  which  is  art's  evolutionary  purpose  on  her  view.  In  any  case,  all   these  writers  have  as  their  target  Western  Fine  Art.  Provided  we  take  the  broad  view  of  art   that  I  recommended  earlier,  one  including  domestic,  decorative,  folk,  and  popular  art,  it  is   apparent  that  art  is  created,  valued,  and  enjoyed  with  a  vigour  that  suggests  it  has  not  lost   the  evolutionary  significance  we  are  supposing  it  to  have  had  for  our  ancestors.   3    

S.  J.  Gould  and  R.  C.  Lewontin,  in  'The  Spandrels  of  San  Marco  and  the  Panglossian  Paradigm:   a  Critique  of  the  Adaptationist  Programme',  Proceedings  of  the  Royal  Society  of  London,  vol.  B   205  (1979),  581-­‐598,  criticised  the  "story  telling"  of  adaptationists.  H.  D.  Schlinger  in  'How   the  Human  got  its  Spots:  A  Critical  Analysis  of  the  Just  So  Stories  of  Evolutionary  Psychology',   Skeptic,  vol.  4  (1996),  pp.  68-­‐76,  made  the  comparison  with  Rudyard  Kipling's  stories  of  how   animals  acquired  their  distinctive  characteristics.  This  style  of  objection  is  widely  regarded   as  the  most  damning  to  the  explanations  offered  by  evolutionary  psychologists.  "Reverse   engineering"  can  be  defended  as  an  acceptable  form  of  abductive  reasoning,  however;  see   Harmon  R.  Holcomb  III,  'Just  So  Stories  and  Inference  to  the  Best  Explanation  in  Evolutionary   Psychology',  Minds  and  Machines,  vol.  6  (1996),  pp.  525-­‐540.  And  evolutionary  psychologists   sometimes  also  employ  other  methods  to  validate  their  hypotheses,  such  as  study  of   primates,  of  children,  and  of  present-­‐day  hunter-­‐gatherers,  and  research  on  neural   structures  and  their  history  (including  research  on  autism  and  selective  brain  deficits).  

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Davies    

Why  art  is  not  a  spandrel  

Despite  the  initial  attractiveness  of  the  art-­‐as-­‐spandrel  approach,  in  this   paper  I  question  its  plausibility.  Before  I  get  to  that,  I  indicate  how  the  notion  of   spandrels  is  applied  in  the  discussion  of  biological  evolution  and  I  mention  some   of  the  theorists  who  claim  that  art,  or  some  particular  art  form,  is  an  example  of  a   spandrel.     I     The  term  "spandrel"  refers  to  an  architectural  feature,  namely,  the  tapering   triangular  spaces  formed  by  the  intersection  of  two  rounded  arches  at  right   angles.  They  are  an  instance  of  an  architectural  byproduct  (one  among  many)   that  need  have  no  functional  significance  on  its  own.4  In  human  terms,  the  best   equivalent  probably  is  the  armpit,  a  structure  inevitably  formed  where  an   articulable  member  joins  the  body's  trunk.  Other  examples  sometimes  offered   are  the  navel  and  male  nipples.  Applications  of  the  term  are  not  confined  only  to   structural  features,  however.  Both  the  redness  of  blood  and  the  whiteness  of   bone  are  regarded  as  spandrels;  in  these  cases  they  are  non-­‐functional  by-­‐ products  of  the  chemical  constitutions  respectively  of  blood  and  bone.  And  the   notion  can  be  extended  to  refer  to  aspects  of  culture  and  society.  According  to   Stephen  Jay  Gould,  with  only  10,000  years  of  history  behind  them,  both  writing   and  reading  are  spandrels.  Indeed,  he  regards  human  culture  and  technology   generally  as  by-­‐products  of  the  oversized  human  brain,  which  evolved  to  address   now  unknown  problems  faced  by  our  ancestors.5  

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The  architectural  term  "spandrel"  was  first  applied  to  biological  features  by  Gould  and   Lewontin  in  'The  Spandrels  of  San  Marco  and  the  Panglossian  Paradigm.'  They  characterised   spandrels  as  necessary  by-­‐products  of  the  structures  on  which  they  are  based,  but  this  aspect   of  the  view  has  been  challenged;  for  example,  see  Daniel  C.  Dennett,  Darwin's  Dangerous  Idea   (New  York:  Simon  &  Schuster,  1995),  pp.  272-­‐273  and  Alasdair  I.  Houston,  'San  Marco  and   Evolutionary  Biology',  Biology  and  Philosophy,  vol.  24  (2009),  pp.  215-­‐230.  

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'Evolution:  The  Pleasures  of  Pluralism',  The  New  York  Review  of  Books,  vol.  44,  no.  11  (26   June,  1997);  see  paragraphs  42-­‐43;  see  also  'The  Exaptive  Excellence  of  Spandrels  as  a  Term   and  Prototype',  Proceedings  of  the  National  Academy  of  Science  (US),  vol.  94  (1997),  pp.   10750-­‐10755.  

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Davies    

Why  art  is  not  a  spandrel  

Several  theorists  suggest  that  art  is  a  spandrel.6  In  The  Prehistory  of  the   Mind:  A  Search  for  the  Origins  of  Art,  Religion,  and  Science  (London:  Thames  and   Hudson,  1996),  Steven  Mithen  discusses  the  way  human  general  intelligence  was   spectacularly  enhanced  by  a  breaking  down  of  the  modularised  isolation  of   mental  domains  specialising  in  natural  history,  social  relations,  technology,  and   language.  His  discussion  suggests  that  the  appearance  at  the  most  general  level   of  art,  religion,  and  science  some  30,000  years  ago  was  a  by-­‐product  of  these   cognitive  developments.  Others  make  the  claim  not  about  art  in  general  but   about  particular  art  forms.  Alfred  Russel  Wallace,  in  Darwinism  (London:   Macmillan,  1889),  regards  music  and  dance  as  by-­‐products  of  our  brain  power   and  excessive  vitality.  Steven  Pinker  says:  "[of  the  arts]  music  …  shows  the   clearest  signs  of  not  being  [an  adaptation]".  He  coins  a  striking  metaphor:  "I   suspect  that  music  is  auditory  cheesecake,  an  exquisite  confection  crafted  to   tickle  the  sensitive  spots  of  at  least  six  of  our  mental  faculties",  these  being   language  (when  the  music  has  lyrics),  auditory  scene  analysis,  emotional  calls,   habitat  selection  (as  expressed  in  musical  tone  painting),  motor  control  (when   music  leads  to  dancing),  and  "something  else  that  makes  the  whole  more  than   the  sum  of  the  parts".7  In  other  words,  senses  and  capacities  evolved  for  non-­‐ musical  purposes  are  stimulated  by  music  in  a  fashion  that  we  find  enjoyable,   though  not  to  any  evolutionary  purpose.8     6    

For  some  recent  examples,  see  Eckart  Voland,  'Aesthetic  Preferences  in  the  World  of  Artifacts   –  Adaptations  for  the  Evaluation  of  "Honest  Signals"?'  in  E.  Voland  and  K.  Grammer  (eds),   Evolutionary  Aesthetics  (Springer  Verlag,  2003),  pp.  239-­‐260;  Merlin  Donald,  'Art  and   Cognitive  Evolution',  in  M.  Turner  (ed),  The  Artful  Mind:  Science  and  the  Riddle  of  Human   Creativity  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  2006),  pp.  3-­‐20;  Terrence  Deacon,  'The  Aesthetic   Faculty',  in  Turner  op.  cit.,  pp.  21-­‐53;  Semir  Zeki,  'The  Neurology  of  Ambiguity',  in  Turner  op.   cit.,  pp.  243-­‐270.  

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How  the  Mind  Works  (New  York:  W.W.  Norton,  1997);  the  quotations  are  from  pp.  534  and   538.  See  also,  Ragnar  Granit,  The  Purposive  Brain  (Cambridge,  MA:  MIT  Press,  1977).  

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Commentators  have  been  rightly  puzzled  by  Pinker's  metaphor;  for  instance,  see  Joseph   Carroll,  'Steven  Pinker's  Cheesecake  for  the  Mind',  Philosophy  and  Literature,  22  (1998),  pp.   478-­‐485.  The  desire  of  Homo  sapiens  for  sweet,  fatty  foods  was  adaptive  on  the  savannahs  of   the  Upper  Palaeolithic,  when  such  nourishing  foods  could  be  hard  to  come  by.  Now,  when   every  street  corner  has  a  burger  outlet  and  coffee  store,  the  taste  may  have  become   maladaptive.  But  in  neither  environment  does  a  desire  for  sweet,  fatty  food  (for  cheesecake)  

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Davies    

Why  art  is  not  a  spandrel  

  II     In  this  section  I  offer  an  arguments  querying  the  claim  that  the  art-­‐as-­‐spandrel   option  is  easier  or  less  controversial  to  support  than  is  the  art-­‐as-­‐adaptation   alternative.     If  asked,  most  people  would  identify  feathers  as  an  adaptation  for  avian   flight.  They  are  wrong  to  do  so.  The  first  feathers  evolved  for  thermoregulation9   and  the  descendants  of  some  ancient  bird  types,  such  as  emus  and  penguins,   have  no  feathers  suitable  for  flight.  Even  in  flighted  birds,  the  vast  majority  of   their  feathers  play  no  role  in  their  taking  to  the  sky.  So,  is  flight  a  spandrel,  is  it   merely  a  non-­‐adaptive  by-­‐product  of  avian  thermoregulation?  Obviously  not.   Though  flight  comes  at  a  cost  (which  is  why  rail  species  revert  so  often  to   flightlessness  on  islands  without  ground  predators),  it  provides  a  mode  of   mobility  that  produces  many  benefits  toward  survival  and  reproduction.  But  if  it   is  an  adaptation,  where  do  we  locate  that?  We  do  so  not  in  the  origins  of  feathers,   but  in  certain  modifications  to  specific  feathers  that  (along  with  other  flight-­‐ facilitating  changes  in  bone  structure,  musculature,  and  the  like)  made  avian   flight  possible   A  yet  more  extreme  example  helps  make  the  point.  The  cochlea  of  the   human  inner  ear,  with  which  differences  in  the  pitches  of  sounds  are  detected,   developed  from  the  lagena,  a  bulging  organ  on  the  posterior  section  of  the   sacculus  of  fish  that  detects  aquatic  vibration  and  thereby  locates  the  presence  of   other  fish.10  But  this  does  not  mean  that  humans'  pitch  detection,  which  is   important  for  auditory  scene  analysis  and  the  appreciation  of  semantic  and   affective  content  in  utterance,  is  merely  a  spandrel  of  an  ancient  Piscean  

function  as  a  spandrel.  For  other  (not  entirely  convincing)  criticisms  of  Pinker  on  music,  see   Daniel  J.  Levitin  This  is  your  Brain  on  Music:  The  Science  of  Human  Obsession  (New  York:   Dutton,  2006).   9    

Stephen  J.  Gould  and  Elizabeth  Vrba,  'Exaptation:  A  Missing  Term  in  the  Science  of  Forms',   Paleobiology,  vol.  8  (1982),  pp.  4-­‐15.  

10    

For  discussion,  see  Charles  O.  Nussbaum,  The  Musical  Representation:  Meaning,  Ontology,  and   Emotion  (Cambridge,  MA:  MIT  Press,  2007),  p.  52.  

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Why  art  is  not  a  spandrel  

adaptation.  In  accounting  for  the  adaptiveness  of  the  human  cochlea,  we  should   look  not  to  the  origins  of  the  relevant  organ  but  to  changes  in  it  that  made  it   useful  for  (that  is,  that  enhanced  the  fitness  of)  terrestrial  creatures.   As  these  examples  show,  evolution  never  begins  afresh  but  builds  instead   on  what  already  exists.  The  result,  even  if  it  is  adaptive,  sometimes  exhibits  an   improvisatory,  jury-­‐rigged  character.  Bipedalism  was  adaptive  for  our  ancestors,   but  we  are  also  heir  to  the  back  problems  and  pains  that  go  with  it.  All  this  helps   to  explain  why  so  little  of  the  possible  "design  space"  is  exploited  by  evolution;   for  instance,  it  explains  why  so  many  living  creatures  display  similar  basic  body   plans.   Here  is  the  relevant  moral:  demonstrating  that  something  is  a  spandrel   involves  far  more  than  identifying  it  as  a  by-­‐product  of  some  prior  adaptation   from  which  it  operates  very  differently.  So,  even  if  it  is  true  that  art  is  a  by-­‐ product  of  Homo  sapiens'  development  of  a  flexible,  general  intelligence,  for   instance,  this  does  not  show  that  art  is  not  an  adaptation.  In  consequence,  the   art-­‐as-­‐spandrel  approach  does  not  have  the  possible  advantage  claimed  for  it   earlier:  it  does  not  require  less  supporting  argument  than  the  art-­‐as-­‐adaptation   model.  Spandrels  can  be  confidently  identified  as  such  only  after  the  possibility   that  they  are  adaptations  in  their  own  right  is  tested  and  defeated.  When  the   investigation  is  closed,  art  may  turn  out  to  be  a  spandrel  after  all,  but  before  we   get  to  that  conclusion  we  have  to  go  down  the  same  hard  road  as  that  taken  by   the  person  who  hopes  to  show  that  art  is  an  adaptation.  A  second  consequence  is   this:  if,  as  I  suggested,  arguments  for  the  adaptiveness  of  art  are  properly   regarded  as  questionable  and  speculative,  arguments  for  the  art-­‐as-­‐spandrel   model  will  inherit  these  same  qualities,  because  they  must  follow  the  same  path.     III     I  now  offer  rather  general  reasons  for  thinking  that  art  is  not  best  regarded  as  a   spandrel,  even  if  it  originates  there.  This  second  and  more  compelling  objection   to  the  art-­‐as-­‐spandrel  hypothesis  can  be  summarised  in  the  slogan:  form  becomes   norm.    

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Structural  integrity  –  symmetry,  proportion,  balance,  and  a  normal   disposition  of  elements  –  is  an  indicator  of  fitness.  It  signals  a  history  of  health   and  immunity  from  disease.  And,  for  this  reason,  structural  integrity  is   appreciated  as  an  aspect  of  human  attractiveness.  For  instance,  the  degree  of   symmetry  of  human  faces  correlates  with  judgments  of  their  beauty.11  (Note   however  that,  though  we  are  attracted  to  hyper-­‐normalcy  in  facial  features  and   the  like,  we  can  be  attracted  more  to  what  is  unusual  provided  it  remains  within   the  bounds  of  a  normal  distribution.  In  other  words,  we  like  what  is  average,  but   we  might  like  more  what  lies  nearer  the  extremes  of  what  is  not  regarded  as   transgressive.12)  

11    

On  facial  symmetry,  see  Judith  H.  Langlois  and  Lori  A.  Roggman,  'Attractive  Faces  are  only   Average',  Psychological  Science,  vol.  1  (1990),  pp.  115-­‐121;  D.  Symons,  'Beauty  is  in  the   Adaptations  of  the  Beholder:  the  Evolutionary  Psychology  of  Human  Female  Sexual   Attractiveness',  in  P.  R.  Abramson  and  S.  D.  Pinkerton  (eds),  Sexual  Nature  -­‐  Sexual  Culture   (Chicago:  Chicago  University  Press,  1995),  pp.  80-­‐118;  and  Patrick  Hogan,  Science,  Literature,   and  the  Arts:  A  Guide  for  Humanists  (New  York:  Routledge,  2003).  On  the  equation  of  beauty   and  symmetry,  see  Colin  Martindale,  'Cognition,  Psychobiology,  and  Aesthetics',  in  F.  Farley   and  R.  Neperud  (eds),  The  Foundations  of  Aesthetics,  Art,  and  Art  Education  (New  York:   Praeger,  1988),  pp.  7-­‐42;  Vilayanur  Ramachandran  and  William  Hirstein,  'The  Science  of  Art:   A  Neurological  Theory  of  Aesthetic  Experience',  Journal  of  Consciousness  Studies  vol.  6  (June-­‐ July,  1999),  pp.  15-­‐51;  and  Randy  Thornhill,  'Darwinian  Aesthetics  Informs  Traditional   Aesthetics',  in  Voland  and  Grammer  (eds)  op.  cit.,  pp  9-­‐35.  On  symmetry  as  a  health   indicator,  see  Dahlia  Zaidel,  Shawn  M.  Aarde,  and  Kieran  Baig,  'Appearance  of  Symmetry,   Beauty,  and  Health  in  Human  Faces',  Brain  and  Cognition,  vol.  57  (2005),  pp.  261-­‐263.  On   beauty  as  honest  signalling  for  fitness,  see  A.  Zahavi  and  A.  Zahavi,  The  Handicap  Principle:  A   Missing  Piece  of  Darwin’s  Puzzle  (New  York:  Oxford  University  Press,  1997);  Geoffrey  Miller,   The  Mating  Mind:  How  Sexual  Choice  Shaped  the  Evolution  of  Human  Nature  (New  York:   Doubleday,  2000);  and  Uta  Skamel,  'Beauty  and  Sex  Appeal:  Sexual  Selection  of  Aesthetic   Preferences',  in  Voland  and  Grammer  (eds)  op.  cit.,  pp.  173-­‐200.  

12  

See  Symons  op.  cit.;  Thomas  R.  Alley  and  Michael  R.  Cunningham,  'Averaged  Faces  are   Attractive,  but  very  Attractive  Faces  are  not  Average',  Psychological  Science,  vol.  2  (1991),  pp.   123-­‐125;  and  Michael  R.  Cunningham  and  Stephen  R.  Shamblem,  'Beyond  Nature  Versus   Culture:  A  Multiple  Fitness  Analysis  of  Variations  in  Grooming',  in  Voland  and  Grammer  (eds)   op.  cit.,  pp.  201-­‐237.  Ramachandran  and  Hirstein  op.  cit.  generalise  this  result,  the  "peak  shift   effect",  to  art.  

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Why  art  is  not  a  spandrel  

Now,  navels  and  male  nipples  count  along  with  eyes,  noses,  ears,  chins,   and  the  like  toward  structural  integrity.  They  have  to  be  present  in  the  usual   number,  proportion,  and  places  if  a  person  is  to  display  at  least  an  average   amount  of  fitness.  Perhaps  that  is  one  reason  why  young  women  wear  short  tops   and  low-­‐slung  jeans,  why  they  decorate  their  navels  with  studs  or  jewellery,  and   why  belly  dancing  developed:  these  behaviours  advertise  health  and   attractiveness.  Ask  yourself,  how  would  you  feel  if  your  son  wanted  to  marry  a   young  woman  who  has  no  navel  and  who  claims  to  have  come  –  whatever  that   would  mean  –  without  one?13  How  would  you  feel  if  your  daughter  wanted  to   marry  a  young  man  who  was  born  with  neither  nipples  nor  navel?  And  would   you  welcome  as  an  in-­‐law  someone  with  blue  bones  and  green  blood?  As  he   flashed  a  blue-­‐toothed  grin  in  the  attempt  to  distract  attention  from  the   spreading  chartreuse  flush  that  betrayed  his  embarrassment,  one  could  not  help   wondering  if  he  is  genuinely  human  and  what  kind  of  offspring  he  might  father.   The  point  extends  to  all  aspects  of  human  behaviour.  A  failure  to  develop   in  the  customary  fashion  –  for  instance,  dysfunctionality  in  language  acquisition   and  use  –  will  be  perceived  by  others  as  signalling  neural  or  other  problems.  The   same  goes  for  aspects  of  social  behaviour  –  for  instance,  a  sense  of  justice  and  a   commitment  to  cooperation  –  that  made  life  in  the  Upper  Palaeolithic  possible.   And  if  the  creation  and  appreciation  of  art  was  prehistorically  as  widespread  as  I   claimed  initially,  a  person  who  showed  no  interest  in  any  form  of  art  would  be  as   unappealing  as  someone  who  is  without  intelligence,  humour,  social  grace,  care   for  others,  and  a  navel.     If  navels  and  art  behaviours  came  to  us  as  spandrels,  they  would  not   remain  so.  Their  occurrence  in  the  usual  manner  would  become  normative   because  they  provide  honest,  though  cheap,  signals  of  fitness.  They  are  cheap  in   the  sense  that  their  occurrence  in  the  usual  manner  is  so  prevalent  that  it  is  only   departures  from  this  that  assume  importance.  Such  departures  would  take  on   significance  for  sexual  selection  and  social  integration.  In  general,  any   transmissible  human  form  or  behaviour  that  was  recognised  as  signifying  well-­‐ 13    

Surgery  can  result  in  the  absence  of  a  belly  button.  A  reduced  one  can  be  the  outcome  of  a   lotus  birth  or  premature  caesarean.    

 

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Why  art  is  not  a  spandrel  

formedness  and  developmental  normalcy  would  not  only  become  statistically   average  as  it  successfully  spread  through  the  population,  it  would  become   normative  in  the  evaluative  sense,  whether  it  first  emerged  as  an  adaptation  or   as  a  spandrel.     IV     In  this  final  section  I  respond  to  concerns  that  might  be  raised  against  the   previous  objection  to  the  view  that  art  could  be  a  spandrel.   The  bodily  features  I  have  discussed  are  universal  and  cheap.  The  most   reliable  indication  of  a  sign's  honesty  as  a  signal  of  fitness  is  its  cost  to  the   creature  that  displays  it.14  Universal,  cheap  signals  will  not  be  accepted  as   reliable  signs  of  fitness,  so  they  will  not  become  normative.  They  will  not  come  to   guide  and  constrain  our  judgments  of  our  fellows  in  the  manner  I  have   suggested.   I  have  two  replies  to  this  first  objection.  In  the  case  of  the  structural   features  I  used  as  examples,  it  is  precisely  their  cheapness  that  makes  departures   from  the  norm  significant.  I  agree  that  their  presence  in  the  usual  way  says  little,   but  if  there  are  anomalies  regarding  them,  this  should  set  off  warning  bells.  I   predict,  though  I  do  not  know  the  data,  that  individuals  with  extra  digits,  webbed   feet,  or  strangely  placed  navels  tend  on  average  to  attract  mates  with  a  lower   overall  fitness  than  otherwise  one  would  predict  for  them.15   The  second  reply  shifts  attention  to  the  complex  social  practices,   including  our  interest  in  the  arts,  that  are  my  main  topic.  The  relevant  talents   14    

See  Zahavi  and  Zahavi  op.  cit.,  Alan  Grafen,  'Biological  Signals  as  Handicaps',  Journal  of   Theoretical  Biology,  vol.  144  (1990),  pp.  517-­‐546,  and  Thomas  Getty,  'Sexually  Selected   Signals  are  not  like  Sports  Handicaps',  Trends  in  Ecology  and  Evolution,  vol.  21  (2006),  pp.  83-­‐ 88.  

15    

Karolina  Kurkova,  a  Czech  supermodel,  has  an  indentation  rather  than  a  navel,  most  likely  as   a  result  of  surgery,  but  a  navel  is  frequently  airbrushed  into  photographs  of  her;  see   http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/magazine/7738144.stm.  And  plastic  surgery  is   frequently  used  to  "correct"  unusual  navels.  Of  course,  stories  in  which  "normal"  people  are   pitted  against  mutants  are  a  science-­‐fiction  stock-­‐in-­‐trade;  for  a  more  subtle  than  usual   treatment  of  the  theme,  see  John  Wyndham's  novel  The  Chrysalids  of  1955.  

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Why  art  is  not  a  spandrel  

and  skills  can  be  developed  and  displayed  to  different  degrees  and  in  different   areas.  In  general,  we  place  a  high  value  on  creativity,  and  we  expect  it  to  be   specialised.  And  we  place  similar  worth  on  connoisseurship  in  appreciation.  A   person  with  van  Gogh's  ear  for  music  –  a  person  let  us  say  who  enjoys  only   commercial  mainstream  music  and  makes  no  discriminatory  judgments  within   the  category,  or  worse,  enjoys  no  music  at  all  –  might  cultivate  an  expert's   interest  elsewhere,  say  in  post-­‐impressionist  painting.  This  emphasis  on   expertise  and  connoisseurship  should  not  be  equated  with  aesthetic  elitism.  It   applies  across  the  full  range  of  the  arts.  Aficionados  distinguish  many  different   types  of  techno16  and  every  pop  fanatic  I  have  ever  met  has  claimed  to  have  a   special  interest  in  a  kind  of  music  with  minority  appeal  and  could  point  to  crucial   differences  between  their  favoured  variety  of  pop  and  others,  these  being   differences  that  my  ears  were  inclined  to  miss.  Expertise,  both  as  creator  and   appreciator,  rarely  depends  on  raw  talent  alone.  It  comes  hard  won,  being   educated,  developed,  and  refined  through  practice,  experience,  exposure,  and   study.   Here  is  the  point:  even  if  the  possession  of  a  normal  navel  is  cheap,  and  is   therefore  not  a  positive  sign  of  fitness,  the  same  does  not  apply  to  the  arts.  These   allow  many  and  costly  ways  to  achieve  creativity  and  subtle  proficiency  in   appreciation,  which  can  therefore  act  as  reliable,  positive  signs  of  fitness.   Moreover,  though  interest  in  the  arts,  broadly  construed,  might  be  universal,   individuals  specialise  where  their  talents,  interests,  and  knowledge  lie,  and  this   differentiates  the  market  in  complex  ways.  A  person  can  afford  to  become  a   narrow  specialist  at  great  personal  cost  in  energy,  cognitive  investment,  and   expense,  provided  enough  others  are  like-­‐minded,  and  what  counts  as  "enough"   might  be  only  a  small  portion  of  the  total  population  if  that  total  is  high.  Relevant   art  behaviours  can  serve  as  reliable  signifiers  of  fitness,  then,  though  there  may   be  high  variability  and  competition  between  the  many  types  and  expressions  of   art  expertise  that  are  possible.  

16    

For  example,  see  Sean  Cooper's  discussion  in  M.  Erlewine  et  al.  (eds)  

All  Music  Guide  to  Rock  (San  Francisco:  Miller  Freeman  Books,  1997),  pp.  1155-­‐1156  

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Davies    

Why  art  is  not  a  spandrel  

The  second  concern  provoked  by  the  idea  that  form  becomes  norm  is  one   that  detects  hints  of  social  Darwinism  in  the  idea  that  arbitrary  aesthetic  tastes   that  do  not  identify  reliable  signs  of  fitness  can,  by  becoming  widespread,  later   dictate  what  counts  as  fitness.  It  looks  as  if  some  aesthetic  standard  would   become  evolutionarily  normative  if  it  could  be  imposed  sufficiently  widely,  with   the  result  that  an  evolutionary  sanction  could  be  claimed,  say,  for  racial  and   sexual  discrimination,  for  foot-­‐binding,  ritual  scarification,  homophobia,  and   enslavement  of  ethnic  minorities.   Admittedly,  the  position  defended  earlier  holds  that  what  become   normative  are  only  those  transmissible  human  forms  or  behaviours  that  are   recognised  as  signifying  well-­‐formedness  and  developmental  normalcy,  but  now   the  worry  can  be  articulated  as  one  about  how  vulnerable  and  corruptible  are   these  notions.  Most  societies  tolerate  many  individual  differences  as  normal  –   differences  in  hair  and  eye  colour,  in  hair  distribution  or  curliness  or   straightness,  in  skin  pigmentation,  in  height,  in  intelligence.  But  suppose  the   government  of  a  populous  society  enforced  a  decree  against  left-­‐handedness  to   the  point  where  its  citizens  regarded  left-­‐handedness  as  an  abnormality.  Rather   than  accepting  that  their  belief  changes  the  standard  for  normalcy,  at  least  in   their  own  society,  should  we  not  regard  their  belief  as  mistaken?   A  first  reply  to  this  concern  notes  that  the  preferences  under  discussion   are  ones  that  shaped  the  lives  of  our  distant  ancestors;  they  are  an  aspect  of  the   human  nature  we  inherited  from  our  forebears.  As  such,  they  will  not  easily  be   changed  by  government  edicts,  though  such  edicts  might  succeed  in  suppressing   or  distorting  their  expression.  Here  we  might  draw  an  analogy  with  human's   selective  breeding  of  non-­‐human  animals.  We  breed  them  for  traits  we  choose,   sometimes  to  the  detriment  of  the  animals'  normal  functioning,  but  this  external   control  does  not  necessarily  change  their  underlying  nature  or  the  preferences   that  are  indigenous  to  their  species.  It  is  not  the  case,  for  instance,  that  Labradors   are  sexually  attracted  only  to  other  Labradors.  In  the  human  case,  we  know  that   locally  arbitrary  conditions  can  conspire  with  human  preferences  that  go  on  to   affect  what  counts  as  statistically  normal  at  a  given  place  and  time  with  respect   to  such  factors  as  neck  length,  height,  weight,  tooth  whiteness,  and  the  like,  but  

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Davies    

Why  art  is  not  a  spandrel  

again,  it  is  not  as  if  intercultural  or  interracial  marriage  is  unheard  of.  So,  the   basic  character  of  the  preferences  we  are  discussing  runs  deep.   Moreover,  it  is  worth  recalling  that,  even  if  human  nature  includes  a   common  core,  it  is  also  a  crucial  aspect  of  human  nature  that  individuals  differ.   As  footnoted  earlier,  we  are  drawn  to  what  is  unusual  as  well  as  to  what  is   average,  and  this  works  to  preserve  diversity.  In  fact,  evolution  is  driven  by   individual  difference;  there  is  not  uniformity  but  a  varied  distribution  of  traits   across  the  species'  population  and  an  equally  varied  distribution  of  preferences   for  particular  traits.  The  point  here  is  that  developmental  normalcy  does  not  and   could  not  correspond  to  developmental  sameness.   Though  I  have  supposed  that  the  creation  and  appreciation  of  art  is   universal,  I  have  also  indicated  the  variety  of  ways  in  which  artistic  creation  and   appreciation  can  find  expression.  Not  only  are  there  differences  in  the  art   practices  of  distinct  cultures,  there  is  a  significant  diversity  of  art  practices   within  each  culture.  And  for  any  given  art  practice,  there  is  likely  to  be  a  spread   of  levels  that  accommodates  many  degrees  of  competence  among  the   participants.  All  this  means  that  there  are  many  ways  that  individuals  can  seek   the  artistic  development  of  their  distinctive  talents  as  creators  or  appreciators.   Nothing  in  the  form-­‐becomes-­‐norm  idea  requires  or  predicts  uniformity  or   regimentation  when  it  comes  to  a  social  practice  like  art,  with  its  long  historical   development,  advanced  sophistication,  and  scope  for  virtuosic  originality.   Indeed,  it  is  precisely  the  multiplicity  of  art's  possibilities  that  make  it  such  an   informationally  nuanced  signal  of  fitness.   The  factors  that  dictate  our  preferences  can  develop  and  alter  over  time,   of  course,  and  this  may  shift  what  counts  as  well-­‐formedness  and  developmental   normalcy.  To  return  to  dogs,  their  association  with  humans  has  altered  their   previously  wolfish  nature,  so  that  now  they  are  among  the  few  animal  that  find   human  yawning  contagious  and  that  look  where  the  finger  points  and  not  at  the   pointing  finger.  But  this  is  not  a  result  that  could  have  been  achieved  by  a  regime   of  training  alone;  it  also  required  the  selective  evolution  of  neural  structures  that   might  make  such  training  effective.  And  while  humans  are  highly  unusual  in  the   cognitive  and  social  plasticity  of  their  desires  and  norms,  and  this  is  certainly   relevant  to  their  capacity  to  adjust  to  an  extraordinary  range  of  environments  

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Davies    

Why  art  is  not  a  spandrel  

and  circumstances,  it  is  not  plausible  that  law,  religion,  or  other  forms  of   "external"  social  control  can  alone  change  our  natures  to  any  radical,  dramatic   extent.     V     In  this  paper  I  have  argued  that  the  thesis  that  art  is  a  spandrel  does  not  provide   an  easy  route  to  establishing  a  connection  between  human  art  behaviours  and   our  evolved  Homo  sapien  natures.  Indeed,  supporting  that  hypothesis  is  not   simpler  or  more  conclusive  than  arguing  for  the  controversial  alternative  that   identifies  our  creation  and  appreciation  of  art  as  an  adaptation.  In  addition,  I   suggested  that  characteristics  and  features  that  display  well-­‐formedness  and   developmental  normalcy  (or  departures  from  these),  even  if  they  originate  as   spandrels,  take  on  the  function  of  honestly  signalling  fitness  (or  unfitness)  and   thereby  acquire  adaptive  significance.  If  interest  in  art  emerges  spontaneously  as   part  of  our  normal  development  and  thereby  comes  to  signify  that  normalcy,  and   if  there  is  then  selection  for  the  art  behaviours  relative  to  that  normalcy,  then  the   art  behaviours  that  result  could  not  count  merely  as  spandrels.  In  fact,  the   variety  of  art  interests  and  specialisations  make  art  potentially  a  rich  indicator  of   many  different  fitness-­‐enhancing  capacities.     Stephen  Davies,   Department  of  Philosophy,   University  of  Auckland.    

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