It has invested in renewable energies: in 2011, Brazil was n°10 investor in clean energy (40% of its energy matrix10) and recorded the third-largest installed ..... Brazilian soldiers let the kids approach, give them a high five and joke with them ...
Working Paper
Brazil: a new powerhouse without military strength?
June, 2013 Mathilde Chatin (BPC Fellow)
BRICS POLICY CENTER – WORKING PAPER Brazil: a new powerhouse without military strength? Author: Mathilde Chatin*
Brazil: a new powerhouse without military strength? “Who can imagine, today, solving the problems of the world without Brazil?”1 The objective of this paper is to find out whether Brazil can challenge (if so how far) the realist conception of power according to which military capacity is a fundamental asset for a state to be elevated as a power on the international scene and whether its economic potential and soft power instruments can enable Brazil to play a strategic role worldwide. We will briefly introduce the realist definition of power before establishing a status-to-date of Brazil’s limited material capabilities, though acknowledging the modernisation process of its armed forces for dissuasion purposes. We will look at some of Brazil’s economic features before focusing on a detailed examination of three instances where Brazil’s soft power is acting, enabling the country to enhance its position as a global political actor: the Tehran Declaration, its participation in UN PKOs and its “diplomacy of generosity” towards Africa2. This analysis is guided by Morgenthau’s quote (1948:29): “in international politics, armed strength as a threat or potentiality is the most important factor for the political power of a nation”. The objective of this paper is to determine whether and to what extent Brazil supports or can contradict this statement. Geographical extent, economic and natural resources, industrial production, size of population and military preparedness are often listed as the elements composing the power of a nation. Realists conceive power either in terms of resources or in relational terms whereby “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not *Mathilde Chatin is PhD candidate, Brazil Institute King’s College London 1 Quote from former French President Nicolas Sarkozy. 2 These examples were chosen independently of the possible controversies and the relative success of each case.
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BRICS POLICY CENTER – WORKING PAPER Brazil: a new powerhouse without military strength? otherwise do” (Dahl, 1957). This study relies on the “power as control over resources” approach.
The 15 countries with the highest military expenditure in 2012 Rank 2012 (2011)
Country
Spending ($ b., market exchange rate)
Change 2003-12 (%)
Share of GDP (%) 2012
World share (%)
Spending ($ b., PPP)
1 (1)
USA
682
32
4.4
3.7
39
682
2 (2)
China
(166)
175
(2.0)
(2.1)
(9.5)
(249)
3 (3)
Russia
(90.7)
113
(4.4)
(4.3)
(5.2)
(116)
4 (5)
UK
60.8
4.9
2.5
2.5
3.5
57.5
5 (6)
Japan
59.3
-3.6
1.0
1.0
3.4
46.0
6 (5)
France
58.9
-3.3
2.3
2.6
3.4
50.7
7 (8)
Saudi Arabia
56.7
111
8.9
8.7
3.2
63.9
8 (7)
India
46.1
65
2.5
2.8
2.6
119
9 (9)
Germany
(45.8)
-1.5
(1.4)
1.4
(2.6)
(42.8)
10 (11)
Italy
(34.0)
-19
1.7
2.0
1.9
31.0
11 (10)
Brazil
33.1
56
(1.5)
1.5
(1.9)
(34.4)
12 (12)
South Korea
31.7
44
2.7
2.5
1.8
44.2
13 (13)
Australia
26.2
29
1.7
1.9
1.5
16.3
14 (14)
Canada
(22.5)
36
(1.3)
1.1
(1.3)
(18.3)
15 (15)
Turkey
(18.2)
-2.1
2.3
3.4
(1.0)
(25.9)
1,753
35
2.5
2.4
100
World
( ) = estimated figure
SIPRI (2013)
Considering Morgenthau’s quote and the realist theory of IR, we must point out that Brazil is not a military power and does not pretend to become one. Though Brazil has the largest hemispheric military capacities (55.27% of spending in 2011) (IISS, 2012), its military potential remains limited. Among the BRIC, Brazil is the only state with no nuclear weapons: its Constitution is the only one worldwide apart from New Zealand´s,
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BRICS POLICY CENTER – WORKING PAPER Brazil: a new powerhouse without military strength? to limit nuclear activities to peaceful purposes3. Brazil´s military spending is low compared to the US or other BRIC4, representing an estimated 1.5% of GDP in 2012 5 (1.9% of world share) and less than 5% of US spending6 (SIPRI, 2013). The size of the Brazilian armed forces (318,480 men) is 20% of that of the US (1,564,000 men) (Diplomatie, 2012). In 2008, while the Ministry of Defence had the third-largest budget7, the majority of its spending went into personnel (Diniz, 2010:166). Over 2000-2011, Brazil allocated only 14% of its defence budget on material investment and acquisition versus 30% for China and India (Hofbauer, 2012). Only half of Brazil´s military equipment is battle-ready: only 53 of the 100 ships and two of the five submarines can navigate; just two of the Marine´s A-4 jets are in condition to fly; not even half of the planes can take off and most exceed fifteen years of use. An ex-advisor to the Ministry of Defence8 commented: “we are incapable to do anything. Our capacity is fictional. I believe that if we went to war we would not have the condition to sustain the fighting for one day.” Nevertheless, Brazil has decided to undergo a modernisation process of its military: “the South American giant does not want to limit its hugeness to a question of money, and to avoid being seen as a politico-military dwarf, embarked in a rearmament strategy aimed at reducing its vulnerability with regards to the new and old powers” (BBC, 2012). For Celso Amorim, Brazil’s Defence Minister, Brazil should increase its defence spending to 2.3% of GDP (i.e. reach the level of the other BRIC) to gain a defence structure compatible with its growing projection abroad. Rising steadily since the mid-1990s (up to 30% over 2001-2010), Brazil’s military spending ranked eleventh worldwide in 2012 (SIPRI, 2012; Defesanet, 2012). Among other projects, in 2008 Brazil signed a contract with France to obtain a nuclear attack submarine by 2022 and plans to buy 36 fighter planes to renew its aerial fleet. Since realists believe that, “in international politics, force serves, not only as the ultima ratio, but indeed as the first and constant one” (Waltz, 1979:113), we will determine Article 21: “all nuclear activity within the national territory shall only be admitted for peaceful purposes and subject to approval by the National Congress”. 4 Military spending of other BRIC: China estimated US$166 billion; Russia estimated US$90.7 billion; India US$46.1 billion in 2012. 5 Brazilian military expenditure amounted to US$33.1 billion in 2012. 6 In 2012, the US alone (US$682 billion) was responsible for nearly two-thirds of worldwide military expenditure. 7 Representing 8.35% of government spending which is below the budget of the Ministry of Social welfare 40.93%, Health 10.27%; above the budget of the Ministry of Education 6.2% and Work and employment 5.6%. 8 M. Brigadeiro do Ar Delano Menezes cited in Rodriguez (2013:133).
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BRICS POLICY CENTER – WORKING PAPER Brazil: a new powerhouse without military strength? which features can enable Brazil to overcome the military handicap and permit the country to be labelled as a power. Based on the elements introduced here above, what are Brazil’s assets in realist terms? Among other examples: 1. Brazil’s landmass (three times Argentina) and population (half of South Americans) are fifth worldwide9. 2. Brazil has extensive natural resources: ·
It is the world’s third-largest exporter (40% of its production is exported). Its production is expected to increase by 40% over 2010-2019; Brazil ranks first or second globally for the production of many foodstuffs (half of sugar world trade and 30% of coffee world trade).
·
It has recently discovered vast “pré-sal” oil reserves. Petrobras ranks tenth worldwide and fourth in oil and gas production. Oil is Brazil’s “passport for the future”: by 2035, Brazil should have the largest growth in daily production outside the OPEC and the second worldwide after Iraq, increasing from the actual 2.2 Mb/d to 5.7 Mb/d in 2035 (Forbes, 2012; O Estado de São Paulo, 2012).
·
It has invested in renewable energies: in 2011, Brazil was n°10 investor in clean energy (40% of its energy matrix10) and recorded the third-largest installed capacity growth11. For example, hydropower represents 86.3% of Brazil’s power generation; the country is the second producer of ethanol after the US and should double its production by 202112 (PEG, 2011; OECD-IEA, 2012; OECDFAO).
3. Brazil has undergone large economic transformations: it is the world’s seventh largest economy and the IMF predicts it will be number five in 2015. Strikingly, having long been an international financial aid recipient, Brazil recently contributed to the IMF rescue fund for the EU.
Landmass: 8,515,000 km²; population: 194.6 million. Versus 26.5% for India, 11.5% for China and 2.6% for Russia 11 Behind China and Turkey. Brazil’s hydroelectric potential equals 260 GW. Itaipu is the second largest dam worldwide, after China’s Three Gorges, and Brazil’s Belo Monte dam will rank third. 12 Production to grow from 25,331 mnL for 2009-2011 to 51,305 mnL in 2021. In comparison, US (production for 2009-2011: 47,617 mnL; by 2021 : 82,610 mnL). 9
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BRICS POLICY CENTER – WORKING PAPER Brazil: a new powerhouse without military strength? 4. Brazilian companies have increasing global visibility and are representative of Brazil’s strategic sectors: among the “100 New Global Challengers”, 14 companies were from Brazil. In Forbes’ “World’s Biggest Public Companies”, 33 companies were Brazilian13 (BCG, 2009). 5. Social changes took place: poverty and indigence dropped from 37.5% and 13.2% to 24.9% and 7% over 2001-2009. If we imagined the Brazilian middle class was a country, considering its consumption capacity, it would be in the G20. The growing consumption of the emerging middle class (representing 53.9% of the population) boosts Brazil’s economy14: e.g. in August 2012, Brazil was the third-largest market for car sales (behind China and the US, overtaking Japan). In 2011, its beauty sector turnover represented 10% of the world market (ranking third behind the US and Japan) (ECLAC, 2011; Le Monde, 2012). Viner (1948) writes: “1. Wealth is an absolutely essential means to power, whether for security or aggression, 2. Power is essential or valuable as a means to acquisition or retention of wealth, 3. Wealth and power are each proper ultimate ends of national policy”. However, as Mead (2004) signals, “economic power is sticky power; it seduces as much as it compels”. In Brazil’s case, its economic expansion contributes to the country’s positive image, fuelling its soft power: “economy and products” (26%) is the second component mentioned after “tradition and culture” (35%) (BBC, 2012). Soft power is to shape what other wants, the ability to get what one wants through cooptive power or agenda setting, persuasion and attraction rather than coercion or payments (i.e. command power). The soft power of a country rests on three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad) and its foreign policies (when others see them legitimate and having moral authority) (Nye, 2004:11). Considering Brazil, where can one see that acting? What are the instances where Brazil has offered alternative perspectives, influenced by its national principles, experience and values, enabling the country to gain visibility and to have its voice heard? We will analyse three instances where Brazil’s foreign policy relies on soft power instruments and put forward the following strategy: “100 New Challengers”: behind China and India with 36, but ahead of Mexico and Russia with 7 and 6. Forbes: 136 from China, 61 from India, 28 from Russia and 20 from South Africa. 14 23.4 million were lifted out of poverty. Middle class: 105.4 million versus 65.9 million in 2003. 13
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BRICS POLICY CENTER – WORKING PAPER Brazil: a new powerhouse without military strength? 1. Brazil benefits from a favourable aura, based on the country’s positive image, in terms of culture, good humour and “inspiring success story”15 of economic and social development, 2. It is faithful to its national principles and values, like the peaceful resolution of conflicts, non-intervention, respect of sovereignty etc., 3. It exports domestically successful efforts and provides valuable expertise for developing countries.
1. Tehran Declaration and Iranian nuclear dispute We will study Brazil’s contribution to the Tehran Declaration and how the country relied on soft power tools, such as persuasion and consensus building, in the process. Marcelo Neri, President of IPEA16, explains: “Brazil has a natural vocation for diplomacy and dialogue. It is impossible to avoid the Brazilian spirit. The Brazilian (is) the mediator of conflict led by diplomacy” (Agência Brasil, 2012). Also, Brazil’s preference for the peaceful resolution of international disagreements strengthens its credibility as a potential leader. As expressed in its Constitution, Brazil favours the peaceful resolution of conflicts; therefore, it decided to intervene in the Iran nuclear dispute and avoid new rounds of sanctions against Iran17. Brazil believed diplomacy was the least damaging option with Iran, especially since Tehran’s political isolation would only radicalise the Iranian position18. To solve conflicts, Brazilian diplomats favour mediation, defined as the “intervention between conflicting parties to promote reconciliation, settlement, or compromise”19 and they intervene as third parties, as Brazil’s attempt to deal with the Iranian nuclear case demonstrates. Brazil’s soft power rests in its abilities to persuade and implement a mediation role. As the Tehran Declaration20 shows, Brazil is able to conceal or seek concessions of contending parts, and guide the discussion to optimise their needs, Quote from Hillary Clinton, former US Secretary of State. Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada 17 Finally, the UN imposed new sanctions ; Brazil and Turkey voted against 18 Quote from Roberto Jaguaribe. Preserving good relations with radical leaders could be a starting point to persuade them to respect rules and norms and bring more predictability to their behaviour. 19 Definition from the Merriam-Webster Dictionary cited in Jesus (2012). 20 A deal in which Iran agreed to send 1,200 kg of 3.5% enriched uranium to Turkey in exchange for 19.75% enriched nuclear fuel for a research reactor in Tehran. 15
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BRICS POLICY CENTER – WORKING PAPER Brazil: a new powerhouse without military strength? especially by carefully taking their perceptions into account and sometimes reframing their views of the strategic context. Brazil understands the need to insert values in its diplomatic action: it can articulate consensus, showing a comprehension of the diversity of interests. Brazil and Turkey insisted that Iran should accept three verifiable elements; Iran agreed to negotiate and made concessions: ·
the quantity of LEU21 to be transferred. Iran agreed to deposit 1,200 kg of its 3.5% LEU, i.e. the quantity indicated in the 2009 IAEA22 proposal,
·
the timing of the transfer,
·
the place where the exchange should occur. UNSC members had expressed the need for the uranium to be deposited in a third country, in this case Turkey.
Brazil tries to be an effective broker: it frames the bargaining process and the negotiation terms, organises and coordinates the dialogue between disputants to keep them in track, even in deadlock, asking them to change the debate’s focus. Brazil tries to orient the negotiation and develop bridges and common grounds by bringing up ties to surpass divergences, minimise tension and hostility (Jesus, 2012). Brazilian diplomats encourage flexibility: they usually offer multiple and flexible possibilities for solving disputes and allow the parts to have greater control over the mutually agreed political result. More likely to understand the other side and deal with underlying issues, they may show the willingness to work together, enhancing the likelihood of compliance and reducing the costs of the final deal. To persuade Iran to accept the Tehran Declaration’s content, Brazil was coherent with the principles of respect of sovereignty23 and non-interference in other countries’ domestic affairs, and avoided excessive intrusiveness and formality that would strongly limit Iran’s autonomy to build trust and facilitate the negotiation process. In the declaration, Brazil and Turkey left out the Iranian production of uranium enriched to 19.75%. Iran could ask for the return of its LEU if the provisions of the declaration were not respected24. To avoid excessive pressure on one of the disputants for rapid and unsatisfying outcomes, Low-enriched uranium International Atomic Energy Agency; the US claimed that the initial conditions had lost validity since Iran had acquired more uranium and after giving 1,200 kg to Turkey it would still have sufficient quantity to create a bomb since stockpiles of LEU had grown to 2,200 kg. 23 The country’s international projection has been coherent with a more mature position on pragmatic concepts, parameters and values such as the respect for sovereignty and the rule of law in its foreign affairs (Jesus, 2012:186). 24 The deposit of LEU was pendant on receipt of 120 kg of 19.75% enriched uranium suitable for Tehran’s Research Reactor; though possible violations were not precisely defined. Those terms were not considered effective or successful by Western great powers, because Iran could request the return of its LEU for any reason, at any time, and preserve the essential structure of its nuclear program. 21 22
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BRICS POLICY CENTER – WORKING PAPER Brazil: a new powerhouse without military strength? Brazil’s style emphasises the search for gradual solutions and approaches to encourage dialogue aimed at long-term results, based on respect, trust, equality and commitment. This gradualist perspective would allow the development of confidencebuilding measures as prerequisites for the settlement of disagreements, which entails patience, mutual understanding and the transformation of a culture of confrontation when dealing with “rogue” states since cordiality makes dialogue more effective and favours more lasting solutions. The country’s culture of cordiality and the moral obligation to help others has created a comparative advantage for Brazil in assisting parts to negotiate their settlements (Jesus, 2012). Iran showed more comfort in working with two emerging nations as “interlocutors between weak and strong” and non-nuclear weapon states enjoying greater legitimacy in negotiating issues related to Iran’s nuclear program. In any conflict, psychology, atmosphere and environment comprise 60% of all negotiations (methodological issues and content only represent 20% each)25. Brazil and Turkey spoke to Iran as their counterpart and equal (not through the power hierarchy of the international system) and without prejudging Iran’s nuclear program had necessarily non-peaceful ends. This atmosphere facilitated a deal with Iran, and not the content, similar to the IAEA proposal. Also, since Brazil used to have low direct participation in political affairs in the Middle East, prior Brazilian decisions or actions regarding security issues in the region did not cause resentment (Ozkan, 2011:28-30; Jesus, 2012). While Brazil advocates for global nuclear disarmament and denuclearisation, it supports the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. As mentioned above, its constitution limits nuclear activities to peaceful purposes. Brazil adhered to the main international nuclear non-proliferation agreements: in 1991, ABACC26’s creation led to a bilateral non-proliferation agreement with Argentina, and, in 1994, the IAEA-ABACCArgentina Brazil agreement imposed inspections and a safeguards system on nuclear activities in both countries. In 1994, Brazil integrated the Latin American Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone by implementing the Tlatelolco Treaty and adhered to the NPT27 in 1998. Brazil’s contribution to the global disarmament issue was recognised by Ambassador Duarte’s appointment in 2007 as the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs at the Under-Secretary-General level. Brazil is a persistent Comment from the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs. Agência Brasileiro-Argentina de Contabilidade e Controle de Materiais Nucleares is a bi-national agency accounting for and controlling nuclear materials. 27 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 25
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BRICS POLICY CENTER – WORKING PAPER Brazil: a new powerhouse without military strength? opponent to the unequal non-proliferation agreement, dividing the world in two groups of countries (those with and those without nuclear weapons), and has actively advocated for the nuclear weapon states to comply with the terms of the NPT and undergo nuclear disarmament. Brazil emphasises that the objectives of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing: if non-nuclear weapon states have guarantees that nuclear weapons are not being developed or targeted against them, they will not feel stimulated to develop their own nuclear weapon programs. About Iran, Lula said: “The existence of weapons of mass destruction is what makes the world more dangerous, not agreements with Iran” (Patti, 2010:180-182; Jesus, 2010). The NPT states that all parties have an “inalienable right” to develop, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Through the Tehran Declaration, Brazil defended the possibility for a Third World country to acquire a technology considered important for its economic development and, as the South’s spokesperson, voiced developing countries’ interests. Brazil and Iran suffered analogue pressures from the international community to abandon their nuclear ambitions28.
“Brazil is committed to the strictly peaceful use of nuclear energy. However, Brazil also asserts its strategic need to develop and master nuclear technology. The country needs to ensure the balance and the versatility of its energy matrix and advance in areas such as agriculture and health, which may benefit from nuclear energy technology. And carry out, among other initiatives that require technological independence in terms of nuclear energy, the nuclearpropelled submarine project”.29 Brazil’s solidarity can be interpreted as the common desire to have access to this energy source, especially as it believed that sanctions would create precedent to target other nuclear programs. Although the success of the Tehran Declaration is controversial and accusations of diplomatic immaturity were voiced by UNSC30 members, Brazil and Turkey created a different type of strategy to the use of sanctions that could bring better political results:
For example, in most recent years, Brazil refused to sign the Additional Protocol of the NPT. 2008 National Defence Strategy 30 UN Security Council
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BRICS POLICY CENTER – WORKING PAPER Brazil: a new powerhouse without military strength? the willingness to listen more carefully to the other side’s demands and the flexibility to accommodate different positions. They crafted a political discourse, which is solutionoriented, fair in its engagement, diplomacy-based on a global issue, changing the nature of discussions, making one-sided dialogue between the international community and Iran obsolete. The Tehran declaration is an effort by non-Western powers to solve a non-Western issue in the security area, often seen as the playground of traditional powers, upgrading the emerging powers’ engagement in global politics. Celso Amorim commented: “the fact that Brazil and Turkey ventured into a subject that would be typically handled by the P5+131 and, more importantly, were successful in doing so, disturbed the status quo”. In its contribution to the Tehran Declaration, Brazil relied on soft power tools like persuasion and consensus creation, permitting the country to gain, if not approval, increasing visibility in global politics.
2. “Braço forte, mão amiga”: participation in UN PKOs32 For Fontoura (1999:32), peacekeeping is “about the activities to be handled in the field with the consent of the parties in conflict, by military officers, police and civilians, to implement or monitor the execution of arrangements related to the control of conflicts and its solution, in addition to the political efforts made to find a peaceful and sustainable solution for the conflict”. First, we will establish the evolution of Brazil’s involvement in UN PKOs. Brazil has been involved in over 30 UN PKOs and, in January 2013, it was the eleventh largest contributor, representing 2.36% of total contributions33. It provided 2,170 troops, 20 UNEM34 and 12 policemen for a total 2,202 individuals. While Brazilians participating in PKOs were only 79 in 2003 or 83 in 2004, they jumped to 1,367 in 2005 and equalled 1,344 in 2010 before the earthquake in Haiti35. MINUSTAH’s successive Force Commanders were Brazilian and General Santos Cruz, recently appointed as Force Commander of the UN mission in Congo, had led MINUSTAH over 2007-2009.
UN Security Council members + Germany Peacekeeping operations 33 After Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Nepal, Jordan, Ghana and Egypt in number of men involved. Comparatively, over 2004-2009, it oscillated between n°14 and n°20. Access March 8 2013. 34 UN Military Experts on Mission and troops 35 These figures correspond to January of the years mentioned. 31 32
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BRICS POLICY CENTER – WORKING PAPER Brazil: a new powerhouse without military strength? Then, we will identify the reasons for Brazil’s participation in PKOs. Neack (1995:183) suggests two sets of reasons. States can have: ·
Idealist motivations: they will participate in peacekeeping out of an obligation to protect international peace and preserve global norms and values, even when it is against their own interests.
·
Realist incentives: they do whatever they can, given their power resources, to protect and preserve their national interests, using participation in PKOs as an instrument leading to more international prestige or more participation in the UN decision-making organs.
So what about Brazil?
Classification of Brazil’s motivations to participate in peace operations
Internal
Bilateral/regional (reasons mentioned more frequently)
Institutional (reasons mentioned in most recent cases)
The interests in the area of legality or Brazilian domestic institutions
The interests between Brazil and the host country or countries in the surrounding region or other contributors of troops
The respect of interests manifested in the UN as international organisation with its own internal politics
- Legitimate the request of a - Comply with the - Show solidarity with a country seat on the UNSC; principles of Article exiting conflicts; 4 of CF/88; - Strengthen multilateralism - Intensify relations with host and the peaceful resolution of - Train the armed country or neighbouring countries; solve conflicts; forces36; - Intensify relations with other - Maximise the Brazilian - Promote the role of countries contributing troops; and influence in the UNSC during the military in the two-year mandates37; society. - Promote Brazilian trade and investments. - Demonstrate capacity of mobilisation. Uziel (2010)
According to Uziel (2010), it is uncommon to have references to the role of training of the armed forces because they do not see the sending of troops to peace missions as one of its central missions. 37 In a few cases, but the beginning of the missions in Mozambique, Angola, East Timor and Haiti actually occurred during Brazil’s two-year mandates: 1993-4, 1998-99 and 2004-05.
36
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BRICS POLICY CENTER – WORKING PAPER Brazil: a new powerhouse without military strength? Following the realist justification, the 2008 National Defence Strategy underlines the need to subordinate the sending of troops to notions of results and national interest: “Brazil will have to expand its participation in peace operations, under the aegis of the UN38 or multilateral organisations of the region, in accordance with national interests expressed in international commitments”. The quest for greater international recognition and prestige is mentioned in debates to explain Brazil’s participation in PKOs. The 1996 National Defence Policy associates three priorities: the achievement and maintenance of Brazilian interests abroad; Brazil’s projection in the concert of nations and its insertion in the international decision-making process; the contribution for the maintenance of international peace and security. Brazilian diplomats believe there is a price to pay to be among the nations making the rules39: “Our participation in the UN mission in Haiti comes from the principle that peace has a price. This price is that of participation. To be absent or to avoid having an opinion or act in front of a situation of crisis can mean the exclusion from the decision-making process or worse the dependence on relations with other countries or regions”40. Brazil’s contribution to peacekeeping would show that it takes responsibility, fitting its role as an emerging world actor, thus giving legitimacy to its claim for a seat in the UNSC41.
“Many people say that Brazil went to Haiti because it wants a place on the Security Council. Clearly, it could be said that all of Brazil’s actions, in a certain way, might enable us to be part of the Security Council but our engagement in Haiti was not conditioned by this specific end. Things do not take place in such an automatic way. There are other factors more profound that are involved”.42 States are capable to take more than one thing into account, meaning they do not associate the action exclusively to whatever element: they emphasise the identities and political institutions, i.e. follow the rules, but do not exclude the calculation of “expected
The UN is the only legitimate body to determine the presence of foreign troops in a sovereign country: “multilateralism encounters in the UN its legitimate expression. The UN has a Universalist vocation of inclusion of peoples and the respect of its member states’ sovereignty. Its large degree of legitimacy is derived from its universal vocation and the representativeness of its composition; and this Brazilian engagement reflects our conviction that, to reflect the will of the international community, the UN are better equipped than whatever individual country to promote international peace and security” (Celso Amorim cited in Uziel, 2010: 102-103). 39 Quote from Monica Herz in The Economist. 40 Quote from Minister Celso Amorim 41 Also pointed as reasons for Brazil’s contribution to the Tehran Declaration and its development assistance to Africa. Olivier Stuenkel (FGV for AFP) “This policy also reflects a political interest: there are 54 countries in the UN, where Brazil aspires to a seat on the Security Council”. 42 Quote from Minister Celso Amorim 38
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BRICS POLICY CENTER – WORKING PAPER Brazil: a new powerhouse without military strength? consequences”43. For Celso Amorim there can be an “interaction between national interest and solidarity. Solidarity corresponds to our long-term national interest”. Neack’s “quest for moral leadership” fits Seitenfus’ view that Brazil’s decision to contribute to Haiti was driven only by solidarity diplomacy and deprived of national or strategic interests. He argues that this idea is supported by Celso Amorim’s comment that Brazil is “fundamentally committed in Haiti, politically and emotionally, and this in the long term”. Actually, Brazil has mostly contributed to missions in CPLP44 members and Haiti with which it had cultural affinities and/or geographical proximity. Finally, we will examine Brazil’s approach to PKOs and establish that it is driven by savoir-faire tactics and influenced by culture, which is “composed of psychological structures by means of which individuals or groups of individuals guide their behaviour”45. PKOs involve a range of aspects like will, principles, strategies, tactics and abilities that are part of an accumulated experience. Due to their “negotiator profile”, Brazilian peacekeepers try to find any possible way to avoid relying on the “last resort” option. The 1996 National Defence Policy commits the country to the “search of a peaceful solution to controversies, with the use of force solely as a resource for selfdefence”. 46 For example:
·
In Mozambique, ex-guerrilleros had blocked a road inside the Brazilian troops’ action zone threatening to plunder NGOs trucks transporting food to the population. Due to the negotiation capacity and the sympathy the troops benefited from, the ex-guerrilleros gave up on the plundering and opened the road for the convoy, escorted by the Brazilian patrol to their destination47.
·
In Angola, a Brazilian commander decided to negotiate with ex-guerrilleros’ hungry relatives and gave them part of their food reserves, rather than defending the UN resources at all costs, risking the lives of poorly armed civilians and compromising the peace process (Aguilar, 2012:219-220).
Human actors choose between alternatives, evaluating their probable consequences for personal or collective objectives, conscious that other actors are doing the same. 44 Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa 45 Definition cited in Aguilar (2012:216). 46 The 2008 National Defence Strategy says: “Brazil is peaceful by tradition and conviction. It conducts its international relations, among others by the constitutional principles of nonintervention, defence of peace and peaceful solution of conflicts. Its pacifist character is part of the national identity and a value that should be preserved by the Brazilian people”. 47 It should be pointed out that in this situation, the troops had not received the mission to escort. This fact permits us to illustrate the high degree of professionalism of the Brazilians and their constant will to fulfil the mission. 43
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BRICS POLICY CENTER – WORKING PAPER Brazil: a new powerhouse without military strength? Brazilian peacekeepers are in a region of conflict to serve, to help. They do not see the population as the enemy and the effect can be evaluated in material illustrating the Haitian people’s affection for MINUSTAH troops or real emotion of local civilians during the Brazilian troops withdrawal from Mozambique, Angola and East Timor. A popular comment says that, from 1994 to 2004, Haitians ran away fearing US troops; today, Brazilian patrols are greeted with open arms. Moreover, Haiti proves the Brazilian peacekeepers’ facility of communication since Haitians do not speak Portuguese, differently from most other missions in which Brazil participated, easing contact with the population. Brazilians are able to communicate as much as with the Armed Forces than with the population independently from the nationality, religion or language. Aguilar (2012:220-221) makes an analogy with Brazil’s domestic situation: the religious cohabitation in Brazil enables the respect for diverse religious practices48. Additionally, the multiracial character of the Brazilian population, of the Armed forces and of the Brazilian troops sent to PKOs facilitates the cohabitation with various nationalities, limiting the risk of racial discrimination towards the local population or mission members. Also, Brazilian soldiers are able to adapt more easily to the situations of misery in Mozambique, Angola, East Timor and Haiti; they are less likely to be traumatised or distance themselves from the poorest members of the population. The shock is tuned down, reducing the adaptation time and permitting quick positive results49. Brazilian peacekeepers are familiar with similar conditions; this enables the soldiers’ proximity to the local population, stimulating the spirit of solidarity and help. Some illustrations were observed in Haiti50:
·
Brazilian soldiers let the kids approach, give them a high five and joke with them; they are even trained to, told that proximity with the children is the best way to win over the population. The researcher has seen the counter-example of a Jordanian soldier pushing a kid away with intermediate force making the child fall down.
·
During patrols, Brazilian soldiers get out of their vehicles and walk around, favouring contact with the population, while some companies of other nationalities are uncomfortable and prefer to stay in their vehicles.
They can create relational problems between the contingents of different countries, even producing difficulties for the success of the operation. 49 For participants coming from more developed countries, initially the impact is large and they have a greater difficulty to adapt to devastated spaces, poor populations living in sub-human conditions. 50 The researcher made the following observations during her trip to Haiti in April 2013.
48
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BRICS POLICY CENTER – WORKING PAPER Brazil: a new powerhouse without military strength? Ultimately, Brazilian peacekeepers consider the populations as equal and do not think themselves as superior because of the difficult conditions locals endure. In East Timor, soldiers gave classes of capoeira to the community and would encourage social activities, like samba and football, for the local population during their free time and at their own initiative; this method was also observed in Haiti. Actually, culture acts as a “business card”: carnival, football and capoeira are Brazil’s “brands” abroad and they create a positive vision of Brazilians, enabling them to act with facility. For example, in 1995, the Bosnian army commander accused the UN of being incapable to solve the problems or maintain security in the Bosnian Muslim areas that the organisation had declared secured. The discussion toned down when he talked about football and carnival with a Brazilian, permitting more cordial negotiations and to tackle some items on the agenda (Aguilar, 2012:223). Brazilians peacekeepers manage to keep their gaiety; that of observers and policemen in former Yugoslavia caught the attention of the other mission participants. UN civil servant asked a Brazilian observer if this character trait was common to all Brazilians; she had known Brazilian observers in different other UN missions and, in whatever situation, all surprisingly maintained their good humour (Aguilar, 2012:223). Brazilian peacekeepers act with impartiality; this is recognised by local populations. In East Timor, though Brazilians were on their territory, imposed rules, sometimes strictly to maintain order, the people agreed that this was their mission and acknowledged the impartiality with which it was carried out. Brazilians are also known for their high degree of professionalism. They have a strong determination to comply with the mission, associated with a capacity to find solutions to the problems, showing goodwill and sometimes going beyond the limits imposed by the mission, possibly increasing the risks involved. As illustrations:
·
During a period of downsizing, the Brazilian contingent in UNTAET51 was put in charge of containers with dangerous contents; this was not part of its
51
United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
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BRICS POLICY CENTER – WORKING PAPER Brazil: a new powerhouse without military strength? attributions52. It gained the gratitude and admiration of the Australian officers who coordinated the logistics of the mission. ·
In Indonesia, the UN decided to organise a meeting including the FALINTIL53 whose participation was conditioned to the guaranty of their physical integrity. This was ensured by sending a Brazilian official to the guerrilla camp throughout the duration of the meeting (Aguilar, 2012:225-226).
Brazilian peacekeepers are capable to endorse the UN’s mission and fulfil it just as if Brazilian authorities had assigned the task. They do not lose courage in front of obstacles, or rely on the operation’s higher organs to solve the issue, complying exactly with the mandate and the established rules to minimise risks or avoid taking responsibility; they search all the possible means to reach the objective. For example, to build the Brazilian base in Mozambique, material had to be bought in Malawi. The Brazilian soldiers managed to cross the border while the UN mandate did not authorise it, without relying on the highest spheres to find an alternative solution, bought the necessary material, finished building the base and carried out the assigned tasks (Aguilar, 2012:226). “The Brazilian contingent and the exceptional Force Commanders have made an invaluable contribution to the stabilisation process, based on a combination of different qualities: professionalism, firmness and courage in the face of opposition; imagination, sensitivity and a readiness to reach out and above all, a genuine desire to help the Haitian people. Drawing on this mixture of characteristics, the Brazilian contingent has played a critical role in overcoming some of the most difficult security challenges. The performance of Brazil’s contingent has won the admiration and gratitude of their comrades and colleagues, and of the Haitian leadership and people. It corresponds to the ideal of UN peacekeeping, according to which peace cannot ultimately be imposed through force, but must be consolidated by winning hearts”.54 This citation explains how the “Brazilian way”, meaning the impact of Brazilian culture, values and behaviours, influences their appreciated contribution in PKOs.
This is why the mission was not attributed but requested. Due to successive delays in the arrival of the foreign boats, the mission was finally postponed. 53 Forças Armadas de Libertação Nacional do Timor Leste 54 Speech April 25, 2009 Hédi Annabi, former Special Representative of the Secretary-General to Haiti 52
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BRICS POLICY CENTER – WORKING PAPER Brazil: a new powerhouse without military strength?
3. Brazil’s “diplomacy of generosity” and Africa In this section, we will present the extent of Brazil’s technical assistance. In 2009, Brazil’s development cooperation spending equaled US$362,210,06355, compared to US$158,103,452 in 2005. Technical cooperation grew from around US$11,422,103 to US$48,872,380.
ABC56
coordinated
the
negotiation,
approval,
signing
and
implementation of over 400 South-South technical cooperation agreements. The total number of projects and partner countries increased exponentially from 23 projects and 21 countries in 2003 to around 489 technical cooperation projects and activities in 56 countries in 2009. Africa absorbed 57.2% (US$22,049,368) of Brazil’s overall technical cooperation budget57, with the five Portuguese-speaking countries representing 74% of those resources spent in Africa. 28% of the allocated resources went into professional education, while agriculture and health represented 27% and 19%. These sectors comprise two-thirds of Brazilian technical cooperation (Inoue, 2012:517-519; White, 2013:130). But how is Brazil’s presence in Africa guided by soft power? Brazilian authorities resist the label of donor and prefer to characterise Brazil as a Southern development partner. Brazil refuses the idea of a hierarchical relationship in its development partnerships with the developing countries receiving Brazilian aid in response to their demands (i.e. demand-driven action). They are more comfortable with the term South-South and horizontal cooperation suggesting that their development assistance relations are qualitatively different from North-South aid relations, distancing themselves from paternalism, conditionality and political interference in domestic affairs often associated with traditional donors. Brazil has positioned itself as a rising power of the South familiar with the development challenges faced by African countries and a better
Inoue (2012) comments that this figure does not include concessional loans by federal banks like BNDES and does not consider that each dollar spent in the Brazilian technical cooperation to developing countries program should be multiplied by ten because most of Brazilian organisations that implement the projects are public institutions and do not charge for their participation or for their know-how. 56 Agência Brasileira de Cooperação 57 More than twice the budget in 2009 (only 50.1% or US$9,608,816.64). In comparison: Latin America 37.4% or US$14,437,785 in 2010 and 39.5% or US$7,575,235 in 2009; Asia & Middle East 5.4% or US$2,082,674 in 2010 and 10.5% or US$2,012,682 in 2009.
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BRICS POLICY CENTER – WORKING PAPER Brazil: a new powerhouse without military strength? understanding of the recipient countries’ needs and sensitivities, having long been a development aid recipient (Inoue, 2012). Marco Farani, ABC former director, explained:
“Because of similarities in social and economic realities and challenges to be faced in many areas, partner countries can absorb knowledge resulting from exchanging experiences with Brazil, which are more easily adapted and applied to real cases if compared to traditional solutions offered by traditional partners. Affinities of historical and cultural, linguistic and economic nature as well as shared heritage and aspirations - favour the expansion and realisation of South-South cooperation and contribute to its success”.58 White (2010) argues that Brazil’s foreign policy, especially in its presence in Africa, is linking various agencies (BNDES59, Embrapa60 and APEX61) with diplomatic agreements and business interests. One must acknowledge that Brazil’s development cooperation with Africa, defined as strategic for Brazil’s foreign policy, is part of its “policy of diversification”, both in economic and diplomatic terms. As illustrations, Brazil has the fifth largest number of embassies in Africa62 (increasing from 17 to 37 in a decade) and Lula visited 29 African countries in 12 journeys. Commercial exchanges reached US$26.5 billion in 201263. Brazil’s major companies are big players in Africa: Odebrecht is the largest private sector employer in Angola, Vale works on megaprojects like a coal mine in Mozambique and an iron mine in Guinea Buissau and the BNDES granted US$682 million in 2012 for Brazilian companies in Africa64. President Rousseff recently announced the cancellation of twelve African nations’65 debts for a total of US$900 million. African countries greatly contributed to Roberto Azevedo’s election as WTO Director General, proving the appreciation of Brazil’s action in Africa. While some argue that prestige and economic interests guide Brazil’s development cooperation, Pino and Leite (2010) explain that its main objective is to promote its partner countries’ socio-economic development. Lula argued that his government’s
Cited in Cabral (2013:5). Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social 60 Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária 61 Brazilian Export Promotion Agency 62 Brazil ranks behind the US (49), China (48), France (46) and Russia (38). 63 Compared to US$5 billion in 2000. 64 Increase of 46% compared to 2011. 65 Senegal, Ivory Coast, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, Mauritania, São Tome and Principe, Sudan and Guinea Bissau 58 59
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BRICS POLICY CENTER – WORKING PAPER Brazil: a new powerhouse without military strength? diplomatic action would be oriented by a humanistic perspective, meaning that SouthSouth cooperation is inspired by the idea of “solidarity diplomacy”.
“(It is part of a broader effort) to strengthen the relations between Brazil and other developing countries. South-South cooperation is an important instrument to show Brazil’s image and its potential to the outside. Brazil transfers not only its best competences and skills, but also reveals the country’s attitude as an active actor in the international scene in support of development and solidarity, thus putting into practice a traditional principle of Brazilian foreign policy”.66 In this perspective, we will present Brazil’s development assistance projects in the key areas of the fight against poverty and hunger, health and energy.
Brazilian technical cooperation by sector supported in Africa, 2003-2010 Social development 2%
Planning 2%
Urban development 4% Public administration 5%
Agriculture 31%
Health 27%
Energy 6% Education and professional training 17%
Environment 6%
ABC (2011) apud Cabral (2013)
1. Brazil provides technical assistance in tropical agriculture, becoming an important partner in Africa's quest for food security67. Because of similar climatic and geological Marco Farani cited in Inoue (2012:515). Since the 1960s, Africa went from being a net food exporter to importer and its population rate outstripped its annual increase in food production.
66 67
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BRICS POLICY CENTER – WORKING PAPER Brazil: a new powerhouse without military strength? conditions to those of most Sub-Saharan Africa, Brazil adapted its agricultural expertise and technology to the African continent68. It offers free transfer of expertise in techniques for improving the soil, adapting seeds and strengthening crop resistance to drought and pests. Embrapa implements agricultural cooperation projects in fifteen African countries69: e.g. the support of horticulture in Senegal and the improvement of cashew nut post-harvest technologies in Tanzania to technical cooperation on native seed rescue, production and breeding in family-based agriculture in Namibia. Brazil’s flagship projects include a model cotton farm in Mali to increase the Cotton-Four’s70 productivity and quality in production and an experimental rice farm in Senegal training technicians from Senegal, Guinea-Buissau and Mauritania in rice production and processing technologies. The Africa-Brazil Agricultural Innovation Marketplace has established a platform linking African institutions and Embrapa research centres; it has ten cooperation projects in seven African countries. Following demands by African Ministers of Agriculture, a project line71, based on the Mais Alimentos program, was designed to support local food production by African family farmers across the value chain. It offers special credit lines for the agriculture machinery purchase and insurance against harvest losses. It is linked to food purchase or national school feeding schemes and other public procurement programs that guarantee family farmers’ secure market access. Because Brazil is seen as a model for effective social programs, African countries showed interest in its cash transfer programs. Representatives72 went to Brazil to learn from the Bolsa Familia experience and gain insights into its design, implementation and management, arranging study tours and visits to the Ministry of Social Development and Hunger Alleviation73. Launched in 2008, the Africa-Brazil Cooperation Program on Social Development will provide a more systematic coordination of cooperation programs with African countries. In 2007, Brazil had already provided Ghana with technical assistance in the design of a pilot social grants program and a pilot project for Bolsa Familia’s implementation is under negotiation with Benin (Stotle, 2012:11-13).
It was easier than for traditional agricultural powers like the US or the EU. Please note that Embrapa is undergoing a restructuring process of its action in Africa. 70 i.e. Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali 71 Implemented in cooperation with FAO and World Food Programme 72 Ghana, Guinea Buissau, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa and Zambia 73 Because it is in charge of the program 68
69
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BRICS POLICY CENTER – WORKING PAPER Brazil: a new powerhouse without military strength? 2. Considering Brazil has included the right to health in its constitution74, Brazil is perhaps the rising power that is strategically most successful in connecting its global health initiatives with a declared foreign policy objective of becoming a player in international affairs75. All of Lula's 12 journeys to Africa had a health component. Brazil has signed 53 bilateral agreements on health topics with 22 African countries. Brazil's know-how in designing and implementing an efficient AIDS program76 interests Africa. Brazil supports African countries in articulating multidisciplinary responses to HIV/AIDS (care and treatment, capacity building in the field of prevention, logistic and supply-chain management for medicine distribution). It shares its experience on methods to mobilise NGOs and strengthens private sector involvement in HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment programs. Brazil has contributed to the construction of a generic antiretroviral drugs factory in Mozambique. It is the most ambitious and expensive South-South cooperation project ever launched by Brazil. The plant operates since mid-2012 and investment costs reached US$100 million77. It will produce 21 medication types to fight HIV/AIDS, initially to meet the national demand only, before expanding to supply all sub-Saharan Africa. Brazil provides capacitybuilding measures to enable the generic drugs production to be taken over by Mozambican technicians trained by Fiocruz78. ANVISA79 and the Ministry of Health support Mozambique in establishing a drug regulatory authority to control the safety, quality and price of these medicines. During the 2010 FIFA World Cup, Brazil developed an Awareness and Prevention Campaign, based on its practice with prevention campaigns during Carnival80. Also, Brazil is establishing a haemophilia and sickle cell anaemia81 centre in Ghana dedicated to treatment, research and training. Fiocruz opened its first regional office in Mozambique in 2008 to coordinate, monitor and evaluate the growing number of Art. 6: “health is a right of all and a duty of the state, guaranteed through social and economic measures that aim to reduce the risk of diseases and other ailments and provide equal and universal access to actions and services for its promotion, protection, and recovery.” 75 Kickbush (2007) cited in Dauvergne (2012: 911). 76 It received the UNESCO award. For HIV/AIDS, Brazil has cooperated with the following countries: Botswana, Burkina Faso, Congo, Ghana, Liberia, Mozambique, Kenya, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia. 77 It was announced during Lula's visit to Mozambique in 2003; amount that should compared to the expected US$ 23 million 78 Fundação Oswaldo Cruz, responsible for the pharmaceutical production process of the plant 79 Agência Nacional de Vigilância Sanitária 80 It included the distribution of 30,000 condoms and leaflets about the prevention of HIV/AIDS and other STDs in fan parks and public viewing areas. 81 For sickle cell anaemia, Brazil has cooperated with Angola, Benin, Ghana, Senegal. 74
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BRICS POLICY CENTER – WORKING PAPER Brazil: a new powerhouse without military strength? Brazilian health projects in Africa and offer training and courses to African professionals in health-related areas. It aims to assist CPLP countries to strengthen their health systems and establish health national institutes. In 2010, Brazil set up the Africa-Brazil Health Research Network to develop a framework for cooperation between Brazilian and African researchers, fostering further research and cooperation projects on neglected tropical diseases82 (Stotle, 2012:13-15). 3. Since energy scarcity is a main obstacle to Africa’s development83, Brazil has offered its expertise on energy-related topics, like renewable and non-renewable energy production and public policies to extend energy access to poor and remote areas. In May 2012, Brazil signed a cooperation agreement with Mozambique to help the country implement its Luz para Todos Program84. Brazil became an interesting partner for states aiming at energy independence85 by offering oil-importing African countries free transfer of its biofuel technology, assisting these countries in developing their own biofuel industries and reducing their oil dependence. Brazil launched several initiatives to share its expertise on biofuel production and use like Pro-Renova86. In Nigeria, plans to build a Biofuel Town including rural migrants trained to become biofuel producers were announced in 200787. With Angola, Brazil has set up the BIOCOM88 joint venture; the plant will produce 30 million L of ethanol and 250 annual tons of sugar, predominantly supplying Angola's domestic market. Sudan became an ethanol exporter using Brazilian technology89. Ghana, which developed a biofuel sector with the help of Embrapa, will host a Brazil-funded sugar-cane plantation expected to produce ethanol for domestic supply and export. For malaria, Brazil cooperated with Angola, Cape Verde, Cameroon, Congo, Guinea-Buissau, São Tomé and Principe. For cooperation projects in the area of health (tuberculosis, cancer, oral health, community-based therapy, primary health care, cardiac and paediatric surgical procedures, prenatal and neonatal care): Cape Verde, Angola, Algeria, Mozambique, São Tomé and Principe, Sierra Leone. 83 The entire installed generation capacity of 48 sub-Saharan African countries is not more than that of Spain. Around 90% of the total population have no access to modern energy. 84 UN refers to the program as a model for rural electrification. Programs in this area with: Angola, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mozambique, Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa, Zambia. 85 Brazil reached energy independence in 2006 and went from being a net energy importer to net energy exporter. Programs for biofuel technology transfer with: Angola, Ghana, Mozambique, Nigeria, Republic of Congo, Senegal, Sudan, Uganda, Zambia. 86 The Structured Programme for Support to other developing countries in the Area of Renewable energy is a memorandum of understanding with the West African Economic and Monetary Union for cooperation on biofuels and biofuel technology transfer in the framework of the IBSA forum 87 Announced by a consortium of Brazilian and Nigerian research organisations and private companies 88 Bioenergy Company of Angola 89 15 million L of ethanol to Europe in 2010; ethanol is expected to become the country's fourth major export 82
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BRICS POLICY CENTER – WORKING PAPER Brazil: a new powerhouse without military strength?
Brazil claims to assist African countries to explore oil reserves: due to geological similarities, it has raised hopes of replicating the Brazilian discoveries. Petrobras has concentrated its African activities on the west coast, exploring deep and ultra-deep waters with the technology that enabled Brazil’s discoveries90 (Stotle, 2012:15-17). Brazil’s development assistance to Africa demonstrates that its action abroad is based on soft power tools, especially when dealing with countries of the South, benefiting from its image as successful economic and social development model, remaining faithful to its national principles like non-intervention and respect of sovereignty and exporting efforts that worked at a domestic level. 85% of Brazilian diplomats think Brazil has a more important international role than ten years ago and 91% that it should have a stronger international presence in the future (Souza, 2008). In the last BBC “Country Ratings Poll”, Brazil ranked n°791 with 46% of interviewees having a positive image of the country’s influence in the world (BBC, 2013). Looking at the realist definition of power and its attributes, this paper has established that Brazil is not a military power and tried to determine which assets could contribute to Brazil’s ascension as a power. This study mentioned the country’s economic potential before analysing in-depth three cases, putting forward Brazil’s soft power strategy driven by the positive image it benefits from, the faithfulness to its national principles and values and its valuable expertise for developing countries, based on the export of projects domestically successful.
References: Agência Brasil (2012) “Presidente do Ipea diz que Brasil tem vocação natural para diplomacia e conciliação”. Aguilar, Sérgio (2012) “Uma cultura brasileira de missões de paz” Diplomacia brasileira para a paz Funag, 215-241. BBC (2012) “Brasil muestra su músculo militar em la fronteira”. ____ (2012) “Imagem positive do Brasil sofreu queda de 2011 para 2012, diz pesquisa”. ____ (2013) “Cresce percepção negativa sobre o Brasil no mundo, diz pesquisa”. Deepwater oil exploration programs with: Angola, Benin, Gabon, Libya, Namibia, Nigeria, Tanzania. 91 It ranked behind Germany (59%), Canada (55%), the UK (55%), Japan (51%), France (49%) and the EU (49%), but ahead of the US and the other BRICS.
90
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BRICS POLICY CENTER – WORKING PAPER Brazil: a new powerhouse without military strength? BCG (2009) “100 New Global Challengers”. Cabral Lídia and Alex Shankland (2013) “Narratives of Brazil-Africa Cooperation for Agricultural Development: New Paradigms?” Working paper Future Agricultures. Dauvergne Peter & Déborah Farias (2012) “The Rise of Brazil as a Global Development Power” Third World Quarterly, 33:5, 903-917. Defesanet (2012) “Brasil precisa investir em defesa como os demais BRICS, diz Celso Amorim”. Diniz Eugênio (2010) “Defesa, orçamento e projeto de força: o Brasil em perspectiva comparada” Segurança Internacional: práticas, tendências e conceitos. Diplomatie (2012) “Géopolitique du Brésil”. ECLAC (2011) “Panorama social de América Latina”. Fontoura Paulo (1999) “O Brasil e as operações de manutenção da paz das Nações Unidas” Brasilia: Funag. Forbes (2012) “World’s Biggest Public Companies”. Hofbauer, J; Hermann, P. and Reghavan, S. (2012) “Asian Defense Spending, 2000-2011. A Report of the CSIS Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group”. Washington: CSIS. Inoue, Cristina Yumie Aoki & Alcides Costa Vaz (2012) “Brazil as ‘Southern donor’: beyond hierarchy and national interests in development cooperation?” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 25:4, 507-534. IISS (2012) “The Military Balance” Chapter 8. Jesus (Santos Vieira de) Diego (2010) “The Brazilian way: negotiation and symmetry in Brazil’s nuclear policy” Nonproliferation Review, vol. 17 no. 3, 551-567. ___________________ (2011) “Building trust and flexibility: a Brazilian view of the fuel swap with Iran” The Washington Quaterly, 34:2, 61-75. ___________________ (2012) “Emancipation through Mediation: Brazil and the Tehran Declaration” The Global Studies Journal, vol. 4 issue 3. ___________________ (2012) “The Global Role of an Intermediate Power: Brazil and the Iranian Nuclear Program” New Global Studies vol. 6 issue 2 art 5. Kenkel Kai 2011 “Interesses e identidade na participação do Brasil em operações de paz” Revista tempo do mundo vol 3 n 2, 9-35. Le Monde (2012) “Brésil: les classes moyennes rehaussent le marché de la beauté”. Mead Walter (2004) “Sticky power” Foreign policy. Morgenthau Hans (1948) “Politics among Nations”. Neack Laura (1995) “UN Peace-keeping in the interest of community or self?” Journal of Peace Research vol 32 n 2, 181-196. Nye Joseph (2004) “Soft power: the means of success in world politics” US: Public Affairs. __________ (2011) “The Future of Power” US: Public Affairs. O Estado de São Paulo (2012) “Agência Internacional de Energia reconhece papel do petroleo brasileiro”. OECD-FAO (2012) “Agricultural Outlook 2012-2021”. OECD-IEA (2012) “Medium-term renewable energy market report”. Ozkan Mehmet (2011) “Turkey-Brazil involvement in Iranian nuclear issue: what is the big deal?” Strategic Analysis, 35:1, 26-30. Patti Carlos 2010 “Brazil and the nuclear issues in the years of Luiz Inácio da Silva government (2003-2010)” Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, 53, 178-197. 24
BRICS POLICY CENTER – WORKING PAPER Brazil: a new powerhouse without military strength? PEG (2011) “Who is winning the clean energy race?” Rodriguez Julio (2013) “Os efeitos de limitadas capacidades materiais na política externa de potências intermediárias do sisterma internacional” Doctoral thesis. Seitenfus Ricardo “Elementos para uma diplomacia solidária: a crise haitiana e os desafios da ordem internacional contemporânea” ______________ “Um exemplo do diplomacia solidária : o Brasil no Haiti”. SIPRI (2012) “Yearbook: armaments, disarmaments and international security”. SIPRI Fact Sheet (2013) “Trends in world military expenditure 2012”. Souza Amaury (2008) “Brazil’s international agenda revisited” Brazil: CEBRI. Stolte Cristina (2012) “Brazil in Africa: just another BRICS country seeking resources?” Briefing paper Chatham House. Terra (2011) “Brasil tem 5a maior presença diplomática na África”. Turan Ilter (2010) “Estranhos companheiros ou novos aliados: a aventura nuclear do Brasil e da Turquia no Irã” Política Externa, vol. 19, no. 2. Uziel Eduardo (2010) “O Conselho de Segurança, as operações de manutenção da paz e a inserção do Brasil no mecanismo de segurança coletiva das Nações Unidas” Brasilia: Funag. Viner Jacob (1948) “Power and plenty as objectives of foreign policy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries”. Waltz Kenneth (1979) “Theory of international politics”. White Lyal (2010) “Understanding Brazil’s new drive for Africa” South African Journal of International Affairs, vol 17 n 12, 221-242. ________ (2013) “Emerging powers in Africa: Is Brazil any different?” South African Journal of International Affairs, 20:1, 117-136.
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