1 Argumentative polylogues in a dialectical framework

Lewiński, M., & Aakhus, M. (2013). Argumentative Polylogues in a Dialectical Framework: A Methodological Inquiry. Argumentation, 28(2), 161–185. doi:10.1007/s10503-013-9307-x

Argumentative polylogues in a dialectical framework: A methodological inquiry Lewiński, M., & Aakhus, M.

1. Research problem Our chief concern in this paper is with the analysis and evaluation of argumentation in multi-‐party discussions (polyogues). Complex multi-‐party discussions, as opposed to simple two-‐party encounters, are a familiar and ordinary argumentative phenomenon. They arise whenever different speakers take up and discuss more than two positions (standpoints) at a time – an event instigated, for instance, by an open Wh-‐question (Who should become the professor of the year? How to help Greece? Which wine should we drink first?). Answers to such questions typically form a set of multiple contrary positions on an issue: they can then be critically examined to judge which one of them is “correct” or “best.” While such multi-‐party and multi-‐position discussions are characteristic of a large class of argumentative activities, especially of a deliberative type, in argumentation theory they are typically analyzed and evaluated with the help of dialectical models. Such models theorize argumentation as a dyadic exchange between two and only two parties (such as protagonist and antagonist or proponent and opponent) who take up only two basic positions (such as pro and con or agree and doubt). We will explore the problem dyadic assumptions pose for adequate argumentative analysis by scrutinizing how extant methods of dialectical reconstruction and evaluation miss important aspects of argumentative polylogues. We aim to reveal some challenges to such methods and suggest possible improvements that pave the way for conceptualizing a polylogical model of argumentative discussion. Our main research problem is, accordingly, this: How do the complexities of multi-‐party argumentative discussions (polylogues) affect the capacity for the analysis and the conditions for evaluation of argument through dialectical models? The question of the analysis and evaluation of polyogues brings about too many fundamental issues to be dealt in one paper. Therefore, we will focus on the following research question: What options for analyzing and evaluating argumentative polylogues do extant dialectical models offer and why are they limited (section 3)? On the basis of this critical inquiry, we hope to lay out a tentative argument expressing the need for an improved model, suggesting some rudimentary elements of the model (section 4).1 As an illustration of the issues discussed we will use an example of a university committee arguing over the “researcher of the year” prize (section 2). This example is a case of 1 We only discuss here the dialectical approach to analyzing and evaluating argumentative polylogues.

There are of course other perspectives investigating argumentative (rhetoric, logic) or some other aspect of rationality in collective decision-‐making (decision theory, social choice theory, game theory, etc.). We notice though, that while they have much to recommend, none of them focuses on the analysis and evaluation of argumentation qua interaction to the extent that dialectical approaches do.

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practical reasoning in the common context of multi-‐party deliberation where the governing question – “What to do?” – concerns future actions. However, we believe that our point is generalizable to cases of theoretical reasoning in other contexts in which the truth-‐related question of “What is the case?” is discussed; for instance: What is the mass of the new asteroid? How many bottles of wine did we drink last night? To such questions, many competing responses (positions, hypotheses) may too be formed and discussed in an argumentative polylogue. That is to say, while for the purposes at hand we work through a specific example and type of deliberation, we see a broader relevance of our investigations to argumentation theory. 2. Who’s the best professor? To provide a place to start, consider the following example of a committee meeting within a university’s school. The example is constructed so as to allow us to focus on the aspects of the committee’s argumentation that are relevant to our inquiry and yet are real concerns of a deliberating group. The committee meets to decide whom to award the annual best researcher prize, for which only one faculty member can be selected. Prior to the meeting, in accordance with the school procedures, three nominations have been officially proposed by the school’s faculty. Each candidate comes from a different department of the school that comprises of five departments; two of the departments are thus not represented in the nominations. Five faculty members -‐-‐ one per department -‐-‐ take part in the meeting, which is presided over by a chair whose sole role is to manage the meeting rather than actively contribute to the discussion of the candidates. Following the procedures, before the meeting the committee members were given the portfolio (updated CV, recent publications, grants awarded, etc.) of the three nominees in order to come prepared to the meeting and advocate for one chosen candidate. Each committee member is expected to support only one candidate, but one candidate may be supported by more than one member. Committee members are free to change their support based on the committee discussion. It is customary in the school to make such decisions on the basis of arguments and criticisms traded during the meeting rather than using the meeting as a stage for rubber-‐stamping deals struck beforehand behind the scenes. It is also acceptable for the committee to decide that no award can be given that year but it is not acceptable to give more than one award. At the beginning of the meeting, the chair invites each committee member to make a case for a selected candidate – a short piece of argumentative discourse in which the merits of a given candidate, as compared to the remaining two, are argued for. After each member’s presentation, it becomes evident that faculty members A and B support candidate α, member C supports candidate β, and members D and E support candidate γ. Having argued for their preferred researcher of the year, they are expected to convince the remaining members of the committee that their candidate deserves the award more than the others. The committee members are of course free to eventually change their position (some indeed have to do it for a decision to be taken). To this end, 2


arguments are traded for and against the three candidates, as each committee member makes a case for their professor in an ordered sequence overlooked by the chair. The ultimate goal is for the committee members to converge on the decision on meritorious grounds. That means that the final decision is not taken as a result of a simple majority voting, but rather on the basis of a consensus, at least in the form of “reluctant adherence” of those who ran out of arguments, of all the members over the best researcher of the year.2 An argumentative situation after the committee members’ presentations is as follows: Issue:

Who should receive the best researcher award of 2012/2013?

Positions on the issue:

Candidate/Position 1: Candidate/Position 2: Candidate/Position 3:

Prof. α Prof. β Prof. γ

(A and B) (C) (D and E)

It is worth noting that α, β, and γ are logically speaking contrary positions -‐-‐ the “truth” of one of them entails the “falsity” of the remaining ones, however the “falsity” of one of them does not entail the “truth” of the other (as would be the case with contradictory positions) (see Author1, 2013).3 So for instance selecting Prof. α excludes the two remaining candidates, but dropping her does not amount to selecting Prof. β or Prof. γ (only one of them can be selected, and the committee still has to decide between the two; also, there is an option of not awarding the prize at all). This makes the deliberation in question a decision-‐making activity in which positions are clearly defined and explicitly advocated by a given party, and the goal is to select, upon critical examination, one of these positions. There are thus “winners” and “losers”. This stands in contrast to other forms of multi-‐party argumentation, such as for instance in open-‐ problem tasks where positions are not attached to the speakers all along and the goal is to collectively “construct” a solution that would best satisfy the arguers’ critical judgment. In this case, there are not necessarily “winners” and “loser”, since, ideally, the end-‐result satisfies everybody or, as the case may be in real circumstances, nobody.4 Despite five actual conversational participants (see the pentagon in Figure 1), we thus have three argumentative parties advocating three standpoints, since A and B converge in their support of Prof. α and D and E in their support of Prof. γ. Thus, during 2 Exactly how they start the discussion is a secondary concern for our present purposes as ultimately whether they come in with established position or develop positions in the course of the conversation, they still must end up at a single choice based on their argumentative discussion of the options. 3 Since we speak here of actions to be taken (whom to award a prize) rather than beliefs in the strict sense,

we put the belief-‐related terms such as truth and falsity in inverted commas. Of course, the decision to select a given candidate is, ideally, grounded in a belief that this is indeed the best researcher. 4 See Author

1, forth., for a distinction between role-‐based dialectics, where arguers take up the roles of the proponents and opponents of given positions, and issue-‐based dialectics, where arguers examine the pros and cons of a given issue without making their case for a selected position on the issue.

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the initial portions of the meeting, at least, each of the argumentative parties (whether made up of a team or an individual) is a proponent of one of the three contrary positions (α, β, γ), and at the same time an opponent of the two remaining ones. They are expected to argue for their position/candidate and against the two remaining positions/candidates since only one award can be given. Each proponent has thus two opponents who, in turn, are opponents vis-‐à-‐vis each other (Figure 1). Figure 1 – “Triangulated” argumentative discussion with 3 distinct parties supporting 3 contrary positions: conversational situation and argumentative situation.

This type of small group deliberation, despite its apparent simplicity, generates a rather complex argumentative discussion that we will use as a basis for our methodological inquiry into the analytic tools offered by the extant dialectical models of argumentation. The case is on face value representative of many kinds of everyday argumentative encounters and thus we also draw upon examples taken from others’ work in argumentation analysis to further illustrate and examine the implications of the position we develop here. We can also imagine many variations to the example, but our aim is to start from a simple exemplary case from which relevant, important variations can be taken up in due course. 3. Dialectical understanding of polylogues 3.1 Analyzing argumentation in a dialectical framework The guiding two-‐fold question of this section is: How would dialectical analysis treat polylogues where multiple positions are advanced and developed through multi-‐party discussion and with what consequence for evaluating argument? Before we set off to 4


answer this question, we need to clarify what we understand by “dialectical analysis”. It is a largely procedural form of analysis of actual argumentative discourse that approaches all varieties of argumentation -‐-‐ mono-‐logical, di-‐logical, poly-‐logical -‐-‐ as a more or less straightforward instantiation of a dyadic dialogical exchange between the arguing party (protagonist, proponent) and the critiquing party (antagonist, opponent).5 The goal of dialectical analysis is to render the structure of argumentative exchanges in dialectical terms (i.e., as moves in a dyadic exchange of pros and cons) and subsequently evaluate them by a comparison to a set of rules stipulated for idealized models of dialectical discussion (Hamblin, 1970; Rescher, 1977; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984, 1992, 2004; Walton, 1984, 1998; Walton & Krabbe, 1995). Interestingly, while dialectic is by definition an approach to studying and practicing argumentative interactions (e.g., Krabbe, 2000), some most prominent dialectical approaches have relied heavily on static methods of argument analysis (see analytic overviews in pragma-‐dialectics or argumentation schemes in Walton’s dialectics) that basically lay out the monological structure of arguments put forth by one of the parties.6 By contrast, in the following we consider what we think is the gist of dialectical analysis, that is, a method of approaching the argumentative aspect of conversation that is dynamic while retaining the normative aim of evaluation. Profiles of dialogue used by Walton (1999) and Krabbe (1999) and dialectical profiles used by pragma-‐dialecticians (van Eemeren, Houtlosser, & Snoeck Henkemans, 2007) are two examples of methods that very well fulfill the requirements of rational dialectical reconstruction of the dynamics of argumentative dialogues in a step-‐by-‐step fashion. The profiles are primarily normative constructs which spell out the moves in ideal dialectical models such as pragma-‐dialectical critical discussion. Therefore, the dialectical sequences in the profiles are modeled as neat two-‐party interactions with simple dyadic turn-‐taking (A-‐ B-‐A-‐B) between the proponent (protagonist) and opponent (antagonist). This, of course, is an element of the idealization inscribed in the profiles. Some difficulties, however, may arise when the profiles serve a heuristic function, that is, when they are used to reconstruct and evaluate actual argumentative exchanges as more or less imperfect instantiations of the idealized dialectical sequences. One such difficulty is how to mold a complex multi-‐party interaction into a dyadic dialectical profile. Taking this specification into account, we recognize two basic ways in which a multi-‐party and multi-‐position argumentative polylogue such as our committee meeting can be analyzed dialectically. We identify different variants of these two basic ways and 5 A di-‐logue in which two parties trade arguments and criticisms is a paradigmatic object for dialectical analysis. However, monological reasoning can be also reconstructed as an internal critical dialogue (e.g., Blair, 1998; Jacquette, 2007; Johnson, 2000). The possibilities and perils of dialectically reconstructing polylogues will be discussed in the remainder of the paper. 6 Walton’s framework of different dialectical dialogue types allows for a dynamic dialogical analysis of the

entire procedure of activities such as deliberation; but such analyses take into account all communicative aspects of deliberation (proposal making, bargaining, preference aggregation, voting), rather than the strictly argumentative exchange of reasons and criticisms (Walton, 1998, Ch. 6; McBurney, Hitchcock, & Parsons, 2007; Rehg, McBurney, & Parsons, 2005).

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discuss the shortcomings of such an orientation for grasping the nature of polylogue and its reconstruction for argument analysis. 3.2 Polylogue as argumentation between two basic camps The first option is to reduce the multiplicity of positions argued for and against to two basic camps. This method would seek to interpret any discussion involving multiple parties and multiple positions as an essentially dyadic encounter revolving around two dominant poles. The argumentative and conversational status of those who do not easily fit into the bi-‐polar division would be demoted to the one of third parties, secondary addressees, uninvolved bystanders, or simply undifferentiated members composing “the other” or “the audience.” The reduction of an argumentative polylogue to two main opponents can be justified on a number of grounds. The crudest form of justification seems to be theoretical stipulation, such as in formal dialectical models. For instance, Prakken, in his formalization of a “persuasion dialogue”, takes into account only one proponent and one opponent and proposes that “[t]he remaining participants, if any, are the third parties with respect to [a thesis] t, assumed to be neutral towards t” (2009, p. 286). There is thus nothing else left to analyze but t vs. t? and t vs. ¬t dialogues, because in a dialectical sense “third parties” are neither parties (they do not participate in a persuasion dialogue by making or doubting a case) nor third (they cannot offer any alternatives). Such formalization does not, however, apply to cases like our committee meeting. While its chairman is by institutional definition a “neutral third party”, we are still left with three other parties each of them having a contrasting opinion with respect to a proposition of who should be given the title of the best researcher. In contrast to such theoretical fiats, empirically oriented dialectical analysts have marshaled factual evidence for excluding some “third parties”. For instance, Salmon and Zeitz note regarding the argumentative conversations they examine: “Although more than two persons are participants in the conversation, usually two of them are engaged in a dialogue while the third participates only incidentally. At different points in the conversation, different participants play the role of the ‘third’” (1995, p. 14). Therefore, in their method of representing argumentative exchanges, Salmon and Zeitz (1995) render multi-‐party discussions as di-‐logues held predominantly between arguers B and C, with occasional or no contributions from the taciturn arguer symbolized by A. A similar solution is adopted by van Rees: “In the fragment which is analysed below, most of the conversation takes place between A and B. C makes the occasional contribution. D is the secretary to the hospital management and rarely speaks. When he does so, it is usually to express support for A” (1995, p. 346). Accordingly, van Rees’s dialectical analysis focuses on the argumentative exchanges between A and B, largely glossing over the other participants’ “occasional contributions”. In such empirical analyses, the reconstruction of multi-‐participant speech events as dyadic dialectical exchanges is justified on purely observational, conversational grounds. Some participants are simply outtalked or virtually “left out” by the two dominant ones, a distinct regularity 6


mentioned already by early conversation analysts (Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974, p. 712). All the same, van Rees’s (1995) in-‐depth analysis of a “problem-‐solving discussion” over a possible merger of two local hospitals in the Netherlands, includes some instances of multi-‐party argumentation. Despite van Rees’s largely dyadic analysis of argumentation between participants A and B, the occasional contributor C does interfere at points trying to argue his own case, different from both A’s and B’s. This breaks the basic dyadic dynamics of A-‐B-‐A-‐B exchanges: “a misunderstanding about the relevance of B’s contribution develops: B intends it as a return to his own point, while A treats it as support for C. They are talking at cross purposes.” (1995, p. 356). For this reason, in van Rees’s view, A’s move to engage the relatively taciturn C rather than argue just with B suffers from irrelevance, a major source of dialectical fallaciousness (Walton, 2004). But this irrelevance cannot be adequately accounted for without a reference to a third party (C). A is not simply irrelevant, and thus fallacious, in a dyadic dialectical encounter with B. He commits an alleged fallacy vis-‐à-‐vis B’s argument in the context of, and because of, C’s argumentative move that is a relevant and legitimate contribution to the current discussion.7 (A is not merely distracted by a bird or a notable passer-‐by.) A’s irrelevance thus possibly lies in the eyes of the beholder focused entirely on the dyadic exchange between him and B. Therefore, with different eyes which take C’s arguments into view, we may reconsider A’s retort as an argumentatively reasonable thing to do. In sum, some important considerations go amiss in a neatly dyadic analysis focused (primarily or even exclusively) on the discussion between A and B. In this and similar instances, we can thus speak of argumentative moves that are apparently unreasonable on dialectical grounds but reasonable in a polylogue. Van Rees’s study, however, also reveals a different possibility, that of one participant “expressing support” for another one (1995, p. 346). This conversational phenomenon has been well analyzed under the label of a “tag-‐team argument” (Canary, Brossmann, & Seibold, 1987; Brashers & Meyers, 1989) or “argumentative coalitions” in conversational polylogues (Bruxelles & Kerbrat-‐Orecchionni, 2004). Argumentation teams or coalitions are formed whenever a group of participants gather behind a position they favor, and consistently co-‐produce various arguments for that position (and against the opposing one), in effect mutually supporting each other. Noticeably, the experimental research design and general framework for analyzing argumentation within and between tag-‐teams is characteristically limited to but two positions on an issue, such as a risky vs. conservative solution to a choice dilemma, each of which is supported by one of the two sub-‐groups confronting each other (Brashers & Meyers, 1989). For instance, out of five arguers, two are assigned a risky option and are set against three who are assigned a conservative one. Thus, again, we obtain two argumentative parties out of a number of conversational participants. This mode of analysis also leads to difficulties in some “uncontrolled” natural contexts of argumentation. To take but one example: Author1 (2010) analyzed the 7 See van Rees’s (1995) study for the transcripts of entire exchanges and her detailed analysis.

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pattern of collective criticism (collective antagonist) in online political discussions. While the collective antagonist seems to be a mere counter-‐part of the tag-‐team (collective protagonist), there are important differences between the two, one of them crucial in the context of a polylogue. Tag-‐teams are by definition clearly demarcated groups that consistently co-‐produce arguments for one position, whereas collective antagonist “is collective only in the sense of the object of criticism”, because arguers that engage in collective criticism “do not seem to be jointly defending any one consistent position” (2010, p. 95). For instance, Republican critics of Barack Obama’s tax policies, are, quite unsurprisingly, consistently challenged by the supporters of the Democratic agenda, but also, less expectedly, by advocates of “the third way” in American politics who are critical of both Republican fiscal conservatism and Obama’s tax plans, because “the Dems and the GOP [the Republicans] are two sides of the same coin” (op. cit., p. 92). Hence, critics of the GOP from the Democratic position are “united” with the third-‐way advocates only temporarily as critics, but quickly disagree with them when argumentation in support of Obama is to be put forth. They thus never create a tag-‐team that can be approached as one dialectical party with a consistent commitment set (see Walton & Krabbe, 1995). Again, even when taking collectivities of arguers into account, we face three (or perhaps more) distinct positions that must not be analytically merged and conflated. Beyond such empirical studies, a bi-‐partisan divide can be justified on analytic grounds whenever the multiplicity of positions is merely apparent. This happens, for instance, when different positions are variants of some overarching position or when they are compatible and can be merged into one. Moreover, depending on the level of generality of the contested issue around which a dispute revolves, some in-‐group differences of opinion can be reconciled or swept away as insignificant nuances when facing the challenge from the out-‐group. In this way, two dominant, opposing sides to the issue emerge. (Think of how some well-‐known divisions within political parties, such as American Republicans or Russian Bolsheviks, fade into the background once the big antagonist, the Democrats or the Tsarists, is to be opposed.) Another solution to dualize the multiplicity of parties is to follow rhetoricians, who typically analyze any multi-‐party discussion as though arguers were rhetors persuading diverse audience.8 The basic framework for rhetorical analysis is a dyad consisting of the speaker and the audience she is addressing. When the speaker confronts the audience which cannot be taken to be a monolithic group, but is for instance divided into “several organized factions” (Perelman & Olbrechts-‐Tyteca, 1958/1969, p. 22), the rhetorical analyst can preserve the duality by approaching the speaker as an arguer that: builds multiple argumentation consisting of individual lines of reasoning catered to different parts of the audience (op. cit., p. 21-‐22; van Rees, 8

Perelman & Olbrechts-‐Tyteca (1958/1969) use the term “composite audience”; Zarefsky (2008) “heterogeneous audience”; van Eemeren (2010, p. 110) distinguishes between “multiple” audience (“consisting of individuals or subgroups having different positions in the difference of opinion”) and “mixed” audience (“consisting of individuals or subgroups having different starting points”).

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2003); addresses a universal audience whose concerns raise above the particularities of concrete factions (Perelman & Olbrechts-‐Tyteca, 1958/1969, pp. 31ff); or at least attempts to persuade a primary audience, the chief target of the speaker’s arguments, to which the other parts of the audience are mere conduits, or secondary audiences (van Eemeren, 2010, pp. 108-‐109). Rhetorical concepts, such as composite or heterogeneous audience, work well for understanding the complexities of the rhetorical situation in which a speaker needs to meet multiple, and sometimes conflicting, demands if her or his speech is to be successful with the addressees. However, our focus here is on the dialectical rather than rhetorical analysis and evaluation of argumentation. Indeed, when argumentation is reconstructed as interaction rather than one-‐way public speaking -‐-‐ which marks a significant difference between dialectical and rhetorical study of argumentation (e.g., Krabbe, 2000; Blair, 2012) -‐-‐ the rhetorical concepts (such as “audience”) do not neatly correspond to the dialectical ones (such as “antagonist”). Zarefsky, who provides insightful analyses of the ways a heterogeneous audience can be handled in political oratory, cautions that: If one were to imagine the audience as simulating the antagonist in a dialogue, then one would have to say that the antagonist is schizophrenic or has multiple personalities. Yet the arguer often tries to appeal to these multiple personalities at the same time. (Zarefsky, 2008, p. 320)

The antagonist’s “schizophrenia” an arguer may encounter in multi-‐party discussions affects, prominently, the basic dialectical requirements of consistency and relevance. Examples of this are plentiful (e.g., Bonevac, 2003; Perelman & Olbrechts-‐Tyteca, 1958/1969, p. 31). Author1 (2012) analyzes a case of a centrist European government which must convince some of the opposition parties to support further austerity measures. It seems to be a straightforward case of a protagonist (government) vs. antagonist (opposition) debate, nicely suitable for dialectical analysis and evaluation. But the opposition parties are divided: leftists criticize the proposal for being too unresponsive to the needs of the poor, while conservatives argue it curbs far too much the entrepreneurial spirit of able businessmen. The government defends the proposal with what seem like well-‐justified arguments, but what is relevant and convincing for the leftists hardly strikes a chord with the conservatives (and the other way round). So the government faces the following predicament. It can either focus exclusively on a dialectical discussion with but one of the opposition parties, thus avoiding the burden of proof against criticisms of the other opposition party; or, it can try to be simultaneously responsive to both parties’ concerns, thus possibly getting itself into uncomfortable inconsistencies (e.g., “we are diverting rich people’s taxes to alleviate the poor” and “we are not overtaxing the rich”). Straightforward dialectical evaluations of such activities are hard. Finally, an argument critic can analyze any multiparty discussion as though involving third parties that play an auxiliary role in argumentation. There are various kinds of roles that can be taken up in collective situations: the judge, chair, facilitator, 9


moderator, mediator, etc. From a dialectical view, these different roles are all versions of third-‐parties to a discussion and are (expected to be) dialectically neutral in the sense that while their function is to shape or overlook the activity of argumentation, they are in principle not supposed to produce or criticize arguments over the issue in question. Detailed analyses of discursive manifestations of such roles have been undertaken by argumentation scholars: both those who aim at a close “dialectical reconstruction” of argumentation (e.g., van Eemeren et al., 1993, esp. Ch. 4; van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2005) and those who start from a dialectical view to investigate what happens under conditions that are dialectically less than ideal (Author2, 2003; Jacobs & Author2, 2002). Noticeably, however, these dialectical analyses of argumentative discourse of various third-‐parties to a dispute remain somewhat vague on the very notion of a “third party” in argumentative interaction. While such analyses focus on the argumentative roles of third parties, these roles do not square well with the basic dialectical capacity of trading pros and cons (or doubts) on a contested issue. Third parties are third precisely because they are not (expected to be) openly active in contention defined by the conflicting positions the protagonist and the antagonist take. Rather, they intervene in a simple support capacity, so this is work done at stages other than the pragma-‐dialectical argumentation stage. In theory, such third parties are excluded from the basic dialectical framework of arguers trying to convince their critics. Yet, as repeatedly observed (Author2, 2003; Jacobs & Author2, 2002) in practice the “disinterested” “third parties” contribute substantially to argumentative interactions, often skillfully managing their role of a neutral moderator with actual engagement, including direct contributions to the content of arguments given and taken. This is evident in third-‐party practices of questioning and summarizing (Author2, 2003; Jacobs & Author2, 2002). While it is possible that dialectical analysis may still see these kinds of substantive intrusions of third-‐parties as necessary element of managing the enabling conditions for argumentation, it is important to examine third-‐parties who are legitimate in a dialectical sense because they are principals to the difference of opinion. For the purposes at hand, it is thus important to consider cases when a “third party” is considered an actual and legitimate contributor to argumentation in the sense of openly advancing and defending a position that is distinct from the (two or more) already contested positions. In all such studies, the grounds for justifying a dyadic analysis are quite explicit and clear. And so is the basic rationale – an analysis that reconstructs a multi-‐ participant debate in terms of a (possibly collective) protagonist facing a (possibly collective) antagonist allows to mold the complex discourse into a basic dialectical framework and thus paves the way for a precise dialectical overview and evaluation of discourse (e.g. using dialectical profiles). However, such gains do not come at no cost. As we are trying to show here, the basic problem about the reduction of the clash of positions to two camps, as in any other reduction, is a loss of some important nuance that makes a difference for how something is to be understood and assessed.

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Now, how does all that relate to our hypothetical committee meeting? Clearly, we notice two tag-‐teams that do consistently support one candidate (A and B for Prof. α, and D with E for Prof. γ). But the overall discussion cannot be reduced to a clash between these two teams since C is given an equal opportunity to support her guy (Prof. β) and, let us assume, she makes good use of her right, which is also carefully enforced by the chair. So, we cannot simply “silent” C on theoretical or empirical grounds – C does argue and does not easily ally with either the A-‐B-‐camp or the D-‐E-‐camp. Instead, she is expected to simultaneously address these two separate camps holding contrary positions, thus risking irrelevance and inconsistency of her arguments. As an active distinct party in a committee meeting, C -‐-‐ or any other participant for that matter -‐-‐ is also not a mere secondary audience that would serve as the conveyor of arguments in some primary discussion, let us say between A-‐B camp and D-‐E camp. (Perhaps in some local instances such things do happen, but not in the global discussion.) Likewise, she is not a mere third-‐party moderator or facilitator – this is the role of the (voteless, impartial) chair. In our case, it seems in no way can we get just two camps facing each other for dialectical analysis that adequately portrays the positions at stake. Unless we entertain another possibility. 3.3 Polylogue as a multitude of dual encounters To overcome the problems of reducing a polylogue to an argument between two main forces, a dialectical analyst can instead follow the method of analyzing any multi-‐party discussion as if it consisted of a multitude of dual encounters. The analysis would start by dividing the “messy” multi-‐party discussion of issues instigated by a Wh-‐question into a set of clear yes/no questions, which by definition break any issue into but two sides. Such analytically generated dyads can be further adequately evaluated to see which of the two sides fares better in a dialectical sense. In our committee meeting, the basic question -‐-‐ Who should receive the best researcher award of 2012/2013? -‐-‐ would thus be split into three yes/no questions -‐-‐ Should Prof. α get it? Should Prof. β get it? Should Prof. γ get it? -‐-‐ that one-‐by-‐one lend themselves well to a dialectical analysis and evaluation on “both sides of an issue”. Beyond this general characterization, we recognize three basic variants of such a dualistic analysis and a fourth, slightly different option. They can be elucidated following the pragma-‐dialectical distinction between different types of disputes, and a notion of sub-‐disputes.9 9 In a pragma-‐dialectical analysis the first option where one proposition is asserted and doubted (α vs. α?), the so called “single non-‐mixed dispute”, is the most elementary dialectical form of disagreement into which all other types of disputes can be analytically broken (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 120); the second type (α vs. ¬α) is a “single mixed dispute” since the other arguer takes up a contradictory position on the same proposition, instead of merely expressing doubt against it. Further, there is a “multiple non-‐mixed dispute” in which a number of propositions is doubted (e.g., α ˄ β ˄ γ vs. (α ˄ β ˄ γ)?) and a “multiple mixed dispute” where a number of propositions is contradicted (e.g., α ˄ β ˄ γ vs. ¬(α ˄ β ˄ γ)). The last option is called a “qualitatively multiple dispute” (see van Eemeren et al., 2007, pp. 26-‐27) since two qualitatively exclusive (contrary) propositions (α vs. β) are discussed.

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The first variant would fit into the framework of a “single non-‐mixed dispute”. To a question “Should Prof. α get the award?” an analyst would take the party that responds “Yes, she should!” (in our example A with B) to be the protagonist of this standpoint, obligated to defend it when challenged. The remaining parties (C, D with E) would be reconstructed as antagonists in the strict sense, in that they do not advance positions but merely cast doubt on the protagonist’s position by asking non-‐committal critical questions (“Does she publish in good quality journals?”, “Is her research attracting grants from the NSF?”). Hence, there is but one protagonist (a tag-‐team supporting Prof. α and consisting of A and B) facing one antagonist, that is, “others” who doubt selecting Prof. α is the best solution. No other options are available. This analytic procedure would be repeated three times, likewise assessing Prof. β’s and Prof. γ’s merits. Hence, in this variant of dialectical reconstruction each of our three parties (A with B, C, and D with E) would be once a protagonist, and twice an antagonist (in this role, along with the other doubting party). A good example of this sort of analysis is Feteris’s (1999, ch. 11) study of court proceedings that involve at least three parties (in a criminal trial: prosecution, defence, and the judge/jury) as two simultaneous single non-‐mixed disputes: 1) between prosecution (“X is guilty”) and the judge/jury (“Is X really guilty?”), and 2) between defence (“X is not guilty”) and the judge/jury (“Is X really not guilty?” ). The judge/jury thus plays the role of a dialectical antagonist without an explicit position until the very verdict, while prosecution and defence are two protagonists arguing for the (lack of) guilt. (By presumption of innocence in most legal systems, the obvious asymmetry arises, since the burden of proof remains with the prosecution-‐protagonist, while the defence-‐protagonist may well remain “argumentless”.) However, while highly illuminating, Feteris’s analyses pertain to a particular institutional activity that exactly allows or even enforces such a dualistic division into single non-‐mixed disputes; by definition, issues in criminal law are delineated by the yes/no question regarding the guilt of the accused. In the second variant, a multi-‐party discussion would be divided into three single mixed disputes. In the case of a “Should Prof. α get the award?” question, the protagonist of a “Yes, she should!” position (A with B) would face the protagonist of a contradictory “No, she shouldn’t!” position (C, D with E), and similarly with Prof. β (C vs. A with B and D with E) and Prof. γ (D with E vs. A with B and C). A notable difference with the previous variant is that each protagonist of a positive position does not face mere doubters and critical questioners, but rather active opposition that would argue for a contradictory position (“She doesn’t deserve it, because she doesn’t publish enough”). Each party in our committee meeting is thus a protagonist of one positive position (α; β; γ) and at the same time a protagonist of two negative positions (respectively: ¬β, ¬γ; ¬α, ¬γ; ¬α, ¬β). In each dyadic encounter both sides thus have a positive burden of proof regarding the advocated position (α vs. ¬α; β vs. ¬β; γ vs. ¬γ). If this seems somewhat complicated, a strict dialectical reconstruction of actual polylogues would require combining the two variants considered above. That is 12


because, logically speaking, a negative position (¬α) presupposes doubt (α?). This is precisely how van Rees (2001) proceeds in her analysis of a problem-‐solving discussion regarding additional training for a group, where three distinct positions are advanced: 1) we need such training, so let’s move to the details (“if” we need it is certain, so let’s decide on “how”) (participants A and B); 2) we first need to see the details to decide on the need (first “how”, then “if”) (participant C); 3) we don’t need any additional training at all (participant D) (van Rees, 2001, esp. p. 462). Van Rees clearly distinguishes the intricate problems involved in this polylogue, in particular the complexities of ascription of dialectical roles: All participants have the role of protagonist for their own standpoints. In addition, they all have the role of antagonist against the other two standpoints and that of protagonist for the contra-‐ standpoints against the same. In our discussion, however, the latter two roles do not get performed adequately. (2001, p. 464)

We can see that by following the precise dialectical framework of analysis we run into an increasingly complex situation. A diligent dialectician would in fact end up having to analyze and evaluate a three-‐party encounter in terms of three single mixed disputes (α vs. ¬α; β vs. ¬β; γ vs. ¬γ) which, strictly speaking, can be further split into six simple non-‐mixed disputes (α vs. α?; ¬α vs. ¬α?; β vs. β?; ¬β vs. ¬β?; γ vs. γ?; ¬γ vs. ¬γ?). And that is a hefty task for both the analyst and the participants who, as in the case above, may end up not performing their distinct dialectical roles adequately. Of course, again, we are talking about a rational dialectical reconstruction – in actual discourse our committee members or van Rees’s consultants “simply” debate three contrary positions in the give and take of argumentative exchange. This brings us to the third variant. Well-‐developed and pragmatically oriented approaches, such as pragma-‐dialectics, recognize the possibility of directly analyzing a clash of contrary positions in a “qualitatively multiple dispute”. Such a dispute arises when a speaker “takes up an alternative standpoint […] [that], viewed dialectically, implies a standpoint that is opposite to” another speaker’s standpoint (van Eemeren et al., 2007, pp. 26-‐27). An opposite standpoint may be both contradictory and contrary to the other position (op. cit., pp. 57-‐62). What follows is that a qualitatively mixed dispute may clearly arise in response to a Wh-‐question which opens room for a clash of multitude of contrary alternatives. Van Eemeren et al. analyze many examples of such disputes, including this: Where can we still see a glimmer of hope in that terrible genocide in Kosovo? That hope does not lie in a victory for NATO or a victory for the Kosovo Liberation Army, UCK. And certainly not in a victory for Milosevic. (quoted in van Eemeren et al., 2007, p. 61)

Although van Eemeren et al. reconstruct this dispute in terms of a dyadic exchange, it is also plausible to see it as a clash of at least three contrary positions advocated by different parties: that NATO will bring peace to Kosovo, that UCK will do it, or that Milosevic will. The author of the newspaper commentary is adamantly against 13


Milosevic, and quite doubtful about two other options: NATO and UCK. Perhaps he argues for some kind of a fourth solution, but this is not clear in the quoted fragment. What is clear, though, is that we deal here with a conflict of contrary opinions in a qualitatively multiple dispute. Yet, dialectical accounts seem to fall short of investigating the intricacies of such a discussion between contrary positions, even if there are only two of them. By definition, such positions cannot be both correct, yet they can be both wrong. And this is exactly because there is a third (or fourth, etc.) position that is correct. The question remains how to introduce this third or fourth position into a dialectical analysis. The fourth dialectical avenue to split a polylogue into a number of dyadic discussions would resort to the concept of sub-‐discussions. A polylogue would thus amount to a collection of sub-‐discussions in one main discussion defined by a single overarching issue (see van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, p. 42). In this method of analysis, the main dialectical discussion can branch out on any disputable point, potentially opening up a profile of dialogue not unlike a conversational Porphyrian tree. Imagine that in our committee meeting the chair (an admirer of Plato’s method of diairesis) suggests to address some crucial issues in the following order: Shall we prioritize research achievements, or not? If so, shall we prioritize publications or grants? If publications, then papers or monographs? If papers, then empirical or theoretical contributions? If empirical, then qualitative or quantitative? To each of these questions, two sides can form thus opening up a sub-‐discussion in the main discussion about who should be the professor of the year. A reconstructed discussion would resemble something like a stem of hierarchically organized issues, and dyadic branches coming out of it. The main point of such a reconstruction is that dyadic sub-‐disputes, if properly separated and resolved, can eventually add up to the clear and distinct resolution of the entire discussion, whether polylogical or not. The problem of analyzing polylogues in a dialectical framework can also be tackled, more or less similarly, in any other dualistic dialectical approach, for instance Walton’s “dialog theory”. For Walton, participation in a multi-‐party discussion would amount to participation in various dyadic dialogues at the same time (Walton & Macagno, 2010, p. 314), and a polylogue would amount to a constellation of dyadic dialogues. It seems, thus, that any addition of a distinct party would increase the number of dialogues by the number of the parties previously involved. In the simplest case, adding one party to a di-‐logue, would potentially create 3 dyadic dialogues (as in our academic committee meeting – see Figure 1); but, e.g., adding a party to a penta-‐ logue, would increase the number of potential dyadic dialogues from 10 to 15. This, no doubt, would heavily burden the participants and analysts. In any case, this is another theoretical attempt at “dualizing” a multiple discussion. Importantly, while Walton does not attempt to satisfactorily solve the problem, he acknowledges the gap between “theoretical simplicity” (Ibidem) of dyadic dialectical models and complex, multi-‐party argumentative exchanges, and expresses the need to bridge this gap through theoretical improvements. 14


The splitting of a polylogue into analytically distinct dyads allows for a precise, if somewhat microscopic, insight into local episodes of argumentative exchanges. However, at least in some cases, it seems to be missing “the logic” of the entire multi-‐ party exchange. As we attempted to show, this method of analysis divides polylogues into what is relevant from the perspective of one or another dialectical model, but not necessarily from the perspective of an analyst interested in the arguers’ rational and strategic choices in the entire discussion. This, on an abstract level, is an instantiation of the reductionism/holism problem -‐ the sum total of carefully separated parts does not (necessarily) amount to grasping the whole.10 One can easily think of examples where the analysis of the simple non-‐mixed disputes or sub-‐disputes does not capture the interconnections among the dyads (that often develop simultaneously). Imagine that in our committee discussion A and B – responding to D and E’s objection – repeatedly stress the importance of the monograph published by their candidate (Prof. α), knowing full-‐well that D+E are paper-‐oriented social scientists who cannot care less about book-‐ long monographs. From both a dialectical and rhetorical point of view, A+B’s arguments would be irrelevant or at least counter-‐productive. But perhaps A+B advance them anyways for the sake of C – the third, and a monograph-‐friendly, party. So what seems to belong to one (sub-‐)discussion is better seen as a contribution to another (see Mohammed, 2011). This subtle interconnection is easily lost in the “atomized” dyadic form of analysis which may lead to paradoxical results: A+B’s argument about the published monograph is evaluated as irrelevant and ineffective when the dyadic exchange with D+E is analyzed, but “suddenly” becomes relevant and effective when the analyst takes it as a contribution to A+B’s concurrent exchange with C. The same speech act is thus good and bad at the same time. While it is crucial, we think, to have a clear dialectical understanding of what happens in localized episodes of one-‐on-‐one argumentation, it is necessary to accompany it with a broader analysis and evaluation of argumentative moves in the entire polylogue. It is exactly the difference between the two that is most fascinating:11 an argumentative speech act might bear on the resolution of a multi-‐party dispute in ways different from a contribution defined in dyadic dialectical models, for instance in precise sequences of dialectical profiles (van Eemeren et al., 2007).12 Admittedly, one can more or less justifiably reconstruct a given move as “primarily” belonging to a dyadic discussion different from the on-‐going one. But this 10 Bonevac claims that “[s]omeone seeking to defend a position against a variety of opponents at once, for example, must meet a number of constraints that cannot be understood as conjunctions of constraints applied to each dispute taken individually” (Bonevac, 2003, pp. 454-‐455, see also Author1, 2012). 11 Similarly to the differences between what is good in logical and dialectical approaches to argumentation, so thoroughly examined by Hamblin (1970). 12

One reviewer suggested that polylogical factors in argumentation analysis are basically rhetorical concerns. But we understand this as a difference different than the one between dialectic and rhetoric. We focus here precisely on the resolution-‐relevant moves which, as we argue, are not always simply dyadic. Our inquiry, then, begins in the realm of the “reasonable” and dialectical – rather than “strategic” and rhetorical – aspect of strategic maneuvering in polylogical argumentation. Therefore, we disagree with a “defeatist” position in which all polylogical facets of multi-‐party discussions are demoted to the status of purely rhetorical complications surrounding a dyadic dispute.

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might lead to a dangerous practice of taking many prima facie irrelevant arguments or criticisms to be relevant by virtue of belonging to some other (actual or potential) discussion that is external to the current di-‐logue. Without precisely demarcating which other reconstructed discussions are relevant, we risk ad hoc and arbitrary assessments. In a polylogue, the boundary is clear – those argumentative moves are relevant which bear on the positions debated in a polylogue. This might happen on a local, dyadic level (a move is relevant in a sub-‐discussion with the currently addressed party) or a global level (a move is relevant to some other parties’ positions). Moreover, splitting into dyads may open the problem of establishing the final outcome of a discussion. Imagine that during the meeting, A-‐B manage to overcome C’s objections and thus win their case for Prof. α; C however convinces D-‐E that her arguments for Prof. β are cogent and reasonable; finally, in a “separate” dispute D-‐E convince A-‐B that their Prof. γ is better than α on rational, dialectical grounds. So α > β > γ but… γ > α! Whose arguments are then strongest and whose position should prevail according to the rules of critical testing? Such a problem of establishing outcome is known from sport tournaments, including chess: in a direct encounter a White player may win over Black, Black defeats Yellow, and Yellow defeats White. Even though we know perfectly well who the better player in each game is, we do not know who the best player of the three is. (This can be seen as a discursive version of Condorcet’s paradox.) Our goal in this section was to critically review the options a well-‐developed dialectical theory of argumentation, such a pragma-‐dialectics or Walton’s dialog theory, has at its disposal in analyzing and evaluating multi-‐party argumentative discussion. On the basis of this scrutiny we are in a position to conclude that while various dialectical methods of analyzing a polylogue are no doubt useful in many routine cases where dyadic reconstruction is warranted for one reason or another, they do not fully grasp some important aspects of multi-‐party argumentation, such as in our committee meeting. These aspects relate to both the understanding of the strategic rationale behind certain discursive choices and to their evaluation in terms of reasonable or fallacious dialectical moves. 4. Towards a polylogical understanding of polylogues 4.1 Why bother? In this last section, we will outline the elements of a polylogical approach to analyzing and evaluating multi-‐party argumentation. Since our point of reference here are dialectical approaches to analyzing argumentative discussions, we will sketch a solution based on a dialectical framework. The greatest advantage of dialectical models is that they theorize argumentation as an interactive achievement of interlocutors engaged in a discussion on a disputable issue. This makes them fit for analyzing a wide range of communicative activities. Moreover, recent dialectical theories have successfully merged the largely descriptive, pragmatic aspect of ordinary argumentation with the 16


normative, even formal dimension of dialectical models (van Eemeren, 2010; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984, 2004; Hamblin, 1970; Walton, 1998; Walton & Krabbe, 1995). Argumentative discussions or dialogues are thus understood as interactions defined through their pragmatic and normative dimension. Therefore, dialectical models are built on assumptions grounded, on the one hand, in pragmatics and conversation analysis and, on the other hand, in formal models of dialogues. We find it crucial to discussing argumentative polylogues that the classic dyadic assumptions on what constitutes interactions (or dialogues) have been challenged: both in the pragmatic (e.g., Clark & Carlson, 1982; Dascal, 2008; Kerbrat-‐Orecchionni, 1997, 2004; Levinson, 1988) and dialectical (e.g., Sylvan, 1985) tradition. Without discussing this broad literature here (see, however, Author1, 2013a, 2013b), we note that both these research traditions offer solid theoretical and methodological grounds for poly-‐logical extensions of current di-‐logical argumentation theory without, however, offering any such clear extensions. To be sure, dialectical analysts themselves acknowledge challenges which multi-‐ party discussions pose for the analysis and evaluation of argumentation. Yet, they also do not offer a theoretical solution that would satisfactorily solve them: In real life, argumentative discourse often contains several discussions at the same time that may be intertwined. Even if the original dispute is simple, new disputes may come up and any number of subdisputes can still arise out of argumentation advanced to resolve the original dispute. These can, in turn, also lead to discussion and hence to the advancing of new arguments. […] This does not make things any easier when it comes to distinguishing the speech acts that are relevant to the resolution of the principal dispute. (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, p. 42; see also Walton & Macagno, 2010, p. 314).

Our claim is that such problems are not mere complications of reality to which theoretical models are immune, but are genuine problems for understanding and evaluating ordinary argumentation that should be given a precise theoretical formulation within the framework of argumentation theory. We begin doing it here by resorting to a “dialectical perspective” on argumentation, as understood by Wenzel (1990). According to him, “[w]ithin the dialectical perspective, the chief resources of interest are designs or plans for conducting critical discussions” (Wenzel, 1990, p. 21). Below, we limit ourselves to a theoretical and highly normative “design or plan” for conducting multi-‐party “critical discussions”. However, research within the “design stance” championed by “normative pragmatists” may instead focus on a design of actually implemented or implementable procedures for argumentative discussions. This approach, in contrast to the former, would seek “design principles,” which are a set of topoi of sorts for arranging and orchestrating the management of disagreement among actual arguers. These principles take into account that real arguers are constrained by concrete communicative limitations which are typically at odds with the requirements of ideal models (see Author2, 2007, 2013; Author2 & Jackson, 2005; Jacobs & Jackson, 2006; Jackson, 1998). While different in their direction, these two approaches to designing argumentative 17


polylogues would face the same (normative or empirical) challenge: to go beyond designs for two-‐party, two-‐sided issues in order to address polylogical multi-‐faceted issues without losing the multi-‐party argumentation element. 4.2 Towards an ideal polylogical model One can start thinking of a normative model of argumentative polylogues in terms of the dialectical models we discussed above but extended to incorporate the clash of more than just two positions on an issue. Such a model can be constructed in a largely formal manner, as in Sylvan’s (1985) polylogue systems, or informally, using the extant pragmatically-‐oriented dialectical approaches as a basic theoretical background. The pragma-‐dialectical model of a critical discussion may be particularly useful in this endeavor as a well-‐defined normative account of everyday argumentation. It offers a useful heuristic of dividing argumentative discussions into four “dialectical stages”: confrontation, opening, argumentation, and concluding (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, pp. 57ff.). We use this well-‐known heuristic to highlight, stage-‐by-‐stage, the extra factors that a polylogical models should take into account when compared to a simpler dyadic model. In the confrontation, pragma-‐dialectics requires of arguers to clearly define their difference of opinion over a standpoint (or standpoints) in terms of one of the basic types of dispute stipulated in the model (see above fn. 9). It is here, in other words, where the disagreement space is interactively constructed by the arguers: “A dispute arises when someone advances a standpoint and someone else casts doubt upon it” (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, p. 107). However, a standpoint itself can be seen as a response to a more or less explicitly stated issue that instigates position-‐taking, such as a problem that calls for a solution or a decision to be taken on who the professor of the year should be. The first step in determining a polylogical confrontation would therefore be to precisely examine the nature of the issue. Is it formulated in terms of a polar yes/no question, a safe Wh-‐question where a set of relevant answers is finite and known to the arguers (such as in our faculty committee), or a risky Wh-‐question where the set of possible alternatives is open-‐ended?13 If the issue demands a yes/no choice (such as in Aristotelian dialectics and all kinds of truth-‐conditional investigations based on a bi-‐valued logic), then only two contradictory sides can be taken (either true or false), and a standard dialectical inquiry should follow. (As we noted above, in approaches embracing a tri-‐valued logic, such as pragma-‐dialectics, the simplest dispute would develop between the party holding either the yes-‐ or the no-‐position and the pure critical doubter – the “I don’t know” respondent to the yes/no question.) If the Wh-‐ questions are at issue, arguers should intersubjectively investigate how many contrary positions on an issue can be reasonably put forth. If only two, then again a dialectical discussion can unfold to judge their relative merits. If a finite set of more than two, then the arguers should see if there is a way to split the multiple positions into two basic 13 See Hamblin (1970, p. 216) for the distinction between safe and risky questions.

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camps (see above section 3.2) or sequentially structured dyads (section 3.3). If any of these works, again, some (complex) dialectical procedure can be followed. Finally, if there is no viable way to “dichotomize” a finite set of multiple positions, or a set is open-‐ ended, then arguers should recognize they are dealing with a genuinely multi-‐party disagreement space that should be explored as such through polylogical argumentation. As we argued above, this happens in our committee meeting where three contrary positions are simultaneously debated. Ideally, all possible mutual relations between multiple positions should be clearly defined (for instance using the classic Aristotelian “square of opposition” which distinguishes between contradictory, contrary, sub-‐ contrary, and sub-‐ and super-‐altern relations). Having done that, arguers would be in a good position to see “what is at stake” in the polylogue.14 At the opening stage, pragma-‐dialectical arguers define their roles as the protagonist and the antagonist of the standpoint, and further determine their common starting points both in terms of procedures they will follow and the shared propositions from which they will build their arguments and criticisms. This is very clear, yet polylogues require a more complex notion of common starting points or, for short, common ground. In a dyadic encounter, common ground is what is shared by the two interlocutors – it is there or it isn’t, and when it isn’t, reasonable communication is largely precluded (see Fogelin, 1985). In a polylogue, by contrast, one can distinguish between a global common ground, what is shared among all parties, and some local common grounds, what is shared by some sub-‐set of parties.15 Therefore, some new solutions for common starting points – whether procedural or material – need to be found to account for a reasonable multiplicity of common grounds in one multi-‐party discussion. Arguers at an ideal polylogical opening stage should clearly delimit various levels of sharedness of their material commitments: Are the facts and values shared among all parties, most of them, or perhaps only two of them? What is the strength of the overlapping commitments – are they fully “asserted,” merely “conceded,” or hidden in the “dark side” (see Walton & Krabbe, 1995)? How to manage the “residual” commitments – those that are shared by some, but not by others, and thus cannot be employed throughout the discussion? Such questions, if settled at the start of discussion will of course impact the way argumentation proceeds in each of these cases. Surely, some interesting work on how arguers construct and negotiate common ground can develop when the complexities of multi-‐party commitments are taken into account (see, e.g., Clark, 1992). Above all, however, polylogues require a different set of procedural starting points: compare the discussion procedure of a dyadic legal trial with a parliamentary 14 Note that it is at the confrontation stage where the fallacy of a false dilemma can be defined in a

polylogical sense: “In a context where one can discuss many propositions (poly-‐lemma), a di-‐lemma is false, because it focuses exclusively on two positions, thus preventing other positions (standpoints) from being considered.” (Author1, 2013b, p. 14). 15 “Even if the principle ‘No common logic, no communication’ held, it would not follow that there must be

a one logic for each polylogue, only common ground for each pair of parties in a polylogue that manage to communicate.” (Sylvan, 1985, p. 110).

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debate to which many members of various parties contribute. By contrast to legal procedures that have inspired much of dialectics, polylogues would require something akin to the famous Robert’s Rules of Order meant to secure an orderly conduct of multi-‐ party assemblies (Sylvan, 1985, pp. 102-‐103). This difference in discussion procedures is significant, as different verbal interventions would be relevant (‘in order,’ ‘legal,’ ‘acceptable’) in court and in an assembly. Indeed, developing reasonable procedures for multi-‐party and multi-‐position argumentative discussions is a main task for both idealized modeling of argumentation and for designing viable disagreement-‐ management protocols in real-‐life argumentation. Crucially, a simple dyadic turn-‐taking model – such as the one on which dialectical profiles are based – will not do a good job here: As for the alternating pattern, the famous ababab formula only works for dilogues, whereas for trilogues the alternation does not respect any kind of fixed rules: we are dealing with an infinite number of possibilities, the abcabcabc model being very exceptional. (Kerbrat-Orecchionni, 1997, p. 5).

This, of course, is an empirical statement; an ideal normative model can impose the abcabcabc order – or some other more flexible set of rules for organizing argumentative contributions from third-‐, fourth-‐, etc., parties. In any case, further work on polylogical procedures or profiles is badly needed. The central stage of pragma-‐dialectal critical discussion – the argumentation stage – is where arguers engage in an ordered exchange of arguments and criticisms. This happens through dyadic turns in which the antagonist drills down on a disagreement and the protagonist responds with increasingly elaborate complex argumentation (Snoeck Henkemans, 1992). These dyadic turns are governed by the rules of a reasonable discussion, and thus are the locus of pragma-‐dialectal fallacies. However, as we argued above and elsewhere (Author1, 2012, 2013a, 2013b), unexpected things can happen, both in the sense of rational quality of argumentation and its strategic shape. As we have seen, arguers may advance arguments that seem irrelevant in a dyadic exchange, but are reasonable since they adequately address concerns of some third, or fourth, party. Similarly, arguers may be seemingly engaged in superfluous or over-‐the-‐top argumentation that however seems just enough if some additional parties are taken into account. To be sure, some acceptable forms of inference should be employed for arguers to remain reasonable (but then, as Sylvan, 1985, pointed out, acceptable on grounds of which of the many logical models?). Many questions arise however regarding basic building blocks of informal (in the logical sense) argumentative exchanges: if informal argument schemes are reasonable when they satisfactorily address relevant critical questions (Walton, Reed, & Macagno, 2008), then whose critical questions are they? Well, obviously “the critic’s”, but each party to a polylogue faces more than one critic, and they should not be conflated. Otherwise, a form of a polylogical (collateral) straw man may occur when an arguer attacks her opponent using commitments of a different critic (Author1, 2013b). In general, all kinds of intersubjective procedures at the argumentation stage (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 20


2004, pp. 145ff.) require a more complex notion of intersubjectivity – for instance, as suggested above, divided into some global and local level. What is shared by two parties, is not necessarily shared by most, or all parties. Eventually, deciding which argument, or criticism, holds and is thus decisive in the current discussion is much more complex in a polylogue than it is in a dyadic exchange. This brings us to the problems of concluding the discussion on the basis of the results of the argumentative procedures. In a dyadic discussion, this is a fairly straightforward business, since arguers can choose from but two options: that “the protagonist’s standpoint is acceptable and the antagonist’s doubt must be retracted, or that the standpoint of the protagonist must be retracted” (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 61). In a polylogue, since there are by definition many protagonists of distinct positions and thus also many distinct antagonists, the choices may be plenty. One position can simply be better than any other, which allows for a clear conclusion. But some positions can be accepted by an equal amount of parties, which possibly leads to a standoff. Arguers may also decide to “sum up” all the conclusions of dyadic encounters – especially in the case where they decide to split their procedure into a sequence of dual encounters. Dialectically speaking, such local concluding stages seem the most viable option, but the final evaluation of the entire multi-‐party deliberation may face the problem mentioned above (section 3.3, p. 15): each party would be once a winner and once a loser, making it hard to decide on a single “best” option (α > β > γ > α). Some novel methods of concluding the complex polylogue are yet to be developed. To recap – one may undertake a relatively conservative (in a theoretical sense) revision of dialectical models which would bring them more in line with the challenges polylogues present to argument analysis and evaluation. The basic assumptions and structure of the models would remain intact, while some additional features would be incorporated to address the novel complexities of polylogues we discussed above. Such a polylogical model would thus extend, rather than supplant, dyadic dialectical models in order to adequately cover multi-‐party cases such as our university committee. Working such a model out would be similar to devising rules for the game of chess for three – we are still speaking of a game on a chessboard with familiar rules and roles, but some little tweaks to include “the third” are put in place. 5. Conclusion

We have analyzed argumentative polylogues as activities characterized by features that make them problematic from the perspective of dyadic dialectical analysis for the purpose of evaluating argumentation. As we have shown, dialectical analyses do their job in a great many argumentative activities, but not so well in the context of polylogue. We have pointed out key pitfalls of dialectical analysis for polylogues. These can be briefly summarized as either descriptive or normative. Descriptive problems consist in the fact that dialectical methods may not adequately perceive the strategic rationality behind the choices of arguers engaged in polylogical encounters. Normative problems 21


amount to the way a polylogue problematizes the dialectical rules: some of them seem to be targeting a different form of interaction, some seem to be missing. Dialectics can be grasped as a “relational” approach to argumentative rationality (note the difference between relational and relative/relativistic approach). In the philosophical sense, dialectics is relational since its highest epistemic goal is that of critical error-‐correction, rather than monological truth-‐tracking. Dialectical starting points and conclusions are merely plausible (defeasible, corroborated) and thus tentative, until there are no overriding criticisms or considerations. A position stands because it is better than some other positions in that it is capable of withholding a larger amount of possible criticisms. As soon as soon as a position is compared to another position that successfully deals with more possible objections, it collapses or is refuted.16 Accordingly, dialectics in its function of a methodical analysis and evaluation of discourse defines argumentative roles in terms of relations that hold between the bearers of these roles and some propositions. The basic relations are of course acceptance, doubt, and rejection of a proposition. Furthermore, these relations between arguers and discourse also define relations between arguers themselves. An author of an utterance does not become a protagonist until her utterance is challenged by someone else, who thus becomes an antagonist. These seem to be basic assumptions of pragmatic (e.g., Jackson & Jacobs, 1980) and dialectical approaches to argumentative discourse alike. Shortly, there are no dialectical parties without a particular relation that holds between them. This relation is defined in a dyadic sense of a one-‐on-‐one opposition. A protagonist of a position exists because there is an antagonist, and vice versa. What we are facing in the simple polylogue of our committee meeting is a situation where a protagonist faces disagreement from two distinct parties who in turn also disagree with one another. This situation is possible whenever the positions are contrary, rather than strictly contradictory, so that the opponent of my opponent is not necessarily my ally, but possibly yet another opponent to engage with. In contradiction, negations are bi-‐conditional (-‐-‐2 = 2 and ¬¬α = α); in contrariness, we deal with simple conditionals: while β entails ¬α, ¬β does not entail α (denying the antecedent); ¬β may even be used as a support for γ, which actually also entails ¬α. So an arguer that seems to be my (α) ally by virtue of criticizing my critic (such as when γ claims “¬β”) may quickly disappoint me by turning her critical edge against me (because “γ” means “¬α”). As we have endeavored to show, division of polylogues into dyadically defined roles collapses for one reason or another. Hence, perhaps a new appreciation of a polylogical role of an arguer involved in a multi-‐party contest of contrary positions is needed. But while there is nothing particularly odd in analyzing a clash of contrary positions (such as in our committee meeting), the parties attached to these positions do

16 Cf. basic Popperian criteria for theory selection (e.g. in Lakatos, 1974), as well as their application to

argumentation theory in: van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1988.

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1 Argumentative polylogues in a dialectical framework

1 Argumentative polylogues in a dialectical framework

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