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K. Rothermund: Counter-Regulation SocialP sychology and © 2011 2011; Control-Dependency Hogrefe Vol. 42(1):56–66 Publishing

Original Article

Counter-Regulation and Control-Dependency Affective Processing Biases in the Service of Action Regulation Klaus Rothermund University of Jena, Germany Abstract. Two basic principles governing the motivational regulation of automatic affective processing are described and relevant evidence is reviewed. According to the counter-regulation principle, attention is automatically allocated to information that is opposite in valence to current motivational states: A positive outcome focus increases the salience of negative information whereas a negative outcome focus induces an attentional focus on positive information. Counter-regulation in automatic affective processing prevents motivational states from escalating or becoming chronic. According to the control-dependency principle, processing of information is characterized by a problem focus (negativity bias) if goal pursuit is experienced as controllable, whereas experiencing a lack of control over important outcomes is accompanied by an enhancement focus (positivity bias). Control-dependency of affective processing promotes persistent goal pursuit in the face of controllable challenges, and facilitates the acceptance of a given situation and disengagement from blocked goals. Keywords: affective processing, negativity bias, positivity bias, automaticity, action regulation, persistence, disengagement, flexibility

During the last decades, the concept of goals has become a core research focus of motivational psychology (e.g., Austin & Vancouver, 1996; Carver & Scheier, 1998; Gollwitzer, 1997; Pervin, 1989). A major function of goals is to organize behavior. By specifying desirable and undesirable end states that have to be attained or prevented, respectively, goals provide criteria that help to guide and select actions and to evaluate their outcomes. Translating a goal into action, however, is not as easy as it may seem at first sight. The successful regulation of goal pursuit and action necessitates overcoming procrastination, stabilizing goal pursuit in the face of obstacles and temptations, and coping with the fact that some of our goals – even important ones – may turn out to be unattainable. Research on action regulation has identified several adaptive responses to the challenges of goal pursuit: For example, developing concrete action plans for specific situations facilitates the initiation and execution of action when the respective external cues are encountered (“implementation intentions”; Gollwitzer, 1999). Being sensitive to positive as well as negative future outcomes prevents people from just indulging in positive fantasies or from becoming paralyzed by threats and dangers (“balanced processing”; Markus & Nurius, 1986; Markus & Ruvolo, 1989; Oettingen & Mayer, 2002). Focusing on goal-related Social Psychology 2011; Vol. 42(1):56–66 DOI: 10.1027/1864-9335/a000043

content in combination with tenacious efforts and a reactant increase in goal importance helps to stabilize goal pursuit in difficult or conflicting situations (“persistence,” “goal shielding”; Kuhl, 1987; Shah, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2002; Wright & Brehm, 1989). Finally, when a goal cannot be reached through personal efforts, adaptive responses include disengaging from the blocked goal, accepting the situation as it is, and/or adopting new goals, thus conserving resources and preventing the emergence of behavioral perseveration and depression (“disengagement,” “accommodation”; Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002b; Brehm & Self, 1989; Gendolla & Krüsken, 2002; Rothermund, 2006; Wrosch, Scheier, Carver, & Schulz, 2003). Importantly, although insight and reflection play an important role in action regulation, conscious deliberation and controlled implementation of rational decisions alone cannot explain any of the aforementioned adaptive responses to the challenges of goal pursuit. Rather, all important action regulation processes also critically depend on automatically operating cognitive and affective mechanisms. These implicit processes provide the basis for action regulation by preparing an organism for certain decisions (e.g., regarding persistence or disengagement) and by facilitating the enactment of what has been decided. In the following, I will first elaborate on the automatic mechanisms that un© 2011 Hogrefe Publishing

K. Rothermund: Counter-Regulation and Control-Dependency

derlie each type of action regulation process. Next, I will focus on affective processing as an important example of automatic mechanisms that are involved in the implicit regulation of goal pursuit. Counter-regulation and control-dependency will be discussed as two basic principles of how affective processing is configured in accordance with superordinate motivational concerns.

Implementation Intentions The advance planning of action responses for specific future situations can be initiated intentionally. The result of such a deliberative process, however, consists in a cognitive representation of a stimulus-response (S-R) link that automatically triggers the prespecified action tendency, without any further effort and deliberation, whenever the situation matches the stimulus part of the S-R representation (Gollwitzer, 1999). The automatic nature of response generation following consciously formed implementation intentions is nicely illustrated by various studies that either prevented the eliciting stimulus from being consciously perceived (Bargh & Gollwitzer, 1994; Bayer, Achtziger, Gollwitzer, & Moskowitz, 2009) or by transferring it into a context in which the previously formed intention no longer holds (Eder, Rothermund, & Proctor, 2010; Schweiger Gallo, Keil, McCulloch, Rockstroh, & Gollwitzer, 2009; Wieber & Sassenberg, 2006).

Balanced Processing Being sensitive to opportunities, chances, and possible gains as well as to risks, dangers, and potential losses is a basic requirement for adaptive behavior, and helps to prevent rash and impulsive decisions as well as long phases of inactivity (Markus & Ruvolo, 1989; see also Oettingen, 1999; Oettingen & Mayer, 2002). However, which of the many potential outcomes of a situation becomes salient and captures attention is not a question of free choice. One cannot intentionally select one’s beliefs regarding the potential consequences of a situation in accordance with personal likes and dislikes. Beliefs – unlike wishes – refer to the world as it is and not as one prefers it to be. Instead, the perception of chances and risks is determined by specific features of a situation (e.g., context and framing effects; Akalis, 2008; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984) and by affective attentional biases that modulate the accessibility of positive and negative information (e.g., negativity bias, Pratto & John, 1991; positivity bias, Kunda, 1990; promotion vs. prevention focus, Higgins, 1997; positive vs. neg1

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ative outcome focus, Rothermund, Voss, & Wentura, 2008).

Persistence and Goal Shielding Commitment to a goal often requires concentration, that is, being sensitive to goal-related content and being insensitive to other cues that are unrelated to the current goal and that might detract from goal pursuit (Heise, Gerjets, & Westermann, 1997; Tipper, 1992). Focusing on a goal and mobilizing the necessary energy for further goal pursuit is of particular importance if goal achievement is difficult and if goal pursuit has to be maintained over longer periods of time, as in the case of personally relevant and ambitious long-term goals. Although concentration and persistence may seem to reflect the result of deliberate efforts, this is not the whole story. For one thing, the mechanics of concentration involve basic processes of selective attention and inhibition, which are not subject to conscious control. Many studies have demonstrated that functional adaptations of selective attention during goal pursuit are elicited automatically, without purpose and conscious intention. The mere intention to execute a certain behavior increases the accessibility of behavior-related information even if the influence of controlled memory strategies has been prevented (Goschke & Kuhl, 1993). After successful completion of a task, the selective attention mechanism does not just decay by itself. Rather, goal-related information has to be actively inhibited (Marsh, Hicks, & Bink, 1998; Rothermund, 2003a). Finally, even subliminal priming with a current goal can reduce the accessibility of potential temptations, whereas presenting cues associated with temptations tends to activate the currently pursued goal (Fishbach, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2003). Similarly, although persistence is a necessary prerequisite for the successful pursuit of ambitious goals, persistence cannot be fully justified on the basis of a simple rational calculation. From a rational perspective, it is particularly hard to explain why people should persist and even increase their efforts in response to difficulties. After all, encountering problems and obstacles reduces the expectation that the goal can be reached and increases the costs that are associated with the efforts that are necessary to reach the goal. According to a model of rational deliberation in terms of maximizing expected value, reduced expectations and increased costs of goal attainment should reduce the incentive value of and commitment to the goal.1 The basic affective mechanism that allows us to stay committed to a goal even when faced with difficulties is, again, an automatic one. Research on reactance and counteractive

Increasing effort in response to the occurrence of a problem is supposed to be rational because this could be the only possibility to reach the goal – without an increase in effort the goal might not be reached at all. This kind of reasoning, however, already starts from the premise that the goal is fixed, and that everything has to be done that is necessary in order to reach the goal. My argument is that deliberately re-evaluating the benefits and costs of a goal in the face of difficulties should lead to a reduction in goal attractiveness and goal commitment, which undermines persistence rather than strengthening it.

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Social Psychology 2011; Vol. 42(1):56–66

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control during goal pursuit has shown that encountering difficulties or attractive temptations automatically increases the importance and value of a threatened goal, thus fostering commitment and energy mobilization in times of crisis (Gendolla & Brinkmann, 2005; Trope & Fishbach, 2000; Wright & Brehm, 1989).

Disengagement and Accommodation The perhaps most interesting regulation process regards situations in which even repeated attempts at reaching a goal have turned out to be futile. In such a situation, disengagement, acceptance, and reorientation toward more promising goals are the most adaptive responses in order to conserve resources and to avoid further frustrations (Klinger, 1975). Nevertheless, as everyone knows from his or her own personal experience, a conscious decision on its own is rarely enough to achieve the difficult endeavor of letting go of a cherished goal and accommodating to an aversive and distressing situation. In spite of knowing that the goal cannot be reached and that it would be best to liberate oneself from the commitment, one often remains bound to the goal by strong affective ties. Only after considerable time are we able to completely disengage from the goal and accept the situation – most often without knowing exactly what has happened to us during the process of goal adjustment (Brandtstädter, Wentura, & Rothermund, 1999). As with most regulation processes, basic cognitive and affective regulation processes have paved the way for disengagement and accommodation. Repeated failure to attain a goal dissolves the attentional focus on the goal so that previously inhibited information becomes accessible again, setting the stage for disengagement and reorientation toward other goals (Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002a; Lee & Maier, 1988; Mikulincer, 1989; Reed & Antonova, 2007; Rothermund, 1998). Simultaneously, relieving cognitions become accessible, allowing for benefit-finding and for a positive reappraisal of the situation (Taylor, 1983; Wentura, Rothermund, & Brandtstädter, 1995).

Summary The previous paragraphs indicate that successful action regulation on a macro-level critically depends on automatic processing mechanisms. The basic idea is that cognitive and affective processing respond flexibly to the demands of goal pursuit or goal adjustment. Information processing is attuned to the requirements of action regulation, fostering motivational balance, flexibility, persistence, or disengagement, in accordance with the demands of the motivational situation. 2

This basically functional view conceives of automatic processing as operating in the service of superordinate regulatory demands. Importantly, cognitive and affective processing are not understood as being directly controlled by deliberation, insight, and decision making. Instead, cognitive and affective processes have an inbuilt teleology or functionality, they are triggered by certain characteristics of a current situation that relate to the regulation of motivation and action. This mutual regulation of motivation, action, and cognitive and affective processing often operates implicitly, in the absence of direct conscious control.

Affective Processing – Stable or Flexible? In the following section, I focus on affective processing in order to explore the basic idea of a mutual regulation of motivation and information processing. Much of the current research literature provides us with a picture of affective processing as being characterized by stable and rigid biases. This view of affective processing is misleading, and stands in the way of an adequate understanding of the functional properties of affective processing. In order to be able to respond adequately to the varying demands of superordinate motivational orientations, affective processing has to be essentially flexible. Before addressing the basic principles of counter-regulation and control-dependency, I will briefly discuss – and reject – two well-known accounts that conceive of affective processing as being stable and rigid.

Accounts of Affective Processing as Being Stable The Negativity Bias Hypothesis A highly influential account argues for a general negativity bias in affective processing (Hansen & Hansen, 1988; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Pratto & John, 1991; Taylor, 1991). Several studies seem to suggest that negative stimuli automatically capture attention, indicating an automatic tuning of affective processing toward negative information (Buchner, Rothermund, Wentura, & Mehl, 2004). Such a general negativity bias is supposed to have its roots in evolutionary selection: It appears to be generally more adaptive to focus on dangers because overlooking a danger is potentially more harmful than not noticing an opportunity.2 Empirical evidence for a general negativity bias, however, is scarce. Some of the most prominent experiments attesting to a general negativity bias contained serious con-

Although this argument seems convincing at first sight, it is overstated and has to be relativized. Only very few dangers have lethal implications, and being less sensitive to rewarding situations will put an organism at a chronic disadvantage in the struggle for scarce goods like food, money, or mating partners.




founds, for example, the negatively valent stimuli were either characterized by salient perceptual features3 (Hansen & Hansen, 1988; see Purcell, Stewart, & Skov, 1996), or differed from positive stimuli in valence extremity, arousal, or behavioral relevance (Pratto & John, 1991; see Wentura, Rothermund, & Bak, 2000). Accordingly, a recent meta-analysis revealed that a negativity bias in affective processing is not apparent in normal populations (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007). The thesis of a general negativity bias in affective processing, thus, has to be qualified. Strong attentional responses were observed only for highly specific negative stimuli with a clear evolutionary basis (e.g., for snakes, see Öhman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001), a finding that is paralleled by strong attentional responses for specific positive stimuli that are equally important for survival, reproduction, and nurture (e.g., babies or attractive potential mating partners; Brosch, Sander, & Scherer, 2007; Maner, Gailliot, & DeWall, 2007; Schupp et al., 2007). A reliable general negativity bias was found only for people with psychopathological symptoms like anxiety or depression (for reviews, see Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005).

The Positivity Bias Hypothesis A second influential account argues for a general positivity bias in affective processing (Erdelyi, 1974; Kunda, 1990; Taylor & Brown, 1988). According to this view, information that is positive and self-enhancing is processed more efficiently than negative information (which is often assumed to become inhibited) and consequently has a stronger influence on perception and judgment. In line with this thesis, several strands of research have documented positivity biases that have been labeled, for example, as wishful thinking, motivated reasoning, need for specific closure, optimistic bias, or perceptual defense (e.g., Balcetis & Dunning, 2006; Brown, 1986; Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Kunda, 1990; McGinnies, 1949; Weinstein, 1980). A potential caveat for most of these findings is that perceptual and judgmental processes were confounded (Erdelyi, 1974), allowing for the possibility that positivity biases reflect response biases rather than differences in perceptual sensitivity (for an exception, see Voss, Rothermund, & Brandtstädter, 2008). Equally important, however, is the fact that nearly all of the studies in which a positivity bias was found referred to situations in which participants had no internal control over the outcomes. As will be shown 3

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later, this is a crucial restriction with wide-ranging implications for affective processing biases.

Summary Taken together, these arguments reveal that neither a general negativity bias nor a general positivity bias provides an adequate description of affective processing. The rejection of these accounts opens the door for a more flexible view on affective processing, as it will be presented in the following paragraphs. This perspective conceives of affective processing as highly context-dependent, allowing for an adaptive tuning of affective processing to the demands of motivational regulation.

Viewing Affective Processing as Being Flexible: Two Basic Principles Governing the Regulation of Automatic Affective Processing Going beyond mere anecdotal evidence attesting to the important role of automatic influences on goal pursuit and goal adjustment, I identify two fundamental principles that govern basic affective processing biases: counter-regulation and control-dependency. These basic principles provide a more systematic framework for understanding how the regulatory requirements of a motivational situation are translated into parameters of automatic affective processing.

The Counter-Regulation Principle An essential feature of human motivation is the tension between positively and negatively valenced outcomes: Goal pursuit always comprises the possibility of success and of failure and is associated with potential benefits and costs. This motivational tension or ambivalence implies that an organism has to remain sensitive to both positive and negative outcomes during goal pursuit (Markus & Nurius, 1986; Markus & Ruvolo, 1989). Focusing exclusively on opportunities and gains (positive outcome focus; Higgins, 1997) would lead to rash decisions and impulsive behavior, and it might also prevent an organism from initiating demanding or aversive behaviors that are necessary for goal achievement (Oettingen & Mayer, 2002). Similarly, an exclusive focus on dangers, difficulties, and potential losses

The question of perceptual confounds in face detection is still highly disputed in the literature. Although some studies argue for a threat advantage of angry faces that is independent of perceptual confounds (e.g., Schubö, Gendolla, Meinecke, & Abele, 2006), more recent studies could show that search asymmetries in favor of threatening or angry faces are dependent on basic perceptual attributes of the faces (e.g., Coelho, Cloete, & Wallis, 2010). Some authors even reported a positivity bias in visual search experiments with schematic faces (Juth, Lundqvist, Karlsson, & Öhman, 2005).



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(negative outcome focus) can undermine the commitment to a goal and can threaten the organism into immobility. Maintaining a balance in the processing of positive and negative information is, thus, an essential requirement for the adaptive regulation of motivation. The basic affectivemotivational mechanism that allows an organism to remain in a state of a balanced sensitivity for gains and losses has been termed the counter-regulation principle (Rothermund et al., 2008). The basic idea is that positive and negative affective-motivational states go along with an opposite bias in the processing of valenced information: Negative information automatically attracts more attention in a state of success or hope, whereas failures and fears increase the sensitivity for positive information. By becoming more sensitive to information that is incongruent to the current affective-motivational state, counterregulatory affective processing biases prevent motivational orientations from becoming one-sided and extreme. A large and diverse set of evidence attests to the validity of the affective-motivational counter-regulation principle. On a macro-level, it has repeatedly been shown that affective states very quickly return to baseline, and sometimes even reverse in quality after the termination of an emotioneliciting positive or negative event (Blaney, 1986; Brickman, Coates, & Janoff-Bulman, 1978; Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998; Rothermund & Meiniger, 2004; Solomon & Corbit, 1973, 1974; Taylor, 1991; see also related findings concerning the life-satisfaction paradox in old age; Diener & Suh, 1998; Rothermund & Brandtstädter, 2003b). Importantly, the psychological neutralization or reversal of emotional states is not restricted to negative states but occurs for positive affective states as well (e.g., Solomon & Corbit, 1973), indicating that the phenomenon cannot be explained by processes of strategic “mood management” or by active attempts at changing a problematic situation alone. The automatic neutralization or counter-regulation of affective-motivational states has been attributed to a “law of affective equilibrium” (Beebe-Center, 1929), to the working of a psychological “immune system” (Gilbert et al., 1998), to “affect minimization” (Taylor, 1991), or to “opponent processes” (Solomon & Corbit, 1974) that counteract affective states and prevent them from escalating or becoming chronic. Although suggestive of the to-be-explained effects, these labels do not yet provide a satisfactory explanation of the processes that neutralize affective states. We have proposed that an incongruency bias in affective processing can explain the psychological neutralization of affective-motivational states4 (Rothermund et al., 4

2008; see also Rothermund, 2003b; Rothermund, Wentura, & Bak, 2001; Wentura, Voss, & Rothermund, 2009). Several studies from our lab support our hypothesis that an incongruency bias in affective processing underlies affective-motivational counter-regulation. In a first set of experiments, a simple speeded evaluation task was employed to investigate the effects of performance feedback on affective processing biases (Rothermund, 2003b). Across four experiments, the same pattern of affective-motivational incongruency effects was observed: Categorization of positive stimuli was faster after receiving negative feedback, whereas negative stimuli were processed faster after receiving positive feedback with respect to the performance in the immediately preceding trial. Interestingly, the incongruency effect emerged only for those trials in which the categorization switched from negative to positive or vice versa, indicating that the effect was independent of response execution processes and involved a reallocation of attention to a new valence category (Rothermund, 2003b; for similar findings, see Derryberry, 1993; Ellenbogen, Schwartzman, Stewart, & Walker, 2002; Rothermund, Gast, & Wentura, in press). Another set of studies employed an outcome focus manipulation to investigate the effects of anticipated motivational states on affective processing (Rothermund et al., 2001, 2008). Participants could either win or lose money at the end of a block of trials, depending on their performance during the block. In the positive outcome focus blocks, participants could win money if their performance was fast and accurate, but could not lose any money if their performance was bad. Negative outcome focus blocks employed a reversed logic: If performance was bad during such a block, money was lost, but nothing could be gained during these blocks if performance was good. Affective processing biases were assessed throughout each type of block by measuring interference effects of irrelevant positive and negative distractor stimuli in a flanker task. In line with the results of the feedback manipulation experiments, we again obtained an affective-motivational incongruency effect. Interference effects for positive (negative) distractors were stronger during blocks with a negative (positive) outcome focus, indicating automatic attentional capture for stimuli that were opposite to the current motivational orientation (similar results were reported by de Lange & van Knippenberg, 2007; Isen, Nygren, & Ashby, 1988; Koole & Jostman, 2004). We recently replicated this anticipatory affective-motivational incongruency effect in a more natural motivational context, using a modified version of the computer game

The self-neutralization of affective-motivational states is reminiscent of a basic postulate of Atkinson and Birch’s (1970) theory of the dynamics of action, according to which the mere execution of an activity reduces the strength of the underlying motivational tendency. This idea can be traced back to dynamic theories of motivation that conceive of motivational states as some kind of energy or drive that is consumed or reduced by performing related actions. Counter-regulation of affective-motivational states, on the other hand, occurs independently of the execution of action, and it does not affect the strength of a motivational tendency directly. Instead, counter-regulation is triggered by motivational states that are related to experienced or anticipated outcomes, and it leads to a change in the focus of affective information processing. Of course, these changes in processing might indirectly also lead to a change in motivational strength, but this is not a direct implication of the counter-regulation principle.




TETRIS (Wentura et al., 2009). In addition to the usual task (fitting “bricks” that are falling from the top of a game board into a structure of bricks at the lower part of the game board), participants had to prevent the “bricks” that appeared at the top of the game board from hitting an obstacle by quickly pressing a left or right key. Affective processing biases were measured via interference effects of irrelevant positive and negative schematic face stimuli that appeared adjacent to the “bricks” but on the opposite side of the obstacle. A positive or negative outcome focus was introduced by framing the TETRIS game as either a win or a loss game, during which the current high score could either be improved or lost, respectively. In accordance with the counter-regulation principle, stronger interference effects were observed for those distractors that were opposite in valence to the current outcome focus. In sum, the studies from our lab as well as other research provide broad evidence for counter-regulation in human emotion and motivation. An automatic processing bias toward stimuli that are affectively incongruent with prevailing motivational states is one basic mechanism that underlies the operation of counter-regulation at an automatic processing level.5

The Control-Dependency Principle The regulation of human motivation and action has to solve a fundamental stability/flexibility dilemma (Rothermund, 1998, 2006; see also Carver & Scheier, 1998; Goschke, 1997). If problems and difficulties arise during goal pursuit, there are basically two options for how to respond: One alternative is to increase effort and commitment, the other option is to reduce effort and to downgrade the importance of the goal. Both options have their pros and cons, and neither persistence nor disengagement is always the most appropriate response in situations of difficulty. Persistence preserves the chances that an ambitious goal is achieved despite difficulties, whereas disengagement from a blocked goal can provide emotional relief and helps to conserve valuable resources. Given that future successes or failures 5

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cannot be predicted with certainty, however, tenacious goal pursuit is also connected to the risks of emotional entrapment, behavioral perseveration, and wasting of resources if the goal turns out to be unattainable after all. Similarly, premature disengagement from a goal can abolish the remaining chances to attain an important goal, and can render previous investments futile. The dual process model of assimilative and accommodative coping offers a functional solution to this dilemma (Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002a, 2002b). According to the dual process model, the degree of perceived control over outcomes determines how individuals cope with goal discrepancies6: If action resources are available and relevant outcomes are seen as being dependent on personal efforts, difficulties during goal pursuit lead to increased persistence. In contrast, when action resources are scarce and the individual perceives outcomes to be independent from his or her actions, challenges during goal pursuit tend to evoke accommodative responses (e.g., disengagement). Multiple studies have demonstrated the regulatory function of control beliefs on persistent versus accommodative coping responses (Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002a; Fournier, de Ridder, & Bensing, 2002; Heckhausen, Wrosch, & Fleeson, 2001; Luszczynska & Schwarzer, 2005; Rothermund, 2006; Rothermund & Brandtstädter, 2003a; Wrosch & Heckhausen, 1999). More specifically, indicators of internal control beliefs predict tenacity whereas lack of control predicts disengagement across a range of different goals and behaviors (aging-related functional losses, health behavior, financial problems, life regrets, passing a developmental deadline). Previously I argued that rational deliberation alone fails to predict assimilative or accommodative coping responses. How then do perceptions of control influence coping responses, if not by rational deliberation? Again, a subtle tuning of affective processing biases plays an important role in the regulation of persistence and disengagement.7 According to the control-dependency principle (Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002b; Rothermund, 2006; Rothermund, Bak, & Brandtstädter, 2005), high perceived control induces a problem focus (“negativity bias”) in affective

The incongruent effects of motivational-affective states that have been subsumed under the label of counter-regulation represent a finding that is categorically different from the congruency effects that have often been reported for affective or evaluative priming procedures (for a review, see Klauer & Musch, 2003). The affective priming effect reflects an automatic activation of attitudes toward the primes that is translated into a corresponding response tendency that either facilitates or interferes with executing the required response for congruent and incongruent targets, respectively (De Houwer, Hermans, Rothermund, & Wentura, 2002; Klauer & Musch, 2002; Klinger, Burton, & Pitts, 2000). Importantly, these affective priming effects reflect purely cognitive categorization processes and do not involve an activation of emotional states. Supporting this distinction, we directly compared the effects of motivational (success vs. failure feedback) and cognitive (memorizing the word good vs. bad) manipulations on affective attentional asymmetries in a recent study (Rothermund et al., in press). In line with our expectations, we observed incongruency effects of the motivational feedback manipulation and congruency effects for the working memory manipulation on affective processing in a visual search task. The conception of personal control refers to beliefs regarding the relation between an agent and an end he or she attempts to achieve. These beliefs comprise beliefs regarding the relation between actions and outcomes, i.e., means-ends beliefs, as well as beliefs regarding the ability to successfully perform the required actions, i.e., agent-means beliefs (Skinner, 1996). In addition to control-dependent biases in affective processing, regulatory effects of control on persistence vs. disengagement are also mediated by closed (high control) vs. open (low control) modes of processing (Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002a, 2002b; Rothermund, 1998, 2006; Rothermund, Brandtstädter, Meiniger, & Anton, 2002; see also Lee & Maier, 1988; Mikulincer, Kedem, & Zilkha-Segal, 1989; Reed & Antonova, 2007). Because of the focus of the current article on affective processing, I will not elaborate on the control-dependency of selective attention.



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processing that helps to motivate tenacious, continued goal pursuit and active coping. Experiences of low control like chronic frustration and helplessness, on the other hand, are assumed to lead to a configuration of the information processing system that favors the processing of palliative and self-serving cognitions (“positivity bias”), which in turn facilitates processes of disengagement and acceptance. These effects of control beliefs on affective processing biases are assumed to occur automatically and not as the result of strategic deliberation. Several studies have supported the assumed relationships between control and affective processing biases. For instance, for attributes and situations perceived to be outside of personal control, self-ascriptions of attributes and risks reveal a self-enhancement bias, whereas a reverse effect (i.e., a negativity bias or problem focus) was observed for self-evaluations of attributes and risks that are perceived as being controllable (Rothermund, 2006; Rothermund et al., 2005; see also Ditto, Jemmott, & Darley, 1988; Dunning, 1995; Duval & Silvia, 2002; Gilbert & Ebert, 2002; Green, Pinter, & Sedikides, 2005). For example, in the study by Rothermund et al. (2005), participants ascribed more positive attributes and fewer negative attributes to themselves if these attributes were uncontrollable; in line with the control-dependence principle, however, we observed the reverse tendency for controllable attributes. Namely, participants tended to ascribe fewer positive attributes and more negative attributes to themselves when attributes were controllable. A study by Brandtstädter, Voss, and Rothermund (2004; see also Voss, Rothermund, & Brandtstädter, 2006) provides further evidence regarding the role of control in automatic affective processing. In this study, the authors assessed automatic affective processing biases more directly by employing a visual search task in which specific stimuli indicated a potential loss of points (“danger signals”). In one condition, participants lost points whenever the danger stimulus was presented (uncontrollable danger condition). In the other condition, participants could avoid losing points by identifying the position of the danger stimulus in a subsequent location task (controllable danger condition). Signal detection analyses revealed that perceptual sensitivity for danger stimuli (d’) was lower compared to a neutral baseline in the uncontrollable condition, but was increased in the controllable danger condition. These results are in line with previous findings from the perceptual defense and pain perception literatures, indicating that perceptual thresholds are higher for uncontrollable but not for controllable aversive stimuli (Averill & Rosenn, 1972; Maier, 1986; Miller, 1979; Reece, 1954; Rosen, 1954; Rothermund et al., 2002). In sum, a large number of studies employing different research paradigms support the hypothesis that perceptions of control moderate affective processing biases. In accordance with the predictions of the dual-process model of assimilative and accommodative coping, studies have demonstrated that perceived control over important outcomes increases the sensitivity for negative information (“probSocial Psychology 2011; Vol. 42(1):56–66

lem focus”), whereas perceptions of low control tend to enhance the processing of positive information (“enhancement bias”). The control-dependency principle of affective processing facilitates adaptive responses to goal difficulties by promoting tenacious persistence when the situation seems amenable to change, and by fostering the acceptance of situations that cannot be changed and preparing the individual for emotional detachment from unattainable goals.

A Flexible Conceptualization of Affective Processing – Implications and Open Questions To sum up, a wide range of research has demonstrated that affective processing is highly flexible. Affective processing biases are constantly adjusted in accordance with the regulatory demands of the superordinate motivational situation. Adjusting affective processing explains how individuals remain sensitive to chances and dangers and is key to an understanding of adaptive coping with uncertainty, daily problems, and critical life-events. In this article, I have elaborated on two basic principles that underlie an adaptive regulation of motivation and action: The counter-regulation principle and the control-dependence principle. The current motivational focus triggers the counter-regulation mechanism: A positive/negative outcome focus is accompanied by an automatic attentional orientation toward information that is opposite in valence to the current motivational focus, thus preventing motivational states from escalating or becoming chronic. The control-dependence mechanism is activated when difficulties arise during goal pursuit. If an individual has a sense of control over the situation, affective processing is focused on potential problems (“negativity bias”), whereas if the individual perceives the situation to be uncontrollable, affective processing is oriented toward enhancement (“positivity bias”). The control-dependence principle helps to prevent premature resignation as well as wasteful perseverance and, thus, provides a solution to the stability/flexibility dilemma that is inherent in human motivation. The counter-regulation and control-dependency principles predict that affective processing is not characterized by a stable bias, but is sometimes characterized by a negativity bias and sometimes by a positivity bias. Motivational variables (outcome focus, perceived control) were shown to determine which kind of asymmetry emerges in affective processing. In general terms, affective processing is under motivational control. Going beyond the domain of affective processing, the counter-regulation and control-dependency principles also have wide-ranging implications for different areas of psychological research. For instance, the counter-regulation and control-dependency principles are essential for an understanding of the adaptive bases of self-regu© 2011 Hogrefe Publishing


lation and goal pursuit across the life span, including the astonishing resilience of the self in accommodating to age-related changes and losses (Brandtstädter, Rothermund, & Schmitz, 1997; Rothermund & Brandtstädter, 2003a; Ryff, Singer, Love, & Essex, 1998; Staudinger, Marsiske, & Baltes, 1995). In particular, counter-regulation and control-dependence offer a potential explanation of the intriguing finding of a positivity bias in old age (Mather & Carstensen, 2005). An age-related shift toward positive information might be explained by the fact that goal pursuit in old age is mostly characterized by maintenance goals and prevention (Ebner, Freund, & Baltes, 2006). In accordance with the counter-regulation principle, this negative outcome focus should be accompanied by a positivity bias. Another reason for the positivity bias might be that action resources become scarce in old age and action regulation shifts from an assimilative toward an accommodative mode of coping (Brandtstädter & Renner, 1990). The positivity bias could then be explained by a related shift toward a preferred processing of positive information in situations of low control, as it is predicted by the control-dependency principle. An important open question remains with regards to the limits of counter-regulation and control-dependency. Research has suggested that these mechanisms are an important requirement for adaptive and flexible regulation of action. Nevertheless, these mechanisms might not work well under certain conditions, leading to a breakdown in adaptive action regulation and to the emergence of psychopathological symptoms. Psychopathological symptoms have repeatedly been linked to the maladaptive regulation of action, emotion, and motivation (e.g., procrastination, perseverance, gambling, obsessive-compulsive repetitions of thoughts and emotions). Recent findings on the relation between rigid affective processing biases and symptoms like anxiety or depression (BarHaim et al., 2007; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005) can be taken as first evidence for a causal role of a breakdown of counter-regulation and control-dependence mechanisms in the development and maintenance of these symptoms. Investigating the effects of situational (e.g., ego threat, chronic loss of control) and personality factors (e.g., state orientation [Kuhl, 1994], low self-complexity [Linville, 1985; Rothermund & Meiniger, 2004]) on counter-regulation and control-dependency might provide important insights into the basic determinants of psychopathological symptoms.

Acknowledgments Writing of this article was supported by a research grant of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (RO 1272/2–3). I would like to thank Katie Bowen, Jacobs University, Bremen, for improving the writing quality of this article considerably. © 2011 Hogrefe Publishing

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Received December 20, 2009 Final revision received April 27, 2010 Accepted May 14, 2010 Klaus Rothermund Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena Institut für Psychologie Am Steiger 3, Haus 1 D-07743 Jena Germany Tel. +49 3641 945121 Fax +49 3641 945122 E-mail [email protected]
