1 When Does Recognition Increase Charitable ...

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When Does Recognition Increase Charitable Behavior? Toward A Moral Identity-Based Model

Karen Page Winterich Vikas Mittal Karl Aquino

Accepted for publication in Journal of Marketing, 77 (May) 2013

Karen Page Winterich, Assistant Professor of Marketing, Smeal College of Business, Pennsylvania State University, 455 Business Building, University Park, PA, 16803, email: [email protected]. Vikas Mittal, J. Hugh Liedtke Professor of Marketing, Jones Graduate School of Business, Rice University, Houston, TX 77005, email: [email protected]. Karl Aquino, Richard Poon Professor of Organizations and Society, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Division, Sauder School of Business, University of British Columbia, 2053 Main Mall, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z2, email: [email protected]. We are grateful to Rajan Sambandam and Christi Clark at TRC, Inc., Fort Washington, PA, for facilitating data collection through the online panel. We appreciate feedback on prior versions of this manuscript from Utpal Dholakia, Ajay Kalra, and Bill Ross.

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When Does Recognition Increase Charitable Behavior? Toward A Moral Identity-Based Model

Each year, individuals in the United States donate over $200 billion to charitable causes. Despite our lack of understanding of whether and how it increases charitable behavior, charities often offer recognition to motivate donor behavior. This research focuses on how the effectiveness of recognition on charitable behavior is dependent on the joint influence of two distinct dimensions of moral identity—internalization and symbolization. Three studies examining both monetary donations and volunteering behavior show recognition increases charitable behavior among those characterized by high moral identity symbolization and low moral identity internalization. Interestingly, those who are high in moral identity internalization are uninfluenced by recognition, regardless of their symbolization. By understanding correlates of the two dimensions of moral identity among donors, nonprofits can strategically recognize potential donors to maximize donation and volunteering behavior.

Keywords: charitable behavior, recognition, moral identity, symbolization, social reinforcement

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Today, 81 percent of nonprofit organizations in the United States rely on unpaid, individual volunteers (Corporation for National and Community Service 2006) and over 70 percent of annual charitable donations come from individuals rather than corporations (Giving USA 2011). Not surprisingly, marketing scholars have examined donations of both time and money (Arnett, German, and Hunt 2003; Bendapudi, Singh, and Bendapudi 1996; Reed, Aquino, and Levy 2007; Shang, Reed, and Croson 2008; White and Peloza 2009). We consider voluntary donations of time or money that are intended to help others as falling under the broader domain of charitable behavior (see Table 1 for an overview). [Insert Table 1 about here] One way nonprofits encourage charitable behaviors is via recognition of donors (Grace and Griffin 2006; Kotler and Lee 2005; Moore 2008). In fact, several charity consultancies help charities create and execute donor recognition programs (cf. Gaffny 1996; see also http://donorrecognition.ca/). Fisher and Ackerman (1998) define recognition as an “expression of appreciation given by a group to individuals who undertake desired behaviors” (pg. 264). Similarly, Kwarteng, Smith, and Miller (1988, pg. 60) define recognition as “formal and/or informal favorable attention given to an individual to provide him/her a sense of appreciation.” The social component—public versus private continuum—of recognition may vary from recognition that is highly public (e.g., buildings and programs named after a donor, Harbaugh 1998; donor names listed in newsletters, Kotler and Lee 2005; giving pink ribbons to breast cancer donors to wear, Moore 2008) to private (e.g., a letter of thanks sent to the donor or appreciation expressed in personal conversation, Merrill 2005). In this paper, we define recognition as an explicit expectation by the donor that their donation behavior received or will receive attention by one or more persons.

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Is recognition a universally effective marketing strategy for increasing charitable behavior? It is tempting to believe that recognition must almost always enhance charitable behavior. However, recognition as a marketing strategy may also be ineffective under some conditions. For example, some donors avoid recognition to prevent unwanted charity solicitations while others prefer anonymity due to religious reasons (Associated Press 2009; Beatty 2008). As reviewed later, evidence from empirical research on the effectiveness of recognition has produced mixed results (Wymer and Samu 2002). These equivocal findings suggest a need for research aimed at understanding when and why recognition is an effective marketing strategy for charitable behavior. This paper proposes and tests an identity-based model to examine the contingent nature of the effectiveness of recognition as a marketing strategy for charitable behavior. We examine a consumer’s moral identity (Aquino and Reed 2002) as a construct that might influence whether and why recognition may or may not be effective. According to Aquino and Reed (2002) moral identity has two dimensions: internalization, which is the degree to which moral traits are central to the self, and symbolization, which is the degree to which moral traits are reflected in the respondent’s actions in the world. We report three studies examining the contingent nature of the effectiveness of recognition based on these two dimensions of moral identity. Additionally, Study 3 shows that social reinforcement mediates the proposed effect of recognition. This research makes several theoretical and practical contributions. First, it extends existing identity-based models of how consumers relate to companies (Bhattacharya and Sen 2003), evaluate services (Homburg, Wieseke, and Hoyer 2009), and make charitable contributions (Shang, Reed, and Croson 2008). We not only show that different identity dimensions can have an interactive effect, but also show their behavioral manifestation is

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differentially sensitive to contextual cues. For instance, a contextual cue such as recognition may be associated with one identity dimension (i.e., symbolization) but not the other (i.e., internalization). Second, and more specific to moral identity, prior research has established the effectiveness of moral identity internalization as a predictor of charitable behavior (Reed, Aquino, and Levy 2007; Winterich, Mittal, and Ross 2009). However, we have seldom systematically investigated the effectiveness of moral identity symbolization. Reed and Aquino (2003, p. 1284) state, “future research should examine conditions under whether the private (internalization) or public (symbolization) aspects of the self-importance of a person’s moral identity will be stronger predictors of particular outcomes.” This research theoretically delineates and empirically tests conditions when symbolization has a unique and systematic effect beyond that of internalization, based on the level of recognition. Third, we demonstrate that social reinforcement mediates the effect of recognition. Specifically, the self-verification process, which relies on social reinforcement, explains why recognition may be effective under conditions of low internalization and high symbolization but not under high internalization. Moreover, our social reinforcement mechanism accounts for why both private and public recognition may be effective. Fourth, from a managerial perspective, our paper clarifies why recognition can be more or less effective for different donors. As explained later, recognition of charitable behavior provides an opportunity to socially reinforce one’s moral identity. Because the need for social reinforcement of moral identity is particularly high for individuals high in symbolization but low in internalization, we find recognition to be most effective when individuals have high levels of symbolization but low levels of internalization. By doing so, our research provides a more

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nuanced approach to the utilization of recognition as a tool to motivate charitable behavior among individuals. It also provides a framework to explore other potential mediating mechanisms in future research. Conceptual Framework Harbaugh (1998, pg. 278) states, “…virtually every ‘how to’ book on fundraising agrees, that the actions of charities to solicit gifts and reward donors with public recognition have a large effect on giving and voluntary provision of public goods.” Yet, Harbaugh also acknowledges there is little understanding, theoretically or empirically, of how recognition works. Harbaugh proposes two primary motives for charitable behavior: 1) internal gratification, or the positive feeling of a “warm glow” arising from giving (Andreoni 1990), and 2) social prestige, or the possibility of some material or social return for charitable behavior when others know about the behavior. In addition, there may be psychological benefits of charitable giving (Andreoni 1990; Bendapudi, Singh, and Bendapudi 1996; Peloza and Hassay 2006). Empirical research on the effectiveness of recognition as a means for increasing charitable behavior is equivocal. In one of the earliest studies, Dawson (1988) examined four reasons for giving to medical research: 1) improve one’s social worth, 2) advance one’s career, 3) receive tax benefits, and 4) benefits received in the past or anticipated need in the future. To the author’s surprise, only the last two predicted charitable giving. Ko, Gibson, and Kim (2011) surveyed ticket buyers and donors of the performing arts from 14 university partners. They found that reported desire for recognition versus anonymity significantly predicted self-reported donation amount over the past four years. Examining recognition through rewards such as volunteer t-shirts and plaques, Fisher and Ackerman (1998) found that promised recognition increased volunteering only when participants felt the needs of the organization were high; thus,

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recognition did not increase volunteering when the group’s need for volunteers was not great. Schlegelmilch and Tynan (1989) identified five different personality types of potential givers: 1) sympathetic benevolents who are generous with friends, 2) indifferent individualists who help others that they do not know well, 3) pragmatic philanthropists who feel personal responsibility toward others’ misfortunes, 4) hard-hearts who do not feel guilty when selfish, and 5) glory givers who are concerned with gaining recognition for their gifts. Interestingly, the glory-giver segment explained the least amount of variance in giving. Similarly, Peterson (2004) surveyed alumni from a business college and found that recognition did not predict the actual number of hours volunteered. Prince and File (1994) segmented donors in different groups and obtained qualitative opinions from each segment. Those segmented as altruists explicitly stated they did not want recognition: “I find it especially upsetting when the charities misconstrue my motivations…want to make a public event out of something I have done” (pg. 76). In contrast, donors deemed as communitarians, stated: “I really appreciate it when they [nonprofit organizations] give me some recognition. It means something when my neighbors are aware of the ways I help.” (p. 29). In summary, the empirical evidence regarding the association of recognition and charitable behavior is equivocal at best and suggests that the effect of recognition is conditional. Moreover, it does not provide theoretical insight into conditions under which recognition is most effective at enhancing charitable behavior. Recognition and Charitable Behavior: The Moderating Role of Moral Identity Aquino and Reed (2002) proposed a socio-cognitive model of moral identity wherein an associative network of related moral traits, goals, and behaviors may represent a person’s moral identity. Within this associative network, the strength of these moral associations reflects the degree to which a person’s moral identity has high self-importance. This model posits two

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dimensions of moral identity: the private (internalization) dimension and the public (symbolization) dimension. This two-dimensional conception of moral identity is consistent with the self as having both an internal (private) and external (public) aspect (Erikson 1964; Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss 1975). According to Aquino and Reed (2002), an individual with higher moral identity internalization should have moral traits, goals, and behaviors more accessible in their thoughts. To be sure, individuals with relatively lower moral identity internalization are not void of moral thoughts; instead, thoughts regarding moral traits, goals, and behaviors are not as dominant in their minds. In other words, it is important that an individual’s personal view of him/herself (i.e., privately) aligns with his/her actions such that individuals who view themselves as high in moral identity internalization are more likely to engage in moral actions, including charitable behavior because doing so enhances the consistency of their self-concept as a moral person (Blasi 1984). On the other hand, the public dimension of moral identity, referred to as symbolization, accounts for the desire of individuals to express their moral character to others through their actions in the world. As such, individuals with high levels of moral identity symbolization seek to engage in activities that express their moral identity to others, whereas individuals low in moral identity symbolization are less likely to seek opportunities to express their moral identity to others though their actions. Notably, an individual’s symbolization may not regard their internalization such that while all individuals may have a base level of moral standards, some individuals may have higher levels of moral identity internalization, whereas others have higher levels of moral identity symbolization. We propose that the mechanism underlying the symbolization dimension of moral identity stems from social reinforcement (Kandel 1980; Lieberman et al. 2001). Social

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reinforcement entails the comments or actions of others that serve to reinforce one’s identity to oneself through the reflected appraisals of others (Lieberman et al. 2001; Schlenker and Weigold 1992). Self-verification theory grounds the logic for social reinforcement: individuals desire to provide an accurate portrayal of themselves to others because doing so contributes to an experience of psychological coherence (Reed et al. 2012; Swann 1983). In essence, recognition of charitable behavior provides an individual the opportunity for his/her moral identity to be reinforced to oneself through the comments and actions of others (i.e., social reinforcement). The social reinforcement that arises from recognition is likely to be particularly important for those with high moral identity symbolization who seek to express their moral self through their actions in the world. We specify our prediction in this regard next. [Insert Table 2 about here] Table 2 summarizes the expected effects of recognition by moral identity internalization and symbolization based on the arguments we have made regarding the motives that underlie the two dimensions. We expect the self-consistency motive to be the primary driver of charitable behavior for consumers who are high in internalization regardless of their level of symbolization such that recognition will have no effect on predicting charitable behavior. In contrast, selfverification motives, which can be achieved via social reinforcement occurring from recognition of the charitable behavior, will influence charitable behavior among those high in symbolization but low in internalization; specifically, these donors need social reinforcement to motivate charitable behavior, and thus recognition will exert a significant effect on charitable behavior. Finally, for those who are relatively low on both moral identity dimensions, recognition will not predict charitable behavior because self-consistency and self-verification do not motivate these donors. Thus, we expect recognition to exert the strongest influence on charitable behavior in

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cell B.1 More specifically, when moral identity symbolization is high, we expect recognition to have a stronger positive relationship with charitable behavior among donors who are low as compared to high in moral identity internalization. This effect should occur because, unlike those who are higher in moral identity internalization, self-consistency should not motivate those low in moral identity internalization. In other words, motivation that is independent of recognition will be limited for donors low in moral identity internalization. Consequently, the social reinforcement needed for the self-verification motive that accompanies symbolization will result in recognition being a more influential predictor of charitable behavior. However, when the selfconsistency motive is strong, as it is for those high in internalization, then the self-verification motive of symbolization that seeks social reinforcement has a lesser influence on charitable behavior, thereby attenuating the effectiveness of recognition in motivating charitable behavior. Among donors with low symbolization, we argue that recognition will not significantly predict charitable behavior. This null effect should occur because those low in symbolization do not seek social reinforcement, thereby rendering recognition irrelevant. As such, self-consistency becomes the primary driver of behavior. If this assertion is correct, then no positive relationship should exist between recognition and charitable behavior among low symbolizers. Since our arguments specify different effects of recognition depending on levels of moral identity internalization and symbolization, we are proposing a three-way interaction that arises from a two-way interaction involving recognition and moral identity internalization predicting charitable behavior when symbolization is high, but not when symbolization is low, which we                                                              1

It is important to clarify that “high” and “low” internalization or symbolization refers to the relative strength within one dimension of moral identity. Because these dimensions represent two distinct psychological phenomena, we do not compare the strength of an individual’s moral identity across the two dimensions: internalization as central to the self-concept and symbolization reflected through actions in the world.

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propose as follows: H1:

The effect of recognition on charitable behavior is stronger among consumers who are high rather than low in moral identity symbolization, but only among those who are low in moral identity internalization.

How does our theorizing, summarized in H1, contribute to research on the effect of moral identity on charitable behavior? While there are over ten articles documenting more than twenty studies using Aquino and Reed’s (2002) measure of moral identity, most studies find internalization to be a stronger and more consistent predictor of charitable behavior, whereas the effect of symbolization shows a weak or no relationship to this outcome (Aquino et al. 2009; Aquino, McFerran, and Laven 2011; Reed and Aquino 2003; Reed Aquino, and Levy 2007; Winterich, Mittal, and Ross 2009). Thus, what effect, if any, symbolization has, and, if so, when and why, is not understood. We contribute to this literature by theoretically arguing a strong, positive relationship between recognition and charitable behavior among those characterized by moral identity symbolization, albeit only for those not motivated by the self-consistency associated with high importance of internalization. Study 1: Recognition, Moral Identity, and Monetary Donations We focus on monetary allocations to a charity offering recognition and operationalize recognition as private acknowledgement through a thank you card from the organization. We measure moral identity internalization and symbolization. Participants Participants were 410 adults (62 percent female; Mage = 47.84 years, SD = 11.99, range = 20-85) from an online panel in the United States who were entered in a $50 Amazon.com gift card

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lottery as thanks for participation. Participants first responded to Aquino and Reed’s (2002) moral identity scale. We then explained that if they won, they could choose to donate any portion in $10 increments or the entire $50 gift card winning to a nonprofit organization. Last, participants completed a manipulation check and background information. We randomly assigned participants to one of two nonprofits: Childhelp or the National Cancer Coalition. The results were consistent for both charities so we collapsed data across them. Measures Monetary donation behavior. As standard practice, the online research firm used incentivizes participants with a chance to win a $50 Amazon.com gift card. We adapted this incentive by telling participants they could choose to donate some portion in $10 increments or the entire $50 gift card winning to a nonprofit organization (Freeman, Aquino, and McFerran 2009; see Table 3). Thus, the dependent variable is the amount, if any, of the $50 allocated as a donation with options including $0, $10, $20, $30, $40, or $50. We assured participants that their donation allocation would not influence their chance of winning the lottery and that we collected their allocation commitment at this time solely for ease of administration. Participants randomly selected as lottery winners received their $50 winning according to their allocation selected in the study, with the research panel administrator facilitating the allocated amount to the charity and the remaining portion to the Amazon gift card. The research participant received a thank you card from the randomly assigned charity recognizing their donation, which is standard practice for both charities selected. Moral identity. Participants completed Aquino and Reed’s (2002) Self-Importance of Moral Identity Scale shown in the Appendix. This measure: (1) is internally consistent, (2) shows significant test-retest reliability, (3) has a stable two-factor structure exhibiting discriminant

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validity in the two dimensions, and (4) has strong predictive validity in terms of various moral cognitions and behaviors (Aquino et al. 2009; Aquino and Reed 2002; Reed and Aquino 2003; Reed, Aquino, and Levy 2007; Reynolds and Ceranic 2007; Skarlicki, van Jaarsveld, and Walker 2008; Winterich, Mittal, and Ross 2009). As shown in the Appendix, participants responding to the scale see a list of nine moral characteristics. These nine moral characteristics do not comprise the moral identity scale or directly correspond to the ten scalable items. Instead, Aquino and Reed (2002) inductively derived these nine characteristics to capture lay construals of a prototypical moral person (Aquino and Reed 2002). Though the instrument does not use the word “moral,” this methodology makes accessible—through spreading activation—other traits around which a person’s moral identity is organized (Collins and Loftus 1975). Thus, participants should have an array of traits that represent their moral identity accessible when they respond to the ten selfimportance of moral identity items. As a result, we can assess the importance of this particular identity to the self. Participants respond to the 10 items (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree), which constitute two subscales. The five items on the internalization subscale assess the extent to which a person experiences their moral identity internally as part of their self-concept. The five items on the symbolization subscale assess the extent to which a person projects their moral identity to others through their actions in the world. In the specific scale items, the reference to “these characteristics” may not only include the nine moral characteristics listed in the scale directions, but also others that the participants’ associative networks may reference. Notably, it is the way these characteristics are referenced in each scale item (i.e., as important to the self for internalization versus expressed to others for symbolization) that differentiates assessment of

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internalization and symbolization dimensions. The eighth item of the moral identity scale intended for the symbolization dimension may seem to assess both dimensions. To be sure, we conducted analysis with this item excluded and a four-item symbolization measure, but we found the reliability of the symbolization index decreased and the correlation between the two dimensions increased indicating that this item was appropriate to assess the symbolization measure. Despite that, study results remained the same when we used the four-item measure only. For consistency with prior studies examining symbolization (Reed, Aquino, and Levy 2007; Reynolds and Ceranic 2007; Skarlicki, van Jaarsveld, and Walker 2008), the results reported in the text are for the original five-item measure of symbolization in this and all subsequent studies. We averaged the five items measuring internalization (α = .85, M = 6.17, SD = .96) and symbolization (α=.77, M = 4.71, SD = 1.13) to form two subscales, which were moderately correlated (r = .25, p < .01). It is important to note that the internalization mean is not only significantly higher than symbolization, but also, at the absolute level, internalization is very high with an average score exceeding 6 on a 7-point scale. Thus, reference to low internalization is not indicative of an absence of internalization; rather, it is lower in a relative sense such that moral identity may still be important to one’s self-concept (e.g., 5/7, less than 15 percent of respondents scored 5 or lower), but it is not as important as it is to those with higher internalization (i.e., 7/7, approximately 30 percent of respondents). In contrast, symbolization scores tend to be lower on average than internalization scores, with over 50 percent scoring below 5/7 and less than 5 percent scoring a 7/7. These means are consistent with those obtained in the scale development (Aquino and Reed 2002) and in subsequent research (Aquino et al. 2009; Aquino, McFerran, and Laven 2011; Reed, Aquino, and Levy 2007; Reynolds and Ceranic

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2007; Skarlicki, van Jaarsveld, and Walker 2008). Since we use +/-1SD to calculate effects, we use the traditional low versus high terminology, but note that low (-1SD) internalization is still above the midpoint of the scale (approximately 5 to 5.5 on a 7-point scale). Recognition. Those randomly assigned to the recognition condition (1 = recognition; 0 = no recognition) were told that any donation they made of their gift card winnings would be made in their name and they would receive a thank you card recognizing their donation. A pretest (n = 48) assessed perceived recognition by the charity with two items (see Table 3; r = .81, p < .01). Those in the recognized (versus unrecognized) condition thought donations would be recognized by the charity to a greater extent (M = 5.67 (1.35) versus 4.69 (1.27), t = 2.59, p < .05). Control variables. We controlled for gender, coded as 0 (male) and 1 (female) because women may be more likely to engage in donation behavior (Winterich, Mittal, and Ross 2009). We also included charity type, Childhelp or National Cancer Coalition, as a control. [Insert Figure 1 here] Results and Discussion Monetary donation behavior. We ran a regression with monetary donation allocation as the dependent variable and the control variables of gender and charity type, effects of internalization, symbolization, and recognition as well as their two- and three-way interactions as predictors of charitable behavior. Note the change in the dependent variable is equivalent ($10) at each level, and the variable is ratio scaled: thus, linear regression is appropriate. We also replicate the results using an ordered logit. We centered both internalization and symbolization prior to analysis in this and all subsequent studies. Results show a main effect of recognition (b = 4.04, t = 2.46, p < .05) and a main effect of internalization (b = 3.92, t = 3.08, p < .05). No twoway interactions were significant. The three-way interaction was significant (b = -3.56, t = -2.07,

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p < .05). Gender and charity type were non-significant (ps > .50). We explored the pattern of the three-way interaction by examining the effect of recognition at high and low levels (+/-1SD) of both internalization and symbolization. Simple slope analysis revealed that for those with higher symbolization, recognition has a significant effect if internalization is low (b = 9.93, t = 2.39, p < .05). In contrast, recognition is nonsignificant when symbolization is high and internalization is high (b = -.77, t = -.25, NS). Moreover, recognition was not significant when symbolization was low for those low in internalization (b = 1.73, t = .60, NS) nor for those high in internalization (b = 5.26, t = 1.50, NS). Figure 1 illustrates the results of the simple slope analysis that support H1. Discussion. Supporting our theorizing, recognition increases charitable behavior when internalization is low and symbolization is high; recognition does not impact monetary donations when internalization is high and symbolization is high or when symbolization is low, regardless of internalization. To increase generalizability, we next examine the effect of recognition when it occurs through volunteer names listed on a website. In addition, we examine donations of time (i.e., volunteer behavior). While one may assume that the pattern found in Study 1 will apply to donations of time, empirical research suggests this may not be the case as the factors impacting giving may differ by donation modality (Lee, Piliavin, and Call 1999). For example, Reed, Aquino, and Levy (2007) found that moral identity differentially impacted donations of time (versus money) because donors may perceive donating time as more effortful and moral than donating money. However, donations of time are critical to many charities (Eisner et al 2009): over 60 million volunteers donated over 8 billion hours of service in the United States in 2010 (valued at $173 billion), and 81 percent of nonprofit organizations in the United States rely on volunteers

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(Corporation for National and Community Service 2006, 2012). Thus, we sought to replicate these results with donations of time. Study 2: Recognition, Moral Identity, and Volunteer Behavior Existing literature has examined donation of time in a variety of ways (see Table 1 for a review). These include subtle but clever measures such as volunteering to participate in future research studies (Fennis, Janssen, and Vohs 2009; Korsgaard et al. 2010), willingness to complete a twoweek food diary (Fennis, Janssen, and Vohs 2009), and participation in a follow-up survey (Korsgaard et al. 2010). To determine if our theorizing holds for donations of time, we follow this existing research and operationalize charitable behavior with voluntary participation in a follow-up survey. Participants and Procedure Participants included 197 adults (64 percent female, Mage = 48.32 years, SD = 11.11, range = 1873) from the same online research service provider in the United States. Participants first responded to Aquino and Reed’s (2002) moral identity scale used in Study 1 (internalization [α = .81, M = 6.21, SD = .89] and symbolization [α = .75, M = 4.62, SD = 1.06]; r = .23, p < .01). Then, they completed background information and responded to filler questions for approximately 10 minutes. Gender was included as a control as in Study 1. At the end of this main survey, we asked participants to volunteer five minutes of their time to complete a survey for a nonprofit, educational organization. The volunteer request clearly indicated that respondents 1) were under no obligation to participate and 2) there was no financial incentive for their participation. The survey – used by the authors for their universityrelated research, thereby benefitting a nonprofit educational organization – elicited evaluations of various nonprofit organizations. Participants indicating “Yes” were redirected to the new survey;

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otherwise the survey ended (0 = did not volunteer, 1 = volunteered). Recognition (1 = recognition; 0 = no recognition) was manipulated by informing participants that, in exchange for completing the second survey, their name would be listed on a website. Although only those in the recognition condition knew this prior to making their volunteer decision, all participants could choose to have their name added to the recognized list of volunteers at the end of the survey. After they completed the survey, we provided participants with a link to an actual university webpage listing volunteer names. This manipulation is consistent with Fisher and Ackerman’s (1998) definition of recognition as “an expression appreciation given by a group to individuals who undertake desired behaviors” (pg. 264). Inclusion in such a list is a form of recognition frequently used by nonprofits. For instance, the American Marketing Association and Association for Consumer Research regularly list volunteer reviewers and other conference volunteers in conference programs and/or at conference luncheons. A pretest (n = 43) assessed perceived recognition by the public with two items (see Table 3; r = .53, p < .01). To a greater extent, those in the recognized (versus unrecognized) condition thought volunteering would be publicly visible (M = 4.20 (1.03) versus 3.38 (1.18), t = 2.44, p < .05). To be sure, perceived public visibility was not particularly high. This may be due to the low visibility of the specific website to the public at large; however, this makes a more conservative test of our theory. [Insert Figure 2 here] Results and Discussion Volunteering behavior. A logistic regression for volunteering behavior revealed a twoway interaction of internalization and symbolization (b = .69, Wald χ2(1) = 4.38, p < .05), which

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was qualified by a significant three-way interaction of internalization, symbolization, and recognition (b = -.77, Wald χ2(1) = 3.99, p < .05). No main effects were significant. Gender was not significant. As in Study 1, when symbolization was high among those with low internalization, recognition had a significant effect on volunteering (b = 1.78, Wald χ2(1) = 3.81, p = .05). When symbolization was high and participants had high internalization, the effect of recognition was not significant (b = -.26, Wald χ2(1) = .28, NS), indicating that offering recognition did not increase the likelihood of volunteering. When symbolization was low, the effect of recognition was not significant when internalization was low (b = -1.13, Wald χ2(1) = 2.49, NS) or high (b = .24, Wald χ2(1) = .15, NS). We also calculated the percentage of respondents in each condition who volunteered using median splits to illustrate the pattern (see Figure 2). The change in the volunteering from 6 percent unrecognized to 21 percent recognized among those with high symbolization and low internalization could be interpreted either as recognition increasing volunteering or no recognition decreasing volunteering since the volunteer rates were similar for those with high internalization (20-24 percent). Given that, when we added recognition to the volunteer request, those with low internalization (and low symbolization) had a relatively lower likelihood of volunteering (13-14 percent), we interpret these results as recognition increasing volunteering for participants characterized with high symbolization and low internalization. Notably, these results suggest that recognition only impacts volunteering among those with high symbolization and low internalization, which is consistent with Study 1 results for more private recognition of monetary donations. Discussion. Jointly, Studies 1 and 2 support H1 for two different kinds of charitable behavior: donating money (Study 1) as well as donating time (Study 2). By showing that our

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theorizing is identical for donations of both time and money, Studies 1 and 2 suggest managers can use similar strategies for both types of charitable behavior from their donors. Second, giving someone a plaque at an awards dinner or listing their name in a program offers public recognition, but sending a thank you note to their home does not offer such public recognition. The important element of recognition for this research is that the donor perceives recognition of their charitable behavior regardless of whether the recognition is public or private. However, recognition only influences charitable behavior among potential donors who are high in symbolization and low in internalization. These results systematically explain why recognition does not always increase charitable behavior; that is, internalization motivates charitable behavior regardless of recognition. Yet why is recognition effective for those with low internalization, but high symbolization, particularly when this effect occurs regardless of whether the recognition is private or public? Drawing upon self-verification theory, we argue that recognition provides social reinforcement for those who are high in symbolization. Charitable Behavior: The Mediating Role of Social Reinforcement We base our argument for the mediating role of social reinforcement on self-verification (Reed et al. 2012; Swann 1983). As described earlier, individuals strive to have others view them in the way they see themselves. As such, the extent to which the behavior provides the opportunity to verify one’s identity through the responses and views of others influences the motivation to engage in a behavior (Swann 1983). Thus, consumers may engage in a reinforcement monitoring process to determine the extent to which others have verified their identity through their behaviors (Reed et al. 2012). Recognition of charitable behavior provides social reinforcement and thus, verification to one’s self of a donor’s moral identity. As argued earlier, such social reinforcement arising from

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recognition of charitable behavior will be more important for those with high symbolization but low internalization. Social reinforcement, arising from recognition of charitable behavior, verifies the self-importance of a key identity through feedback in response to one’s action. That is, social reinforcement, which can result from recognition of the charitable behavior, supports a person’s underlying identity through the reflected appraisals of others. In other words, recognition of charitable behavior socially reinforces moral identity thus affirming for a donor their morality. Thus, we propose that social reinforcement underlies the effect of recognition on charitable behavior for those with high symbolization who are not motivated by self-consistency due to lower internalization. Consistent with our theorizing for H1, social reinforcement arising from recognition should not influence charitable behavior by consumers high in internalization—they should engage in charitable behavior regardless of whether the behavior is recognized or unrecognized. Consumers high in moral identity internalization can experience self-consistency of their moral identity simply by acting morally (e.g., engaging in charitable behavior) regardless of whether the behavior receives recognition. In contrast, for those who are low in internalization and lack self-consistency but are high in symbolization and seek self-verification, we predict social reinforcement will underlie the effect of recognition on charitable behavior. We make this prediction because self-verification can only occur when the moral (e.g., charitable) behavior is socially reinforced, which occurs when it is recognized. Based on these arguments, we test the following hypothesis: H2:

Social reinforcement mediates the moderating effect of the two dimensions of moral identity on the effect of recognition on charitable behavior. More specifically, social reinforcement will mediate the effect of recognition on

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charitable behavior among consumers who are high in moral identity symbolization, but only among those who do not already have high moral identity internalization.

Study 3: The Mediating Role of Social Reinforcement on Charitable Behavior This study examines social reinforcement as the mediating mechanism underlying the observed effect. Participants and Procedure Participants were 267 adults (78 percent female; Mage = 49.94 years, SD = 12.17, range = 22-78) from an online panel in the United States. Participants receive panel points for participation, which is standard practice for the panel. In addition, participants entered in a $50 Amazon.com gift card lottery. Participants then responded to the donation allocation measure with the recognition manipulation, which were both identical to Study 1 except Feeding America would receive all donation allocations. After the donation allocation, participants completed a series of measures regarding the donation as well as personality measures, which included the moral identity scale, and demographic information. An index for each moral identity dimension was calculated (internalization [α = .89, M = 5.96, SD = .87] and symbolization [α = .80, M = 3.95, SD = 1.20]; r = .16, p < .01). We controlled for gender as in earlier studies. As shown in Table 3, we measured social reinforcement with eight items (α = .76, M = 2.63, SD = 1.22) adapted from Lieberman et al. (2001). Participants thought about friends and/or coworkers to whom they feel close or friends and/or coworkers who have the greatest effect on their behavior and ideas. We reminded participants there were no right or wrong answers. We did not expect responses to these items to correspond specifically to participants’ donation allocation,

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but we anticipated that the extent to which individuals perceive their friends and/or coworkers to socially reinforce charitable behavior represents the extent to which they themselves are motivated by social reinforcement. Social reinforcement was not correlated with moral identity internalization (r = -.06, p = .29) but was positively correlated with moral identity symbolization (r = .40, p < .01). Results Monetary donation behavior. A regression analysis revealed a main effect of internalization (b = 2.44, t = 2.33, p < .05). No two-way interactions were significant, but the three-way interaction of internalization, symbolization, and recognition was significant (b = 2.11, t = -2.07, p = .04). Gender was not significant (p = .14). Simple slope analysis revealed that when symbolization was high, recognition had a significant effect for those low in internalization (b = 5.92, t = 2.75, p < .01). In contrast, recognition was not significant when symbolization was high and internalization was high (b = -1.75, t = -.96, NS). Recognition was not significant when symbolization was low for those low in internalization (b = .28, t = .15, NS) nor for those high in internalization (b = 1.04, t = .45, NS). Figure 3 illustrates the results of the simple slope analysis, which support H1, and the pattern found in Studies 1 and 2. [Insert Figure 3 here] Mediating role of social reinforcement. We conducted mediated moderation analysis following Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes (2007) to determine the extent to which social reinforcement of charitable behavior mediated the effect of recognition, moderated by symbolization and internalization, on charitable behavior. We used bootstrapped estimation of conditional indirect effects as it directly estimates the size of the indirect effects, provides confidence intervals (CIs) for the estimated effects, demonstrates higher power and greater

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control over Type I error rates, and relies on fewer assumptions about the sampling distribution, especially for smaller samples like ours (Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes 2007). Conducting 5,000 iterations, the 95 percent CI for the highest order, three-way interaction excluded zero (-.0587 to -.0042). Thus, we examined the pattern of mediation at high and low (+/-1SD) levels of both internalization and symbolization. For high internalization, the 95 percent CI for the indirect effect of recognition on charitable behavior included zero for both low (-1SD) and high (+1SD) symbolization (-.0776 to .0159; -.1074 to .0099). For low internalization, the 95 percent CI also included zero for low symbolization (-.0314 to .0360). However, for low internalization and high levels of symbolization, the 95 percent CI did not include zero (.0067 to .1384), indicating that social reinforcement of charitable behavior mediates the effect of recognition on charitable behavior for those with high symbolization and low internalization, supporting H2. Discussion This study replicates the results of the previous two studies and shows the mediating role of social reinforcement. To our knowledge, these results are the first to demonstrate empirically how social reinforcement may explain the effect of recognition in conjunction with an individual’s moral identity. General Discussion Three studies show that recognition enhances charitable behavior but only among those having low internalization and high symbolization. We find this whether measuring charitable behavior as donations of money (Studies 1 and 3) or volunteering one’s time for research (Study 2). The finding is also robust to recognition which is private (i.e., thank you card: Studies 1 and 3) or public (i.e., name listed online: Study 2). Moreover, respondents were adults from nationally

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representative panels, not undergraduates. Thus, collectively, our studies provide robust evidence for our theorizing. Theoretical Contributions to the Identity and Charitable Behavior Literature Aquino and Reed’s (2002) two-dimensional model of moral identity has been mostly applied as a simple additive-effect model (see Skarlicki, van Jaarsveld, and Walker 2008 for an exception though they did not explicitly examine recognition). We examine the interactive effect of the two dimensions—internalization and symbolization—showing that recognition increases charitable behavior for consumers with high symbolization. Nonetheless, consistent with the robust support for the effect of internalization, recognition does not increase charitable behavior when internalization has already motivated giving. It is critical to understand that, for consumers to hold a relatively high level of either internalization or symbolization, they need to have a base level of moral trait associations that they deem important. However, beyond this base level of moral trait associations, consumers may have 1) relatively stronger or weaker levels of general self-awareness based on introspection of one’s inner thoughts and feelings and 2) relatively stronger or weaker levels of general sensitivity to the self as a social object (Erikson 1964; Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss 1975) for which they may seek self-verification (Swann 1983). Thus, just because a consumer has relatively low moral identity internalization, it does not preclude him/her from having relatively high moral identity symbolization. Once meeting a base threshold of moral trait associations of importance to one’s self, consumers may have stronger or weaker levels of internalization and symbolization that are not necessarily highly correlated. This nuance is an important contribution to our understanding of Aquino and Reed’s (2002) conceptualization of the two dimensions of moral identity. Showing that social reinforcement mediates this phenomenon is an additional

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contribution of our research as it provides theoretical insight into the conditions wherein recognition is most effective at enhancing charitable behavior. However, we acknowledge there may be other potential mediators that remain unexamined. For example, we propose the role of social reinforcement demonstrated in this research to occur due to the extent to which it verifies the identity to the self and propose that a desire for consistency with the self to underlie the effect of moral identity internalization. Future research should examine these additional motives as potential mediators. Managerial Implications: Recognition as a Marketing Strategy for Charitable Behavior First, managers can utilize the brief instrument shown in the Appendix to determine the level of both moral identity internalization and symbolization for their current and potential donors to better understand how they will respond to various charitable donation solicitations. We acknowledge that measuring a donor’s individual differences may not always be practical for organizations. Yet, the measure is short and may be particularly beneficial if one moral identity dimension tends to characterize the donor base more strongly than the other dimension. For example, in the present research, a large subset of participants (approximately 50 percent in our samples) would donate regardless of recognition and a smaller subset would not donate even when offering recognition. If managers can determine the average levels of moral identity of their donors, they can determine whether offering recognition will be effective (if their donor base has a reasonable proportion characterized by low internalization and high symbolization) or will likely be less effective (if their donor base has a large proportion characterized by high internalization or both low internalization and low symbolization). If one of the latter cases is observed, then managers may be better off by employing strategies other than recognition (e.g., donation matching, emphasis of personal benefits) to increase charitable behavior.

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Prior research on moral identity shows it can be temporarily activated and will have effects consistent with those of chronically important moral identity (Aquino et al. 2009, Aquino, McFerran, and Laven 2011; Reed, Aquino, and Levy 2007). Importantly, product advertisements can activate moral identity (Choi and Winterich 2012). Thus, managers could temporarily activate moral identity in a donation appeal or an advertisement for a cause-related marketing campaign. In taking this approach, recall that the present findings demonstrate that recognition is less effective at increasing charitable behavior for those characterized by high internalization. Thus, managers who temporarily activate moral identity internalization in their donation appeals should not need to incorporate recognition into their marketing strategy since the motivation for charitable behavior would arise from internalization regardless of the presence or absence of recognition. In such cases, managers could save the costs associated with employing donor recognition. When employing recognition to increase charitable behavior, managers should examine various forms of recognition with a view to maximizing effectiveness while minimizing cost. For instance, recognition via listing donor names on a website is similar in effectiveness to sending thank you cards. To the extent that online recognition may be less costly, managers should consider utilizing online tools and social media such as Facebook, Twitter, or LinkedIn to develop effective, but efficient recognition strategies. The effectiveness of such low-cost forms of donor recognition should be of particular interest to managers who need to engage in recognition to strategically manage their volunteer pool, yet have limited funds to do so (Eisner et al. 2009). Moreover, these recognition strategies may be more appealing to younger donors than the more formal, standard recognition methods. This area is ripe for future research. Additionally, we suggest that managers of nonprofits develop more targeted recognition

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strategies rather than employing them universally for all donors. For example, charities may want to give donors a choice to “opt in” to receive recognition by checking a box on the donation request as not all donors may seek such recognition. This can save money from any costs associated with recognition. In other cases, if organizations know or believe the majority of their donor base is high on symbolization and low on internalization, then they may seek to implement an “opt out” strategy so those who strongly do not desire recognition can choose not to receive recognition, but recognition will be given to all others. Clearly, understanding the relative effectiveness of such opting in/out strategies is a key area for future research. Last, managers may enhance charitable behavior by training employees to reinforce donors’ identities socially. For example, training cashiers to offer social reinforcement may make donation appeals at store checkout more effective. More generally, the notion that recognition is an effective means for facilitating the reinforcement of one’s social identity may apply in many contexts beyond charities. For instance, in many cases individuals consume brands as a way to manage and bolster their own identity. Strategically recognizing customers based on the selfimportance of their identity can foster stronger brand connections. However, future research should address the extent to which other consumer identities may be amenable to recognition. Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research First, we measured moral identity though past research has shown isomorphic results using both measured and temporarily activated moral identity internalization (Aquino, McFerran, and Laven 2011; Reed, Aquino, and Levy 2007; Winterich, Mittal, and Ross 2009). Still, research should replicate our results using activated moral identity. Second, there is a need to more comprehensively explicate the construct of recognition and examine how different types of recognition may affect not only charitable behavior, but also

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other consumption behaviors. Though our studies found similar results for different types of recognition, namely private and public recognition, the similarities in the current results for both types of recognition should not mask the subtle differences among these recognition modalities that deserve careful consideration in future research. Nor should organizations use different types of recognition strategies indiscriminately. In addition to their cost, they may be differentially related to other aspects of a donation context (the extent to which an organization wants to motivate others to donate) or donor characteristics (e.g., altruism, self-monitoring, etc.). Third, our recognition manipulation of a thank you card sent to the donor from the charitable organization in Studies 1 and 3 is a very subtle form of recognition. It is likely that offering stronger, more direct forms of recognition may increase the effectiveness of recognition for those high in symbolization and low in internalization. Clearly, the subtle recognition used in the present studies suggests a more conservative test of our hypothesis. Moreover, our theorizing may also explain results from Reed, Aquino, and Levy (2007), who found that internalization consistently predicted giving both time and money, but symbolization predicted donations of time but not money. Our theorizing suggests this effect could have occurred if participants perceived donating time (e.g., volunteering time at a local community service organization) to result in greater recognition than donations of money through writing a check or electronic transfer. Fourth, to the extent that recognition can have a non-linear impact, additional studies may reveal that very high levels of public recognition are a detriment to charitable behavior among some consumers—likely those that prefer anonymity (Associated Press 2009; Beatty 2008). Similarly, very low levels of recognition may negatively influence charitable behavior if donors expect some minimal level of recognition as a form of gratitude (Prince and File 1994).

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We theorize and empirically demonstrate that social reinforcement underlies the effect of recognition moderated by symbolization and internalization on charitable behavior. This social reinforcement likely provides psychological benefits through self-verification. However, it is important to note that there is an ongoing debate regarding whether experiencing a “warm glow” from giving is egotistic versus altruistic to the extent that it offers psychological benefits (Andreoni 1990; Bendapudi, Singh, and Bendapudi 1996). We do not address this debate. Notably, individuals may use self-interest motives as justification for engaging in charitable behavior (Miller 1999); however, the stronger underlying motive may be the psychological benefits of social reinforcement. We hope future research will explore these issues.

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TABLE 1 Overview of Charitable Behavior Definitions and Operationalizations Article

Definition of Charitable Behavior and/or Prosocial Behavior

Operationalization (DVs)

Bendapudi, Singh, and Bendapudi (1996), JM

Helping behavior is behavior that enhances the welfare of a needy other, by providing aid or benefit, usually with little or no commensurate reward in return. (defined from the perspective of charitable organizations)

Conceptual framework and research propositions

Fennis, Janssen, and Vohs (2009), JCR

Benevolence-no explicit definition provided Examples of diverse acts of benevolence: 1) Endorsing a campaign for traffic safety 2) Working as a volunteer on a canned food drive for homeless shelters 3) Signing a petition supporting an increase in tuition fees

1) Willingness to keep a food diary for 2 weeks (yes versus no) 2) Volunteering as a future research participant for studies conducted on behalf of the Tax and Customs Administration (number participants volunteered for from 0-10) 3) Length of time willing to volunteer as a research participant over the year (0-240 minutes in 30 minute intervals) 4) Volunteer to participate in future studies (yes versus no)

Fisher and Ackerman (1998), JCR

Volunteerism-no explicit definition provided

Number of hours willing to donate to fundraising drive or (#hours/day for one week, up to 25 hours) or Soccer Festival (0-11)

Klein, Smith, and John (2004), JM

Prosocial behavior includes “actions intended to benefit one or more people other than oneself-behaviors such as helping, comforting, sharing, and cooperation” (Batson 1988, p. 282).

Boycott decision

Korsgaard et al. (2010), JAP

Organizational citizenship behavior is defined as not being directly or formally recompensed by the organization’s reward system though it does not need to be beyond the job or not lead to system rewards (Organ 1997).

1) Volunteering for a follow-up experiment 2) Agreement to participate in a follow-up survey and degree of actual participation

Lee and Shrum (2012), JCR

Prosocial behavior (donation and helping behavior); no explicit definition provided

1) Donation likelihood 2) Actual monetary donations to Feeding America 3) Likelihood of helping in 6 scenarios

Reed, Aquino, and Levy (2007), JM

Charitable behavior - No explicit definition provided

Perceptions of giving time versus money; Preferences for giving time versus money;

Zhou et al. (2012), JCR

Charitable behavior is a form of prosocial behavior; such behavior entails actions that intend to help and do help others (Taute and McQuitty 2004).

Monetary and volunteer intentions; Monetary donations to a real charity

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TABLE 2 Effect of Recognition on Charitable Behavior by Moral Identity Internalization and Symbolization Moral Identity Symbolization

Moral Identity Internalization High

Low

High

Cell A No recognition needed; Self-consistency motives for charitable behavior

Cell B Recognition needed; Provides social reinforcement of charitable behavior

Low

Cell C No recognition needed; Self-consistency motives for charitable behavior

Cell D No motivation for charitable behavior

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TABLE 3 Description of Measures Used in all Studies

1. Monetary Donation Allocation (Study 1 and 3; from Freeman, Aquino, and McFerran 2009) Donation choices were: (a) $50 donation/no gift card, (b) $40 donation/$10 gift card, (c) $30 donation/$20 gift card, (d) $20 donation/$30 gift card, (e) $10 donation/$40 gift card, and (f) No donation and $50 gift card. Monetary donations range from 1 to 6 with higher numbers indicating larger monetary donations. 2. Recognition (Pretest for Study 1 and 3) To what extent did you think donations would be acknowledged by the charity? and To what extent did you think donations would be recognized by the charity?: 1 = Definitely not acknowledged/recognized to 7 = Definitely acknowledged/recognized 3. Recognition (Study 2 pretest) To what extent did you think donations would be recognized by others? and To what extent did you think donations would be publicly visible to others?: 1 = Definitely not recognized/visible to 7 = Definitely recognized/visible 4. Social Reinforcement (Study 3; adapted from Lieberman et al. 2001) My friends and/or coworkers and I talk about our charitable behaviors quite often. My friends and/or coworkers encourage me to donate. My friends and/or coworkers often point out opportunities to make donations. My friends and/or coworkers have shown me ways I could use to donate more. My friends and/or coworkers have told me that I should donate more. My friends and/or coworkers and I rarely talk about charitable behaviors (reversed). My friends and/or coworkers encourage me to be charitable. I feel my friends and/or coworkers expect me to donate. 1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree

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FIGURE 1 Monetary Donation as a Function of Moral Identity Internalization and Symbolization and Recognition of Donation (Study 1)

 

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FIGURE 2 Volunteering as a Function of Moral Identity Internalization and Symbolization and Recognition of Donation (Study 2)

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FIGURE 3 Donation Allocation and Social Reinforcement as a Function of Moral Identity Internalization and Symbolization and Recognition of Donation (Study 3)  

   

45 APPENDIX SELF-IMPORTANCE OF MORAL IDENTITY SCALE (AQUINO AND REED 2002) Instructions: Listed alphabetically below are some characteristics that might describe a person: Caring, Compassionate, Fair, Friendly, Generous, Helpful, Hardworking, Honest, Kind The person with these characteristics could be you or it could be someone else. For a moment, visualize in your mind the kind of person who has these characteristics. Imagine how that person would think, feel, and act. When you have a clear image of what this person would be like, please indicate your agreement with each statement below. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

It would make me feel good to be a person who has these characteristics. (I) Being someone who has these characteristics is an important part of who I am. (I)  I often wear clothes that identify me as having these characteristics. (S)  I would be ashamed to be a person who had these characteristics. (I/R)  The types of things I do in my spare time (e.g., hobbies) clearly identify me as having these characteristics. (S)  6. The kinds of books and magazines that I read identify me as having these characteristics. (S)  7. Having these characteristics is not really important to me. (I/R)  8. The fact that I have these characteristics is communicated to others by my membership in certain organizations. (S)  9. I am actively involved in activities that communicate to others that I have these characteristics. (S)   10. I strongly desire to have these characteristics. (I) 

Note. I=Internalization item, S=Symbolization item, R=reverse-coded.