5 On models and representations

On models and representations: ʻA cow on a locomotiveʼ, a linocut by Marek Dakowski.

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To Marek, my sunshine

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Table of Contents

Introduction��15 In a nutshell��15 The purpose and its limits��16 Some important conceptual distinctions��17 The questions��26

Chapter 1. Addressing the mystery of language learning and teaching: a retrospective sketch��29 Introduction: colonizing the unknown territory��29 1.1. The pre-linguistic stage: grammar as the key to foreign language learning and its alternatives��30 1.1.1. Preoccupation with grammar��30 1.1.2. Alternatives to the Grammar-Translation Method��32 1.1.3. Characteristic features of the pre-linguistic stage��35 1.1.4. Contributions of Sweet, Jespersen and Palmer. The impact of phonetics��37 1.2. The linguistic stage: the role of the source disciplines in the mid-twentieth century��41 1.2.1. Approach, method, technique��43 1.2.2. The role of Transformational Generative Grammar��44 1.2.3. Selecting a descriptive linguistic model of language��46 1.2.4. Complicating the relationship of the field with the source disciplines��48 1.3. The present: mapping the territory��51 1.4. Toward autonomy��56 1.5. Concluding remarks��57

Chapter 2. Targeting the relevant aspect of language: focus on language use��61 Introduction: on the many facets of language��61 2.1. How to reduce the complexity of the problem?��63

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2.2. The format of ‘normal’ academic disciplines as a source of orientation��66 2.2.1. Scientific activities as specialization of human cognitive processes��68 2.2.2. How can scientists communicate with the empirical reality?��71 2.2.3. On the interface between Foreign Language Didactics as an empirical discipline and the empirical reality��72 2.2.4. What informs a ‘normal’ academic discipline?��81 2.3. On the meaning of the adjective ‘interdisciplinary’��82 2.4. Applications in a ‘normal’ academic discipline��84 2.5. The field of Foreign Language Didactics as a ‘normal’ academic discipline��87 2.5.1. Deriving models of language learning from language use��88 2.5.2. The human locus of foreign language use and learning��90 2.5.3. The learner as human information-processor��93 2.6. Advantages of regarding language use and learning as human information processing�� 101 2.7. The constructive contribution of the language learner to language use�� 105 2.8. Concluding remarks�� 107

Chapter 3. Focus on the learner’s cognitive equipment: the mechanism of human information processing (HIP)�� 111 Introduction: the cognitive site of foreign language use�� 111 3.1. Distinctive properties of human cognitive functioning�� 112 3.2. Human information processing (HIP)�� 128 3.2.1. Hierarchies (subordinate and superordinate levels) in human cognitive functioning�� 129 3.2.2. The mechanism of human information processing including foreign language use�� 131 3.2.3. Perception: the interface between the subject and the environment�� 132 3.2.4. The role of perception in learning a foreign language�� 137 3.2.5. Attention�� 140 3.2.6. Attention versus working memory�� 145 3.2.7. Working memory and intentional behaviour�� 146 3.2.8. Memory�� 147 3.2.9. Memory representations requisite in language use and learning�� 150 10

3.3. Information structures and their types: cognitive schemata�� 152 3.4. Concepts in our mental lexicon�� 155 3.5. Procedural and declarative representations�� 156 3.5.1. Multiple coding and filing in language use and learning�� 158 3.6. Controlled, automatic and hybrid processing�� 160 3.7. Skill acquisition and expertise�� 161 3.7.1. Differences between experts and novices in the use of skills�� 165 3.8. The role of feedback in learning�� 166 3.9. Implications for understanding foreign language learning and teaching�� 167

Chapter 4. Focus on the phenomenon of language use in verbal communication�� 177 Introduction: the communicative structure of language use�� 177 4.1. Information, signals, signs and symbols in verbal communication�� 179 4.2. Verbal communication as a human cognitive activity�� 183 4.2.1. Alignment in verbal communication�� 184 4.3. Interpersonal communication as a relationship�� 185 4.4. Verbal communication in the developmental perspective�� 188 4.5. The centrality of meaning in verbal communication�� 194 4.6. Ties between verbal communication and culture�� 199 4.7. Verbal communication as human operations in time and space�� 201 4.8. The nature of verbal communication�� 205 4.8.1. Constituents of verbal communication�� 207 4.8.2. Constructing communicative intention�� 210 4.8.3. Targeting the message at the addressee�� 210 4.8.4. Encoding the communicative intention into the verbal message�� 212 4.8.5. Reconstructing the communicative intention by the addressee�� 212 4.9. Knowledge, skill and discourse as a cycle in language use�� 214 4.10. Language as the code of communication�� 219 4.11. Implications for understanding foreign language learning and teaching�� 224

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Chapter 5. Focus on comprehension and production in speech and writing with potential applications in teaching English as a foreign language�� 231 Introduction: Toward a realistic account of language use�� 231 5.1. Comprehension and production: the status of meaning and form�� 233 5.1.1. The nature of comprehension; the nature of production�� 234 5.2. Properties of comprehension and production in speech and writing�� 239 5.3. The component of skill in language use and learning�� 242 5.3.1. Options relevant in developing the skill component in language use�� 245 5.3.2. Task difficulty in the development of language skills�� 247 5.4. Reading comprehension as search for meaning�� 248 5.4.1. The depth of reading comprehension�� 251 5.4.2. The EFL learner’s perspective of reading�� 253 5.5. Listening comprehension as an integral part of verbal communication�� 256 5.5.1. Functions of auditory input in learning English as a foreign language�� 258 5.5.2. Sources of difficulty in listening comprehension tasks�� 260 5.5.3. Feedback on form in listening tasks�� 261 5.6. The nature of speaking as an integral part of verbal communication�� 262 5.6.1. Abilities involved in participating in a conversation�� 264 5.6.2. Long-term investment in the speaking skill�� 266 5.6.3. Related strategies for developing the speaking skill�� 268 5.7. Writing as constructing a message�� 269 5.7.1. Differences between experienced and inexperienced writers�� 272 5.7.2. Long-term investment in the writing skill�� 273 5.7.3. Error correction in the written work�� 274 5.8. Some accuracy enhancement strategies�� 275 5.9. Concluding remarks�� 276

Chapter 6. Conclusions�� 277 6.1. Characterizing language use for the purpose of Foreign Language Didactics�� 277 6.2. Fundamental questions in Foreign Language Didactics�� 281 6.3. On the notion of foreign language teaching in the educational system�� 288 12

6.3.1. Systematizing options for foreign language teaching�� 291 6.4. Concluding remarks�� 298

Explanation of terms�� 303 References�� 323 Index of Authors�� 353 Index of Subjects�� 359

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Introduction

In a nutshell In the field of foreign language learning and teaching, like in all language sciences, everything revolves around our understanding of the notion of language (for a recent discussion, see Seedhouse et al. eds. 2010). In this book, I develop a conception of this central notion intended to be relevant to the field of foreign language learning and teaching with focus on English as a foreign language. This seems natural since English is the most widely taught foreign language and has become the international language of global communication. My conception is presented in the following stages: 1. First, I take a look back at some past strategies of conceptualizing the notion of language in the context of the developing field of foreign language learning and teaching and in order to address this issue I choose the framework of an autonomous (even if only relatively autonomous) empirical discipline. 2. Next, I define language for the purpose of this discipline as a representation of its subject matter; as a result, I can use this field’s constraints on the scope and level of generality of this representation to narrow down the notion of language to language use by people, whose cognitive activity is information processing, and who use language within the universal phenomenon of verbal communication, as a coding device in comprehension and production in speech and writing in various human sociocultural situations. 3. Then, I look at the locus of foreign language learning, in other words, the main components, processes and information structures of human cognitive mechanism of information processing specialized for verbal communication in order to gain some insight into the participation and constructive contribution of the foreign language learner in the process of language learning. 4. To make the notion of verbal communication more specific, I present its basic structure as the flow of articulated, information-carrying energy discharges from the sender to the addressee and vice versa, but first and foremost, I emphasize the centrality of meaning (and sense) as the causal factor of verbal communication, as well as the role of cognitive, linguistic and communicative resources available to the participants. Naturally, I recognize the dynamics of verbal communication, i.e. constructing and deconstructing

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the communicative intentions which involve task-specific activations of vast knowledge representations by the participants, as well as their constructive and reconstructive processes, operations, skills, strategies and procedures involved in weaving the thread of discourse in human relationships. 5. I finally focus on comprehension and production in speech and writing to identify the foreign language learner’s perspective of target language use in order to outline the options in foreign language teaching which emerge from this cross-sectional conception.

The purpose and its limits This book is an attempt to conceptually identify foreign language learning as language use, a sociocultural phenomenon with its cognitive and psycholinguistic underpinnings, i.e. language-specific operations performed by people in their interactions with other people in verbal communication. Regarding some key terms, foreign language didactics is understood as an academic discipline in its own right, i.e. a science, to use a more ambitious though controversial term; for any format of reflection on foreign language learning and teaching, the term ‘field’ rather than ‘discipline’ is used. ‘Foreign language learning’ and ‘foreign language teaching’ are treated as symmetrical concepts in that our understanding of foreign language learning determines the ensuing teaching procedures. A phenomenon is an occurrence in space and time, whereas cognitive and psycholinguistic underpinnings refer to the activity of human information processing, especially verbal communication and reasoning. Operations and procedures imply human subjects with resources as well as abilities to make and integrate the necessary choices. It is a distinctive feature of this perspective that central position in the subject matter is taken up by human subjects constructively involved in communication. My purpose is to: a) conceptually decompose the phenomenon of language learning into language use as a more elementary entity in the subject matter of foreign language didactics; b) justify the choice of foreign language didactics as a discipline, in contrast to the past developments and conceptions in the field, to provide a map of steps and junctures for the purpose of dealing with the complexity of language; c) elaborate the discipline’s internal hierarchical organization with some guidance from the theory of science to be able to identify language use realistically, i.e. as human cognitive processes and operations involved in verbal communication, i.e. comprehension and production in speech and writing, the processes which are psycholinguistic in nature; 16

c) draw conclusions and guidelines from this realistic understanding regarding various options and strategies of eliciting and cultivating processes involved in language use in the context of teaching English as a foreign language with possible relevance to teaching other foreign languages. As a term, language use emphasizes an essentially cross-sectional perspective of foreign language learning, i.e. it barely touches upon foreign language learning along its longitudinal, developmental dimension. However, without a more explicit cross-sectional view of what it means to be able to use a foreign language, it is hard, if not impossible, to develop a longitudinal perspective because the most significant temporal changes are derived from the entities of the cross-sectional representation. With this important reservation in mind, the book is intended for specialists in foreign language learning and teaching, especially English as a foreign language, which is used as a world language with all the ensuing consequences for its learning and teaching. It is recognized and strongly emphasized that the site of foreign language use is the cognitive system of human beings, specialized for verbal communication. When we try to reconstruct conditions for, and stimulate the processes of foreign language learning, we address this and no other cognitive mechanism and its communicative functioning There is no way of circumventing it unless we wish to go against the grain of target language learning. Therefore, the cognitive site of communicative processes is selected as a justified point of reference. To be useful to the discipline of foreign language didactics, such a perspective must be specific and comprehensive enough to target real processes, operations and strategies involved in language use. In the long run, such a specific focus may even contribute to the field’s transformation from its present state into a still more articulate format of an academic discipline. It is not my purpose in this presentation to investigate the relevance to Foreign Language Didactics of various conceptions, theories and models in Second Language Acquisition Research, or its attitude to the neighbouring fields based on the attempts to reconcile these conceptions, theories and models with its own concerns (as can be found in e.g. Hulstijn 2002, Seedhouse et al. 2010, Whong 2010). This fascinating line of enquiry has been saved for a subsequent monograph project. Here, I prefer to focus on the phenomenon of language use itself.

Some important conceptual distinctions In view of the above, three aspects of the notion of second/foreign language learning and teaching can be distinguished:

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a) the natural phenomenon of first and second language learning, i.e. the empirical domain of language use and learning, which exists independently of our research policies and degree of our understanding of this phenomenon; b) the intellectual domain of reflection on first, second, and foreign language learning and teaching, which may range from commonsense to scientific, and employ a variety of perspectives on language learning and teaching, as well as representing, exploring and understanding foreign language use and learning, and c) practical teaching, aimed at evoking first and second/foreign language learning in the educational environment, i.e. the cultural domain of formal (partly constructed) foreign language learning and teaching, which may be influenced by our implicit and explicit ideas and values. The first point refers to the natural processes of language acquisition in the typical social environment, which include first, or native, language acquisition/learning as well as other languages learned subsequently, such as second language acquisition/learning. I use ‘learning’ and ‘acquisition’ as synonyms, with no reference to Krashen’s distinction. First language acquisition is the norm in the human species. Both first and second language acquisition are natural in the sense that they happen as inevitable and universal human processes. Certainly, language acquisition cannot take place in the absence of a speech community, especially without the child’s interaction with more competent individuals (E. Clark 2009, Taylor and Taylor 1990), but this interaction is spontaneous, or some would say, instinctive, and is qualitatively different from deliberate human actions, involving institutional choices and educational work, i.e. goal-oriented physical and/ or mental effort to make language acquisition happen. While phenomenon is regarded as an event or episode in space and time, the adjective ‘natural’ stresses its ubiquity and inevitability in the human species, regardless of our degree of understanding or control of this phenomenon. In contrast to its natural counterparts, foreign language learning takes place when we institute it in the educational system and try to make it happen by teaching. In most neutral terms, foreign language teaching can be understood as the construction of the learner’s educational environment and experience, i.e. input, interaction and feedback. In this broad sense, although the process taps our natural human propensities to some extent, it is always sensitive to various socio-cultural and political factors, not to mention material and intellectual resources, as well as social values and expectations regarding foreign language proficiency (for a recent account, see Phillipson and Skutnabb-Kangas, 2009). In other words, it is a cultivated phenomenon par excellence. As in the case of 18

any other cultivated phenomenon, people in charge of foreign language education are designers who make choices, i.e. follow strategies based on their understanding and resources, in contrast to the inevitable natural phenomenon of first language acquisition in childhood. Needless to say, first language development benefits from schooling later in life leading to its diversification and specialization at various levels. Second languages may be acquired both naturally, via social interaction in the field, and in the classroom environment, while being taught. The natural and the cultivated phenomena of language acquisition/learning are treated as equally real and available for investigation in the empirical reality, i.e. as empirical phenomena. For analytical purposes, however, we should keep in mind that foreign language learning and teaching are shaped by someone’s implicit or explicit understanding of the whole process, reflected in the construction of learning environment and resources, as well as in teaching behaviours. The extent to which these ideas result from, are congruent with, or interfere with the mechanism and processes of language learning is open to investigation. In an attempt to understand the mechanism and the processes of language learning, its natural instances certainly provide a more solid point of reference and evidence than the cultivated ones because the latter are, of necessity, stained by our partial/approximative understanding. The difference between second and foreign languages is considerable: second language learning takes place in the educational setting where the language is taught, as well as outside, in the broader social environment where it is used for communication; the learner has extensive input and interaction opportunities outside the classroom. The ultimate attainment is attributed to both sources, i.e. language use ‘in the field’ and in the educational setting. A foreign language, on the other hand, is not used for communication by the speech community at large; it is learned principally while being taught, within the confines of the educational system (on the distinction between naturalistic and instructed learners, see Ortega, 2009). This has important consequences for constructing the process: the classroom must provide sufficient conditions in the form of input, interaction and feedback opportunities to evoke foreign language learning. Mitchell and Myles (1998: 1) use the collective term ‘non-primary languages’, within which they distinguish second from foreign languages; I use my terms in the same way: …‘second languages’ are any languages other than the learner’s ‘native language’ or ‘mother tongue’. They encompass both languages of wider communication encountered within the local region or community (e.g. at the workplace, or in the media), and truly foreign languages, which have no immediate local uses or speakers.’

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Cook (2010) aptly points out that the notions of ‘native language’, ‘second language’ and ‘foreign language’ refer to dynamic phenomena and require much finer distinctions than has been the case so far. Nevertheless, the level of specificity he suggests is not absolutely necessary at this point. Foreign language teaching is the domain of deliberate human activities aimed at reconstructing the phenomenon of language learning in the educational environment, in other words, instituting it from scratch, in the absence of this language being used by the community at large. This reconstruction takes the form of language experience, materials and resources, based on our conception of the respective phenomenon. Like breeding livestock on a farm, growing plants in a hothouse, and regulating/enhancing our own fertility, second/foreign language learning and teaching is both natural and cultivated/meliorated by human expertise, choices and work. Its reconstruction, cultivation and melioration in the educational context, however, can be effective only to the extent to which it is understood as a real occurrence, i.e. to the extent to which it is understood as an empirical phenomenon. The third area refers to the mental domain of exploration and reflection on first/second/foreign language learning and teaching, i.e. the domain of concepts, their systems, questions, conceptions, perspectives, interpretations and ideas, ranging from elementary, commonsense and informal to highly sophisticated, systematic, and even scientific, forged by various intellectual traditions and schools of thought. For the lack of a better term, let me call this aspect ‘academic reflection’, ‘academic’ for its link with the institutions of higher learning and organised/developed forms of knowledge rather than in the sense of ‘too theoretical to be of any practical value’. Various fields of research have evolved to take a specialized interest in primary and non-primary language acquisition, such as psycholinguistics, the study of bilingualism and multilingualism, first and second language acquisition research, applied linguistics, foreign language teaching methodology, second language pedagogy, foreign language didactics, and others. Subfields of linguistics have also investigated numerous aspects of language and language acquisition from universal, prescriptive, descriptive, synchronic, diachronic, stratificational, functional, generative, cognitive, and numerous other perspectives. For this reason, it is not precise enough to claim that the field of foreign language learning and teaching must be guided by the field of scientific research on language -there are many, potentially relevant areas to look up to and use for guidance. The three aspects of second/foreign language learning and teaching, i.e. the natural phenomenon, the intellectual and the practical domains, have been 20

distinguished primarily for the sake of clarity; in fact they are hardly separable. It would be a good idea to visualize them as a system of communicating vessels in which the domain of academic reflection refers to the phenomenon in question and reciprocates with non-arbitrary guidelines for constructing the conditions for and cultivating the phenomenon. In turn, the natural phenomenon cannot be addressed and investigated without some cognitive tools, such as concepts, terms, ideas, and theoretical systems, more or less explicit, which are formulated within the academic domain. If this domain sees itself as relevant to the society at large, especially to the practical activities of foreign language learning and teaching, it deliberately targets the relevant empirical phenomenon in question, i.e. events and episodes in space and time, to capture and explain their nature, generate their understanding and to develop applications on this basis. Whether or not, and if so, to what extent the aspect of non-primary language learning as an empirical phenomenon, relevant to foreign language learning and teaching, has been systematically targeted in the language sciences is not so obvious. However, to attempt this task a very urgent matter because in the world of professional foreign language teaching on a mass scale, especially teaching English as a Lingua Franca, the practical domain cannot afford not to focus on a realistic account of language use and learning processes which emerge from the respective academic discipline. It needs all the help it can get. However, despite these interactions, each entity must be recognized as having its own specificity and limits. For one thing, research attempts targeted at the phenomenon are mere approximations at understanding so there is no reason to treat them as foolproof or sacrosanct. At the same time, under no circumstances should the natural phenomena and processes which function in the empirical reality be confused with formal constructs which function in the researchers’ minds. The relationship between the empirical reality and the researcher who tries to explore them is interaction, at best. Whether or not, and to what extent, our cognitive processes can approximate representation and understanding of the empirical reality adequate for the purpose at hand is another matter. It certainly does not hurt to try. On the other hand, the fact that we would like to elicit the phenomenon of language learning with our practical activities neither predestines the phenomenon for, nor prevents it from becoming the subject matter of a scientific discipline. The development of such a ‘normal’ academic discipline may take place when the phenomenon becomes the focus of a research agenda congruent with the accepted scientific values, criteria and operations relevant for the domain in question. The more conceptually ‘colonized’ the empirical domain, i.e. the more knowledge we have about the nature of the phenomenon in question, the easier such an approximation may become.

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There is a significant difference between being scientific and being practical. This is a matter of attitudes, values, criteria, and strategies. We must recognize two fundamentally distinct human goals: epistemic, i.e. to understand the world and ourselves, and practical, to meet our survival needs and to adapt to the environment. Being scientific is a specialized route to understanding which uses such sophisticated strategies as model representations and explanations negotiated socially and tested against evidence. Being practical, on the other hand, is a route to effectiveness and workable solutions to everyday problems not limited to rationality (Carruthers, 2002, McGregor, 2007). Clearly, there is a considerable overlap and interdependence between these two forms of human activity, especially nowadays when workable solutions must be based on highly sophisticated, socially negotiated rather than subjective understanding. Both are a form of problem solving. However, confusing one with the other would only obscure the matter. Table. 1: Polarizing practical and scientific thought and action

the goal

BEING SCIENTIFIC to satisfy our cognitive curiosity, i.e. the need to understand ourselves and the world around us; looking for underlying coherence, invariance, systematicity, generality, mechanisms;

BEING PRACTICAL to meet our immediate needs, including adjustment and adaptation to the environment; finding workable solutions;

the route – thought scientific thought takes various diversified forms of reasoning, focused on specialized levels of science, such as model representations, theory construction, empirical testing, evaluating evidence, etc.;

practical thought involves all kinds of problem solving, i.e., intuitive, inventive and creative; however, it is focused on the local and the particular, it may include engineering;

the route – action

scientific action involves empirical research to test hypotheses, i.e. gathering data to support or modify (also refute) theories;

practical action includes all sorts of familiar and innovative procedures to satisfy our various needs; one could say: anything goes;

the effects

socially negotiated intersubjective understanding of the phenomena, shared as scientific knowledge; objectivity is the value to which we aspire;

effective adaptation, which may be based on limited, local, individual, and subjective solutions and understanding, shared as tips or directives.

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I endorse the view that science looks for generalities and regularities, i.e. coherence and underlying systematicity in its subject matter, which reflects our understanding and enables us to reconstruct, cultivate, regulate, meliorate or even (to some extent) control the respective phenomenon. This goal involves bottom-up processes of idealization which begin with our focus on the phenomenon of interest, i.e. an occurrence in the empirical reality, to be represented as a hierarchy of relevant factors (Nowak 1977), i.e. a coherent model (Nersessian 2008). Such a representation is superfluous in performing and designing practical activities. Practical activities are aimed at adjusting the environment to our utilitarian goals. Practice is thought and action for the sake of improvement of our living conditions in the most general sense. The main values here are effectiveness and success. Practical thought and action may be fairly local in scope, subjective, idiosyncratic, spontaneous, or even creative, and involve a compromise to accomplish the goal under the circumstances. Some, but certainly not all of them may be negotiated by a group of people. We do not look up to science in practical activities unless we have to, just the opposite: trivial problems preclude science. However, the more complex the phenomenon, the more clear it becomes that reconstructing, cultivating, regulating and/or meliorating it becomes feasible only if such actions are based on profound understanding. This justifies the attractiveness of science with its own specialized procedures and research operations as a route to understanding the phenomenon. After all, science is a full-time human activity geared at explanation, i.e. making sense of the world. Understanding and explanation are two sides of the same coin provided they refer to the same phenomenon in its technical meaning, i.e. in the sense of an occurrence/event in space and time (Hempel and Oppenheim, 1988). Unlike practical activities, science is highly specialized: it is a structured, organized, and self-controlled area of human cognition with clear values such as precision, systematicity, and replicability, to name but a few. Its principal aim is finding out, satisfying our curiosity, our drive for understanding. A sufficient justification of scientific research is that it can advance our knowledge and understanding of the world without necessarily incurring utilitarian benefits. However, empirical knowledge and understanding of the world can be very useful. A trademark of knowledge is that we can do something with it. Ideally, a fully-fledged academic discipline would investigate the natural phenomenon of language learning scientifically, but, at the same time, comprehensively and specifically enough to provide a body of knowledge relevant to the practical concerns. In this way it could have a real impact on the shape of the cultured phenomenon, i.e. foreign language learning while being taught in

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a deliberately constructed environment. In reality, however, the matter is more complicated. First of all, the field has been witnessing a dynamic, if not overwhelming, growth of awareness regarding the immense complexity of language learning. Trivial it is not. Furthermore, the dynamic development of civilization necessitates profound changes in foreign language education, so the field of foreign language learning and teaching is constantly challenged, i.e. in need of innovation based on adequate foundations. Fortunately, the awareness of its own identity and priorities has been growing steadily. Until now, the field has looked up to various sources of insight and inspiration to strengthen its foundations, within and outside science, and various strategies have been suggested to link the scientific basis in linguistics and psychology with practical teaching. At the same time, for more than three decades, Second Language Acquisition Research has developed into a fascinating and dynamic field, but it is not quite clear whether, on top of their explanatory pursuits and descriptive goals, Second Language Acquisition researchers should feel responsible for satisfying the demands for applicable knowledge, e.g. discussion by Long (2004, also see section 1.2.4). Certainly, because Second Language Acquisition Research deals with non-primary language learning occurring naturally, in the target language speech community, where it is available for interaction, investigation and explanation, as well as – additionally – in the educational context, it is not constrained by the same requirement of specificity of its representations as the field of foreign language didactics. This is to say that SLA models may, but do not have to be convertible into principles of constructing conditions for non-primary language learning in the formal/educational context. To sum up, it is helpful to keep in mind the interaction as well as the specificity of the natural, the practical, and the academic domains to appreciate their complementary rather than mutually exclusive roles and judge them accordingly in the world of foreign language learning and teaching. Roles are usually defined as a set of expectations addressed to an incumbent of a certain position with a special function in the whole system. Each of the three domains, identified in terms of their values, goals, agenda and quality criteria, has a distinct role: the domain of the natural phenomena is expected to inform the academic discipline investigating them and provide the source of evidence. This can be accomplished only if and when foreign language learning and teaching as an academic discipline (a science) defines itself as empirical and focuses on these natural phenomena as its subject matter, i.e. as the point of reference and the source of information for all its sub-tasks, such as model construction, selection of relevant concepts, hypothesis testing, development of explanatory systems, i.e. theories, various methods of empirical research, and above all, as a source of data for empirical studies 24

of various types. The natural phenomenon is also an indispensable point of reference for the meta-level of the field which evaluates the discipline’s philosophy and policy, i.e. research goals, relationships with the neighbouring disciplines, as well as the compatibility of its model representations with the empirical and theoretical levels of research in these neighbouring areas. It is no longer justified, and it would even be counterproductive, to reduce the status of foreign language teaching merely to practical activity, because it can just as well, and at the same time, be represented as an integral part of a fully- fledged academic discipline, vide, medicine as science and practice, or political science and the practice of politics. There is no conflict of interest between the two roles: relevant scientific knowledge can help to rationalize foreign language teaching, while the field’s goal of providing applications can materialize thanks to the empirical constraints on its own subject matter to make this representation specific enough, i.e. involving human subjects operating in time and space. Regrettably, with all the mysteries of language use and learning, the field of foreign language teaching has for long been trivialized and pushed to the academic margin, patronized as the weakest link of language research, or treated as a borderline territory – too tricky to be merely practical and too entangled in educational issues to be fertile theory construction – rather than defined by language use and more than complex enough to merit a ‘normal’ science program. All in all, in order to be rationalized, practical activities must be informed and justified by our understanding of the natural phenomena with which we cognitively interact. The most promising provider of such an understanding is an academic discipline which investigates these phenomena within its framework, with field-specific terminology and research agenda. This is not at all for such an obvious or acceptable conviction (e.g. Whong 2011).To be useful to the practical domain, the academic field does not have to be ‘special’ in the sense of ‘not quite scientific’, but, to use an optical analogy, it must target the relevant phenomena and bring them into focus. In other words, we must define language learning as events in space and time in the empirical domain in contrast to other potential foci of attention, such as descriptions of language as a system of forms, abstracted from the human being in whom language lives as well as from space and time. Second, to bring them into focus, we must ensure that our cognitive tools for research, i.e. terminology, models, hypotheses, etc. are specific enough to capture these events as human operations in the context of sociocultural interaction. To make our expectations toward each of the three domains more realistic, we should not treat specialized work in one domain as entirely responsible for the success of the remaining ones, or impose additional tasks on the representatives of a given domain which are not intrinsic to their original role. For example,

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expecting foreign language teachers to do the work of researchers – as a strategy of bridging the gap between too abstract theories and too arbitrary teaching practices – would benefit neither the effectiveness of their teaching nor the research progress in the academic discipline of foreign language teaching and learning. This is not say, however, that teachers need not be highly educated professionals who follow theoretical and empirical advances in their own as well as related disciplines, or that they should be confined in their professional lives to assuming only one role. Most specialists in the field of foreign language didactics are quite capable of juggling several professional roles quite successfully.

The questions In the course of this book the following key questions will guide the whole presentation: a) To what extent have the above three tightly related areas been articulated so far? b) What are the consequences of seeing them as communicating vessels for the shape of the discipline of foreign language learning and teaching, especially its subject matter? c) What points of orientation does this discipline have for identifying its subject matter within its own framework? d) Can these guidelines be helpful in developing a conception of the phenomenon of language use as specific (psycholinguistic) processes of foreign language use? e) Can this understanding be used for the purpose of deriving symmetrical guidelines for foreign language teaching? f) Can these guidelines be systematized in the context of this conception? g) Is this systematization meaningful from the point of view of practical foreign language teaching? This investigation opens with a retrospective account of various strategies with which the complex issues of foreign language teaching have been addressed in the past. They set the stage for the current scene and justify dealing with questions of foreign language learning and teaching within the framework of an academic discipline called Foreign Language Learning and Teaching, Foreign Language Didactics or Glottodidactics. There are two main advantages of constituting such a discipline: a) it can deliberately target its subject matter in the empirical reality by incorporating its own constraints on the subject matter representation, and b) with this subject-matter representation as a source of identity, it can interact with the neighbouring disciplines more assertively. 26

Non-primary language learning is regarded as a function of language use, i.e. as human processes, operations and choices which take place in our cognitive system of Human Information Processing, specialized for verbal communication, i.e. comprehension and production in speech and writing. The main cognitive processes activated for language use are identified as verbal communication and reasoning about it. Both are involved in gathering the information resources and operations required in language use, especially in reconstructing the code of the target language. Each part offers an outline of implications for foreign language teaching, which are finally systematized as junctures and options for various teaching strategies derived from the operation of the subsystems, processes and information structures in the HIP mechanism, as well as the structure of verbal communication and its specific instantiations as comprehension and production in speech and writing. In this context, foreign language teaching is understood as strategic behaviour. The whole investigation develops a framework of foreign language teaching which maps a rather specific (bottom-up) representation of non-primary language use as situated in human subjects (cf. Grucza 1983, 2007), especially their cognitive equipment to interact/communicate with themselves and other human beings in their sociocultural environment. There is one clear point of convergence with Ushioda’s perspective (2007), who stresses the need to: …focus on real persons, rather than on learners as theoretical abstractions; a focus on the agency of the individual person as a thinking, feeling human being, with an identity, a personality, a unique history and background, a person with goals, motives and intentions; a focus on the interaction between this self-reflective agent and the fluid and complex system of social relations, activities, experiences and multiple micro-and macro-contexts in which the person is embedded, moves and is inherently part of. (quoted in Ellis 2010: 39).

However, apart from the important similarity, there will have to be numerous differences in further assumptions, steps and solutions. Last, but not least, applications developed in my framework are regarded as logical inferences drawn from the relationships among relevant factors and entities in the subject matter, especially the nature of constructive human operations in verbal communication and reasoning. They are not information packages discarded by other fields.

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Chapter 1. Addressing the mystery of language learning and teaching: a retrospective sketch

Introduction: colonizing the unknown territory Unlike the historical accounts of second language teaching by Musumeci (2009) or Whong (2011), the purpose of this chapter is to outline some developments in the reflection of foreign language learning and teaching in the 19th and 20th century with focus on ideas and attempts of coming to terms with the notion of language, especially their source, nature and manner of implementation. This sketch will highlight the evolution of the field of second/foreign language learning and teaching from its initial reliance on intuitive ideas to the need for exploring foreign language learning in a systematic, disciplined manner. From the point of view of the development of the field, it is important to take into account the sociocultural context at each stage, especially the forms of human contact afforded by means of transportation and communication, as well as demands and expectations addressed to foreign language teaching. As the goals of foreign language teaching become increasingly challenging, and the intellectual resources grow more and more sophisticated, its conceptions and solutions also become increasingly refined. The list of questions below provides focal points for the following retrospective outline of the developments in the field of foreign/second language learning and teaching relevant to the issue at hand: 1. How are the ideas on language teaching and learning generated? a) Where do they come from? b) What do these ideas refer to? c) To what extent are the notions of foreign language teaching linked to the notions of language learning (native, second, formal, informal)? 2. How are these ideas implemented? a) What is their exact function: to facilitate, improve, rationalize foreign language teaching? b) In which area of the field are they instantiated? 3. What form does reflection on foreign language teaching take? a) The status of the field; b) The relationship between teaching and learning; c) The goals of the field;

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d) Relationships with neighbouring fields and their justification; e) The information flow inside the field (bottom-up, top-down, other).

1.1. The pre-linguistic stage: grammar as the key to foreign language learning and its alternatives 1.1.1. Preoccupation with grammar It seems fair to say that the initial source of conceptions of language for the purpose of systematic foreign language teaching was normative grammar. Mackey (1965:141) states that ‘language teachers have always tended to apply language analysis to the teaching of language; in fact, some of the first descriptions of a language were made for the purpose of teaching it’ (quoted after Kelly 1969: 34). Rivers (1968: 65) explains this concept in a neutral but accurate way: The writing of a grammar is basically an attempt at systematization and codification of a mass of data which may at first sight appear amorphous but within which recurrent regularities can be discerned. The way in which this systematization is approached will depend on the convictions of the grammarian on the nature of language.

The strongest emphasis in grammar is on syntactic relations, i.e. relations between language forms, usually depicted at sentence level. Grammar, especially Latin grammar, was considered to be the key to language knowledge expected of an educated person. The invention of printing in 1455 made Greek and Latin classics available in language teaching. Grammar based on these texts gradually became an end in itself, rather than the means to understanding the classics. In this way, Latin grammar established itself as a model for other languages which appeared on the foreign language learning scene as well as the most important teaching category, the focal point of debates on foreign language teaching. The Grammar-Translation Method. As outlined by Richards and Rodgers (1986), the Grammar-Translation Method is the effect of the influence of Latin on a) the way the vernacular languages were supposed to be taught; and b) the goals for which language was taught, i.e. literacy and understanding of the classics rather than practical goals. The Grammar-Translation Method provided what was expected from an educated person: the ability to read and understand the classics and recite the rules of grammar or proverbs. Among its proponents were Johann Seidenstrücker, Karl Plötz, H.S. Ollendorf, and Johann Meidinger. The method was based on the following tenets: 1. The key to learning the foreign language was the knowledge of its grammar, especially in the form of memorized rules learned by heart and accompanied by various declensions for nouns and conjugations for verbs. Native language 30

grammar was used as a point of reference. This kind of knowledge had special value: it provided mental gymnastics for the intellect. Rules, i.e. explanations of the regularities in the occurrence of language forms, were presented first, and various examples followed, with the manner of presentation relying on deductive reasoning. 2. The main form of activity in the class was translation from the target to the native language and vice versa. The unit of the material for translation, as well as for the whole method, was the sentence. The two forms of translation, from and into the target language, were performed both orally and in writing. The learner’s native language had an important role to play: it was used as the medium of instruction, e.g. for talking about the target grammar and in translation activities. 3. The teaching material included classical texts for reading and grammatical analysis. Reading was emphasized, but the readings were neither contemporary nor communicatively useful. Accuracy was emphasized to the point of hypercorrectness. 4. Vocabulary items were presented in the form of bilingual lists to be memorized. Verbatim (word-for-word) learning had an important role to play in this method. In contrast to the deductive presentation of rules, some nineteenth century specialists advocated the inductive approach to teaching grammar, i.e. inferring the rules from examples, either texts or sentences in the target language. Literary texts of the classics turned out to be too complicated for this purpose, so, to overcome the problem, Seidenstrücker wrote texts based on simple disconnected sentences containing most of the grammatical features to be learned. This innovation was taken up by Ahn, and later by Ollendorf. As Titone (1968) points out, their method was based on constructing artificial sentences to illustrate a rule. The outcome was characteristically boring and dry material, hard to remember for being far from idiomatic and real, and, ironically, completely useless in real life, not to mention a laughing stock in foreign language teaching. Titone (1968:28) provides the following examples: The cat of my aunt is more treacherous than the dog of your uncle. We speak about your cousin, and your cousin Amelia is loved by her uncle and her aunt. My sons have bought the mirrors of the duke. Horses are taller than tigers.

Seidenstrücker’s disconnected sentences especially constructed for teaching grammar were turned into a principle by Karl Plötz (1819-1881) whose method

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was divided into two parts: (1) rules and paradigms, and (2) sentences for translation from and into the target language. Throughout the nineteenth century, language teaching in schools followed Plötz’s techniques. It was a matter of using the first language to acquire the second, rote learning of grammar rules, putting grammatical labels on words and applying the rules in translation, as well as using the reading passages to study grammar and semanticizing their meaning by way of translation. Needless to say, in the meantime the needs and expectations of language learning changed rather dramatically and the method came under attack for its obsolete procedures and materials.

1.1.2. Alternatives to the Grammar-Translation Method Approaches which emerged in reaction to the Grammar-Translation Method stressed teaching a foreign language without the mediation of explicit grammar instruction, i.e. directly from text and conversation, and the primacy of the spoken language over reading and writing, e.g. Claude Marcel (1793-1896). Marcel sought inspiration for foreign language teaching in the way children learn their native language and stressed the role of meaning, making a point for the teaching of language first through the comprehension of texts, listening, followed by speaking and writing. Prendergast (1806-1886) also looked at children learning their native tongue and noticed that they use situational clues to interpret utterances and memorize whole phrases to be used in speaking (Richards and Rodgers, 1986). At first, the method was unsystematic, but at the turn of the twentieth century it began to follow a more definite set of principles: emphasis on the spoken language, the use of phonetic notation, presenting the meaning through pictures, gestures/dramatization and objects (realia), inductive learning of grammar, and the use of contemporary texts about everyday life and high culture of the foreign country. Inspired by observations of a child playing and commenting on his activities, Francois Gouin created teaching units which consisted of a series of connected sentences built around an activity broken down into minute stages. The advantage of the Gouin Series was that the sentences could be remembered more easily because of the sensible links in the material, the association with a real life activity (an episode), and the links between language and dramatization, which comply with the more general laws of human learning. Its disadvantage, however, was the narrow focus on the verb and the act of commenting on the activity. The Reform Movement. A violent attack on the grammar-translation method came from the German specialist, Wilhelm Viëtor (1850-1918), who stressed the need to focus on the spoken language, the use of connected sentences and illustrations (gestures, pictures), to teach speaking first and reading at a later 32

stage, as well as the need to develop the knowledge of the foreign country and its culture. Grammar was to be learned inductively, with the addition of songs and games to the teaching process. The key principles of the Reform Movement, according to Howatt (1984), included the primacy of speech and oral activities and the central position of a connected text used for the inductive teaching of grammar. The emphasis on the spoken language was reinforced by the role of phonetics and phoneticians such as Jespersen and Sweet. Phonetics provided foreign language teaching with scientific foundations which were hard to resist. As a result, phonetic transcription was introduced to teaching English and French. The principle of connected text was well accepted. The law of association was recognized by the newly emerging science of psychology, whereas the learning material consisting of absurd, disconnected sentences illustrating points of grammar was strongly criticized. To be learned, the material had to be internally connected to allow associations. The Natural and the Direct Methods. The essence of the Direct Method can be explained with a quote from Howatt (1984: 234): The Direct Method … originated in a desire to do something that the schools of the time were not doing, and could not do, namely to teach foreign languages as practical skills for everyday purposes of social survival. Questions of educational value and ‘worthwhileness’ were irrelevant, what mattered was the ability to communicate effectively in ordinary (‘trivial’) life.

It would be impossible to make a rigorous distinction between the Natural and the Direct Method. ‘Natural’ comes from nature, and it is based on the observation of the natural process through which children learn their mother tongue. ‘Direct’ comes from the absence of any mediating role of grammar, translation, or dictionary. Language learning is a natural ability of humans and can be done intuitively provided there are opportunities for interaction or conversation, in other words, to quote Howatt (1984: 193): ‘someone to talk to, something to talk about, and a desire to understand and make yourself understood. Interaction is at the heart of natural language acquisition, or conversation, as Lambert Sauveur (1826–1907) called it when he initiated the revival of interest that led eventually to the direct method.’ Locke stated that the most appropriate and efficient way to learn a language is through conversation and practice rather than studying rules of grammar. The principle of the Direct Method was learning the language in a situational context, linking new words to their meaning, e.g. naming objects in the environment, stressing oral work, introducing writing to consolidate oral work, listening practice (short lectures about interesting topics), inductive learning of grammar

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from texts, and graded reading. In his Introduction to the Teaching of Living Languages without Grammar or Dictionary Lambert Sauveur (1874) stressed the importance of the dialogue between the teacher and the student, naming various classroom objects, the leading role of oral work and of the written m aterial - mainly to consolidate oral work, delayed at least by a month. The use of the native language was not recommended so the learners had to understand the material on the basis of situational clues. Error correction was not used. Critics of the Direct Method stressed that it was insufficiently focused on grammatical accuracy and systematicity and that it put high demands on the teachers’ language proficiency and energy resources. However, the Direct Method addressed the practical needs of language learners (Kelly 1969, Mackey 1965, Howatt 1984, Richards and Rodgers, 1986). In most general terms, the characteristic tenets of the Direct Method responsible for its name centre on using language in a situational context rather than talking about it. More specifically, instead of explanation, these tenets stress interaction and focus on the learner’s active involvement, as well as practice, the primacy of speech over writing, the role of the natural pace of speaking and the use of connected texts. One of the specialists who recognized the limitations of the Direct Method was Henry Sweet. He postulated the need for the teaching method to have a sound and systematic linguistic basis. As a result, he saw a way to combine the Direct Method, especially its emphasis on language learning from text and conversation where language was arbitrary with the formal focus on grammar rules of the Grammar-Translation Method where language was logically organized, on condition that the study of grammar be made more practical and linked to meaningful material. Another method which stressed the need to learn the language from texts was the Reading Method. Its primary aim was comprehension of written text to develop the ability of rapid silent reading. The texts introduced controlled and limited vocabulary as well as some speaking to talk about the target language and culture (Mackey, 1965). Reading provided the necessary amount of input for production to emerge naturally. The approach stressed the need for the learner to be exposed to authentic material and to really link the forms to their exact meaning. Understanding the material was the key to language learning. The difference between the function of the text in the Grammar-Translation Method and the Reading Method seems quite clear: the former used the text to present the learner with grammatical forms which were essential for language knowledge, while the latter used the text as meaningful material for practicing reading comprehension (for Comprehension Approach, see Winitz, ed., 1981, Piske and Young-Scholten, eds. 2011). 34

The notion of grammar as the key to foreign language learning stands in direct contrast with the idea that foreign language learning should be direct, i.e. it should aim to replicate the way children learn their mother tongue. The Direct and Natural Methods, outlined above, are inspired by fairly random and informal insights into the process of first language acquisition. Nevertheless, they are significant to the development of the field in that they enrich the spectrum of possibilities in language teaching with an important alternative to sentence- based and explicit grammar-oriented strategies. The Direct and Natural methods are time consuming because their impact depends on the sheer quantity of the learning material and contact hours available for language use. This remains in sharp contrast with the qualitative grammar-based strategies of providing the learner with the information for language learning in a condensed form. The demise of the Grammar-Translation Method was certainly accelerated by the changing social demands regarding foreign language mastery. The world was shrinking. Greater possibilities of travel at amazing speed by new means of transportation, such as the steam ship, the train, the automobile, migration waves from Europe to the United States, the intensity of international contacts as well as the dynamic development of mass communication, i.e. the growth of the press/journalism, necessitated a redefinition of the goals of foreign language teaching from the formal, academic skills in grammar and the translation of classical texts to the communicative abilities of direct, fluent face-to-face communication in the foreign language. Foreign languages were introduced in schools on a regular basis, while the educational system became more and more accessible to young generations of learners. In this context, the state of the field of foreign language teaching in the first half of the 20th century is considered far from satisfactory to meet the challenges of the real world.

1.1.3. Characteristic features of the pre-linguistic stage In the period under consideration the complexities of language learning and teaching were regarded through the lens of grammar, which had various implications. 1) Grammar is a body of normative or descriptive information which is obtained when language is subjected to reflection, i.e. reasoning processes to find recurrent regularities in the way morphosyntactic forms occur in ready sentences, their functions, as well as their paradigmatic and syntagmatic distribution. 2) At that time, the aforementioned normative and/or descriptive generalizations resulting from grammatical analysis were regarded as equivalent to the knowledge of language represented in the minds of language learners activated for language use.

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3) This metalingual information, presented to the learner in the form of rules and examples, deductively or inductively, was believed to be convertible into the knowledge necessary for language use. The implication was that a descriptive grammar of a given language and the mental representation of information tapped in language use must be isomorphic. In other words, a grammarian’s discovery procedures were identified with mental operations requisite in language use. This central role of grammar established a strong tradition of identifying language with descriptive information about morphosyntactic forms, while grammatical analysis and descriptive information about language syntax became the key to language learning. The Grammar-Translation Method, represented by Plötz, Ahn and Ollendorf, may be viewed as a stimulating development in the field of foreign language teaching as a discipline because the method generated reactions, objections, specifications and alternatives: a) one of the issues raised by the method was how to teach grammar rules, by induction or by deduction; b) one of the improvements following the Grammar-Translation Method was the elimination of the artificial and often meaningless texts formulated especially for the purpose of illustrating rules to be replaced by contemporary texts which were coherent and meaningful; c) one of the criticisms of the Grammar-Translation Method was referred to as the abuse of translation as an all-purpose teaching procedure, which led to its redefinition as a finely adjusted procedure with specific functions; d) an alternative to the Grammar-Translation Method was a set of methods, called direct or natural, which were inspired by a completely different source of insight, the way children learn their native language; these methods seemed to be too random at first but ideas regarding their systematization soon appeared. In direct methods spoken language, especially conversation, took primacy over reading and writing and when texts were used, they had to be contemporary and rich in cultural content. To avoid the use of the native language, whose role in foreign language learning was specified, the meaning of words was to be presented through pictures, gestures and objects. These ideas were reiterated by the representatives of the Reform Movement, led by Viëtor. An alternative to bilingual lists of vocabulary was offered in the form of presenting meaning through pictures, objects and dramatizations. 36

At this point we see two poles of a continuum of ideas on how to systematize foreign language teaching: one -the grammatical description and the related teaching procedures, and the other -the communicative processes, such as conversations between learners and more competent language users, or native language acquisition by children. The two poles epitomize inspirations for two extreme philosophies of language teaching at the time: one route to language learning/teaching is by learning descriptive information about the language regarded as the object of formal reasoning, the other route is through reading texts and participating in conversations in an interactive attempt to achieve language proficiency. These two clues resurface in the debates on foreign language learning and teaching in different guises and proportions. However, for quite some time grammar remained the hub of foreign language teaching, a distinctive, if not defining, point of reference: teaching foreign languages was to take place either with grammar and dictionary or without them.

1.1.4. Contributions of Sweet, Jespersen and Palmer. The impact of phonetics Henry Sweet (1845–1912), a distinguished British phonetician, the author of The Practical Study of Languages, advocated a rational, principled method of foreign language learning, based on psychological and linguistic principles. A good method must, above all, be comprehensive and eclectic, he said. The practical study of languages is different from the theoretical study of languages in that it pertains to language use, but is equally scientific (1900:1): It is hardly necessary to enlarge on the distinction between the practical and the theoretical study of languages -between learning to understand, read, speak, write a language on the one hand, and studying its history and etymology on the other hand. But it is important to realize at the same time that the practical study of languages is not in any way less scientific than the theoretical.

He stressed two distinct aspects of language: form and meaning. The science of linguistics looks at language as an object of observation whereas psychology, the science of mind, is concerned with meaning. When he expressed his reservations about the Grammar-Translation Method, he was not against teaching grammar or the use of translation since grammar highlights the forms and translation provides meanings. Instead, he pointed out that rules of grammar do not provide us with the information necessary to speak in that language. He also opposed the Natural Method which attempted to imitate native language learning by children because, when used in its pure form, the method puts the learner in an underprivileged position: the adult can no

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longer make use of the abilities of the child yet is not allowed to use the intellectual faculties s/he has as an adult. Moreover, it is impossible to replicate child language learning in the classroom. Sweet stresses the need to control the amount of vocabulary to be presented (3,000 common words would be sufficient for general purposes) and to group them thematically. He finds the Gouin series, based on superficial observations of child-play, too shallow in its foundations and insufficient. The most important principle is to base the teaching of foreign languages on the science of phonetics and give primacy to the spoken language because some of the language material is based on what he calls irrational combinations which must be learned by association. Some phenomena cannot be brought under rational rules. Otto Jespersen (1860-1943), a Danish phonetician, made a lasting impact on foreign language teaching with How to Teach a Foreign Language, first published in 1904. His ideas seem to be quite progressive not only considering the time of writing because they highlight the teaching problems from the learner’s perspective. He argued: ‘Language is not an end in itself, just as little as railway tracks; it is a way of connection between souls, a means of communication’ (Jespersen, 1967: 40, my emphasis). It is the best possible means of communication for people to exchange thoughts, feelings and wishes. Studying languages for their own sake is quite specialized and qualitatively different from the reasons why foreign languages are taught at schools. The reason why we learn languages is to be able to engage in sensible first-hand communication about the thoughts of others, and to get access to the target language culture, ‘the spirit of the nation in the widest sense’ (1967: 9). Materials for learning must have sensible meaning and consist of connected sentences, they must be interesting and varied, and focus on practical everyday topics. Jespersen was critical about the use of translation as a leading activity in foreign language teaching, but accepted it for quite specific purposes, such as providing the exact meaning of individual words, testing the learner’s understanding, or eliciting a specific response. It should not be overused even in these functions; there are more direct means of providing the meanings, such as illustrations, objects, drawings, etc. Learning word meanings should be integrated with the reading process. Jespersen explained his objections to the use of grammatical rules: ‘… grammatical propositions are abstractions, which are often difficult for the experts to understand, and which must therefore be far beyond the horizon of our pupils …’(1967: 126). There are also age limits connected with the use of grammar; children can hardly make any sense of the information they are required to learn. The problem with such a treatment of grammar is that it separates form and function, which is unfortunate from the point of view of teaching, not 38

to mention untenable from the scientific point of view. To learn grammar practically and to remember the material, the learners must be involved in learning the material in lexical expressions and constructing the sentences themselves. Moreover, Jespersen advocated the use of phonetic transcription as an aid in teaching foreign language pronunciation as an economic tool which provides information in a condensed form. Phonetics is not a new study that we want to add to the school curriculum; we only want to take as much of the science as will really be a positive help in learning something which has to be learned anyway … (Jespersen 1967: 143).

From the point of view of our focus on the evolution of ideas of language in the field of foreign language teaching, Jespersen’s contribution is significant for his distinction between a descriptive view of language as an end in itself and language as a means of communication and its practical mastery through a variety of procedures. He emphasizes the language learner’s perspective of language when he stresses the fact that grammar rules are abstractions and may be too difficult for the learner to follow, and that meaningless texts constructed for the purpose of teaching these rules are useless from the point of view of memory processes. His view of the functions of translation and reading, including special techniques such as retelling and question-and-answer activities is quite modern. Like other outstanding figures of the time, he stresses the need to base foreign language teaching on scientific foundations, especially the science of phonetics, and to incorporate phonetic transcription. The advantage of using scientific support is that science unifies the knowledge to be acquired, which enhances the economy of the process. Harold Palmer (1877–1947), a British applied linguist, stressed the need to derive the principles of language teaching from linguistics, especially phonetics, grammar, lexicology; psychology, e.g. the laws of memory; and pedagogy, including the role of concretization in teaching (Titone 1968). Palmer argued for a multiple line of approach in language teaching, tapping all our capacities. Moreover, he argued that the key figure in the learning process is the learner, especially his/her language proficiency, abilities and incentive to learn. He made a distinction between the spontaneous and the studial capacities of the learner, which, in current terms, correspond to communication and reasoning. Practical language learning is contingent upon direct contact with the language, including frequent listening practice, repetition and conversation, as well as the purely theoretical work of the intellect. According to Howatt (1984), Palmer turned the field of foreign language teaching into a fully-fledged profession. In This Language-Learning Business (1932), Palmer made a crucial distinction between language as a code and language as

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communication to say (1932: 28): ‘A language is essentially a code -an organized system of signs or signals.’ But, he continues, it is a mistake to approach it as a code in teaching English as a foreign language. Language users are unaware of the functioning of this code. Palmer’s work on The Scientific Study and Teaching of Languages, first published in 1917, asks the question whether the science of language-study (i.e. the science of language learning and teaching as distinct from linguistics) exists. Based on his criteria and conception of the scientific method, it has not yet reached the scientific stage. Such a science must have its separate terminology and answer questions regarding the function of the teacher, the pupil, the textbook and the exercises, as well as the role of translation, grammar and semantics. It must be able to evaluate the Direct Method, classify exercises, and determine the role of the mother tongue, of problem-solving, and of memorizing. Palmer concludes that ‘the science of language-study does not exist, but it is high time that it should exist’ (1968: 3). Such a science, however, must aspire to generality, comprehensive basis and wider principles as opposed to ‘tricks of pedagogy’ based on common-sense. In this way, it can be relevant to methods-writers, teachers and students. Palmer defines language as the medium by which thoughts are conveyed from one person to another. Language is an instrument of thought, a mirror of thought, and it is irregular. His analysis of the limited usefulness of rules as abstract formulations in learning to speak is excellent, if not timeless (1968: 75): ‘The following sentence formed by an English student by synthetic construction will necessitate twenty-five separate efforts of the mind: Ich habe mit grosstem Vergnugen seinem freuntlichen Vorschlage angenomen. (1) to (9) Choice and recollection of the nine words in their employed uninflected form (presuming Vergnugen, freuntlich, Vorschlag, and annehmen to have been previously acquired as primary matter). (10) to (18) Respective position of each. (19) Derivation of superlative from gross. (20) Recollection of the neuter dative singular case-inflection of an adjective when not preceded by article, etc. (21) Determination of gender of Vergnugen. (22) Recollection of masculine accusative singular case-inflection of the possessive adjective sein. (23) Ditto for the adjective freuntlich. (24) Determination of the gender of Vorschlag. (25) Derivation of the past participle angenommen from the infinitive annehmen. By learning the whole sentence as an integral unit, these twenty-five efforts would be reduced to one, viz. the production of the complete sentence in response to some stimulus.’

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He discusses vocabulary units of different sizes, which correspond to what we now call lexical phrases and stresses the role of idiomatic expressions and idiomatic language in language use. In his opinion, eclecticism has a pejorative meaning of an unoriginal, incoherent array of bits and pieces. He would rather see it replaced with a ‘judicious and reasoned selection of all the diverse factors the sum of which may constitute a complete and homogeneous system’ (Palmer 1964: 108). A complete method is not a compromise between two or more antagonistic methods but incorporates a variety of valuable procedures for specific functions and goals. Palmer skilfully ridicules teaching compromises or middle- of-the-road approaches, which result from not knowing the precise functions of certain acts: read neither very intensively nor very extensively; translate a little occasionally, but do not let translation be particularly good; drill enough to destroy naturalness, but free enough to encourage inaccuracy; aid our memory by doses of mental synthesis, in fact just enough to prevent the laws of memorizing from operating (112-113).

Ideas presented by Palmer are surprisingly modern. He sees the role of linguistics, especially phonetics, as central in foreign language teaching, but at the same time he makes a distinction between two perspectives of language: a) language as a code, which is the object of reflection and deliberate study of the learner (with his or her ‘studial’ capacities), and language as communication, which can be mastered by subconscious processes (spontaneous capacities) of the student. In this way an important distinction is made between reasoning about language and language use for communication. Palmer develops a highly balanced professional approach to the method of teaching, its specific components and the role of memory, as well as such processes as imitation, mimicry, practice, and visualization in foreign language learning. Characteristically, he sees a role for a separate science of language study, i.e. language learning, as distinct from linguistics or philology, which has the aim of integrating various aspects of relevant sciences, such as phonetics, philology, lexicography, psychology, and pedagogy, as well as linguistic pedagogy, focused on developing an efficient, comprehensive method of teaching.

1.2. The linguistic stage: the role of the source disciplines in the mid-twentieth century As new technologies developed for people to move and communicate faster, foreign language teaching followed suit. Demands for proficient speakers of foreign languages were related to these profound changes in communication and transit systems, e.g. the spread of fast means of transportation -the plane, the

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train and the automobile -as well as the flourishing of mass media, especially the radio and television, not to mention films and the press. At the same time, the contact between different language groups became intensive due to the various ethnic migration waves from Europe and Asia to the United States and Canada. It is generally recognized that the field of foreign language learning and teaching was revolutionized as a result of the US involvement in WWII. The urgent need for training military personnel fluent in various foreign, often exotic, languages for face-to-face communication led to a rejection of the available, traditional, written text-based methods of teaching foreign languages. At the time, the idea of modernizing foreign language teaching was understood as the import of scientific foundations from linguistics and psychology in order to construct new methods of teaching. These methods were based on the success of the Army Specialized Training Program developed in the United States (Moulton 1962). A significant aspect of the linguistic stage is the participation of linguists, for example Fries (1945) and Lado (1957, 1964), in designing materials and formulating teaching principles for foreign languages. Their active role had a lasting impact on the bond between foreign language teaching and the related disciplines for years to come. There was a growing awareness of the complexity of language teaching and of the need to provide it with more solid bases. Therefore, it was assumed for quite some time that linguistic and psychological theories had the power to optimize foreign language teaching by virtue of being scientific (Rivers 1964, 1982); they were automatically treated as the theories of foreign language teaching. It seemed so natural and obvious that specialists did not even attempt to justify this idea, which explains the name of the stage, also called a ‘complete dependence position’ by Krohn (1970). In contrast to the pre-linguistic stage (see section 1.1.3), based on the much less systematic linguistic (phonetic), as well as other, sometimes quite informal observations, the influences of linguistics and psychology in the second stage run fairly deep stimulating the field’s internal specialization; the source disciplines impact not only global but also specific issues, such as methods of teaching, teacher training and testing, criteria of difficulty and syllabus design, the role of the native language, the priorities and development of the four language skills, teaching materials and classroom techniques, the form and role of grammar, error correction policy and lesson planning (Dakowska 1987, 2005). However, Newmark and Reibel (1968: 149) question the logic of such a relationship: The logical flaw arises when the linguist attempts to draw simple and direct conclusions about the manner of acquisition of language from his knowledge of the abstract structure of language and claims that the success or failure of language teaching programs depends to a large extent on the degree to which the language course writer or language

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teacher orders his pedagogical material to reflect a theoretically sound description of the native and target languages.

They criticize the preoccupation with language structure at the expense of language use and stress that language can only be learned when a sufficient number of particular whole instances of language use are modelled for the learner and his/her own acts of using the language are selectively reinforced. When these conditions are met, the analysis and generalization about those wholes will not be necessary.

1.2.1. Approach, method, technique The authoritative role of linguistics and psychology was clearly seen in the audiolingual implementation of their tenets, and codified by Anthony in an oft-quoted article on approach, method, and techniques, originally published in English Teaching Forum in 1964, reprinted in 1965. The article accurately depicts the top-down flow of information from the disciplines to language teaching as well as their influence on methods and techniques of teaching. Anthony (1965: 64) defines ‘approach’ as a set of axioms, an article of faith, regarding the nature of language, the nature of teaching and the nature of learning. Approach can be evaluated in terms of the effectiveness of the resulting methods. The ‘method’ of foreign language teaching is the focal point of this framework -hence ‘methodics’ or ‘methodology’ and it reflects the axioms of the approach, whereas ‘techniques’ implement the method consistently with the approach at the level of classroom activities (Anthony 1965). This one-way traffic of ideas justifies the term ‘source disciplines’ commonly used with reference to linguistics and psychology, which were regarded as highly competent -the fountain of wisdom -in matters of language and learning. The field of teaching was emerging as a young, developing discipline, hungry for conceptions and interpretations to come to terms with language learning and teaching and open to the ideas from the more authoritative neighbours. Naturally, this uncritical receptiveness resulted from its own scarcity of insights into language learning, i.e. still insufficient recognition and understanding of language learning, rather than anything else. The field seemed still far away from recognizing the necessity of adopting the format of a fully-fledged academic discipline, the more so that its emphasis was primarily on one of its aspects, the teaching aspect. The teacher’s behaviour as well as the teaching method were derived from the source axioms of the approach, while learning was believed to result from teaching in a way similar to the relationship between learning any content subject and its teaching. Such central concepts as ‘language’, ‘linguistics’ and ‘language learning’ were treated as

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part and parcel in no need of refined discriminations. The teaching component at the time was not intended to reflect, be derived from, or determined by, the way we learn languages. Remaining in the background, subordinated to teaching, (foreign language) learning was considered to be an element largely pliable by teaching as understood at the time. The conviction that teaching can cause foreign language learning epitomizes the so-called ‘methods’ tradition.

1.2.2. The role of Transformational Generative Grammar This predominantly uncritical attitude of the field of foreign language teaching to linguistics was put to the test when Generative Transformational Grammar (TGG) and cognitive psychology emerged as new schools of thought in the source disciplines. Their representatives, especially Chomsky, entered the scene to criticize their predecessors (for a more detailed discussion of the issues, see Dakowska 1987). In this context, the teaching specialists felt that their theoretical carpet had been pulled out from under their feet, and, willy-nilly, they had to choose between the older schools and the more recent, equally, if not more ‘scientific’ ones, i.e. generative transformational grammar and cognitive psychology. The fact that there were options in the linguistic offer made the teaching specialists formulate some criteria. At the same time, the lack of convincing empirical evidence regarding the superiority of the audiolingual method over the more traditional way of teaching, as well as classroom feedback on its strengths and weaknesses evoked a wave of scepticism towards the source disciplines. Many articles appeared at that time questioning linguistic influences in language teaching (e.g. Bolinger 1972, Brown 1970, Carroll, J. B., 1971, Cooper 1970, Gefen 1966, Hill 1967, Johnson 1969, Kandiah 1970). Lamendella (1969) and Oller (1973) presented important ideas in this regard when they argued that, undoubtedly, what TGG offers was scientific and probably linguistically more adequate than the structural linguistic description, but it referred to language as a self-contained system depicting relationships between forms. Lamendella (1969) argued that what is needed in language teaching is a psycholinguistic, not linguistic characterization of verbal behaviour. In other words, we need a cognitive theory of how people’s knowledge of language is used. In such a theory human construction of meaning and human thought processes are of utmost importance. Oller (1973) made the following claims for a theory of natural language: a natural language constitutes a system of human communication, natural languages are learned codes, which function to codify cognitive experience, whereas learning, reasoning, and other factors interact to affect the universal and non-universal rules of grammar. Theories must be empirically vulnerable 44

to be of the greatest value. In his important, yet underestimated work, Coding Information in Natural Languages (1971:19), he stated: The question of whether or not language is a self-contained structure dates from antiquity. There are those who have argued, and some who continue to maintain, that language as a system is independent of its function as a medium of communication and that it can be analyzed and studied without reference to communicative contexts. I believe that the latter position is indefensible for a number of reasons, and assume rather, that the function of language as a medium of communication is an inherent aspect of its nature.

Transformationalists, he says, overlook the context which is available to the language learner. He continues this reasoning to talk about inborn and learned knowledge (1971: 24-25): … certainly the human organism has built-in capacities which it brings to the language learning situation, but there seems to be no good reason for assuming that these capacities are the result of an inherited knowledge of the nature of language. It would appear much more reasonable to assume rather that language conforms to human capacity, and that in the language acquisition process, the child is actually learning -i.e. acquiring information which it did not previously have. If we discard the concept of innate ideas and base a theory of language acquisition on the information available to the child in communicative events, I believe that we will in fact be much more apt to discover just what language acquisition involves.

This view is central for my own investigation, in which the foreign language learner’s environment plays an indispensable role: the relationship between the learner’s genetic endowment for verbal communication and the environmentally available information in the form of utterances make up a synergetic relationship in foreign language learning. In the structural descriptive view, however, language is disconnected from the human being it is living in (see Engels 1973), as well as from the psychological processes which make it possible for us to acquire, store and use language knowledge. Therefore, it is irrelevant to the field of foreign language learning and teaching, in which a psycholinguistic description is needed. A cognitive theory describes people, not languages in the sense of abstract representations of an autonomous system of forms with the human subject factored out. As Mackey (1973: 6) puts it: ‘Linguistics is not language learning’. Oller (1973) emphasizes that a theory which aspires to adequacy must take the communicative function of language into account. However, this principled attitude toward the linguistic and psychological transplantations into the field of language teaching, and fine distinctions between various perspectives of language should not overshadow the fact that the impact of the related fields as source disciplines remained very strong. Their

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influence went right into the core of the field, into the conception of its subject matter, which consisted of three entities each individually illuminated by the respective source discipline. Linguistics provided the conception of language, psychology defined learning, and pedagogy -teaching. Although the view of language is much more progressive than in the early audiolingual era, the subject matter is still envisaged as a sum of three parts, rather than a coherent whole, i.e. a system of factors. Language learning and teaching was conceptualized with the help of the partial representations derived from the source disciplines; as a result, it was a representation of representations, a derivative construct rather than an empirical system. Individual components of the subject matter so conceived could be easily discarded when a new school of thought in the source disciplines defied the older one. The audiolingual slogan: ‘Language is a system of habits’ was replaced by the generative dictum: ‘A living language is characterized by rule-governed creativity’. The syndrome of chasing the linguistic and psychological developments, simplified into the form of adages, as those above, was rightly criticised as pendulum swings. Additionally, the matters of language learning and teaching were not treated as a research focus in the strict sense of the term because the main goal of the field was to construct teaching methods and test their effectiveness. In typical circumstances, there would have be a top-down and bottom-up flow of information in research activities, such as generating as well as testing hypotheses, replacing them with more accurate formulations, revising them, explaining the subject matter, etc. (see Chastain 1971, 1976, Dakowska 1987, 2005, Diller 1978, Richards and Rodgers 1986, Rivers 1964, 1968). This state of affairs was still to come in the field in question, however.

1.2.3. Selecting a descriptive linguistic model of language However, this instability, metaphorically depicted as ‘shifting sands’ (Marckwardt 1075), did bring about some positive developments regarding the perception of the language component in foreign language learning and teaching. The growing number of linguistic schools of thought which emerged and seemed relevant to the field necessitated a qualitative change in the manner in which the potential and the real linguistic influences were viewed. They were no longer perceived as adequate or inadequate, scientific or not, from the point of view of linguistic description and analysis, but as different models of language, each reflecting specific goals of linguistic research as well as a perspective on its functioning. This was a fundamental leap in the direction of distinguishing language ‘as such’ from its scientific representations. Spolsky (1969) pointed out that one 46

of the most fascinating characteristics of language is that it can be described in a number of ways, each disclosing exciting aspects. Corder (1971) argued that language can be investigated in an infinite number of ways, whereas it is the point of view that creates the object. Revzin (1966: 4) stressed that a language model is not a part of language but a construct. According to Grucza (1970), linguistic reality should be distinguished from language reality. It was recognized that the linguistic description was not indispensable in language teaching, i.e. it was not necessary for language to have been described in order for it to have been learned. Leontiev (1963) explains the nature of modelling a language as constructing an object – real or imaginary – that is isomorphic with the object it represents in certain essential features, for example in that it captures its governing principles. Subsequent empirical research demonstrates to what extent the model reflects the real patterning or structure of the phenomenon in question. An absolute model of linguistic description is neither feasible nor necessary because each model is determined by the purpose for which it is constructed. Therefore, linguists who work on a model must clearly envisage the requirements of the task for the model they are trying to develop. An exhaustive description of language is no real model but an aggregate of all possible models, a purely hypothetical assumption. No task requires an exhaustive description of language. Leontjev’s reasoning leads us to the conclusion that an eclectic combination of the existing models ad infinitum is neither necessary nor desirable. Instead, it would be essential, first of all, to pose such basic questions related to foreign language learning and teaching as: which linguistic model of language is needed, where, why, and for what purpose. Clearly, in order to address them and select the relevant criteria, the field would have to have a much more distinctly articulated framework to begin with. However, the attractiveness of this idea resides in its much more balanced and criterion-oriented attitude of the field not only toward linguistics, but toward itself. Halliday’s opinion (1973) is that the task of linguistics is to elaborate a model which would be relevant to language teaching, but the question regarding the criteria of such relevance remains without an answer. Widdowson stresses that a model which aspires to being useful must focus on the language user. The following quote comes from his article ‘The partiality and relevance of linguistic descriptions’ (1979: 232): It is a common assumption among language teachers that their subject should somehow be defined by reference to models of linguistic description devised by linguistics. This does not mean that they try to transfer such models directly into the pedagogic domain (although such attempts are not unknown): there is usually a recognition that they have

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to be modified in one way or another to suit a teaching purpose. But the basic theoretical orientation is retained. The same assumption dominates applied linguistics. The very name is a proclamation of dependence (my emphasis).… In this paper I want to question this common assumption, axiomatic in its force, that a linguistic model of language must of necessity serve as the underlying frame of reference for language teaching.

Widdowson objects to the notion expressed by Halliday, McIntosh and Strevens (1964) that the contribution of linguistics to language teaching is to provide good descriptions of the language being taught. He sees no evidence for the assertion that the best description of language is derived from linguistics. It is a kind of propaganda, a declaration of faith. Widdowson (1979: 244) concludes: It is this kind of description, participant rather than observer oriented, deriving from the beliefs and behaviour of learners as users and not as analysts of language, that I believe applied linguistics needs to develop as relevant to its concerns. … Such a description will be necessarily partial, and it will probably not meet the approval of others with different axes to grind. This should not trouble us. We have our own conditions of relevance to meet and our own independent way to make in the world.

Widdowson’s point of view is interesting, but it is progressive and misleading at the same time. It is progressive in stressing that the status of description provided by applied linguistics, which is the theoretical level of language teaching, is one of many possible descriptions so, to be accepted, it must be relevant to our concerns. It must focus on the language user, the participant, and his/her perspective of language. However, Widdowson’s position is misleading in that it supports the status quo whereby the field of language teaching is merely practical and its theoretical level is reduced to applications of linguistics. To sum up the ideas on the role of linguistics and psychology typical of the linguistic stage, it must be reiterated that both fields serve as the source of theory for language teaching, either with or without the mediation of applied linguistics. Linguistics provides a description of language, which must ‘somehow’ be incorporated into teaching. The recognition of the plurality of language models calls for the criteria of their relevance for the purposes of teaching, especially their focus on language users as opposed to descriptions produced for the sake of linguistic analysis. All told, however, the field of foreign language teaching remains a practical matter with a little bit of theorizing sprinkled on top.

1.2.4. Complicating the relationship of the field with the source disciplines As has been pointed out, the initially submissive attitude of language teaching toward the related fields (i.e. which treated them as source disciplines) resulted 48

from the scarcity of relevant knowledge about language learning and teaching available to specialists. This information shortage attracted various tenets from the academically more advanced neighbours. Indeed, in view of increasing social demands for more effective routes to foreign language mastery, the available linguistic and psychological theories seemed promising, considering the academic authority behind them. However, the whole relationship was challenged when the sophistication of these theories grew beyond the point of supposedly easy, one-way flow of the source findings to the field of foreign language learning and teaching. The most important development of the linguistic stage was the call for explicit criteria of relevance for the linguistic model in the field of foreign language teaching with the purpose of guiding teaching, syllabus design, testing and teacher training (Dakowska 1987). Interesting ideas were also elaborated to convert the direct impact of the source disciplines into an indirect one, or a narrow linguistic focus into a broader one: 1. The idea of an indirect influence of linguistics on language teaching in terms of implications rather than applications, e.g. Spolsky (1969), produced a rather random list of implications which contained quite subjective ideas about the impact of linguistics on language teaching (see also Harris 1973); the problem with implications seems to be their inherent subjectivity and divergent nature; 2. The notion of linguistic eclecticism which advocated freedom to combine the existing linguistic schools and language models rather than the commitment to only one of them; eclecticism referred to the linguistic basis of language teaching as well as the methods of teaching, which turned out to be more attractive, i.e. comprehensive, when used in combination (e.g. Filipovic 1972, Harsh 1975, Noblitt 1972, van Parreren 1975, Politzer 1972, Roulet 1975); the problem with this solution is that it is unsystematic and mostly reactive to external influences rather than constructive; 3. The idea of extending the list of potentially relevant disciplines to embrace the newly emerging hyphenated fields, which offered a broader, macro-as opposed to micro- linguistic view of language, such as psycho-linguistics, socio-linguistics, ethno- linguistics, neuro-linguistics, etc (e.g. Harsh 1982, Richards 1975, Wardhaugh 1974); this as well as the eclectic conception were clear attempts to overcome the initially too narrow views of language used in the field of language learning and teaching, but without the benefit of some coordinating framework; 4. The notion of applied linguistics mediating between theoretical linguistics and the practical activity of language teaching, responsible for converting linguistic ideas into more specific recommendations for the classroom had many followers, but while inserting a connecting level between the two fields, it sanctioned the status quo in the area of language teaching (Brown 1970, Corder 1971, 1973a,b, Kaplan (ed.) 1980, Roulet 1975, Wardhaugh 1974, Wardhaugh and Brown, eds., 1976, Widdowson 1979); 5. The shift of interest from language teaching to language learning, or acquisition, linked with the idea that learner language should be investigated as a linguistic

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system in its own right, and it should first and foremost be described and explained; this idea initiated the field of Second Language Acquisition Research (e.g. Corder 1981, Davies et al., eds., 1984, Gass and Madden, eds., 1985, Ritchie 1978, Seliger and Long, eds., 1983, Selinker 1972, 1992).

Fascination with language learning, which embraced naturalistic, instructed and foreign language acquisition, developed into a specialized discipline of Second Language Acquisition Research (SLAR). Its representatives recognized that language learning is governed by its own laws and that teaching does not necessarily cause learning. Corder (1981) and Selinker (1972) were instrumental in forging the view of learner language as a system in its own right developing according to its built-in syllabus. Within the past decades, SLAR has developed dynamically both in terms of empirical and theoretical research increasing our understanding of non-primary language learning and providing vast evidence for countless research questions (e.g. deKeyser, ed., 2007, Dornyei 2005, 2009, Doughty and Williams, eds., 1998, Ellis 1985, 1994, Larsen-Freeman and Long 1991, Long 2007, Long and Doughty, eds., 2003, 2009). Doughty and Long (2003) provide a representative listing of these questions: Is language an innate ability unique to human being? Is it a skill that is acquired through exposure and interaction? To what extent does learning a second language resemble first-language acquisition? To what extent is explicit versus implicit attention to linguistic rules a condition for successful acquisition? What is the nature of errors? Are they part of a developmental process that will eventually dissipate with increasing exposure and experience or are they something pernicious to be avoided or immediately corrected before they become a permanent part of the underlying grammar? What is the role of the learner’s first language in the learning of the second?

It seems clear that the main point of interest of SLA researchers is to describe invariant developmental processes of second language acquisition in order to develop explanatory theories (Gregg 1993, Jordan 2004, Long 1990, 2004, 2007). It would be a mistake, therefore, to expect that all the solutions for foreign language teaching would come from SLAR because, despite a considerable overlap, there is an important difference between the two fields. As has been pointed out earlier, SLAR investigates classroom processes in addition to language learning in the field. From the point of view of SLA researchers, teaching -or instruction -is a form of intervention into what is called ‘naturalistic’ acquisition; classroom teaching provides only some of the language learning opportunities, but not all of them. In the case of foreign language teaching, the classroom is the 50

only language learning environment there is and this environment – to echo Newmark and Reibel (1968) – must provide all the necessary and sufficient conditions for successful foreign language learning. Therefore, the perspective and understanding of language learning for the purposes of foreign language teaching must be sufficiently specific as to enable us to make foreign language learning happen solely in the educational environment. The process has nowhere else to develop. Moreover, SLAR’s clearly expressed goals, i.e. to develop explanatory theories of non-primary language acquisition, do not necessarily include obligations to deliver applications, i.e. knowledge useful to the language teacher, as Long (2004: 4) comments: Most SLA theories, and most SLA theorists, are not primarily interested in language teaching, and in some cases not at all interested. So, while SLA theories may be evaluated in absolute terms and comparatively in a variety of ways – parsimony, empirical adequacy, problem-solving ability and so on – it makes no sense to judge them solely, as some have suggested, or in some cases at all, on the basis of how useful they are for the classroom or how meaningful they are for the classroom teachers.

In this way, the field of Foreign Language Learning and Teaching is left to its own devices with fundamental tasks to work on. Returning to the image of the communicating vessels, I see the main tasks selected for this investigation as building an interface between the practice of foreign language teaching and the scientific discipline of foreign language didactics as a consequence of their joint preoccupation with the phenomenon of language use and learning. For foreign language teachers this involvement means teaching the language effectively on the basis of their professional knowledge derived foreign language didactics while for foreign language didactics this involvement means grasping this phenomenon as its subject matter specifically enough to retain its empirical, i.e. spatiotemporal anchoring in the human subject.

1.3. The present: mapping the territory As each of the source disciplines produced increasingly advanced ideas and theories, the field of foreign language teaching also grew and matured to judge these source findings more rationally, i.e. from the point of view of its own aims and priorities. By way of analogy with human development, the first stage of this stormy relationship can be regarded as the time of compliance on the part of language teaching, marked by identifying itself with the source disciplines. The second, much more demanding stage of defiance, was characterized by the strong rejection of their influence. Finally, the natural third stage of the field’s

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maturation is its movement away from subordination toward academic autonomy. The attitude of an autonomous discipline to its relatives and neighbours is bound to be prudent, i.e. quite deliberate and discriminating to begin with. An autonomous discipline, including the field of language learning and teaching, is capable of interacting with the related fields as a partner, in reciprocal transactions, while protecting its own, internally-defined interests. This attitude is qualitatively different from the linguistic stage presented above, in which the task of presenting a model of language relevant to the field of foreign language learning and teaching belongs to linguistics. The quintessential route to academic autonomy is beautifully articulated by Mackey in a well-known volume from 1973, Focus on the Learner, edited by Oller and Richards, which made an impact on the field of foreign language teaching in the 1970s and 1980s. I consider the following statement to be my motto pointing out the task which, to my knowledge, has been underestimated so far. It is likely that language teaching will continue to be a child of fashion in linguistics and psychology until the time it becomes an autonomous discipline which uses these related sciences instead of being used by them. To become autonomous, it will, like any other science, have to weave its own net, so as to fish out from the oceans of human experience and natural phenomena only the elements it needs, ignoring the rest …(Mackey 1973: 13).

The long-term goal which Mackey points out is challenging and complex. This means for the field of foreign language learning and teaching, or the discipline now rather than just the field, to start weaving its own net, i.e. constructing a representation of its own subject matter in order to cognitively interact with the world of natural phenomena. This goal may be ambitious, but unless it is selected as a legitimate objective, it will never be attained. Once the goal is accepted as a priority, it may be facilitated in a number of ways: it may be placed in the context a larger framework, outlined as a finite problem-space or map, divided into hierarchical levels, broken down into sub-parts, etc., to be addressed in a systematic manner and reintegrated meaningfully within the map. As Mackey describes this assertive attitude toward the source disciplines, he explicitly compares the steps to be taken by the field of language teaching to the steps of any science, or academic discipline, to use a more neutral term. Weaving one’s own net is a standard academic procedure of defining the field’s subject matter as a coherent model, i.e. a system of factors. Autonomous academic disciplines do not leave this fundamental task to anyone else. Either a discipline has its own subject matter – be it implicit or explicit, representing a separate phenomenon or its unique aspect – or it is not an autonomous academic discipline. The subject matter is its ultimate justification. 52

In the long run, accepting random influences from the source disciplines resulting from their own concerns is clearly detrimental to the field’s interests, first of all, to identifying and addressing its own problems. At the same time, strengthening the field’s autonomy is instrumental in developing exchanges with other fields competent in matters of language, language use and human cognitive functioning. Such exchanges demand from the field of foreign language learning and teaching the ability to seek and appropriately incorporate input from these fields within its own disciplinary infrastructure. The essential difference between cognitive subordination to the more advanced neighbouring fields and cognitive autonomy resides in the strategy of constructing the field’s subject matter. The autonomous framework calls for its outline as an empirical phenomenon of second/foreign language learning, i.e. a spatiotemporal system (Wójcicki 1977). This system must be derived from its elementary event or episode (Kotarbińska 1977), i.e. language use, which is central to my present investigation. Such a representation is not a sum of conceptions accepted from other – authoritative – fields, no matter how carefully or skilfully integrated. Instead, it is constructed ‘from scratch’, as a representation of the designated empirical phenomenon, an occurrence in space and time, in line with the constraints relevant to foreign language didactics. Cognitive subordination, on the other hand, admits the conceptions and perspectives of the source disciplines as components, which, even when integrated, cannot provide a uniform representation of an empirical (human social) phenomenon with its vital energy flows, i.e. communicative interactions among people, but clusters of factors chosen as relevant by the source disciplines and stitched together. Mackey’s metaphor of weaving one’s own net highlights the nature of academic autonomy as comprising the following essential elements: the field’s focus on the natural phenomenon (‘…so as to fish out from the oceans of human experience and natural phenomena…’), the constructive nature of this focus (i.e. ‘weave its own net’) guided in the selection process by the field-internal criteria (‘only the elements it needs ignoring others…’), and its exchanges with related disciplines justified by the field’s identity rather than the neighbours’ academic authority (‘using these related sciences instead of being used by them’). We may see significant differences between such a conception, followed in this book, and other well-accepted solutions for the field of foreign language learning and teaching. They will be briefly mentioned here for the sake of contrast, to be discussed extensively elsewhere, in a separate monograph: a) foreign language teaching as a practical endeavour (e.g. Widdowson 1979, 2003). While foreign language teaching as a practical activity is very strongly

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anchored in the empirical reality, this connection is unsystematic, i.e. without the benefit of a coordinating conception of language learning as an empirical phenomenon, required by scientific research agenda. There is certainly no place for constructing a coherent model of the domain in which practitioners operate, or seeking explanations of this phenomenon at some level of generality. The real catch in this program, deceptive in its simplicity, is that if we make a point of saying nothing systematic about something, nothing systematic will be said, with all the ensuing consequences. b) foreign language teaching as methodology, still accepted by many specialists in Poland and abroad. This term emphasizes the field’s preoccupation with methods of foreign language teaching developed from the source insights in the absence of an understanding of language learning in the formal setting. The label is inaccurate since ‘methodology’ is used both in the philosophy of science with reference to scientific discovery procedures (e.g. Przełęcki and Wójcicki, eds. 1977) as well as methods of language teaching (Adamson 2004, Richards and Rodgers 2001). The predominantly top-down information flow from the source disciplines to the field of teaching makes no provisions for the healthy reciprocity between them. If any, the empirical feedback for the field of teaching in this conception refers to the effectiveness of the methods developed in this top-down influence (Chastain 1976) rather than the accuracy of any implied conceptions of language learning as a phenomenon. Nowadays, the term ‘methodology’ is increasingly used in language learning and teaching research with reference to research tools and procedures in empirical studies, which is consistent with its technical meaning. c) foreign language teaching as a subfield of applied linguistics. The view of linguistics, or even macro-linguistic, as the provider of theories for foreign language teaching puts the latter into the position of a consumer of these theories precluding systematic focus on its own concerns (e.g. Davies and Elder, eds., 2004, Cook and Seidlhofer eds., 1995, Ewert 2013, Grabe 2002, McCarthy 2001, Schmitt, ed., 2002, Widdowson 1990). This conception, therefore, is conducive to developing a variety of connecting paths between the two areas, mostly leading from linguistics to the field of teaching, rather than a representation of the phenomenon of non-primary language learning and teaching as the field’s subject matter, a unique research territory of an autonomous discipline within language sciences. d) foreign language teaching as language pedagogy. “Pedagogy’ is used in various accounts of the relationship between SLAR and the practice of second language teaching (Crookes 1997, Eckman et al., eds., 1995, Ellis 1991, 1994, 1997, 2010, Gass 1993, Nassaji, 2012, van Compernolle and Williams 2013), 54

but from the point of view of my investigation which focuses on foreign language learning and teaching it is an inaccurate label. Technically, the term ‘pedagogy’ categorizes our field as a domain of upbringing whereas our primary concern is not upbringing in general, but targeting the distinct specificity of language use and learning along the life span. Foreign language didactics stands out among other disciplines, such as pedagogy or didactics of various content subjects as well as other language sciences, because of its focus on non-primary language learning as a human phenomenon, specific enough to provide guidelines on foreign language teaching. For the purpose of converting language learning into foreign language teaching in the educational system, the most fundamental and elementary instance of language learning is language use. I strongly endorse the view that language learning is language use (Wolff 2002). Most importantly, language use anchored in our cognitive system and communicative interaction along the life-span provides a unique diffraction while learning. The term ‘pedagogy’ does not even begin to do justice to the unique specificity of this phenomenon emphasizing the general area of upbringing instead. It is significant that leading SLA researchers do not target language use as their focus of investigations, but deliberately choose acquisition. For a collection of reprinted articles on the lively acquisition/use controversy in SLA, see Seidlehofer ed. 2003, section 4. Gass 2003: 221 is explicit about this issue: “the emphasis in input and interaction studies is on language used and not on the act of communication”. e) foreign language teaching as an interdisciplinary endeavour. Similarly to SLAR, (e.g. Beretta and Crookes 1993, Crookes 1992, 1997, Grabe 2002), foreign language teaching can be identified as an interdisciplinary endeavour in which the complexity of language learning is accounted for by various ‘feeder’ disciplines. However, this conception postulates the need to integrate concerns of such research areas as linguistics, sociolinguistics, psychology and others to guide research on language acquisition (Gass 1988, 1993) rather than to construct -in a bottom-up manner, by way of idealization -a coherent unified representation of language use (and, subsequently, learning) as a spatiotemporal occurrence in its sociocultural context. An inherent difficulty here, which has been pointed out earlier in this section, is that the implied representation of the subject matter is a derived construct, a representation of representations, a sum of research foci belonging to the source disciplines. Their connecting lines prevent the researchers from being able to capture the vital human energy flows in interactions by means of language-coded meanings.

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1.4. Toward autonomy The idea of the field weaving its own net to single out its relevant entities from the immensity of human experience and natural phenomena, as Mackey aptly put it, is in clear contrast with the notion of making a patchwork from pieces of fabric handed down by more authoritative/mature scientific disciplines, linguistics and psychology. It is characteristic that although it has limited implications for foreign language teaching, a similar discussion on the notion of language, still going on in Second Language Acquisition Research (e.g. Seedhouse et al., 2010), regards the issue of how to integrate the existing research and reconcile the leading perspectives rather than how to focus on language as a phenomenon in the empirical reality (see Ellis 2010, Fortune and Andon 2012, Hulstijn 2002). Since language learning is a real phenomenon available in the empirical reality, complex enough to justify a ‘normal science’ program, the question remains: is the field of foreign language learning and teaching doomed to accessing this phenomenon solely via the mediation of linguistic and psychological conceptions, or can it claim a more direct route of targeting the relevant domain to represent its relevant aspect, selected with the help of field-internal criteria, as its own subject matter? It has taken us quite a while to realize that although language learning – be it primary or non-primary – can be regarded from a variety of vantage points and represented in a multitude of ways, it is a natural spatiotemporal phenomenon which exists independently of our perspectives and epistemological strategies. Most importantly, it is universal, natural, ubiquitous, pervasive and inevitable in our species as verbal communication. All cultures engage in it for the sake of construction, expression and reconstruction of meaning. Verbal communication permeates all domains of our life, individual as well as social whereas people are involved in it with their entire bodies and minds throughout their life span. The field’s priorities must shift from relying on various representations of language as a system of forms with various additional human factors, inserted by way of concretization, to a model representation of the phenomenon of language use and learning by human beings, a human occurrence in time and space. Anchoring language processes in human thought and action of the language user is absolutely indispensable because there is no knowledge or human learning without a human subject, i.e. the knower, nor any constructive language processes and operations unless they are executed by this human agent. Language teaching, therefore, is not about presenting information about grammatical forms, even in context, and their practise, but making language learning happen primarily by instituting conditions for language use in relevant 56

situations. Such situations elicit relevant knowledge activations, as well as constructive and reconstructive processes, operations, strategies and procedures on the part of the participants, i.e. language users in the role of senders and/or addressees.

1.5. Concluding remarks Let me reiterate the main developments in the field’s progress towards emancipation: a) the multitude of newly emerging schools in linguistics and psychology in the middle of the 20th century necessitated a more criterion-oriented evaluation of their impact on foreign language teaching than had initially been the case; this weakened the ties between foreign language teaching and the source disciplines while their impact began to take more elaborate forms; b) the numerous linguistic descriptions were assigned their proper status, that of language models, i.e. partial representations of some aspect of language, an abstraction in itself, to be considered in terms of their relevance to the field of language learning and teaching; c) the relationship between language teaching and various other areas was compounded to allow various adjustments and concretizations of ideas coming from the source disciplines to suit the needs of the receiving field. The table below summarizes characteristic features of each stage in the evolution of the discipline of foreign language learning and teaching from the state of informal reflection, through applications of other sciences toward the state of relative emancipation and autonomy. Table 2: Key aspects of the evolution of the field of foreign language learning and teaching from informal reflection to an academic discipline Informal reflection (the 19/20th C) • early industrial society • language use for educational pur-poses (reading) • philological inspirations • the role of normative grammar as the key to language

Scientific applications since mid 20th C • late industrial society • language use for communication • the growth of mass media, communication technology and fast transit • trust in the power of science;

Emancipation (turn of the 21st C) • information/global society • the status of English as a world language for global contacts, leading to its highly specialized, expertise-demanding purposes (ESP)

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Informal reflection (the 19/20th C) • the knowledge of language understood as the knowledge of rules of grammar • the use of older texts of the classics and translation in language teaching • informal observations of language learning by children used as inspiration for some teaching strategies • an increasing role of phonetics • influences from linguistics as an emerging discipline in its own right • the basis of foreign language teaching understood as commonsense principles.

Scientific applications since mid 20th C • definitions of language and learning derived from more advanced source disciplines, especially linguistics and psychology • linguistic and psychological theories used for designing methods of foreign language teaching • focus on the search for a universal method of teaching which led to a disappointment with the whole “methods” framework • emphasis on language teaching rather than learning • identifying the basis of foreign language teaching as foreign language methodology

Emancipation (turn of the 21st C) • rapid growth of mass media and the Internet, eliminating the constraints of space in verbal communication • intellectual inspirations from the social/human disciplines, especially cognitive sciences • questioning the reliability of science as a tool of knowing • progress in research on non-primary language learning and teaching called SLAR • progress in understanding verbal communication, including cross-cultural and global communication, in its situational context • an emerging discipline of foreign language learning and teaching, called foreign language didactics

It seems that the field’s maturation and progress toward understanding second/ foreign language learning relevant to, i.e. convertible into, foreign language teaching has evolved in the following manner: a) the first stage, featuring a nascent, still feeble field which accepts the authority of related disciplines to shed light on, i.e. conceptualize, the nature of language and learning, the field which sees itself merely as a practical endeavour; b) the second stage, in which the need for effective teaching of foreign languages on a mass scale justifies the use of various competent sciences, while the field is seen as a ‘special’ undertaking – a mix of practical concerns and conceptions from other academic fields, neither purely practical nor fully scientific; c) the third, most recent stage, characterized by a dissatisfaction with the existing solutions and the field’s search for its own identity as an academic discipline, 58

i.e. with its subject matter, purpose and agenda; needless to say, the dividing lines between these stages are far from rigid. This gradual emancipation of foreign language learning and teaching has been accelerated by a growing awareness of its own territory, even if mainly in the wake of linguistic and psychological influences, and by numerous insights into the nature of foreign language learning and teaching. Emancipation has a number of implications. First of all, it is inseparable from the field’s reflection on its own identity, priorities and focus while being critical about top-down influences, i.e. summing up two concepts, ‘language’ and ‘learning’ as concretization of language learning. My preference in this monograph is for the opposite strategy, the bottom-up route of idealization, which starts with the phenomenon of language use in the empirical reality to be represented as a unitary, anthropocentric (i.e. user-based) representation of human cognitive functioning specialized for verbal communication with other human beings in the sociocultural context. I am convinced that this route is conducive to identifying processes of language use relevant from the point of view of foreign language didactics.

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Chapter 2. Targeting the relevant aspect of language: focus on language use

Introduction: on the many facets of language The multitude of approaches in linguistics and other language sciences testifies to the fact that the notion of ‘language’ has no rival in its potential for affording diverse perspectives and intricate interpretations which refer to aspects of language in use as well as its formal properties. This sentiment is aptly expressed by Cook and Seidlhofer (1995: 4, later quoted in Atkinson 2011: 1): Language is viewed in various theories as a genetic inheritance, a mathematical system, a social fact, the expression of individual identity, the expression of cultural identity, the outcome of dialogic interaction, a social semiotic, the intuitions of native speakers, the sum of attested data, a collection of memorized chunks, a rule-governed discrete combinatory system, or electrical activation in a distributed network. But to do justice to language, we do not have to express allegiance to one or some of these competing – and aspiringly hegemonic – views. We do not have to choose. Language can be all of these things at once.

Language may, indeed, be regarded from different perspectives, represented at various levels of generality and along various dimensions, for example time (synchronic/diachronic linguistics), space (i.e. language families, regional dialects) phylogenetic/ontogenetic/life- span dimensions, languages for general/ specialized purposes, norm/pathology, monolingual/multilingual speakers, and language system/language use, as well as neurolinguistic, psycholinguistic, sociolinguistic and cultural dimensions. To complicate the matters further, we have a host of linguistic traditions and schools of thought, which select their special angle, be it taxonomic, structural, stratificational, generative, universal, or cognitive, not to mention the highly abstract focus characteristic of the philosophy of language, which ponders the miracle of human language in an abstract sense. Naturally, language may be of interest from a pure as well as an applied point of view: one can aim at language description and explanation, as well as first, second, third, foreign language education, language revitalization, policy and planning (Phillipson and Skutnabb-Kangas, 2009). Additionally, these pure and applied vantage points may be largely determined by the prevalent conception of science at the time. In Second Language Acquisition alone, Cook (2010) enumerates and discusses a whole spectrum of meanings of the notion of language:

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for example as human representation system, as abstract external entity, as a set of sentences, as the shared possession of the community, as knowledge in the mind of the individual and as action. According to Johnson-Laird (1980, 1983, 2005, 2006) and Nersessian (2002, 2008), each of these perspectives of language may serve as a useful model generating research questions of a certain kind, whereas different purposes may require different models of the same facet of language. However, coming to terms with the notion of language use for the purpose of foreign language leaning and teaching is hard not only because of this abundance of possibilities. What makes matters worse is the inevitably constructive nature of educational process: what is investigated in the empirical reality as the formal process of foreign language learning and teaching results from interactions between the natural and the cultured, i.e. instituted, elements all tangled up into a whole. Depending on the adequacy of the underlying understanding of language learning, our educational strategies, mainstream as much as alternative, either enhance or interfere with the fundamental, natural processes of language learning significantly affecting their outcomes. Moreover, maturational changes in the process of language learning along the life span complicate our efforts of coming to grips with the task of understanding even further: a considerable uniformity displayed in the early period of language development is followed by differentiation in language learning due to the role of individual factors and experience later in life, not to mention the effect of the knowledge of one language already in the learner’s cognitive system, which constantly interacts with the new one(s) (E. Clark 2009, Rebok 1987, Schaffer 2004). Additionally, regardless of age, the learner’s contribution to these processes is considerable as he or she accumulates, (re)constructs, and elaborates knowledge along the life span, which undergoes representational explicitation and restructuring (Karmiloff-Smith 1986, McLaughlin 1990) Therefore, keeping the main goal of this investigation in mind, i.e. to search for processes of language use relevant from the point of view of foreign language didactics, one must first of all humbly acknowledge the protean nature of language and recognize, that unlike other objects of inquiry, especially outside the humanities, it is not ‘given’ or otherwise available for investigation as an easily discernible object with natural borders. Capturing it in its entirety is not only infeasible for such reasons as the intentional, i.e. aspectual, nature of our cognition (Nersessian 2008, Searle 1992), but also unnecessary considering the task at hand. Instead, it has to be carved out mentally, according to some criteria, by way of conceptualization. In other words, its relevant aspect must be selected and named in line with the purpose and assumptions of the given area 62

of inquiry. Both in human cognitive development as well as in mature cognitive functioning, conceptualization is an instance of categorization, based on our capability for feature coding, and can be treated as a process of abstraction, which selects some features of the targeted objects while actively disregarding others to integrate them into entities with a name. There are clear affinities between categorization and model construction: categorization may be perceived as an elementary case of construction in that it requires selection of features and their integration. Putting a (verbal) label on the resulting construct affords various operations with its use, especially communication. In my investigation, relevant features must be derived from the spatiotemporal phenomenon of language use as opposed to categories of language understood as a synchronic system of forms, i.e. as a system disconnected from space, time, and the human subject. This remains in clear contrast with still persisting approaches to this problem which focus on integrating and reconciling conceptions and theories of an abstract nature, which represent the process of language learning as a linearization of forms and regard the goal of the process as the acquisition of target language grammar (e.g. Whong 2011). In view of the early experience of the young field with its neighbours outlined above, one must be sceptical that the perspective of language or language acquisition offered by a source discipline would automatically be relevant to its purposes. A reasonable solution, therefore, is to determine the discipline’s own angle on language as language use in order to develop a conceptualization in and on its own terms.

2.1. How to reduce the complexity of the problem? At this stage of development, to guide its research operations, the field not only needs cognitive freedom to conceptualize its subject matter autonomously, but also discipline -a framework of science. A qualitative difference can be seen between the situation in which a field dominated by a more mature neighbour is expected to adopt the neighbour’s conceptions as its own and the situation in which a field develops a framework suitable for the humanities to do the necessary theoretical and empirical research guided by its internal goals while communicating with the related fields as necessary and drawing from their expertise. In order to reduce the complexity of language to its relevant aspect, a logical strategy for the field of foreign language learning and teaching seems to be to adopt the format of ‘normal’ science, a conventional, socially coordinated way of conceptualizing, exploring and explaining empirical phenomena systematically. Representing language learning as an empirical phenomenon

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with a satisfactory degree of specificity and comprehensiveness can provide an indispensable interface between the input from the empirical reality and the agenda of scientific reasoning operations inside. Communication between the real world and the world of science is made possible when this science is equipped with a sufficiently with precise scientific terminology. This modest recommendation has nothing to do with so-called science fetish or science envy (Block 1996, Gregg et al. 1997), or with admiration for exact sciences. Instead, it is advocated as a promising cognitive strategy, superior to commonsense, non- science or pre-science, which outline diverging and fuzzy problem spaces for the field of foreign language learning and teaching without chances for coordinating research operations. The subject matter in social sciences, and especially in the humanities, is qualitatively different from that of hard or natural sciences; therefore, the criteria which the field of foreign language learning and teaching aspires to satisfy should not be selected a priori, before the specificity of its subject matter is recognized. However, depending on research strategy, the subject matter of foreign language learning and teaching may be defined as either animate or inanimate (Dakowska 2000). Atran (2002: 67) summarizes the difference between animate and inanimate matter as the subject of science: organisms are teleological and ‘hence not reducible to contingent relations which govern inert matter’ so that laws which may suffice in physics and chemistry should be enriched by further qualitatively different laws. Since the field of foreign language learning and teaching defines itself as an empirical discipline which defines language learning as human processes and operations, it can put itself among the humanities. If, on the other hand, the activity of the human subject is factored out, the criteria of success have to come from formal sciences. Since the specificity of the subject matter has not yet been identified -and it cannot be pinned down unless the field appreciates and executes its right to cognitive autonomy -the discipline’s quality criteria will have to be selected at a later stage. That much, at this point, can be said about the attractiveness and inevitability of the ‘normal’ science program, viewed as a set of socially recognized steps and values coordinating academic research. As a result, the complex, ill-defined problem can be reduced into a complex, well-defined problem. The reasoning goes as follows: Step 1. The field cannot decline its fundamental responsibility to the society at large of satisfying its demand for practically-useful knowledge, i.e. for knowledge applicable to foreign language teaching in the educational setting; such a demand can be met by approaching rather than avoiding the task of understanding language use and learning. 64

Step 2. The optimal route toward understanding language use and learning is the route of science in the sense of a fully-fledged, primarily autonomous academic discipline which explores language use and learning as its subject matter, constrained by its own priorities. Step 3. To satisfy social demand for practically-useful knowledge, this academic discipline defines itself as empirical, i.e. a discipline whose subject matter deliberately targets the world of phenomena, i.e. pitched at such a level of specificity as to capture foreign language learning as a human processes and operations in time and space. Step 4. The discipline’s empirical status resides in the fact that its representation of language learning as language use is a unitary empirical model, i.e. a coherent spatiotemporal system which represents dynamic verbal interactions among language users; such a level of specificity can provide a conceptual interface for the field’s specialists to communicate with the empirical reality in their search of evidence to test hypotheses against data. Step 5. The discipline’s internal research goals can be distinguished at two interacting levels: to develop explanations/facilitate understanding of its subject matter at its pure level, and to convert this understanding into rational strategies/guidelines/options of language teaching at its applied level. Targeting second/foreign language learning as a phenomenon in the empirical reality eliminates the question of how to combine the notions of language and learning; they are replaced by a unitary albeit decentred concept of language use and learning which refers to a universal, inevitable human occurrence of verbal communication. In sum, the demand for knowledge about language use and learning applicable to foreign language teaching can be satisfied by the relatively autonomous empirical discipline in question, capable not only of developing explanatory systems, but also conceptually and structurally equipped for generating applications based on our understanding of foreign language use and learning by human beings in the real world. The most significant difference between Second Language Acquisition Research (SLAR) and Foreign Language Didactics (FLD) seems to reside in what could be called the “convertibility requirement”, which applies only to FLD. As Gregg (1993) points our, SLAR seeks to explain second language acquisition. Based on Gass (2003), we can add – as evidence of change in the grammatical system. In other words, SLAR is not constrained in its research operations by the requirement to operate at such a level of specificity of its conceptions as to enable researchers to use their findings as guidelines for teaching in a causal sense, i.e. of making language learning happen by reconstructing the necessary conditions for non-primary language use and learning in the absence of target language

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communication outside the classroom. This focus on acts of language use is vital in foreign language learning and teaching, but redundant in Second Language Acquisition.

2.2. The format of ‘normal’ academic disciplines as a source of orientation Science is about understanding. Giddens (2001) defines the goals of science as constructing knowledge in a certain domain with the help of systematic methods of empirical research, analysis of data, theoretical reasoning and logical evaluation of arguments. Day (2001) offers a very modest, yet attractive understanding of science (and evidence) as institutionally governed social, i.e. discursive (or, should I say, communicative), practices, a very realistic definition of science as an aspect of culture (also see Thagard 2005b). For one thing, science, as one can guess, is only as good as its people with their talents and limitations. Yet, science offers a chance to accomplish tasks where individual activity would be insufficient (Giere 2002), especially when it comes to a) the social negotiation of meanings developed in various research operations, and b) the availability of more general terminological and operational framework which affords (at least a degree of) compatibility and subsequent integration of individual research projects. At the same time, it offers no guarantee of success. In this book, the notion of ‘normal’ science is understood in a neutral, generic sense, as specialized coordinated human (both intra-and interpersonal) cognitive and communicative processes targeted at some object of investigation in order to explore and explain it. This is in no conflict with the notion of ‘normal science’ used by Kuhn in his 1970 classic, with reference to the state of science between paradigm shifts. Advantages of science include satisfying our natural cognitive curiosity, producing understanding which is intrinsically gratifying, as well as enabling us to survive in the environment, sometimes to influence, modify, meliorate or even control it. In contrast to art, literary criticism, magic, or mysticism, scientific operations are recursive, selective, organized, orchestrated, and aimed at hypotheses to be verified or falsified by evidence/data and other reasoning processes. These processes are regulated, precise, systematic, planned, goal-oriented, and incorporating feedback, as well as disciplined, explicit, formalized, specialized, elaborated, based on wide knowledge representations, communicable, and socially known. However, a ‘normal’ science program may refer either to a purely mental/formal construct, i.e. a construct without a deliberate reference to a phenomenon in the empirical reality, or to a spatiotemporal occurrence, i.e. a phenomenon 66

in its technical sense. As we link a distinct empirical domain with the framework of science and launch its specialized inquiry procedures, i.e. agenda in the sense of a goal-oriented hierarchical plan, we come up with an academic or scientific discipline in operation. Essential attributes of the ‘normal’ science framework relevant to the field of foreign language learning and teaching are as follows: a) a ‘normal’ science accepts the following almost inseparable, yet indispensable values: academic identity, i.e. the awareness of its own distinct specificity residing in its subject matter, which enables it to stand out among other, equally ‘normal’ scientific disciplines as a relatively independent academic agent rather than an adjunct (sub-part) of some other field, and cognitive autonomy, i.e. the freedom to be guided by its own research concerns and goals, to make requisite choices and take responsibility for them, rather than be reactively preoccupied with research concerns of its neighbours; b) it designates its domain, i.e. a phenomenon or an aspect thereof, in the empirical reality represented as its subject matter of enquiry; consequently, the discipline’s identity, as well as the subsequent research procedures and/or quality criteria, result from the uniqueness of this subject matter being, its ‘private territory’; c) it sets an agenda, or program, with pure and applied goals, in which pure goals implement a series of generally accepted research steps and operations aimed at understanding the phenomenon under investigation, while the applied ones make use of this understanding to institute, elicit, reinstate, meliorate, regulate, control, facilitate, cultivate and otherwise enhance the phenomenon in question; this does not rule out the possibility that applied questions may stimulate research at the pure level and vice versa; d) the field’s subject matter is determined by two important coordinates: the degree of generality, which may range from the most specific to the most abstract level, and the scope of the subject matter, which refers to the extent of its natural borders; e) the field admits multifarious interactions within and without, i.e. ongoing communication between the levels, bottom-up and top-down interactions, leading to mutual adjustments and modifications of theoretical explanations, empirical testing or modelling of the subject matter, as well as the lateral interactions among the factors defined in the model of the subject matter; since the humanities share some elements of the subject matter and, consequently, some research concerns, various alliances and information trading among the related fields can be justified, if not inevitable;

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2.2.1. Scientific activities as specialization of human cognitive processes Langley and Simon (1981: 375) see discovery as a special case of learning: ‘Discovery – acquiring knowledge by putting questions to Nature – is simply the limiting case of learning – acquiring knowledge from all the sources that are available’. Gopnik and Melzoff (1996) make a case for similarities between scientific knowledge and cognition as well as between scientific change and cognitive development. In their view, children gradually develop their abilities to perform various cognitive operations along their life span, such as systematic goal-oriented, regulated observation, (subjective or even objective discovery), analysis, synthesis, comparison, contrast, categorizing, ordering, symbolic processes, abstract thought, and generalizations. They build increasingly complex mental representations of real and fictional entities, as well as cognitive schemata to organize their experience. Children develop constructive and often creative processes as well as metaprocesses about various aspects of their cognition, especially language. This growing explicitation of cognitive processes, including problem-solving strategies, enables them to deliberately regulate their thought and reasoning (Karmiloff-Smith 1986). In all of them, the initial input information is transformed through reasoning to yield more complex, sometimes highly innovative ideas. Children’s thought processes directed at the understanding of the surrounding reality operate on observational data, i.e. such as images of percepts available or not available in the environment, as well as mentally constructed entities, and later -concepts and propositions. During this development, the processes become increasingly convertible and coordinated, providing grounds for understanding laws and regularities. The growing child’s thought becomes more and more formal, which is to say, more independent of the substance on which it operates. (It should be mentioned that Faucher et al., 2002, pointed out some specific problems with this view, but they did not reject it as a whole.) Developmental psychologists (e.g. Mitchell and Ziegler 2013, Schaffer 2004), make an important distinction between action-oriented practical behaviour and exploration-oriented cognitive behaviour (for a comparison, see the introduction, Table 1). Practical activities are aimed at solving various problems which occur whereas exploration is aimed at understanding, i.e. perceiving the given phenomenon as a coherent system. This growing autonomy of thought is connected with an increasing universality and objectivisation of its content, as well as with the development of criticism and the ability to monitor one’s own cognitive process. A strong group of scholars advocate a cognitive view of science (Carruthers et al., eds., 2002, Giere 1988, 1999, 2006, Giere, ed., 1992, Holyoak and Morrison, 68

eds., 2005, Johnson-Laird, 2006, Klahr 2000, Nersessian 2008), which regards science as a natural and cultural phenomenon and looks to cognitive psychology in search of understanding scientific activity. Gopnik and Melzoff (1996:15) state that there is in fact no alternative view, while recognizing that the idea is derived from the ‘naturalistic epistemology’ of Quine and others: Science is cognitive almost by definition, insofar as cognition is about how minds arrive at veridical conceptions of the world. In some sense, scientists must be using some cognitive abilities to produce new scientific theories and to recognize their truth when they are produced by others. Scientists have the same brains as other human beings and they use those brains, however assisted by culture, to develop knowledge about the world. Ultimately, the sociology of science must consist of a set of individual decisions by individual humans to produce or accept theories. Scientists converge, however painfully or slowly, on a single set of decisions.

According to these researchers, science is a special cultural practice which makes use of the individual cognitive processes operating on our mental representations of the world together with information that comes from other people via communication. Interestingly, they recognize the fact that human representations of the world can be veridical. I share this point of view entirely. A cognitive scientist would say that evolution constructed truth-finding cognitive processes. On this view, science and our ordinary practices of explanation, inference, prediction, and causal attribution, in which science is grounded, reflect a particularly powerful set of these cognitive abilities. Science uses a set of representations and rules particularly well suited to uncovering facts about the world. Science gets it right because it uses psychological devices that were designed by evolution precisely to get things right (Gopnik and Melzoff, 1996: 17).

In cases of difficulty, i.e. dealing with research objects that are too big or too small, too rare or too distant for normal perception, science makes use of cognitive prostheses, such as the telescope, the microscope, or statistics. Reasoning operations, such as explanation, prediction, causal attribution, theory formation and testing, are considered to be a basic natural part of our cognitive equipment rather than a late cultural invention. Although theory change grows out of culture and society, it also has important links with natural learning mechanisms. Cognitive scientists (Giere, ed., 1992) stress that theories are instances of general cognitive structures, such as schemata, metaphors, nets and production systems. Theorizing devices are designed for rapid, powerful and flexible learning and exploring logical regularities for this purpose. Theory is understood as a condensed form of understanding. ‘If you want to get ahead, get a theory’ (Karmiloff-Smith and Inhelder, 1974), the adage goes.

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Table 3: Properties of ‘normal’ science as a cultural phenomenon, specialized reasoning processes and communicative interaction Science as a cultural phenomenon a) science as a cultural phenomenon is aimed at satisfying human needs, here cognitive needs to understand and make sense; b) scientific values accepted in search of understanding are a special case of human cultural values; c) like other forms of human activity scientific research is focussed on the human beings in their environment and resources used for the purposes of human adaptation; d) it is mandatory to recognize the synergetic bond between the human being and his or her sociocultural environment and habitat; e) as in other forms of culture, specialization of science results from the specificity of its substance or domain; at the same time this specialization by far exceeds basic necessity; f) in science, the use of conventions, characteristic of culture in general, leads to group differences and the formation of scientific communities;

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Science as specialization of our cognitive processes a) the goal of scientific research processes is to understand the world, i.e. grasp the coherence of the phenomena; b) s cientific explorations make use of the available reasoning processes: categorizing, comparison, contrast, definition, analogy, induction, deduction, chronological ordering, modelling, problem solving, formulating principles, regularities and rules, cause and effect reasoning, looking for anomalies, etc.; c) the nature of research operations is determined by the nature of the subject matter under investigation; reasoning about inanimate matter is qualitatively different from reasoning about humans; d) c ognitive processes of scientific research are a form of interaction with the subject matter under investigation; the quality of this interaction is determined by the precision of the cognitive tools: its cognitive prostheses and statistics;

Science as a form of (expert) communication a) the goal of communication in science is not only to spread scientific information, but first and foremost, to negotiate meanings and interpretations of the phenomena/issues of interest; b) such a function is suitably carried out by polemics, critiques, opinions, reviews, controversies, and discussions; d) as in other cases, scientific communication makes use of communicative conventions, shared background knowledge and expertise, cognitive schemata, terminology, norms, expectations, presuppositions, discourse genres, and rules of communication; e) the fact of accepting the above structures and norms, i.e. the language of scientific communication responsible for the group’s coherence, means group membership, i.e. turns a person a member of the give research community.

2.2.2. How can scientists communicate with the empirical reality? Human cognitive processes are subject to some constraints which may be regarded as serious limitations in various areas in which scientists try to delve into the essence of the surrounding world, but not when they investigate language because a) language is unique to humans and b) we have both first and third person access to it. In other words, it is not external to the researcher. As evidenced by the development of our civilization, human ability to deal with the empirical reality is not bad at all. This view is quite different from relativism as critically discussed and rejected by Jordan 2004 and Long 2007. Velmans (2000: 44) points out: Modern empirical science is not hampered by this problem (the problem of knowing the world through sensations, which are as close to the world as one can get, yet the world, in many respects, being quite different from our sensations) because it accepts the Greek rationalist intuition that through the power of reason, expressed in the ability to theorise, develop mathematical formalisms, and so on, it is possible to generate descriptions of the world which go beyond the evidence of the senses. It is central to scientific method that such theories be open to empirical testing (verification, falsification, etc.) but a commitment to empirical testing requires no commitment to empiricist epistemology. Cognitive psychology, for example, does not accept the simple hierarchical empiricist model of the way concepts derive from sensations, theories from concepts, and so on (knowledge of the world is thought to be concept-driven as well as data-driven).

Velmans is convincing in his view that the brain constructs a ‘representation’ or a ‘mental model’ -based on environmental stimuli, expectations, and previous knowledge -in formats determined by the sensory modality employed. After all, there is a difference between empirical and virtual reality: in virtual reality we interact with a virtual world outside our body although there is no actual, corresponding world there. Velmans (2000:159) states: … it seems reasonable to assume that the experienced world produced by perceptual processing is a partial, approximate, species-specific, but nonetheless useful representation of what is ‘really there‘. While the world we experience is a representation which depends for its existence on human perceptual processing, the reality so represented does not.

However, there is no knowledge without a knower, the subject whose mind represents it. Knowledge can exist only in the mind of the knowing subject or agent, not in the book. Books contain information coded and recorded in the form of symbols which convey meaning to creatures who know how to understand and interpret them. There may be different ways of representing a given entity

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or event depending on the perspective, distance, level of abstraction or selected properties, but, at the same time, representations for a given purpose may differ in their accuracy and utility. Velmans points out that although various scientific communities construe the nature of selected entities in some way appropriate for their purpose, this does not prevent us from assessing their relative merits in terms of their ability to explain, predict and control these entities, i.e. in terms of their ability to fulfil their purposes. Moreover, procedures of science can be transcultural. Scientific theories refer to models, which are constructs pitched at a certain level of abstraction to explain the phenomena of interest. Velmans (2000) is not alone in stressing the observer-relative nature of observations, i.e. the idea that our knowledge is filtered through, and conditioned by the sensory, perceptual and cognitive system as well as the conjectural status of any given scientific theory. Leontiev (1981) emphasizes that mental phenomena are a subjective reflection of objective reality. This position is consistent with the realist theory of science (Bhaskar, 1975, Collier 1994, Corson 1997), according to which ‘perception gives us access to things and experimental activity access to structures that exist independently of us’ (Bhaskar 1975, 9). The cognitive conception of science assumes that there really is something there to experience or think about, whether we perceive it or not. Phenomena are different from illusions or hallucinations. Science is public in the sense of being based on similar individual experiences, not to mention the fact that it is impossible without group effort. It is intersubjective, i.e. socially communicated, negotiated, agreed upon and shared, similarly represented in other minds, rather than objective. In addition to shared experience one needs shared language, shared cognitive structures, a shared world-view or scientific paradigm, shared training and expertise and so on, to form part of the database of a communal science (Carruthers et al., eds., 2002). Science is a natural – universal – human fact as well as part of human culture in that it displays group and temporal differences (Giere 2002).

2.2.3. On the interface between Foreign Language Didactics as an empirical discipline and the empirical reality As has been pointed out, an empirical discipline functions at a hierarchy of specialized levels of research operations. These levels are listed below starting with their anchoring in the empirical reality to visualize the interactive information flow between a community of scientists and the real world.

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Table 4: Specialized levels in FLD as an empirical discipline communicating with each other as well as the empirical reality via a deliberately specific conceptual interface

1. Domain in the empirical reality

a phenomenon in the empirical reality selected by the discipline, i.e. observable events in space and time involving language use by people, i.e. verbal communication; the distinct specificity of this phenomenon in the context of communication in general is singled out on the basis its verbal code, i.e. language, which outlines the scope of its subject matter; the facet of language relevant to the discipline is verbal communication clearly distinguishable from various other facets of language;

2. Subject matter represented as a model

an interface between the conceptual system of the empirical discipline and the real world, the subject matter is a mental representation of the domain which selects relevant factors integrated into a coherent hierarchical empirical (spatiotemporal) system, the subject matter is a construct, a mental model of the empirical phenomenon in the selected domain; its basic entities are language use in comprehension and production in speech and writing by non- primary language learners; some conceptual categories may be shared with other human sciences providing grounds for their cross-disciplinary compatibility;

3. Empirical research

deals with empirical questions addressing various aspects of the subject matter, in search of evidence for the relationships postulated in the model; results of the studies can be hierarchically integrated in the context of the model; interaction is possible between empirical research and the investigated domain via sufficiently specific terms; feedback is possible regarding various aspects of the framework itself; research methods, determined by the calibre of the question, may be unique to the field as well as shared with other disciplines;

4. Theoretical research

theory construction to explain the functioning of the phenomenon in question; development of the criteria for theory evaluation, theory modification, theory change or entire paradigm shift; a degree of compatibility with other theories in human sciences is feasible depending on shared terminology and assumptions, yet the distinctive specificity of the phenomenon is reflected in the nature and scope of the theories;

5. Meta- reflection

general policy questions on the ontological and epistemic commitments as well as the goals of the discipline, its models, theories and methods, especially its applicative power, in the case of foreign language learning and teaching – applications refer to the issues of educational construction and intervention; new questions and areas of research generated in view of the developments within the field and in other human disciplines; epistemological issues and points of contention;

6. Paradigm

in this account, Foreign Language Didactics subscribes to the cognitive paradigm in the humanities because learning is cognitive by definition; cognitivism emphasizes the centrality of meaning and the constructive, i.e. selective/integrative, nature of human cognition; its guiding metaphors shared with other human sciences include distributed yet hierarchical dynamic networks, the idea of hybrid processing, the notions of interaction (reciprocal determination) and strategic nature of human thought and action, as well as the emphasis on the aspectual and evaluative nature of human cognition.

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Domain or territory is understood as the designated (specialized) area in the empirical reality addressed by the given discipline. In the case of foreign language learning and teaching, this domain features verbal communication in which people perform the requisite operations of language use and learning in speech and writing as senders and addressees, i.e. these operations are other- directed and interactive (involving mutual influence). In this way we focus on language as a) a natural social phenomenon, as well as b) a cultural, partly constructed phenomenon in the educational context. Focus on language use and learning as a phenomenon is of vital importance here. This perspective is qualitatively different from the predominant perspectives of language as a formal system, abstracted from its users, depicting an inanimate object. The field of foreign language learning and teaching can derive a great deal of orientation from its domain, i.e. the nature and structure of verbal communication and its specialized varieties in that in the context of communication in general we can single out language-specific occurrences as well as types of structures and processes in language use and learning. Subject matter is the focus of inquiry targeted by the given field; it may be represented as an explicit model, i.e. a network or a conceptual system. A model of the subject matter is a mental construct and what matters is its point of reference, i.e. the aspect it represents: Is it a model of the formal system? Is it a model of the language user? Is it a model of our cognitive functioning in general or our neuronal functioning? Its adequacy can be tested against the data derived from the empirical domain. The model of the subject matter identifies and thereby justifies the discipline’s unique specificity since it must distinguish itself from others and delineate its own scope and borders. When the level of specificity is sufficient, as reflected in its terminology, the subject matter representation can provide an interface between the world of phenomena and the world of empirical science. A model is synonymous with an elaborated definition (interpretation) of the field’s subject matter. Models are mental constructs which represent (graphically, conceptually, physically) the phenomena of interest reducing their complexity to a number of factors which the discipline deems significant together with their functional relationships. A model is a cohesive whole which reflects as well as facilitates our understanding of the respective phenomena (Johnson-Laird 1983, 1989, 2005, 2006, Nercessian 2002, 2008). When this representation is adequate, the model can fulfil its function of guiding research. If, however, this is not the case, the model must be adjusted, or discarded and replaced by a more satisfactory representation. It seems safe to say that the feasibility of empirical investigations to meet the goals of a given discipline depends on the adequacy of 74

its subject matter representation for this purpose. Leplin (1980) distinguishes developmental models as a special class of representations of phenomena and regards them as a driving force of innovative problem-solving in science. In his view, models postulate an internal structure of the phenomenon by enumerating their constituencies, properties of these constituents and relationships among them, whereas solving problems of the phenomenon requires information on the internal constitution of the model. In empirical disciplines researchers construct models by selecting what they perceive as significant by way of idealization, a bottom-up process which selects some factors while excluding others to represent the subject matter, i.e. research focus, as a network or system. As a result, the model is a hierarchical structure with functionally related entities, which should have some empirical indicators; the model sets limits of scope and generality on the investigated phenomenon or its relevant aspect. This means that models can be more or less abstract, as well as more or less explicit. It is essential for empirical disciplines to focus on relevant and sufficiently specific models representing spatiotemporal phenomena because each model representation affords only a certain range of feasible reasoning and research operations (Johnson-Laird 1983, 1989, 2005, 2006, Nercessian 2002, 2008). According to Dubin (1969), a model is so significant in an empirical discipline that its presence distinguishes science, i.e. conducting coordinated systematic research, from non-science, i.e. a mere activity of asking questions. In science (in the sense of an academic discipline), questions are derived from a theoretical model which generates empirically testable hypotheses; information is not gathered for its own sake, but to measure the values associated with units of the theory. Theoretical models provide the discipline with a strong empirical orientation which is missing in ad hoc hypothesis testing, and – most importantly – with a hierarchical organization of research questions. The task (of scientific activities) is to build viable models of the empirical world that can be comprehended by the human mind. These theoretical models are intensely practical, for the predictions derived from them are grounds on which modern man is increasingly ordering his relationships with the environing universe (Dubin 1969: 3).

Models of phenomena which capture spatiotemporal relationships are empirical systems which can be either closed or open. Open systems are defined as conducting an exchange with the environment; this exchange is absent in closed, self-contained systems where there is no import or export of information, energy, or other substances, products or materials between the system and its environment. Language use and language learning cannot function without information

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exchange between the language user and his/her social environment; for our purposes, therefore, language use and learning must be represented as an open dynamic system. All in all, once constructed, a model performs essential functions among the other components and levels of an academic discipline, first and foremost: a) it defines what does and does not belong to the subject matter of the discipline; by setting such borders, it separates the subject matter as an integral relevant whole in a criterion-based manner; this is especially significant when, as in the case of language, the focus of inquiry is not available as a finite entity, but must first of all be identified conceptually; b) it justifies the field’s identity which resides in the distinctive properties of its subject matter; in our case the essence of language is inseparable from the human being and his/her cognitive system, which may be used as a criterion to distinguish it from some linguistic perspectives of language acquisition which do not admit cognitive underpinnings of the process, or some cognitive conceptions of language acquisition which factor out language specificity in the context of our cognitive system; at the same time, from the point of view of the area of potential educational construction and intervention, even though extremely fascinating in itself, the neuronal/neurolinguistic level of processing must be left outside the scope of the subject matter as neighbouring, yet too specific. c) its reference to a segment of the empirical reality is a source of the field’s desirable, even if only temporary, stability of focus; progress in understanding the phenomena of interest may be expected from debates about various conceptions converging on one and the same focus of inquiry rather than various conceptions of diverging foci; without such an anchoring of the model in space and time, the task of modelling language use and learning has limited or no empirical reference, insufficient empirical coordinates or relevant quality criteria; d) it represents the phenomenon in question as relevant entities derived from the empirical constituents and their relationships, which reflect our understanding; this is inseparable from the pure goals of making sense of the phenomenon as a coherent system and the applied goals of reconstructing and cultivating the phenomenon on the basis of these quintessential constituents and their relationships; e) it facilitates researching the phenomenon in question by imposing coherence/unity and hierarchy for the existing hypotheses, for generating new hypotheses and, last but not least, for interpreting, incorporating, synthesizing 76

and rejecting research findings with implications for higher levels of the discipline. Theory intellectually civilizes a given domain by embracing it with a network of concepts and relationships imposing a kind of (infra)structure of a system; it categorizes reality into entities, names them, assigns them their functional relationships and hierarchy, i.e. explains how the phenomenon in question functions; it is ‘a set of related propositions used to classify and explain aspects of the universe in which we live’ (Littlejohn 1999: 21). These propositions link various entities by way of correlations, mutual causal relationships, or teleological relations in the sense of action connection which suggests that we can choose to do certain things to reach certain goals to assist us in making sense of our lives, predicting the future and helping us to respond to different situations. This is the place to recognize the unique dynamics of human beings and their cognitive systems. Theories are taken as adequate when they help us see things clearly and they are useful, i.e. provide practically useful knowledge, and they are discarded when they no longer serve this purpose (Littlejohn 2007). It is in the human nature to seek clear and useful explanations, so it is no wonder that scientists systematize and formalize theories. We cannot understand reality without a theory, but there can be several theories about any realm of life. Reality in any domain can be represented in a variety of ways, which means that our access to it is not direct. A theory is a system of thought, a way of looking at things. We can never ‘view’ reality purely. Instead, we must use a set of concepts and symbols to define what we see, and our theories provide the lenses with which we observe and experience the world (Littlejohn 2007: 5).

Theories are constructed by scholars for particular purposes. Theories have generality, fit and utility, i.e. they apply to various situations of the same type, they make sense of our experience to a certain degree and they help us to do things, i.e. they are applicable. Theory construction is a human social activity (Godfrey-Smith, 2003, Thagard 2005a). As a human activity it is determined subjectively. As a social activity, it is done among a community of scholars who share certain assumptions, discourse and research practices. Givon (2005: 216) admits that: ‘Theory T does not reside in some abstract epistemic space, but rather is subscribed to – ardently, as a system of beliefs – by a substantial portion of an extant scientific community.’ A theory in one community may be rejected in anther. Creating a theory involves persuading a community of scholars that the theory makes sense and is useful. As Gopnik and Melzoff (1996) state, theories possess the following features:

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–– abstractness (generality), i.e. they go beyond sentences which express evidence, they employ entities and laws to explain evidence and they are more abstract than evidence which facilitates transfer to other situations; –– coherence, i.e. they form a system with a particular structure; their entities are related to one another to make sense of the phenomenon; –– causality, i.e. theoretical entities are causally responsible for the evidence; it should be pointed out that social/human sciences are satisfied with interrelationships between the entities of the theory rather than aim at causality to be applicable; –– ontological commitment, i.e. the concepts they select reflect a perspective. According to Gopnik and Melzoff (1996) and Littlejohn (2007), theories provide us with essential benefits: a) interpretation, i.e. a perspective of events; theories help us focus on relationships between important variables and guide our research; b) explanations, i.e. coherent systems which make sense of the data and are cognitively deeply satisfying; they organize and synthesize our knowledge; Langley and Simon (1981) point out that good explanations should be more basic and simpler than the phenomena they explain, and they should be free of ad hoc components; c) predictions, which are intimately linked with causal relationships and explanations, which are extremely important from the point of view of our adaptation to the environment; these causal relationships can be used for the purpose of manipulating or even – to some extent – controlling our environment. Littlejohn (2007) stresses that the scientifically ideal theory formulates general laws, but in the social sciences the situation may not be so ideal: ‘We do not place a lot of faith in covering laws because behaviour is too situational. But is human life so situational that we cannot have theories at all?’ (2007:12). Most scholars think that at least some level of theorizing is possible in the social sciences, so that a theory can be general enough for the purpose for which it is generated. In connection with this view, Kamiński (1992) expresses the opinion that, because of the complexity and intentionality of the human subject, humanistic disciplines must take multiple causality into account; they are more likely to focus on the teleology of human behaviour than exclusively on causal relationships, characteristic of those sciences which investigate inanimate matter. Bhaskar (1998, 3) stresses that ‘it is the nature of the object that determines the form of its possible science’. I share this view entirely (also see, Atran’s view in section 2.1). Theories are dynamic: they change, or undergo restructuring, especially as a result of 78

accumulated counter-evidence. On the one hand, they are nets: only s/he who casts will catch, but on the other hand, a good theory is one that holds together long enough to get us to a better one. Theory formation is the most advanced, specialized achievement of human cognitive processes in general. Theories characterize events in the real world in terms of some underlying abstract entities. To remain in line with the tenets of critical realism, we should say that theories refer to empirical reality and attempt to explain it while retaining the relationship of correspondence (reference of its representation to the real world) and aiming at verisimilitude. Human cognitive development is also about the development of representations that provide us with a veridical view of the world. This is not to deny that these representations are actively constructed by individuals as well as socially negotiated via human communication. The epistemological premise underlying my framework is that human cognition of the empirical reality is possible thanks to our cognitive system with its specialized organs, which constructs humanly-specific mental representations of the real world of a certain kind. That these representations are not the same as the real world does not mean that there are no correspondences which can be identified between the input available to our perception and the nature of the representations. Representations are OF something. “Perception does refer to things outside itself ” (Gopnik and Melzoff 1996: 57). Moreover, these perceptions, which have developed in the process of our adaptation to the natural environment, are constantly modified/refined/perfected via our action in, and interaction with, the natural and social environment which provides sensory, behavioural and mental feedback on their accuracy. Meta-reflection is the level of reasoning which focuses on the discipline itself, and its relationships with empirical and academic environments. The topics for reflection include global issues of research format and policy, both short-and long-term, the interaction as well as match or mismatch between the levels of the field, especially its model representations, evaluations of the existing theories and their empirical evidence, the suitability of various research tools and methods for old and new research questions and, last but not least, the significance of advances in the related fields which may affect the whole research paradigm. It seems clear at this point that the framework of a ‘normal’ academic discipline does not single out one type of research methods (for example empirical rather than theoretical research, or quantitative rather than qualitative analysis of data) as the only relevant one, or more important or scientific than others, but admits a variety of methods based on their suitability for the calibre and nature of the emerging problems. Work on discerning the subject matter or constructing a model, which has profound consequences for the epistemic identity and future

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of the field, should not be underestimated for not belonging to data-based studies. At the same time, empirical testing cannot be expected to pose or solve all the problems of the discipline, especially the more global (political) ones. Methods of empirical testing, which address specific (testable) questions, are ideal for retaining the field’s paradigmatic status quo, whereas theory change depends on more synthetic approach to research findings (e.g., Chalhoub-Deville, Chapelle and Duff, eds., 2006, Norris and Ortega, eds., 2006) as well as conceptual change. Theoretical research makes use of all kinds of scientific reasoning operations, by far exceeding the scope of individual data-based studies. Large-scale issues, leading to paradigm change or restructuring not only in the field in question, but in the humanities in general, would be debated at this global level. Paradigm is the most general level in academic enquiry, at which various ontological and epistemic commitments are made. This level of research is especially significant in the human sciences which deal with a very complex multiaspectal subject because these implied or explicit commitments have far-reaching consequences, to the point of generating quite divergent definitions of language learning processes: a) as a mechanism in inanimate matter or b) as operations taking place in a living (human) organism (see Dakowska 2003, 2014). Mutual influences in the human sciences are inevitable and highly stimulating. After a very long period of structuralist hegemony, which highlighted functional relationships among formal entities within self-contained systems, we are now facing an advent of alternative approaches which may be jointly labelled poststructural (see Atkinson 2011, McNamara 2012). In my view, the most attractive among these approaches is the emerging cognitive paradigm. Its meaning is clarified in the Explanations of terms under ‘cognition, cognitive conceptions, cognitive theories’, also extensively discussed in my other publications, Dakowska 2003, 2013. In its basic meaning, “cognitive” refers to all the processes involved in knowing and the functioning of the human cognitive architecture, including perception, attention, memory, imagery, language functions, developmental processes, problem solving and artificial intelligence (Corsini, ed. 1987). At the same time, this meaning is not to be confused with the meaning of ‘cognitive’ used in SLAR with reference to principally linguistic representations of language acquisition understood as the reconstruction of the grammatical system of the target language in contrast to the social dimension of language use (see Doughty and Long, eds., 2003, Watson-Gegeo 2004, Zuengler and Miller, 2006). The cognitive paradigm – with its focus on meaningful and constructive human information processing at different orders of magnitude – remains in sharp contrast with linguistic structuralism focusing on the notion of language as a self-contained formal system. Needless to say, structuralism used to be 80

accepted as a dominating framework in various other fields of human sciences, not just linguistics. Nowadays, the concepts of distributed hierarchical networks and/or open dynamic complex systems, as in chaos/complexity theory (see e.g. Larsen-Freeman 1997, Larsen-Freeman and Cameron 2008,), have found their way to academic enquiry, attracting such ideas as agency, intentionality, interaction, strategic behaviour, construction, negotiation and interpretation of meaning in human relationships. Although present-day paradigm is inclusive enough to accommodate chaos/complexity theory, my own framework does not make use of any version thereof (the point will be discussed at length in a different publication). To sum up, considering interactions among the specialized levels presented above and thanks to the interface between the discipline and its empirical domain, afforded by its fine-grained subject matter representation, researchers are able to communicate with the empirical phenomenon. Moreover, terms developed for various empirical constituents of the subject matter may guarantee a degree of compatibility with other human sciences since information trading in specific issues is necessary (Thagard 2005a).

2.2.4. What informs a ‘normal’ academic discipline? The livelihood of a ‘normal’ science is sustained by the interaction between coordinated cognitive operations characteristic of an empirical discipline and the empirical data derived from its designated domain (Holland et al., 1986). To contrast the program for the field outlined here with the previous stages of its development, let it be pointed out that in a ‘normal’ academic discipline scientists’ gratifications, such as findings and insights, are derived from the phenomena in the empirical reality, filtered and constructed by researchers’ cognitive processes as the subject matter of the discipline. What makes science tick are the results of research operations targeted at the designated phenomenon, explored via hypothesis formation and testing, data collection of all sorts, theoretical explanations and their evaluation. Certainly, the manner in which the subject matter is defined and the manner in which empirical information is selected play an important role from the very beginning. However, even though a host of assumptions and choices are involved, it does not seem to be the case that a ‘normal’ academic discipline is kept alive by ready systems, interpretations, or theories developed in related or neighbouring disciplines, which are supposed to ‘feed’ it. The impact of other disciplines may be invigorating, even revolutionary, but not to the point of imposing their own interpretations of the recipient’s focus of investigation.

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To reiterate, the source information in a ‘normal’ science, in the sense of information which satisfies our cognitive curiosity, resides first and foremost in the results of research on its own subject matter, rather than the transplantation of information from other – authoritative – sciences. Even when substantively linked with the field in question, which is certainly the case in the humanities, other sciences can shed light on various aspects and levels of the field’s content or research methodology, and stimulate restructuring or an entire paradigm shift, but they do not ‘feed’ a normal science in the way in which the tributary disciplines were supposed to feed foreign language learning and teaching. Clearly, such a role was to compensate for the scarcity of insights in the young, just emerging field of foreign language learning and teaching, the field perceived as incapable of generating the required knowledge itself. However, this inevitable developmental stage does not have to be regarded as a desirable state of attainment for the field at present, especially when we consider the exponential spread of English as a world language and its learning while being taught for the purpose of survival in the global world.

2.3. On the meaning of the adjective ‘interdisciplinary’ Interdisciplinarity refers to two aspects: a) to the nature of the field assigned as a way of compensating for its lack of internal discipline and organisation and b) to research above the disciplinary borders. As for the first meaning, regarding the field of foreign language learning and teaching as an interdisciplinary endeavour (see Crookes 1992, 1997) before it has matured into a fully-fledged discipline does not help the field’s search for its own identity. As for the second meaning, recognizing the need for interdisciplinary research, conducted by related, cooperating disciplines, e.g., within social sciences, is needed in every field in order to tackle a given domain from several perspectives and to develop a more insightful understanding of a problem above individual disciplines’ boundaries (also referred to as transdisciplinarity, see Atkinson 2011). In the former sense, we have a field whose subject matter is constructed as a sum of the foci of interest in the source disciplines; in the latter -a broader scope of investigation concerning topics which ‘cut across or occur at the boundaries of two or more of the established disciplines’ (Thagard, 2005a: 317) otherwise intangible, also described as cross-or multidisciplinary research. We can easily see that some issues are more basic than others. a) Regarding the interdisciplinary nature of the field, in order to flourish and survive in the academic world ‘normal’ disciplines are first constituted as fully 82

articulate research areas, i.e. they must prioritize their own autonomous status. Then, with a clear view of their academic identity, agency and a sense of purpose, they can successfully enter temporary or permanent alliances and federations to pursue cross-disciplinary and supra-disciplinary goals. As has been stressed, the humanities inevitably have a tremendous potential for, and the need of, interdisciplinary alliances because their interests are vested in multifarious aspects of the human being which overlap considerably; compartmentalization may not always be conducive to understanding; under these circumstances, their interdisciplinarity can be understood as conceptual compatibility with other fields investigating human beings in addition to, but not instead of, their own disciplinary autonomy. To characterize the field of foreign language learning and teaching as primarily interdisciplinary is an attempt to camouflage such ‘adolescence’ problems as insufficient recognition of its own identity, lack of internal discipline and under-defined academic constitution. Some disciplines, e.g. psycholinguistics, took the road to their academic autonomy via understanding themselves first in opposition to other disciplines, e.g. linguistics and psychology (Slobin 1971, Abrahamsen 1987, Bechtel 1987, McCauley 1987, Reber 1987). This also seems to be the prospect of FLD, to understand itself in contrast to linguistics and psychology. b) As for the interdisciplinary research, it can reasonably be postulated in addition to, but not instead of, intradisciplinary, i.e. field-internal research as it involves specialists in various fields exploring a certain domain, phenomenon or single event from their own perspectives. At the same time, there must be some intellectual basis for cooperation, such as a broader underlying idea, issue or phenomenon, compatible terminology and shared research goal (Thagard, 2005a). In sum, in order to be involved in interdisciplinary relationships, a given field must itself be a mature discipline to begin with. As has been said, interdisciplinary interests are promoted at the cross-section, but not instead of, basic identity-related concerns. If second/foreign language learning and teaching is defined as primarily interdisciplinary, it is impossible to construct a model representation of its subject matter as a coherent system of factors interacting within and without; instead, the subject matter representation is constituted by partial models derived from other research areas. Even when integrated, these models do not refer to, i.e. represent, a real phenomenon in the empirical reality. Instead, they are second-order representations, a kind of conceptual chimera (see section 1.3.e). A good example of an interdisciplinary research area is cognitive science, which includes various disciplines, such as philosophy, epistemology, psychology,

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linguistics, anthropology, information science, neuroscience and education. Each distinct discipline with its own issues and methods has a vested interest in trading information and research findings with other fields referring to aspects of cognition, thus contributing to cognitive science as a whole, a genuinely interdisciplinary endeavour (Gardner 1985, Thagard, 2005a). Another example may be investigations of mass communication and media research by various disciplines, such as linguistics, psychology, sociology and political science (Dobek- Ostrowska 2006). Anthropology is yet another instance of an interdisciplinary endeavour, since it looks at the human being from different perspectives, be it biological, social and cultural. However, collaboration – which results from shared interests and conceptual compatibility – should not be confused with subordination. Second/foreign language learning and teaching may be defined broadly enough to embrace various political, geographical, ethnic, historical, economic and cultural issues, but addressing them from these various perspectives will not replace the discipline’s focus on quintessential matters regarding the mechanism and processes of language use, learning and teaching which take place in the individual human mind interacting with others.

2.4. Applications in a ‘normal’ academic discipline The ultimate justification for any discipline is its ability to provide explanations whereas feasibility to generate applications is the ultimate testing ground of an empirical as opposed to formal scientific discipline. As Pitt (1988: 7) points out, explanations: are supposed to tell us how things work, and knowing how things work gives us the power to manipulate our environment to achieve our own ends, …science is supposed to be our best means of generating explanations which satisfy the criterion of providing the means to accomplish our goals. All the research in the world counts as nothing if it fails to generate explanations of the domain under investigation.

He is very critical of knowledge for its own sake, stating that: these are either interesting fictions or irrelevant to the issue at hand, which is to account for the philosophical importance of scientific explanation….Whatever knowledge may be, its hallmark is the ability to do something with it. In the case of scientific knowledge this means offering an explanation for some phenomenon or other. If it can’t successfully be used in some such fashion then it doesn’t qualify as knowledge.

This conviction is significant for one important reason: the program of a ‘normal’ academic discipline is called upon here (for the sake of posing and solving the problems of foreign language teaching) because it offers the most promising route 84

to providing an understanding of non-primary language learning as an empirical phenomenon, i.e. as episodes or events involving human operations and interactions in space and time. An understanding of non-primary language learning as an empirical phenomenon can be the source of inferences about the conditions and events promoting non-primary, i.e. foreign, language learning in the educational (cultured) setting. Essentially, such inferred conditions and interactions are foreign language teaching behaviours. This point of view is completely neutral with regard to knowledge for its own sake in other language disciplines, which may see themselves as formal and/or purely explanatory. What follows from the above is that in contrast to borrowings, transplantations or inspirations, applications are not developed in a top-down manner as by-products in another field. In their technical sense, applications result from the incorporation of a network of relevant constraints on the subject matter within the format of an empirical discipline. These discipline-specific constraints enable researchers to communicate with the empirical phenomenon, identify significant relationships among the factors and derive applicative inferences, or conclusions, from them. Under no circumstances can applications in ‘normal’ science be regarded as just surplus ideas discharged by related fields, floating around and waiting to be utilized. Typically, language sciences are divided into theoretical and applied (Kaplan, ed., 2002). However, I prefer Grucza’s (1983) distinction between pure and applied research levels in one and the same discipline, keeping in mind that a rigid division cannot be made. Pure research provides evidence for a question with a view to theory construction, while ‘applied’ research does all of the above as well as tests findings which can influence (elicit, enhance, regulate, cultivate, control) the phenomenon in the real world. Applications are legitimately elaborated within the scope of the field’s subject matter (McLaughlin 1987) and their successful export to another field is an extra benefit. Descriptive linguistics investigating phonology and syntax in the past decades did not provide the field of foreign language learning and teaching with applications, but ideas, conceptions, terms, definitions and taxonomies referring to the linguistic nature of language as a synchronic formal system. Benefits of this relationship should not be underestimated: linguistics provided external descriptions of the language subsystems which, from the learner’s point of view, must become internalized, i.e. acquired functionally. At the same time, as outlined in Chapter One, this relationship spurred the field of foreign language learning and teaching toward emancipation, i.e. toward a definition of its own angle on language as integral component of the phenomenon of language learning in time and space. At the same time, language teachers must be thoroughly educated in linguistics in the broadest and deepest sense of the word (Kaplan, ed., 2002).

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All told, the goal of scientific disciplines is to enable us to understand. Therefore, each discipline investigating a given phenomenon must sooner or later provide this understanding in the form of an explanatory theory. Theoretical knowledge is abstract and abstract knowledge is characterized by being relatively independent of concrete situations from which it is derived. Therefore, it can be transferred, i.e. applied, to new ones provided they belong to the same category of phenomena. Applications are derived from our understanding of the phenomena under investigation, especially the relationships and interactions among the factors singled out in the subject matter of enquiry. To reiterate, applications are primarily derived from various relationships among the factors within the scope of the empirical system rather than developed in a top-down manner across two different disciplines. Understanding a given phenomenon in the empirical reality inevitably produces potentially useful knowledge, i.e. knowledge which can be applied in reconstructing and cultivating the phenomenon which has been the source of understanding in the same discipline to begin with. In light of the above, how can applicability be accomplished? In foreign language learning and teaching, applications in their technical sense are not to be seen as directives based on the abstract notion of language as a formal system, or language learning as the acquisition of grammar, transformed into teaching guidelines by way of adjustments or concretizations, but as logical inferences drawn from our understanding of the functioning of language use, learning and teaching as a phenomenon. It would be realistic to see applications as guidelines for constructing relevant conditions for language learning and removing any hurdles therein. The top-down flow of reasoning by way of concretization is a dubious path for developing applications because a) it is, of necessity, limited by the source ideas which are too abstract as representations of the empirical phenomenon at hand (this is why they have to be concretized to begin with), and b) such ‘applications’ are elaborated unsystematically, by intuitively restoring some, but not all of the relevant elements to reconstruct the empirical phenomenon. However, representing an empirical phenomenon by way of idealization, a bottom-up process, gives us a chance of capturing the relevant factors, necessary in instituting and enhancing the phenomenon under investigation.

2.5. The field of Foreign Language Didactics as a ‘normal’ academic discipline The main reason why the field of foreign language learning and teaching should become an academic discipline is that this seems to be a tangible route to sorting out its problems of identity and constitution in order to meet the expectations 86

of the society at large, i.e. providing rational foundations for language teaching in the form of its own applications. The program of a ‘normal’ academic discipline can considerably reduce the level of uncertainty in dealing with various problems and aspects of foreign language use and learning. Because the field is expected to develop applications, it must turn to language use and learning as a phenomenon in the real world, especially in order to define its own, unique perspective. The framework of a ‘normal’ academic discipline can make this focus comprehensive and specific enough so that the field can zero in on its own territory with the relevant aspect of the phenomenon represented as its subject matter to justify its academic identity and status as an empirical, essentially autonomous discipline. Such a program can enhance the field’s internal articulation, especially the awareness of its levels of generality and methods of research, with prospects for social coordination of research activities, not to mention the field’s autonomy necessary in its healthy relationships with other fields. Its advantages include the following: 1. Since the field accepts its obligations to the society at large, the program will enable the discipline to provide useful knowledge, i.e. knowledge specific enough to be implemented in the classroom. The program of a ‘normal’ academic discipline can be seen as a promising option in contrast to various divergent ideas on how to go about foreign language teaching. This qualitative change can eliminate the unproductive power play with other fields in order to focus on the field-internal considerations. 2. The field’s autonomy has been treated as the cognitive right to determine its own perspective of language learning. Since cognitive processes are inevitably constructive, this angle must be determined by the purpose at hand, deliberately selected with the use of relevant criteria. As a result, the program of a ‘normal’ academic discipline targeted at the phenomenon in question shows the route to its own identity, derived from the properties of the subject matter which make it stand out among other fields, in a way that is conducive to pure and applied research. 3. The program of a ‘normal’ academic discipline directs the field’s focus onto its own niche in the real world to make sense of it, i.e. to explain it, achieved by way of its cognitive interaction with the empirical phenomenon, including hypothesis testing as well as other empirical and theoretical procedures. It also specifies various constraints, not available otherwise, helpful in targeting language learning as inseparable from the language learner, who is the locus of the relevant processes and the agent of the requisite operations and interactions in a typical human environment, social and cultural, so that the

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ensuing knowledge about language learning can be translated into language teaching. In a broad sense, foreign language teaching may be understood as a way of recreating language learning in exactly the same type of language learning agent as the one who has been the source of exploration and applicable knowledge to begin with. 4. Language learning is treated as a unified concept, referring to a distinct phenomenon rather than a sum of two concepts: language and learning. This enables us to formulate a classical definition of the subject mater in which first a broad category (here: information processing by the human subject) is singled out, in which a specific difference is then found to make the object of the definition stand out from other such cases (here: language-specific forms of information in their different manifestations and uses in verbal communication). This is in contrast with conceptualizing foreign language learning as acquiring grammar, i.e. a self-contained system of forms, and focussing on language forms as the units of learning, with its stages of acquisition defined as serialization of forms, target-like as well as non-target-like (c.f. Dakowska 1996).

2.5.1. Deriving models of language learning from language use My emphasis on model representations in scientific disciplines is justified by the fact that each model outlines a unique problem space which affords its own type of exploration, i.e. sets of questions, data gathering, interpretations and predictions, and, by the same token, its own type of understanding. Constraints in the program of a ‘normal’ academic discipline provide a welcome source of orientation and can be grouped as external and internal to the field. A. The external constraints result from the relationship of the discipline with the society at large, e.g. its responsibility to provide knowledge applicable in language teaching, as well as academia, e.g. the need to protect its distinctiveness among other fields in the humanities, especially language and language learning disciplines. The most significant external constraint comes from the genesis of the discipline of foreign language learning and teaching. The field has been founded to rationalize -not so much to optimize, but to rationalize -foreign language teaching, in other words, to satisfy the social demand for practically useful knowledge, i.e. knowledge specific enough to be used in the foreign language classroom. The ultimate purpose for the discipline of foreign language learning and teaching is to satisfy this demand. Therefore, arguments that scientific research is justified solely by satisfying our cognitive curiosity, i.e. it does not have to produce applications, are not convincing in this particular case. In the event of some difficulties or failure to come up with practically useful knowledge, 88

the discipline in question cannot avoid the problem, but must, instead, redefine and restructure itself to approach it anew. The stages of pre-scientific or non-scientific developments in the field point to the necessity of a) following the program of a ‘normal’ academic discipline as an orienting agenda which enables a coordination of research efforts and the field’s full articulation with all the requisite levels and research goals and b) choosing the empirical as opposed to the formal science format to guarantee that its tools and structure be targeted at, and sensitive to, the information input (data and evidence) from the empirical reality. B. The internal constraints reflect the type of discipline selected – empirical rather than formal – with its functionally specialized, yet interacting levels. This choice determines the source and nature of the model of language learning and its subsequent function inside the discipline. As a result, we have the following coordinates: Table 5: Parameters of a model of language use and learning in the discipline of Foreign Language Didactics The purpose for which the model to represent the relevant aspect of the empirical is constructed domain as a coherent system of factors; its relevance results from the selection and integration procedures in model construction; the task of model construction does not compete or interfere with the tasks of other specialized levels of the academic discipline; The source and point of reference the targeted phenomenon in the empirical of the model reality, i.e. human beings involved in language use for the natural and sociocultural purposes of communication; language learning is seen as a natural -more sophisticated and elaborate derivative of language use; The focus of representation and its context

the focus of representation is our cognitive functioning in the sociocultural networks which must, at the same time, be language- specific, i.e. targeting psycholinguistic processes and operations performed by language users producing and comprehending humanly feasible messages in various sociocultural situations;

The function of the model in the to define the problem under investigation as a discipline at the pure and applied more specific conceptual system of categories; levels to provide a map of research questions and hypothesis of a certain kind; to provide the context for interpreting evidence and deriving applications.

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2.5.2. The human locus of foreign language use and learning Except for analytical purposes, language and the human being are inseparable. In the real world, language is an inalienable human property: human beings cannot exist without language and language does not exist without human beings. Language use is a constitutive feature of human beings as living organisms, who, in contrast to inanimate matter, depend on their environment for their life and growth. Inanimate objects do not need outside contacts to sustain their existence. Living organisms, on the other hand, conduct energy exchanges with their environment and, within the limits of their genetic type and specialized receptors, are sensitive to certain specialized environmental stimuli, which they interpret as (meaningful) clues. A living organism develops along its life span, it derives energy from external sources, uses, generates, and expends it; it is predisposed to act and it must demonstrate certain adaptability to the environment, essential to its survival. Language use and learning as an empirical phenomenon must be represented as located in a living organism. If a discipline is to investigate relevant processes in a living organism, this organism’s interaction with the environment cannot be regarded as a matter of ideological debate or a compromise between two extreme positions, but rather as synergy. Synergy is the action of two or more elements which bring about an effect that each element is incapable of individually. The biological life-sustaining exchanges make use of organic substances as well as air and water, while cognitive processes are fed by information (Shell et al. 2010). These features of the living organism must be reflected in the subject matter, defined as an open dynamic system referring to an agent with a locus of control interacting with his/her environment, i.e. involved in reciprocal influences by means of energy in hierarchical networks. It is also necessary to retain features which distinguish human beings from other living organisms, such as intentionality, intelligence, rationality as well as emotionality, specifically human social nature and the ability of making choices, abstract thought, symbolic processes, and creativity, and of generating species- specific culture. The next step is to distinguish between the synchronic and the diachronic dimension of the model, i.e. to represent language use and learning by humans both cross-sectionally, as an act, and longitudinally, along the life span, to depict the natural stages of social, emotional and cognitive development as well as the individual history of the organism with the manifest role of individual differences after the initial period of uniform development. Cognitive processes in a life-span perspective can take various forms, ranging from play and incidental, even rote learning, to intentional learning, or study in the sense 90

of intellectual reflection and creativity. With these observations in mind, it is possible to define language use and learning according to the constraints derived from the empirical domain. As has been pointed out, in empirical disciplines phenomena are represented by constructs at a fairly low level of generality and in a sufficiently inclusive scope to produce a rather high-resolution, or fine-grain picture which captures its relevant aspects. In this way, the discipline can have a sufficiently specific, yet comprehensive view of the phenomenon. As has been said, in order to conceptualize language learning as an entity in space and time, with its distinct specificity, it is essential to recognize its episodic structure and see it as operations performed by people, i.e. as language use in verbal communication in the social context, constrained by our information processing mechanism, especially attentional limitations. Operations are deliberate acts performed by conscious individuals with their cognitive resources. Each episode of language use produces its memory trace and this qualifies as learning. Therefore, we can treat language use as an elementary instance of language learning and derive primary language teaching strategies from the structure and nature of this unit. Language learners can make use of all their cognitive processes: in addition to the distinctly specialized processes of language use in verbal communication, they can benefit from all kinds of reasoning processes available to them developmentally, especially reflection on verbal communication. In this way, language learning can be represented as an empirical occurrence derived from its elementary instance of language use. Reasoning is a specialized form of human cognitive activity which involves all kinds of thought processes aimed at systematizing and otherwise making sense of the world, including verbal communication as part of the learner’s experience. Therefore, language regarded through the lens of verbal communication must be categorized as a) the code of communication as well as b) the focus of all kinds of reasoning processes available to the learner at a given developmental stage. In order to outline the subject matter of the field, we must capture the distinct specificity of language as the code for assigning meaning to words and words to meaning among other systems of information processed in our cognitive architecture. It is especially important at this point to stress its double articulation, arbitrary symbolic nature and segmental organization as opposed to analogical systems of representation and other symbolic systems. The specificity of foreign language learning resides in its status as non-primary language which interacts with the previously learned languages producing variable effects along the life span. The goal of the discipline of foreign language learning and teaching is to come to terms with language use and learning at such a level of specificity

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that this understanding can be converted into our expertise of instituting, cultivating and sustaining non-primary/foreign language learning in educational, i.e. cultured, as opposed to natural social, circumstances. The borders of the subject matter are delineated on the basis of the specificity of language among the paralingual and non-lingual systems which cooperate with the language code in expressing/signalling meaning, but are devoid of such distinctive features as double articulation, arbitrary symbolic nature and segmental (categorical) constituents. Because of their joint function of communicating meaning, these systems interact rather than display clear-cut specificity with considerable overlap among language-specific, para-lingual and non-lingual information. Language use and learning in our sociocultural environment is a process of constant change, i.e. the growth of information structures, the way they are represented, accessed and used; it must, of necessity, be represented as an open, dynamic, complex system because it involves informational exchanges between individuals who form relationships (Courtright 2007). The cognitive perspective of the individual is meaningful to the extent to which it depicts this individual with his or her cognitive resources as designated and geared for interaction with other human beings in the social and natural environment, i.e. in his or her relationships within the family and social groups, and in the context of mass communication/culture. These interacting groups can be viewed as human networks. Courtright (2007: 314) stresses an important idea about human interaction: All living organisms are open systems. They must take in nutrients, water, and oxygen from the environment, and in turn they must expel waste products. …. All human communication systems are also open, although the commodity of exchange is information, not energy. All normal people belong to various open systems – family, class at school, friends, work group, and so forth…. Even when people are not interacting in a system, they gain information by reading, watching television, or personally experiencing non- social aspects of the environment.

In sum, the field’s distinctiveness resides in the fact that language happens to be: a) a non-primary (subsequent) language which interacts with the previously learned languages, b) which is acquired at different points in time along the learner’s life span; this makes a difference in the processes of language learning and reasoning about it, c) in different conditions and circumstances, which create variable opportunities for learning as well as variable outcomes, d) learned by variably-apt individuals, i.e. learners with individual characteristics, which do not make a considerable difference early in life but certainly do later, especially around and after puberty.

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The above considerations are responsible for a fascinating dispersal of the initially uniform development of language learning earlier in life, which may provide exciting feedback to various other related language learning disciplines in which the processes of interest show much greater uniformity and may therefore be less marked to a researcher. To reiterate, the main internal constraint related to the process of reducing the complexity of modelling language learning for the purposes of the discipline in question is anchoring the model in space and time, i.e. targeting the human subject as the locus of cognitive processes and operations underlying verbal communication in a non-primary target language, supported by the reasoning processes available to the learner for the task. The model represents the phenomenon as a network of factors, justifying a unitary conception of language use and learning. The model is a map for research primarily to facilitate understanding of the phenomenon rather than generate methods of teaching. At the applied level, understanding of the phenomenon can rationalize instantiating, cultivating and sustaining foreign language learning in the educational context.

2.5.3. The learner as human information-processor From the point of view of the field of foreign language learning and teaching which is interested in exploring language learning so that languages can be taught, it is especially significant that language learning takes place in the mind of a living human organism, in human cognitive architecture which presupposes consciousness and the available human cognitive resources, which have their neuronal (brain) correlates. Human cognitive architecture determines all our cognitive processes, including foreign language use and learning. If we can activate foreign language use, we can also, at the same time, activate foreign language learning. At the most elementary level, cognition refers to the processes and structures whereby humans process information, or, should we say, a certain spectrum of information in order to survive, adapt to the environment, as well as effectively regulate their own behaviour and meet their needs. Churchland (1989: 14) states: ‘The fundamental nature of cognition is rooted in the tricks by which assorted representational schemas give organism a competitive advantage in predicting.’ Most, if not all cognitive psychologists indeed conceptualize the activity of the human mind as a form of information processing (e.g. Aitkenhead and Slack, eds., 1987, Barsalou 2009, Bruner 1973, 1990, Eysenck and Keane 2010, Eysenck 2006, Kellog 2012, Koch 2012, Lindsay and Norman 1991, Matlin 1994, Neisser 1967, 1976, Nęcka et al. 2006, Shell et al. 2010, Solso 1998, Velmans 2000, Thagard 2005b,

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Whitney 1998). We may envisage a whole hierarchy of information processing to contextualize the spectrum relevant to our model, perhaps leaving the precognitive level aside. The material basis of information processing is our neuronal brain tissue (with the rest of the nervous system) and energy, which is generated, emitted and propagated within and between human organisms, carried by some kind of a transmitter. When the energy transmitter has a form recognizable to the recipient, it makes a difference, i.e. it becomes information. From the point of view of human cognition, information processing takes the form of learning, i.e. perceiving, decoding, comprehending, structuring and storing information. From the point of view of human communication, i.e. mutual contact and influence in which we code and decode information in different formats, information is processed for its significance and relevance, i.e. meaning to the human subject, his or her state and circumstances in the world, especially relationships with others. Meaning is the pivot which makes verbal communication go round. When we look at energy as stimulus, we stress its ability to affect/upset the entropy of the perceiving system by activating the receptor cells. ‘Impulse’ (impetus) points to the thrust aspect of this energy. The term ‘signal’ implies the emitting behaviour of a certain kind by an organism which/who is the source of this energy. Clearly, only a living organism can generate, send out and process information in this sense. Generating, emitting and propagating energy in our nervous system takes the form of electrochemical activity, with various ‘neurotransmitters to diffuse across the gaps between neurons’ (Baars, 2007:6). Neurons have a distinctive feature – they are instruments of communication in that they receive, integrate, and send signals (Churchland 1989). Neurotransmitters act as molecular messengers, which make neuronal communication possible by carrying the information across the brain and the rest of the nervous system. The neurochemical activity of the brain is fed/sustained by our metabolic processes. Shell et al. (2010: 8) provide the following explanation: For all the biochemical complexity underlying how a neuron works, its operation can be described in simple terms: A neuron “fires” or produces an electrical output in response to having been “fired upon” by other neurons. All neurons have an input end and an output end. The input end can be connected to (receive input from) one or many other neurons. Once this input passes a threshold, the neuron sends an electrical potential that produces release of biochemicals (neurotransmitters) at the output end that are input to the neurons with which it is connected. These connections are called synapses.

Synapse has been used as a name for communication structures of neurons by virtue of which one neuron can transmit a signal across a gap to another neuron (Churchland 1989). This form of communication takes place at various orders 94

of magnitude, from crossing the gaps in the synapses in the brain tissue at the most micro level to beating the barriers of time and space, as in communication via the Internet at the most global level. From the point of view of foreign language learning and teaching, the most relevant span of information processing, which outlines our problem space, is at the level of our cognitive functioning featuring verbal communication and reasoning. Definitely, such a representation of language use and learning is infeasible without its anchoring in human/ living organism, an organic locus of the processes, whose brain must be fed, who performs the necessary processing, makes the requisite decisions and tries to sustain his or her livelihood in its characteristic sociocultural environment. Life is the property or quality manifested in functions such as metabolism, growth, response to stimulation and reproduction, by which living organisms are distinguished from dead organisms or from inanimate matter. This information processing span embraces the organism’s consciousness, which a) admits of degrees, ranging from focal awareness to peripheral states of consciousness and pre-and sub-consciousness, and b) houses only a tip-of-the-iceberg segment of all the processing that goes on in the subject’s cognitive system (Thagard 2005a). Cognitive psychology defines information as an interpretable element which derives its meaning from the system it is a part of (Neisser 1967). As has already been said, information is what makes a difference; it does not exist independently of the human perceiver, or more exactly, of the information processing system of the human subject (I deliberately leave out other organisms). Information derives its significance from the context of various forms and structures in which it is perceived, be it clusters, constructions, hierarchies or systems (e.g. Eysenck and Keane 2010, Lindsay and Norman 1991, Shell et al. 2010). Where there is no form recognized by the processing subject, there is no information. The notion of information in the field of cognitive psychology has the same function as the notion of atom in the natural sciences, or the notion of cell in biology. I see a fascinating analogy between the atomic theory of matter and the information theory of human cognition. Information may be hard to define at the most elementary level and much easier at higher levels, when it makes up more noticeable constellations, but its reality, be it inferred or observed, as well as its central relevance in human thought and action are unquestionable. Information at the micro-level of genetic coding is necessary for human life and reproduction; at the level of neuronal activity it conditions the functioning of our nervous system, while at the macro-level of cognitive coding and communication it makes human survival, as well as human societies and cultures possible. Human learning, including language learning, is a form of communication: it is based on interpersonal information transmission whereby information sent

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by one subject is registered and re-presented, i.e. mapped, copied, redescribed, reconstructed, as well as stored and used by another processing subject. In this case, the term ‘transmission’ does not mean that information changes hands like money, being no longer available to the sender. It means ‘propagation by multiplication’. What is changed as a result of this transmission are human relationships, including human states, situations, conditions, knowledge, feelings and attitudes. The immensity of human information exchanges, especially nowadays, in the age of digital culture, is truly amazing. If people make a living by producing, creating, presenting, spinning, duplicating, transforming, translating, analysing, interpreting, converting, transporting and storing information, i.e. knowledge and expertise in highly specialized domains, information must be real. It is not by accident that the present period is called the Information Age, and our social organisation – the Information Society (e.g. Beniger 2005, Cairncross 2005, Castells 1996, Day 2001, Hargreaves 2003, Mattelart 2003). Information and its complex internalized and externalized systems, i.e. knowledge, have become our basic commodity, a vital part of economy and professional activity. Computer technology and computer networks, built by human minds, are but our specialized cognitive artefacts, which externalize and reify our information processing ability, multiply and put it to use to enable us to do things our natural brains would not be capable of doing with this immensity, speed, accuracy and complexity. However, the fact that we are living in the Information Age is not a justification for turning to the perspective of human information processing in cognitive psychology. The reason is more serious than the need for a current, trendy metaphor: language use and learning is located in our brain, the headquarters of our nervous system and our nervous system is an information- processing machine. Etymologically, in-form-ation unites the most essential properties of human cognitive behaviour: the fact that humans are programmed to go after meaning, which is derived by assigning structure to the perceptual field, so that it can be recognized as a coherent, i.e. meaningful whole to be processed and operated upon further. Information does not exist without its form, i.e. in a way neutral to form. Stimulus energy becomes informative when it is structured by the perceiving subject, so that through interrelationships/contrasts with its environment it stands out as an entity with borders, i.e. a category, and some function in the system. The ability to format environmental as well as mental cognitive material as information, which is to say, to consciously or subconsciously assign it structural properties and treat it as meaningful, must be recognized as a universal feature of human cognitive activity. Assigning structure, or structuring, is not 96

limited to mental representations; it also takes external forms, as in the case of shaping various raw materials and other resources in our natural and social environment, evidenced in all human cultures. Information serves as the material of processing for our cognitive system in the same way as organic matter serves as nutrient to our digestive tract. Both human information processing and digestion are genuinely organic processes. Both evolve during the life span in an organism which is born different from its adult form and are greatly influenced by volition and emotions, partly regulated by our intentions and decisions, and only partly available to awareness. Both run on resources, depend on a certain kind of metabolism, consist of specialized subsystems, are genuinely interactive, i.e. require certain expectancy states and secretions/activations, rely on processing matter made up of organic wholes with structure/fiber, and feature different types of processing: controlled and automatic in HIP versus mechanical and chemical in digestion. Both are susceptible to boredom and monotony and both take quite elementary as well as highly sophisticated cultural forms. Last but not least, both determine our well-being or lack thereof. As pointed out by Givon (2005: 76), some common metaphors around learning as eating nicely highlight this analogy: ‘he spoon-fed them information’ ‘she chewed on the idea for a while’ ‘he swallowed (her version) whole’ ‘that is a half-baked idea’ ‘it’ll take time to digest the information’ ‘algebra whetted her appetite for maths’ ‘she had them eating out of their hand’ ‘he just wants to regurgitate his own ideas’

The analogy between the organism’s digestion and information processing can be very useful in the discipline of foreign language learning and teaching because it highlights the organic bases of human cognition, including language use and learning to be retained in defining the field’s subject matter. At the basis of our nervous system is a neuron. Churchland (1986: 13) explains: Neurons are excitable cells, and neurons on the sensory periphery are activated by such things as photons or vibration, while neurons on the motor periphery cause contraction of muscles. In between are neurons that orchestrate the sequence of muscle cell contractions permitting the organism to move so as to deal appropriately with the world outside its nervous system, by fleeing, feeding and so forth.

The most elementary form of information processing and the material basis for the activity of the mind is our nervous system, the central nervous system

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with the brain and the spinal cord, and the peripheral nervous system divided into the voluntary somatic (sensory and motor nerves) and the involuntary autonomic subsystem, the latter divided further into the parasympathetic system, which maintains body functions, and the sympathetic system, which activates under stress (Sternberg 1996). Shell et al. (2010: 7) recognize this basic biological functioning, but they focus on these aspects of the brain and the nervous system which are involved in higher learning and behaviour: …the remainder of the brain is devoted to gathering sensory inputs and generating motor actions. The brain has two primary jobs. One is to take and save information about the world from the senses (hearing, taste, touch, smell, vision, and internal feedback from those internal sensors that sense how things are “working together” called proprioceptive feedback). The other is to produce outputs that generate functional behaviours in the world like finding food, building shelter, and speaking….The remainder of the cortex is devoted to specialized functioning like language or is available as general memory area.

The brain is the organ that most directly controls our intentions, thoughts, emotions, and actions, but it is reactive as well as active, responding to various other organs. The function of the spinal cord is to carry information from the peripheral nervous system to the brain and from the brain to the peripheral system. The multidirectional communication between the organism and the environment as well as within the organism’s nervous subsystems involves sensory organs, which register environmental physical energy and convert it into information. The receptor cells are especially designed to receive information or detect change in the sensory organs to transmit it to the brain, and the effector cells transmit motor information, i.e. the instructions for the large and the small muscles to act, from the brain and the spinal cord to the peripheral system. Within the organism, information is transmitted by way of electrochemical reactions with the help of various neurotransmitters. For the purposes of interpersonal communication, transmitters of information across distances are typically light and sound waves. The neurochemical activity of the brain is fed by various nutrients, such as glucose and oxygen, from the blood supply (Sternberg 1996). There is a substantive difference between the neurophysiological perspective of the brain as a massively parallel processing device and the cognitive perspective, which is about human mental life, i.e. our thought, experience, and action, available to our awareness, at least to some extent. An inalienable property of a living human organism is consciousness. From the first-person point of view, mind takes the form of conscious experience and thought (Baars 1997, 2007, Gillet and McMillan 2001, Koch 2004, 2012, Thagard 2005b, Velmans 2000). Consciousness enables us to reflect upon and attribute 98

meaning to our existence. Human beings are social semiotic animals who interact with each other and deal with meaning and sense all the time. This is to say that we are capable of constituting and using signs as well as generating and interpreting their meaning in the context of social interaction. Language is the most potent code for these fundamental human purposes. Consciousness is inseparable from intentionality, which is always aspectual, i.e. goal-oriented (Searle 1992). Intentionality enables the human subject to guide his/her behaviour, i.e. organize, direct and regulate it, for example, respond to environmental stimuli as well as initiate or withhold action. Admittedly, there are life-span constraints on the development of intentionality. A human being is not only an open, but also a self-regulating (self-steerable, self-dirigible, or self-navigable) system, specialized for receiving and using the environmental information (Nilsson and Shaps 1980, Shell et al. 2010, Williams and Burden 1997). Information exchange with the environment is indispensable for our biological and cognitive survival. The human mind/brain is an adaptive organ specialized for dealing with the environment, i.e. the real world. Its representation of the world is not a mirror image but an individual construction, which does not have to mean -an inaccurate one. Our brain would be useless from the evolutionary point of view had this had been the case (Klix 1980, Nęcka et al. 2006, Velmans 2000). In contrast to models of inanimate matter, machines, artificial intelligence and non-human organisms, the understanding of language use and learning appropriate for the discipline of foreign language didactics must retain the parameters of living human organisms with natural intelligence -language users, i.e. organisms, characterized by consciousness who are agents in their search for meaning, equipped for social interaction. Human agency has its locus of control, goals and choices in the human cognitive architecture, probably in the working memory. Language learning, which takes place in the human cognitive architecture, is both organic and cognitive by definition. It materializes as language use, i.e. acts or episodes of adaptive, goal-oriented, intelligent communicative behaviour of constructing, encoding and reconstructing, decoding meaning. Reflection about it can make use of various perceptual and reasoning operations, depending on the age of the learner. In view of the above, verbal communication is impossible without our cognitive endowment and resources, such as its specialized processing subsystems, cognitive energy and mental representations, while each instance of verbal communication produces some cognitive effect in the form of implicit or explicit memory representation as well as new potential for both cognitive and communicative behaviour. Most important of all, communication is a vehicle for the spread of knowledge, as in cultural transmission, while cognition entails all kinds

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of information processing which bring about the acquisition and generation of knowledge, not just the highly controlled ones in the focus of our attention and available to our awareness. For this reason, cognition and communication are regarded as overlapping, hardly separable processes. Verbal communication, a special case of communication in general, grows out of cognition to the point of unique specialization. Language plays a vital part in both processes: in communication it codes complex meanings into message form, meanings which could not otherwise have been transmitted; in cognition language gives form, i.e. shape, to otherwise fuzzy concepts and ideas making them more tangible in further, more involved operations. In this connection, Whitney (1998: 4) says that ‘language made culture possible but it also revolutionized thought’. The clearest contrast in this investigation exists between verbal communication on the one hand and reasoning operations, i.e. the most explicit cognitive processes, on the other. Although they constantly interact, we may juxtapose verbal communication and reasoning on the basis of their predominant direction, nature and purpose. 1. Verbal communication is the flow of meaning in human networks aimed at contact and interaction between people by means of sending out and receiving messages, i.e. it is mainly, but not entirely social; the main function of verbal communication is to influence other people whereas reasoning is more egocentric, inward-looking and storage-oriented, i.e. focused on some object – internal or external – in order to investigate and understand it, and retain the ensuing information in our mind; needless to say, reasoning is stimulated and facilitated by environmental information and social interaction with other people (cf. McGregor 2007). 2. In contrast to verbal communication, which can be dynamic and action- oriented, in-depth reasoning may tend to be more static; it often puts our observable behaviour on hold to enable us to focus our cognitive resources on the object of inquiry as an entity, which may, but does not have to, arrest its observed dynamics, even petrify it. Under no circumstances is reasoning limited to noticing; it features categorizing, comparison and contrast, ordering, grouping, drawing inferences, identifying regularities and structures, organizing into hierarchies, formulating rules, definitions, analysis and synthesis, induction and deduction, finding analogies, anomalies and inconsistencies, etc. (Holyoak and Morrison, eds., 2005). Through these processes, information available in the stimulus becomes more organized, general, explicit and elaborated, to be understood, learned, and used. The processes involved in reasoning about verbal communication may sometimes conflict with our personal involvement in the act, in which strategic decisions and 100

adjustments are made within communicative time constraints to meet desired goals. When we try to keep pace with the communicative demands, there is little or no time for reflection. Nevertheless, whether during or after communicative events, language learning takes both forms: verbal communication and reasoning about it. Episodic memory traces may later become categorized in generic memory and become available as more transferable information structures. Verbal communication and reasoning also have their life-span dynamics whereby changes are driven by the organism’s growth and maturation, which afford qualitatively new opportunities to generate knowledge internally as well as learn from the environment and experience. Therefore, foreign language learning is seen as taking place in a state-changing system with internal and external sources of dynamics, such as maturation, growth, experience, representational changes, i.e. restructuring and the explicitation of knowledge, development of intentionality in the form of regulation of cognition and behaviour, accumulation of experience and the emergence of cognitive and metacognitive strategies. These properties make foreign language learning not only an open system, i.e. one that interacts with the environment, but a dynamic system driven by internal (endogenous) and external (exogenous) sources of change.

2.6. Advantages of regarding language use and learning as human information processing In contrast to the notion of information in mathematical theory, information in living systems, i.e. organisms, is not easily measurable. In biological systems information can be everything that influences the organism’s orientation (Kłoskowska 2007). Likewise, in human information processing (HIP), information is inseparable from the human being; it does not exist without or outside the sensitive organism equipped for perceiving, recognizing and interpreting it. Human organisms as well as social systems operate via information; it is the elementary unit of human cognitive processes. Like beauty, information is in the eye (mind) of the beholder, and it materializes in human interaction with others in the sociocultural environment, especially in human relationships. Information is the most elementary unit of our cognitive stuff, usually structured and highly elaborate, processed by the human being, and it has the following essential properties: it can be coded (encoded and decoded), recorded and retrieved within our cognitive system, i.e. represented in a symbolic form, translated from one format of representation into another, compressed or elaborated and stored for future uses (Klix 1980). But most importantly, information can be generated (produced) by one person to be sent out, i.e. communicated

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interpersonally: one organism can encode it and send it out to be decoded by another organism, it can be propagated, disseminated, transported, picked up and copied (re-presented) in other human organisms. Thanks to these basic properties of information, the field of foreign language learning and teaching can capture the dynamic quality of its complex subject matter within a unitary as opposed to interdisciplinary framework. In one focus of investigation we can embrace: –– three qualitatively different states of the language matter: a) mental representation, i.e. vastly distributed multiple hierarchical knowledge networks in memory; b) behavioural entity, i.e. flexible and fluid skill, which involves hierarchically integrated operations, and c) external representation, i.e. discourse, a fairly solid, linear, further-recordable product of verbal communication, diversified as genres in various sociocultural domains, input for comprehension and output of production, indispensable in language learning; –– two distinct, yet interacting natural kinds of processes, comprehension and production, i.e. the decoding of verbal information into pre-verbal and conceptual/propositional form on the part of the addressee, and the encoding of conceptual/propositional information into pre-verbal and verbal form on the part of the sender, each of the processes typically taking place in two distinct (phonemic and graphemic) sub-codes, i.e. speech and writing, in the context of paralingual and non-lingual meaningful clues as well as in interaction with environmental and mental contexts and our reasoning processes. Talking about learning, especially language learning, information is a suitable concept for demystifying the human being’s position vis a vis his or her language environment. The exchange of information and subsequent learning is possible thanks to the human brain, especially characteristically human perception, which is sensitive to, and capable of picking up, recognizing as, i.e. structuring, and processing a spectrum of information formats with its modality-specific receptors, which register, identify, map, i.e. copy, integrate across modalities, interpret and take in even distant environmental physical energies and convert them into information meaningful to the processing organism as well as store it, i.e. re-present them mentally. Receptors are the interface between the world and our brains (Churchland 1986). This information becomes input for mental representation and further processing. Perception results in mapping and interpreting the information accessible to the human receptor system in a given situation, subject to the selective mechanism of attention. Relevant to processing is the kind/type, form/shape and structure/configuration of the external energy stimulus to be recognized on the basis of the information already in the processing system’s 102

memory, to be further decoded and interpreted for meaning. New systems of information can also be constructed internally by the human being on the basis of productive and creative cognitive operations. Language users make use of various kinds of information: phonemic, graphemic, syntactic, semantic, associational, relational, e.g., syntagmatic, paradigmatic, hierarchical, depending on the size of the communicative unit under consideration. Regarding these various facets of language in verbal communication, such properties of information as transformability, (re)codability, storability and replicability, and malleability, make the term sufficiently versatile to capture these different aspects. Moreover, ‘information’ is a sufficiently sensitive term to integrate different qualities of information, non-lingual, paralingual and lingual, in their joint function of conveying meaning in verbal communication. At the same time, ‘information’ is sufficiently elementary to link the different stages in coding and decoding communicative intention: the conceptual and propositional stage, the pre-verbal stage, and the verbal stage in the context of other communicatively relevant information systems available at each of them. The conceptual and propositional information is selected from among other thoughts, propositions, sensations and images, as our communicative intention constructed in the situational context of human relationships and knowledge of the world in general; the pre-verbal information is selected from among all sorts of syntagmatic plans and other linear constructions necessary in discourse processing. The verbal form is chosen from among various language specific units, associations, collocations, clusters and sentence constructions. Additionally, information is a sufficiently specific entity to unite verbal communication with other cognitive processes (and their outcomes), which have collectively been called reasoning. Only information can be structured, restructured and integrated into a system, analysed, synthesized, categorized, elaborated, condensed, developed into an innovative (creative) quality, (re)defined, (re)ordered, (re)organized, compared and contrasted, as well as redescribed at a more abstract level. From the point of view of language learning, human information processing is a sufficiently detailed perspective to capture language development as growth and restructuring of language knowledge, both in terms of representational as well as behavioural change, the degree of certainty and explicitation of this knowledge, the development of non-target-like into target-like forms, and an increasing coordination, awareness, control and automatization in the use of these forms and their meta-modal representations. In other words, the concept of information is sufficiently precise to reflect the distinctions between the way

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language is represented and stored, the way it is processed and used and the way its storage and use is increasingly available to awareness and regulated by the learner. In this perspective, learning foreign language information clusters involves not only their perceptual structuring, but a considerable elaboration and enrichment of information available in the environmental stimulus to be formatted into its distinct mental mapping and various contrasts. This implies a trace with identity and a border to make it stand out among/different from other entities and strong enough to be available in recognition and retrieval. To take an example, learning a single phoneme must entail: –– sorting out its identity on the basis of intra-and interlingual contrasts to form its mental representation as a category, an internal norm, a bundle of distinctive features resulting from fine discriminations with allophonic variants; –– discovering its distribution and sequences in which variants (allophones) can occur in discourse; –– identifying/recognizing its graphemic and phonemic representations in various contexts, and subsequently constructing its meta-modal representation; –– the ability to regulate its articulation by comparing production with the internal norm and incorporating feedback information to approximate the norm; –– the ability to integrate its articulation in relevant discourse environment in production; When we ponder what it means to know a word, what typically comes to mind is: a) to be able to articulate it with the required level of fluency and coordination with other elements in discourse; b) to make fine discriminations between and among the elements which make it up and its context in order to retain its identity as an item; c) to retrieve either graphemic or phonemic form from memory when we wish to express its meaning; d) to adjust the form of the word to its appropriate syntagmatic position and context, e) to identify and assign it a structural description in discourse comprehension; f) to compute its meaning and interpretation when processed in context; g) to consolidate all of the above information in permanent memory and keep it in good working condition; h) to adjust this information in view of new information available to us in language learning, etc. In addition, we store not only the item’s lexical, but also pragmatic and cultural meanings, which change in time, sometimes very fast. To wrap up this list of advantages, information is the lowest common denominator for all the stages and manifestations of language use and learning which holds the field’s subject matter together, precise enough to do justice to its dynamic complexity and heterogeneity. The distinct specificity of language use and learning as an instance of information processing results from the symbolic 104

relationship between meanings and their representations by segmental, discrete and arbitrary units of the language code with a very specialized complex organization. Information is convertible, i.e. it can be transformed (recoded) in various formats or transcoded from its phonemic representation into the graphemic one, and vice versa, unifying heterogeneous entities into a polymorphic problem-space with various components, such as internal/mental, behavioural and external representations. It is significant from the point of view of learning that -especially in human interactions with other people -information can be copied from the sociocultural environment and mapped into the learning subject’s mental representation, as well as interpreted, evaluated, multiplied, recorded, constructed, created and propagated in various formats of internal, behavioural and external representations. It is typical of human processes that mental representations may take time to develop fully, that they may develop incrementally taking interim forms, that information may be too fuzzy to be registered, that it may fade away, be ignored or discarded, forgotten, confused, misfiled, misinterpreted, etc., as well as identified, segmented, classified, stored, strengthened, elaborated upon, or otherwise articulated, explicated, and proliferated. This is a ‘holographic’ picture underlying language use, quite different from the descriptive linguistic focus on the system of grammatical forms to be abstracted by the learner from the sentences of the target language, which used to be influential in the field of language learning and teaching (see part 1.2).

2.7. The constructive contribution of the language learner to language use In cognitive models of language use and learning, it is essential not only to recognize the distinct lingual specificity of the domain, which cannot be reduced to just any form of learning, but the central role of the agency of the learner. This central position of the human subject with a constructing role in the process can be contrasted with various other representations, such as structuralist or connectionist models in which the human subject has been factored out. Fogel (1993:119) makes an important distinction here: ‘Connectionist models avoid a central planning agent and allow cognitive activity to emerge from the multiple transactions of the system.’ This may be adequate in the neuronal representations of brain activity, but at the level of cognitive processes available to our awareness, positing a strategic decision centre of the planning agent is indispensable. Therefore, it seems appropriate at this point to reiterate that here the learner is visualized as an organism which/who is intentional (forward-driven, predisposed to act), goal-oriented (selective) and self-regulated (dirigible, with

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a locus of control and a monitor of its own activity), an organism whose contribution to the process of language use and learning is constructive, i.e. involving selection and integration of information structures from among the available options and resources (mental representations) in working memory, and even creative, and an organism who/which is sensitive to feedback information from the environment. This contribution makes language use and learning somewhat hard to measure exactly, but the more distinctly human. Since language use and learning are not limited to identifying the grammatical system of the target language, but must be regarded as multifarious and heterogeneous processes, we should expect complexity and variability and be willing to accept them to do justice to human nature. It would not be tenable to claim that all the cognitive processes are within the learner’s control. I accept the iceberg metaphor of our cognitive functioning whereby a majority of processes are not available to our awareness and take place at the pre-and subconscious level, whereas only a small segment of them is available to our decision centre in working memory for goal- oriented choices, operations and strategies. In this centre, they may be within our focal awareness or at its periphery. Because of the individual differences among language learners (e.g. Skehan 1989, Dornyei 2005, Robinson, ed., 2002, Arabski and Wojtaszek, eds., 2011), we must expect variable results of foreign language learning in the formal context with a considerable dispersal of data along the life span. According to Gardner (2005), this is due to the quality of information processing by individual learners, i.e. their acuity/precision of representations and the speed and flexibility of nerve conduction. Because of the learners’ goal-orientedness, i.e. the necessity to make choices, we must face the fact that learners will vary as to their particular perspective of the communicative and educational events they take as well as their interpretation; cultural differences between the L1 and L2 can compound these diverse perspectives even further. Learners are variably gratified by satisfying their cognitive curiosity in the educational, especially L2 communicative processes, which produces motivating effects in most but not all of the learners. Since they are, to some extent, in control of their cognitive resources, at least once they reach school age, learners can choose whether or not to approach the L2 learning tasks or to avoid them, to put most of their cognitive energy into them or only some, to sustain their effort for a longer time or not. It should be taken into account that the degree to which learners participate in, and process, the L2 communicative and other educational events 106

depends on such factors as their level of assertiveness and anxiety, on top of their personal investment of cognitive energy and persistence. Verbal communication is a form of adaptive, intelligent behaviour; the success of the so-called good language learner is a function of his or her general level of intelligence, which means that the strategies learners use may be more or less finely adjusted and suitable to the processes of language learning. To make the process of verbal communication effective, speakers must reciprocally coordinate their efforts to construct and reconstruct meaning; the act of language use is about computing meaning with all the available internal and external clues in the cultural context. The effects will vary here because learners have individual knowledge representations, they come from cultures different than their L2, they perceive different clues as variably significant, and they apply themselves individually in the effort of coordination with the communicative partner, especially in their search for meaning and sense. The process of computing meaning requires not only using the available clues but also inferring the missing information in comprehension, and skipping some by way of ellipsis, in production. These processes, which are the norm in verbal communication rather than the exception, create variable effects in language learning. The search for meaning in comprehension and constructing meaning in production do not stop at the level of literal meaning, but involve its interpretation, computing figurative meaning and understanding humour, which require additional levels of processing. It is natural in the process of interpretation that learners will come up with variable outcomes. Their individual level of knowledge activated for the task also brings to bear on the diversity of outcomes in comprehension and production. However, without interpretation, figurative meaning and humour, verbal communication would be an intolerable drag. Humans are known to actively process feedback, including communicative feedback, which means that the information about the effects of our behaviour may either be noticed and incorporated or ignored and discarded.

2.8. Concluding remarks The purpose of the second chapter was to outline a strategy of coming to terms with the complexity of foreign language teaching, which derives orientation from two sources: a) the format of an academic discipline with a potential for systematic and coordinated research, and b) the empirical domain of language

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use and learning, i.e. verbal communication in its cognitive/mental and social/ interpersonal contexts. The discipline’s subject matter, which is in focus of attention here, can be identified with the help of external and internal constraints for the field of foreign language learning and teaching outlined in the chapter. These constraints narrow down the number of feasible options, i.e. they make the resulting definition justified as opposed to accepted on the basis of authority, and capable of grasping the aspect of language use and learning relevant to the field’s goal of producing applicable knowledge. Such steps are clearly aimed at redefining the relationship of the field of second/foreign language learning and teaching with other language and language learning disciplines. Although their potential and actual contributions are undeniable, these ‘contributory’ disciplines are not expected to provide their own conceptions to serve as subject matter representations in our field. Their impact must be quite different from such a power relationship. However, because the present framework focuses on verbal communication, which recognizes the whole-person involvement in the act, there are numerous reasons and ample opportunities for various profitable knowledge transactions on the condition that Foreign Language Didactics approaches them with a sense of identity and purpose. Any present or future relationships in this framework must be mediated by a map of subject matter concerns since in order to take over some ideas or conceptions from a potentially relevant discipline, one must ask the following questions: a) What in particular do these ideas refer to? b) What makes them relevant to our field? c) Which questions in our field are these ideas supposed to address and what kind of answers are they able to provide? d) Where in the field of language learning and teaching are they supposed to be used and in what function? The format of an empirical discipline provides us with the following points to consider: 1. Primary as well as non-primary language learning takes place in the human subject, i.e. his or her humanly-constrained architecture in the context of relationships with other people in various groups; human contribution to the language learning process is constructive while the learner is seen as an intelligent, decision-making agent with an executive centre, who selects and integrates lingual units and constructions from various options in his or her mental representations; this opens prospects for the field to establish itself as a genuine subfield of the human sciences, an empirical discipline about human 108

beings, as well as their thoughts, actions and interactions, i.e. about people’s language use for the purpose of humanly meaningful communication in space and time, i.e. in the context of human cognitive resources, motivations 2. The subject matter is pitched at a fairly low level of generality, but it is sufficiently comprehensive and distinct thanks to the recognition of the uniqueness of language in our cognitive functioning, first and foremost in communication; language use and learning is classified as a special case of human information processing, the conception of language learning is primarily derived from the understanding of language use in verbal communication and reasoning about it; foreign language teaching emerges as a logical consequence of this understanding; 3. Language use and learning is regarded as an open, dynamic, complex, guided system: a) the system is open in that the human subject is in the state of multiple, life-sustaining (i.e. indispensable) interactions with the external sources of information and energy, especially in human relationships in the sociocultural environment, b) the system is dynamic in that the human subject undergoes internally and externally-driven changes, i.e. endogenous and exogenous changes; we can observe restructuring of knowledge resulting from its growth from the external sources, and knowledge explicitation, i.e. its re-description in an increasingly exact way within the mind, c) the system is envisaged as complex in that human cognition is considered to be a hierarchy of heterogeneous systems operating on a variety of polymorphic information formats, and d) it is guided because the human subject is seen as a goal-oriented, constructive, self-regulated agent (i.e. aware of itself), capable of learning from the results of his or her behaviour; 4. The notion of ‘language’ is helpful in discerning the qualitative difference between verbal communication and communication in general; however, it is too abstract to identify (psycholinguistic) processes of language use underlying verbal communication relevant from our point of view; ‘language use’ on the other hand, does not have such a disadvantage because it implies a user, a human being, an agent of the processes implied in language use; the notion of ‘language code’, understood as a system of transformations of one kind of representation into another (meaning into language form in production and language form into meaning in comprehension), is also less general because it presupposes the cycle of verbal communication and the coding operations performed by the human subject, but still to be specified further in order to reach modality-specific, space-and-time reference as phonemic and graphemic sub-codes used either by senders or addressees. When used by the sender, the sub-code serves production, i.e. the process of encoding

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meanings into language messages, i.e. discourse; when used by the addressee, it serves the purposes of comprehension; the processes of decoding language messages, i.e. discourse, into meanings. Moreover, senders and addressees either use the written, graphemic, or the spoken, phonemic sub-code in their encoding and decoding operations. Although these operations often overlap a great deal, or can be performed almost simultaneously, they are distinguished as the psycholinguistic processes of speaking, listening, reading and writing. In fact, what second/foreign language learners acquire is not language, but knowledge, operational abilities and skills of (re)constructing discourse in two communicative sub-codes -phonemic and graphemic (plus their meta- modal representations) used in a) comprehension and b) production. Comprehensiveness and referential links of this representation with the empirical reality offer the field some prospects of a stability of focus as opposed to the well-known pendulum swings of the past, or chasing other disciplines, or developing mostly in reaction to innovative ideas in other fields, or by constructing incompatible mini-theories of selected aspects of the phenomenon. The model can provide the field with a sense of purpose and orientation and guide relationships with other fields as partnerships, until it is discarded as no longer useful. With such an empirical focus on language use and learning in verbal communication, foreign language teaching may eliminate the invisible but real walls dividing the educational process from the real world to make itself more relevant to the society at large in the epoch of global communication.

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Chapter 3. Focus on the learner’s cognitive equipment: the mechanism of human information processing (HIP) Introduction: the cognitive site of foreign language use It is justified to look for relevant knowledge about human cognitive functioning, including language use and learning, in the field of cognitive psychology and psycholinguistics. As Eysenck (2006: 3) stated, the subject matter of cognitive psychology consists ‘of the main internal psychological processes involved in making sense of the environment and deciding what actions might be appropriate. These processes include attention, perception, learning, memory, language, problem solving, reasoning and thinking.’ Since they inevitably take place in the human mind, the processes of language learning are cognitive by definition. As has been emphasized, at the most elementary level, they take the form of human information processing, which involves registering, representing, organizing, converting, structuring and composing information in our cognitive subsystems. As a result of these processes, information is copied, multiplied, abstracted, constructed, proliferated, and propagated in various ways. The term ‘information’ denotes some meaningful unit with a form determined by its context. Therefore, the form of the transmitter, its meaning and context are part and parcel of information. Information is meaningful because it makes a difference, i.e. reduces unpredictability. Predictability, in turn, derives from the knowledge structures activated by the subject. Cognitive psychology attributes considerable significance to the context, both mental and environmental, in human information processing, storage and use. The role of natural and sociocultural environment is crucial to human survival whereas our information processing equipment is the most fundamental adaptive device for our interaction with this ecosystem (Klix 1980). Even infants demonstrate that they are biologically equipped to search for information and meaning and they are able to adapt to changes in information during this search (E. Clark 2009, Rebok 1987). Most important of all, thanks to its transmitter, information is communicable: it can be emitted by one organism, transmitted, propagated, i.e. disseminated by being copied (re-presented) in a different organism, transcoded in a different format and multiplied. In this way, the flow of meaning is made possible in human networks.

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The cognitive school in psychology has successfully replaced behaviourism and since the 1970s has been considered a leading, if not the leading framework. It aims at veridical, plausible, ecologically valid models of human cognitive functioning which can be tested against the data of actual cognitive functioning. Such models are materialist and mentalist at the same time in that they affirm the reality of the human mind (Cairns and Cairns 1976, Markus and Zajonc 1985, Thagard 2005b). Some mental structures inaccessible to direct investigation, at least in psychology, are postulated and inferred, i.e. reconstructed by reasoning, from models and observational data (Aitkenhead and Slack, eds., 1987). As has been mentioned in section 2.5.3, the cognitive perspective assumes such categories as consciousness, which occurs only in living organisms, especially in humans. It is associated with our motility and has a vital function in human survival and adaptation. Consciousness as a property of a living organism is indispensable for the intentional quality of our mental life; it provides the locus of control of our thought and action (Baars and Gage, eds., 2007, Koch 2004, 2012, Shell et al. 2010, Thagard 2005b, Velmans 2000) Cognitive control is the system’s ability to self-regulate and self-organize, initiate, withhold and, finally, time action (Klix 1980, Schraw 2009). The cognitive framework also recognizes the semantic quality of our mental life as well as such structures as hierarchically embedded schemata and symbolizations, understood as associations between representations in different codes.

3.1. Distinctive properties of human cognitive functioning The central component in models of cognitive functioning is our mental representation in memory of the information available in the environment as well as generated internally by such processes as creativity and reasoning (Anderson, B. F., 1975, Eysenck and Keane 2010, Shell et al. 2010, Thagard 2005b). Information is processed at various levels of depth and stored in multiple ways, as sensory traces, as mappings of various arrangements, as categories and semantic information and linear (syntagmatic as opposed to paradigmatic) structures, e.g. schemata. This property of processing information at multiple levels and in multiple formats is a universal feature of human cognition. Mental representations are constructed actively, by way identification and mapping of entities and their mutual differentiation, selection and integration of the incoming data in light of the existing mental structures as well as constant revision and modification of these data (Eysenck 2006, Nęcka et al. 2006, Schraw 2009). Rumelhart and Norman (1987) interpret the nature of our mental representations as mappings or mental models of various aspects of the environment at various 112

levels of specificity/abstraction. However, these models do not represent the environment in any direct way, but rather our phenomenal experience, which is a function of our brain states at the cognitive as opposed to neurophysiological level. The cognitive level is concerned with much larger units and structures of information processing available to our awareness, processed and interpreted for meaning and sense. The authors point out (1987: 17): ‘Our theories of representations are in actuality representations of the brain states, not representations of the world.’ These representations may be mere approximations rather than faithful reflections of the world, but they are adequate enough to enable us to deal with it and interact with others. This observation is a recurrent motif in cognitive psychology, e.g. Fogel (1993). Moreover, the accuracy of these representations is negotiated via social communication. Rumelhart and Norman (1987: 18) also recognize the cognitive connection between the represented world and the representing world: The objects of our experience are not the same as the objects of the world, but they would seem to reflect much of the structure of the world. In this way, it probably does make sense to speak of our experiential “representation” of the world.

In their view, most of our actual representation systems are hybrids, i.e. they are systems whose components belong to more than one category: analogical as well as symbolic elements (this is certainly the case of verbal communication inseparable from para-and non-verbal communication), both declarative and procedural representations (this is certainly the case of language use and learning in view of their temporal constraints), and include both representations and processes (this is certainly the case of constructive use of language in verbal communication in which knowledge is activated and used for composing and decomposing utterances). The processes that evaluate and interpret these representations are as important as the representations themselves. Cognitive processes may be investigated from the individual (subjective) as well as the social (intersubjective) point of view. Social cognition is the area which stresses the interactive nature of social perception; it regards communication as the essence of social cognition, and stresses the contribution of the perceiver. Like cognitive psychology, social cognition recognizes the constructive and evaluative nature of our cognitive processes, but it also focuses on how cognitive processes are influenced by the presence of others, how we take the feelings and thoughts of others into account, on the role of affect and motivation in our cognitive functioning as well as the social basis of categorization (Augoustinos et al., 2006, Brehm and Kassin 1996, Fiske and Taylor 1984, Lindzey and Aronson, eds., 1985).

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It has been pointed out that even at the most elementary level, information is significant because of its form. Our cognitive activity demonstrates a tendency as well as the ability to organize, i.e. structure information. We tend to integrate both the internal and the perceptual material into mental wholes, i.e. cohesive systems with relevant distinctive parts perceived in their oppositions, complex relationships and functions. Additionally, representations make up hierarchies: not only are we able to represent the world and our thoughts about it, but also to represent these representations at increasingly higher levels of abstraction (i.e. generality based on certain criteria) and explicitation (precision in the amount of detail of different aspects of information clusters or constellations, c.f. Karmiloff-Smith 1986). Representations may be analogical, i.e. based on resemblance, or arbitrary, i.e. without any resemblance, unmotivated; they may also be conventional, i.e. selected by agreement (H. Clark 1985, 1996). This cognitive perspective represents language learning as taking place in the “cognitive organ” of a living organism – in the human being’s cognitive system, which is significant from the point of view of the differences between natural and artificial intelligence. Cognitive psychologists stress that, since they are complex living organisms, human beings are open, self-regulating systems (Corsini, ed., 1987: 525, Schraw 2009). Norman (1987: 321) systematizes these features in the following way: Table 6: Features of cognitive systems (based on, and abbreviated from, Norman 1987: 321) All cognitive systems Receptors for receiving information about the world. Motor control for performing actions. Cognitive processes which include: a means of identifying and interpreting information received; a means of controlling the actions to be performed; a means of guiding the allocation of the finite cognitive resources, especially in synchronization problems; a memory for the history of experiences and actions; some way to devise plans and to monitor their implementation, which requires a meta-level of knowledge; basic operations and some feedback mechanism to observe the effects of operations on the world and change accordingly; for intelligent interaction, there must be a model of the environment, of one’s self, and of others; learning, i.e. changing one’s behaviour in fundamental ways, which takes a system capable of inferring causality, inter-relations between events, and of self-observation.

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Animate systems Animate systems maintain and protect themselves, regulate their own operations, and reproduce themselves; the organism at birth differs from the adult organism and requires considerable biological and educational maturation to grow, gain knowledge and develop its regulatory system. In order to survive, i.e. to maintain life, an animate system must be alert and coordinate its regulatory and cognitive system to maintain homeostasis, comfort and safety. An animate system has goals, desires, and purposes. It is motivated to perform some activities, i.e. to select interesting, (goal-oriented) tasks and ignore others. It must control the amount of effort devoted to these tasks, scheduling their initiation and termination. It must be able to maintain long-term goals which need not be part of the self- awareness of the organism.

Such systems conduct life-sustaining transactions with their environment by means of air, water, energy and information. Their livelihood depends on maintaining these exchanges. This pre-empts the issue of nature versus nurture, which ‘most psychologists consider to be a pseudo-problem’ (Corsini, ed., 1987: 600). Deacon (1997) sees this as a superficial, stale dichotomy, the more so that psychological evidence demonstrates the complexity and interdependence of biological and environmental contributions. Norman (1987: 325) makes this point clear: ‘Animate organisms must be multiple-minded, data-driven by environmental events, ever ready to capitalize on the accidents of the world, or to avoid the unexpected dangerous spots.’ The environment plays an important role in our thought processes as we solve problems by building mental models of the environment and, in turn, using these models for our problem-solving operations. Shore (1996: 183) stresses our dependence on environmental and interpersonal exchanges: Like other creatures, humans survive and reproduce only by engaging in substantial interchanges with other forms of life or artefacts whose substance and identity will inevitably compromise the autonomy of the individual person, group, or species. Hunting, eating, sexual intercourse, marriage, gestation, and tool use are all areas where conceptual and existential autonomy are inevitably breached.

The transactions and use of organic substance and information for biological and cognitive survival are the key to understanding the human being as a living organism. Interaction is an inherent property in an open, dynamic, complex, guided system; it involves the natural as well as the social environment, especially family, group and culture. Human interaction with others takes the form of

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relationships in the sociocultural context. Relationships with others are of paramount importance: they define the quality of our lives. Taking into account how human systems act with reference to others, it is necessary to assume complex reciprocal determination as a notion of causality (Neisser 1967, 1976). There are enough substantive differences between animate and artificial cognitive systems, between natural and artificial intelligence, between biology and electronics, as pointed out by Norman (1987), to rule out any confusion of models of human cognition with models of artificial cognition, or, worse still, using models of artificial cognition to represent human cognition. The difference between artificial and natural systems is not only that they are constructed of different stuff -their basic functions differ. Thagard (2005b) points out that human cognitive system is influenced by emotions and hormones, and it needs organic nutrients for sustaining the system’s metabolism which provides the necessary energy. This emphasizes the fundamental difference between human cognitive processes and information processing in a machine. Humans survive, get nourishment from the environment, protect themselves from physical insult, form families and societies, reproduce themselves and protect and educate their young. Much of this is handled with the aid of biological structures which I will call the Regulatory System (Norman 1987, 317-318).

The Regulatory System cooperates with the cognitive system as well as the emotional system. The issue to consider is not only how we respond to events, but also how they are interpreted. The cognitive system is at the service of the regulatory system whose function is to sustain the organism’s survival. The cognitive system grew out of the requirements of the regulatory one, to be its servant and establish its own goals in addition to the function of supporting its own life. The emotional system, which plays a critical role in behaviour, is interrelated with both of the other systems (Eysenck and Keane 2010). First and foremost, however, the human mind is the generator of thought and meaning. Human beings are semantic, as well as semiotic animals. I understand meaning as the stuff of our mental life. When looked at from the point of view of social interaction, especially verbal communication, meaning developed in various relationships can be seen as relevance or significance of someone or something to ourselves, i.e. the difference they make to us. From a general point of view, meaning may be treated as the effect of understanding, i.e. as recognition of a coherence assigned to some object in our perceptual field. From the point of view of learning operations, it may be regarded as content, i.e. a propositional system of knowledge. Meaning representations can be implicit or explicit and may be stored as sensations, images, emotions, concepts, 116

and propositions (which include thoughts and ideas). Within an individual, the process of meaning explicitation, whereby it becomes more precise and available to our awareness, is enhanced by having this meaning coded into language forms and taking in the resulting utterances as the input material for further comprehension and reasoning, a clear case of communicating with oneself. We can further clarify, define, formalize, explicate and negotiate meaning via intra- and interpersonal verbal communication. To sum up, the following properties have been recognized as distinctive features of our cognitive functioning as living organisms: a) consciousness, connected with the activation of our cognitive resources (our waking state) which enables us to experience a spectrum of perceptions, information processes, thoughts and feelings, as well as the awareness of the external world and ourselves (Eysenck 2006); consciousness occurs only in living systems and is associated with motility; in humans it is the locus of (self) awareness, regulation and control of our thought and action, i.e. volitional processes; consciousness enables us to generate, as well as search for, meaning and sense (Baars and Gage, eds., 2007, Chalmers 1996, Koch 2004, 2012, Thagard 2005b, Velmans 2000); Miller (1987) points out that consciousness is our window on cognition; b) the semantic quality of our thought and action, i.e. the fact that we try to understand ourselves in relationship to others as well as our place in the natural and social environment, and we act toward this goal constantly searching for meaning and sense, i.e. coherence in our thoughts, actions and events and their significance to our states, goals and motives; at the same time, we are capable of creating meaning and sense as a result of our propensity for reference and predication; c) our inevitably synergetic relationship with the natural environment and social networks, i.e. our dependence on the external supply of the organic and cognitive (information) resources which are essential to our biological survival and physical as well as mental well-being as individuals and as a species; in the case of interpersonal relationships in the sociocultural context, these interactions involve contact, energy exchanges via shared attention, constructing shared knowledge, mutual influences and adjustments, i.e. taking the other person into account; in order to interact with others and the environment we construct via selection and integration our mental representations, i.e. mental models, of other people and the environment, and store our experience in memory; d) intentionality, i.e. predisposition to act, the ability to initiate and/or withhold action; characteristically, its significant proportion is directed at other

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human beings; intentionality is rooted in our internal motives, needs and desires which energize us to take action, and it manifests itself in our adaptive, intelligent behaviour; human beings cannot be visualized as static entities, but ‘guided missiles’ – highly dynamic agents capable of motility and forward driven by internal motives, such as cognitive curiosity among others; e) goal-oriented, strategic behaviour; because of our limited processing resources, especially the attentional ones, our thoughts and actions are inevitably episodic -they take the form of events and tasks; we must make selections from among various available options and choose or build a plan which - under the circumstances and with the available resources -seems optimal to reach the goal; constructing a plan to reach the goal on the basis of some optimality criterion are distinctive features of strategic behaviour; at the same time, strategic behaviour is intelligent, i.e. flexible and adaptive, and it makes use of feedback, i.e. the knowledge of effects, for the sake of precision of our mental representations as much as our goal-orientation; f) a life-span view of cognition, which takes into account the fact that a young organism is different, i.e. smaller, with a less developed cognitive system also in terms of its knowledge and strategies, and it has yet to develop the ability to regulate its own thought and behaviour; this involves the development of metacognition; the process of development is viewed as a combined effect of the maturation of the organism on the one hand and environmental interaction strengthened by the growing individual experience and knowledge on the other hand, i.e. a combined effect of endogenous and exogenous factors; g) the central role of memory, which is our complex (organized, structured, hierarchical, dynamic, associative) mental reservoir of information systems mapped from the environment and generated internally, constantly activated and resourced as well as modified in our thought and action; after all, cognition is recognition; h) two elementary kinds of information processing, i.e. chronological and feature coding; the former involves coding stimuli in their temporal or spatial order, which gives rise to linear arrangements (schemata, plans, syntagmatic constructions, etc.), whereas the latter, indispensable in concept formation and abstract thought, selects only relevant features while actively disregarding others leading to representations at higher orders of our mental structures; i) the constructive propensity of our cognitive system to select and integrate/ organize, information in the perceptual field as well as reasoning at every stage of processing (i.e. input, storage and output); this is tantamount to organizing stimuli as structures, i.e. as wholes with distinct, even contrasting, relevant 118

parts in complex functional relationships; the propensity for structuring may be regarded as a matter of degree: it can be weaker or stronger, more or less explicit, depending on a variety of factors such as the stage of the subject’s cognitive development/age, the level of expertise, situation, emotional state, kind of task, etc.; j) the human symbolic ability, i.e. the ability to represent one form of information (or whole systems) in a different format, i.e. associating/matching entities with what they stand for and using both; when 1 represents A, 1 and A remain in a symbolic relationship; this ability inevitably involves coding, i.e. encoding and decoding, understood as converting information in one format into a different one, more appropriate for the operations to be performed on it at a given time; when meanings are encoded into (matched with) their language representations, i.e. signs constituted by their language form imposed on their material transmitter, they acquire a more appropriate format for the on-going communicative operations in that they can be emitted, i.e. sent out to other people and decoded, as well as submitted to reasoning and recorded; k) the human ability of constituting hierarchies and operating in hierarchies; in mental hierarchies, though not only, we have a combination of symbolization and abstraction; the relationship of representation, i.e. symbolization, occurs at various levels of generality, so that at each higher level we have entities representing (symbolizing, standing for) several entities from the level below; as a result, at the topmost level we have a very powerful entity representing certain aspects of the elements at the subordinate levels; our ability for using mental hierarchies and operating in human hierarchies is evident in reasoning as well as in social organizations and institutions. Let me now focus on some of these properties significant from the point of view of language use and learning: Consciousness is the state of alertness or arousal, or a running span of subjective experience in a human organism, but it is not limited to humans. It has a survival value because it allows processes which make us more adaptable to the environment, i.e. more intelligent. Needless to say, intelligence has a survival value (Miller 1987). Consciousness can be juxtaposed to lack of consciousness, i.e. sleep, or a comatose state, and it is associated with the motility of living systems. It seems to be located in the cerebral cortex. Stimulation of the reticular activating system (RAS) awakens a sleeping animal or alerts an animal which is awake, whereas the destruction of the system produces a comatose animal (Anderson, B. F., 1975, Koch 2004, 2012, Baars and Gage, eds., 2007, Thagard 2005b, Velmans 2000). Consciousness is central to our life. Velmans (2000: 276) points out:

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Viewed from a first-person perspective, nearly all our sophisticated mental activities seem to depend on it. We seem to need it whenever our interactions with the world are novel, flexible and complex. And it is hard to know what it would even mean to think, feel, remember, plan, or dream, if one were not conscious.

It is genuinely indispensable as the locus of control and regulation of our thought and action. Its role is to allow voluntary organization and coordination of the subconscious operations that are going on in our minds (Chalmers 1996, Eysenck 2006). It is a window on the brain used to access all its functions, a workspace with the available attended information (Styles 2006). According to Velmans (2000), there is little doubt that consciousness relates closely to the activities in the human brain, but because of their speed, only a fraction of cognitive processes are knowable, i.e. available to our awareness. We can think of human consciousness as having a span in the sense that some forms of information processing may be too fast while others -too slow to be registered as change or difference by our consciousness; information may also be hardly perceptible when it is built into, i.e. implicit in, a larger information structure. Information processing of the order of 250 ms, for example, may seem preconscious. Although most information processing is not conscious in the sense of ‘available to our awareness’, not even in the sense of preconscious or subconscious, what is available to consciousness are the products of information processing (Velmans 2000). We may not be aware/conscious of the steps of even the most deliberate mental operation, or the inherent nature of the representation itself, yet we know what is represented and whether or not it is perceived or imagined (Johnson-Laird 1983). The operating system must be conscious to construct a mental model of itself and of the manner in which it is performing. Thagard (2005b) states that brain processes are causally involved in consciousness, while the function of sleep is to replenish glycogen, the main source of energy for neurons. He points out (2005b: 178,180): Loss of consciousness can arise from many kinds of events including death, coma, seizures, concussions, sleep, anesthesia, hypnosis, and fainting. All of these involve cases where a previously conscious person ceases to be conscious. …. consciousness requires proper brain functioning, indicating that the biological causes of consciousness are specifically neurological.

Consciousness is necessary for the analysis of meaning (Velmans 2000) -it enables human beings to make sense of the world. Meaning and sense are of primary importance in human cognition and adaptation. Meaning has an unparalleled survival value. Consciousness is also the locus of our self-awareness. As pointed out by Johnson-Laird (1983:470), self-awareness is a recursive phenomenon: 120

It (the mind) understands itself at least to some extent, and it understands that it understands itself… The idea is both central to the subjective experience of consciousness and paradoxical.

Intentionality. The intentional/volitional quality of human cognition and behaviour can be characterized as our predisposition to act as well as our directionality in pursuit of needs and desires. As has been stressed, a human being is not viewed as a cognitive object, capable merely of reactive behaviour, but as a forward-driven subject, an agent able to initiate action. Johnson-Laird (1983) points out that self- awareness is crucial for the formation of intentions. They involve visualizing the effects of our actions, planning actions and making decisions. Self-awareness allows us to know what we know, i.e. for meta-cognition. It is significant that a considerable proportion of human intentionality is targeted at other human beings. The cognitive framework posits internal motivations for cognitive functioning, such as curiosity, needs, attitudes, and affects which activate energy required for cognitive work and behaviour, as well as for guiding it. Dennett (1997) is of the opinion that human beings are hungry for information; epistemic hunger must be the driving force in any complex system where learning occurs. Our cognitive curiosity, creativity and instinct to communicate with others (in contrast to autism) must be included among our vital human propensities. These drives are responsible for the dynamics of human cognition; they unify the domains of intelligence and activity. Admittedly, our cognition and action are determined both by internal as well as environmental factors (Markus and Zajonc 1985, Aitkenhead and Slack, eds., 1987). Johnson-Laird (1983: 473) stresses the mental correlates of intentionality and their links with the ability to plan: An organism can have an intention only if it has an operating system that can elicit a model of the future state of affairs, and decide that it itself should act so as to try to bring about that state of affairs. A crucial part of having an intention is precisely an awareness that the system itself is able to make such decisions. The system has to be able to represent the fact that it can itself generate models of the future states of affairs and decide to try to bring them about. Granted a goal-directed planning ability and the recursive machinery to embed models within models, the operating system only needs access to a model of itself in order to have intentions.

The model that the intentional organism possesses includes options available to the operating system, which enable it to make choices. Self-awareness is necessary to integrate our life memories and experiences and give us a sense of identity, continuity and individuality. This view is highly consistent with his idea of people as responsible agents. A life-span view of cognition. Cognition in human species undergoes a natural development determined by the growth of the organism and its increasing

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knowledge, regulation of thought and action, as well as strategies and metaprocesses. Cognitive psychologists have increasingly adopted a life‑span approach (e.g. Mitchell and Ziegler 2013, Rebok 1987). In his account of Werner’s contribution to this perspective, Rebok discusses his orthogenetic principle which states that development proceeds from a state of relative globality and lack of differentiation to a state of increasing differentiation, articulation, and hierarchic integration. Development has direction; it is a transition from minimally organized to well‑organized, highly specialized and articulated forms. Concepts, for example, develop according to this principle. They become organized into increasingly more specialized and differentiated categories and subcategories. Bruner (1973) treats human development in terms of three stages: enactive representation, iconic representation, and symbolic representation. Piaget (Gleitman 1981) views these stages as the sensorimotor period, pre-operational period, concrete operations and formal operations. Both authors have recognized the importance of action in infancy and both see human growth as the development from the present and the perceptual toward connectedness over time and invariance underlying surface of phenomena. These processes involve the individualʼs differentiation of oneself from the objects in the environment, while mental representations involve a movement from the global states to the states of differentiation and hierarchical integration -from simpler to more complex forms. The intellectual powers of children are developed into the more highly evolved intellectual powers of adolescents and adults due to the growing complexity and differentiation of their mental representations. Major trends over the life span outlined by Werner include: 1) syncretism to discreteness (differentiation); 2) rigidity to flexibility (growth of skills, plans, strategies); 3) diffusion to articulacy (coordination and integration); 4) instability to stability (fluctuation to equilibrium, growth of attention span, long-term goals). A question which still remains central in the life‑span perspective is whether development is continued in adulthood and old age, or there is stagnation or even regression of cognitive skills later in life to more generalized forms, for example, from flexibility to rigidity. The life‑span approach focuses on the study of cognition as well as personality and social development. Some work has also been done on language loss. The centrality of meaning. Human mind is the generator of meaning which is possible thanks to our ability to refer (perceive relationships) and predicate (construct propositions about ourselves, the others and the world. Meaning is 122

vital in human thought and action, both that of individuals and groups, and it is intrinsically gratifying. Human beings pursue and generate meanings, i.e. concepts, ideas, thoughts, and feelings, which constitute the content of our mental life. Meanings are created or recreated individually to be communicated, reconstructed, clarified, negotiated and acquired within a group via social interaction, collaborative learning and cultural transmission. Making sense is part and parcel of understanding; it involves the perception of a given field of reflection as a coherent whole (Kintsch 1998), i.e. the recognition of its underlying structure with internal organization and functional relationships among the parts. Recognizing structures and other forms of organization enables us to interpret meaning inferentially, i.e. to go beyond the information given (Alexander and Winne, eds. 2009, Bruner 1973, Gaskell ed. 2009, Johnson-Laird 1983, 1989, 2005) This observation demonstrates the extent to which meaning and sense are inseparable from, and determined by, form. Meaning may be permanent or temporary, of mental as well as environmental objects and people, events and accounts of the world. At the same time, the degree of its explicitness may range from a) amorphous fuzzy content of our mental life, which is hardly communicable to b) more precise content, i.e. potentially and actually communicable thoughts, including explicit, well-articulated, logically-organized concepts and propositions. Once the communicative intention is identified, the internal meaning is matched with the respective form cast upon its transmitter, which makes this meaning easier to handle, i.e. more tangible to the addressee as well as the sender. Meaning may range from global, universal and existential content to fairly specific, even minute ideas. In the cognitive view, meaning comes from the pattern of relationships among which a given entity locates itself (Rumelhart and Norman 1987). The ability of understanding varies with intelligence since it is a demanding process of computing, composed of a host of elementary sub- processes, first and foremost inferencing. One of the quintessential components of cognition is the ability to organize, i.e. integrate information into a coherent whole by reinstating the missing links on the basis of various sources of knowledge, i.e. by way of bridging inferences (Singer 1994, 2009). The tendency to understand guides most activities, whereas knowledge which has been thoroughly rather than vaguely understood is retained better and can be generalized to other situations. Meaning-focused cognition cannot take place without interpretation and evaluation; it takes the form of symbolic interaction. In symbolic interaction human beings assign meaning and value to the environmental stimuli being processed. The meanings of social and mental objects are not in them, they arise out of social interaction in which they are assigned to be modified, negotiated

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and interpreted. Meanings are dynamic, not fixed, and they are identified in the process of inferencing, construction, interpretation and evaluation (Corsini, ed., 1987, Hałas 2006). People form their own identities and direct their actions at others on the basis of meanings (relevance, significance) these others have for them (Augoustinos et al., 2006, Corsini, ed. 1987, Hałas 2006, Jupp, ed., 2006). The goal-oriented (adaptive) nature of our thought and action. Because of their intentional and goal-oriented, intelligent, strategic behaviour, humans can be characterized not merely as open-control, but more specifically as feedback- control systems (Cohen 1977, Schraw 2009). While the former cannot alter action once it is launched, the latter is much more flexible and effective at the same time. Goal-orientedness is entailed in intentionality as its more specific component: in addition to initiating action we make a selection from among several mentally represented alternatives to focus upon one, and we construct a strategic plan to reach this goal; ‘strategic’ means optimal under the circumstances and with the available cognitive and other resources. As a result, our actions are structured as episodes, events and tasks embedded in space and time, in the context of the situation. Our thoughts and actions can be characterized as constructive and planful (Miller et al. 1960, Dennett 1997, Schraw 2009). Their control and regulation involve the ability to come up with a plan, maintain and oversee/monitor its completion and incorporate feedback information. Plans are constructed to satisfy specific motivations/goals and to bring about a yet non- existent state of affairs. Human beings are complex, adaptive systems, i.e. ‘systems which confront the change by attempting to nullify either the change or its effects’ (Anderson, B. F., 1975: 23). Anderson continues to say that in nature only the living systems are adaptive. Adaptation is found in individuals and in species. Adaptive organisms possess three kinds of mechanisms: a receptor mechanism to detect change in the world, an effector mechanism to do something about the change and a mental representation which connects the receptor states to the effector states. An intelligent adaptive system represents covariation in the world, that is, how things differ together in terms of order, lawfulness, structure, correlation or contingency and stores this as knowledge. However, knowledge may be both learned as well as innate, represented in a format available to our awareness or not. The organism is adapted to monitor the consequences of a response to the environment or itself. The adaptive effect of the organism is enhanced by feedback control, i.e. guided response. Human strategic behaviour is highly adaptive in that it is flexible and innovative -it makes use of human intelligence understood as the capacity for understanding, problem-solving and incorporating feedback. Human intelligence, which involves perceiving, knowing and 124

reasoning, enables humans to adapt to the changing environment (Anderson, B. F., 1975, Churchland 1986). Indeed, feedback is a very important mechanism in any intelligent system in which learning occurs since it allows the incorporation of the knowledge of results to modify our immediate, goal-oriented behaviour, as well as our more permanent knowledge representations. In this way, feedback greatly enhances the effectiveness of our behaviour and the adequacy/precision of our mental representations (Cohen 1977, Corsini, ed. 1987). Symbolizations, essential in human information processing, indispensable in language, emerge as a result of our ability to establish and use relationships in which one entity refers to/stands for another, i.e. represents it (Deacon 1997, Klix 1980). Representation is of the essence in human cognition as well as the functioning of social systems. Hierarchies, for example, may be understood as pyramid-like systems of organization in which each unit at a higher level represents (substitutes) several units from the level below with one unit at the top subsuming all the levels below. Human cognition makes constant use of symbolic processes in that information in one format is matched with/translated into its equivalent in a different format. Symbols, i.e. entities which stand for something else, may be discrete (categorical, segmental, digital), arbitrary and conventional as well as analogical. They may be abstract or specific, as well as mono-and polysemic, which is why their context is very important in eliminating ambiguity, i.e. competing interpretations. Images/icons resemble what they stand for so they are analogical representations, but this does not prevent them from remaining in a symbolic relationship with what they represent. On the other hand, phonemes and their arrangements, morphemes and words, are arbitrary as well as conventional. They are arbitrary because there is no justification for their particular form, and they are conventional in that users have selected them from among feasible alternatives and agreed to use them in this particular form and in this particular function. Conventional representations can be arbitrary as well as analogical. When one of several analogical representations is selected and agreed upon to be used, it also becomes a conventional, though not an arbitrary representation. Because of their symbolic, arbitrary properties, language signs must be learned from other members of the speech community, and – to be of any use in verbal communication – represented and used according to their conventions, internal structure and relationships with other signs. Depending on the domain and level of specialization, elementary symbolizations may become very sophisticated, compounded, polymodal and even artistic. Our culture operates on complex, yet flexible systems of symbols. Various areas of the fine arts make extensive use of the most complex and deliberate polysemic forms of symbolizations. At the same time, the appreciation of their

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meaningful potential depends not only on the intelligence and expertise, but also the depth and extent of processing by the addressee (Frutiger 2003). Language signs. Human languages testify to our fascinating ability of constituting and using complex systems of categorical arbitrary forms cast upon some transmitting substance and associated with their meaning. The use of language signs is tantamount to sending and receiving them as information packets capable of upsetting the entropy of our information processing system to be interpreted for their meaning and sense. Unlike forms, which are represented both mentally and externally, meaning is represented only internally, i.e. mentally, and would not be communicated with such amazing precision, sophistication, and power, had it not been coded into language forms (acoustic units, shapes, gestures, protrusions, imposed upon some transmitting vehicle, such as sound wave, light wave, texture). Meaning/form combinations may be analyzed at various levels of language as a formal system: phonemic, graphemic, morphemic, syntactic, lexical, semantic and pragmatic. However, to perform their function in human communication, language signs must be regarded not only as form/ meaning relationships, shaping their material transmitter, such as light or sound wave, analogically to the neurotransmitters in our nervous system, but also as energy discharges which commute between speakers across time and space, instigating the information flow in human networks. People are not only capable of coding meaning into language form, but also of emitting, i.e. sending out, and receiving, i.e. decoding, meanings which reach them in their verbal form as messages. Ontologically, human beings and language signs are inseparable; humans are the generators and carriers of signs, veritable transmitters of meaning across time and space. At the same time, as demonstrated by the history of our civilization, the use of written language signs as well as other kinds of records of the spoken language are equally adaptive and socially functional. In these cases, the human being as the source of language signs and the signs in their recorded form can be physically and temporally disconnected. However, to be brought back to life, i.e. understood, language signs must be processed by a competent, i.e. knowledgeable sign decoder. Messages may travel across space and time in their recorded form, which increases their durability and practicality. As we know, various possibilities of recording available nowadays involve transforming spoken and written messages into yet another – digital – format. This does not undermine the initial idea that language signs are constituted by their users. Only language users are capable of producing/articulating and emitting signs which travel from the sender to the addressee as finely-structured energy transmissions. Language use is impossible without human energy resources, which is to say, without energy 126

transmissions between the sender and the addressee. First and foremost, only language users can be the source of meanings. Meanings determine the kinds of forms which are used in coding them. Only language users can format the interpersonal transmitters into a message. More specifically, it should be reiterated that: a) meanings, which are represented only in the human mind, are the point of departure in the process of social interaction, especially in verbal communication; b) language forms (which remain in a symbolic relationship to meanings) are represented mentally, but unlike meanings, they can be externalized; form/ meaning relationships make up a whole structured and complex code, i.e. an orderly system of transformations (Cherry 1957) of one format of representation into another; c) language signs have their observable existence and (relative) permanence thanks to their vehicle/transmitter, such as light wave or sound wave, but also gesture for the hearing impaired and texture for the visually impaired; these interpersonal transmitters are formatted by the sign users into the required units of the code and emitted to carry the coded meaning across time and space; the sound wave, for example, is modulated as for pitch, loudness and sound quality, and converted by way of articulation into clusters of phonemes and whole phrases to be sent out to the addressee; as they are emitted, the transmitter carries the information to the addressee; d) language users have the dual ability to act as senders and addressees; as senders, they emit and direct signs, i.e. articulate them by coding meaning into form cast upon the transmitting vehicle according to the requirements of the code in terms of oppositions and distinctive features; as addressees of signs, they receive, register, segment, decode and process signs sent out by other users by registering and recognizing their distinctive features coded into the transmitting vehicle as instructions to the addressee as to how to assign them meaning. Following this outline, a profound difference must be pointed out between reflecting upon and describing the forms of language signs and their functional relations within their system, on the one hand, and reflecting upon, and describing, the processes of using signs in the context of human interaction on the other hand. The latter perspective does not refer to ready language products, sentences or connected texts, but to the processes involved in constructing and using signs: selecting them for coding meaning in the context of a human situation, including their articulation and emission, and recognizing and receiving

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signs by human beings in order to decode their meaning and sense in human interactions and relationships, as well as learning how to format, use, integrate into sequences and control them for human purposes.

3.2. Human information processing (HIP) The purpose of the HIP perspective is to trace the flow of information across space and time. The processing system is sensitive to a certain spectrum of energies. It has sensory receptors, i.e. specialized modalities, which take in inputs processed to be stored and/or to become outputs. We process information (Solso 1998, Eysenck and Keane 2010) so that sensation – raw physical energy – is registered by our receptors and transformed by our neurotransmitters into a form that has meaning. Elementary processes in HIP take place in tens of hundreds of milliseconds. Inputs and outputs are held in the small short-term memory (STM) store, conventionally thought to contain four to seven chunks. Seconds or tens of seconds are needed to access information in the long-term memory (LTM) store (Carroll, D. W., 1986). HIP refers to ways in which perceptual input is processed, selected, reduced, elaborated, categorized, coded, recoded, transformed, retrieved and used through hypothetical mental processes which take place in the human brain (Neisser 1976). Information acquisition, i.e. perception and storage, is a precondition of higher mental operations, such as reasoning, decision making, language use and mathematics. As information is processed by the system, it is registered, attended to, recognized, structured on the basis of the information already in the memory, elaborated, converted into a meaningful code, compared to other available information, interpreted, evaluated, classified, reorganized, and used for current goals or stored in our memory for future purposes. Output occurs in the form of verbal or nonverbal response, a decision or a representation stored in our memory (Rebok 1987). HIP, which spans vast subconscious processing as well as higher order processes available to our awareness, is considered to be the most progressive area in cognitive psychology. As has been pointed out, HIP is a sufficiently detailed perspective to the purpose of studying non-primary language use and learning. It is equally suitable for investigating developmental cognitive processes, such as the growth of memory capacity, memory strategies, speed of processing, the increasing organization and restructuring of knowledge as well as metacognition. It provides a characteristically detailed ‘high‑resolution’ (Rebok 1987) or ‘fine grain’ (Rumelhart and Norman 1987) picture of the temporal course of cognitive activities. Essentially, human information processing reflects our ability to organize information, i.e. categorize and structure it at different hierarchical levels, as well 128

as to code it, i.e. convert it from one form of representation into another. When information units are converted, they are in fact matched with the corresponding information unit in a different format, which is more suitable for the task at hand. Most notably, we use such coding systems as language (speech and writing), numbers and musical notation. Paivio (1986) has developed a dual-coding theory, according to which there are two distinct, specialized, but interconnected systems for the representation and processing of information: the verbal and the visual system. The latter carries out image-based processing and representation that enters into tasks like analysis of scenes and the generation of mental images. This type of representation is analogical to what it represents. The verbal system stores arbitrary linguistic information linked to concepts and propositions, which are coded into their language symbols. Propositions themselves express meaning; they assert certain states of affairs which may be true or false. Evidence for the dual-coding theory comes from experiments in which memory for certain items is enhanced when they are encoded in both pictures and words (Eysenck and Keane 2010, Sternberg 1996). However, it must be pointed out that this division is not as clear as it seems because graphemic information is both visual and arbitrary. Johnson-Laird (1983, 2005) focused his attention on one other important category of representations, mental models, i.e. structural analogues of the world, an important construct in representing information in addition to images and symbolic representations. Mental models raise the following question: what is it that makes a mental entity a representation of something? This question is of the essence in referential phenomena in psychology, first and foremost the relationship between language and the world. According to Johnson-Laird, the nature of human mentality is such that humans construct mental models of the world and that thought processes involve manipulating these mental models like real objects. While images are analogical to the objects represented, propositional representations are expressible in words, i.e. communicable symbols, and can be judged as true or false. Johnson-Laird also claims that humans can construct mental models of a real or imaginary world at various levels of specificity and map propositions to these representations.

3.2.1. Hierarchies (subordinate and superordinate levels) in human cognitive functioning In order to avoid terminological misunderstandings, ‘the executive system’ is used to denote information processing in the sense of Norman’s regulatory system, whereas ‘the representational system’ refers to the memory store. In the

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executive system we can distinguish the ‘central processor or central executive’, which is superordinate with reference to the subordinate executive system in that: information from different sources and modalities is integrated for coding; all the important decisions and strategic choices are made here; plans for tasks and sub-tasks are developed; plan maintenance, adjustment, and monitoring take place; feedback information is incorporated (Eysenck, 2006). The subordinate executive system implements these decisions, most of them at the periphery of attentional control, i.e. almost automatically. Judging by the flexibility and complexity of human behaviour, especially language use, the two systems are hierarchically coordinated with dynamic interaction taking place between them all the time. Attention, planning, monitoring and feedback span the representational store with the executive systems. This cognitive decision centre is within the scope of our consciousness; it is the site of intention, will and effort. The central executive (superordinate) system has direction, i.e. goal-orientedness and adaptability -its processes are serial and controlled by attentional resources. The superordinate system involves the frontal cortex and is single and serial, while the subordinate one is outside this focus; it is a parallel executive mechanism capable of doing more than one thing at a time. It bypasses the frontal cortex. Goal-oriented behaviour requires the maintenance of a plan in short-term memory (STM) and integration of its components. Plans are formed in the superordinate system and that is where they are executed in the early stages of practice. Later they become automatized, or mechanized, and turned over to the subordinate system. This relates to the process of learning a single task and to the course of cognitive development in general. The representation of the task accessible to awareness may fade away with practice. The assignment of cognitive effort is determined in part by the available representations, but largely by the requirements and structure of the task (Anderson, B. F., 1975). The subordinate system performs even highly automatized components of activities, selected, delegated and supervised by the central system, which may run in parallel, and with peripheral attention. It makes use of routines and other automatic operations which run on procedural representations. Controlled and automatic processes make up integrated hybrid systems, which account for the complexity and flexibility of human behaviour (Aitkenhead and Slack, eds. 1987, Eysenck and Keane 2010). This is especially important in language use which is regulated by our attentional resources at the higher levels as well as subconscious 130

and automatized ones at the lower, subordinated levels. According to Levelt (1975: 88), there are some general principles which hold for hierarchical hybrid systems, including speech processing: a) the higher level is concerned with larger portions and broader aspects of the systemʼs behaviour b) decision times on the higher level are usually longer than on the lower level c) the higher level is concerned with the relatively slow aspects of the systemʼs behaviour d) the description of the higher level is usually less structured, less certain, and more difficult to formalize.

3.2.2. The mechanism of human information processing including foreign language use The term ‘mechanism’ is understood as an arrangement of connected specialized components which use energy to do work, i.e. perform certain operations and functions. A mechanism is regarded as a system of parts which operate like those in a machine, reflecting the way we visualize human cognitive work, especially the way information is processed, organized, segmented, recoded, stored as input, and retrieved, organized and composed as output (Anderson, B. F., 1975, Lindsay and Norman 1991, Sternberg 1996). Here, the mechanism is viewed as organic in that its material basis, i.e. its locus, is in the living human organism, in which there is constant interaction between cognition, volition and emotions (Eysenck and Keane 2010). Human information processing operates on our cognitive energy resources which require organic fuel; the resources may be directed to focus on a given task or to ignore it. Our expenditure of these resources is sensitive to various mental, e.g. emotional, and environmental influences, leading to boredom or fatigue and, first and foremost, to the influences of other human beings, groups as well as individuals, who interact and affect each other in various relationships. As can be seen from the above, this view has nothing to do with the computer analogy of human cognitive functioning. The mechanism of human information processing consists of the following elements: a) the interconnected specialized subsystems of the mechanism, such as primary and secondary perception, attention and memory; considering the directionality, i.e. goal-orientedness of human cognition, we must also recognize the role of planning, monitoring, anticipation, retrospection and feedback (Eysenck and Keane 2010). Perception, attention and memory are the

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subsystems which register, organize and store the flow of information being processed, as well as retrieve it and use constructively as much as inferentially. Information is selected or ignored, picked-up, structured, restructured, coded, recoded, decoded, maintained or forgotten, elaborated or compressed, stored and restored, retrieved and constructed or composed to be used in various operations. Planning, monitoring, feedback, anticipation and retrospection are active in the regulation of our cognitive functioning, especially language use in comprehension and production; b) the substance of processing, i.e. modality-specific (visual/iconic, auditory/ echoic) structures and representations, e.g. constellations and clusters of information, postulated in the formats suitable/required for various operations and their outputs, such as sensations, images, concepts, each of which can be symbolic and/or analogical to the point of being verbatim, as well as metamodal representations (more abstract than modality-specific ones), propositions, discourse types, plans of differing length and nature (e.g. schemata, scenarios, scripts, prototypes, stereotypes) syntagmatic and paradigmatic constructions, declarative and procedural representations, etc.; c) the processes, operations and strategies which take place in the mechanism, especially controlled and automatic processing, in the case of language use, hierarchically integrated into flexible hybrid processing systems, understood as ‘an arrangement with both serial and parallel components’ (Corsini, ed. 1986: 588), essential in our intentional and regulated cognitive functioning, especially in verbal communication. As has been pointed out, cognitive psychologists recognize the fact that only a segment of cognitive processes takes place within the confines of our consciousness; most of them happen subconsciously, i.e. at the periphery/border of our consciousness, as well as preconsciously (e.g. while we are asleep). The fact that we do not register given information with our awareness may mean that its processing is too fast for our perceptual system, or that the information is built into a larger structure as its component, or both. In language use and learning these cases are quite common. However, I would like to refrain from categorizing them as incidental or implicit learning (Hulstijn 2003, DeKeyser 2003).

3.2.3. Perception: the interface between the subject and the environment Cognitive psychologists consider perception to be a process that supplies the basic information for cognition, developed along the life span by higher order mental processes (Rebok 1987). It is regarded as a constructive process by 132

which we select and recognize, organize and make sense of (i.e. assign meaning to) environmental stimuli. I take construction to mean a selective process of integration to organize the environmental stimulus into wholes/categories; this, in turn, involves segmentation of the flow of the environmental energies into more permanent constituents. Neisser (1976), a founding father of cognitive psychology, explains that what is perceived is determined both by the type of environmental information available in the input and the active and constructive processes internal to the perceiver since, in addition to sensory information, the subject uses prior knowledge and context. Perception, which is a constant sampling and re-sampling, starts when we register environmental stimuli, such as physical energy – optic and/or acoustic waves, chemical particles, or pressure from touch. In other words, perception begins when we receive sensory information (sensory reception), environmental as well as internal to the organism, and convert it into mental information (mental perception), i.e. the information which has been identified and recognized as something on the basis of its context (which involves structuring), our expectations and previous knowledge. Without recognition, the environmental stimuli do not mean anything. A whole complex of our mental sub-processes is involved here with the sole function of enabling us to maintain contact with the real world and survive in it. Although mental information from our perceptual processes is just an approximation rather than an exact copy of the external world, our percepts, i.e. perception-driven representations, refer to the objects in the external world: they can be traced to the environmental objects via a series of transformations of our highly active and constructive information processing system (Rumelhart and Norman, 1987). The contact between the sensory information and our mental processing leads to a conversion of the former into the code known to the neural structures of our cognitive system. As a result, a distal stimulus outside the processing organism, away from its sensory receptors, such as the ear and the eye, becomes available as a proximal stimulus, which is very close or even internal (Nęcka et al., 2006). Cognitive psychologists stress the constructive and active nature of information processing at the stage of perception, especially the reciprocal determination between the bottom-driven (environmental) and top-driven (mental) sources of information. After all, cognition is recognition. Bruner (1973: 92) makes a characteristically pertinent observation: The environment includes the stimulus complex brought to us by distance receptors and by the somatic senses. Here we purposefully use the term information to characterize stimulus input, for we are not concerned with the energy characteristics of the stimulus as such, but with its cue or clue characteristics.

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Sensory register. The first stage of processing the incoming information is the sensory register where the information from the five senses enters and remains there for about half a second in its analogous form before being passed on to the short-term store. The information in the short-term store which has been rehearsed, organized, elaborated or chunked to make it meaningful and therefore more memorable can be passed on to permanent memory. Information processing is about physical energies being transformed into nervous impulses at the sensory level, with some preliminary organization (structure, form) activated from memory imposed on these nervous impulses by the processing subject, further processed and committed to memory as memory representations; it is also about the use of the results in constructing and evaluating various courses of action. Anderson, B. F. (1975: 25) states: Information is received by the senses, processed by a variety of analyzers, and formed into an analogue model of the world. The story of how man knows the world begins at the sensory surfaces, the interface between the knower and the known, where physical energy is transformed into neural activity, to be treated as information.

The receptors in our nervous system admit this stimulation to be constructed into some representation of what the world out there might be like. Our access to the world is always mediated via our sensitivity to a certain range of information afforded by our human nervous system. As the incoming information is processed for storage, a very important, yet underrated process takes place, that of re-describing (in the sense of copying and mapping) the environmental information into our information processing system to be further defined and processed as our mental representation. The environmentally available forms of language signs, which are arbitrary with reference to their meaning, must be represented analogically and verbatim, i.e. exactly, in our mind to be of any communicative use. This happens gradually, via approximations and modifications based on feedback, but the point remains the same. Further, feature processes and analogue processes, not to mention the symbolic processes, integrate, abstract and code information and consolidate it with that in memory. A major function in perception is to detect distinctive features understood as the dimension of difference between two or more objects, as well as invariants, i.e. objects with the same features despite variations in other features (Rebok 1987). The role of the environmental sensory experience and the way in which it is fed into our mental representation must be fully recognized in modelling the processes of language learning, even though we are usually unaware of them in native language use. However, this is certainly not the case in foreign language learning, where new forms attract the learner’s involuntary attention and are resistant to 134

automaticity. The cognitive perspective is a framework which shows that, because of their limited processing capacity, humans, including foreign language learners, learn languages by observing, and participating in, structured events or episodes of verbal communication to reconstruct the code necessary in language use. HIP is a perspective which anchors language use and learning in the dimensions of time and space. The telereceptors. Vision and audition are considered to be the two most essential perceptual processes that impact our cognition. These modalities are two of the openings in the nervous system in the form of the eye and the ear and their neural infrastructure, which are specialized for language processing. They register the modulation, i.e. the differences in intensity, duration and location of the environmental stimuli. Feature analysis is an innate mechanism which constitutes the first step in information analysis and combination. Acuity is the degree of precision with which the system can register and make fine discriminations in the information being processed (Rebok 1987). Primary perception, fast and crude, represents things in three‑dimensional space and in the dimension of time. The various modalities in our nervous system include other sense modalities, such as tactile, olfactory, haptic, etc. Therefore, information is first represented in a modality-specific form, e.g. as echoic or iconic representations, as well as in an amodal form at a more abstract, meta-modal, level. Intersensory (cross-modal) coordination develops very early and evidence shows that children can translate visual information into auditory information in the first year of life. As Rebok (1987) points out, during life-span development, what is stored in memory becomes more abstract and less tied to a specific sensory modality. The cognitive status of language use results from situating the requisite component processes in the subsystems of Human Information Processing and decomposing the more complex structures involved in language use into elementary ones as required by the functioning of the whole mechanism as well as the stages of language learning.Information from the sensory register is further processed by secondary perception (Anderson, B. F., 1975, Eysenck and Keane 2010), which depends on attention and recognition. Recognition is an interactive process of matching the stimulus information with that activated from long-term memory (LTM). This is a function of anticipation schemata and experience. Context predisposes us to recognizing information as something. Recognition runs its full course when we activate all the relevant knowledge to interpret and evaluate the data. The interactive and constructive nature of perception results not only from the fact that the various information structures must be activated from memory for processing to take place, but also from the fact that they are activated and constructed, when necessary, on the basis of their

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perceived relevance (Eysenck 2006, Eysenck and Keane 2010). Language data are instinctively interpreted for their meaning (Aitchison 1979). The distinction between primary and secondary perception. According to Bruner (1973), it is possible to distinguish three stages in perceiving: expectancy or hypothesis, processing the stimulus information for clues and confirming the initial hypothesis. Perceiving takes place in a tuned organism, in other words when we are to some extent prepared for seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting something, which can be an element or a class of things. It has been pointed out that, in primary perception, information is received by the senses (picked up by the receptors), processed by a variety of analyzers and formed into an analogue model of the world. Analogue processes should be contrasted with symbolic processes. Symbolic processes operate on systems of entities which represent something other than themselves and include phonemes, graphemes (also morphemes and lexemes), number digits, logical symbols and musical notation. These segments, digits or phonemes, are discrete mental units with distinctive properties which make them stand out among other units of the same system; they are identifiable because they have boundaries. As identifiable entities with clear boundaries, these discrete segments have a highly combinatorial potential. Analogical information is combined and organized to yield a perceptual world which is meaningful. Secondary perception is the mechanism which selects and combines features of the objects in primary perception to relate them to what is in memory. Therefore, perception is reciprocally determined by the information in the stimulus and our information in the LTM. This takes place in the posterior association area. At the same time, perceptual patterns are often activated by the internal mental activity, like in the case of memory images, which can be verbal and nonverbal. A percept must relate a particular state in the world to a somewhat generalized, but not identical representation, and it does so by corresponding imperfectly to each of the two. Psychologists query whether this is essentially template matching or testing features. Bruner (1973) regards perception as a highly constructive process which involves two steps, an inferential leap from some features of an object to a category -provided it is available in the mind of the subject -whose accuracy is additionally tested via hypothesis. Categorization of an object or event is tantamount to giving it identity, which involves recognizing it as something. Bruner points out: All perception is generic, in the sense that whatever is perceived is placed in and achieves its meaning from a class of percepts with which it is grouped (Bruner 1973: 8)… All of this suggests that veridicality is not so much a matter of representation as it is a matter of what I shall call “model building”. In learning to perceive, we are learning the relations that exist between the properties of objects, events that we encounter, learning

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appropriate categories and category systems, learning to predict and to check what goes with what (1973: 11). (Bruner is clearly talking about structuring here)

Givon (2005: 40) emphasizes the role of categorization in this way: ‘the mental representation of individual tokens of experience as members of recognizable recurrent types -is one of the most profound adaptive moves in the annals of biological evolution.’ By constructing internal models or generic representations which are isomorphic with the more redundant environmental information, an individual can predict, extrapolate or go beyond the information given. There seem to be two aspects of secondary perception: differentiation, i.e. categorizing and extracting information from the representation in primary perception, and enrichment (or elaboration), i.e. supplementing this information from the memory store. Enrichment is the result of interpretation, i.e. assuming more about the incoming information than is actually available. Categorization involves organizing raw stimuli into entities with distinctive characteristics and clear boundaries (Sternberg 1996). Certain facts suggest that mechanisms for processing phonemic distinctions are innate. Categorical perception of phonemes appears to be present in infants by at least the age of four weeks (Carroll, D. W., 1986, for a fascinating discussion of recent controversies in categorical perception of continuous speech stimulus, see Pisoni and Levy, 2009). While primary perception produces an analogous image of the sound wave, representing dimensions as continua, secondary perception represents a much more limited number of positions along the same dimension. Here, information is segmented and categorized as it is coded into features of secondary perception, such as language units and structures (Sternberg 1996). A necessary aspect of processing is judgement which involves comparing the current stimulus with information in long‑term memory; when the relevant structure or item is missing, the stimulus will be perceived as new, which takes up processing resources (Anderson, B. F., 1975). This is what Schmidt (1990) has called ‘noticing’. Bruner (1973) stresses that perceiving accurately in typical, far from ideal conditions involves being able to refer the input to appropriate categorical coding systems; in this way, one is able to restore the missing information from the knowledge of the code to which the input has been referred.

3.2.4. The role of perception in learning a foreign language In this account, perception is of fundamental significance in foreign language learning and teaching because it is a highly interactive window onto new environmental information, the interface between the environmental language input and the language learner’s information processing system. This is how

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information structures are admitted into the learner’s mind. To refer to the analogy of HIP with digestion, the processing system, which activates various types of knowledge structures relevant to the incoming data, acts similarly to the digestive tract in which enzymes are secreted in anticipation or the presence of some nutrients to be processed mechanically as well as chemically. At the most elementary level, the learner’s telereceptors, such as the eye and the ear, register the distal environmental language stimulus, and convert it into the proximal/mental stimulus. This happens preconsciously and involuntarily most of the time. However, when the input information compared to the available knowledge store is identified as new, its processing requires more attentional resources because the information must first be assigned structure, i.e. identified as some category. The fact that it requires more attentional resources makes it more noticeable. Thanks to this entrance, language forms, meanings and their various arrangements as well as combinatorial options, can be recorded, mapped/copied, redescribed in different formats and reconstructed with their implicit contrasts as the learner’s mental representations to be used and/or operated upon further -in much more complex, even constructive or creative ways -by his or her processing mechanism. I am using the word ‘copy’ not in the sense of producing a mirror image, but in the sense of a replica, a reconstruction of modality-specific information structures for recognition and use as mental representation in a different organism. From the foreign language learner’s perspective, the process of mapping, copying, re-presenting must include the analogical, maximally exact, i.e. verbatim, modality-specific representations of forms and their arrangements in addition to the fact that the relationship of forms to meanings is symbolic, i.e. involves reference and representation, their elements -arbitrary, whereas their use is rule-governed in line with the nature of language as a communicative code. In the long run, the learner not only maps the forms and form-meaning representations, but constructions of various sizes, to actively and gradually reconstruct the whole system of forms and meanings, their arrangements, mutual relationships and admissible combinations for the target language use and for sorting out the target-native language relationships. This implies such processes as: a) composition and decomposition into ever smaller constituents; b) establishing their identity and borders by comparison and contrast within the same language code and across languages in the learner’s mind; c) their range and distribution in allophonic, allomorphic and allolexic forms; d) their function in different contexts; e) their control in use based on procedural records from practice in language use as comprehension and production in speech and writing. 138

Having these forms in place, represented mentally as elements of the code, the learner may process written or spoken discourse for meaning, investing only very limited resources in the language forms which are perceived as familiar. The situation is quite different when they are new, i.e. when they cannot be readily matched with the existing mental representation. Instead, they demand some investment of processing resources to be registered and assigned their structure, consolidated and incorporated into the code as a representation of a unit with identity. These processes take place simultaneously, as numerous episodes and long-term learning via language use as the learner processes language utterances in meaningful contexts while he or she interacts with others to clarify forms and form/meaning relationships; at the same time, there is feedback on performance from more competent communicative partners. The underlying argument throughout this book has been that the mechanism of language use and learning is entailed in the mechanism of human information processing as its highly specialized instance. More exactly, it is entailed in the general mechanism of information processing as a distinct case among other symbolic and analogical representational systems. In this perspective, language must be recognized as a unique, highly complex code consisting of signs with arbitrary forms, organized in double articulation, with specialized entities, structures, hierarchies and types of processing as well as specialized, cultural varieties which make up the whole domain of verbal communication. Last but not least, language in use is unique for its unparalleled role in individual life and cognition as well as social interaction. Nowhere is the status of language learning as a special case of human information processing more clearly evident than in the perceptual processes. This contact stage between the processing subject’s mind and other language users in the sociocultural environment makes the language code acquirable from generation to generation by way of communication. For a young individual or a foreign language learner, taking in environmental language data in perception is indispensable for the reconstruction of mental representations underlying language use. To say that perception is a necessary, though underestimated, stage of HIP, however, is not the same as to say that it is both necessary and sufficient. Other conditions must be fulfilled, such as interaction and feedback, to be discussed later. This role of perception makes us even more aware of the importance of the quality of language environment/input in foreign language learning, and the negative consequences of the poverty of language input, such as degenerate input, or trivial, meaningless input, or modified input with unnaturally condensed occurrence of language forms.

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3.2.5. Attention Attention is narrower than consciousness in that it is intentional and temporary: we can engage, maintain and disengage our attention as well as direct it to various aspects of the object within focus with varying degrees of intensity. This view, which presupposes selection/choices and voluntary control, makes it highly integrated with intentionality (Call and Tomasello, 2005). Attention is our decision centre to exercise voluntary control of thought and action, as well as our focalization of the currently available, i.e. limited, cognitive resources, which can be directed to various goals/tasks according to our priorities (Styles 2006). We may consider it as largely, though not completely, episodic and strategic, as the available cognitive resources which are dispatched mostly voluntarily, according to our goals via decision-making, and as a meeting ground of the various components of the information processing mechanism affording their integration and interaction between the environment and our mind. The founding father of research on attention, William James, pointed out as early as 1890 that attention is a) focalization, concentration of our consciousness, b) a withdrawal from some tasks to deal effectively with others and c) the opposite of being confused. He stressed the role of attention in forming memories, as well as the role of practice in overcoming the attentional limitations while performing more than one task. Styles (2006) emphasized that we cannot remember what we have not attended to while novel information and tasks require attentional expenditure, i.e. effort in processing. Attention allows us to recombine/integrate various sources of information from separate multiple codes into coherent objects. Strayer and Drews (2007) list influential metaphors of attention, offered at various stages of research, as that of the limited capacity channel, which allows only the relevant information to pass to the higher levels and prevents the irrelevant information from entering the system. Broadbent’s (1958) filter acts as a gatekeeper, which uses certain criteria to select some information items and block others. Further metaphors include a bottleneck, a zoom lens with adjustable focus and limited resources (Eysenck 2006). Styles (2006) adds a spotlight metaphor, which has a centre, a margin and a fringe. All in all, one would be tempted to think of attention as a doorway to our cognitive system, since it is a flexible, dirigible narrowing in the thoroughfare between the mentally and the environmentally-driven sources of information, underlying the top-down and bottom-up traffic in our cognitive functioning. Limitation of cognitive resources. Attention is regarded as concentration of our processing resources and limitation on our IP capacity, responsible for the 140

adage that human beings are limited-capacity processors. This concentration of processing resources is a matter of degree considering the fact that information processing takes place when we are barely awake, fully awake, alert, when we stay focused and highly concentrated, as well as bored and exhausted. At the same time, regardless of the degree of concentration, the narrowing in the tract between the environmental stimuli and our memory store requires that we engage in a considerable proportion of serial, linear processing. However, this limitation is compensated for by the use of LTM structures for organizing information such as plans in their various guises, especially schemata. Planning is related to plans as process is to products, two sides of the same coin. The function of schemata at all stages of processing is crucial and will be discussed in section 3.3. The central processor must be supplemented by a mechanism in order not to forget its goal, i.e. to make goal‑directed behaviour possible, the mechanism works by launching a plan, understood as a mental arrangement of entities in their temporal or spatial ordering. To overcome their attentional limitations, subjects may look ahead to anticipate, or predict, the information to come on the basis of the available knowledge and environmental clues, or to look back at the material of processing to derive better a orientation from this retrospection. The main point, however, is to maintain the plan within the attention span. To keep track of the plan, we monitor our activity to determine where we are in the plan in terms of our goals, while, at the same time, we may be working on sub-goals. Sustained attention is the ability to maintain the focus of attention on a given task for longer periods, which is necessary in time-consuming, complex tasks, i.e. tasks that require long-term effort. Individuals vary in the ability to deal with complex tasks as well as in their avoidance of such tasks, not to mention the ability to resume an interrupted ongoing activity (Strayer and Drews 2007). Divided attention is the ability to perform two or more activities, also called multi-tasking, which require a flexible allocation of our processing resources based on processing priorities. Selective attention is the process of deciding which stimuli will be ignored to make attentional space for those we wish to focus upon, attend to and concentrate our effort upon (Sternberg 1996). People tend to focus on the most relevant aspects of the environmental stimulus (Rebok 1987). The above observations emphasize the temporal dimension in human information processing: investment of time is a most potent remedy for the limitations of our attention. This is why complex tasks, especially language learning, require sustained effort in order to deal with the intricate processing components and to focus attention on various aspects/facets of the complex substance of processing. Attentional limitations may be compensated by a number of strategies, such as:

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a) taking more time with a single task to be able to process in a controlled manner what otherwise would have to be processed automatically, i.e. in a way not conducive to perceiving new elements; b) repeating the task several times – e.g. with clear instructions from the teacher to direct the learner’s attention – to be able to focus on a different aspect each time; c) repeating the task several times to be able to process more deeply each time; d) use part-whole task strategy and rehearsal, which also involve repetition. Voluntary – involuntary attention. There are more sources of information than we can handle. Attention is a selection mechanism whereby approximately only 1/3 of the potentially available stimuli are processed, i.e. noticed and remembered. They are selected on the basis of internal or external relevance, anticipation and/or retrospection. An important distinction must be pointed out between voluntary attention, which is guided by our decisions, i.e. internal factors, and involuntary attention, which is attracted by certain properties of the environmental stimuli, i.e. external factors (Eysenck 2006, Styles 2006). Voluntary attention is subject to developmental constraints in that it emerges gradually in childhood. Attentional limitations may be compensated not only by using more time on task, as has been mentioned above, but by the individual investment of effort at the single-task level as well as in the long-run, which can bring about beneficial task transfer in time. According to Kahneman (1973), trying harder means allocating more attention, i.e. more mental effort to the task, which enables us to accomplish more ambitious goals within its confines. Our involuntary attention is captured by novelty and change. What is new can be determined with reference to our present knowledge so it is largely but not entirely individual. After all, we also process socially novel or even creative/ newly created stimuli. Stimuli may also be quite objectively noticeable by virtue of being salient, i.e. prominent in their environment, or contrasting, i.e. quite different from their context, or surprising, i.e. incongruent with our expectations, or unstable, i.e. inconsistent in terms of their intensity. Characteristically enough, our attention is also attracted by the dynamics within the perceptual field, so we involuntarily attend to moving or otherwise changing stimuli. As pointed out by Eysenck (2006) and Eysenck and Keane (2010), emotional factors such as stress as well as trait and state anxiety play an important role in our attentional policies and functioning (also see section 3.2.7). Directed attention. Within the scope of voluntary control, attention may be treated as concentration of our cognitive resources. It is said to have a focus and a periphery and it may be allocated in various ways, for example to the following tasks: 142

a) to general monitoring of the environment, called vigilance b) to analyzing stimuli and c) to maintaining information within our attention span. In line with the concept of voluntary/directed attention, the limited cognitive resources can be deployed on the basis of self-set or externally-assigned goals. At the same time, they can be assigned to various aspects of the task, depending on its structure, relevance and task demands (Styles 2006). General monitoring of the environment is part of vigilance, the state of being watchful, and its adaptive role is self-explanatory (Strayer and Drews 2007). Focal attention is equally significant in that, for the incoming stimuli, it facilitates the analysis of a percept into attributes. For the outgoing stimuli, focal attention is the site of constructive, even creative processes. The zoom lens metaphor highlights the variable level of specificity at which the subject may select to process stimuli, ranging from a broader scope with a lesser amount of detail to a smaller scope with a greater amount of detail. In addition to the varying scope of vision, we can also vary the mental or physical distance from the perceptual field, which is of the essence not only in aerial photography, but also in abstract thought and generic concept formation. Cognitive psychologists recognize and stress the fact that we try to make sense of enough data at the most useful level of representation (Sternberg 1996). A similar point has been made earlier in connection with model construction, especially the importance of adjusting the level of the model’s generality and scope to capture the relevant aspect of the phenomenon in question (see section 2.2.3). Directed, focal attention makes information processing a fundamentally temporal, quintessentially aspectual endeavour. Considering the fact that humans engage, sustain, disengage, reengage, and shift their attention, our cognitive operations can only have an episodic, task-structured form. These observations apply to all the manifestations of human information processing, including language use and learning in verbal communication. Yet another dimension of attention is arousal, defined as the level of alertness of our information processing system. Learning new bodies of information requires arousal, i.e. activation/mobilization of our processing resources to do the cognitive work required by the task. ‘It is an allotment of analyzing mechanism to a limited region of the perceptual field’ (Neisser 1976: 88). A human subject must focus cognitive resources on one object to perceive and understand it from many angles, as clearly as possible. The material of processing in focal attention is more memorable in this way and may even be available to our awareness, so that we can produce a verbal report about it. Focal attention is needed when we try to understand the information being processed -as well as ourselves -to

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become aware of the result and gain some cognitive control over it. Analysis of this kind determines whether knowledge will be understood and memorized, or merely understood. Understanding requires a certain capacity in the superordinate system. Intelligence establishes the limits of this capacity. Practice increases it by turning routine chores over to the subordinate system. The intention to understand puts this capacity into use (Anderson, B. F., 1975, Sternberg, 1996). However, this does not mean that the unattended stimuli play no role in our cognitive process. The concepts of implicit knowledge and incidental learning are receiving increasingly more coverage at present, especially in second language acquisition research (e.g. Doughty and Long, eds. 2003, Ortega 2009, Whong 2011). An important function of attention, especially from the point of view of using language for the purposes of communication, is to coordinate information from various sense modalities, known as cross-modal attention. To use a simple example, when we listen to someone speak, we process the auditory stimulus, i.e. the phonemically coded message, as well as the visual one, such as lip movements and body language, in the context of the situation (Shell et al. 2010, Eysenck 2006). These sources of information define each other and reduce the amount of uncertainty involved in the exact processing of the message for meaning (see section 3.2.7. on working memory) To sum up, attention can be treated as our cognitive processing resource with a directed focus and a periphery as well as a variable level of effort. ‘Only information in focal attention can be verbalized, and it appears in focal attention only when information processing is under cognitive control, not when it is executed automatically’ (Miller 1987: 8). On the other hand, information processing cannot be executed automatically when our attention is engaged in processing something new. As has been stressed, novelty invariably engages processing resources. This applies to foreign language use and learning just as any other form of information processing. When the information is not available to our awareness, we can treat it as subconscious or preconscious, but under no circumstances as unconscious, which, technically speaking, occurs in a dead or comatose human being. These properties, limitations and compensatory systems of attention must be reflected in representing verbal communication. To begin with, attentional processes in language use operate on complex information structures in the form of discourse. Attention is a central component of a spaciotemporal model of language processing. Attentional limitations justify considering language use and learning as gradual, i.e. incremental, taking time, admitting of degrees and materializing as recurrent goal-oriented episodes with different aspects focused upon. Second Language Acquisition Research has numerous sources on the role 144

of cognition in language learning (for an overview, see Ortega 2009), the view of attention as detection, and the role of attention in language learning as noticing (e.g. Schmidt 1990, Tomlin and Villa 1994). These ideas are qualitatively different from my cognitive account of foreign language learning as human information processing. A more extensive treatment can be found in Dakowska 2003. Yerkes Dodson Law states that there is an optimal level of arousal for tasks (see Levelt 1989, Eysenck and Keane 2010). When this is the case, only the relevant clues are processed. When the arousal is high, only some of the relevant clues are processed. Complex tasks involve more relevant stimuli and, for this reason, a lower level of arousal is optimal. Arousal can be increased by incentives to improve performance.

3.2.6. Attention versus working memory There are reasons to think that the terms attention and working memory overlap a great deal (Eysenck and Keane 2010). Attention emphasizes the (limited) mental resources mobilized for our mental activity to do the cognitive work, whereas working memory stresses the state of activation and retrieval from memory of mentally represented forms, structures, schemata and knowledge, as tools relevant for the task of processing the incoming information, a desk top or work space (Boduroglu et al. 2007). According to Gathercole (2009: 757), it is: A flexible mental workspace that can be used to maintain and transform information in the course of demanding cognitive activities, and that acts as a temporary bridge between externally and internally generated mental representations.

Rebok (1987) defines working memory as the amount of mental work that can be carried out rather than the amount of information that can be stored, which is close to our understanding of attention. Givon (2005) points out that working memory is of limited-capacity and short duration, in which the material is kept temporarily awaiting further processing decisions; working memory has a cross-modal component that interacts with guided attention as well as modality specific subconscious components. Attention span is the number of items a person can process within a certain period. The effective capacity of working memory is determined by an individual’s prior knowledge. These mental representations, activated from memory, are indispensable since our perception is impossible without the assignment of structure to the incoming stimuli, i.e. without recognizing them as something, whereas our knowledge, be it episodic or generic, activated as relevant concepts and propositions, or situational knowledge, brings to bear on the process of understanding the situations, events and contents. The notion of working memory was originally

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proposed by Baddeley and Hitch (1974) to complement the distinctions in memory stores of short-term and long-term memory. Only a small number of items can be maintained in working memory but the complexity of the material is also an important factor. Resources are allocated on the basis of task demands. Some of the limitations, especially at the subordinate levels are subject to domain constraints. The best known estimate of our working memory limitations is George Miller’s magical number 7 plus or minus 2 chunks, later reduced to 4.

3.2.7. Working memory and intentional behaviour The core executive functions that regulate human cognition include the ability to maintain and update the contents of working memory, i.e. maintenance and updating, inhibit irrelevant information, i.e. inhibition; shift attention to a new piece of information or a new task, i.e. task-shifting; keep tract of a set of goals, i.e. goal management; coordinate a variety of tasks, i.e. multi-tasking, and plan, i.e. planning (Boduroglu et al. 2007). These researchers maintain that individual differences in working memory and executive functions underlie differences in intelligence, as demonstrated by a 0.65 correlation at various cognitive tasks and intelligence tests. It is concluded that general intelligence reflects individual efficacy of executive control. Working memory capacity can be enhanced by strategy training as well as rehearsal, imagery, or semantic chaining. Mood and emotions affect working memory as has been demonstrated by Eysenck and Keane (2010), among others. Anxiety and positive as well as negative moods which lead to intrusive thoughts may reduce working memory capacity. High anxiety may reduce the working memory capacity on various demanding cognitive tasks. The relationship between working memory and intelligence is present in Sternberg’s (1996) model of intelligence and intellectual development, which emphasizes the role of metacognitive processes involved in the executive function. These processes include determining the nature of the problem/task, selecting the information necessary for the completion of the task, allocating processing resources, monitoring the performance, interpreting feedback about the effectiveness of the efforts, deciding to act upon feedback and modifying the performance in response to feedback, i.e. genuinely strategic operations. Intellectual growth is facilitated by the developing operations of the metacognitive components. What is also essential is the growth of mental representations and mental resources as well as the increasing ability to metacognitively regulate behaviour, including communicative behaviour. Like attention, working memory anchors our cognitive processes in space and time; it performs the function of a mental desk top for the transfer of 146

information from the environment to storage and from retrieval to production systems. It is the work space for planning ahead, which includes making various choices, and retrospecting into the past, with both functions intimately interconnected. It is the locus of our reasoning processes such as problem-solving, inferencing, analysis, synthesis, etc. Problem-solving and decision-making abilities (how we make use of our cognitive resources) are primary abilities in professional work, in which storing large bodies of information is less important than the operational abilities.

3.2.8. Memory According to Klix (1980) and Anderson, B. F. (1975), there are three sources of information/knowledge stored in human memory. Klix (1980: 12) specifies them as follows: The different ways in which these three classes of information are imparted seem remarkable: memory of the species is inherited, knowledge obtained by the society is transferred via the sign system of language, whereas individual experience is obtained through coordinated function of sensomotoric perception of figuratively experienced correlations.

Rebok (1987: 230) says: ‘Memory is critically important to our ability to survive in our world’. Tulving (1983: 28) defines memory as an active storage system which makes it possible to retain, retrieve and use the acquired knowledge. Memory performs the function of information storage which is relatively durable but also functional from the point of view of its future uses. From the language learning perspective, it is indispensable to highlight such modality-specific memory systems as echoic and iconic memory considering the fact that the echoic memory is the store of phonemic representations whereas the iconic one is the store of graphemic representations. It is well accepted that memory is associative and hierarchical, that memory structures are organized into such forms as networks, concepts, prototypes, basic levels, schemata, frames, scripts, hierarchies, events and situations, spatial information and motor knowledge, and that there are strategies for organizing, rehearsal, consolidation, retrieval and use of knowledge (Eysenck 2006, Norman 1987, Sternberg 1996). There is indeed an intricate reciprocal relationship between the function of memory as a storage system and the qualitatively different forms of memory representations activated in various domain-specific mental and motor activities, stored at various levels. Taking into account the flow of information from the environment into the processing system, i.e. the duration of processing for storage, memory can be classified as very short‑term or iconic/echoic memory (VSTM), short-term or

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working memory (STM), intermediate memory (ITM), and long‑term or permanent memory (LTM). Long‑term memory is the location of relatively permanent changes in knowledge, whereas intermediate memory retains information for about a week. Depending on the quality of processing and storage, items in permanent memory may be available for recognition and recall. We also make use of external memory in the form of notes, books, computer files and other records, which render vast knowledge representations more permanent and accessible. Because my interest is in language use and learning, I wish to target the specifically lingual information structures and other language-related representations in memory. The following information structures have been recognized as memory representations required in language use: 1. syntagmatic and paradigmatic representations, i.e. linear information structures, such as plans and schemata with empty spaces for paradigmatic options, which result from chronological coding, and categories, i.e. concepts, which result from feature coding; both can form hierarchies, i.e. arrangements at various levels of generality (Anderson, B. F., 1975, Markus and Zajonc 1985); 2. declarative and procedural representations, or better still, declarative and procedural records, understood as two poles of the highly dynamic representational continuum, in which the former is available as relatively more explicit propositional knowledge, while the latter -as information records implicit in operations demonstrated in various types of tasks, mental, motor or both. Let me now turn to the classical distinction made by Tulving between episodic and semantic memory. He (1972: 385f) writes: Episodic memory receives and stores information about temporally dated episodes and events, and temporal-spatial relations among these events. … Semantic memory is the memory necessary for the use of language. It is a mental thesaurus, organized knowledge a person possesses about words and other verbal symbols, their meaning and referents, about relations among them, and about rules, formulas, and algorithms for the manipulation of these symbols, concepts, and relations.

Episodic memory comes from coding events temporally/chronologically, i.e. as organized personal experience in time and space, resulting in event memory. Events and situations are important categories in our life, which naturally reflects the nature of our information processing mechanism, while situational awareness arising from this type of coding is highly adaptive in social life and absolutely fundamental in verbal communication. Tulving (1983) states that episodic memory has autobiographical reference, whereas semantic memory refers to more processed knowledge, such as concepts, relations and propositions, 148

abstracted from episodic reference; it exhibits only cognitive reference because the link between the particular event and the circumstances in which it was acquired may have been lost. There is a strong interdependence between the two systems in that they interact closely, each influencing information processing in the other. Tulving himself acknowledges the fact that the term ‘semantic’ is not ideal to denote world knowledge, generic knowledge and categorical knowledge, especially given the fact that ‘semantic’ comes from linguistics and highlights the meaning of words only. The alternative term, generic, could have been more accurate, but the term ‘semantic knowledge’ gained quite a wide circulation. He does not regard the two systems as the only kinds as he also recognizes propositional and procedural knowledge, neither of which can be classified as episodic or semantic because they are derived from different criteria (Tulving 1983). My conviction regarding this point is that the term ‘generic’ (Gleitman 1981) is indeed more appropriate than ‘semantic’ and that, instead of claiming that generic knowledge is a source of episodic knowledge, we should posit a highly dynamic interactive relationship between episodic and generic types (for the opposite view, Robinson 1995). Especially with Tulving’s terminological modifications, the distinction between episodic and generic memory is useful to researchers in cognitive psychology as much as in foreign language learning because it is based on the criterion of degree of processing. Episodic memory is the more elementary kind, coded along the temporal dimension, more detailed and less flexible situational representations. ‘Generic’ is understood as the more processed, categorized knowledge of the world, which includes the entities abstracted from their situational/ temporal context, therefore more flexible and universal. Generic knowledge may contain semantic, syntactic and lexical representations as well as generalized situational/episodic representations, which refer to typical social events and can be retrieved for the sake of our situational awareness (SA). Both episodic and generic memories have their form and meaning representations and, as has been mentioned, there must be quite a considerable dynamic transfer of information between them. Metamemory is an aspect of metacognition, i.e. knowledge about knowing and understanding, which develops along the life span and refers to various abilities important for the regulation of memory processes, i.e. a) the improvement of remembering, such as deliberate use of memory strategies (mnemonic devices), e.g. inferencing, making lists and external resourcing, as well as organizing/categorizing, meaningful/personal associations, imagery, rehearsal and elaboration; and b) memory monitoring, in other words keeping track of items currently in memory and memory evaluation, i.e. the judgement of one’s

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knowledge and memory span. Psychologists are increasingly aware of the role of metamemory in storing and using knowledge of the world and its role in maintaining memory functions throughout our life span (Rebok 1987). As in many other areas of human functioning, metamemory enables us to improve our storage processes by turning them over to the level of controlled, i.e. deliberate choices, which is to say, the level of regulated strategic behaviour.

3.2.9. Memory representations requisite in language use and learning On encountering foreign language input in real life, we store meaning as well as language forms in their modality specific as well as metamodal formats, forms of different sizes/scope/length and various levels of generality. Moreover, as stressed in the section on perception, 3.2.3 and 3.2.4, because verbal forms in language signs are arbitrary representations of meaning, their mental representations in the minds of foreign language users must possess a high degree of definition/fidelity/precision to be functional as units in the language code, i.e. they must retain their distinctive features/internal articulations both as invariant categories as well as their context-dependent varieties, e.g. allophones, allomorphs. In other words, they must be re-described in the learner’s mental representation analogically as well as verbatim, precisely and exactly with all the implicit structural contrasts of the target forms in place. To be useful for coding meanings in verbal communication, mental representations of forms must at least aim to approximate the target, i.e. the socially shared norms and conventions observed in verbal interactions of the community of language users. Group membership in the target language speech community depends on this conformity. In addition to these representations, language users must be able to reconstruct combinatorial potential of these units according to the language norms. Such a reconstruction includes forms with their meanings, the way they are combined in messages, and the way these combinations are recognized by addressees and sent out by senders in basic subcodes. The only way to become a speaker of a given language is to functionally acquire/reconstruct in comprehension and production – in speech and in writing – a sufficiently articulated language code, conforming to the communicative practices of that speech community. A native speaker may treat these signs as transparent because to him or her they are thoroughly familiar and proceduralized, but this does not mean that forms of these language units can be taken for granted in a model of foreign language use and learning. They are essential components of both the episodic and generic memory stores. Language learners must have opportunities – with 150

focal and/or peripheral attention -to work out and store a host of information units/constellations implicit in language forms with their identities, i.e. distinctive characteristics and borders, their meanings, meaning/form as well as form/ meaning mappings, multiple relationships among forms, and among meanings, for the purposes of spoken and written discourse comprehension as well as discourse production in speech and writing. The learner’s cognitive resources are invested in the process of acquiring forms and their constructions in addition to their admissible combinations which allow their use in conveying meaning. Language input in the classroom is much more important in foreign language learning than it is in second language acquisition, in which verbal communication with members of the speech community outside the educational institution is readily available so that classroom processes only enhance the acquisition in progress. Teaching, in this case, may be called intervention, unlike in the case of foreign language learning, in which it involves the reconstruction of conditions for the entire processes. At the same time, foreign language learning as human information processing seen through the lens of verbal communication can be recognized as a unique, yet highly informative diffraction of more basic information structures and processes in language use, such as: a) the way information is represented, e.g. as paradigmatic or linear, syntagmatic, arrangements, necessary for the computations requisite in language use; b) and the way information is used, i.e. processes, operations and strategies in other words, computations performed on the above representations in human interaction (Churchland 1986). From the point of view of the relationships between the linear form of utterances and the hierarchical structure of categories in knowledge representations, the distinction between chronological coding and feature coding is fundamental. Categories such as concepts are hierarchical structures which result from feature coding, whereby only some properties of represented objects are singled out for categorization, while others are actively disregarded. Chronological coding enables us to form associations and arrangements in their sequences at different levels of generality, ranging from very specific to very abstract (Markus and Zajonc 1985). Propositions are mental sentences which combine concepts to make various assertions about the world, most typically in the form of arguments and predicates (Clark 1985). The two DeSaussurean dimensions, the syntagmatic and the paradigmatic ones (de Saussure 2002), which result from chronological and feature coding of information, make it possible for us to use language in the sense of composing and decomposing utterances. The syntagmatic dimension refers to linearly

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(chronologically) coded verbal information which follows syntactic norms with the size of the units ranging from two elements to a whole piece of discourse. The paradigmatic dimension, on the other hand, is the effect of feature coding, which produces categories alternatively suitable for a given position in the syntagmatic structure. The links between elements in the syntagmatic structure may be both very strict as well as flexible, e.g. syntagmatic structures may work as plans with empty slots open for various fillers as well as fixed expressions, such as idioms. Information of this kind must be available to competent speakers of the given language as structural options of one syntactic category to be selected as fillers of an empty slot in a syntagmatic construction. At the same time, foreign language learners must store lexical units of different sizes, such as phrasal verbs, phrases, sentence constructions, fixed expressions and idioms. Psycholinguists (e.g. C arroll, D. W., 1986) refer to these linear arrangements as schemata, story grammars, scripts, scenarios, micro‑ and macrostructures, prefabricated expressions (phrasal verbs, idioms), collocations and clause as well as sentence plans (see section 3.3). The use of patterns fits in beautifully as an example of the combinatorial potential of the syntagmatic/paradigmatic dimensions, as well as a justification for memory work in language learning (Levelt 1978, 1989). Knowing these linear structures makes discourse production and comprehension partly predictable. Oller (1972) regards expectancy for successive elements, which results from having the requisite mental representations, as the key ingredient of language use. Predictability is a well known aspect of perception and recognition in general. Knowing a language means being able to activate these conventionalized syntagmatic and paradigmatic units in discourse comprehension and production.

3.3. Information structures and their types: cognitive schemata Schemata are abstract units with elements coded in succession; they function as plans for representation as well as for productive and reproductive information retrieval. To a considerable extent, they reflect the structure, as represented in perception and associative memory, of the problems they have been developed to handle. Human beings have categories and plans for associative construction of information retrieval as well as for generating inferences. There are plans for assembling new combinations from information acquired in different contexts as well as plans for storage since information must be located and reassembled. Plans are used for memorizing, comprehension, storage and production (Anderson, J. R., 1983, Eysenck 2006, Eysenck and Keane 2010). 152

As has been said, cognitive psychologists accept the creed that cognition is recognition. Our information processing is based on recognizing the incoming information as something on the basis of the existing knowledge structures. They stress that information can only be processed if the perceiver has some mental forms to register and organize it (e.g. Aitkenhead and Slack, eds. 1987, Anderson, J. R., 1985, Baars and Gage, eds. 2007, Bruner 1973, Durso et al., eds. 2007, Eysenck and Keane 2010, Hewes 1995, Johnson-Laird 2006, Neisser 1976, Styles 2006). Such information structures have been identified as inferential sets, hypotheses, theories, scripts, themes, frames, categories, prototypes, attitudes, and schemas (schemata). Although distinct in various ways, they share important structural and functional similarities in that they are linear arrangements capable of organizing our processing (Markus and Zajonc 1985). Cognitive psychologists cannot stress enough the role of schemata in human information processing. Markus and Zajonc (1985: 143) define schemata as the main type of cognitive structures, also called knowledge and information structures, as follows: Cognitive structures are organizations of conceptually related representations of objects, situations, events, and of sequences of events and actions. What is stored in a cognitive structure can be the specific elements and features defining the object, event, or situation, or it can be the rules defining the interrelationships among the elements, or both. Cognitive structures derive from past experience with many instances of the complex concepts they represent. Cognitive structures simplify when there is too much, and thus they allow the perceiver to reduce an enormously complex environment to a manageable number of meaningful categories. They fill in where there is too little and allow the perceiver to go beyond the information given. These structures help the perceiver achieve some coherence in the environment and in the most general sense provide for the construction of social reality. They are built up in the course of information processing and they function as interpretive frameworks.

Schemata determine the parameters for the incoming information to be identified when it is underspecified and to be interpreted as coherent. They can be assembled during on-line processing as well as retrieved from memory as conventionalized ready wholes (Rumelhart and Norman 1987). Last but not least, they make up hierarchies. Listing memory representations without schemata would be impossible in this account. Schemata, the building blocks of cognition, are constructions of information which, once acquired, reduce the degree of uncertainty in the input information and help us make sense of the complexity of individual experience. Neisser (1976) regards them as the ultimate product of the processing mind, which can represent knowledge at all levels, ranging from letters of the alphabet and morphemes to culture. They result both from

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chronological and feature coding because the linear arrangements of information may be coded in detail or at a certain level of abstraction, i.e. with certain specific details factored out. For example, a language learner reading a story and trying to remember it so that he or she can retell it may store its plan, i.e. schema, at the level of the overall gist, at the level of paragraphs or even at the level of individual sentence constructions, expressions and phrases. Cognitive literature is rich in accounts of these structural arrangements. 1. Schemata (Rumelhart and Norman 1987), taken in the technical sense, refer to general categories and linear data structures (objects, events, sequences of events, actions and sequences of actions), which have empty slots for alternative fillers and serve to store generic information in our memory; they also contain sensorimotor elements. The authors call them active devices for recognizing and processing information and for constructing thought and action. There are schemata which represent a central tendency for the distribution of a given set, template schemata which are filing systems for the organization of information and procedural schemata for actions. They operate on, and bridge, the individual and the shared pool of information. 2. Frames (Minsky 1975) are lower-level structures. They function as abstract units of information, procedures or rules which are needed in organizing and interpreting data. Frames make us recognize a given object for what it is even when it is perceived in certain transformations. Likewise, we are able to recognize a given story frame even when it is presented in specific contexts. 3. Scripts and scenarios (Schank and Abelson 1977) are kinds of schemata for a frequently occurring sequence of events; they contain individual expectations about certain situations in the social world; they refer to culture- specific conventional or general social events. A script is a mental structure which assigns social roles, objects, conditions and results which emerge in a stereotypical sequence of events, such as a doctor’s appointment, eating out or an air-flight scenario (Markus and Zajonc 1985). These scripts and scenarios are, in fact, identical with social schemata, such as schemata of oneself, roles and social group schemata, event and action schemata, as well as practiced behavioural scripts, which contain social information. These constructs specifically refer to events in time and contain a number of entry conditions, a sequence of scenes and a set of results (Rumelhart and Norman, 1987). For the scenario approach in second language learning, see DiPietro (1987). 4. Micro-and macrostructures can be found primarily in discourse (van Dijk and Kintsch 1983). The former are local structures identifiable sentence by 154

sentence, whereas the latter are hierarchical arrangements of propositions contained in a piece of discourse reflecting the global structure of the text. A macro-structure is unavailable in the text in a ready form but must be reconstructed. Schemata are units of knowledge which play a very significant role at each stage of information processing. They are essential in identifying and evaluating the information being processed (Rumelhart 1980, Eysenck and Keane 2010, Markus and Zajonc 1985). Schemata can be both mentally driven (top-down activation) or input driven (bottom-up activation) to be used in interpreting and predicting sensory information, both language and other kinds, and they help us in determining goals and sub-goals, as well as in allocating our cognitive resources. They guide our attention in the processes of encoding, storage, inference, retrieval from memory and production. Information which is congruent with the schema is remembered better than that which is incongruent. Needless to say, when a schema is activated prematurely and turns out to be inaccurate, it may create a distraction in the process of understanding. In storage, schemata give permanence to the information in memory. Rumelhart (1980) suggests that the process of remembering is essentially the same as the process of perception, with the exception that in remembering the source of data is memory representations, not sensory representations. Schemata also support information recall and retrieval as well as the processes of inferencing, when they provide clues for some missing information. They are significant both at preconscious and controlled levels of processing and play a role in such response parameters as accuracy, certainty and fluency. New schemata can be created from the existing ones by way of accretion, modification and restructuring, also in a way similar to elaboration and refinement of concepts. Restructuring involves discarding the existing schemata for the sake of new, more comprehensive ones (Rumelhart and Norman 1987). Once the familiar schemata are identified in processing, they are treated as wholes, which reduces some burden of processing. In essence, schemata are plans for information and action which are absolutely indispensable in verbal communication.

3.4. Concepts in our mental lexicon Concepts are mental representations of classes of objects or their entities. They are of vital importance in perception, learning, memory and the use of language because by assigning conceptual identity to objects and naming them, we treat specific cases as instances of categories and deal with them on this basis; by providing relevant categorizations concepts help us understand what is happening

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(Eysenck 2006). Perceptual grouping overlaps, but is not identical with conceptual grouping because in identifying concepts, differences between objects of one assigned category are actively disregarded. Our focus is on the aspect in which the two objects are alike. Concepts and concept structures are indispensable in every cognitive activity. The ability to think in terms of classes and systems of classes represents a major step forward in cognitive development. It is fundamental to abstraction as well as to taking into account a number of points of view, aspects or perspectives. Concepts may form hierarchies with a superordinate, most generic category, e.g. ‘man’, a basic category, e.g. ‘men and women’, and a subordinate category, i.e. individuals, which can be grouped as professionals. Concepts also form arrangements, such as classes, dichotomies, orderings, nested classifications and cross‑classifications. Classes are representations of an attribute (its intension) and a set of objects (its extension). The classical approach to characterizing concepts is based on a set of defining attributes which single out specific categories from their super-ordinate category, e.g., a chair is defined as a piece of furniture used for sitting on. As Eysenck (2006) points out, this view has been dismissed as inadequate for its rigidity with more attention devoted to the typicality gradient approach. Rosch developed a prototype approach in which the prototype, a central description, stands for the whole category with the rest of the instances bearing family resemblance to the prototype. Ashby and Maddox (2005) make a very useful distinction between a) learning concepts explicitly, by way of reasoning processes with the use of verbal descriptions and b) learning them by information-integration tasks, which require the complex processing of multiple information sources. They are different types of verbal communication tasks. The first type is a resource-demanding kind of processing with the resulting awareness of forms and meanings that have been learned. The other, integrational, type is learning concepts through their use which leads to the procedural representations required in comprehension or production. There is convincing evidence that previous knowledge plays a very important role in acquiring concept (Eysenck, 2006).

3.5. Procedural and declarative representations In order to account for the dynamics of human thought and action it is necessary to distinguish between two forms of representations, declarative and procedural (Rumelhart and Norman 1987). They do not make up a dichotomy but a highly dynamic continuum, depending on the individual experience. I deliberately 156

refrain from using the more common terms ‘declarative and procedural knowledge’ since the term ‘knowledge’ does not do justice to the real nature of the distinction. Declarative representations involve the knowing of, e.g. facts that can be stated, whereas the procedural ones – how to do something, i.e. procedures for operations that can be implemented (Rumelhart and Norman 1987, Shell et al. 2010, Sternberg 1996). Unlike procedural representations, which are implicit or embedded (entailed) in the respective procedures, declarative representations are stored in an explicitly encoded format, which makes them accessible to reflection, analysis and manipulation. Therefore, they are knowledge systems. Procedural representations, however, are available only via the operations which we perform while using them. Their benefits result from their efficiency whereas their presence is implied in these operations. Therefore, they are not knowledge representations in the sense of ‘knowledge’ used here as systems of propositional information. Not all representations take the form of organized knowledge systems. Some analogical systems, for example, take the form of images. We may, in addition to procedural representations, have propositional representations of procedures, which may be used for some time and fade away when no longer needed. As Johnson-Laird (1983) states, it is much harder to investigate subconscious learning of procedures than the explicit learning of propositional knowledge. In brief, procedural and declarative representations differ in the following way: declarative representations are explicit and available to awareness, used in controlled processes, while procedural representations are implicit in larger, more complex operations, are not available to our awareness and used automatically. Rumelhart and Norman (1987) find the division of knowledge into declarative and procedural rather fuzzy and context-dependent. Each realistic information processing system, they say, is hierarchical and what is regarded as procedural at one level will have to be recognized as declarative at a higher level, where decisions are made to launch these procedures. In their view, all the operations of the system are in fact procedural. Declarative representations of procedures in the form of propositions should not be identified with procedural representations, which are essential in skilled behaviour. A very useful term to clarify this distinction is ‘procedural records’ because it stresses the fact that procedural representations come form practicing the given operation, behaviour, etc. While declarative representations may be acquired verbally, as propositional content, from external sources, procedural records originate in the individual experience, practice and participation in communicative interaction of the particular language user. Procedural records/representations are indispensable in the use of language as skill (see section 3.7).

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3.5.1. Multiple coding and filing in language use and learning Our memory is capable of representing information in a variety of formats. Rummelhart and Norman (1987: 58) stress this multiaspectuality of knowledge representations: There is no single answer to the question ‘how is information represented in the human?; many different representational formats might be involved within the human representational system. Thus, within the representing world, different aspects of the represented world might be represented through different representational formats. This allows each dimension to be represented by the system that maps best into the sets of operations that one wishes to perform upon them. Different representational systems have different powers, and the choice of which one is used reflects those powers.

They add, however, that the tremendous power of knowledge representations must be traded off for the benefit of coordinating information from different sources when there is a change in one format of representation in order to maintain synchronized structures of the same represented world. The information perceived and processed is copied into various storage systems where it enters into a variety of relationships with the prior information in the representational store. Different systems of coding information are used for the auditory and visual modalities. Meaning constancy, i.e. the interpretational permanence of different representations, makes it possible to include divergent representations in a relatively coherent problem space: a) the auditory – phonemic – form of an utterance in echoic memory, b) the representation of meaning of the same utterance, c) its visual – graphemic – representation of the written message in the iconic memory, d) the mental representation of concepts, and e) the various structures needed in the process of comprehension. All of the above may be regarded as parts of the same mental domain. Additionally, knowledge may be directly represented in working memory, as well as indirectly coded, inferred and generated at the time of working on a given task. The executive system makes use of two types of utterance processing: encoding meaning into verbal form and decoding form into meaning. Encoding involves processes of decision making and selection of items from LTM to express a given propositional meaning in the verbal form, while decoding involves meaning reconstruction by matching meaning activated from LTM to the verbal stimulus by way of elimination and inferences. Redundancy can be treated as the property of utterances resulting from the fact that, e.g. one syntactical category is marked more than once, or in more than one way (e.g. plurality in a Polish noun phrase is marked both in the adjective and the noun; 158

moreover, it is marked in the verb form). Redundancy supports the processes of decoding in that the recurrence of certain functional markers relieves working memory load and compensates the attentional limitations (Neisser 1976). However, its status in encoding is quite different: learners initially find it easier to retain the number of morphosyntactic markers at the level of the essential or minimum, i.e. they manage to code only some of the target forms in their utterances. With the help of feedback and practice, however, these reduced forms can be gradually developed into full forms approximating native speaker norms. By binding percepts together, associative memory is capable of storing elements in succession at various levels of generality. This is a consequence of experience. Our memory represents/stores bodies of information together with their conceptual, logical and syntactic relations. These resources are used by the executive system which employs conceptual, logical, and syntactic plans for retrieving information. The law of frequency asserts that the more frequent the activation, the stronger its memory trace, especially when we add spaced practice opportunities. The law of recency asserts that the more recent the activation, the stronger the trace. Consolidation is the process of repetition which helps the learner to transfer the material from working to permanent memory. Verbal associative memory plays an important role in thought, particularly in language, logical reasoning and problem solving. The strength of associations depends on such parameters of processing as frequency, recency and the level of the subject’s arousal. The more frequently the association is reviewed, the stronger it becomes (Anderson, B. F., 1975). However, spaced practice is also very helpful because on different occasions relevant knowledge structures activated for this purpose are retrieved anew rather than as ready chunks available in short-term memory. As a result, their procedural records become more consolidated, but, at the same time, their access route for retrieval is facilitated. Recall involves plans for information retrieval, which are formed by actually attempting to use them. Distribution of practice is beneficial when there is a large component of rote learning. Practice improves executive control but not comprehension. Plans for comprehending are syntagmatic information structures, which involve ordering to enable us to go far beyond the information given. Plans are stored longer than the specific information contained in the given material of processing. Categorizations, i.e. concepts, are essential for productivity and creativity. Human beings generate sequences of ideas and behaviours of varying length. The dependency in these sequences operates over arbitrary distances. Such complex sequences require suitable processes to ensure completion of a plan (Bever et al. 1968).

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3.6. Controlled, automatic and hybrid processing Controlled and automatic processes were identified by Shiffrin and Schneider in their celebrated articles from Psychological Review (1977). Controlled processing denotes operations which are performed in a sequence, one by one, with attentional control, whereas automatic processing may be parallel, i.e. operations are performed simultaneously (concurrently) rather than sequentially. Processing tends to become parallel with extended practice. Psychologists recognize practice effect in mastering concurrent tasks, such as reading and writing (Neisser 1976). The distinction between automatic and controlled processes is strictly connected with the fact that humans tend to allocate their cognitive resources to the more crucial levels of constructing and guiding their cognitive and motor behaviour, such as planning, monitoring, and otherwise regulating it. Controlled processes are reserved for the more demanding aspects of our thought and action; they are relatively slow, but can be used for performing complex tasks, e.g. problem solving or understanding an idea, as well as developing new representations, before they can be delegated through practice to the subordinate levels of processing. Because they are controlled by our cognitive resources, they can be modified or adjusted to the goal in view of the incoming information. Automatic processes are fast and do not require attentional resources; they are rather inflexible and fade away from our memory faster than the controlled ones. In the realm of higher cognition, automatic processes are usually regarded as those which have become automatized via practice so that they no longer consume our cognitive resources and thus enable us to deal more effectively with the significant aspects of the task. This distinction is especially important from the point of view of skill acquisition in language learning and use. Table 7: Contrasting controlled and automatic processes (based on Eysenck and Keane 2010) CONTROLLED PROCESSES require attentional resources, can be controlled

AUTOMATIC PROCESSES require minimal attentional resources, hard to control once well-practiced

flexible, pliable, adjustable, i.e. can be used in strategic operations

rather inflexible once activated but they make fewer demands on our cognitive resources

Relatively slow, available to our awareness, but run in a serial order

quite fast, not available to awareness may even be sub-or preconscious

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Reserved for the demanding parts of the task where important decisions take place

Reserved for the lower levels of the task hierarchy where execution of the task takes place

more lasting memory effect (because of the demand on cognitive resources)

less memorable

Controlled processing implements choices which are attentional and can make use of complex knowledge, such as abstract principles and rules. Automatic processing relies on ready chunks available as procedural representations (Aitkenhead and Slack, eds., 1987, Anderson, J. R., 1983, Shell et al. 2010). The form of information activated by each of the subsystems is qualitatively different but each formation is indispensable as a component of the hybrid executive system. Controlled processing is performed by the superordinate system, responsible for volitional/intentional choices. Automatic processing is performed by the subordinate system and secures fluent speech. Controlled and automatic processes are treated as parts of an integrated hierarchy, or heterarchy, not as a dichotomy, with controlled processing at the top. The intentional nature of language use is based on the simultaneous execution of attentional choices in controlled processing and the retrieval of procedural representations for automatic processing (Levelt 1989, Shell et al. 2010). An utterance is the outcome of integrating selections at both levels of this hybrid processing (Pawley and Syder, 1983). Neves and Anderson (1981) describe this as the outcome of both proceduralization and composition, i.e. integrating the component processes into a more composite/ complex whole. Shell et al. (2010) make a reservation that the automaticity in the processes running on procedural representations may be a matter of degree, depending on the level of their difficulty.

3.7. Skill acquisition and expertise As has been pointed out, the behavioural entity in which language manifests itself in verbal communication, i.e. skill, presupposes quite different mental representations than those required in other mature cognitive abilities. Cognitive psychologists separate skill from these other categories on the basis of its structure and types of practice required in its development, the stages of skill acquisition as well as the differences between novices and experts. Although it is possible to distinguish between largely cognitive, i.e. intellectual, and largely perceptuomotor skills, most tasks require a combination of both (Styles 2006; see also Irion 1966, Colley and Beech 1989, Schraw 2009, Temporowski 2003). Language skill stands out among other skills because of the unique coding

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components (meanings coded into verbal forms and/or verbal forms into meanings) indispensable in language use, and the conventional nature of countless syntagmatic (linear) constructions which are part of discourse. At the same time, the use of language skill operates in the context of extensive, domain-specific situational knowledge representations which influence its course. With regard to the nature of skill, Bruner (1973: 241) stated that skill is distinguished by intention which guides and provides the criterion for terminating the act, i.e. task. The second element is feedback. Throughout the act, the actual behaviour is compared with the intended state so that the difference can be eliminated. The third element is skill structure; skill is a hierarchically-structured act consisting of subcomponents which are integrated into a linear form in fractions of seconds (see also Levelt 1978, 1989). Bruner (1973: xvii) states: The execution of a skill is thought to be guided by an intention that specifies possible serial orders which will result in successful completion of a task. The constituents of the skilled act must be orchestrated into one of these serial orders if the intention is to be fulfilled. Complex skills are slowly mastered in infancy through the integration of simpler constituent skills, a view that has implications for educational policy, as we shall see.

To adjust this outline to the purpose of characterizing verbal communication, i.e. sending and receiving messages in their verbal form, it must be pointed out that, although both comprehension and production feature a very strong skill component, i.e. temporal, automatic integration of relevant subparts, they differ with regard to their basic goal and course: comprehension requires language users to decode meaning from discourse, i.e. they work with language messages to reconstruct their senders’ intention by parsing and semanticizing discourse as well as understanding the reconstructed propositions by way of computing their meaning with all the available clues. Production requires language users to code meanings into discourse form, i.e. they work with their intentional and emotional states to construct their communicative intentions, linearize them into propositional form, encode them into clauses and emit messages in the form of discourse. The skill component in comprehension is primarily involved in semantization, whereas in production, it is primarily connected with lexicalization. Iron (1966) reviewed trends in motor skill research pointing out the main concerns, such as the role of distributed as opposed to massed practice, the part-whole task problem in skill practice, the problem of age-maturation to benefit from skill practice, the transfer of training across skill tasks, the retention of motor skills, and the role, timing and frequency of knowledge of results, i.e. (augmented) feedback on the accuracy of skill performance and learning. She writes about two basic strategies of task training: part-task and whole-task. 162

Whole-task training is structurally as difficult as the target task and its level of accuracy may be rather low, but it produces greater transfer to other contexts than part-task training. Transfer is taken to mean the benefit produced by a skill developed in one situation for a similar, but new task. Part-task strategy, on the other hand, reduces the level of difficulty of the target task by breaking the overall activity into relevant components, which must later be reintegrated. The level of accuracy while performing part-task practice is relatively higher with lower task transfer, but the learner is not overloaded by the new task demands. When practice tasks match the level of complexity of the target tasks and are realistic, they may provide excellent opportunities to acquire new skills (see also Schraw 2009). Temporowski (2003) points out that when learning new tasks we seek out teachers who know how to perform the task at hand and can provide models, guidance, and instructions. Gradually, we develop mental models of the task which link actions to be taken with the desired outcomes. Feedback, including augmented feedback, provides knowledge of results, which is essential in eliminating the difference between the standard and the actual task performance. The author stresses the helpful role of whole-task and part-task approaches, mental practice, including imagery techniques, and rehearsal. Repetition of tasks leads to the proceduralization of knowledge representations required in skilled performance. Additionally, when attention is directed to successful outcomes, performance is considerably enhanced. According to Sincoff and Sternberg (1989), a very important element in skill learning is strategy construction as well as detecting regularities in the experience recorded in time. This enables the learner to eliminate redundant steps in performing the tasks, as well as task intra-and inter-coordination. Equally important is separating a skill into distinct but relevant components, first practiced in isolation, mentioned earlier as part-whole task strategy, and providing various clues. Pre-cuing relevant information and providing integration opportunities improves the performance of less-gifted students more than the performance of more gifted ones. Sincoff and Sternberg (1989) review theories of skill acquisition and emphasize the significance of Vygotsky’s view of the role of more capable peers and adults in modelling skilled behaviour as well as the role of observation, i.e. learning from other people. However, performance of a skill depends not only on the amount of practice that the learner has had and relevant sub-tasks selected for this practice, but also on the presence or absence of various stressors, e.g. anxiety (Eysenck 2006, Eysenck and Keane 2010). It is especially significant in language learning that the acquisition of skills involves domain-specific knowledge and procedures, which, in this case, refer

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to the domains and procedures of verbal communication. In contrast to simple tasks, complex tasks require integration of a large amount of information and a complex set of underlying procedures to guide their execution. If practice is to lead of the improvement of skilled behaviour, the structure of practiced tasks must be equivalent to the nature of the skill to be acquired. This is to reiterate that some mentally represented standard or norm for the performance of the skill is needed, which may be regarded as a mental model of the task. As for the stages of skill acquisition, Fitts (1964) was one of the first authors in the field of language learning to identify three stages of skill learning: 1) the cognitive stage, in which the learner makes the initial approximation of the skill-demanding task, based on background knowledge, observation and instructions; 2) the associative stage, in which the task is consolidated with some elimination of errors; and 3) the autonomous stage, in which the skill is gradually established and improved. The first stage is needed for the general orientation regarding the activity, especially the instructions and the initial procedure. The next stage is more fluent and accurate as the program for the activity becomes more practised. In the last stage the activity becomes fully automatized as a result of the availability of the whole procedure so it can be delegated to the subordinate system. Practice makes performance smoother and faster. In some cases, consciousness may be bypassed completely. Automatization frees the central processor to attend to other tasks or to attend to strategic matters within the task. Anderson, J. R. (1983) used Fitt’s ideas to further develop the understanding of skill acquisition. He sees the role of working memory as mental work space, a transition between declarative and procedural representations, the intake of information from the environment as well as the rehearsal to enhance its representation in memory. He suggests a declarative stage similar to Fitt’s cognitive stage and a procedural stage similar to Fitt’s autonomous stage. Fitt’s associative stage is a transition between assembling the components of the skill, including relevant schemata, and executing and refining the requisite procedures. Colley and Beech (1989:5) express a widely-received view of skill mastery: Early in acquisition, processing is controlled, that is, it uses general processing capacity, it is also slow, effortful, generally serial, under intentional control and involves awareness. Later in practice, apparently effortless performance results from automatic processing, which is fast, parallel, obligatory, does not involve awareness and has low demands on processing capacity.

Lewandowsky et al. (2007: 85-86) explain the role of deliberate practice in the development of expertise, which also applies to skilled language behaviour. 164

Expertise is a learned adaptation to task constraints rather than some inborn talent. What is required for its development is not mere exposure to relevant tasks, but extensive deliberate practice. Deliberate practice differs from mere exposure and repetition in that it is intentional, systematic and highly goal- directed, i.e. it involves a well-defined specific task that the learner seeks to master, its performance is followed by immediate feedback from expert coaches and mentors, and there is opportunity for repetition and improvement. Schraw (2009) stresses the effectiveness of deliberate practice when it is situated in authentic setting to enable learners use their skills under real-world conditions

3.7.1. Differences between experts and novices in the use of skills Markus and Zajonc (1985) define experts as individuals who have vast, well- organized knowledge representations, especially numerous schemata in a particular domain. In addition, these schemata enable them to evaluate new information with regard to its relevance for the domain in question, so that they can make judgments and decisions with relative ease and certainty. Experts are consistent in their responses and they have a relatively better memory for information in this domain, so that they can resist contradictory information. Moreover, they can process the domain information more deeply than non-experts and evaluate it qualitatively and more critically. Lewandowsky et al. (2007) enumerate such commonalities among experts in various domains as accuracy, ease of problem solving in the target domain, superior memory for the domain of the expertise and superior perception of patterns in the tasks. However, expertise takes a very long time to develop; it is highly domain-specific and brittle. In the cognitive perspective it is possible to make distinctions between experts and novices on various tasks which are relevant from the point of view of language learning and use. Schraw (2009: 255) points out: Overall 30 years of research suggests that intelligence and talent provide initial advantages, but that high levels of expertise are due primarily to sustained, systematic effort on the part of the learner. Ability alone is not sufficient for high levels of expertise. Ability and sustained practice are ideal.

All in all, experts possess a vast knowledge base in a given domain, organized in the form of schemata, they have a repertoire of useful strategies for various tasks, they quickly construct mental models of the problem, perform skills in a highly automated fashion and monitor their solving paths (Schraw 2009).

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Table 8: Differences between experts and novices in skilled tasks EXPERTS 1. fluent performance 2. accurate performance 3. certainty regarding language forms 4. longer, more developed tasks 5. strategies and metacognitive regulation 6. mental global model, or standard 7. deeper processing, more critical evaluation

NOVICES 1. more hesitant performance 2. more errors 3. lack of certainty regarding language forms 4. shorter, more laconic tasks 5. strategies still to be developed 6. insufficient or missing model or standard 7. surface processing, focus on local aspects

3.8. The role of feedback in learning Feedback is a very important element of human information processing, indispensable in any intelligent system in which learning occurs, because it provides the knowledge of results necessary in goal-oriented behaviour which is fed back into the system to enable it to adjust its action to reach the goal or match the standard of thought or action. Feedback may be incorporated or ignored. According to I. Bilodeau (1966), informative feedback presupposes some mental representation of the standard/norm for the task, so that the subject can define the discrepancy between the goal and the obtained response. Feedback is essential to the subject to produce a more precise attempt, i.e. approximate greater accuracy in reaching the standard, and especially for further learning. Once within the learner’s control and awareness, feedback information helps the learner to modify his or her state of knowledge by strengthening, sustaining, modifying, or eliminating the current response. The author expresses the opinion that feedback is more influential in subjects of high rather than average ability, probably because they are able to process task-intrinsic feedback, which is connected with the awareness of one’s own behaviour and the goal of the task. In language learning, feedback can take various forms. First of all, it may be positive or negative, the latter known as error correction (see Pawlak 2012); it may be provided as natural communicative (implicit) and explicit, metalinguistic, as well as on-going and terminal feedback; delayed or immediate, provided as complete, ready input or as material/clues for problem-solving, provided by the teacher, the learner or the peers, anonymous or not, individual or group- directed, involving revisions, self-correction and/or editing or not, etc. In choosing the specific feedback provision strategy, it would be important to consider whether or not the learner already has the standard for the given task or response 166

represented in his or her mind. If the learner is doing the task for the first time, the standard for the response demanded by the task does not exist in his or her repertoire of behaviours. The task is a learning opportunity so the target-like behaviour must be specified by a more knowledgeable partner, i.e. the teacher, by means of additional input, interaction and feedback. At the same time, if the norm or standard in the learner’s mental representation is not yet available or sufficiently clear, we cannot blame the learner for the imperfections or errors committed in the task. There is no alternative route to learning the productive skills in a foreign language with a satisfactory level of accuracy than attempting various productive tasks and incorporating feedback information to approximate the norms of accuracy for these tasks.

3.9. Implications for understanding foreign language learning and teaching Learning, including language learning, is considered to be a specialized case of our cognitive activities, which embraces all kinds of cognitive processes in addition to the most widely recognized kind, i.e. acquiring factual (declarative) knowledge in the focus of our awareness. Language learners make use of the human information processing mechanism to more or less intentionally register, gather, re-describe, organize, retrieve, revise, supplement and refine our mental representations, i.e. knowledge -especially lexical, semantic and syntactic knowledge, domain-specific and task-specific knowledge, declarative as much as procedural -to reorganize and restructure these mental representations, build new structures and plans, as well as raise the level of awareness of the acquired information to enhance the regulation of behaviour, develop new strategies, principles and skills and foster their stability and accuracy. Learning new information demands cognitive resources, such as focused attention (Shell et al. 2010), to map the representations and thereby modify the HIP system so as to enable us to perform new tasks or to improve our performance on subsequent tasks of the same type. Learning enables us to increase our working memory capacity in the sense of dealing with longer chunks of discourse and storing them in our memory as recognition devices in further processing. Imitation, modelling, practice and rehearsal are important activities in acquiring and consolidating the requisite representations. Feedback is a very important component of learning; it helps us to use the knowledge of results of our actions to modify the existing knowledge, e.g. its organization and precision, to further improve our productive goal-oriented strategic operations. The learner must develop his/ her knowledge representations as complex elaborate networks with numerous

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junctions of prefabricated chunks to choose from in language use rather than an abstract system of the target language grammar. Errors produce learning if improvement is attempted and the learner can discover the source of error within the task context (Langley and Simon 1981, Norman 1987, Eysenck 2006). Task context makes feedback meaningful. As pointed out by DeBeaugrande with reference to the process of reading (1987), learning may occur across tasks, for example as task transfer, when knowledge, procedural representations and strategies from previous tasks seem relevant and are therefore retrieved from permanent memory to serve in the task at hand. However, learning also occurs within a single-task context as the subject makes use of the information input derived from the earlier parts of the task as knowledge representations in working memory in its subsequent stages. This observation points to a very important role of the length of the task, related to situations/events and topics, so that task-internal learning and cross-task transfer can take place in the mental context activated for the purpose. Below is a list of the implications of the cognitive account of human information processing for understanding foreign language learning and teaching: 1. The state of the human information processing mechanism results from the stage of the subject’s development along the life-span. In the light of the above, tasks and topics as well as the more form-focussed subtasks must be adjusted to the subject’s developmental stage with regard to intentionality, deliberate guided attention, noticing and incorporating feedback, metacognitive, metalingual, metacommunicative awareness, the available strategies, knowledge of the world, interests and propensities as well as the availability of abstract concepts and thought. Langue use and learning inevitably call for a whole-person involvement in the learning process along our life span so as to exploit the natural varieties of our energy expenditure at various developmental stages, such as learning through play and motor activities in childhood, learning by studying in adolescence, and learning in connection with work in adulthood (ESP). This life-span development and the whole-person involvement in verbal communication justify natural units in materials design, such as tasks reflecting natural events, communicative episodes and situations, demonstrating sociocultural scripts, scenarios and behaviours for practice in language learning adjusted to the learner’s current developmental stage. It is a reasonable conclusion that eliciting foreign language learning by means of teaching must first of all take the form of meaningful language input which can be processed by the learner to form his or her records in episodic and generic memory. At this stage, experience, meaning and episodic memory 168

play the most significant part. These memory records are tapped in subsequent interaction in speech and writing and referenced in incorporating feedback. For any form of learning to take place the learner must understand what this input information means; for this reason, various semantization strategies are mandatory which may be derived from natural conversational interactions or more explicitly inserted into it. Other forms of learning, such as language study of the more focussed variety in which more processed forms of information are involved can serve to supplement, facilitate, enhance and accelerate language use and learning driven by task units. 2. Information is a relational term; it only makes sense in connection with the processing individuals for whom it may or may not be interpretable, i.e. meaningful in the light of their current level of knowledge. This relational nature of information outlines three basic sets of strategies of facilitating, i.e. adjusting foreign language learning tasks, i.e. a) reducing the informational deficits in the processing individual, among others, by ‘pre-teaching’ some information needed in the task, b) adjusting the material of processing to meet the current abilities of the processor, as happens in conversational adjustments of all kinds, and c) adjusting the conditions of the task, such as its length and pace to the current level of the learner’s abilities; the shorter the material and the slower its processing, the easier it is. 3. Consciousness is a default setting in any living organism (Baars 2007). Therefore, unconscious learning is a contradiction in terms. The crux of the matter is more subtle: it is not the ‘conscious’/‘unconscious’ dichotomy, but the degrees of awareness that we have of our information processing within our attentional focus as opposed to its periphery, and the relationship between these degrees and the emergence of explicit flexible representations which afford our regulation and control of behaviour, especially language use. It is important in the cognitive framework to reiterate the differences in the manner in which information is coded, represented, stored, processed and retrieved for comprehension and production in speech and writing. The fact that the learner may be unaware of some information in language use comes from two feasible sources: the hierarchical nature of language units in which only some, but not all the information is prominent, i.e. noticeable, and the hybrid manner in which these units are processed, i.e. some processes involved are controlled and therefore slow enough for our perception to notice the respective information units whereas some processes run in an automatic way so that the information units are processed too fast for being noticed. Automatic processes are possible because they have been learned, i.e. the subjects have developed the requisite procedural representations/records through practice. Once

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they are acquired, however, automatic processes are too fast to be registered by out focal attention. Nor do they have to be. Moreover, because information is never processed as isolated units but in integrated chunks, constructions, hierarchies and constellations, some of the information may not be available to our attentional focus, but only to its periphery precisely for this reason. In language use, i.e. in comprehension and production, especially in speech, information is structured into clauses, which, in turn, are structured as accented (salient, more noticeable) content words and unaccented (reduced) grammatical morphemes. In other words, discourse is perceived and produced as acoustically/prosodically organized, i.e. information subordinated to, or built into, a larger structure will be perceived as implicit (less salient) rather than explicit (more salient). However, it is information, not learning, which is considered implicit or explicit here. Learning can be intentional or incidental. Learning and teaching a foreign language often involves explicitation, i.e. the use of strategies which take the implicit information out of the attentional ‘closet’ to be highlighted and brought to the learners’ awareness in order for them to learn it more exactly and automatically, in other words, in order to gain a better understanding and control of its form and use in verbal communication. 4. The status of interaction in language learning. The human information processing mechanism has developed especially for the purposes of interaction with the natural and social environment as well as sustaining itself. Interaction between this mechanism in living human beings and their natural and social environment is a constitutive property of the human being which reappears in the more specific models of language use and language learning. Interaction is assumed as a precondition in any model of learning, especially in language learning and use, which is universal in our species. The learning organism and the environmental sources of information remain in a synergy, in other words, each is incapable of doing in isolation what they can do together. Interaction is a condition sine qua non. It is not informative in this framework to understand interaction as a factor which makes a difference, or as a hypothesis (Long 2007), if humans cannot survive, not to mention cognitively function, without interaction. Verbal communication is merely a refined system to make this interaction culturally sophisticated and effective in constructing and reconstructing humanly-specific meaning. Admittedly, in a given informational environment it is the subject’s responsibility to perceive, structure, interpret, and act upon the environmental information with his or her cognitive equipment. But this fact does not undermine the essentially synergetic relationship between the individual and his or her sociocultural environment. 170

The cognitive perspective of human information processing provides a framework in which it is possible to discern specific contributions of the learner’s information processing mechanism to the overall effect of language learning. These contributions result from the properties of the human processor, the components of the mechanism, the ability of the human processor to structure and record of the environmental information as mental representations and perform constructive operations on them. In the foreign language classroom, the relationship between the processor and the informational environment must be recognized and due emphasis placed on the nature of the material of processing, i.e. discourse. The contribution of the processing mind of the learner, equipped with a cognitive mechanism of a certain kind, is first of all that he or she is predisposed to act on this discourse in a certain way: to instinctively code and decode it for meaning. The language environment in the foreign language classroom must be structured so as to recreate the nature of verbal communication to be conducive to foreign language learning, i.e. to be sufficiently involving for the learner to participate and activate the natural processes of language use and learning. This is to say that the language material, i.e. discourse, must be sufficiently interesting and illustrative of human matters in the real world. 5. The role of meaning. On many occasions it has been stressed that meaning is the main reason of human information processing. In language use and learning, meaningfulness determines the way in which we perceive the relevance of the material being processed and, subsequently, whether or not we remember it. To enhance the effectiveness of language learning, we must emphasize meaning because it is the main driving force of our cognitive processes, including language learning and use. Learning material can be presented as relevant and interesting if we stress its logical organization and connections with the previously learned subject matter (Ausubel 1968). It must be humanly reasonable, relatable to our knowledge of the world, present human beings in real (and/or fictional) situations as opposed to meaningless bits and pieces, constructed on the basis of formal criteria. Formal aspects of language signs can be learned more effectively in larger episodic/ situational/topic-related contexts which properly semanticize these forms and structures as well as impose coherence and cohesion upon the inevitably arbitrary forms of language material. Rote and verbatim learning may be reserved for those aspects of language forms in which information is purely arbitrary. Meaningful – unlike meaningless – context determines information storage and retrieval. At the same time, as various studies have

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demonstrated, processing for meaning (deeper processing) consolidates information into more durable memory traces than shallow processing for form. This must be taken into account in designing didactic tasks in foreign language teaching. 6. The significance of form and structure in HIP. As has been emphasized throughout this chapter, the mechanism of human information processing does not process individual or isolated information, but information chunks, i.e. linear, yet hierarchical arrangements, clauses, constructions, clusters, constellations, systems, structures, i.e. schemata, and hierarchies of information depending on the domain of human activity. Since information is defined by its context, i.e. its environment, its form and relationship with structures of other items is vitally important. Information has also been interpreted as the reduction of uncertainty, as opposed to predictability, within a structure. This uncertainty results from options allowed by the code at a given juncture. Therefore, the code and the options must be known to the person processing it, i.e. they must be represented in his or her mind as precisely as possible to be of any use in verbal communication. Language learning involves perceiving, recognizing, storing and using the elements as well as their linear associations, syntagmatic constructions, and ‘vertical’ alternatives, paradigmatic options. The structure of the stimulus has an important role to play from the point of view of both the addressee and the sender of utterances because it determines the kind of mental schemata, concepts and knowledge structures that are to be activated for recognizing, categorizing and processing it (top-down and bottom-up interaction), as well as cognitive strategies that seem promising in reconstructing the communicative intention of the sender. Some arrangements of information have a considerable degree of permanence, whereas others are quite fluid and flexible, so that new or partly new structures can be formed. Focusing on form is essential for the retention of this form’s identity whereas presenting or highlighting the structure of the material to be processed, e.g. text schema, before the task helps the learner to organize the incoming information as well as retain and use it productively. 7. Perception in the cognitive perspective is an extremely important stage of processing through which input material from the environment can enter the learner’s cognitive system to be processed and recorded as his or her mental representations. Certainly, the learner’s contribution is constructive but he or she cannot operate in an informational vacuum. To facilitate perceptual processes for learning, we may use such strategies as enhancing the salience of the input information by augmenting the information, i.e. making it more clearly 172

pronounced, louder, bigger, or singled out from its background for selective attention, or exploit the law of contrast for the material, or slow down the presentation so that the learner can focus on the information and analyze it or employ the strategy of priming, i.e. creating the state of readiness/anticipation/expectancy for the information to come. Perception is the process which leads to mapping/copying/recording of the incoming information in the form of mental representations of the learner to be segmented, categorized, filed in various forms to be used in various combinations and arrangements on subsequent occasions. Representations of forms are not user-neutral: representations needed for comprehension require form-to-meaning mappings whereas those for production – meaning-to-form associations. Therefore, we need the so-called silent period in language learning before developing some productive abilities and our receptive skills most often exceed our productive ones. 8. Attention is this part of the subsystem of information processing which, when a certain developmental stage is reached, can be guided internally by the learner or externally, by the teacher, as his or her instructions for the task. Considering the information deficits of the learner, his or her attention focused on a certain aspect of the task facilitates deeper analysis and retention of at least this particular aspect as opposed to a situation where - without attentional guidance -too many stimuli simultaneously compete for the limited attentional resources leading to insufficient representations and storage of the task material. Attentional limitations may also be overcome by such strategies as repeating the presentation of the material, adjusting the pacing of the task, eliminating unpredictability in activities, appealing to the learner’s curiosity, selecting relevant material on the basis of learner-derived criteria to match the learner’s interests and, finally, using elaboration and rehearsal strategies as well as chunking and organizing. Thanks to elaboration and rehearsal, information may be maintained in working memory and remembered better. Elaboration is the process of adding information we already have to the stimulus in question to form a more lasting (because bigger, more developed) trace by way of association. Rehearsal is the process of refreshing items in short‑term memory by repeating them thus building a stronger, consolidated memory trace. The subjectʼs focus on the organization of information is also helpful in its retention and recall. Elaboration, chunking and rehearsal are considered to be memory strategies developed during our life span (Jagodzińska 2003, Pressley and Harris 2009). According to Rebok (1987), spontaneous use of rehearsal dramatically increases during childhood.

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9. Memory processes are enhanced by the meaningfulness and organization of the material to be learned. Strategies that facilitate memory processes come from organizing the material to be learned as well as relating the incoming information to the knowledge of the learner by way of personalization. According to Craik and Lockhart (1972), the deeper the processing, the stronger the memory trace. This means that when learners are interested in reconstructing the language forms from the input, their investment in processing must be considerable including controlled processing, analysis, comparison and other reasoning operations in focal attention. Episodic memory is the most elementary form of representation for the input, which is stored as events and situations, whereas the more processed forms, such as generic memory, are derived from the former, more elementary representations. This processing can be enhanced by various strategies which employ reasoning but cannot be stimulated at will or substituted by processed information provided externally. Information is of greatest use when it has the form appropriate for the given tasks, which means that the structure of the learning tasks should be commensurate with the real verbal communication tasks outside the classroom. (This is not the same as identifying real-life tasks on the basis of the learner’s needs analysis and converting them into pedagogical tasks, as proposed by Long and Crookes, 1992, the more so that their real-life tasks are not, if at all, language specific). Declarative representations are derived form the factual input, whereas procedural representations are formed as a result of performing various operations, so the enhancing strategy would be practice, necessary for the development of procedural records, and especially spaced practice which improves the stability of traces. Metamemory, i.e. our awareness of memory processes and strategies for coding, storage and retrieval help us to deliberately use our cognitive system in various tasks, in other words, to regulate our cognitive behaviour. 10. Feedback has been mentioned as an indispensable aspect in any intelligent learning mechanism. Feedback in foreign language learning can be positive or negative; it may be differentially geared in comprehension -for the precision of decoding meaning from discourse or production -for the precision of encoding meaning into discourse form; it may refer to any aspect of the task at hand, communicative in a broad sense of the term, not just its formal aspect. However, its relevance and comprehensibility, i.e. processability to the learner is determined by the task context. Moreover, this function of feedback presupposes that the learner’s performance is matched against some norm and any difference between the learner’s 174

current performance and the norm should be gradually eliminated by way of modifying the learner’s knowledge representations to match this norm, internal as well as external. Feedback enhances the precision of the learner’s mental representations and in this way performs a most useful service to the communicative precision and effectiveness of the learner’s system.

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Chapter 4. Focus on the phenomenon of language use in verbal communication

Introduction: the communicative structure of language use Human cognitive functioning thus far has been presented as information processing geared toward meaning and sense. The human being has been treated as a subject/agent, i.e. as a social being with a locus of control, cognitively equipped for interaction with the social and natural environment, able to mentally represent his or her experience in time and space and make use of symbols. It was possible to discern specific information arrangements and processes requisite for language use and learning from the point of view of their representation and use in the human cognitive architecture, such as procedural/ declarative and syntagmatic/paradigmatic representations, categories, concepts, plans, and schemata, as episodic and generic representations at various levels of explicitation and abstractness, as well as controlled, automatic and hybrid processes. To retain the specificity of language among other forms of information systems, the qualitative difference between analogical and arbitrary representations has been stressed. Arbitrary forms in language are representations of representations. To be functional, arbitrary entities must be categorical, i.e. discrete, which makes them capable of entering various more or less complex (syntactic) relationships in the language code. Analogical information can be processed for meaning on the basis of its resemblance to what it represents whereas arbitrary information must first be decoded, i.e. converted/transformed into meaning according to its assignment in the code. At closer analysis, I am convinced that the real nature of the process is not that of a conversion or transformation so that the initial form of the information changes its state, i.e. the initial state no longer exists, but matching one form of representation with a respective representation in another format, more suitable for further processing. For example, an arbitrary phonemic form may be matched with its meaning, conceptual or syntactic, in the semantic format. As a result, the representation which is more appropriate for the subsequent stages of the processing task pushes the previous one aside – in fractions of seconds – from the confines of our working memory. In sum, the initial form of representation is still available in the cognitive system and can be used for other processing tasks, whereas the form which had once been in focus of our working memory will have to give

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way to subsequent, ongoing matches, according to the flow of the processing operations in the given task. Emphasis has been put on the quintessential nature of language signs constituted by their meanings and arbitrary forms cast upon the vehicles which transmit them. Their meanings, i.e. concepts and propositions, are represented only mentally while their forms – both mentally and externally in various units, structures and arrangements of discourse. The aim of this chapter is to outline the nature of language use and learning as the natural phenomenon of verbal communication and point out the consequences of such an understanding for foreign language learning and teaching. It must be reiterated here that, in contrast to linguistic descriptions of the language system, which are intellectual constructs and refer to the relationships among language forms, verbal communication has been recognized as a universal and fundamental human phenomenon – both natural and cultural – a specialized, highly complex, dynamic system of interaction in human networks. The sole purpose of verbal communication is generation, propagation, computation and negotiation of meanings, indispensable for human survival and well-being, especially for our relationships which enable us to forge our identities. Verbal communication is vital for the society to reconstruct itself from generation to generation and for socializing the young. First and foremost, however, communicative interactions are vital for constructing and negotiating our understanding of the world. As Hewes (1995:1) stresses: Our interpretations of the world in which we live, and the people and institutions that comprise it, are acquired through complex interactions among what we believe to be true, what the world is, and/or what the others think it is.

This chapter presents verbal communication as a distinct form of human thought and action with its specialized structural components and stages, as well as the key points regarding its development along the life span in the context of group and culture. In this conception foreign language teaching is understood as a rational, justified way of constructing the environment and conditions for language learning, i.e. eliciting the processes of language use and learning in the educational setting through input, interaction, which entails comprehension and production in speech and writing, and feedback. It is relevant in this context to recognize three distinct manifestations of language in use, or three states of matter, language as knowledge, skill and discourse, which make up a dynamic (i.e. temporal) communicative cycle thanks to the human user’s psycholinguistic operations of: a) production -whereby vastly distributed knowledge networks are activated, selected and integrated through fluid skill to code meaning into a relatively stable discourse form -and b) comprehension in which a reverse 178

processing takes place, i.e. vastly distributed knowledge networks are retrieved, selected and integrated by fluid skill to reconstruct meaning from a relatively stable discourse. Clearly, this perspective is qualitatively different from the more abstract, achronic notion of language as a formal system on the one hand and the static, product-oriented notion of communicative competence with four linguistic levels (Canale and Swain 1980), disconnected from the dimensions of space and time, underlying Communicative Language Teaching (CLT) on the other hand. For a more extensive discussion of qualitative differences between verbal communication and communicative competence, see Dakowska 2003.

4.1. Information, signals, signs and symbols in verbal communication Information has been described as the basic meaningful unit. Any element in our environment, be it animate or inanimate, may be the source of information. An element in the environment is considered as information once perceived as such by a living organism, which is why information is a relational concept. To do this, the living organism must be sensitive enough, i.e. equipped with the necessary receptors, processing and storage system to register a given stimulus, structurally identify it in light of its own mental representations and interpret it as meaningful, i.e. making sense (coherent), relevant (important to the organism) or significant (informative). Information is the most elementary unit of verbal communication used in much more complex clusters, constructions, constellations and processes. Signals presuppose the emitting behaviour of a living organism in the form of energy discharges (Corsini, ed. 1987: 614). Animals use signals in their interaction with other animals, producing sounds or smells to attract a partner, as well as issue danger warnings, or threats. Cases of very intricate deception are also known in the animal kingdom. Human beings also emit signals in a more or less controlled manner, most of them to accompany human interactions, especially verbal communication. At the most elementary level, the use of language signs is a more advanced, specialized form of human signalling behaviour (Grucza 1992). Signs are more complex in that they are emitted voluntarily/intentionally, i.e. they are part of human actions and operations rather than merely behaviour, and signs have meaning. Meaning is not in the sign itself, regarded in disconnection from the human being, but in the sign’s power of referring the user to its meaning in his or her mental representation. The association/match between the sign’s form and its meaning is possible thanks to its cognitive representation in the

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mind of the user and his or her processing/computational activity. To reiterate, language signs, which have an arbitrary form, do not exist without their senders and addressees. Their use in verbal communication materializes as two distinct processes: comprehension (i.e. the activity of the addressee) and production (the activity of the sender), each a natural organic process with specialized localization in the brain (Balconi, ed. 2010, Paradis 2004, 2009). This human ability to send out and receive messages in language and other sign systems has enabled man throughout the millennia to develop such areas of culture as literature, philosophy, fine and performing arts, and science. Since the forms of language signs are arbitrary, it is impossible to identify them accurately as categories and recognize them without knowing their semiotic usage, i.e. meaning, which derives from the community of users and their culture. It must be reiterated that language signs are used in specific sociocultural situations defined by the place, the participants, their roles and relationships, the topic and the purpose of interaction characteristic of human domains. Meaning is not fixed but dynamically constructed (generated) and reconstructed (computed), interpreted and evaluated by senders and addressees in the communicative context with the use of all the available clues in various knowledge sources. ‘What do you mean?’ is more important than ‘What does it mean?’ We acquire and make use of complex systems of analogical and arbitrary signs as well as principles and rules for their use. For the language signs to retain their identity, which comes from their distinctive features, as well as their position and function in the code, the forms cast upon the transmitting vehicle must be sufficiently articulate to be recognized for what they are in their context. In other words, to fulfil their encoding and decoding function in verbal communication, language signs must have sufficiently exact/precise/correct forms, i.e. forms which respect the target language norm, as clues for the reconstruction of meaning by the addressee. It follows from the above that foreign language teaching must regard correct pronunciation and morphosyntactic accuracy as unquestionable values in the educational system. It is another matter to what extent the implementation of our values and norms is feasible in the real world, e.g. in the educational system with its limited resources and in view of the average quality of verbal communication at large. Signals, signs and symbols belong to those terms which may be easily confused. However, it is possible to distinguish them on the basis of the following properties: signals are sent out (the term points to our emitting behaviour), signs have meaning (the term stresses the property of reference) whereas symbols stand for something (the term emphasizes representing). In the case of human communication, signals are used intentionally, they are highly 180

articulate and diversified in their arbitrary form, and they are conventionally associated with complex meanings so when they are emitted they function as cues for the addressee to reconstruct this meaning in their own mental representation. In this way, signals of a certain kind function as language signs in verbal communication. Language signs are one of several possible human sign systems. At the same time, signs may be coded into such substance which makes them relatively permanent and therefore no longer dependent on our signalling behaviour, but still dependent on the human decoder for their interpretation. Language signs have meaning on the basis of their reference assignment. Symbols also have meaning, but on the basis of their association with what they represent, or stand for, and they may be either arbitrary, based on convention or analogical, based on resemblance (similarity). In human languages, we have a clear case of an overlap between the terms ‘sign’ and ‘symbol’; the only delicate difference is that we think of signs as entities which, once emitted, refer (direct) their addressees to the meaning of the message, whereas we treat symbols as entities which represent, i.e. stand for, replace, this meaning in a different format than mentalese. In language use, signals, signs and symbols are integrated in their function of work together toward the goal of providing clues for meaning, in other words, for making communication happen. The above progression of terms shows that anything can be a source of information, as long as it is received by a sensitive living organism. Signals imply living organisms both for being emitted and registered, whereas language signs are arbitrary, emitted intentionally as extensively diversified articulated human signals with meanings addressed to someone. As opposed to a reflex or a biological reaction, intentionality is a form of deliberate behaviour, i.e. it is under human voluntary control in that it can be initiated or withheld. This property provides one more reason to qualify such expressions as ‘unconscious language use or learning’ as a contradiction in terms (see also section 3.9, point 3). In one of the early cognitive accounts, Cohen (1977) stated that when the organism cannot choose to withhold information, it is merely informative. Intentional human signalling is aimed at bringing about a change in the state or behaviour of another organism. ‘The operational criteria proposed for intentionality are that the signaller selects the appropriate signal from a range of alternatives, and continues to try variations until a goal is achieved’ (Cohen 1977: 90, my emphasis). The use of signs is goal-oriented and informative in contrast to what it is not. Therefore, the implied alternatives/options left out from the selection on a given occasion must also have their mental representations in the minds of senders and addressees. This requirement applies to foreign language learners as much as

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anyone else. In addition to intentionality and goal-orientation, human beings are capable of developing and processing complex, hierarchically organized systems of arbitrary language signs. Because of the vital link/association between their form and meaning, processing language signs is impossible without mapping (re-describing) their forms and meanings onto the mental representations of their users to be able to subsequently match incoming/stimulus forms with their meaning represented mentally. Moreover, while using language people employ their ability to plan, i.e. to mentally construct multiple, embedded units in their temporal and/or spatial arrangement and monitor their execution of this plan in the situational context. Such distinct properties of language code as double articulation, arbitrary character, discrete mental categories and productivity (e.g. Lyons 1977, Cohen 1977, Yule 1996), help us realize the uniqueness of language signs among other kinds of human information systems, such as analogical forms of representation and other symbolic systems, as used in mathematics, music or fine arts. On the other hand, displacement, i.e. reference distant in space and time, rooted in the human ability for abstraction, reflected in the nature of concepts, illustrates the difference between communication systems across species rather than within the human being. When used in verbal communication, language signs are produced and comprehended in the context of para- and non-lingual signals and signs as well as various sources of environmental information. Para-lingual and non-lingual signals and signs possess some of the attributes of language signs which can be arranged as a continuum in terms of their discreteness, arbitrariness, and intentionality (e.g. emblems). All in all, verbal communication is a veritable playground where people use clues with different status, i.e. analogical information, signals and arbitrary signs, which continually interact, emphasize, support, and contradict one another in their function of conveying meaning as well as in their meta-communicative function of expressing the participants’ attitude to the message itself (Jandt 2007, Neuliep 2006). This is an opportune moment to recognize the fundamental significance of modern linguistic contributions to our understanding of the unique nature of language signs as well as the unique specificity and complexity of the language system, thanks to which verbal communication can be carved out as a subject matter for investigation sufficiently distinct in the context of communication in general. Our recognition of this specificity in the context of human cognitive functioning including communication, however, is qualitatively different from constructing a model of language learning as linearization of linguistic forms, be it target or non-target like, disconnected from the human user. 182

4.2. Verbal communication as a human cognitive activity Because the headquarters of verbal communication are located in the human cognitive architecture, in the information processing mechanism, verbal communication retains the essential features of human cognitive functioning, such as consciousness, intentionality, goal-oriented, intelligent, planned, adaptive, strategic behaviour, meaning-driven quality of our cognitive functioning and its life-span development. Verbal communication can only happen as mental and behavioural operations which take up cognitive resources, such as energy, of a human subject, i.e. an agent with the predisposition to initiate actions, an agent with an identity, i.e. with the awareness of his or her distinctive characteristics and roles defined in constant interactions with others. Emitting language signs inevitably requires the activity of this agent with a locus of control, capable of highly constructive and creative, as well as, or at the same time, scripted and schematic behaviour in the role of the sender and the addressee. Our decision centre, the locus of processes within our voluntary control, makes the communicating person capable of initiating behaviour, i.e. taking action and interacting, rather than being merely reactive, and makes him or her a central planning agent who initiates communicative behaviour as well as participates in its construction, regulation and co-regulation with communicative partners. The fact that the role of the agent is constructive means that he or she makes selections from the available relevant options represented mentally and integrates these choices in the on-going processes of composing and/or decomposing discourse. The nature of the process of communication is largely unpredictable, for which scripted dialogues learned by heart cannot provide satisfactory preparation. The distinctive property of verbal communication, however, is the flow, i.e. generation, propagation, computation and negotiation of meaning, transmissible once coded in the language form as messages in human networks. Table 9: Properties of verbal communication compatible with our cognitive functioning Properties of verbal communication Explanation Intentional capable of initiating and withholding action

Goal-oriented

targeted at one of many feasible options

Constructive

involving selection and integration

Adjustable

flexible under the circumstances

Intelligent

regulated by its feedback control system;

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Properties of verbal communication Explanation Adaptive serves all human needs and purposes Strategic

optimal with the available task resources

This intentional, goal-oriented, constructive, intelligent, and strategic behaviour of the human being in verbal communication is subject to various natural (temporal, spatial, cognitive) and sociocultural constraints, which limit the vast combinatorial potential of language use to feasible and conceivable human purposes, i.e. generating, expressing, and sharing human ideas and intentions, reasonable in the context of group, society and culture. A considerable degree of structuring in verbal communication as a phenomenon comes from the fact that communities of users select/admit only some of the potential options afforded by the coding system to implement cultural norms, schemata and conventions. It is also significant from the point of view of communication that members of the same sociocultural group share their cultural perspective of the universe, which is to say, possess similar mental representations with negotiated meanings. Such a cultural formatting considerably reduces their degree of freedom and uncertainty in communicative encounters as well as greatly increases uncertainty of language users in the case of intercultural communication. Communicative experience/interactions are represented in our memory as event sequences with generalized knowledge about people and situations, their social roles and routines, as well as norms and rules of behaviour. This knowledge at various levels of generality is activated as anticipations/expectations for coming to terms with new communicative messages and as options to be selected in constructing the communicative intention (Wyer and Gruenfeld, 1995). Thanks to the constructive, even creative role of the human agent, we have a common frame of reference for such seemingly conflicting forces in verbal communication as the drive to individuality as well as affiliation, autonomy and association, identity (based on distinctive invariant features) and adjustments (which involve accommodation to the context/environment), stability and dynamics, control and freedom (of choice), invention and convention, or even prevention, etc.

4.2.1. Alignment in verbal communication Interlocutors do not use language merely to encode and decode their messages, but to come to similar mental states so that they can have the same ideas on the topic under discussion. Etymologically, ‘communication’ means ‘to become one’, to reach a state of communion. In a very informative chapter, Garrod and Pickering (2007) consider alignment to be the utmost form of communication 184

and see this state as an advanced form of coordination, also found in other joint activities, such as ballroom dancing or using two-handed saw. We simply assume that interlocutors seek to align their mental states, just as we assume that isolated speakers and listeners seek to encode and decode messages….Full alignment (in which interlocutors have identical mental states) may never occur, but interlocutors attempt to align just as isolated speakers and listeners attempt to encode and decode (Garrod and Pickering 2007: 443).

Alignment is a complex cognitive process with automatic and strategic components. There is a difference between common ground (Clark 1996), understood as all the information that is available to the interlocutors in the communicative event, and alignment, which is stricter in the sense that it refers only to the information which is actually shared while their mental states become one. Their mental states are aligned to the extent their common grounds are the same, or at least similar. Alignment may be accomplished by a variety of means, such as beliefs about one’s interlocutor, imitation, agreement between interlocutors (convention), feedback, which increases comprehension, and physical presence. Alignment presupposes that interlocutors in a communicative encounter build a very complex mental model of the situation and their interlocutors, especially their mental states, which is constantly tapped and updated as their interaction unfolds. This dynamic model is used by the interlocutors to construct and adjust their communicative intentions and to interpret their partners’ contributions.

4.3. Interpersonal communication as a relationship Some researchers (e.g. Long 1996, 2007, Saugstad 1980) assign a very narrow meaning to the notion of interaction as contained within the notion of language use. As has been reiterated here, however, interaction, defined as a form of mutual influence, is regarded as a fundamental activity of living organisms, especially human beings, reflecting their position in their social network and natural environment. After all, interaction is the fundamental condition of maintaining the livelihood of any organism, which must take in nutrients and other elements from the environment to replenish its own resources for biological and neurological, i.e. cognitive, processes (see chapter 3). The extent of interaction is much broader than verbal communication -it entails various instances of human behaviour including communication in general. The vehicle of this mutual, and not only mutual, influence is physical energy, which is derived from our bodily functions, and cognitive energy, derived from our mental functioning. The former is merely the most specialized and prevalent instance of human interaction which, thanks to its code, language, can rise to real finesse and precision in expressing and trading

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meanings. As a result, language is seen as a medium of social relationships whereas verbal communication is the sociocultural institution which makes them happen. The purpose of verbal communication is to facilitate the flow of information in the human networks and sustain their existence for as long as they are useful and necessary. At the same time, the specific nature of a given human network, i.e. group, determines the specific nature of its communicative flows (e.g. as can be seen in specialized communication for professional – expert – purposes, ESP). Communication, especially verbal communication, is constituted by transactions in meaningful messages to satisfy all human needs, basic, organic, material and practical as well as not-so-basic, or material or practical, such as bonding -family, group, ethnic bonding -as well as cognitive curiosity and emotional, religious and aesthetic needs. Social relationships engage us in our various communicative and/or professional roles with the aim of satisfying these various needs. Communication permeates all domains of human life and is essential in any group endeavour, e.g. efforts to control our natural environment as well as our survival as individuals and as a species. As has been said, verbal communication is essential in socializing/acculturating the young generation as the society reconstructs its demographic resources. In most but not all cases, communicative interaction takes place in the context of a relationship, a recurrent, highly dynamic constructive connection between people defined by their mutual relevance. Our relationships define the way we communicate while the quality of our communication determines the quality of our relationships. Relationships with other people are instrumental in the development of our identities which emerge and evolve in the process of sociocultural communication throughout our lives. Human development may be viewed as a clash between the drive toward belonging (affinity, association, identifying with others by opening up, sharing and adjusting to them) and autonomy, the need to remain independent and isolated, the need to define and protect our own identity and its borders. Human boundaries are determined during our relationships with others. Relationships can be real as well as imaginary. Fogel (1993: 153) calls them participatory and imaginative and points out that ‘the self is the developmental history of these participatory and imaginative cognitive relationships.’ A well-known author admitted at one point that the truly satisfactory emotional relationships with the opposite sex take place only in our imagination. Human interaction is about having an influence: the nature of communicative interaction is the same as of other cases of interaction: speaker A affects speaker B and is in turn affected by him or her. This influence materializes via the exchanges of energy generated by the participants in their bodies and minds, or brains. We communicate with our entire bodies and minds; hence whole-person 186

involvement in verbal communication. Although constrained by the nature of the situation and the relationship, the participants always make the communicative outcome somewhat (or largely) unpredictable within certain options. First of all, their goals in the communicative encounter may be different. But even when these goals happen to be compatible, meaning is constructed rather than retrieved from memory in a ready form, although this latter possibility is not ruled out completely. To express it, participants make selections from among the available options in their representational networks to construct sequences of utterances, which may consist of familiar elements but in new arrangements. They integrate and strategically use multiple clues, i.e. they make decisions on the basis of their perceived optimality criterion, which is subjective, as well as draw massive inferences. They engage in reconstructing the communicative intention depending on their level of intelligence, effort, relevance of the interlocutor and the whole situation. Indeed, interlocutors are involved in communication with their bodies and minds, their whole persons. There must be some amount of cognitive and emotional tension between them to enable them to engage in the exchange of communicative intentions, which at the most elementary level of interaction is nothing else but the flow of energy. Fogel (1993: 56) asks a profound question: ‘How can the behaviour of one person affect another?’ The behaviour of a person does not transfer itself physically to another person. Exchanging smiles or trading insults are merely metaphors, he adds. We perceive the information which may be translated into a feeling. It is the way we perceive, experience and interpret this information in the context of our relationship with the interlocutor and the situation that gives it its significance. Communication defines ongoing relationships in the context of which meanings are constructed so that we can develop as individuals. It is not an exaggeration to say that the quality of our lives is determined by the quality of our relationships with the significant others. With them we grow by sharing and participating in the creation of meaning and knowledge. Relationships may enhance and renew the perception, evaluation and understanding of the self and the world around us. Relationships take place in time, in other words, they have their onset, development and conclusion, and they may grow as well as deteriorate in their degree of intimacy. Fogel (1993: 97) points out: ‘Relationships will not persist in the absence of creativity.’ Information is created when the degrees of freedom are reduced. In the beginning of a relationship, the number of options for the relationship to develop is very high and with time these options are gradually reduced. Relationships sustain themselves as long as information, i.e., meaning, is mutually created. As has been mentioned earlier,

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meaning, which has a content and relationship component, is intrinsically rewarding whereas predictability is what kills relationships. As in all the other cases of our cognitive functioning, the most important role in the development of a relationship must be attributed to our mental representations, our perceptions and ideas of the others, including the manner in which we create stories of these relationships and negotiate meanings and interpretations.

4.4. Verbal communication in the developmental perspective Humans are born with the instinct to communicate (E. Clark 2009). Following Corsini, ed. (1987), instinct can be understood as a highly adaptive, innate, species-specific behaviour with the following properties: except for anomalies, it is common to all members of the species though its manifestations may vary from individual to individual; it provides benefits to individuals and the species; it is congruent with the normal environmental circumstances of the species; it develops within a definite order and regularity in the life of the individual, in accordance with the process of growth and maturation; it is goal-oriented and terminates in specific consequences; and finally, it is not learned on the basis of individual experience though it may emerge in the context of learning and learning may take place in relation to it. In contrast to instinct, learned behaviour may be abrupt and differ greatly among members of the species as well as depend on a number of clues. By the same token, the ability of, or the instinct for, verbal communication must be treated as default setting in the cognitive equipment of the non-primary language learner and taken as the learner’s dowry in the processes of foreign language teaching. Communication plays a crucial role in human survival and development since it enables individuals to understand others in the dynamically changing social world. It is justified, therefore, to regard the development of communication as a process of maturation and learning from others in the social context, through which we try to understand the world, exchange and negotiate meanings to establish our own identity and status to be able to form relationships, based on our images and perceptions of the others and our attitudes toward them. Children communicate to find out as well as to build a set of beliefs about the world, themselves and others (E. Clark 2009, Wood 1981). Wood uses the term ‘communication power’ to refer to this essential function of language use: As parents and teachers of children, we must help children build a repertoire of communication strategies with which they can deal with the critical situations they will encounter. We must help them in their struggle to make sense of themselves, the world they live in, and persons that are important in their lives. Effective communication is the key to

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making sense and to be effective communicators children must be aware of the options available to them in each situation they encounter (Wood 1981: 5).

Communication evolves along our life-span as our cognitive abilities develop and mature (Rebok 1987). Fogel (1993: 5) stresses that ‘models of communication and thought that do not develop are inadequate to the task of explaining the mind and its origins’. The infant is initially very egocentric and has yet to learn how to differentiate between the self and others. Egocentrism is understood as an inability to differentiate between the self and others, whereas perspectivism denotes the capacity to discriminate between one’s own point of view and those of others, and better still, to assume these different perspectives for different purposes. Egocentrism can be found in the cognitive processes of an individual as well as of social groups. In adolescence and adulthood there is progress in self- other differentiation, a growing awareness of the social complexities of life, the development of self-concept, perspective taking, role-taking and the conceptions of others (Rebok 1987). The term role refers to culturally specific norms and expectations addressed to the incumbents of various positions in the social structure (E. Clark 2009). The ability to assume different roles depends on their ability to distinguish themselves from others, the ability to recognize the existence of a variety of viewpoints and the ability to put oneself in another person’s shoes. This accomplishment emerges about the age of 6 to 8, when children can take another person’s perspective and become aware of the reciprocity of thoughts and feelings with another person. A very important aspect of this process is the development of empathy, the ability to understand and imagine what the others are feeling. The ability to understand our own feelings, needs and intentions as well as those of others is a very important developmental achievement, relevant to verbal communication and interpersonal problem-solving, i.e. to the development of communicative intelligence. Table 10: Components of verbal communication gradually emerging in childhood and adolescence Development of cognition and language Allocentrism – other-oriented, goal- oriented behaviour, using others as resources;

Elements of verbal communication First vocalizations, emitting behaviour, response to the presence of others, crying, gestures, joint attention, from private speech to social speech, other-oriented messages to be understood, taking other people’s point of view into consideration, decentering, adjustments, processing feedback;

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Development of cognition and language Interaction – mutual influence, reciprocity, which implies self-awareness, autonomy of thought and action; growth of working memory span -the ability to construct continuous discourse, monologues as well as conversations, ability to coordinate one’s communicative behaviour with the interlocutor;

Elements of verbal communication Reciprocal exchanges, symmetrical behaviour, imitation, body language (smile, facial expression, touch, caresses, movement) ability to attract attention, role acquisition, questioning, control over the elements of conversation, discovering and constructing one’s identity to be able to interact;

Knowledge and awareness of language

Learning and using phonemes and words, symbolization, development of syntax and lexicon, growth of accuracy in articulation, grammaticality and of mean utterance length, metalingual knowledge and awareness;

Development of thought processes – reasoning, abstract concepts and theoretical thought processes, perspective taking, increasingly objective thinking, growth of cognitive awareness and early and mature creativity;

Generation and negotiation of meaning and sense, acquiring ideas and knowledge from others, social referencing; inner speech for the expression of thought, growth of HIP system, increasing control of this system, the ability to generate culture.

According to Papalia and Olds (1990), early in life children grow to become goal- oriented beings who can organize their behaviour toward people and objects, generalize it to a variety of situations and integrate old and new behaviour. The fundamental prerequisite of all communicative abilities in children is their discrimination between the self and the environment, and their growing awareness of their interactive relationship with other people who receive and respond to their actions. This is the basis of communicative readiness, which is first implemented as nonverbal behaviour, and later evolves into verbal communication. At about the age of 18 months children start developing mental representations of meaning, which are linked to objects and the words that stand for them, i.e. the essence of symbolization. This may be treated as the real beginning of language once the emitted vocalizations are made up of phonemes, they are intentional and they have meaning. Mental representations enable the child to prepare practical activities by mental consideration and planning (Matczak 1992, Mitchell and Ziegler 2013, Schaffer 2004). Emerging intentional behaviour is the beginning of human intelligence. A child is a thinking individual who is capable of planning his or her actions as well as a social individual who is able to interact with others. During this time children grow to become goal-oriented beings, 190

who can organize their behaviour toward people and objects, generalize it to a variety of situations and integrate old and new behaviour. They often engage in imitation, especially deferred imitation of adult activities, which involves an ability to encode and store the mental image of a given activity and replicate it after a lapse of time. This is possible thanks to the called ‘mirror neuron system’ in our brains (Rizolatti and Craighero, 2009, Sousa, 2011). Prelinguistic communication takes place as the use of vocalizations without words or grammar. Its first form, crying, is ‘an innate form of communication that in newborns and infants expresses a need for attention or a strong emotion; basic infant’s cries include the rhythmic cry of need, the angry cry, the cry of pain, and the cry of frustration’ (Papalia and Olds 1990: 248). Babies whose cries bring relief gain confidence fast, so they cry less and less. Smiling is another form of non-linguistic communication which is innate and begins as a reflex only involving the lower facial muscles, but soon becomes social and engages the muscles around the eyes. Smiling begins to express pleasure and trust, as well as the recognition of the caregiver, especially his or her face. Laughter also appears and becomes quite common at that time; it is used to relieve tension at times. A ‘conversation’ as early as at the age of 8 months may take the form of imitative exchanges between the mother and her child in which both parties take great delight in producing the same vocalizations which form symmetrical conversation-like turn-taking patterns. Mothers tend to accept even the most minimal of the child’s behaviour as a conversational ‘turn’. In the second half of the first year, children accidentally imitate phonemes, but later they imitate them deliberately. Pre-linguistic communication makes use of the body, i.e. gestures as well as facial expressions, which show a wide range of emotions and needs that children cannot express verbally. Children learn how to get their parents’ attention, which functions as an important factor in their development. According to Jay (2003), infants begin to use gestures when they are 8 months old. Whether or not they are intentional may be determined on the basis of the following properties: effort to get the adult’s attention, persistence, i.e. repetition of the gesture until there is a desired action from the adult, and using alternative strategies, such as crying. This intentional use of gestures is an instance of the child’s goal-oriented behaviour. When the gestures which children make up are not interpreted by their parents, they drop them. At around 10 months of age children develop protoimperatives, the ability to use gestures to obtain objects, as well as protodeclaratives, the ability to draw the adult’s attention to an object. Joint attention which results from this effort forms the basis of communication. Researchers have found that the more effort is put into joint attention, the faster the development

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of language (Jay, 2003). Children are able to use some gestures and movement in the symbolic function, for example to represent a horse or a dog. Papalia and Olds (1990) point out that these gestures are quite significant indicators of cognitive development: they show that children understand that objects have names which can be used to refer to things and happenings in everyday life even before speech. Naming is a very important activity in acquiring communicative ability. Macnamara (1973) argued that infants use the meaning of words as the key to the language form rather than language form as the key to meaning. Motherese is child-directed speech which has various features of adjustment, such as elaboration of production, slower pace, pausing between sentences, clear, slightly exaggerated pronunciation, simple and short constructions, here- and-now reference, numerous repetitions, as well as scaffolding, recasts, plenty of feedback, etc. Usually, parents reward the truth-value of what the children say rather than accuracy (Ferguson 2004, Rebok 1987, Taylor and Taylor 1990, Shugar 1995). Characteristically, when engaging in a conversation with a child caregivers often provide recasts, i.e. elaborations of the child’s utterance which retain its meaning. In this way, they provide them with input on demand which can be incorporated into the developing language ability of the child. Children learn such social skills as getting the adults’ attention, using them as resources and showing affection and hostility, planning activities and carrying them out. As they learn to understand language, they become actors, reactors and interactors; they learn to make their own choices and decisions, and how to follow their own interests and how to engage in the communicative power play (Wood 1981). As children develop their communicative abilities, they become less egocentric, which involves understanding that their interlocutor’s perspective differs from their own; at the same time, they become sensitive to feedback in the course of communication. Children can adjust their communication to the age and status of their interlocutor, for example being able to ‘talk down’ or use motherese to a younger child or otherwise tailor their message to the needs of the other person. What matters in the development of their communicative ability is their improvement in monitoring and evaluating the clarity of their own and others’ speech (E. Clark 2009, Rebok 1987). An important achievement in the development of verbal communication is the emergence of the episodes of joint attention highly significant in the growth of the ability to interact. Joint attention is explained as a situation in which a child and an adult are attending to the same object and referring to it, which is manifest to them as they do so; it is a joint, not just a simultaneous activity, a meeting of minds (Eilan 2005). It emerges at about 12 months. By responding to an invitation, the child enters into agreement to do something together, for 192

example, look at an object. At the same time, the child has an understanding of attention as a mental resource. Joint attention is an early and vital milestone in the development of verbal communication; the other is that communication should be seen as a co-operative daily activity (Heal 2005). Children with autism have deficits in the ability to participate in joint attention. Social referencing is the phenomenon where children (at the age of 9 months) appear to look to the adults to get emotional clues about the way of reacting to new or unsettling stimuli (Eilan 2005). An important aspect of development is attention-getting behaviour on the part of children. Adults support children’s learning by providing communicative scaffolding, an interactive support for the expansion of communicative activities not otherwise possible in order to develop the skills of the child, e.g. by simplifying the learning task and involving children in interaction as opposed to being just models for language use (Bruner 1973, 1990). Fogel (1993: 78) explains the notion of communicative repair: ‘Depending on their age, infants will vocalize repeatedly, use alternative forms of gesturing, grab an adult’s arm or clothing, or otherwise persist until the adult responds in an acceptable manner’. Adults do the same. This behaviour suggests that from a very early age, infants act in this way because they view communication as a process over time and not as a set of discrete signals and because they understand that the success of their communicative behaviour depends on the way it is framed and co-regulated. Another concept which is relevant to the development of communication in the cultural context is conventionalization, (a form of abbreviation, from the point of view of social needs), a transition from negotiation to consensus, from co-regulation to framing, where initially there has been no frame for some action and it has taken weeks to establish this frame. It becomes a stabilized, repeatable pattern automatized to allow for more elaborate forms of interaction (Fogel 1993). According to Fogel, relationships change thanks to the processes of innovation/negotiation and consensual framing/conventionalization. The role of the adult guide evokes the notion of Vygotsky’s zone of proximal development and the role of more capable partners who help children learn how activities are organized culturally by way of guided participation, handing the responsibility for the task to the learner and supportive structuring of the novice’s efforts. Adults are instrumental in co-construction of frames for making the environment informative to the child. This role of the more knowledgeable adult is also retained in acquiring a foreign language in the educational system. In view of the above considerations a fundamental question arises as for the nature of the contract between the learners and the teachers in the process of foreign language teaching: a) what exactly is it that the foreign language learners

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are supposed to take out from the educational process and b) what contribution to the educational process are they able to make thanks their own cognitive and communicative endowment? Like other human beings, foreign language learners possess their characteristically-human communicative endowment and have acquired their first language. Therefore, they expect language learning in the educational situation to be like any other case of verbal communication, only in L2. They expect foreign language learning to serve natural communicative purposes. What is not available and has to be learned in the educational setting is the target language code of communication which can be broken and reconstructed only with the help of more knowledgeable others whereas familiarity with verbal communication must be treated as the learner’s mental equipment, i.e. implied infrastructure of their cognitive system of information processing.

4.5. The centrality of meaning in verbal communication Human beings are programmed to understand themselves, other human beings and the world around them. Verbal communication is the most powerful institution for discovering, constructing, and negotiating beliefs about reality, ourselves and others (Wood, 1981). Information, which is meaningful by definition, and its systems, can be regarded as the essential commodity of human interactions and relationships. People construct, share, exchange and negotiate meaning via verbal communication, as well as individually find things out by learning from records, from other, more knowledgeable individuals and by exploring the world. Not to be confused with the process of clarification of meaning (as implied in M. H. Long’s notion of ‘negotiation for meaning’), negotiation of meaning takes place when individuals try to meet half-way in their interpretation of the world by other individuals, especially the significant others in their lives, and construct its modified shared understanding. Negotiation of meaning is the essence of group processes, especially culture. To sum up, human beings, especially their brains, are regarded as generators of meanings in the sense of creators, producers, reproducers, interpreters, negotiators and accumulators of meaning. What is significant for these considerations is that people are able to perceive others as intentional beings. On the strength of this idea, verbal communication is seen as a connection of minds in which individuals construct meanings in order to transmit them to their interlocutors. This is to say that verbal communication involves highly dynamic directional energy flows defining human networks in time and space. Cherry (1957) points out that ‘to communicate’ means ‘to unite’, ‘to be one’, ‘to share a point of view’. The whole teleology of verbal communication is to exchange and share meaning, be it conceptual, factual, 194

propositional, pragmatic, social/relational or all of the above. The participants’ efforts and coordination are instinctively aimed at the search for meaning and sense: at the most elementary level, a very complicated coding system, made up of phonemes or graphemes, is used by one speaker, the sender, for distal stimulation of another speaker, the addressee, in order to provide him or her with more or less precise instructions which must be decoded for meaning, interpreted and evaluated by him or her as the sender’s communicative intention. Both participants are active in constructing and deconstructing meaning, i.e. the communicative intentions at the centre of their interaction. Givon (2005: 120) defines communication as a ‘dedicated signalling system whose purpose is to induce others to comprehend what is on one’s mind.’ As a form of cooperation, it requires an overlap in the participants’ respective mental representations of the world and some perspective/insight of his/her interlocutor’s state of beliefs and intentions. This is what we call shared background knowledge indispensable in verbal communication as much as in any other form of human interaction. Human communicative behaviour would be inconceivable without an on-line, at least subconscious, mental model of the interlocutor’s dynamic intentional and epistemic states. Meaning is the causal factor of verbal communication. A causal relationship takes place when A always follows B, and B never occurs without being preceded by A. Communicative intention, i.e. having something to say to the other person, is what makes verbal communication tick. First and foremost, meaning is not in texts or in situations, but in the participants’ minds. The motivation to sustain communicative relationships over time is to construct meaning rather then the mere meeting of one’s goals and needs through other people (Fogel 1993). The concept of ‘meaning’ has different aspects, depending on the scope of its context of interpretation in verbal communication: a) Meaning versus form. Meaning and form have a much wider scope than meaning and form in language. Meaning in general is the stuff of our mental life, e.g. thoughts, sensations, feelings, images; it may be fuzzy, vague or explicit, dependent as well as independent of the language in which they may be stored. While we have direct access to our-own meaning, other people’s meaning can only be communicated to us. For this reason, other people’s meaning cannot be code-neutral but is influenced by the raw material used as a transmitting vehicle and the code according to which the transmitting substance has been formatted, as is the case in verbal communication and the arts. In my framework, it is essential to see a spectrum of meaning ranging from expressable/communicable meaning to conceivable meaning, which

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is a much broader, unstructured (precognitive, intuitive) purely mental representation of meaning. In contradistinction, linguistic semantics regards meaning predominantly as part and parcel of language forms; it is accessed from the vantage point of sentences/utterances and investigated in connection with them (Krzeszowski 2012). b) Meaning encoded in the verbal form. That meaning can be communicable by language results from two elementary and universal properties of our information-processing system: the ability of feature coding, which leads to categorizing (concept building) and chronological or serial coding, which underlies associations; at the same time, feature coding and chronological coding are jointly involved in forming hierarchies, pervasive in language and all forms of human culture. Categorized meanings can be assigned to discrete, arbitrary labels, i.e. language entities, which represent them, can be articulated and emitted; moreover, meaningful entities can be combined to form propositions in our mentalese and/or sentences in an ethnic language. When there is more than one entity, functional and structural relationships among them emerge instantly; relationships, mostly hierarchical, are universal in human species; in language, they are represented as syntactic categories. Their relational meaning is in line with the distinction between content and relationship component in verbal communication (see point c) below). c) Meaning as reference. Reference is the inherent property of signs which direct language users to their respective mental and environmental associates as clues for the reconstruction of meaning. These clues are not confined to language but are also available as non-verbal and para-verbal information, e.g. body language of the communicating participants, their appearance and surroundings. Like verbal communication in its entirety, reference also has its content, i.e. ‘aboutness’ (Wilkins and Wakefield 1995) and its relationship component and it may be enhanced by verbal or bodily pointing, i.e. deixis (see point d) below). Five main types of deixis have been recognized: person deixis, spatial deixis, temporal deixis, social and discoursal deixis (Cruse 2000). d) Meaning as content and relationship component. The distinction between content and relationship applies to the participants of the communicative act as much as to language use in discourse itself. Content is the conceptual and propositional reference of language entities, whereas relationship is the reference of language entities to each other and their mutual adjustments when they occur together. Content is the outcome of our ability to express judgements and ideas, i.e. to predicate about the world. When we think of meaning as content, we refer to a developed body of concepts and propositions which make up an organized, sometimes highly sophisticated, hierarchical 196

system of knowledge within a domain or theme. The relational aspect of meaning is identified in the context of human bonding and networking in social hierarchies; language forms suitably reflect the attitudes and mutual perceptions of the participants, especially when it comes to their power play and negotiation of status in the sociocultural context. In verbal communication, by virtue of its intricate systematic organization, content functions as a connecting tissue holding discourse together, whereas morphosyntactic clues, which work above the clause and sentence units, provide markers of coherence and cohesion (see section e) below) e) Meaning as in ‘making sense to somebody’. When we can relate to this system of propositions and comprehend it as addressees, i.e. perceive it as coherent, clearly and logically connected, it makes sense to us. Understanding and meaning are intimately connected: understanding is perceiving something as coherent, which is tantamount to perceiving it as meaningful (Ausubel 1968). Discourse is coherent by virtue of propositional coherence and linguistic cohesion by virtue of various morphosynatactic and other devices at sentential and supra-sentential level (van Dijk, ed. 2000). f) Meaning as relevance. Relevance or significance results from the fact that something or someone is perceived by the interlocutors as important (useful and necessary) on the basis of some criterion, such as their personal goals and motivations (Sperber and Wilson, 1998). Therefore, relevance has a very strong relationship component. g) Pragmatic and cultural meanings. Like other aspects of meaning, these two also depend on the context of interpretation: pragmatic meaning refers to the relationship between language forms and their users, whereas cultural meaning is identified in the context of cultural schemata, scenarios, values, attitudes and conventions (Cruse 2000, Krzeszowski 2012). With these distinctions in mind, we can now clarify meaning as a currency in human interaction: meaning vs communicative intention, message, language form and discourse. Meaning is the content of our mental life in general (images, sensations, emotions, propositions, attitudes), communicative intention, however, is the effect of constructive processes of selection and integration performed on meaning by a participant in the context of a communicative situation and its parameters. Message refers to the externalized representation of the communicative intention, i.e. it is coded in some form. Language form is a representation encoded in one of the language transmitters, suitable for a given modality, e.g. graphemic or phonemic form. From the point of view of foreign language learners, two kinds of forms are especially significant: lexical, with conceptual

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meaning, and morphosyntactic, with relational meaning. Discourse is a coherent and cohesive message in the language form regarded in the context of human interaction. At the same time, when regarded in the mental context of encoding and decoding the communicative intention from non-verbal through pre- verbal into verbal form, the term ‘language form’ overlaps with ‘verbal form’. The implied contrast here is between ‘conceptual/propositional form’ and ‘language form’. When regarded in the context of the situational clues activated in verbal communication, such as non-lingual, paralingual and lingual form; there is clearly an overlap between ‘language form’ and ‘lingual form’(see section 2.6). The term ‘language’ is inclusive of these meanings (i.e. lingual and verbal) because it is more abstract, but by the same token, insufficiently sensitive to reflect the inner working of language use in verbal communication. It has been stressed that meaning is of fundamental significance in verbal communication: meaning determines the selection of language forms to be used in the communicative act, not the other way around, as it predominantly happened in old-style foreign language courses where forms were often selected (in the sense of isolated and foregrounded) for their own sake and their meaning was marginalized or regarded solely through the lens of these forms. Predominant grammar exercises consisting of lists of disconnected sentences exemplify this strategy of prioritizing forms at the expense of meaning, conflicting with chances of developing sustained discourse plans underlying working and long-term memory processes (see section 6.3). Admittedly, it is impossible to accomplish the communicative goals without forms because they structure the transmitting vehicles to make them phonemic or graphemic, morphosyntactic, lexical and syntagmatic vessels for carrying otherwise amorphous and fluid internal intentional states beyond the sender’s mind, to the addressee. However, in verbal communication forms are selected because of their meaning, i.e. communicative intention, not for their own sake. The importance of form may vary according to the type of communicative situation ranging from completely subordinated to meaning to equally important to meaning. In fact, the only situation in which language forms are of paramount importance and may legitimately be severed from meaning is when they are submitted to a certain category of linguistic analysis, a highly specialized activity which focuses on the relationships among language forms in order to discover their underlying regularities. When a foreign language learner is involved in such an analysis, he or she may develop explicit knowledge about the forms rather than procedural representations required in their use in communication. The learner’s task is to learn the forms and functions at various levels of the language system, their categorical identity (i.e. their contrasts with other forms plus their borders), their contextual alloforms, 198

their legitimate syntactic, syntagmatic and pragmatic environment, their selection, retrieval, skilled integration and emission in production, as well as their recognition and interpretation in comprehension. Learning grammatical forms functionally is not neutral to the sender’s and addressee’s perspectives. Adequate knowledge representation does not guarantee skilful use, which in turn is no guarantee of correct use in sustained discourse.

4.6. Ties between verbal communication and culture Allport (1985) lists the following conditions which must be met for a group/society to exist and survive: the society must be able to reproduce itself to survive longer than one generation and socialize its young; it must establish relationships with the natural environment to provide for the organic needs of its members. The society must have a system of norms as well as a system of controlling the behaviours which endanger social interests, and, most importantly, it must have a system of communication among group members. Verbal communication is a constitutive property of individuals and groups. According to McGrath (1984), ‘group’ can be understood as an aggregate of people who are mutually aware of each other and have an opportunity to interact. The life of a group depends on the tasks facing them. Group cohesion results from sharing certain elements, material as well as immaterial, i.e. the elements which are available to the individual group members as their mental representations and/or as material possessions. Characteristically, group members are aware of their shared past, present and future. Without communication, there is no socialization of newborn group members or cohesion of the group/society. Verbal communication in the human species is vital in all these spheres of social life as an institution for coding, storing and transmitting information, coordinating the activities of group members and satisfying various human needs, be they organic, emotional, cognitive, aesthetic, religious or ludic, as well as the needs to dominate and to possess. The remarkable power and precision of verbal communication has made it possible for the human species to develop the elaborate hierarchical systems of interpersonal networks we call cultures. It is quite justified to treat the notions of ‘group’ and ‘culture’ as coterminous (Price-Williams, 1985). Groups do not exist without cultures and cultures can only survive in groups of people. Group membership is a state of mind, in which a person accepts certain values, attitudes, mores, ideas, myths, narratives, conventions, scenarios, priorities, traditions, conceptions of life and our place in the world, the relationship to the past, present and future, as well as the natural and supernatural environment. This state of mind is activated as a set of assumptions, implicit or explicit, in verbal

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communication where it plays a crucial role in the construction and interpretation of meaning. Verbal communication as a phenomenon is greately diversified and structured according to domains and can be highly elaborate as well as elementary. In this way we can talk about communicative cultures of various groups and subgroups. Cultural differences can be observed even among couples and families, not to mention the most conspicuous contrasts between ethnic/ national and regional groups. Humans create culture by formatting various material and immaterial as well as mental and environmental resources, such as light, space, time, behaviour, organic (including nutrients) and inorganic substances, the natural and social environment, the flora and the fauna, ideas, values, myths, mores, etc., individually and in various combinations. It is significant that language, the code of verbal communication, is used as a most versatile material of cultural creation. In verbal communication as well as in other areas of culture, we can observe elementary forms which are indispensable for satisfying human needs as well as highly elaborate and specialized domain-specific forms, e.g. refined rituals, by far exceeding the utilitarian goals and basic necessities. Clearly, these elaborate forms illustrate the most spectacular differences between cultures. Since verbal communication is also subject to cultural elaboration (it has both simple and highly developed specialized forms), we can meaningfully talk about communicative culture, which is significantly diversified within and across ethnic groups, the culture with its own schemata, scenarios, conventions and various forms of scripted behaviours. Culture is a hierarchical network of meanings shared by a given group and transmitted from one generation to the next in the processes of verbal communication. In this way, new generations reconstruct the language system from communication to gain access to the cultural heritage (i.e. cultural meanings) of the group. Ontogenetically, communicative culture emerges very early, as early as in the pre-verbal period. ‘Children acquire patterns of action and thought that work for them in particular real-life situations, when alone and in the company of others. Children discover these patterns of acting and thinking through their own activity with others; they are not explicitly learning, nor are they following rules’ (Fogel 1993: 14). The processes of acquiring culture by foreign language learners include observation, imitation, modelling, play, e.g. symbolic play and role-play, practice in a sheltered environment (without dangerous consequences of errors), negotiation of meaning, social referencing, learning interactional synchrony devices in various situations to serve collaboration and coordination, such as adjacency pairs, constructing increasingly complex -and longer – conventional units of behaviour, acquiring scenarios for various cultural 200

situations and the culturally accepted norms of behaviour, as well as processing/ incorporating feedback about the accuracy and effectiveness of their own behaviour, etc. A leading vehicle for acquiring culture is the narrative, or story; reading and listening to stories provides an inexhaustible source of cultural information in a foreign language. The essence of culture is the construction and interpretation of meaning. According to Fogel (1993: 160), ‘communication, self and culture are constituted by the same processes…. Culture is created through communication’. Cultures provide frames/formatting for individuals to create meaningful relationships, regulate/coordinate interactions and forms of discourse and construct and reconstruct messages. The culture of a given group facilitates intra-and inter- group interactions by conventionalizing, coordinating and/or ritualizing social and interpersonal situations. In this way, culture permeates verbal communication as much as it is propagated by verbal communication; it imposes a kind of network on social institutions and human behaviour, a network of meanings constructed, stored and activated for social purposes. This formatting reduces the degree of unpredictability (uncertainty) in verbal communication by providing interpretational contexts for human thought and action. Communicative connections with other people are fundamental to the workings of the human mind and self, and to the culture that sustains our group survival. ‘An activity is cultural if the form of the action is similar enough to an accepted community standard to be recognized and interpreted by the other members of the community’. At the same time, a cultural activity is done at the right time and place and according to a shared contour (scenario) (Fogel 1993). No human action is acultural – cultural activities hold us in their grip throughout our lives.

4.7. Verbal communication as human operations in time and space Language may be viewed as a system of arbitrary forms, but this is just a perspective, one of many perspectives clearly distinct from, and in sharp contrast with, focus on language use as a universal and inevitable phenomenon of verbal communication. The term ‘verbal communication’ refers to a real phenomenon in space and time which involves whole people using language for the quintessential purpose for which it has evolved, i.e. our trade in meaning in the sociocultural environment. Because of our fundamental constructive role of agents in these acts, an account of verbal communication must recognize qualitatively different types of information systems which senders and addressees strategically

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activate for a given communicative encounter in their minds and a host of computations/processes which they launch in this act, i.e. constructing the communicative intention, its encoding and decoding, including inferences and ellipsis, most of which are hierarchically embedded to overcome our working memory limitations. What does this active participation involve? A. Whole-person involvement. As has been said, people participate in verbal communication with their entire bodies and minds, their cognitive, volitional and emotional systems at the given developmental stage, their anxiety, imagination and creativity, personal culture, attitudes and expectations, as well as stereotypes and prejudices, but first and foremost with their identity, personality, self-confidence, self-esteem, assertiveness, motivations and stamina for cognitive work, not to mention their sociocultural personae defined by gender, age, social status and roles, as well as previous experience and knowledge of the world. These individual personality and cognitive factors have a positive as well as negative influence on our communicative behaviour and chances of successful attainment of communicative and other goals. Last but not least is an influential cognitive factor involved in verbal communication, namely the individual quality of our cognitive equipment, in other words the quality, acuity and speed (Gardner 2005) of our information processing, i.e. our individual ability of making fine discriminations and associations, especially of language information, during communicative encounters. This translates into the level of intelligence and aptitude. B. An element of subjectivity. Human interaction in the natural and sociocultural environment is influenced by the way in which it is construed by the participants. Interaction between the mental and the environmental components of the communicative act is of crucial importance. The subject’s internal, mental, and external, sociocultural and natural, environments, most of all other people, participate in the communicative act as construed by the processing agent. Givon (2005: 35) is of the opinion that the environment is not ‘a purely objective entity, but rather the relevant environment as construed, selectively, by the behaving-cognizing organism during adaptive interaction. This relevant environment is often social, and thus includes both the construed ‘objective’ behaviour and construed ‘mental states of others, be they cooperative or hostile.’ Admittedly, senders as constructive agents have a way of adjusting and targeting their messages at the addressees according to their perceptions/images of these interlocutors and receive feedback on their acceptability to these interlocutors. The natural environment also provides feedback on the stability, regularity, covariation and controllability of various 202

natural entities or elements resulting from human understanding. It is clear that individual knowledge resources of the participants have a significant role to play in verbal communication. C. Anticipation and retrospection. In order to reduce the degree of uncertainty in communicative interactions and overcome the spatiotemporal constraints, participants generate anticipations, the state of looking ahead for the information to come, based on their relevant previous knowledge activated from permanent memory for the purpose of the communicative encounter. They also look back at previous encounters to recall relevant information and get more orientation about the context of the task at hand. As has been pointed out, all kinds of knowledge, not just of language forms, are activated and tapped for this purpose (knowledge of native, target and other languages, cultural/ communicative schemata, knowledge of the topic and the domain, knowledge of discourse types and the general knowledge of the world). After all, cognition, including verbal communication, is based on recognition. These assorted clues are retrieved for the purpose of the communicative act and made available in the working memory as contexts of interpretation for the information to come. Predictability of some of the communicative elements goes hand in hand with the state of orientation of the speakers in the communicative event. Anticipations and retrospections refer to various aspects of communicative acts, their cultural properties, the participants and situations, the topics and contents, discourse genres, previous communicative encounters relevant to the current situation, as well as to the meta-communicative and meta-lingual knowledge helpful in regulating communicative behaviour and interactions on subsequent occasions. All participants, including foreign language learners, must activate this communicative mental set and without attempting to perform the requisite operations and strategies, no language learning in the practical sense can take place. D. An act of composing. Before it takes language form, the sender’s communicative intention is generated by various interacting processes, especially the processes of selection, integration, adjustment, ellipsis which results from perspective taking, encasting the image of the addressee and inserting various relationship (distance or intimacy) clues into the message as well as the use of figurative language and other indirect, individual strategies of expression. Symmetrical processes are activated on the part of the addressee, such as elimination of unlikely hypotheses, assigning structure to the message, segmentation or decomposition, i.e. taking the elements of the message apart, reconstruction and interpretation of meaning, inferencing, recognising the sender’s perspective, recognizing and negotiating one’s own status, image,

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and degree of intimacy in the message, computing its literal and figurative meaning, as well as synthesizing different indirect sources of clues. These highly involved and fast constructive operations tap various options in our communication system and forms of reasoning. As participants collaborate in their joint effort to construct/reconstruct/negotiate meaning, their perceptions of the situations and the participants, as well as their own goals and motives, play a significant role in these selections. E. Encoding meanings into words and decoding words into meaning. Once the communicative intention is constructed in the given communicative situation, its non-verbal, i.e. conceptual and propositional form is matched with its pre-verbal form of a plan with places for lexical insertion, and then into the verbal form in which the language material is serialized and integrated. This strong interdependence between thoughts/ideas and their language form surfaces in production and comprehension in the modalities available to the participants. Various interactions between bottom-up and top-down processes are indispensable here. This is precisely what doing things with words is about in verbal communication and what any user, especially foreign language learner, must do to engage in it. F. Strategic use of all the available clues. Each communicative encounter taps various sources of information; their interaction and seepage are the norm which should be accepted as one of the distinctive features of verbal communication. As the specifically lingual information is processed in the act of verbal communication, the processing agent makes use of all the mental and environmental sources of information relevant to the message, especially the clues which come from the participants of the communicative act in its situational context. In other words, the clues are not limited to lingual, i.e. purely arbitrary forms of the language code, but include paralingual, i.e. mixed analogical/arbitrary information, as well as non-lingual information, which may be purely analogical, e.g. images, or arbitrary but in a different code, e.g. numbers, logical symbols, musical notation, which accompany and enhance comprehension and production. These clues are selected, integrated and used strategically, which means depending on the purpose, resources and optimality conditions in the given situation. G. Interacting modalities. The assorted types of information are usually available in more than one modality; in the case of the language code, primarily in the auditory and the visual modalities with phonemic and graphemic forms respectively. The function of our working memory is to integrate/coordinate/ synthesize/translate these various sources of information for us to decode meaning and, most of the time, generate their more abstract meta-modal 204

representation. Wilkins and Wakefield (1995) talk about amodal, cross- modal, supramodal, multisensory, modality-specific and modality-free representations. Fogel (1993:72) explains that ‘cross-modal perception occurs when information perceived in one modality is translated into perception or action in another modality.’ Cross-modal perception is the norm rather than exception in verbal communication as all kinds of clues are being processed for meaning. Needless to say, in contrast to information in one modality only, interaction among the modalities increases precision of their respective mental representations because they define each other in mutual relationship. As in many other cases of human information processing, e.g. multilingualism, interactions between mental representations enhance their own identity. H. Knowledge, skill and discourse. Language use in verbal communication makes up a recurrent cycle in which we have distinguished three ‘states of matter’: language represented mentally as vastly distributed knowledge networks, behaviourally as fluid language skill and externally as relatively stable discourse, i.e. the communicative outcome of production and the input for comprehension. Reflection on language use is incomplete without due consideration given to each of these states because, while they determine one another, each is special, i.e. each presents its unique cognitive challenges to the foreign language learner and requires specialized care, practice and cultivation strategies in language learning. It follows from the above enumeration that dynamic constructive processes of various kinds and at various levels of the communicative structure are activated by the human agent for the global purpose of generating, exchanging and negotiating meaning.

4.8. The nature of verbal communication Verbal communication is consistently understood as a special case of communication, which, in turn, is regarded as a special case of human interaction in typical sociocultural contexts, a dynamic human phenomenon with somewhat fuzzy borders, afforded by the structure of human cognitive functioning, discussed in Chapter Three. 1. Verbal communication is a universal human phenomenon, taking specialized forms in human cultures, evolutionarily developed for the purpose of generating, transmitting and negotiating meanings among individuals and groups of people. It is indispensable to our survival as individuals and groups whereas its various specialized varieties permeate and determine all aspects of our lives.

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2. This form of interaction, i.e. behaviour which involves mutual influence of the communicative partners, is highly effective in synchronizing and coordinating human thought and action, affording group cohesion and collaboration. In order to successfully interact/exchange meanings, people make use of various adjustments encoded in their goal-oriented language messages selected with view to taking the addressee(s) into account. In this way, they make up a system. 3. Verbal communication has an intrapersonal and interpersonal as well as group dimension, as in mass communication (also as impersonal communication in the Internet); the first two are essential in individual’s relationships with the significant others, whereas the remaining ones are significant in all forms of sociocultural life. 4. Like other forms of human thought and action, communicative behaviour is intentional (i.e. directed, volitional) and it takes the form of goal-oriented operations. As a result, verbal communication has an episodic, recursive nature taking a variety of culture-specific generic forms, e.g. events, tasks, discourse types, scenarios and situations. 5. Because of our limited resources, such as time, space, cognitive energy, and memory/knowledge resources, our thoughts and actions are not only episodic, i.e. referring to human situations, but, of necessity, strategic, i.e. involving goal-orientation, selection/construction of an optimum path to reach the goal with the available resources economically (Hargie, ed., 1997). 6. People involved in verbal communication make use of the feedback mechanism, which enhances their adaptive potential; feedback provides them with knowledge of effects of their behaviour, which enables them to modify and refine their mental representations as well as modify and refine their on-going communicative acts to make them more goal-effective. In verbal communication, feedback also enables individuals to refine their social knowledge representations to make them similar to other members of the given speech community. Sharing mental representations of a given group is tantamount to having mental representations similar to their mental representations. 7. In this highly constructive dynamic process, communicative intentions, i.e. meanings generated, cued and negotiated in the act, are not fixed but generated, constructed and reconstructed, i.e. computed on-line, in their contexts; they are subject to social interpretation and modification. Communicative intentions are selected and composed on the basis of all kinds of information available to the participants of the event both in their memory, i.e. internal knowledge representations, and in the external, socio- situational circumstances. 206

8. The dynamics of verbal communication results from the fact that human beings, motivated by their needs and goals, use their individual resources while trying to maintain a balance between identity and belonging, autonomy and associations with others, stability and flexibility, predictability and unpredictability, discipline and freedom and conventionality and innovativeness of human interaction. For this purpose they also make use of their assorted cognitive abilities, such as structuring and reasoning processes, especially abstraction, as well as their productive and creative potential. 9. Cultural formatting which we infuse from birth considerably reduces the degree of unpredictability of communicative situations within one sociocultural group, but leads to considerable sociocultural differences across groups complicating communicative processes in cross-cultural interactions. Foreign language learners suffer from quite acute degree of uncertainty in intercultural communication whereas low-intensity classroom learning is not a surrogate for extensive experience in the target environment.

4.8.1. Constituents of verbal communication Except for intrapersonal communication, a significant and meaningful process of communicating with oneself, the act of communication involves a sender and an addressee who turn their attention to each other to make up a communicative channel. In this was they make up a communicative system, a functional whole in which components adjust and determine each other in a situation, defined by who speaks to whom, about what, where, and for what purpose, a genuinely spatiotemporal system. The most significant aspect of verbal communication is the mental set of the participants, i.e. their activation of communicatively relevant information resources, perceptions, attitudes, motivations and decisions. The senders define their communicative intentions in their mental and situational context in order to encode and send them to the addressees, who decode them in the context of their own mental set. The situational contexts may be the same in space and time, as in face-to-face communication, whereas the mental contexts may only partly be shared since each is determined by the individuals’ knowledge representations and the way they construe themselves and their environment, especially other people. Participants of verbal communication are engaged wholly, i.e. with their entire bodies and minds, personalities, identities, knowledge, attitudes, values, goals and perceptions. Moreover, communication presupposes that the sender and the addressee are aware of each other and, ideally, willing to work toward their shared goal of constructing and reconstructing the meaning. Communication

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is impossible without at least some degree of cooperation between the interlocutors in this regard. Two closely related terms, coordination and co-regulation, refer to this particular aspect. H. Clark (1985, 1994, 1996) uses the former to denote synchronization of the sender’s and the addressee’s activities and (a degree of) cooperation in their effort to search for meaning in the communicative act. Not confined to verbal communication, coordination characterizes all forms of social behaviour. H. Clark considers it a key factor operating at various levels of communicative organization, ranging from word level to whole conversations, indispensable in any situation when at least two people interact. Obstacles in coordination may be eliminated by explicit agreement, salience (some circumstantial evidence), precedence (tradition) and conventions. He defines convention as certain regularity in social behaviour developed by a given community to overcome coordination problems. Conventions are recurrent forms of behaviours and they are partly arbitrary. We can talk about a convention when: it is known to the members of the community, it is expected to be adhered to, in other words conventions must be ratified; it is not the only possible form of behaviour under the circumstances; it results from choice. The most basic form of coordination takes place at the level of communicative intention, that is, between what the sender means and what the addressee understands him or her to mean. Helpful in the task of understanding is the activation of relevant perceptions, expectations, predictions and world knowledge, especially the cultural one. Further types of coordination refer to our synchronization of communicative behaviour as in turn taking, the choice of the subject, the flow of the narration, adjacency pairs, responses to clarification questions, various strategies used by the sender to orient the addressee, coherence and cohesion devices in discourse, etc. Members of a given speech community have the knowledge of scripted regularities in behaviour known to their class (scripts and scenarios, regarding the order of events in restaurants, doctor’s offices, classrooms, male and female roles) and a belief system shared with other speakers: they share a communicative culture. In this way culture enters verbal communication as mental representations activated for the purposes of interaction. A special case of these scripted representations is the knowledge of discourse genres and other plans, macrostructures, schemata internalized and used by members of a (sub)community. Fogel (1993: 19) uses the term co-regulation, which extends the idea of agents regulating their own, individual, behaviour, i.e. self-regulation, onto their 208

interaction with others. He explains the term as a joint action to achieve a mutually created set of social actions rather than merely an exchange of messages borne by discrete communication signals. In co-regulation people select and/ or alter their actions with regard to the current and anticipated actions of their communicative partners. It is a ‘dynamic balancing act by which a smooth performance is created out of the continuous mutual adjustments of action between the partners. In co-regulated communication, information is created between people in such a way that the information changes as the interaction unfolds. Co-regulated communication is created as it happens, its process and outcome are partly unpredictable.’ It follows that no single individual is completely in control of the process, structure, and outcome of communication. He adds that co-regulation is recognized as ‘the fundamental source of developmental change. In social and mental life, co-regulation allows the individual to participate in the discovery of the unknown and the invention of possibilities. If our genes provide us with any developmental guideline at all, it is our ability to enter into co-regulated discourse.’ (1993:6, my emphasis). Givon (2005) adds two important concepts, those of social restraint and feedback about our perceptions by others, which complement the idea of co-regulation in the social context. Verbal communication may be collaborative as well as highly competitive. People lie, deceive, manipulate turn taking and subvert normal forms of coordination, which would not be possible without having these norms in the first place. Underlying communicative co-regulation is anticipation, which helps us to eliminate the uncertainty or unpredictability of the encounter by activating our relevant knowledge sources. Coordination/co-regulation requires the speaker to select a clear and known form of the message to orient the addressee in reconstructing the intention primarily on the basis of the available clues. To sum up, the whole process starts when there is enough tension between the participants for the sender to conceive of a communicative intention, i.e. some meaning/content to be constructed, which he/she can encode into the verbal form, decodable to the addressee, with the addressee willing to receive and decode it in order to reconstruct the intention of the sender (Hewes, ed. 1995, Littlewood 1979). In face to face interaction the participants interchangeably take the part of senders and addressees. In other forms of interaction, especially those in which the contact is delayed in time and/or remote in space, immediate reciprocity is not possible, which does not undermine the need of the participants to be equipped for and ready to perform both roles. The key considerations in the form and content of the communicative event are the situational parameters: who speaks to whom, where, about what, for what purpose, and

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with what effect. Verbal communication may take place at the individual level as interpersonal communication, and at the social level as public/mass communication, in which audiences are involved in the role of the addressee and mass media play the central role.

4.8.2. Constructing communicative intention Carving out the communicative intention from the content of our mental life is highly constructive and dynamic. Among the various thoughts, ideas, concepts and propositions which occur in the mind of the sender in a given situation, in response to the internal and environmental stimulation, what is to be sent out to the addressee is only the tip of the iceberg of all the potential ideas available to the sender. The communicative intention is an outcome of the process of selection of some elements by eliminating others as well as their integration, i.e. assembly in a (coherent) whole. Subconsciously, senders may ask themselves a number of strategic questions, such as for example: Which ideas should I express and which should I keep to myself? Which ideas will serve my purpose best? Which of them are suitable and relevant to the communicative situation at hand? Which will have the most impact on the addressee? The speaker considers options and makes choices as to what to say and how to plan, organize, and present this meaning in a certain perspective. Constructing a message, i.e. the language form of the intention, is an act of composing par excellence. Needless to say, the choices that the sender makes are determined by the situational context, first and foremost, by such considerations as the status of the participants, their goals, mutual perceptions and attitudes, the way they regard and value each other and their common ground, or shared knowledge. The attitudes of the senders to the addressees and vice versa are influenced by such factors as their identity, social role and status, relevance to the sender’s goals, previous communicative experience in general, in this particular domain and with this interlocutor, various conventions and the etiquette appropriate for the occasion, and numerous other circumstances (Littlewood 1979). They are a part of the mental set (social and world knowledge) activated by the interlocutors in the communicative act.

4.8.3. Targeting the message at the addressee One of the important considerations in the construction of communicative intentions in the mind of the sender is his or her idea of the addressee’s level of knowledge in comparison with the sender’s own. As a result, the sender constructs an image of their shared knowledge, also referred to as common ground 210

or frame of reference. H. Clark (1994) makes an additional distinction between social and interpersonal common ground. This category has a profound influence on structuring and linearizing the communicative intention in the sender’s mind because the perspective in which he or she presents it reflects his/her perception of what is new, what is given and what is implied in the frame of reference, so that it can be reconstructed by the addressee (E. Clark 2009, Levelt 1989). Littlewood (1979) stresses that the dynamics of communicative decision- making is tantamount to selecting the elements which, under the circumstances, are to be verbalized, as opposed to those which can merely be implied and reconstructed by the addressee. For a number of reasons, especially our limited cognitive resources, we are not capable of verbalizing all the elements in a given communicative act anyway. The sender must resort to ellipsis, while the addressee – to inferring the non-verbalized information so as to bridge the verbalized elements into a coherent whole (Carroll, D. W., 1986, Gaskell ed. 2007, Gernsbacher ed. 1994). As a result, the image of the addressee is encoded in the message, especially in the amount of its relative redundancy or compression, the level of conceptual explicitness and concreteness of the content, the proportion between what is brought into the message as new information and what is implied or treated as given. If the addressee is satisfied with his or her image implied in the sender’s encodings, the process of communication will focus largely on the content of the interaction. If this is not the case, however, most addressees will insist on negotiating their status so that they reach an acceptable encasting. In fact, in the course of interactions, the participants are equally, if not more, interested in negotiating their image – identity, status and power – than they are in their opinions, decisions, values and plans for future actions. It must be reiterated after Wood (1981) that verbal communication has content and relationship components. The image of the addressee is encoded not only in the content of the message, but also its form of delivery, for example its pace, number of repetitions, loudness and precision of articulation. In other words, the rendering of the message is (intuitively) adjusted to what the sender regards as the decoding possibilities of the addressee. Our verbal communication is always adjusted depending on whether we speak to children (Ferguson 2004) or the elderly, experts or novices, men or women, new acquaintance or intimate friends, native or foreign speakers of the language. Indeed, the degree of compression or redundancy (elaboration) of the message, the explicitness or implicitness of the content, its level of technicality, abstractness or concreteness and salient or implicit markers of the genre, are among the factors which influence our subjective ease or difficulty in decoding the message.

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4.8.4. Encoding the communicative intention into the verbal message As has been pointed out, language use cannot be regarded as neutral to the roles of the sender and the addressee. As for the former, the communicative intention in the mind of the sender is his/her amorphous or explicit emotional, conceptual and propositional internal state. To be externalized, it must be encoded into the form which can be registered, recognized and decoded by the addressee, i.e. matched with verbal forms integrated as linear discourse. In other words, the meanings he or she wants to communicate must be recoded into their arbitrary representations in a different format. As has been pointed out on various occasions in this monograph, the reason for retrieving language forms by the sender are the meanings selected as his or her communicative intention; meaning comes first, and forms are selected to represent it, perhaps with the exception of play on words or avant-garde poetry in which form may take the upper hand. One such example is an unrivalled delight to the ear, ‘Lokomotywa’, a poem by Julian Tuwim, a goldie among Polish children and adults alike. Littlewood (1979) depicts the process of externalizing the non- verbal (conceptual) intention as mediated by a pre-verbal stage, which relies on syntagmatic constructions and other plans instrumental in assigning the conceptual and propositional content its linear verbal form suitable for being emitted serially. During this last operation, the sender inserts the lexical material and makes all the necessary adjustments in syntax to execute his or her verbal message. The conceptual, pre-verbal and verbal levels/stages mentioned above need not necessarily be available to our retrospection and awareness because they take place in fractions of seconds. However, the most important strategic decisions regarding the message in the case of fluent/native speakers are within the realm of controlled processes, i.e. they are executed with the use of attentional resources, while the subordinated levels of pre-verbal planning and verbalization into an utterance form seem to be performed more or less automatically. The stages of these computations do not take place in a rigid sequence, but simultaneously, so they have been distinguished for purely analytical reasons. What makes them quite viable, however, is the structure of the product, i.e. discourse.

4.8.5. Reconstructing the communicative intention by the addressee The addressee instinctively perceives the message as a language product – Aitchison (1979) states that humans do this instantly and intuitively – and processes it accordingly. More specifically, s/he must: 212

a) register it as a linear arrangement of verbal forms in context, b) segment it and assign a structure which defines syntactic relations of individual components, c) identify its pre-verbal plan, d) reconstruct the components as language signs, i.e. semanticize the forms by matching them with appropriate meanings, e) restore their coherence and cohesion, using such strategies as bridging inferences, among others, to reconstruct the communicative intention of the sender, and more often than not f) evaluate this intention in the context of his or her own mental set. The task of the addressee is to reconstruct the communicative intention from the message, but the message is not the only source of information for this purpose. Addressees use all the help they can get referring to the relevant environmental and mental sources of information, recognizing, semanticizing and interpreting the verbal message within the activated knowledge resources. Verbal communication takes place in its situational context, i.e. as a human event, an episodic instantiation of the relationships between people in their social and natural environment. Therefore, important clues for processing the message by the addressee come from the participants in their social and communicative roles, the setting/ environment, the social purpose and the agenda of the encounter. These sources of environmental information as well as the perception of the participants’ appearance and behaviour reduce uncertainty by eliminating unlikely options of understanding the message. The above sources have been referred to as linguistic (the verbal form of the message), paralinguistic (information tightly linked to the verbal message, e.g. sounds or icons, but not phonemes or graphemes) and non-linguistic, e.g. body language, environmental clues. However, to be consistent with my initial distinction between the level of language phenomena, especially verbal communication, and the level of reflection on them, we need to substitute the names for these clues with the adjectives ‘lingual’, ‘paralingual’ and ‘non-lingual’ respectively to rule out any associations with the universe of specialized linguistic description and analysis. The adjective ‘lingual’ refers to ‘language’ while ‘linguistic’ is reserved for the science of ‘linguistics’. As for the information resources activated for the communicative purpose, the addressee refers to his or her knowledge of the world, people in general and the participants in the communicative event in particular, knowledge of the communicative situation, previous encounters, cultural knowledge, knowledge of L1, L2 and any other language, knowledge of the subject, etc.

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Having identified the meanings and contents encoded by the sender, the addressee sets them against the background of these knowledge sources, which s/ he activates strategically from the point of view of their potential relevance, to reconstruct the sender’s intention including the perceived communicative goal behind the message. Additionally, because the addressee is in a relationship with the sender, he or she responds to this intention evaluating his or her own attitude to it, again on the basis of the relevant information, first of all, from the point of view of his or her own goals, values, beliefs, attitudes and expectations. The stage of evaluation is subjective by definition. However, it is a fact to be recognized and accepted in academic investigations of verbal communication. This subjectivity is counterbalanced by the systematic/rigid organization of language as a coding device. It is my conviction, therefore, that the discipline of foreign language learning and teaching must recognize and accept the processes of construction, interpretation, evaluation and negotiation of meaning as an integral aspect of verbal communication and treat them as important, if not the most important, didactic categories. This outline of verbal communication suggests its quintessential structure, which does not imply that real cases of verbal communication must always take a complete, elaborate or innovative form. However, their real instances may be easily systematized with reference to this extended view.

4.9. Knowledge, skill and discourse as a cycle in language use The episodic property of verbal communication results from its goal-oriented character, which requires the use of monitoring and feedback; the monitor supervises (modifies) the implementation of a plan, whereas feedback provides the knowledge of results which may be incorporated to refine our mental representations. The episodes of communication are recursive: a full cycle involves the sender’s message reaching the addressee to be reconstructed in his or her mind as well as a response on the part of the addressee reaching the sender’s mind to be reconstructed and evaluated. Each individual is equipped to take both roles, even almost simultaneously, whereas their communicative intentions are largely determined by their knowledge, goals, previous exchanges as well as the entire context of the situation. Since people enter communicative situations in some social roles with agendas, attitudes and expectations, their communicative intentions are defined by these social roles, identities, motives and desires. All in all, communicative encounters are events with a clear episodic form, i.e. with their onset, development (possibly culmination) and termination (dissolution). 214

A goal is linked to a plan which is constructed on-line to suit the circumstances or retrieved from memory as a more or less ready schema for action. Reaching the goal leads to terminating the event, whereas an encountered difficulty necessitates its repetition, possibly some modifications, or its abandonment. This view of language use is not compatible with the creed resulting from a descriptive linguistic perspective of language as a system of forms that language has no beginning and no end. The recursive property of verbal communication can be regarded from a very local, short-term perspective, as well as a long-term, life-span vantage point. Most importantly, this property, which results from the intentional nature of human behaviour, is also helpful in identifying the specific, qualitatively different states of the language ‘matter’ manifested in the cycle. The sender must activate his or her mental representations in the form of knowledge in order to encode the intention as discourse within the communicative time constraints, i.e. resort to his or her language skill. This means that we recognize, both for the sender and the addressee, the appropriate representations in their minds required in verbal communication, that is a) knowledge representations underlying language use, distinct from receptive or purely conceptual knowledge, or from the knowledge of grammatical rules; b) language use as skill, a complex form of behaviour which enables the communicating person to select and integrate hierarchically organized choices from among various represented options and execute them in comprehension/production, and c) language product, the outcome of communicative processes in the form of discourse, i.e. serial encoding of our communicative intentions as utterance or written text. Knowledge refers to the vastly distributed mental networks, hierarchies and systems of information with various junctures and options to choose from, activated in the encoding and decoding of communicative intentions. Since cognition is recognition, these representations are indispensable in identifying the incoming information as categorical by way of matching the continuous flow of information in the incoming stimulus, i.e. input, with the language specific categories and their syntagmatic constructions represented in the mind of the decoder. At the same time, they are also tapped in the process of formatting amorphous meaning in production. The knowledge component in the communicative cycle includes different qualities of representations, i.e. declarative and procedural, conceptual and propositional, paradigmatic and syntagmatic, episodic and generic. To begin with, there are concepts/lexis in our mental lexicon categorized from the point of view of form, associations and meaning, propositional knowledge, modality specific representations, declarative and procedural records, syntagmatic and paradigmatic representations, (preverbal) plans,

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schemata, scenarios, scripts, conventions and rules, as well as models of culture- specific discourse genres. Knowledge may be fuzzy and poorly organized, and therefore harder to access, as well as well-organized and explicit, and thus more easily accessible and available for verbalization. It may also vary as to its level of generality/abstraction and may therefore be more or less easily transferable to new tasks and situations, as evidenced in Content and Language Integrated Learning. These considerations have serious implications for didactic strategies of cultivating knowledge types helpful in verbal communication. The first one that should be mentioned is the provision of relevant input in the foreign language learner’s communicative environment. The learner may accumulate the necessary knowledge for communicative behaviour especially by processing input which has episodic structure and is communicatively relevant, i.e. situationally- embedded, showing communicative encounters in which people convey meaningful messages to their communicative partners, messages, which refer to human matters in their natural and sociocultural environment. In this way, the learning process is fed by the experience and observation of environmental input, which is not to be confused with experiential learning, which to me is a tautology (cf. Williams and Burden 1997). This idea also diverges from the notion of comprehensible input developed by Krashen (1985) in that Krashen’s input is both a necessary and sufficient condition for language acquisition, a subconscious process, and it is addressed to a linguistic processing mechanism, i.e. Language Acquisition Device, rather than a human addressee, a living person equipped with species-specific information processing system, who can launch highly constructive comprehension and production processes, adjusted the communicative context, strategically and inferentially using all the relevant knowledge sources to process language and store the experience in memory to use it at subsequent occasions. Certainly, experience and observation are necessary, but insufficient conditions for language learning. What is also needed is the communicative interaction and feedback. An essential prerequisite of learning from experience, including observation, is the communicative weight of the input material. In contrast to Krashen’s idea that input be comprehensible (Krashen 1981, 1982), my conception sees input as communicatively relevant, situationally-embedded discourse, illustrative enough to cover important genres of verbal communication. At the same time, the skill component is needed in addition to the ability to produce sustained discourse, while discourse must be available to the learner for his or her study purposes so that language code can be successfully reconstructed, e.g. with feedback on form from more competent language users. Krashen does not single out knowledge, skill and discourse as 216

vital components to be cultivated in the communicative cycle, whereas here the experience of processing the communicative material in the form of discourse takes an episodic form of comprehension and production with knowledge representations developed according to the principle of multiple coding and filing. Episodes of comprehension and production lead to development, enhanced by the study of language as a coding device for communicative uses, unlocked with the help of the teacher. The notion of language use as skill has been defined as a behavioural category denoting a hierarchical integration of communicative choices which enable the language user to resort to controlled processes for the strategically more important decisions and execute them with the help of subordinated automatic processes. Automatization of lower-level choices helps the language user to keep pace with the communicative fluency demands. Both the lexical material as well as the syntagmatic plans and other linear arrangements are used in encoding and decoding the intention into and from discourse form. The choices that the speaker makes must be implemented in fractions of seconds. The qualitative difference between knowledge in the sense of mental representation and skill as behavioural category is not only in the ability of the language user to retrieve the required information from memory, but first of all, the ability – within the constraints of his or her working memory – to integrate the necessary operations in time to control the composing activity and navigate it in the desired direction. The lower-level choices must be automatic to free the attentional resources for the more ambitious and demanding level of the task. The learner’s route to automatization is via practice and it has its own progression identified by Fitts (1964, see also Anderson, J. R., ed., 1981) as the declarative, associative and autonomous stages. The difficulty of developing skills in foreign language learning results from the fact that the integration and automaticity necessary in skilled language use are developed via flexible adjustable acts of composing utterances, i.e. they must be practiced in countless communicative tasks which take time, in contrast to rigid language drills aimed at fixed grammatical forms, taken out of their communicative environment. Skill acquisition requires relevant models of behaviour, practice, imitation and repetition, rehearsal, deliberate planning, integration, whole-part task strategy, feedback incorporation, etc. (see Chapter Five, Table 14), provided the material is communicatively relevant and the unit of activity is sufficiently sizeable to be remembered as a communicative event, which is to say, it must have an episodic structure of a meaningful communicative task. Discourse is the more tangible language product of encoding in verbal communication which may be recorded in a form more permanent than our echoic or

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iconic memory. The distinctive property of this natural unit of verbal communication is the unity of the communicative intention, constructed by the sender and directed at the addressee, as well as its profound anchoring in the situational context. Discourse hangs together because of its coherence and cohesion, i.e. topical connectivity and prosodic, morphosyntactic and lexical suprasentential devices which retain the links between the new and given information from the speaker’s perspective to hold the thread of discourse together. Givon (2005) contributes to our understanding of the mental operations underlying discourse production by contrasting the idea of coherence as the property of the product of communication, e.g. a written text (or a mental text stored in memory) with coherence as on- line mental operations. He defines coherence as continuity or connectivity and stresses that the production of coherent and cohesive discourse requires mental operations in the context of the current speech situation and the current text in episodic memory. The text in episodic memory has a hierarchical structure. Coherent episodic representation guarantees the retrieval of specific episodic memory nodes during discourse production and comprehension to be connected to the pre-existing discourse grounding (i.e. anchoring) in the working memory. During discourse comprehension and production, both the speaker and the comprehender are busy connecting the incoming lexical and propositional nodes to the pre-existing episodic structure of the current text within the constraints of their working memory. Weaving the thread of discourse in a conversation is an act of composing by collaboration. Anaphoric grounding is retrospective whereas cataphoric grounding is anticipatory. New elements which are brought into discourse are usually coded as indefinite referents. Definite referents, on the other hand, are assumed to be retrievable from the listener’s working memory as belonging to the topic domain. To facilitate the listener’s search for their referents, the speaker would re-code them as still topical. Givon points out (2005: 134): ‘A surprisingly large portion of the grammatical machinery of human languages turns out to partake in the cuing of referential coherence.’ Anaphoric distance would be a measure of the number of clauses in the preceding discourse in which the most recent co-referent can be found. In other words, the grammatical devices used during natural on-line discourse production and comprehension, such as the articles or the tenses in English, may be viewed as coherence signals designed to cue the hearer about the retrieval operations in episodic memory. From the point of view of the needs of language learners, the most important function of discourse is that of language input, i.e. the source of information on how competent speakers code their communicative intentions into target language forms and do this intelligibly as well as idiomatically in situational contexts. More specifically, target language discourse is a model and a source 218

of knowledge about discourse genres, i.e. situationally and culturally-specific discourse types with their domain terminology, structure and characteristic coherence and cohesion devices. Practising discourse production must entail the experience of using the coherence and cohesion devices, such as morphosyntactic ones, accurately over some communicative distances within the working memory constraints. Therefore, various grammatical forms should be practiced in their natural discourse environment with view to their function as coherence and cohesive devices in communication, i.e. the devices which, as a rule, function not only within, but mostly above sentence level. Their use by the foreign language learner requires some stretching of the working memory resources to communicate meaning accurately in the context of the situation. Even quite advanced learners of English as a foreign language tend to make grammatical errors at discourse level. Discourse is not only an outcome of communicative processes, the effect of language production and the material for comprehension, but also the material for study and reasoning for the purpose of language learning. It may be taken apart and put back together again, the underlying plan may be inferred and reconstructed with a view to its conventions. Lexical units of various sizes may be focused upon, semanticized, elaborated upon, systematized and learned in connection with the discourse model. From the point of view of foreign language teaching, the ability to produce discourse may be developed with the use of models for imitation, partial imitation, completion and summarizing, parallel writing, analysis and recognition of discourse plans and conventions, as well as in relevant partial tasks which include planning, drafting/rehearsing, editing/ feedback incorporation and rewriting/retelling, as well as process writing.

4.10. Language as the code of communication Language is an inalienable property of the human being. It is vital to all human purposes as it permeates all areas of individual and group, i.e. cultural, activities used by human beings to satisfy various needs – organic, cognitive, social, emotional, religious – primarily to bond and belong, i.e. to a family or group, as well as the need for identity and relative autonomy as an individual. Language use enables man to code individual and group experience and thought, understand, elaborate, operate on them, and, most importantly, to communicate them to others across space and time. Language is needed in individual, interpersonal and social interaction which makes culture possible. It is quite justified, therefore, to conceptualize it as a communicative code used in the context of areas, or domains, of human experience and expertise.

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De Saussure defined language as a system of arbitrary signs. It would be anachronistic and counterproductive to argue that language does not have a system which can be analyzed and described. This has been the focus of linguistic conceptions with the strongest impact on foreign language teaching. However, that language can successfully be described as a formal system does not mean that such a description represents operations of language use and learning by the language learner. As Givon (2005) points out, for structuralists, (unlike for cognitivists, my comment) the relationship between the sign and its meaning involves no framing mind. This is the reason why a representation of language use and learning which is derived from the system of forms, for example, as a process seen as a linearization of forms cannot be accepted as an empirical (spaciotemporal) representation, even though this has been the case throughout the evolution of second language acquisition research (Schmidt 1988, Ortega 2009). The strategy of modelling language for the purpose of foreign language learning and teaching which has been adopted here as a bottom-up view is language use by human beings, anchored in and constrained by the human cognitive architecture, unfolding in time and space as episodes of socio-culturally structured verbal communication, employed for countless human purposes. This model targets language use in human situations, involving human agents in cognitive processes, operations and strategies which link outgoing humanly-generated meaning coded into the form of verbal messages to be understood by others on the one hand and as in-coming messages in the verbal form to be decoded and understood for their meaning on the other. Cognitive psychologists would be well advised to accept de Saussure’s definition as well as the distinctive properties of language, such as productivity, abstract reference and the arbitrary nature of signs, all of which make language stand out among other communicative systems in the animal world and among other symbolic systems in human cognitive functioning. It is quite natural that - in exploring the processes of language use and learning -one must not ignore the unique nature and internal structure of the code being acquired and used. However, the cognitive psycholinguistic perspective of language use and learning as human communicative processes and operations is qualitatively different from the description of language as a formal system disconnected from the human subject, God forbid, as an asemantic system, i.e. solely as a self-contained system of forms and their relationships. Instead, my perspective is aimed at representing and investigating how this communicative code, which does have a system (it is a code, after all), is used by humans in social interaction. What defines the didactic view of language forms is as follows: 220

a) the use of forms is determined by the context of verbal communication understood as a human social phenomenon, a system of human relationships, in which there is no language use without the human user, i.e. people activate and select forms according to the parameters of this communicative system; b) meaning is present solely in the human mind and it is merely re-presented by language forms in the discourse of verbal communication as clues for its reconstruction; it is not, and never can, be represented and reconstructed exactly and ‘objectively’; c) this emphasis on the inextricable bond between the human subject and language signs, which cannot be emitted and interpreted without people, remains in clear contrast with the view of language in the abstract, as disconnected from the user; d) in verbal communication, meanings are primary whereas forms are subordinated to meanings; this primacy of meaning applies to all human relationships, especially their content and relationship component; e) language forms are not neutral to the role of the sender and the addressee: the sender matches meanings with language forms, whereas the addressee matches language forms with meanings; f) language forms are represented mentally in various ways which differ qualitatively and quantitatively, i.e. in a multitude of formats and degrees of detail, depending on the manner in which they are processed in different tasks, for example, in controlled, automatic and hybrid processing, as lexical entities and their syntagmatic constructions, as plans and prefabricated patterns for clauses and utterances in sustained discourse, or as explicit algorithms, rules, scripts, conventions and procedures. g) language forms evolve during the language learning process, depending on the way they are stored, retrieved and integrated in sustained discourse in on-line processing, with a gradual elimination of errors as well as the degree to which they are mentally articulated from a fuzzy state of the subject’s (subconscious) uncertainty into explicit and proceduralized knowledge representations, available for use in time-constrained communication. Language is the earliest human digital invention in the sense that it makes use of discrete arbitrary symbols at different levels of its organization for coding meanings. Therefore, to serve their function, these units must be represented mentally as sufficiently articulate discernible categories, i.e. emitted with sufficient precision by the producer to be identified/recognized by the addressee of the signs. The identity of these discrete units in their signifying function results from their implicit contrasts with other such units in the system. Analogical representations

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typically contain sensory images, and they are tied to a particular modality, whereas verbal representations are modality specific as well as more abstract, meta-modal (Baars 1997, Eysenck 2006, Norman 1987). To sum up the above considerations, concerns of the field of foreign language didactics would call for the following general characterization of language use and learning in verbal communication: 1. the point of departure in language use, as well as its destination, is meaning, i.e. the content of our mental life: ideas, thoughts, feelings and images generated and stored in the subject’s mind; meanings may range from vague, fuzzy, under-defined and amorphous to clear, articulate, well-defined entities represented with fine distinctions, well-organized/structured and available to our awareness as concepts and propositions; ideas, thoughts, attitudes, feelings, and images are the raw material from which we carve out our communicative intentions in the context of our mental set as well as situation, especially our relationship with others; 2. we construct our communicative intention to match, couple, or pair our ideas and thoughts (concepts and propositions) with their verbal representations; meaning refers not only to the conceptual or propositional content, but also to the relational aspect of the communicative system; 3. forms have their modality-specific, i.e. phonemic and graphemic representations, which develop into more abstract meta-modal mental representations as the process of language use and learning continues in an individual; as different modality-specific representations for the same form are stored, they are (subconsciously) juxtaposed, compared and contrasted in the learner’s mind which leads to their more precise and therefore explicit mental representations which are available to our awareness; 4. verbal representations of concepts and propositions are arbitrary labels: they are unmotivated (unjustified) and conventional (chosen from among alternatives and accepted), in contrast to analogical (similar) representations, i.e. images, and other arbitrary, but not linguistic representation systems, such as numbers, musical notation or symbols used in formal logic; all of them meet in human interactions, including verbal communication; 5. the categorical units of the coding system have their identity (distinct specificity), boundaries (contours) and distribution (ability to form associations in certain circumstances); identity comes from their distinctive characteristic features which distinguish them from other entities; these discrete units are not meaningful by themselves other than in terms of the oppositions and functions in the coding system, which is to say that their various formal 222

properties are indispensable in retaining their identity, stability and function in the coding system, especially their effectiveness as cues for signalling meaning to interlocutors; accuracy in forms facilitates understanding; 6. once selected for coding meaning in a given situation, forms are cast on some transmitting vehicle to be carried as signs in space and time; such a vehicle is most typically the articulated/modulated sound wave and the contrasting light wave, each affording its own sign formats and specific processing; foreign language teaching must take into account not only the accurate reconstruction of forms but also their accurate emission under time-pressure in the communicative context. This conception can be contrasted with approaches, also labelled as cognitive, which postulate mental representations of language as linguistic rules, lexis and pragmatic conventions (e.g. McLaughlin 1987), or which define language as a complex cognitive skill (Crookes 1988, Skehan 1998), which can be fully automatized to be no different from habit, or as proceduralization of declarative knowledge (Johnson 1996). In his account of second language acquisition, Ellis (1994: 295) pointed out: ‘Theories and models of L2 are cognitive in that they view L2 acquisition as a mental process involving gradual mastery of items and structures through application of general strategies of perception and production.’ As a result, the distinctive specificity/uniqueness of language use, as discussed above, is not fully recognized, if recognized at all (for a more detailed discussion, see Dakowska, 2003). Language use and learning is a unitary concept in the sense that language use cannot be meaningfully broken down into ‘language’ and ‘use’, nor can language learning be divided into ‘language’ and ‘learning’, as has been done in the history of teaching English as a foreign language. They denote a natural and cultural phenomenon in the empirical reality, in time and space, to human communicative events. The notion of ‘language’ in this context refers to a unique code of communication, an organized system for form-meaning and meaning-form assignments, not reducible to skill or the application of general strategies of perception and production. Its cognitive status results from the localization of language processes in the human cognitive architecture and from being operated upon by the language user. This anchoring in human cognitive architecture determines the types and status of mental representations of information structures necessary in language use as are suitable for language use as skill and for the product of language operations as discourse. These constituents are perceived through the mechanism of human information processing in our cognitive architecture and in the context of verbal communication, understood as an empirical system

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made up of the sender and the addressee. In my analysis, keeping in mind that people communicate with their entire bodies and minds, the primary tool of verbal communication is the human brain because this is the organ which generates and computes meanings. Language is merely a coding device for converting/ transforming meanings into messages; unlike meanings, messages can be transported from senders to addressees to be decoded; texts are merely are products of these meaning-coding, or message-making, processes. De Beaugrande (1987) emphasizes the central role of the time factor, which had disappeared from the linguistic models. Linear processing is a characteristic feature of language use. Schemata, he adds, are vital for such linear activities (the left hemisphere is specialized for linear, time-based sequences, Dornyei 2009, Paradis 2004, 2009). Knowledge representations should have a format suitable to the tasks performed upon them. He attributes general cognitive processes to the human subject and sees the language specific processes as entailed in the general cognitive processes. According to the views expressed in Aitkenhead and Slack, eds. (1987), the nature of cognitive modelling is that a model of a particular cognitive ability requires the specification of the representation of the knowledge structure underlying the ability, and a description of the processes which operate on those structures. The model should be testable, include memory and be analogical. This is, according to them, the essential cognitive way of decomposing cognition. The success of a model is the degree to which it matches the data.

4.11. Implications for understanding foreign language learning and teaching Our understanding of foreign language learning and teaching in the formal context is derived from verbal communication as a natural and sociocultural human phenomenon and the manner in which language use is determined by its status and function in this human relational system. Therefore, foreign language learning and teaching in the formal context can only be instituted by reconstructing the conditions for, and activating the processes of, language use in verbal communication and their derivatives, which calls for: a) the construction of an adequate surrogate sociocultural environment as input (cultural, communicative and language input) for comprehension and storage to create the requisite mental representations for language use, especially situational genres; b) creating conditions, reasons and stimulation for verbal communication, i.e. the learners’ interaction in the target language, i.e. comprehension and 224

production in speech and writing to create opportunities for them to practice constructing and reconstructing messages; c) creating conditions for the modification of the learners’ mental representations to approximate the target language norms, i.e. providing positive and negative, corrective, feedback. From the point of view of foreign language didactics, learning how to communicate in a foreign language must include learning how to articulate and discriminate language signs (in their various constructions and arrangements), i.e. verbal forms cast upon their transmitting vehicle in association with their meanings with numerous references to relevant contexts of knowledge sources in the environment and the learners’ minds used for encoding and decoding the communicative intention. Meaning is of central importance in communication: from the perspective of the sender it is the choice of meaning which determines the activation of forms in a communicative encounter, not the other way around, as is often the case in a foreign language class. From the perspective of the addressee, forms are not analyzed for their own sake, but only to the extent to which they are helpful in identifying meaning and sense in the situational context. Learning forms without meaning is an impossibility in the case of a system of signs, learning them in isolation from their natural contexts is art for art’s sake, wasteful from the point of view of language learning, especially the learners’ practical needs of relating classroom experience to their episodic memory for people and events, as well as generic memory for more categorized knowledge of the world. In real communicative situations, choosing a communicative intention to encode and subsequently decoding is a highly demanding activity, a truly constructive act. Expecting an ideal flow of communicative processes is far from realistic. Human beings have tremendous difficulties in understanding each other in verbal communication for a variety of reasons (Nęcki 2000): they do not know each other; they do not respect each other enough to treat as equals; they are not sufficiently intelligent; their attitudes are permeated with prejudice, animosity or envy; they do not pay enough attention to their communicative partners; they are too lazy to recall the relevant knowledge; they want to show their lack of acceptance by not hearing or understanding the partner; they do not share the same communicative conventions, etc. Foreign language teachers cannot eliminate or change the dark side of the human nature but they certainly can sort out their own social role as professionals taking into account certain facts, especially that language learners can enhance their adaptive potential by learning the target language as a coding device as accurately and functionally as possible. The

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only way to reconstruct it is to learn the requisite knowledge in the context of communication and using it for performing relevant tasks. It seems clear that the stress and subjective difficulty experienced by communicative partners result not only from the limited mastery of the foreign language, but also from not knowing each other: having limited background knowledge about each other and the speech community, having a fuzzy view of the scope of shared knowledge/common ground and representing different attitudes and expectations, conventions and values, which is to say, belonging to different (communicative) cultures. A remedy for these nontrivial difficulties is not only more foreign language learning, but getting to know the specific target group better. This cannot be done a priori, in the educational context, although the learner may, to some extent, be prepared to cope with the real life challenges well, if the educational process is communicatively relevant and provides opportunities for learning the code in the context of verbal communication. Code is certainly the information that is shared. Becoming a member of the target group is not simple. A group has been defined as an aggregate of individuals who are aware of each other and have the opportunity to interact (McGrath 1984). Group members share their past, present and future, and perform some tasks, which makes the group cohesive. Verbal communication is a means of sustaintaining the group as a unit. Becoming a member of the group is a social matter. To quote Cherry (1957, 8): ‘A society has a structure, definite sets of relationships between individuals, which is not formless or haphazard but organized. Hierarchies may exist and be recognized, in a family, a business, and institution, a factory, or an army – functional relationships which decide to a great extent the patterned flow of communication’. Group membership facilitates the selection of communicative intention and the process of adjusting the intention to the image of the addressee. Also knowing how to perform a given role is a strength which comes from experience in a given community. Didactic situations in the classroom cannot and should not be expected to equip the learner for all social challenges, but if the experience they provide replicates the structure of verbal communication and sensitizes him or her to its parameters, the learner, who is an intelligent organism, will use it to solve his or her own social problems later in life, on subsequent communicative occasions. To do that he or she must functionally learn the code for verbal communication, i.e. learn how to operate it in social encounters. This can be done in the classroom. The ensuing guidelines and values in foreign language didactics seem to be the following. Signs may be described in the abstract, their forms may be described in the abstract, even their meanings may be described in the abstract, but 226

they cannot be transmitted, recognized and controlled/regulated in the abstract. This suggests that in order to facilitate the acquisition of the code for verbal communication, foreign language learning and teaching must reconstruct conditions for language use as determined by the context of communicative system: 1) it must take place in an informationally rich environment providing relevant language input and experience, i.e. discourse materials which are long enough to illustrate reasonable human situations/events/actions, roles, goals and meanings to provide knowledge representations required in verbal communication; the natural unit of language learning is the situation, which has the episodic character of verbal communication, it should be adjusted (addressed) with regard to its length and complexity to the learner’s age and level of proficiency; a situation may be covered in parts and presented from different angles, but in the final accounting, this is the unit of communicative experience that our information processing mechanism, especially our episodic memory for events and people, can relate to and record; discourse is different from a disconnected list of sentences in that it is a coherent and cohesive result of human interaction, whereas a disconnected list of sentences is the material of grammatical analysis; 2) it must recognize meaning (both its content and relational component) as a very important didactic category because this is what motivates the use of language signs in their various arrangements naturally engaging our information processing according to real purpose for which it is used in verbal communication; to practice communication the learner must activate his or her communicative mental set with relevant information resources to select from, have the freedom to choose what to say in a given situation and express it as an utterance or written discourse; as has been mentioned, this freedom of choice is often taken away from the learner for the sake of misconceived simplicity; however, for the classroom activities to be practical (i.e. equivalent to the communicative demands outside the class), they must build extensive background knowledge resources, involve meaning construction and feedback incorporation; 3) selecting and constructing a communicative intention is a vital part of communicative situations, a causal factor of verbal communication; learning how to communicate in a foreign language must consist of tasks which incorporate selecting and constructing communicative intention not only for the sake of the learner’s communicative freedom, but at least one more important reason: these choices take up attentional resources, so other lower-level operations must be automatized within the task constraints to be executed

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with only peripheral attentional resources. If we do not provide tasks with the freedom to choose what to say, the learner practices behaviours which are not commensurate with skill development for real communication, not to mention the fact that these activities are not stimulating; 4) considering the role of extensive background knowledge and the arbitrary character of the signs’ form, as well as the conventional nature of most language structures and plans used in verbal communication, foreign language learning and teaching cannot afford to underestimate the role of memory processes, deliberate commitment of meaningful as well as arbitrary information to memory, its recall, consolidation, rehearsal, imitation and practice. These extensive and exact knowledge representations store options to choose from in communicative interactions. Not having enough of these mental representations before a task or encounter prevents the learner from creating a state of communicative expectancy or anticipation, which causes an acute feeling of anxiety/uncertainty. At the same time, it is necessary to redefine the function of grammar rules at the sentence level; rules highlight the potential of the code rather than its actual use in what is a highly conventionalized, i.e. schematic, form of constructive behaviour with the use of prefabricated syntagmatic and idiomatic constructions at discourse level; 5) foreign language learning and teaching must continue to emphasize, and do it even stronger, the role of assorted, both mental and environmental information resources which normally accompany communicative encounters; non-lingual and paralingual clues are helpful in deciphering the sender’s intention, whereas the non-verbal/conceptual context of knowledge is essential in the process of constructing the communicative intention because it is evoked in making the requisite conceptual and propositional decisions; highlighting these contexts in the foreign language learning environment enables the learner to practice these choices and learn to reconstruct and operate the language code effectively; 6) considering the fact that verbal communication is other-directed, foreign language learning and teaching must involve not only reconstructing the signs to send out messages, but reaching some satisfactory level of precision to be able to address them to someone so that they can be decoded and understood; being able to control the system of signs – regulate its use according to his or her needs and decisions – is highly adaptive for the learner. In order to master language as a coding device behaviourally, i.e. learn how to regulate his communicative behaviour, the learner must make use of his or her discrimination and consolidation abilities, language and communication awareness as well as monitoring and feedback mechanisms to push learning 228

process in the direction of the target language norm. These subsystems are available to the learner as components of the mechanism of human information processing; 7) it is justified in the process of foreign language learning and teaching to replicate elements of authentic communication with their age-specific adjustments, such as joint attention, naming, caretaker talk, social referencing, scaffolding, etc. and make use of authentic communicative tasks based on authentic, culturally accepted scenarios to be imitated and modelled in foreign language learning and teaching, such as role-play, games, simulations of social encounters, media programs, drama activities and situational dialogues.

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Chapter 5. Focus on comprehension and production in speech and writing with potential applications in teaching English as a foreign language Introduction: Toward a realistic account of language use The goal of the monograph has all along been to conceptually identify real processes of language use, i.e. identify them in such a specific way as to provide a systematic point of reference for guidelines in the field of foreign language learning and teaching. This task is treated as complementary to, i.e. in no way conflicting with, the existing research foci of various related language sciences, especially Second Language Acquisition Research. The first step in this direction was to recognize not only the intricate, but also the protean nature of language, which necessitated a selection of relevant criteria and constraints to make the whole task more tangible. These criteria were derived from general considerations on the nature of carving out the subject matter in academic disciplines, whose success depends on understanding their unique subject matter, while the nature of the field of foreign language learning and teaching was defined as an autonomous academic discipline with pure and applied goals. For this discipline to attain its applied goals, it had to be further characterized as an empirical science with the ensuing spatiotemporal constraints in its subject matter definition/ representations. With the above in mind, it was possible to focus on: a) the locus of language use, the human subject with a cognitive system (i.e. the mechanism of Human Information Processing) capable of highly specialized, constructive information processing involved in language use, first and foremost operations and strategies; b) verbal communication as a universal, sociocultural human phenomenon of its own kind, in which the processes of language use have a natural structure and direction as sending and receiving messages, and c) the elementary unit of human cognitive functioning, i.e. information, precise enough for depicting human processes, operations and strategies requisite in language use, which, at the most elementary neuronal level, is a synaptic activity within and among human brains (see section 2.5.3); they include e.g. recording, mapping, matching, organizing, structuring, encoding,

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decoding and transmission of information structures which go on in verbal communication. Non-primary language learning and teaching have been identified as a consequence of our understanding of the empirical phenomenon of language use, i.e. of verbal communication in speech and writing in which senders and addressees activate their cognitive equipment for information processing to adjust and interact with each other, i.e. to construct and reconstruct meaning coded into verbal messages which are sent to others in the context of dynamic human sociocultural networks. For this purpose senders and addressees do not use language in the abstract, or, worse still, language rules in the sense of descriptive generalizations about language forms external to the user, but their comprehension abilities, which help them to recognize, decode and understand verbal messages, and their production abilities, which help them to construct, encode, articulate and emit messages to their addressees. Within the adopted perspective, real processes of language use and learning can be identified in the context of human interaction, i.e. comprehension and production in speech and writing. Other processes, which can and have been distinguished in this connection, must – of necessity – be qualified either as derivatives of the primal, real processes of language use and learning or as hypothetical constructs and postulations, i.e. purely conceptual characterizations which refer to our reasoning operations about language rather than language use in verbal communication. Since applications are within the scope of this framework, it can only seem justified to focus our attention on these real, i.e. fundamental processes as the point of reference and orientation. At the same time, meaning constructed in human minds, both its content and relationship component, has been identified as the causal factor energizing the flow of information in human communicative networks, whereas language has been defined as the code of verbal communication. An important distinction must be pointed out between a) language as the central concept and its use treated as communicative function, and b) the perception of language as the code of communication, according to which communication, i.e. the construction and reconstruction of meaning in human interaction is primary whereas language forms are regarded as devices for conveying the message. In this context, meaning is the reason why verbal communication happens, while language forms, which do not exist in disconnection from meanings in the minds of language users, make verbal communication possible. They are flux capacitors, to use a quote from ‘Back to the Future’ Part One. The complexity and abundance of meaning comes from negotiated effects of subjective meanings generated by individual language users and cultural meanings generated via social (group) 232

interaction to be used and stored in the group-members’ minds (also see Schraw 2009). The code of verbal communication, on the other hand, is treated as a complex system of restricted form/meaning allocations shared by the given social group and used for the purpose of encoding and decoding meanings. Being able to communicate with the use of this code, i.e. becoming a member of the speech community, requires reconstructing it via verbal communication, or, to be more exact, developing its mental representation adequate and suitable for communicative purposes. In no sense is this code autonomous or superior to meaning in communicative interaction. This view remains in stark contrast with the commonly discussed alternative, i.e. focus on form or focus on meaning, or with the marginalized significance of meaning and the prioritized status of form in various traditional approaches to foreign language teaching (see Chapter 1). The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the main processes which take place in this empirical phenomenon with view to enhancing foreign language communication and learning with implications for the mastery of the code of verbal communication. These specific processes are psycholinguistic rather than linguistic: they are cognitive processes, operations and strategies (controlled, hybrid as well as automatic) which run on our mental representations of non-verbal, preverbal and verbal information constructions in the context of para-and non- lingual information constellations, and which use our mental resources, such as cognitive energy, attention and knowledge representations. They are inseparable from the mind/brain of the language user while, at the same time, being unique to language use in communication. Human beings are involved in verbal communication with their entire bodies and minds (hence, their whole-person involvement); verbal communication is seen in a life-span perspective, i.e. it takes place in a state-changing system; the cycle of language processing takes three states of matter: knowledge, skill and discourse; moreover, the learning process requires the following stages: input, interaction and feedback. Such a deconstruction, feasible only in the context of the phenomenon of verbal communication, may be used for defining options for instituting and cultivating these processes, operations and strategies in the formal context. Throughout this chapter, I have English as a foreign language in mind since the spatiotemporal constraints adopted in this monograph imply reference to a specific ethnic non-primary target language.

5.1. Comprehension and production: the status of meaning and form Perceiving language use as comprehension and production in speech and writing in the context of verbal communication can organize and systematize our

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subsequent outline of their development and cultivation because these two fundamental types of processes display they distinct structure, course and purpose. They are categorized as types of processes rather than actual processes; to reach such a level of specificity, comprehension and production would first have to be broken down into medium-specific language use in task context. Listening and reading comprehension as well as speaking and writing will be discussed in the subsequent section. Admittedly, people use not only speech and writing in comprehension and production (e.g. sign language or Braille), but in this chapter only the prevalent sub-codes for the visual and the auditory modalities will be considered. This does not preclude the utility of the whole framework for considering foreign language learners with visual or auditory impairments on a different occasion. As has been said, in the universal empirical phenomenon of verbal communication, people direct their attention to others and interact with them developing lateral and hierarchical relationships within their communicative networks. Taking into account people interacting with other people in various specialized instances of verbal communication in the sociocultural contexts is indispensable for the spatiotemporal anchoring of the subject matter: finally, at least in Foreign Language Didactics, language use and learning can be represented as human operations performed by living conscious organisms using human cognitive resources, especially cognitive energy, in various human situations for humanly-reasonable purposes. This empirical, distinctly human quality of the subject matter representation opens prospects to the field of foreign language learning and teaching of generating relevant, practically useful knowledge.

5.1.1. The nature of comprehension; the nature of production When people are involved in communication as addressees, they use their equipment for decoding messages which enables them to identify and understand them. They work with language forms to be matched with meaning. When they act as senders, on the other hand, they use their equipment for encoding messages which enables them to generate, execute and emit them to their addressees. They work with meaning which has to be formatted by means of language forms. This defines the users’ problem-space in the sense of their individual and local, as opposed to descriptive linguistic, perspective of language. Below is a table, which summarizes important features of comprehension and production as specific instances of verbal communication.

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Table 11: Properties of comprehension and production shared with verbal communication

Comprehension and production Episodic: deeply embedded in human situations, events and encounters

Additional justification

Intentional: driven by the instinct to establish relationships by way of trading meanings

The main purpose of comprehension and production is the generation, computation, evaluation and negotiation of meaning whereas language forms serve this purpose; while they carry content and relationship cues, they are processed subconsciously by proficient language users, but they are within the user’s control;

Goal-oriented: the goal of comprehension and production is to trade our personal meanings in view of our needs, purposes, attitudes and motivations

The construction and reconstruction of meaning in comprehension and production is always aspectual; nevertheless, meaning is what makes verbal communication ‘tick’; language users learn a language primarily to communicate their personal meanings rather than primarily to identify its grammatical system;

Dynamic: involving constant flow, change and expenditure of human resources

Neither production nor comprehension is wholly predicable; they are based on an ongoing tension between the given, i.e. familiar, and the new, the conventional and the unconventional, involving innovative, combinatorial use of language and knowledge representations with the available cognitive resources; comprehension and production are acts of composing;

Constructive: involving choices from among options in our vast mental representations and their integration in on-line processing

These subconscious choices refer to all the levels of communication, from selecting a perspective of the events, communicative strategy and style in the area of communicative intention to selecting morhosyntactic identity of function and content words in parsing and in lexicalization; this involves language use as skill with its component sub-skills;

Adaptive: intelligent, flexible and strategic

Comprehension and production are under our voluntary control in their meaning-making aspects; participants use all the resources and cues they can get; they incorporate feedback information to reach the goal and make use of their optimality criteria for this purpose; ability for understanding, especially at the level of content, depends on intelligence;

This episodic property is inevitable considering our attentional limitations as well as constraints on our cognitive resources, especially processing energy, in space and time; the episodic structure is emphasized by the use of various schemata and syntagmatic forms; this property makes our communication of meaning aspectual, i.e. involving merely a perspective of events and issues;

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All told, the user’s problem space in comprehension and production is defined by two poles: meaning and form. In the course of comprehension, forms are identified and processed as cues for reconstructing the communicative intention by way of matching meanings to forms, while in production, meaning determines the choice of forms for the purpose of expressing the communicative intention. The nature of comprehension and production is described as constructive (see also Kintsch 1998), based on selection and integration of extensive mental representations, as opposed to being rule-based. In comprehension as well as production, forms are selected from the store of our mental representations in fractions of seconds, within fluency constraints of on-line communication. This is true of all forms of communication, even with minimal time pressure involved. Therefore, it is logical to assume that the building blocks of mental representations required are form-meaning and meaning-form mappings, which include (hierarchically embedded) syntagmatic constructions of various sizes, such as clause, sentence and discourse plans with empty slots for lexical insertions, pre-fabricated patterns, lexical items and phrases, collocations, formulaic expressions, idioms, conventional metaphors, sayings, etc. (Levelt, 1989), rather than abstract knowledge in the form of rules to be used for deriving the requisite syntactic forms. Rules would take too much time and energy to ‘apply’ under normal fluency constraints (for a more extensive treatment of the topic, see Dakowska 2003). As for the status of meaning in comprehension and production, it must be emphasized that, unlike in the typical classroom activities in which communicative intention is already provided to free the learner’s attention to focus on form, communicative interaction, most of which is not highly scripted or routine, requires the users to invest a considerable proportion of their working memory resources into constructing and reconstructing their communicative intention (see section 4.8). The processes involved may not always be available to our awareness, yet they are complex, most of the time highly sensitive to environmental clues, and strategic, as well as coordinated with our interlocutor, which leaves only marginal resources for coding meaning into verbal forms, adjusting forms to each other syntactically, coordinating message execution and emitting it as discourse. Practice activities in the foreign language context, therefore, must follow the same principle: the learner must have the freedom to choose what to say and process language forms in a way qualitatively similar to verbal communication, i.e. with rather marginal working memory resources involved in selecting and integrating forms while attempting automaticity in processing them. As for the transmitting substance, it will be pointed out in the subsequent section that speech and writing impose their own specific demands on the user/learner while, at the same time, offering their own ‘affordances’ in foreign language communication and learning. 236

Table 12: Basic processes in comprehension and production in the context of verbal communication Comprehension and production in the context of verbal communication 1. Alignment as the goal of comprehension and production in verbal communication in the sense of reaching the same ideas about the topic of under discussion as our partner in communication (see section 4.2.1); 2. The defining role of the situational context and the relationship between interlocutors in constructing meaning; the role of sociocultural norms, scenarios and schemata as well as discourse genres and lexis for the given domain; 3. The significance of the whole-person involvement, body and mind (the interlocutors’ culture, cognition, emotion, imagination, knowledge of the world); strategic use of all the clues we can get in coding and decoding meaning; the role of non-verbal and para-verbal clues; 4. The use of conventional cultural as well as linguistic coordination devices available to the interlocutors for ‘weaving the thread of discourse’, i.e. constructing it as a linear event while making it coherent and cohesive at the same time; 5. Various, not just linguistic, knowledge sources strategically activated for the purpose of comprehension and production, including previous communication, knowledge of discourse genres, knowledge of the world and the subject, current events and the people involved; Processes involved in comprehension: recording discourse, mapping input into memory, matching form and meaning, recognizing discourse segments, inferencing, reconstructing coherence clues and communicative intention of the sender, i.e. computing his or her meaning (they are not serial, but highly interactive) 1. From discourse to communicative intention: –– parsing, i.e. identifying forms in the message and assigning them structure –– assigning/matching meaning to the forms in the clause structure (semanticizing) –– reconstructing global discourse meaning on the basis of discourse cohesion and coherence markers as well as all other knowledge sources (interpretation) –– evaluating the discourse meaning in the context of our knowledge of the situation, the speakers, knowledge of the world, attitudes, goals and values (evaluation) –– identifying the content and the relationship components 2. The role of inferencing in comprehension to bridge the verbalized elements –– at the lexical level –– at the text level 3. Processing figurative language 4. Monitoring the process of comprehension Processes involved in production: generating meaning, constructing the communicative intention, ellipsis, mapping meaning onto propositional form, matching propositions with discourse segments, lexicalization, integration and syntactic adjustments, writing or articulation (they are not serial, but highly interactive) 1. Constructing the communicative intention in view of the image of the addressee: adjustment to the addressee, selection of the relevant information in view of the

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1. goal of communication, the perspective taken and shared knowledge; incorporating the situational clues (deixis); the role of ellipsis, based on the known elements; 2. From communicative intention to discourse –– converting the communicative intention into its propositional form –– taking a perspective of the events/ideas –– serializing the communicative intention into pre-verbal plans –– selecting the elements to be verbalized/skipping those that do not have to be –– selecting pre-verbal plans at the level of clauses –– inserting the lexical material while adjusting the elements syntactically –– using indirect clues for meaning, e.g. metaphors or others –– execution in speech or writing making sure coherence and cohesion is marked 3. Modifications of production in the light of feedback from the on-going interaction and clues from the interlocutor.

Language may have no beginning and no end, but verbal communication is strictly episodic. In this framework, we emphasize the goal-oriented nature of communication and appreciate the role of situational context as well as the centrality of meaning; conveying meaning and sense as communicative intention is the ultimate reason why people communicate. The use of the four language skills is regarded as situationally-embedded and episodic, which means that the situational parameters (who speaks to whom, where, when, about what and for what purpose), building a mental image of the situation, adjustment to the addressee, perspective taking and the type of message (discourse genre, topic- domain, relevant knowledge sources, especially schemata) must be included as practice considerations in teaching English as a foreign language. In practicing each skill, learners must be involved in building a mental model of the situation and the addressee, active construction of their communicative intention, in strategic processing of relevant clues, verbal as much as para-and non- verbal, skipping what is not to be verbalized as well as drawing inferences, adjusting to the sender, negotiating status, processing feedback information, updating the flow of communication as mental alignment and monitoring comprehension and production. In lieu of this understanding, learning foreign language skills must be developed in terms of events, i.e. fairly specific, episodic experiences which leave procedural and declarative records in the learner’s episodic memory, and – as a result of their recurrence – are also processed at the more abstract level of generic memory providing relevant representations for transfer. The most suitable concept to name such a unit of activity which shares criterial attributes with episodes or events of verbal communication is the task. As has been noted in Chapter Three, task is a unit of human purposeful activity,

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in which we perceive a problem-space, activate our relevant sources of information for dynamic decision-making to process the input material and accomplish a desired goal, e.g. develop a solution. Naturally, task is a unit of verbal communication. Episodes of verbal communication, i.e. tasks, are embedded in situations and they are meaning-oriented, i.e. involve on-line processing of environmental, verbal and non-verbal information, as well as knowledge activation from the learner’s long-term memory to build a mental model of the situation and the interlocutors. The only constraint in the use of task as a universal unit of communication would be developmental, i.e., referring to the period in human development before children reach the ability to perform deliberate goal-oriented operations. This is a very deep cognitive justification of regarding tasks as units of activity in foreign language teaching, which is qualitatively different from Task-Based Language Teaching and Task-Based Approach in SLA (e.g. Ellis 2003).

5.2. Properties of comprehension and production in speech and writing While they belong to one and the same ethnic language, speech and writing possess their own specificity as sub-codes. Speaking develops in time, while writing develops in space. According to Brown and Yule (1983: 14): ‘the major differences between speech and writing derive from the fact that one is essentially transitory and the other is designed to be permanent.’(or, should we say, relatively permanent in the times of electronic reading devices, my comment, M.D.). Writing allows the use of a greater amount of embedding devices, in which more information is packed into idea units than would be possible in real-time speech production. They add that ‘the overall effect is to produce speech which is less richly organized than written language, containing less densely packed information, but containing more interactive markers and planning fillers.’ (page 15). As a result, it is often recognized that the syntax of spoken language is less structured, i.e., it contains incomplete sentences, sequences of phrases, simple rather than complex sentences, pre-fabricated fillers, active forms, rarely the passive, or conditional or relative sentences. Typically, the reference is located in the environment so pointing and other gestures may be used. The density of the information in spoken language is, or rather should be, appropriate for speakers to process comfortably within the limits of their attention span. The written language uses discourse markers to link clauses, which are more tightly integrated than in speaking. Rost (1990: 9) points out important differences in our access to the sender’s planning stage in listening and reading:

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Spoken texts contain features such as (…) irregular pauses, false starts, hesitations. Self- revisions, and backtrackings. These features do have correlates in drafts of written texts (e.g., irregular and illegible scrawls, lines crossed out, arrows inserted), but most early written drafts are not made available to the readers. Listeners, however, have access to the composer’s (that is, the speaker’s) on-line planning and editing processes and must somehow make sense of the appearance of planning and editing signals in the discourse

It is untenable that written language is rather formal and organized, whereas the spoken one is informal and spontaneous. Such an evaluation can be done more fairly in the context of specific situations of language use. The spoken language used in the court of justice or in formal diplomatic situations is bound to be formal. At the same time, instances of very informal, casual written communication, such as e-mail correspondence between close friends or other personal notes, are quite common. Nevertheless, there are essential differences between speech and writing related to temporal constraints, intensity of interaction, and the role of prosodic elements which have significance for language use and learning, especially from the point of view of the foreign language learner. The graphemic form of discourse consists of discrete elements (graphemes, words, clauses, sentences, paragraphs, etc.) with clear visual representation and boundaries, whereas in speaking users must cope with co-articulation, accented and unaccented forms, abbreviated forms, overlap of different speakers, unfinished sentences, changes of sentence plans in the middle, and other reductions. Boundaries in speech units can be detected at the level of phrases, clauses, and turns. Listening comprehension takes place under temporal fluency constraints in the sense that listeners are pressed for time: either they can manage to process the material within their attention span, i.e., limits of their working memory, or it will fade away. In reading comprehension, on the other hand, readers are, to some extent and at least in typical situations, able to control the pace of the task themselves and review the material of processing, if necessary, moving their eyes back and forth, or even up and down the page (this refers to the left to right linearity of the English language graphemic system). The listener may sometimes, but not always, influence the pace of the task by negotiating it with the speaker, or, where appropriate, ask clarification questions. We must realize, however, that in our culture not all the communicative face-to-face encounters allow such negotiations to a degree which would satisfy the needs of a foreign language learner. Nor is this possible in taking auditory input from mass communication, such as the media, unless we record the material in one form or another. When the speakers see each other, they can process a considerable amount of visual clues, both verbal, para-verbal, and non-verbal, such as articulatory movements the tongue and the lips, body language, especially facial expressions, appearance, 240

environmental clues, in addition to prosodic features which organize discourse into a structure giving prominence to its elements. In the case of writing, the burden of assigning the structural description and hierarchy of elements rests with the reader, who explores the potential significance of morpho-syntactic markers for this purpose. From the foreign language learners’ point of view, the relatively short life of the auditory stimulus is the most difficult part of listening comprehension. In view of the time-constraints, the role of procedural representations underlying the automaticity necessary in auditory discourse processing is significant. Foreign language learners have not yet developed the basis for automaticity in language use. This means that in the initial and intermediate stages of the learning process, they perform language processing operations more slowly, in a more controlled manner, than skilled language users. Listening activities in their case present a real challenge and may be a source of considerable stress. However, without active participation in listening comprehension practice, they will not be able to develop the necessary automaticity resulting from the acquisition of procedural records, to reach a comfortable or almost fluent level. It is not by accident that recordings of passages and conversations on tape are so frequently used in the foreign language classroom, because they overcome the main drawback of authentic face-to-face oral communication: their input is relatively more permanent and may be repeated for the sake of language learning. There is no way of circumventing auditory practice in developing listening comprehension ability. The auditory input is an essential source of data for our echoic memory which stores information on pronunciation, including rhythm, stress and intonation, and auditory models of linking words into causes. This aspect is of primary importance in the case of English as a foreign language in which the phonemic form is in no faithful relationship with the graphemic form. Each of the two forms requires deliberate efforts to learn and to be matched with the other to develop meta-modal representations. Therefore, it seems reasonable for the EFL learner at the beginner and early intermediate level to be exposed to both the graphemic and the phonemic forms of the same discourse because they complement and mutually define each other. The written code with its permanence and precision of representation of the message (spelling, punctuation, word boundaries, explicit, unreduced forms which, in the auditory code, would be strong and week forms, including suffixes, prefixes) is an important source of information to the language learner, who must reconstruct these forms precisely. In the written message, the morphosyntactic forms are simply more salient than the same morphosyntactic forms in

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the spoken version of the same message. The auditory message, on the other hand, is an integrated, prosodically structured form, the form which the learner must acquire to be understood in spoken communication. Since the learner’s aim is to reconstruct the language code, his or her exact identification of each and matching both forms of discourse will enhance precision of their mental representation. Transcoding activities, which require the learner to convert the spoken discourse into the written form, or vice versa, draw his or her attention to the language forms in the context of discourse, a highly educational foreign language learning experience with focus on the language code, and a source of feedback information about language learning for the teacher. They include the use of transcript to provide feedback on form of the listening material, dictation, or reading aloud. Table 13: Differences between language use in speech and writing SPEECH –– listening and speaking develop in time –– the spoken message is transient, except for recordings –– most of the time, language users must rely on their working memory –– usually, a host of non-verbal and para-verbal clues are available –– there are other situational clues –– emotional clues are available –– to some extent, the message is organized by prosody –– co-articulation, hesitations, and other imperfections are the norm rather than exception –– the level of formality depends on the communicative situation –– some possibilities exist of negotiating comprehensibility

WRITING –– reading and writing develop in space, except for electronic display situations –– the text is (relatively) permanent –– theoretically, the reader/writer has ‘external memory’ and can work at their own pace, as well as re-read/edit and go up and down the page –– there may be non-verbal clues, such as illustrations and graphs –– language forms are presented explicitly and they are presented as discrete elements –– some structuring of the message comes from punctuation and paragraphing –– additional clues are possible from typography –– the level of formality depends on the communicative situation –– some situations in reading and writing allow for a considerable degree of embedding and in-depth processing and the use of external resources.

5.3. The component of skill in language use and learning Language use involves performing complex tasks in which we make coordinated, hybrid use of controlled and automatic processes. This should apply to comprehension and production, but is nowhere demonstrated more dramatically than 242

in speaking (Levelt 1989). Language use as skill involves integration of various operations by subordination of their components and their synchronization by means of automatizing the low-level operations. In his ground-breaking article Levelt (1975: 57) pointed out: One of the most general features of complex tasks is their HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURE. This means that the task consists of sub-tasks, sub-sub-tasks, etc. The idea is that execution of one part of the task requires the completion of various smaller operations in accurate temporal integration. Each of these operations may in its turn require a set of still more elementary operations, etc. Speaking is an excellent example of hierarchical task structure. There is the first order goal to express a certain intention. In order to realize this, one has to do various things, such as for instance, deciding on topic and new comment to be made, and selecting a certain syntactic schema. In its turn, the realization of this schema requires sub-activities like formulating successive phrases which can express different parts of the intention. Within these phrases word retrieval operations have to executed until the phrase is completed. But each word in its turn has to be realized phonetically by the activation of articulatory patterns, etc. After completion of lower level tasks control must be returned to higher levels, consequent selection of the next phrase, and so on. In short, the hierarchical nature of complex tasks requires the existence of PLANS or programs for their execution. Creation of such plans or programs consumes large amounts of effort. Planning a subtask means retrieving from memory the necessary information (about present and desired state, about rules for achieving the desired result, etc.). During this planning, partial results may have to be kept in STM in order to stay available for successful execution of later operations. ….One of the most important characteristics of skill is that the creation of plans during performance is reduced to a bare minimum. The skilful performer has these plans available in long-term memory. This is especially the case for lower-level plans, such as articulatory patterns for words, phrase structures, intonation patterns and so on. Plans which have become part of the more permanent cognitive outfit of a person, are said to be automated. The acquisition of skill consists essentially of automation of low level plans or units of activity. Initially the execution of such a unit of activity requires the allocation of a large amount of mental effort, since it has to be designed anew.

According to Levelt (1978, 1989), language use as skill possesses the following features: a) hierarchical organization, i.e. higher order, more important decisions influence the subordinated, lower-order choices; this implies the ability to integrate tasks and sub-tasks within one episode of activity; b) hybrid processing, i.e. the higher order choices, strategically more significant, are controlled by attention, while the lower-order subordinated ones, performed in fractions of seconds, require procedural representations for automaticity in processing;

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c) language use as skill is an act of composing, which requires not only the acquisition of the complex nature of tasks, but also the ability to act in a largely unpredictable and changing environment. Performing a task which requires a skill involves the ability to integrate in time all the hierarchically arranged operations (see also section 3.7). In the case of language skills, such as involved in production, the top of the hierarchy is occupied by the communicative intention; at the next, lower level there are pre-verbal discourse schemata which may contain various syntagmatic (linear) plans and constructions, and at still lower – discourse in its verbal form. To say that skill has a hierarchical nature means that higher-level choices are more important than the lower level ones, i.e. they determine the lower level choices and decide about the whole effect of the task. To communicate, speakers must make numerous decisions regarding the communicative intention. In addition, however, they must synchronize all of these decisions in time, implement the plan, monitor its execution, edit while speaking, and take feedback information from the interlocutor(s). These decisions take fractions of seconds. If the learner has not yet mastered language use as skill, (s)he will be unable to keep pace with the typical communicative fluency requirements. However, automaticity involved in performing the operations at the lower levels of skill hierarchy, such as syntactic adjustments and articulation, cannot be singled out and practiced separately in elementary drill-like activities, because the level of complexity and flexibility is incomparable so, as a result, we can expect hardly any transfer from such elementary practice to communicative language use. The most appropriate strategy for developing automaticity in skilled language use is deliberate, spaced practice (Schraw 2009, de Jong and Pieters 2009) in a realistic context of a meaningful communicative task, for example, rehearsal or repetition of a meaningful, learner-generated utterance to improve its integration and fluency. Such practice may be transferred to real-life tasks. In order to develop language skills, the learner must be involved in practicing comparable operations, i.e. operations with a similar goal, i.e. a) converting meaning into form and form into meaning rather than form into form, and b) degree of complexity, resulting from the number of rapid selections that the learner must make from among his or her own knowledge representations and integrate into discourse. This relationship can be estimated with reference to the skill hierarchy, especially the degree of freedom of choice that the speaker has in communicative situations. We may wonder about the typical communicative exercise: how many of the essential communicative decisions are made by the learner and which decisions in a given task have already been made for him? 244

1) Do learners decide as to what to say? 2) Do they choose the perspective and style (tone) of their utterance? 3) Do they select the plan of the utterance and sentence constructions? 4) Do they decide on the lexical material to insert into their utterance, i.e. its syntagmatic plan? 5) Do they integrate these operations within the time constraints of communicative fluency? 6) Do they themselves monitor their utterances and edit them for accuracy? 7) Do they themselves evaluate their communicative effectiveness? If all of these decisions are made by the learner himself under the communicative time pressure, we can safely assume that indeed language skills are involved and being practiced. If only a proportion of these decisions are the learner’s responsibility, the task is probably graded or controlled, but nevertheless conducive to skill learning. If, however, it is much more elementary, such as sentence repetition, transformations of forms, or filling in the gaps in a sentence, not even a continuous text, it may be completely irrelevant to acquiring language skill because of the qualitative differences between the practice activity involved and the complexity of the target behaviour. Naturally, this does not mean that it is useless for other purposes.

5.3.1. Options relevant in developing the skill component in language use As has been suggested in section 3.7, discussing stages of learning a given skill brings us to the differences between experts and novices in language use. Novices are characterized by the fact that their utterances are laconic, much shorter than those of the experts, novices are much less fluent than the experts in that they take more time to produce or comprehend an utterance, they do not demonstrate the same level of certainty as the experts as far as their accuracy is concerned, and finally, they make more errors. Experts speak more correctly, following target-language norms, as well as fluently; they develop their utterances, i.e. make them longer and complete, while their certainty regarding accuracy is stronger (Levelt, 1978, 1989). These differences demonstrate that skill acquisition has several dimensions. The first dimension is acquiring a variety of language forms, including the lexical (syntagmatic expressions) and syntactic material, to enable the learner to express ideas idiomatically and adequately to their meaning and context; the second one is the linear (syntagmatic) dimension of this material, such as discourse plans, schemata and other constructions, which enable the learner to build fully developed discourse; the third dimension

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is the growing awareness of these forms which enables the learner to control their use in agreement with the principles of the code and monitor his or her accuracy, and the fourth one is the ability to integrate all the operations in time which enables the learner to perform the task fluently. Below I have listed forms of learning and practice helpful is developing the skill component in language use. Table 14: A list of teaching options relevant for the development of the skill component in language use 1. learning by observation

source of language input, i.e. knowledge, such as situational discourse models, schemata and scenarios, including lexical material and standards for skill- demanding tasks; observation facilitates procedural records as resources for subsequent tasks

2. imitation, i.e. verbatim opportunity to coordinate, consolidate and sustain the repetition, of ready tasks production of longer chunks of discourse to “stretch” the limitations of the learner’s working memory and enhance fluency (also see no. 8, fluency work) 3. modelling

initial exposure and practice of new (culture-specific) units of behaviour in a modified rather than verbatim manner, exposure to, and acquisition of, relevant schemata and scenarios for skilled behaviour

4. rehearsal for the task

opportunity to assemble a complex task in a rough version, incorporate any internal and external feedback information on the task in order to improve its quality the second time around

5. instruction, guidance

enables the learner to attempt new tasks without a ready model at hand, but with some assistance provided by the teacher; scaffolding and turning the responsibility for the task to the learner

6. mental practice

retrieving task-relevant material from permanent memory and planning the progression of the task; covert practice which is very common in our lives

7. accuracy enhancement

attention to form in the task which increases the precision of mental representations and their use before proceduralization, this allows incorporating accuracy into skill

8. fluency work

repetition of one’s own production to integrate parts of the task, sometimes, but not always hard to distinguish from rehearsal; its written version is called revision or editing

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9. distributed, deliberate practice

helps to consolidate and improve the quality of skilful performance in time; thought to be more effective than amassed (concentrated) practice because each time it requires new retrieval of task components from LT memory; this improves the quality of representation and the strength of the memory trace

10. feedback incorporation performing the task with immediate and delayed feedback enhances the precision of practice; feedback, which can be implicit or explicit, may even take the form of target-like model for the task to improve its idiomatic quality 11. part/whole strategy

is an opportunity to cope with task complexity gradually rather than to opt out, provided the parts are commensurate with the overall target-task structure

12. s trategy prompts and task regulation

some strategic or metatask cuing may be helpful to guide and facilitate practice, but they cannot replace practice responsible for procedural records;

The above strategies make use of relevant dimensions of difficulty, such as keeping pace with fluency demands, the complexity of the task and the requisite knowledge representations in the learner’s mind, which can be used in adjusting tasks to the learners’ level. All the insights into the problems discussed above, such as the sources of skill difficulty and its subcomponents, the differences between the written and the spoken codes, as well as the dimensions of task difficulty can be helpful in adjusting practice tasks to the learner’s current proficiency level.

5.3.2. Task difficulty in the development of language skills Task difficulty is a relational term which depends on the learner’s knowledge activated for the purpose of the task and task demands, especially the level of knowledge which the task presupposes. The available mental representations can be used for the purposes of recognition of various task components, whereas the information which is needed but unavailable has to be inferred from various other sources or developed by means of compensation strategies. Table 15: Dimensions of task-difficulty 1. the length of the task

the shorter the task, the easier and less tiring it should be for the learner to cope with (the problem of scripts and schemata for sustained discourse); the task length, to some extent, also implies its conceivable hierarchical complexity (narration may exceptional here);

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2. m ental resources needed for task completion, including world knowledge, the situation/domain and knowledge of the target language

the smaller the difference between the learner’s available mental resources and the demands of the task, the easier it is because of reduced uncertainty (to facilitate the task we use external sources, e.g. teacher input)

3. the pace of the task in view of the still developing automaticity

the smaller the time pressure, the easier the task because learners can do it at their own pace; time given to plan also helps,

4. the pressure to integrate the necessary choices in limited time

the more opportunities to break the task into subtasks and then re-integrate them, the easier the task (e.g., a rehearsal stage before performing the task, separate editing stage, repetition)

5.4. Reading comprehension as search for meaning Reading comprehension possesses essential features of the cycle of verbal communication, in which knowledge resources are activated as skill to produce linear discourse: a) reading comprehension may be defined as search after meaning and sense (Danks et al., 1983); in other words, the goal of the comprehender is to reconstruct the communicative intention of the sender and, possibly, to respond to it, where necessary; b) the act of comprehension is, to a large extent, an act of recognition, i.e., diagnosing the incoming information in the light of what we already know; in this, like in any communicative effort, the comprehender makes use of all, not just linguistic, knowledge sources; they include his or her communicative (cultural) and world knowledge, linguistic knowledge of L1, L2 and other languages, procedural knowledge and imagery (visual non-linguistic information), etc.; c) the comprehender makes use of plans, scripts, schemata and other cultural conventions imbedded in the material of processing, i.e., discourse, as well as active computing, or working out, the meaning, not only literal, but also figurative, of various lexical elements; these meanings are not fixed or ‘contained’ in the discourse, but constructed, updated and interpreted by the individual in their social/cultural context; d) the process of comprehension is dynamic and strategic, which is to say, it requires what under the circumstances seem to be the optimal choices; in this dynamic and strategic undertaking the comprehender makes use of the monitor and feedback to enhance the effectiveness of comprehension. 248

While reading we activate our mental set for verbal communication: we put ourselves in the position of an addressee of a written message who is trying to comprehend and respond to it, if necessary, some of the time attempting to align with the writer. It is stressed nowadays that reading is a highly interactive process: writers influence readers by their messages and vice versa, readers reconstruct ideas from the reading material depending on the amount of clues they are able to recognize as familiar on the basis of their own knowledge, attitudes and experience, as well as the environment in which reading takes place. Recognition refers to the processing of language forms used by the sender for coding sense, which the addressee/ the learner must recognize for their morphosyntactic identity and function. Only then is matching them with non-language specific meaning possible in order to build a mental model of the situation (Kintsch 2012, Perfetti and Adlof 2012). It follows from this framework that developing reading in a foreign language must be treated as an integral part of communication, which takes into account the whole communicative situation (the purpose, the topic, the roles of the participants, the place, the type of communicative exchange, the discourse genre, etc.). Naturally, such a view of developing the reading skill in a foreign language emphasizes the role of various sources of information in addition to the language (graphemic) form of the text. These sources can be located a) in the text, b) in its situational environment (a popular magazine, internet page, scientific publication, official document) and c) the reader’s (mental) knowledge representations. a) Discourse presented in the graphemic form is most typically organized into paragraphs and sections, with typography indicating the function of elements in the text, and illustrations emphasizing the ideas with visual clues. These sources of information reflect the structure and organization of the text facilitating our search for meaning and sense which the writer is trying to convey. b) The environment surrounding the text, its whole situational context, helps to determine the nature of the communicative event and its discourse genre, which narrows down the scope of hypotheses as to the feasible category of communicative purpose. c) The most significant source of information is in the reader’s memory: his or her knowledge of the target language, the knowledge of the native and other foreign languages, factual knowledge of the topic and other background knowledge, knowledge of the writer and previous reading episodes, knowledge of discourse genres, etc. These knowledge types help to recognize the structures and assign meaning to language forms in the discourse under processing. In the literature on reading we come across such terms as bottom-up and top- down processes (Flores D’Arcais and Schreuder 1983), which reiterate not only

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the interactive nature of reading comprehension, but all the cognitive processes. The ‘bottom’ in this case refers to the information derived from the text and its context, whereas the ‘top’ -to the various knowledge sources in the reader’s memory, especially concepts and schemata relevant to the task at hand. The bottom-up processes are initiated and dominated by the textual information on the printed page; the text form, also referred to as the stimulus structure, is said to define the intention reconstructed from the passage. The top-down ones refer to the various knowledge sources in the reader’s mind to narrow down the reader’s expectations toward the text to be comprehended. While developing the reading skill in a foreign language, we cannot afford to ignore either of these two closely related, indispensable poles of the learner’s processing of written materials, but must, instead, stimulate their interaction and make use of their specific advantages. For example, bottom-up processes are usually stressed during intensive reading activities, which treat the text first and foremost as language learning material, whereas top- down processes may be stressed to activate the learner’s coping potential before a difficult reading task in an attempt to demonstrate to the learner that many clues can be used to narrow down the scope of his or her search for meaning. Table 16: Contrasting intensive and extensive reading Intensive reading Size of the material: shorter passage, often a segment of a bigger whole, selected by the author of the program

Extensive reading Size of the material: book, story, essay, novel, often self-selected by the student on the basis of interest and variety

Pace of the task: rather slow with repetitions, intensive interaction between the teacher and the student to negotiate meaning, e.g., input for the task, feedback, comprehension checks, analysis, consulting external sources of information, etc.

Pace of the task: fairly fast pace of reading, typical of communicative fluency; the learner’s knowledge deficits are compensated by ample context; the task is mostly performed as individual activity, a form of teaching oneself how to read.

Function: serves as learning experience for the development of reading comprehension. Memory trace is the effect of precise processing.

Function: serves as communicative experience providing language input in he written form. Memory trace is the function of more global (meaningful, complete) unit of the material.

Benefits: helps the learner to learn how to read in a foreign language and practice reading strategies, learn vocabulary and discourse types, deliberately commit information to memory.

Benefits: significant source of cultural and factual knowledge and incidental vocabulary acquisition, the interest factor performs an important motivational function while enhancing communicative autonomy.

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5.4.1. The depth of reading comprehension Reading comprehension is understood as the process of computing the writer’s intention from his or her detailed instructions in the form of a text. With our eye movement, the text is segmented into clauses fitted into the more global organization of the text, which must also be recognized by the reader. In this process, the reader uses such clues such as blank spaces between words, punctuation devices, paragraphing, bold print, subtitles, numbering of the sections, etc. We can distinguish the following sub-processes in reading comprehension: 1) Parsing (van Gompel and Pickering 2009) during discourse comprehension refers to recognizing syntactic structure of the material being processed. Parsing involves segmentation into clauses, recognizing syntactic relationships within clauses and the significance of word order. This process is incremental in which readers interactively incorporate each word into the preceding syntactic structure as they encounter it, which allows them to come up with “referentially plausible parses and exclude implausible ones” (Trueswell and Gleitman 2009: 635). This involves pattern-recognition and pattern completion process and elimination of unlikely alternatives. Although non-syntactic information has a very rapid effect on sentence processing, the process of decoding must start with the reader’s recognition of the structure of the material. This recognition of discourse form determines the reader’s assignment of propositional and referential meaning. As Trueswell and Gleitman (2009) point out, language learners are innately predisposed to assume that discourse refers to the real world. For this reason, they attempt to interpret referential meaning of these syntactic characterizations of analysed input from the very beginning. 2) Semanticizing (Palmer 1968); the impulse to assign meaning to language forms occurs whenever we see a piece of text written in a language we are familiar with; semanticizing language material in the form of discourse is different from assigning meanings to isolated unknown words because in discourse the context defines the status and function of individual elements. Specialists who investigate reading comprehension stress that the meanings of words are not given in the text in some ready form; they must be reconstructed in the context, i.e., our mental image of the situation presented in the text. In other words, we do not pick ready information regarding the meaning of a given item from our mental lexicon, but compute it, i.e., work it out for the specific context, eliminating the unlikely possibilities to arrive at the most suitable interpretation. The meaning we look for a given clause depends on the morphosyntactic structure we have assigned to it; at the same time,

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it is the least subjective stage of comprehension because here we are largely confined by the language code. Negotiation of meaning between the learner and the teacher, with prompts and feedback at this stage, is inevitable in view of the language learner’s deficits because it enhances the learner’s processing precision. 3) Reconstructing the communicative intention takes place at a more global level of the text in the light of the communicative situation and various sources of knowledge perceived as relevant to the task at hand; at this stage the comprehender is trying to reconstruct the communicative intention of the writer, which is not available in a ready form; it must be reconstructed on the basis of the local meanings as well as various coherence and cohesion devices used by the writer; interpretations of different readers do not have to be exactly the same considering the differences in the available knowledge resources activated for the task, especially their background knowledge. 4) Personalization and evaluation refer to perceiving the communicative intention from the point of view of our own values, convictions and ideas about the topic, with the reader responding to the writer’s intention in an almost dialogical form; evaluation may seem to be the most subjective of the comprehension processes, but this is no reason for concern, provided the reading material has been decoded to a satisfactory degree; this subjectivity reflects the fundamental nature of human communication. The above enumeration is not intended to suggest that we engage in these processes in isolation or in a serial manner, but to emphasize the extent or depth of comprehension providing grounds for strategic selections of relevant aspects of comprehension to focus upon, as well as interaction between the teacher and the learners, in which the learners are actively involved in monitoring their comprehension processes, asking questions, identifying unknown items and searching for or inferring their meaning. The deeper the level of comprehension of the material, the more accurate and lasting its storage in the learner’s mind. The better the storage of the given communicative episode, the more useful it is for being transferred to other tasks and activated for use in other communicative episodes. This may help the learner to perceive the reading tasks as interesting and relevant to him or her personally. Memorable reading activities must involve the text as part of real communication rather than merely an object of lexical and grammatical analysis. Syntactic parsing, which has been recognized as a very important level which determines discourse comprehension, may be regarded as the essential basis of reading, but 252

certainly not the target point of attainment in a reading task. On the other hand, shallow reading, such as skimming or scanning and superficial comprehension activities with multiple-choice questions, prevalent in CLT textbooks nowadays, cannot be regarded as conducive to learning English as a foreign language.

5.4.2. The EFL learner’s perspective of reading For proficient foreign language users reading is not hampered by reduced redundancy conditions: their natural reaction to the text is to act as addressees of the text, i.e. to extract some factual information, critically evaluate the ideas and respond to them. Foreign language learners, however, use the text as input for learning the code of the target language as well as a source of content (knowledge of the world, culture, technical knowledge). Most importantly, they use the text as language and cultural input, i.e. as the source of information about the way in which proficient speakers communicate ideas in the target language, about its lexis, syntactic forms and constructions, idiomatic expressions and discourse plans and conventions. Although language learners cannot afford to ignore the communicative impact of the text, especially its content, which functions as the connecting tissue for language forms, they must exploit it as input for learning this language as a coding device. While proficient readers treat language form in a utilitarian manner, using it to get to the meaning and subsequently pushing it aside to store meaning in long-term memory, language learners can benefit greatly from remembering meaning as well as focusing on form at different levels of organization. This knowledge will be necessary on subsequent reading tasks. Strategies of dealing with language learners’ reduced redundancy condition include eliminating the difference in the expected level of knowledge for the task by: a) making learners more knowledgeable for the purpose of the task, i.e. providing them with informational input as well as guiding them to retrieve useful items from their long-term memory to make them aware of what they already know; b) giving them opportunities to take time to perform the necessary operations usually done automatically by proficient readers; c) giving them opportunities for reading more than once to enable them to focus their attention on various aspects of the material. These options include:

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Increasing background knowledge. Considering the highly interactive nature of reading, the foreign language learner’s subjective difficulty may be attributed to deficiencies in any and all of the knowledge types activated during the process of reading. The ideas (content) may turn out to be quite complex and hard to understand, as happens to be the case in studying English for Specific Purposes, for example, regardless of the language form in which they are expressed. This difficulty may be eliminated by a variety of pre-reading activities used in the foreign language classroom: providing input for the task in the form of factual information or brainstorming, recalling and sharing information in the form of a classroom conversation, or thinking aloud about the topic of the text, and last, but not least, using external resources. It is beneficial for the student to perceive and become aware of the discourse plan before the process of reading, as well. Enhancing readiness for the reading process. The reading process may be facilitated when the reader approaches the task in the state of anticipation for what is to come, based on the previous knowledge or, as Oller (1982) calls it, the state of expectancy for successive elements, which is a function of the reader’s knowledge of certain communicative and linguistic structures and their arrangements. This readiness for the information to come is usually accomplished by pre-reading activities whose purpose is not to kill curiosity, but to stimulate it and eliminate the readers’ anxiety by showing them that they have a coping potential. First and foremost, however, the reading process may also be enhanced by means of an on-going clarification and negotiation of meaning between the learners and the teacher. In this case, learners accomplish the level of accurate/ exact comprehension by means of social referencing from a more competent other. Enhancing focus of discourse form. Proficient readers differ from language learners in that they have acquired automaticity in processing the lower-level aspects of the reading process, such as parsing and segmentation. As a result these processes do not take up proficient users’ attentional resources and run smoothly -clauses are fixed upon by the readers’ eyes only for fractions of seconds and thereafter, in the saccadic movement of the eyes, the language material is replaced by a new clause. As a result of fluent reading meaning rather than form is stored in permanent memory. Because of such nature of reading, verbatim or almost verbatim form of the text is easily retrievable by the proficient reader on the basis of the available knowledge resources but it may not be so easily available to the language learner, unless focused upon and targeted for deliberate learning during the reading task. Since written discourse is regarded as language input, strategies which aim at learning discourse form (analysing 254

the plan, inserting titles for paragraphs, practicing lexical phrases from the text, close tests, retelling, summary writing, parallel writing) are indispensable. Enhancing global comprehension. The learner’s orientation in the whole task is not as easy as it is in the case of proficient readers because insufficient automaticity of processing the local aspects of the task creates greater demands on their working memory resources. Therefore, they may not have any resources left for dealing with the more global aspects of the task. To eliminate this difficulty, one can use the following strategies during and after reading: focus on the generic aspects of the text, its introduction, development and conclusions, focus on the plan of the text, focus on the topic sentences and subtitles of text sections, interim summaries, the main idea in a highly condensed form, etc. Helping the learner to perceive the overall structure of the text has twofold advantage: a) the knowledge of the structure will help in the retention of language and content information, and b) it will itself turn out to be useful in subsequent reading tasks as knowledge of discourse types may be transferred to other receptive and productive tasks. Once the genre is familiar, reading comprehension of similar texts is facilitated (Hudson 2007). In the long run, reading tasks based on these strategies and developed in line with the teacher’s ingenuity should enable the learner to do the following: 1) Engage in the task with the entire person, body and mind, especially visualization, to build a mental model of the situation and relate to the message. 2) Bring all the relevant knowledge sources to the task at hand. 3) Make active and strategic use of all the clues, verbal and non-verbal alike, to get orientation in the nature and meaning of the text. 4) Process the text with view to its language forms, structure and organization, especially its coherence and cohesion devices. 5) Recognize larger rhetorical parts, process figurative language and other stylistic devices. 6) Distinguish between fact and opinion, main point and example, irony and sarcasm. 7) Infer the information which is not expressed explicitly. Infer the meaning of some unfamiliar words from context, but use a dictionary where necessary for confirmation. 8) Read interactively, i.e., evaluate the writer’s intention and respond to it. Read with deep comprehension, critically, and insightfully. 9) Monitor his or her own comprehension process and check for accuracy in comprehension. 10) Use the text to learn and study its content.

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Table 17: Strategies of enhancing the reading process adjusted to the foreign language learner Processes in reading comprehension

Enhancement of reading comprehension suitable for the foreign language learner Defining the context, especially the Recalling relevant information about communicative situation, the content various aspects of the text and the situation and the relationship and roles of the to recognize the type and significance of people involved, as well as their purpose the encounter and make this information of communication explicit for the purpose of other tasks Formatting (structuring) the text at the level of clauses, paragraphs and globally, while all the time interactively assigning meaning to the processed material

Reading more than once, taking more time to read, focusing and elaborating on various important points, especially concepts, negotiating meaning with more knowledgeable language users, etc.

Perceiving elements of the text in their mutual discoursal relations, bridging inferences, retrieving the plan, genre, main and supporting ideas, computing literal vs. figurative meaning, perceiving the text as a whole

Strategies derived from intensive reading, including analysis of form, discourse markers, coherence and cohesion at the morpheme level, content coherence, bringing world knowledge to bear on coherence and cohesion

Building a mental model of the text with the use of imagery to link the content with the reader’s knowledge of human situations and conditions,

Elaboration of concepts, domain terms and other lexical material, elaboration of content, cultural input from the teacher, cross- cultural comparisons

Relating and interacting with the text in the role of the addressee, personalizing the content, perceiving the text as a perspective and its critical evaluation.

Analysis of discourse genre, especially its structure, summarizing, retelling, parallel writing, précis writing, responding to the text in the role of the sender, etc. to retain the information in the text as a whole.

5.5. Listening comprehension as an integral part of verbal communication It is often stated that listening is a prevailing form of communication. Hedge (2000:228) points out that ‘of the time an individual is engaged in communication, approximately 9 percent is devoted to writing, 16 per cent to reading, 30 per cent to speaking, and 45 per cent to listening. Listening is involved in all areas of our life, both public and personal. Both public and personal communicative situations make use of a host of discourse genres. They range from formal to highly informal and include such instances as interviews, TV news, reports, radio phone-in programs, commercials, songs, feature films, documentaries, talk 256

shows, political speeches, news conferences, quizzes, announcements, weather forecasts, sermons, talks and lectures, conference presentations of various kinds, public speeches, stories, anecdotes, jokes, instructions, etc. The knowledge of discourse genre in a given communicative situation provides the same welcome kind of orientation to the listener as it does to the reader. The sub-processes involved in listening comprehension by proficient speakers include (Clark and Clark, 1977, Jay 2003): 1. The listeners register chunks of speech (phrases, clauses) with their working memory. 2. They assign them a structural description (segmentation into constituents with certain functions). 3. As they identify each constituent, they assign meaning and reconstruct the underlying propositions building them into a hierarchical representation (i.e., organized into important and subordinate propositions). 4. Once they have identified these propositions for a given constituent, they empty their working memory of the auditory information (the form of the auditory stimulus) to be able to process new incoming material. While doing this, they forget the exact wording and retain the meaning. Comprehending the spoken message can be visualized as four basic sub-processes of parsing, semantizing, reconstructing the speaker’s intention, personalization/ evaluation, similar to those identified in reading comprehension. Listening comprehension is influenced by the situational context, the relationship between the interlocutors, the sender and the addressee, and their mutual perceptions of each other as well as their goals in the communicative event. Like any form of communication, spoken communication is goal-oriented, based on a plan and strategic as much as the written communication is. The main difference is that in many cases spoken communication affords greater intensity of interaction between the speakers, i.e. their mutual influence upon each other, including the possibility of negotiating their status, the pace of interaction, the degree of redundancy, and other features. We could say that competent listeners can understand different styles of speech intelligible to well-educated native speakers, and when not, they are able to elicit clarification; they are able to understand speech at different levels of intellectual complexity, monitor their understanding and be aware of areas of their knowledge deficits as well as recognize when the speaker is not clear; they are able to respond in a wide variety of situations and adopt an appropriate risk-strategy to respond to task-demands. A speaker of limited ability is able to understand a limited range of styles but is often unsuccessful in seeking clarification, may have problems with understanding more abstract concepts in the

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target language and requires repetitions and explanations and may not always be quite aware where their own knowledge is lacking and confused about the source of problems in understanding; their range of listener responses (feedback) may be small while and their-risk strategies at listening tasks may be inadequate.

5.5.1. Functions of auditory input in learning English as a foreign language Auditory input, i.e., spoken discourse which is processed as listening material for language learning, is of fundamental importance in language acquisition (Nunan 1991). Written input aside, it is the main source of information for observational learning, especially of models of communicative interaction, such as conversations. This information, i.e. meaningful and situationally-embedded discourse, is mapped onto the learner’s long-term memory as meaningful language chunks categorized from the point of view of different criteria and filed at different levels of organization. This auditory material may take a variety of forms, depending on the source of input and intensity of interaction, especially, the learner’s personal involvement in this interaction. Input from the mass media, especially TV engages the learner in the process of comprehension accompanied by a wide variety of quite helpful contextual clues, but the role of the learner is confined to being a member of an audience, a listener or a viewer, rather than a directly involved participant in interpersonal communication. The message is most probably neither targeted at the learner as an individual, nor adjusted to his or her needs and abilities. The learner comprehends this input, but does not at the time interact with the sender to construct output. He or she is merely an observer, rather than a sender and an addressee. But even in this limited role the learner benefits from the opportunity to process monologue and dialogue discourse models and learn cultural and language information, especially from the opportunity to pick up plentiful lexical material in its auditory form. This form of input is an occasion for extensive listening, whose advantages resemble those of extensive reading Although the learner in not personally involved as an individual addressee in communicative interaction, the benefits in terms of traces recorded in echoic memory cannot be underestimated. But this form of input alone is not sufficient in foreign language learning. The remaining conditions are interaction, i.e. participation in the communicative exchanges via comprehension and production in speech and writing, and incorporating feedback. As has been pointed out, the first type of input which presents instances of verbal communication but is not addressed to the learner personally is treated as 258

an interaction model and can be replicated with various modifications, or even verbatim. Foreign language learners vastly expand their classroom experience by taking over proficient speakers’ communicative behaviour as models to be recreated, i.e., acted out in the classroom with various degrees of fidelity. A more interaction-conducive form of input processed by the learner in the foreign language classroom is provided by the teacher and other group members, or visitors, when they target, i.e., address/adjust, their utterances to the learners and engage them in a conversation. Such input demands from the learners acting both in the role of addressees as well as senders. Even when the learners are not speaking at the time, they must, at least mentally, prepare for taking their turn and for responding to the dynamics and unpredictability of a conversation. Moreover, interlocutors constantly update their mental image of the situation trying to align with each other. Interpersonal communication in which the learners participate as subjects is essential in learning how to make constant communicative decision to cope with the ongoing conversational demands, how to monitor and clarify comprehension problems, how to make oneself understood and process feedback from the communicative encounters. In conjunction with the learner’s participation and involvement, auditory input provides vast experience for language learning, consisting, among other things, of procedural representations required in skilful execution of language tasks as well as pragmatic knowledge. Such input is processed for comprehension and interaction, i.e., conversation. The auditory input is also the essential material for the learner to master the pronunciation of the target language in communication, i.e., in production and comprehension of discourse rather than in isolated words. In production learners must be able to articulate the phonemes, or rather their allophonic variants, automatically as they construct discourse, while in comprehension, they must be able to discriminate them subconsciously as they decode the incoming discourse. The most significant contribution of the auditory input to language learning is that it is the only source of data for recording the models in the learners’ echoic memory and reconstructing the spoken code of the English language with its distinctive phonemic entities, their rhythm and intonation within their temporal constraints. If we cannot observe speakers of the target language modelling verbal communication in the spoken form, we are unable to discern and reconstruct the segments of this system and the way they are used, which means that we are unable to interact using the spoken language ourselves. Auditory input brought into the language class acts as a surrogate spoken environment, which is so indispensable in first, second, and foreign language acquisition. The point of such practice is not to replace the well-known traditional, yet absolutely indispensable discrimination and articulation work at word or phrase

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level, but to take the learner’s pronunciation ability a step further. A situation in which the learner is asked to repeat a text (be it a dialogue or a monologue), phrase after phrase, having to keep pace with the speaker’s rhythm, intonation, pronunciation and fluency for as long as five or more minutes -depending on the student’s level -is an excellent ‘aerobic’ for his or her a) working memory as well as for b) the articulatory coordination at discourse level. As for a) the working memory span is challenged by the necessity to structure the incoming material (a phrase or clause, not a word) with an appropriate schema, as well as to hold and reproduce it not just once, but for an extended period of time. At the same time, the learners’ articulation ability is put to the test in that they must implement and coordinate a series of various articulatory movements of their speech organs and must also keep doing this fast for an extended period of time. This is essential in building articulatory foundations for speaking. Both accomplishments provide the basis for the learner’s ability to produce sustained spoken discourse.

5.5.2. Sources of difficulty in listening comprehension tasks It may safely be said that listening difficulties in a foreign language classroom result from the learners’ too limited echoic memory representations for discourse in the target language. Without experience and extensive echoic memory records there are no procedural and declarative resources for activation and development of listening comprehension skill. For this reason, it is necessary for the learners to be exposed and participate in processing spoken discourse from the beginning of the course. Practice and experience in sufficient quantities will itself improve listening comprehension and the development of listening skill. Since the learner at his/her learning stage is bound to perform auditory processing tasks slower than the skilled user, it is natural that he or she feels more comfortable with written materials, which are suitable for the slower pace of processing. The only remedy for this lack of automaticity is more input in the form of intensive and extensive listening. Faster action will be possible with further temporal integration of the component sub-tasks and the development of the requisite procedural representations. Because of their structural affinities, listening comprehension tasks may be based on the same principles of grading difficulty in skill development as those used in intensive reading comprehension tasks: 1) the length of the task is a factor: the shorter the task, the easier it is for the learner to complete it; 2) the pace of the task is a factor: the faster the task, the more difficult it is for the learner; suspending the fluency requirement makes the task easier; 260

3) the amount of input is a factor: the more material is presented to the learner for the sake of the task, the easier it should be for the learner to complete it because comprehension difficulty is a function of the proportion between the given and the new on the part of the learner; 4) task complexity is a factor: if the task is first broken down into sub-tasks that the learner can handle, it is easier for him or her to perform the whole of it. Table 18: Some strategies of adjusting the level of difficulty of the material for listening Spontaneous informal talk The role of situational clues especially prosody and para-and non-verbal clues

Adjustments for foreign language learners The use of recordings, especially video recordings which retain these clues and their presentation can be repeated

The natural features of connected speech, especially intonation

Exaggerated intonation patterns, carefully articulated pronunciation, more redundancy built into discourse

Variety of accents

Standard Pronunciation to reduce the number of target language models

Colloquial language, incomplete utterances, speakers interrupt each other or speak at the same time,

More careful, clear turn taking, complete utterances, more formal language, less co-articulation

Background noise present

Background noise eliminated

5.5.3. Feedback on form in listening tasks From the perspective of a foreign language learner who is not yet very skilled, listening comprehension presents itself as auditory discrimination task of the material which is not available to the learner in an exact/explicit form. The fact that the speaker structures discourse into sense groups with stress patters, rhythm, and intonation, uses the pitch and accompanies speaking with body language, facial expressions, and other non-verbal and para-verbal clues enables a competent listener to decode the message without deep analysis of the morphosyntactic forms. The most important semantic information may be extracted on the basis of the accented content words in context. Syntactic information does not have a significant role unless there are alternative interpretations of meaning. Native or very fluent speakers can afford not to be preoccupied with reduced and unaccented forms in the spoken discourse because they can recognize and restore these forms on the basis of their own auditory mental representations anyway. For foreign language learners, however, the forms are not readily available from

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their mental representations. The learners find it frustrating to process a listening passage because the speakers’ clues are reduced and therefore insufficient for them to reconstruct their forms on the basis of the incoming information. When they infer the meaning and still feel unable to identify the input forms precisely, they may be shown the transcript as a kind of feedback on form at the end of the listening task, after they have made the effort to understand the meaning on the basis of the auditory information and the teacher’s input. Matching the graphemic representation of the listening passage with the recording helps learners to improve the precision of its mental representation leading to meta-modal records. The use of transcript in this function will have a positive influence on the quality, i.e., precision and certainty of the language code under reconstruction.

5.6. The nature of speaking as an integral part of verbal communication Producing discourse has a specificity of its own, which is hard for the learner to acquire because of its temporary constraints and the necessity to perform the requisite communicative coding operations in working memory (for an extensive review of the literature, see Kormos 2006). In addition to these temporal constraints on working memory operations, the learner faces the challenge of learning extensive material because spoken discourse has many different forms, the most essential being monologues, dialogues, and polylogues (i.e., when more than two speakers communicate, such as a panel discussion, Nęcki 2000). In this wealth of natural varieties or genres of spoken communication we may nevertheless find some underlying properties which provide guidelines in teaching the skill of speaking and grading the difficulty of the tasks. Below is a list of our points of orientation in this complex problem-space: 1. Speaking in ‘real-life’ is always constrained by the context of the communicative situation with its essential parameters, including participants in their roles, topics, goals, settings, genres, cultural norms, conventions and other communicative circumstances. Our social encounters may be seen as a complex map of these natural varieties, whereas our cultural/communicative ability may be treated as familiarity with these areas of the map which are relevant to our everyday communicative endeavours. The natural varieties, for example academic lecture as opposed to a casual telephone conversation friends, differ in terms of their specific content, plans, conventions, terminology, goals and speech acts. Developing the speaking skill in the educational context is, of necessity, connected with selecting the most important situations on this communicative map. It is didactically more sound to cover a few relevant situations in some 262

depth than to cover many only superficially because the learner must have sufficient material to reconstruct the typological features of these instances. 2. As in any communicative situation, speakers are involved in the act of communication with their entire persons, their bodies and minds, they process verbal as well as non-verbal information from the environment, they activate all their relevant background knowledge sources represented in their minds, and they adjust their message to the addressee, based on the image of the addressee that they have formed. Communicative encounters have their content and relationship components, and sometimes one aspect may dominate the whole encounter. The speakers’ knowledge and experience enable them to make instantaneous communicative decisions required by the communicative act. All of the above direct our attention to the need of vast experience and extensive background knowledge in speaking to provide mental options to choose from. In order to participate in spoken communications, foreign language learners must activate such a communicative mental set and engage in constructing and expressing their personal meaning while make instant decisions to ‘weave the thread of discourse’. 3. The constitutive property of verbal communication is the occurrence of communicative intention in the speaker’s mind. Forging communicative intention may, on one occasion, be a highly constructive and demanding act or automatic and casual act on another. Communicative intention is the meaning and sense that the speaker wants to encode and convey to the addressee to enable him or her to reconstruct it, in other words, to be understood. The speaker’s production must contain sufficiently accurate clues for the addressee to understand, interpret and evaluate it. The speaker is involved in integrating hierarchically arranged choices from intention, through planning, lexical insertion, integration, monitoring to articulation. These choices must be coordinated and executed in fractions of seconds to keep pace with the communicative fluency demands of the task. The role of morphosyntactic accuracy is very important: it helps the speaker to be understood, which is to say, it functions as an adjustment, listener-friendly strategy of helping the addressee to reconstruct the meaning. Whether it is sufficient by itself is another matter. Problems with reconstructing the meaning may be deeper than the morphosyntactic level and depend on the attitude and intelligence level of the addressee. To sum up, the difficulty of the speaking skill results from: a) the need to perform numerous hierarchical operations, especially at the level of communicative intention, first and foremost, deciding what to say,

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b) the need to integrate these operations in fractions of seconds to keep pace with the demands of communicative fluency, and c) the need to do this primarily in the working memory and relying primarily on our internal (mental) auditory representations of meaning to form mappings. The links between speaking and the remaining skills are very strong. The auditory code imposes the same temporal constraints in speaking as it does in listening comprehension. Moreover, listening comprehension may be used as a way of providing the learner with input for the productive task (i.e., as a source of receptive knowledge), and considerably facilitate speaking at the same time. Reading may function as a source of extensive input for speaking. On the other hand, writing, the other productive skill, is helpful during speaking practice as external memory, i.e., a way of recording information for the spoken task, a kind of mnemonics.

5.6.1. Abilities involved in participating in a conversation Conversation is such a universal form of face-to-face communication that learners of a foreign language, such as English, can activate quite a lot of previous knowledge to bring to bear on the task. The joint project of conversing is the effect of socialization in a community, so when we teach English as a foreign language, for example, we do not teach learners how to take turns, but how English language forms are used for the expression and comprehension of meaning and English conversational conventions and etiquette. How can a foreign language learner acquire the art of ‘weaving the thread of conversational discourse’ in English? By processing language input and learning its structure and components, such as how to open and close a conversation, how to take turns, how to complement the adjacency pairs with English language resources. Jay (2003:290): comments: ‘The unfolding structure of a conversation depends on the participants’ goals, shared background knowledge and what new information needs to be added to that shared information to achieve the goals.’ Participants in conversations have their own personal identities and feelings as well as personal roles. They also have their professional roles and identities. Common ground is this dynamic construct which emerges in social encounters, constantly updated and restructures depending on the circumstances and situations, i.e. it is an integral part of the communicative mental set, activated in the mind of each member of the communicative encounter. It includes cultural elements such as stereotypes, prejudices, attitudes, values, norms, metaphors, taboos, and presuppositions, which play a very important role in any instance of verbal communication, but become very 264

prominent in face-to-face situations, such as a conversation. However, this knowledge cannot be acquired in any other way than observation and modelling while being a member of the group. Foreign language learning in the educational context can provide some surrogate environment and input for observation and modelling, but in view of the low intensity of language courses, deliberate study and intentional learning of declarative knowledge are also an important option. In a conversation, new elements are added to the participants’ common ground. Participants in a conversation must be able to open it according to the situation and the level of formality, conduct it, regulate its flow, monitor their own comprehension, engage in various speech acts and functions, and close it according to the politeness etiquette. A good example of shared knowledge are adjacency pairs (Schegloff and Sacks, 1973) are two symmetrical and matching elements, which are intended as complementary in an exchange between two speakers: e.g., greeting -greeting, complement -a word of acknowledgement, invitation – acceptance, question – answer, etc. H. Clark (1996) calls them minimal joint projects. Adjacency pairs, speech acts and functions of English, such as requesting, asking for information, agreeing, refusing, asking permission, giving reasons, making suggestions, etc., are building blocks of a conversation. In addition to these, speakers use various discourse genres such as stories and other narrative accounts, jokes, anecdotes, personal information, such as impressions, convictions, opinions, recommendations, etc. as construction material to develop in this social enterprise. An important aspect of the structure of conversation is turn taking. Usually in a conversation, one person talks and others listen waiting for their turn (too idealistic?). Participants usually follow three simple implicit turn-taking rules (Jay 2003): 1. The speaker can pick the next speaker. 2. The speaker may continue but does not have to. 3. If the speaker does not pick the next speaker, someone else can speak. This is often indicated by pauses and hand-gestures, which signal that the speaker is about to finish his or her turn, or that a new turn is about to begin. Jay (2003: 297) lists the following cues for taking up the speaker position: ‘shifting head direction away from the partner, moving the head forward, initiating gesticulations, tensing the body, or pointing a finger’ and the following devices indicating that the speaker is ready to become the listener: ‘unfilled pauses, a trailing off of voice intensity, cessation of gesticulations, relaxation of the body, looking at the next intended speaker, or the utterance of some stereotypical expression’. In formal debates or discussions, the order of turn-taking steps and their

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duration may be quite rigidly fixed. In a conversation, as much as in continuous discourse, propositions expressed by different speakers are linked to each other by co-references, reiteration, recurrence of items, and many other devices, such as cohesive hand gestures. While anything may serve the purpose of opening a conversation, it is interesting what Jay (2003) has to say about closing them. Speakers use what he calls preclosing statements, which introduce the need to finish the encounter gradually. They provide a reason for having to go, indicate some plan for a future encounter to reaffirm their relationship, express pleasure at their meeting, Some speakers summarize the main points of the conversation, wish their interlocutors well, and sometimes more than one of the above. The purpose of these strategies is not to let the conversation end abruptly, but gradually and smoothly. These strategies will have to be considered also in terms of age groups and their norms as well as levels of formality, but it seems that the situations to practice in the school setting would still remain within the more or less neutral category of conversational etiquette.

5.6.2. Long-term investment in the speaking skill Part of the difficulty in developing the speaking skill in a foreign language is that speaking calls for extensive knowledge representations in the learner’s mind. The learner, by definition, is not yet so well-equipped for speaking. As a result teacher must deal with the inevitable limitations of the learner’s requisite knowledge resources of any kind. This void cannot be filled instantly. To make the learner ready for speaking, the teacher must engage in long-term (course-level) as well as in short-term (lesson or task-level) preparation for speaking tasks. Long-term preparation involves taking advantage of the transfer of training from other skills which have been cultivated in a way which links receptive and productive practice: a) Reading and listening activities which stress the need to bring to life the text in its communicative context, especially the typological properties of communicative situations, can be regarded as a long-term investment in the learner’s productive abilities: discourse genres and plans highlighted in such a way help the learners to remember these extremely important communicative forms and use them as information containers in their own communicative attempts, either as ready or raw plans and materials. b) Taking full advantage of the communicative potential of the text is a form of preparation for speaking and writing. Responding to the comprehension material in the role of the sender is straightforward language production 266

practice under sheltered conditions, in which the facilitation of the production task comes from the rich input from reading comprehension. The communicative situation has already been fairly well defined and visualized by the learner, so he or she can maximize the benefit of this mental model by expressing his or her own intention without the need of reconstructing all the situational circumstances from scratch, for the purpose of a new productive task. c) Focus on meaning, sense and content of learning, so strongly emphasized in reading comprehension activities, also benefits the learners’ speaking readiness because they develop representations of networks of propositions, the stuff of communicative intentions. Throughout this work, meaning, sense, and content have been regarded as very important didactic categories; we have also stressed the need of content (especially cultural content) elaboration in reading comprehension, as well as the importance of critical reading, and extensive reading and listening. These principles help the learners to consistently develop factual information (i.e., knowledge) through language learning and to pay attention to the ideas expressed in the foreign language. If this aspect of verbal communication is systematically stressed, if not to say, prioritized in the educational process, having nothing to say will probably be less of a problem to the learner than when meaning and sense are marginalized. Reading comprehension as search for meaning and sense, as well as the source of interesting content for learning, is a worthy long-term investment in developing the learners’ knowledge representations from which they may be more likely to carve out some communicative intention. d) Elements of long-term preparation for speaking as well as writing can be found in the activities following reading or listening comprehension which require the learner to summarize the comprehended material. When learners make the effort to construct such a summary, they in fact build a new text which is a symmetrical, condensed version of the original. They must perform important planning and integration operations which prepare them for free productive tasks when they struggle with their own discourse plan and try to retain important information in their working memory. Moreover, when learners know they would be required to summarize the text, they pay more attention to the source material than when the follow-up task is less demanding, which in turn enhances their general memory processes. e) In a way similar to note-taking in listening comprehension tasks, we may assign some role to writing in the speaking tasks. Writing may be regarded as a skill in its own right as well as a form of our external memory, a mnemonic strategy of recording items so that they would not be forgotten. Such is the

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function of making lists of things to do as well as making notes to prepare for a speech or presentation. Jotting down ideas before speaking can help the learner to organize things to be said and to control the task better. Written preparation allows the learner to take time while working on various items of the task at hand and to do them consecutively, which may directly benefit the quality of discourse integration in memory. f) Listening input that is provided to the learner may serve the function of modelling monologues and conversations in English for the learners to replicate with a varying degree of exactitude. Such models are important back-up resources to rely upon: the learner who does not want to learn them verbatim can modify them or use them as raw material. These models certainly fill the mental void of options to choose from in spoken monologues and dialogues. The above long-term investments which are natural products of fostering other skills provide building blocks for speaking ability. Similar strategies, i.e., emphasizing receptive input, factual knowledge and discourse plans, may be used as a way of preparing for speaking right before the task.

5.6.3. Related strategies for developing the speaking skill Strategies for the development of speaking, which result from our understanding of the nature of difficulties involved, include: a) Gathering information about the topic or role to provide content/factual information as options which facilitate the choice of communicative intention and planning. b) Time given to plan takes the pressure off the speaking task allowing the learner to recall information relevant to the utterance and to organize it in a linear manner appropriate for the discourse format (Foster 1996). c) Rehearsal is the segment of the speaking task when the learner is able to put his or her utterance together and deliver it in a ‘rough copy’, before presenting it in an improved version the second time. Benefits of rehearsal include some opportunity to try out integrating the operations necessary for the completion of the task, leading to an increase in fluency, and incorporating feedback. In typical classroom conditions, this stage of the task usually takes place as pair work. Additional benefit of rehearsal is that the next round of the task is always a repetition, which benefits both fluency and accuracy (Bygate 1996, 2001). In case of doubts about error correction during speaking and in front of the class, rehearsal is the appropriate time to build accuracy into the task, and subsequently into the speaking skill. 268

d) Written preparation is also a form of facilitating a speaking task: the content and plan is available in the form which does not burden the learner’s working memory, and the learner’s available attention is directed to the appropriate integration and delivery of the utterance. If there is an audience to address, the delivery may be hard enough in itself. The function of writing in this case is reduced to mnemonics, external memory, rather than a skill in its own right.

5.7. Writing as constructing a message ‘Writing’ may denote several operations: a) the act of using graphemes to code a message (the ability which learners acquire as part of their literacy in L1 and L2, i.e., reading and writing ability); b) writing something down, e.g., a list, as a mnemonic strategy, i.e., to record it in our external memory; and c) writing as a form of written communication with its natural varieties of written discourse characteristic of our culture. In this section I am concerned with the second and third meaning of the term. Graham (2009) rightly points out that writing has become so important nowadays that more than 85 percent of population write. People who are illiterate are at a disadvantage because they do have a most valuable tool for learning and self-expression as well as a support system for refining and extending learning. He adds (Graham 2009: 457-458): In terms of education, writing is the major means by which students demonstrate their knowledge. They use it to gather, remember, and share subject-matter knowledge as well as to explore, organize and refine their ideas about the topic.

In a communicative situation, the difficulty in writing results from the number of simultaneous decisions that a writer must make at the level of content and form, especially planning, organizing, and expressing ideas in a sufficiently explicit way to make them comprehensible to the reader essentially on the basis of graphemic clues. Illustrations, for example pictures, drawings, photographs, charts, tables, graphs of various kinds, used in written communication, have a much more modest function in conveying meaning of the written text in comparison with the rich information provided to the listener by non-verbal and prosodic clues in speaking. Nevertheless, speaking and writing share important similarities characteristic of language production: both involve hierarchically- integrated decisions in content, planning and lexical insertion with syntactic adjustments, based on procedural records, which must be integrated to produce linear discourse. Dimensions of task difficulty in writing include: 1) the cognitive difficulty of the content; other things being equal, immediate experience and everyday content would be easier to write about than abstract

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ideas which activate complex thought processes; the narrative, i.e., events coded chronologically, is considered to be the elementary form of organization which would present the least cognitive difficulty to the learner (Littlewood 1978); 2) the length of the task; other things being equal, the longer the task the more complex it would be; this concerns the hierarchy of ideas and planning strategies involved; in a way similar to the receptive tasks, we may always seek facilitation effect by segmenting a bigger task into smaller components; 3) the resources needed for the task; the information pool needed to do the task can be available to the learner internally as his or her own knowledge representations, externally as available resources to be consulted for the task, time permitting, and the immediate input for the task presented by the teacher; 4) the time available to the learner; the task will always be more difficult when there is a time limit, which means that the learner must work at a certain designated pace, not always adjusted to his or her insufficiently developed automaticity, and may not be able to consult the external resources. In fact, to be communicatively fit and to survive in our culture, we must be able to perform written tasks within certain reasonable time limits; written tasks cannot take for ever. In their classic from 1980, Flower and Hayes (and subsequent refinements by Hayes 1996) described the dynamics of composing as juggling constraints. Although the act of writing, on most occasions, is not influenced by such time limitations as speaking, the fact that the message must be well-organized and explicit for the reader to understand makes it sufficiently complicated as a skill in its own right. The essence of writing (Eysenck and Keane 2010) concerns selections at the level of content, based on the knowledge of the topic which we recall or generate for the task, the level of planning the discourse while verbalizing our ideas with the use of lexical elements and constructions, text production and transcription, editing, i.e., improving as we go along, and writing the revised version in the sense of putting it down with incorporated improvements. Hardly ever do these operations occur in isolation, especially if we use electronic word processing. Most writers (Hedge 2000, Zamel 1982) perform these operations recursively, over and over again, rereading and revising simultaneously, while introducing considerable changes, generating new or eliminating old ideas from the text. They strategically concentrate on the parts of the task which demand attention at the moment (Graham and Harris 2000). These characteristics indicate the essentially dynamic, constructive and strategic nature of our communicative processes in general, writing included. 270

It clearly follows from the above that writing in the sense of written communication, especially in its mature forms, consists of the thought component, i.e. the communicative intention, the element of composing and coding this information into language form. The thought component is implemented through content: propositions and ideas, facts and evidence supported by reasoning, e.g., arguments and other forms of logical substantiation; composing is implemented as planning, organization, and mutual adjustments within discourse to make up a balanced whole with satisfactory relationships between parts, and accents and contrasts as desired by the author to achieve his or her communicative goal, and coding into language form is connected with activating the requisite verbal material from memory and integrating it by means of syntactic devices to express the designated meaning according to the author’s intention and in the form of coherent and cohesive discourse. As stressed by Flower and Heyes (1980) and Hayes (1996), the writer juggles several mental operations: visualizing the addressee, recalling relevant information, planning, introducing new ideas, adding supporting details as they read, modifying their plan to incorporate new evidence, testing their view of the addressee against the discourse they have written, modifying their perspective of the information presented to suit the image of the addressee, summarizing, emphasizing, perfecting rhetorical devices, etc. To coordinate this complex task writers usually produce multiple drafts, and, unlike foreign language learners, they do not regard the first draft as the finished product, but as the material to start working on. Multiple drafting and redrafting are the norm rather than the exception with native speakers and other proficient writers in English. Keeping in mind the recursive, dynamic, and strategic nature of the act of writing, we may still claim that, for analytical purposes, the most important construction stages in writing a piece of discourse include (Eysenck and Keane 2010): 1. identifying communicative intention/perspective in the context of the situation; 2. planning the arrangement of ideas and rhetorical strategies; 3. inserting the lexical material, both single elements and phrases coordinating these elements to fit the whole (syntactical adjustments, coherence and cohesion); 4. executing the task in the sense of drafting; 5. editing, i.e., receiving and incorporating feedback information and inserting it into the earlier draft as well as generating own feedback for the task from acting as a reader.

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As can be seen, the last stage is either processing feedback from some external readers or from the writers’ own reading as they assume the role of addressees of their own writing (Levelt, 1989). The clarity of discourse is enhanced by a clearly formulated goal, some image of the addressee or audience, clear structure, coherence and cohesion, conventional discourse devices which are used to organize it and signal this to the reader, as well as subtitles and typographical devices to accentuate text hierarchy and plan.

5.7.1. Differences between experienced and inexperienced writers Better writers are more concerned with the global, fundamental aspects of composing (larger structures) than the local aspects, even leaving some elements at the language surface unfinished. The weaker writers, on the other hand, are preoccupied with the surface elements at the local, clause level, such as sentence syntax or expressions, paying insufficient attention to the global aspects of the task (Eysenck and Keane, 2010, Hedge, 2000). In their study of the writing process, Flower and Hayes (1980) compared the strategies used by knowledgeable, ‘expert’, and less knowledgeable, ‘novice’, writers and discovered that the knowledgeable ones formulated much more exact and better coordinated plans than the less knowledgeable ones, not only demonstrating greater awareness of the available options of developing their piece, but also greater awareness of the addressee. The more skilled authors maintain that the best route to improving their writing is perfecting their planning. This is, indeed, the stage which absorbs more of their attention in comparison to writing itself, and certainly more than the planning stage in the case of the less skilled writers. When it comes to editing discourse, experts go deeply into its global structure sometimes modifying it to put the addressee into perspective, whereas the less skilled writers perform editing operations fairly fast and they take smaller units into account. This result may be interpreted as the effect of the author’s not yet having sufficiently automatized lower-level processes. They absorb the writer’s attention preventing him or her from moving up, to the higher-level structures. From the point of view of foreign language teaching, it is significant that while editing, experts were able to trace and correct 74% of their own errors, improving the overall comprehensibility of the text, whereas the less skilled writers – only 42% of errors. This result is meaningful because in debating the question of editing and error correction in foreign language writing, we must not forget, that there is a proficiency barrier to successful error correction of the learners’ own writing. Successful editing is not only the question of the learner’s good will, but language ability leading us to the conclusion that the less proficient the learner, the more important the teacher’s role at that stage of improving the written work. 272

Hedge (2000:328) lists the following features that good writers demonstrate, which nicely wraps up our outline so far: 1) They have something to say as well as a sense of purpose. 2) They have a sense of the audience. 3) They control the development of their ideas, giving them a sense of direction. 4) They can organize their content clearly and in a logical manner. 5) They can use language conventions, such as grammar and spelling, to develop sentence structure. 6) They link ideas and demonstrate a range of vocabulary. The above list seems to suggest that good writers activate their communicative mental set for writing more carefully than do the not-so-good writers.

5.7.2. Long-term investment in the writing skill In fact, any teaching ideology which emphasizes discourse as a unit of foreign language material is a good candidate for providing foundation for the written skill. The list of long-term strategies which enhance the students readiness to write is not vastly different from the long-term investment in the speaking skill, but I will reiterate the most important points: 1. Stressing typological features of various discourse genres in the receptive skills, especially reading, provides the learner with various discourse models and plans, which can be used as raw material in writing. 2. Productive tasks used to top off reading comprehension, such as responding to the author of the reading passage in the role of the sender are straightforward writing tasks defined in terms of situational context and content, but demanding important communicative decisions from the learner. 3. Parallel writing, as well as summary and précis writing, are useful graded activities which exploit ample reading input from reading in the writing task. In the case of summaries and précis, some content decisions have been made for the learner; in the case of parallel writing, discourse genre is used as the point of reference, whereas the content is usually changed, depending on the learner’s intention. 4. Language learning which does not disregard content provides raw material for writing in terms of factual knowledge that the learner accumulates and can use in various written tasks. Learners who are consistently encouraged to think critically and to evaluate ideas are ready and willing to express their thoughts on a given subject in writing. 5. Jotting down ideas, writing plans for oral compositions, and writing down whole oral presentations are the strategies which bring the learner closer to

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integrating the numerous operations of full-scale writing. The benefits which emanate from these long-term investments can be summarized as helping the learners to develop their ability of constructing sustained discourse. This ability is an extremely important context for the mechanics of using syntax to signal coherence and cohesion, as well as storing sentence constructions to support longer utterances. Sample activities include: diary of journal writing, letter writing, e.g., personal letters and other forms, narrative, book report or book review, description, creative writing, such as poems, stories, and process writing.

5.7.3. Error correction in the written work To summarize reasons for error correction and teacher’s feedback during the stage of editing in process writing, the following arguments can be listed: 1) Peer input is most valuable during classroom interaction, brainstorming or brain searching for ideas to be shared, critical discussion of issues to stimulate thinking on a given topic, or in joint projects when the responsibility for the product is evenly distributed among peers. Peer-correction of written work, however, which is common in the first language context, is not justified in the process of foreign language learning, and writing in particular, other than as a time-saving device (Hedge 2000, Ur 1991, Raimes 2002). It is an integral part of the teacher’s professional role to help the learner eliminate language imperfections in his or her work. Peers cannot be responsible for the teacher’s professional role nor do they have sufficient language resources to do that in the context of foreign language learning. 2) Since error correction is necessary as part of feedback which pushes the language learning process forward, it would be useful to point out that editing a written task, especially produced in process writing, is the most opportune moment to do it. These are the reasons: a) The feedback is provided in a private way, on the written work that only the learner concerned gets to see. When the teacher sees the need to publicly discuss a segment of the text as relevant to the rest of the class, he or can do this anonymously; nobody’s ego is hurt while everybody can learn some useful information; b) Unlike speaking, writing has the advantage of giving permanence to language utterances so, in addition to producing the piece, we can also reflect on it to focus on forms and process related feedback, as well as reason about forms to learn them better; c) Writing is the appropriate context for processing feedback on form because forms in the graphemic code are represented explicitly, as opposed to their 274

reduced representation (unaccented pronunciation) in speaking; what we process fast and automatically in on-line speaking and listening can now be taken out of our attentional periphery and made precise to be automatized in the target-like form. d) Editing and improvements on the drafts are a natural activity for native speakers and even for highly accomplished writers; the better the writer the deeper the editing; if learners do not wish to benefit from this natural stage of writing, this means that they, not the teachers, are the ones to change their attitudes. We know very well that good language learners pay attention to form and edit their writing very carefully as they gratefully, which is not to say uncritically, incorporate their teacher’s ideas; weaker learners, on the other hand, treat the editing stage in a rather nonchalant manner sometimes trying to educate the teacher to change his or her point of view rather than modifying their own. I call such learners defensive learners; they do not come to the educational process to change because they think of themselves as finished products. Unfortunately for them, this is a deeply misconceived idea of the role of the learner and the role of the educational process. e) Errors in foreign language production are quite natural because of the unpredictability of verbal communication; when we see some imperfections in students’ writing, the problem is not that the students are wrong; the students are not yet 100% right. So the task of the teacher is to add -not to correct -but to add the necessary input to help the learner come closer, i.e., approximate, the target language norm in this particular task. Writing accurately can only be learned while receiving error corrections on written tasks, there is no other way to learn productive accuracy. It is a natural and normal part of language learning. At the same time, expecting the teacher to perform error correction tactfully and effectively should not be considered as asking too much of a professional. f) A productive task is the ideal context in which accuracy in syntactic forms can be polished; expecting that all errors will disappear as a result of such corrections is unrealistic; acquiring morphosyntactic accuracy is a painstaking process, yet the only natural unit of the material for this process to operate is the task rather than sentence-based grammar exercise.

5.8. Some accuracy enhancement strategies 1) Developing listening comprehension requires precision in recognizing forms in the spoken message, which can be fostered by means of transcoding, when and where necessary (dictation, tape-script as a form of feedback on form).

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2) Developing reading comprehension requires accurate segmentation and structuring of the material into clauses, which can be cultivated by parallel listening or reading the text aloud by the learner for feedback from the teacher, also a form of transcoding as well as negotiation for meaning. 3) Developing speaking means helping the learner not only to reach extensive knowledge representations, declarative and procedural, but to reach the stage of reasonable accuracy and idiomaticity in expressing himself or herself; this can be accomplished by receiving plentiful target-like input before and after the task and the incorporation of corrective feedback. 4) While developing the writing skill the learner is expected to reach the level of morphosyntactic precision and target-like idiomaticity by means of organization and editing processes which integrate these forms in line with discourse coherence and cohesion principles; error correction can thus be incorporated into the task and later transferred into other tasks.

5.9. Concluding remarks The above section is not supposed to be rounded off by separate implications for foreign language teaching because the whole chapter has been devoted to such considerations. The main point of this section has been to outline a spectrum of didactically relevant categories and options which emerge from the perspective of language use in verbal communication, i.e. comprehension and production in speech and writing, developed especially for this purpose. It is my conviction that this perspective is conducive to non-arbitrary listing of didactic consequences and that its main components can be used further for evaluating the existing and for developing new classroom procedures. It also seems that the systematization of their abundance reflects the multiaspectual nature of language use and learning and is more justified than any form of eclecticism in the so-called ‘methods’ of teaching (see section 1.2.4).

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Chapter 6. Conclusions

6.1. Characterizing language use for the purpose of Foreign Language Didactics The goal of the monograph has been to develop a view of language use, specific enough to be relevant to the field of foreign language didactics, in other words, a view which would capture these processes in space and time to facilitate their understanding and deriving applications for teaching a foreign language in the educational context. The specificity of this view comes from the use of several important constraints and criteria taken from the overall format and agenda of foreign language didactics defined as an autonomous empirical discipline, justifying the location of these processes in the cognitive system of the language user (HIP). These processes have been identified from the point of view of their lingual specificity in three qualitatively distinct, cyclically related states, i.e. knowledge, skill and discourse. The notion of language use has been decomposed as verbal communication in comprehension and production in speech and writing. Language use has been regarded as the most elementary form of language learning which can provide grounds for various procedures of cultivating, facilitating, enhancing, unblocking and stimulating foreign language learning and teaching. As a result of adopting this set of constraints, language use is inseparably linked with language users who are engaged in verbal communication with their entire bodies and minds. Because of this inextricable connection and considering the fact that language use and learning take place in a state-changing system, this framework emphasized a life-span perspective of foreign language learning and teaching, in which age is not considered a factor which makes a difference, but the developmental property of the agent of language use and learning with a host of consequences for the cognitive, emotional and social considerations. Verbal communication instantiated as language use in comprehension and production in speech and writing can be further specified for the purpose of the formal process as three components: input, interaction and feedback. Below I list key properties of language use and learning in this human, operational perspective developed throughout the monograph as a source of guidelines and justifications for non-primary language teaching:

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Table 19: Properties of language use in a bottom-up perspective relevant to FLD Property of language use 1. Organic, i.e. possible only in a living organism

Description language use is a function of synaptic activities in the brain of a living human organism requiring metabolism to generate energy; in its most elementary sense, communication understood as mutual influence by energy discharges takes place at various orders of magnitude, even at the level of neuronal networks with the help of neurotransmitters;

2. Unitary, i.e. integrated by an underlying elementary entity, information

the unit of human cognitive functioning, information, has its meaning and form which shapes its transmitting vehicle propelled by human energy; forms and constructions of the code are language-specific, while the meaning component overlaps with other semiotic systems; this means that information types with different status are included in the scope of the subject matter, not just the linguistic ones;

3. Anthropocentric, i. e. humanly specific

the nature of language use is inseparable from the human being; language use is located in, therefore constituted, constrained and afforded by, the unique nature of human cognitive architecture, thought and action; human users are capable of exploiting the combinatorial potential of the code as well as their own strategic abilities; in no sense is this a property of a self-contained system of forms;

4. Other-oriented, i.e. aimed at sending and receiving messages

language use, our inalienable property as social animals, is a form of human bonding, it has its direction, i.e. dynamic course, within human networks: it takes place in the context of human relationship, group and culture; human brain has a generating equipment for the construction and emission of humanly significant messages and a computing equipment for the registration and comprehension of humanly significant messages; human bonds take place by means of shared attentional resources, mutual adjustments and mental alignments;

5. Designed for communicating meanings; language use is about people and the world;

the purpose of language use is trading meanings within human networks; meanings constitute the contents of our mental representations indispensable for adaptation, survival and satisfying our needs; while communicating, senders almost instinctively encode meanings into language forms, whereas addressees decode them into meanings; the most relevant context for the interpretation of meanings is individual and group culture;

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6. Capable of expressing content and relationship components; hence predication and reference;

in language use we express ideas as well as our relationship to ourselves, the others and the world; the profound embeddedness of language use in our mental, discoursal and situational context takes the form of deixis, whereas the extensive content of our mental life, i.e. our thoughts, sensations, ideas and knowledge the world, are predicated in the form of linear propositions made up of concepts and their relations;

7. Goal-oriented and language use is predominantly, though not entirely, dirigible, i.e. (mostly) an intentional form of other-oriented behaviour, i.e. within human control processes, operations and strategies largely, but not entirely within the person’s cognitive control; goal- orientation involves selection from among options, planning, integration, monitoring and feedback modifications; these properties make language use dynamic and flexible; exceptions can certainly be found in routine language use; 8. Involves the whole person

people are engaged in language use with their entire organisms, bodies and minds; language use strategically taps all the areas of human functioning: cognition, volition and emotions; at the same time, all our sensory modalities are employed in an integrated manner; senders and addressees recruit and interpret all the available, potentially relevant clues in the communicative act, not just the linguistic ones;

9. Not quite predictable; involves on-line generation and computation of meaning in human situations

language use is an act of composing determined by the context of situation; it involves strategic, inferential, interpretive choices to generate and compute not just surface, but deeper, often figurative meaning by subjects with individual levels of intelligence as well as individual and shared goals and knowledge representations; only some degree of coordination is possible in dialogic exchanges;

10. Multipurpose, i.e. language use permeates all areas of human life at the capable of serving all individual and group levels, it serves all human individual human needs and sociocultural purposes, including basic survival and well-being as well as highly sophisticated, spiritual ones, not to mention the cultural formatting of the young; 11. Polymorphic (tapping various forms of representations)

various forms of representations are used in coding and decoding meaning, they include conceptual, preverbal, and verbal forms as well as lingual, para-and non-lingual forms (body language); at the same time, users process mental as well as environmental information for content and relationship clues;

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Property of language use Description 12. Dynamic (flexible language use/learning is located in a state-changing and growing) system, i.e. important changes in the process of learning are driven by the subject’s maturation and growth of his/ her experience; endogenous as well as exogenous sources of change in knowledge representations interactively contribute to overall life-span development in the ability to use language(s); 13. Communicable (contagious); transmitted via verbal communication

language code is learnable by new generations who, thanks to their excitable brain tissue, reconstruct the code in communicative processes via observation (and mapping the environmental information), imitation, interaction, practice and reasoning; this reconstruction is never 100% exact, which marks cohort identity as well as drives language change in a diachronic perspective; precision in reconstructing a foreign language code in a formal setting is even more variable; most of the above processes do not take place at the level of our focal awareness;

14. Strictly organized as well as productive

language use can be productive or creative as well as restricted by the language code; it can be viewed as an ordered system of equivalences in different formats for coding and decoding meanings with the sole purpose of being understood and understanding the other person respectively; while the code is strictly organized and rule- governed, its combinatorial potential is imposing;

15. Conventionalized (based on selection and agreement by the users)

the vast, if not infinite, potential of the language code is somewhat reduced by various sociocultural norms and conventions which select only some, as opposed to all the potentially-available options of language use at different levels of it organization, which must be known to the community of language users;

16. Multicomponential (operating on three states of language matter)

language use is best represented as a cycle of three mutually convertible, yet distinct subcomponents: distributed mental representational systems (knowledge), fluid integrated behavioural operations (skill), and fairly stable external linear products (discourse); each state of the matter has its distinctive specificity, not shared with other states; language learners are able -and can be taught -to acquire knowledge for language use, convert it into skill, and implement this skill in discourse construction and reconstruction;

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17. Hierarchically integrated in time

language use in production requires complex hierarchically coordinated operations characterizing skill (integration by subordination and synchronization by automatization), which select options from vast knowledge representations and construct them into a linear message in the form of spoken or written discourse; comprehension requires reverse, deconstructive processing;

18. Self-diversifying

synchronically as well as diachronically, i.e. in a life-span view, in individuals as well as groups, language use can take a variety of forms ranging from primitive, elementary and laconic, to highly elaborate, developed and specialized; likewise, functions of language use may be basic, simple and subordinate as well as refined, complex and dominant in social situations;

19. Personalized in use (available for personal identification)

language code is a categorical device which has provisions for individuals to make an idiosyncratic use of its repertoire, so that they (subconsciously) construct their own language style as a form of personal identification, i.e. an idiolect;

20. Displaying individual differences in learning

language learning depends on the individual ability of making fine (high fidelity) discriminations in information (sub)systems to identify and use elements of the code as well as the speed and accuracy of information processing; serious deficits in this regard can be illustrated by such cases as dyslexia; individual differences become more manifest in non-primary language learning.

6.2. Fundamental questions in Foreign Language Didactics The list below systematizes basic questions pertinent to foreign language learning and teaching in the framework of an academic discipline which has been elaborated so far: I. What category of human phenomena is language use and learning? The category is verbal communication, a universal form of human activity, a specialized case of interaction, i.e. mutual influence, which is indispensable and ubiquitous in human societies and cultures (Balconi, ed., 2010, Corsini, ed., 1987, Dakowska 2003, Fogel 1993, Hewes 1995, Tomasello 1999). Participants of verbal communication are agents of language use; they act constructively and strategically, i.e. they perform a host of operations in language use. The purpose of their interaction is to convey a message conceived in the mind of one person

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to the mind of another, capacitating the flow of information in human networks. The whole teleology of verbal communication resides in the expression of humanly-feasible meaning and sense generated in the brain of one person across the gap to another to be computed and evaluated. People have the equipment for sending and receiving meaningful messages. Meaning entails content and relationship component (Wood 1981). Verbal communication is a mental bond between the sender and the addressee which may range from intrapersonal to interpersonal -or even impersonal -as well as group, mass and global. The quintessential nature of language emerges from the fact that in communicative interactions it is used for coding and decoding meanings constructed and directed at other people. A host of mental operations underlying communicative interaction include activating extensive knowledge representations from permanent to working memory, constructing an appropriate intention in view of the situation and our goals and coding this intention into the form of spoken or written discourse. The sender encodes meaning into verbal form; the addressee decodes meaning from its verbal form. This perspective must be retained in foreign language learning and teaching and clearly contrasted with the still predominant concept of descriptive grammar, neutral to communicative interaction and external to the role and perspective of the sender and the addressee. II. Where is language use and learning located? The material basis for language use and learning is the human brain with its neuronal synaptic electrochemical activity with neurotransmitters and metabolic sources of energy. This synaptic activity between neurons of the brain is also a form of communication, only of a much smaller order of magnitude, if communication is understood as mutual influence by means of energy. Our cognitive system for information processing (Human Information Processing – HIP), which is the “organ” for language processes, consists of such specialized subsystems as perception, attention, memory, planning, monitoring, anticipation, retrospection, and feedback, as well as various information structures and forms of representations and certain types of processes (automatic, controlled, hybrid). Our attention/working memory serves as a desktop for selecting and integrating information from various sources, external as much as internal, digital as well as analogical, especially from our modalities (Anderson, B. F., 1975, Anderson, J. R., 1983, 1985, Baars 1997, Baars and Gage, eds., 2007, Baddeley, A. D., 1986, 1990, 2003, Baddeley and Hitch, 1974, Barsalou 2009, Benjafield 1992, Carroll, D. W., 1986, Eysenck 2006, Eysenck and Keane 2010, Jay 2003, Lindsay and Norman 1991, Matlin 1994, Solso 1998, Styles 2009). HIP takes the form of cognitive work, including necessary decisions and operations as well as the 282

storage of knowledge representations. Not all of them are available to awareness because they are too fast. These processes, operations and strategies, are adaptive in the sense that they enable us to deal with our environment and other people in human situations in their individual, sociocultural and natural environment. Because of our limited cognitive, especially attentional resources, cognitive/ communicative activities are bound to have episodic structure of situationally- embedded events. III. What is the significance of this location for foreign language teaching? Foreign language teaching is addressed to human beings with exactly the same brain-based cognitive “organs” as the one underlying language use and learning, i.e. verbal communication, in general. Therefore, our sources of orientation for teaching options are derived from a) the components of our HIP system to enhance their functioning by respective cultivation strategies; in this way we can enhance specific processes connected with perception, attention, planning, memory, monitoring, anticipation, retrospection, automatic, controlled and hybrid processes, as well as concepts, schemata, etc.; and b) the nature of verbal communication, language users, including foreign language learners, instinctively focus on meaning; they ‘go for meaning’ as Whitney (1998) says. The foreign language learner’s mental set is defined by his or her processes, operations and strategies of encoding meanings into words (discourse) and decoding words (discourse) into meanings, which tap extensive mental representations. Because of the constructive nature of verbal communication, language users not only make conscious and subconscious choices but they do so all the time; language learners do not like having this freedom taken away from them, as is often the case in foreign language classrooms. Therefore, this location is of fundamental significance from the point of view of foreign language teaching, especially the learner’s mental set, the perspective adopted for language use and practice in the classroom and the activation of invisible mental operations and strategies indispensable in language use for communicative purposes. For example, asking the learner to make three sentences with the verb ‘to go’ does not provide a genuinely communicative reason to use language. When such activities are predominant in comparison to communicative language use in the sense described above, the effect of learning is far from practical. To be of use, foreign language practice must resemble language use and recreate the conditions which stimulate both the visible and the invisible processes, operations and strategies. Language use is strategic and such, likewise, must be language teaching. Strategic behaviour is a form of flexible/intelligent behaviour characterized by the fact that subjects diagnose their problem-situation and construct solutions on the

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basis of their criterion of optimality and the available resources. This property justifies the need of expert knowledge resulting from profound understanding of language use and learning on the part of the foreign language professional. To resemble verbal communication in its criterial attributes, learning experience in the educational setting must be episodic in structure, based on communicative input rich in meaning and content and make human and sociocultural sense so as to stimulate the learners’ curiosity and enable them to code and decode messages and commit their classroom experience to long-term memory, both episodic and semantic (generic). Focus on specific aspects of language use, such as pronunciation, morphosyntactic and pragmatic accuracy, vocabulary, discourse plans, etc. requires ample meaningful communicative environment. IV. What is the mechanism of language use and learning? The defining property of language use is that it is a form of communication, i.e. synaptic activity between human brains. Synapse refers to communication structures of neurons by virtue of which one neuron can transmit a signal across a gap to another neuron (e.g. Churchland 1989). The mechanism of language use is entailed in verbal communication which is entailed in Human Information Processing whereby special meaningful units, information clusters/constellations, are mapped, coded and decoded and represented in another format (transformed) to enable humans to perform such cognitive operations as verbal communication and reasoning. Verbal communication is other-oriented (allocentric). The mechanism of language use and learning, therefore, is the mechanism of verbal communication: the components of HIP system, as well as the structures and processes are the same whereas the processes of language learning are derived from the processes of language use and our reflection about it. Reflection, especially reasoning, unfolds along the life span and boosts the explicitation of knowledge and exploitation of the combinatorial potential of the language code. Language code is special because its elementary units are categorical/segmental, whereas its organization is based on double articulation and arbitrary as well as analogical representations/symbolizations (Baars, 1997, Bruner, 1973, 1990, Eysenck and Keane, 2010, Koch, 2004, Neisser, 1967, 1978, Nęcka et al., 2006, Sternberg, 1996, Thagard, 2005b, Whitney 1998). V. Is the mechanism for foreign language teaching in the educational context the same or different? To work optimally, foreign language teaching should be addressed to, and activate exactly the same mechanism, Human Information Processing, especially language use in comprehension and production and reasoning, taking into 284

account its life-span constraints and whole-person engagement, only more deliberately and intensively with all kinds of cultivation and stimulation strategies introduced into the process with full cognizance of the specificity of language code (see point IV) and its use as knowledge, skill and discourse in verbal communication. (This is not the only feasible view; Bley-Vroman 1989, for example, claims that they are different. For a review of various models of language use and learning, see Dakowska 1996). The mechanism can be activated by constructing an informationally-rich environment (input), reflecting the generic features of communicative situations, with opportunities for interaction (comprehension and production in speech and writing) and the provision of feedback for the sake of perfecting mental representations. The three ‘states of the language matter’ distinguished in the communicative cycle require special strategies: a) the underlying knowledge can be acquired by committing to memory the material and experience which are maximally meaningful, i.e. coherent and cohesive, b) the behavioural operations, i.e. skills, can be learned through practice and participation activities which leave procedural records in the learner’s mind, and c) the external product, i.e. discourse, can be learned by practicing comprehension and production with natural materials above sentence level, such as various discourse genres, with focus on their generic features, such as plans and conventions. VI. How does language learning happen? To be realistic and in line with the empirical constraints of the field’s subject matter, foreign language use and learning must be understood as taking place in the learner’s mind, while the learner participates in verbal communication, is able to record and map extensive knowledge representations needed in subsequent communication, and as a consequence of various mental and psychomotor processes, operations and strategies underlying verbal communication. In verbal communication, thanks to our excitable brain, the requisite knowledge and procedural representations from the experience are mapped, i.e. redescribed, onto our memory systems by means of multiple coding and structured and restructured by our cognitive processes to be activated on subsequent occasions; the main purpose of foreign language learning is to reconstruct the language code; learning the phonemic and graphemic sub-codes requires extensive input processing, discrimination activities, comprehension as well as attempted production, and plenty of feedback on precision, consolidation and accuracy. Initially, language learning requires environmental stimulation as observational learning with input for comprehension and learning, but as the process unfolds, it becomes increasingly important for the learner to participate in communicative interaction in the role of the sender/producer and addressee/comprehender

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of spoken and written discourse, and to incorporate feedback on various aspects of verbal communication; learning the communicative code is enhanced by reasoning about its forms and functions in verbal communication; moreover, new information systems can be elaborated, constructed and created in the learner’s mind (Carroll, D. W., 1986, Jay, 2003, Velmans, 2000). This conception does not undermine the generative and computation abilities of the human learner, nor does it deemphasize the role of his or her reasoning and creative abilities, but first and foremost stresses the fundamental role of informational resources, i.e. form/meaning mappings recorded from environmental communication as the essential equipment of the foreign language decoder/encoder. This is a decidedly operational view of the process. VII. How can we make foreign language happen in the classroom? To reach this goal, the primary conditions for language learning constructed in the classroom must have the criterial attributes of verbal communication. Learning one thing at a time is infeasible, but we may focus our attention on one aspect of verbal communication at a time by using various tasks and gear instructions respectively. The dowry of the learner, i.e. his or her cognitive equipment, and the contribution of the environmental information are seen as a synergy. There is nothing embarrassing in the significant role of the informational environment and learning by observation in foreign language learning, the process in which the learner acquires the communicative code of another speech community in the classroom, which simulates this environment. Since foreign language learning requires input, interaction, and feedback, the teacher must provide meaningful communicative material for observational learning and organize relevant communicative interaction for the learner to participate in, whereas the cognitive processes of reasoning, including reasoning about language forms, should refer to verbal communication or its components. Feedback is essential in any intelligent learning organism in that it enhances its adaptive target-orientedness. Opportunities to be creative eliminate anxiety and boredom, and become highly motivating (Holyoak and Morrison, eds. 2005). The conception of teaching resulting from these considerations is discourse didactics with foreign language learners the main agents. VIII. What is the elementary unit of language use in verbal communication? The elementary form of verbal communication is an episode, an event, an act of verbal communication embedded in its situational context, a form of interaction in which human intentions are encoded into language forms to accomplish some human purpose and decoded by someone else into meaning, interpreted for 286

sense, significance or relevance in the situation. The behavioural, i.e. observable aspect of this event is merely a tip of the iceberg of all the mental processes which go on in the minds of the participants. Foreign language learners are competent communicators by virtue of being humans; they are also quite knowledgeable regarding meaningful contents of their minds. Therefore, the crucial aspect of foreign language learning and teaching is acquiring the language code, which cannot be done efficiently unless it is observed, “broken into” and operated upon with the teacher’s assistance in the context of communicative interaction, i.e. encoding and decoding messages in speech and writing (Barsalou 2009, Carroll, D. W., 1986, Styles 2006). Learning descriptive information from grammar books in the form of rules and principles is qualitatively different from using language forms to encode and decode meanings in situational contexts. The most important consequences for foreign language learning and teaching are as follows: a) the inevitable unit of language learning and teaching is the task, a goal-oriented human activity; b) the focus of foreign language learning and teaching is on the language code to be reconstructed and proceduralized as the ability to use the forms of the target language to encode and decode meanings according to the norms of the language community. These acts involve semanticising forms (matching forms with meanings) and lexicalizing (matching meanings with forms) for the purpose of constructing meaningful discourse. As for a), communicative events, episodes, and tasks are the elementary units of experience to be processed by our episodic memory, coded chronologically and further processed, categorized, organized and recorded in semantic memory. As for b), the process of breaking the code cannot take place effectively without the teacher’s assistance because of the arbitrary nature of language forms and their complex functions. Although cases of language learning with a minimum of the teacher’s assistance are not unheard of, the most efficient guidance to meaning-form mappings in the educational system comes from a competent target language teacher. IX. What is the nature of changes taking place in foreign language learning? Among the most significant ones are the changes which involve increasing amount and quality of information mapped into the learner’s memory as relevant mental representations; this leads to an inevitable restructuring of knowledge along with the necessary representational changes, e.g. explicitation and proceduralization of representations, to allow controlled (regulated) and automatized processes in language use in production and comprehension as knowledge, skill, and discourse in specialized domains. In this sense, foreign language learning in the educational setting cannot and never will be entirely within the teacher’s control, but rich input, interaction opportunities and feedback can be provided,

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so that the desirable changes can be stimulated. Language learning is conceptualized as an open, dynamic, complex, guided system in which changes are stimulated by internal and external factors and which takes place with individual speed and fidelity, i.e. depending on the learners’ acuity of representations of external informational structures and the speed of internal information processing. X. To what extent can all these changes be brought about by the teacher? The provision of meaningful/communicative material as input for observational learning and input addressed to the learner is certainly the basic obligation of the teacher. The next obligation is to provide relevant practice opportunities, commensurate with language use, i.e. language-specific tasks which are encountered in communication outside the classroom. These tasks require the learner’s activation of his or her communicative, rather than descriptive linguistic, mental set, including the addressee’s oriented flow of information, the goal of communication, perspective taking, the image of the addressee, extensive knowledge activation, constructive and strategic processes of comprehension and production aimed at alignment and monitoring. The third element, feedback, both negative and positive, is necessary for the learner to improve the precision of his/her existing mental representations needed in comprehension and production. Some of the changes, especially the endogenous ones, require time, ample information input and its recycling in numerous practice opportunities. For this reason, the learner’s progress cannot be caused by the teacher. However, the amount as well as the quality of input, interaction and feedback play a considerable role in the foreign language learning process. The classroom process can provide some preparation for the outside, fairly unpredictable needs of verbal communication; however, this preparation is variably exploited by foreign language learners because of their individual potential for foreign language learning at their age. This does not mean that nothing can be learned in the educational context.

6.3. On the notion of foreign language teaching in the educational system There are far-reaching consequences of the fact that foreign language learning is considered an organic process, located in, and operated by, a living human being: the language learner is represented mainly (although not exclusively, since there is interaction with volition and emotions) from the point of view of the functioning of his or her cognitive system, the system operates on human cognitive resources, such as (limited) cognitive energy and attentional/working memory limitations, it is driven by human motives, first of all to make sense of the world and oneself, 288

and to satisfy human needs. The human being acts flexibly/intelligently within the confines of the communication structure, making use of his or her cognitive resources and cognitive equipment, as an agent rather than an object or victim of the environment, activating either the sender’s or the addressee’s processes, or both. The environment and the learner are strongly interconnected. For this reason, all the principles and criteria of language teaching must be adjusted to the addressee, i.e. the language learner, his or her stage in life-span development, language proficiency as well as interests and needs. At the same time, considering the fact that verbal communication is a universal human phenomenon and the code of verbal communication is shared within the community, individualizing foreign language instruction does not have to take such extreme forms which would create barriers to group processes. Instead, variety of activities, tasks and materials should be treated as a solution to the problem of individual differences. In this conception, we must discard the old-fashioned view of language teaching as providing knowledge or explaining something, or grading the material in terms of grammatical criteria, as in the structural syllabus. The whole idea of the difficulty and complexity of the material and its grading is clearly relational, i.e. based on the proportion of what the learner already knows and what the task demands. Because of the empirical constraints selected above, which highlight human goal-orientation and limited attentional resources, task, an instance of human goal-oriented behaviour (Corsini, red. 1987) is the most natural unit of the language learner’s experience as well as the learning/teaching experience. Tasks are episodic, i.e. situationally-embedded in space and time; as a unit of all human activities, including verbal communication; they result from the attentional limitations of the subject and the ability to build a plan in order to reach the goal. We perform communicative tasks strategically in view of our limited resources, which necessitate dynamic decision-making and choices from among alternatives; likewise, our language use is strategic and flexible, more like composing, a form of constructive behaviour consisting of selection as well as integration based on the available resources. Needless to say, this notion is broad and not to be confused with the notion of task underlying Task-Based Language Teaching (see Dakowska 2014). The most important properties of task in my conception come from the structure and scope of verbal communication. These tasks are a) language-specific, i.e. concerned with language use in social situations, rather than any activities, e.g. tying your shoe-laces or painting a fence with no language use involved, and b) their level of difficulty is sensitive not only to the task structure, but to the learner’s current knowledge and other available resources. Therefore, tasks can be graded in a manner which is relevant to the foreign language learner.

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The learner is not visualized as a receptacle to be filled with knowledge, but an active agent of his or her own learning. The empirical manifestation of language takes the form of language use in verbal communication with all the consequences for foreign language teaching resulting from this fact. The most important of these consequences refer to different forms of learning and kinds of knowledge, including processing input from observational learning, participating in communicative interaction, i.e. comprehension and production in its sociocultural context, which typically requires the mastery of phonemic and graphemic representations for the auditory and visual modalities, as well as processing feedback to modify and gradually adjust our mental representations to the target language norms. The educational process must recreate the communicative environment conducive to these forms of learning, both real, imaginary and simulated. Needless to say, these forms of learning do not mean receptive learning of content or practicing rules, or rote learning of ready formulae. Providing the learner with opportunities to process input, to participate in communicative interaction via comprehension and production and to receive feedback (see also Gass 1997 for SLA) are the most important responsibilities of the teacher at the macro-level when it comes to the learner’s reconstruction of the target language code. But there are also numerous options of teaching operations at the micro-level. Once the material has task structure and fulfils the communicative criteria, i.e. it features someone talking to someone else, somewhere, about something, for a purpose, especially once it fulfils the criterion of being meaningful, it is possible to recognize various more specific intervention strategies in the language learning process, leading to its cultivation, melioration, facilitation and enhancement. These strategies include imitation, repetition, slowing down and/or speeding up the processing of the task, priming for the task, explicating the information in it, generalizing, guiding learners through the task (scaffolding), taking the task apart and putting it back together, part-whole task strategy, rehearsing the material, for example vocabulary, repeating and otherwise practicing and consolidating various aspects of language use, reconstructing, interpreting and elaborating the meaning of utterances, augmenting the material of learning to make it more salient, increasing redundancy in the material, compressing the material to make it easier to remember it whole; highlighting its structural/formal properties to make it more coherent, contrasting various types of information for easier discrimination, introducing modality- specific discrimination activities and/ or cross-modal tasks to increase their precision of representation, elaborating the material semantically or syntactically to enhance memory processes, focusing the learner’s attention on one aspect of the material to be learned at a time 290

to overcome working memory limitations, using various catalytic and orienting devices, such as imagery and semantic maps for the lexical material as well as syntactic and pragmatic principles to enhance storage, explaining schemata and rules to provide for task transfer, highlighting communicative conventions and adjustments to compensate for knowledge deficits, providing the learner with the elements missing in his or her knowledge for the task, especially relevant cultural and factual information, prompting memory-, processing-, and problem-solving strategies, e.g., categorizing, organizing, associating, providing material for form-focused/accuracy and vocabulary activities, semanticizing, code-focused activities highlighting the specificity of the graphemic and the phonemic codes as well as trans coding to form metamodal representations of forms and, last but not least, providing feedback on demand, to name the most important ones. The points of orientation for grouping/categorizing these procedures are derived from our cognitive system, its component subsystems and processes, the nature and structure of verbal communication with its code and its development along the life span, and the processes involved in comprehension in speech and writing. The goal of foreign language teaching is to create a relevant stimulating environment to activate the learner’s natural drive for communicating meaning to other people as well as various reasoning processes available at a given developmental stage, helpful in reconstructing the language code, or rather specific sub-codes for comprehension and production in speech and writing, rather than to create altered states of consciousness or offer hocus-pocus or slogan-based methods of teaching.

6.3.1. Systematizing options for foreign language teaching The framework developed so far defines the subject matter of foreign language didactics as verbal communication, i.e. comprehension and production in speech and writing, in which the learner is the agent involved as the sender and the addressee. In their elementary form, the processes activated in verbal communication are Human Information Processing, taking place in our cognitive system, which consists of perception, attention, memory, planning, monitoring, feedback, anticipation and retrospection. By participating in verbal communication in the target language, the learner is able to reconstruct the code of the target language, used for encoding meanings into words and decoding words into meanings. This conception emphasizes the role of ample communicative input in the target language, available to the learner’s perception, processed for meaning and stored in permanent memory. The learner activates his or her sender’s or addressee’s equipment to participate in verbal communication making use of

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all of his or her mental and environmental clues (distributed mental representations), as well as skill of language use (behavioural integration of elements) and the ability to deal with linear discourse (which is held together by coherence and cohesion devices). Verbal communication is episodic, i.e. it consists of events or situations, whereas an instance of language use and learning is a task, an episode with a purpose. The form of learning, postulated in this conception, does not undermine the role of reasoning or declarative knowledge, but first and foremost, it sees language use and learning as operational and strategic. Although language use requires extensive mental representations, the route to language learning is by means of doing things with words, or more specifically, by doing things with words in the context of communication, a natural form of human action. Below is a table which systematizes the components of the subject matter in foreign language learning and teaching, as well as their functions in language use and learning and their relevance for developing foreign language teaching strategies. Table 20: Systematizing options for foreign language teaching from the point of view of the components and processes in language use ELEMENTS of the subject matter The human subject and agent

Properties and functions with implications for foreign language learning and teaching our view of the human being provides a general plausible structure of the nature and functioning of human cognitive system including consciousness, cognitive resources; agency of the human being; self- regulation, instinct for interaction in the sociocultural networks; human drives and motives; constructive contribution of the language learner to language use and learning; intentionality, goal- and meaning-orientation; human cognition as recognition, hence the role of our mental representations; the properties of the human being are the properties of the language learner;

The mechanism language learning, including foreign language learning, is an of HIP instance of HIP; therefore, its nature and structure, i.e. the components, processes and sensitivity to a spectrum of stimuli, are regarded as the learner’s genetic equipment; in this view, language learning starts with mapping the communicative experience in the learner’s mind; extensive mental representations must be developed for language use in addition to psychomotor skills and abilities, whereas the process of language use, both comprehension and production, is massively constructive; subcomponents of HIP system are all involved in language use and learning;

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Information – information is the central elementary term integrating a) the the substance of sensitive and capable processing agent with a neuronal brain, b) the processing environmental and mental material of processing interpreted in the light of what the subject knows, and c) the constructive outcome of processing, either as mental representation, thought, discourse and action; information is the essence of the synergy between the language learning subject and the natural and social environment; classroom learning must reinstate this synergetic bond by providing a critical mass of communicative input for learning;

Reasoning – enhances productivity of language use

reasoning processes available to language learners depend on their developmental stage; they may focus on the language code (forms, functions, form/meaning mappings) as well as verbal communication as human activity, including its content, types of discourse, cultural conventions and knowledge of other people; they facilitate knowledge transfer to other tasks; however, generalized information, e.g. in the form of rules about language forms, is not a substitute for procedural representations, developed through practice, required in skilled language use;

Perception as entry of information to the learner’s cognitive system

perception is the interface between the learner’s information processing system and the environmental information; availability of language information to perception preconditions any form of language learning, native, second or foreign; perception in language learning is fed by rich, meaningful, situationally-embedded input in which form/meaning mappings are shown in different arrangements and contexts; perception is not passive, but displays propensity for structuring – in perception the learner contributes his or her ability to discriminate and elaborate the available input, process it for meaning, imitate, repeat, model, and commit to memory; useful strategies include repetition, imitation, modelling, discrimination, focus on elements, focus on implicit information; meaningless input is irrelevant for memory processes and permanent storage;

Attention – the narrowing of our cognitive system

depending on the developmental stage, voluntary/involuntary attention; involuntary attention is attracted by the salience of the stimulus; voluntary attention with a focus and periphery can be guided to various aspects of the task and focused upon, especially the discourse being processed; this is reflected in instructions for the task; focus on specific aspects of language use enhances the precision of information being mapped and the accuracy of its use; strategies for dealing with attentional limitations include activating background knowledge for the task, guidance from task instructions, directing the learner’s attention to different aspects of the input and output material, the role of repetition and rehearsal strategies in learning, salience (auditory, visual) of the material to be learned in attracting the involuntary attention, focus on the schemata which consolidate information and help to overcome attentional limitation;

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Working memory – the mental work-space

working memory is the mental space for integrating various polymodal clues and assigning them meaning; it is the ‘desk top’ for tasks; strategies for overcoming working memory limitations include: part/whole task strategy, planning, activation of knowledge from permanent memory, mnemonics, polymodal strategy (e.g. imagery), anticipation strategies, priming and increased redundancy to overcome working memory limitations;

Memory – storage of representations, also used in anticipation and retrospection

multiple storing and filing of information structures needed in language use: modality-specific (echoic and iconic) representations, results of chronological (schemata) and feature coding (concepts), syntagmatic and paradigmatic representations; declarative and procedural representations, or records, hierarchically-organized structures, implicit and explicit information, effective storage is enhanced by meaning-oriented strategies, networking, structuring and restructuring, decomposing, organizing and memorizing, explicit plans and schemata, concept structures (mental lexicon), domain and topical organization; coherence-oriented strategies; anticipation strategies are aimed at uncertainty reduction while retrospection enhances orientation and certainty;

Planning – essential in serial order of behaviour

the need of using and/or developing serial orders of representations essential in dealing with time and space, and indispensable in language use especially in sustained discourse; instantiated in syntagmatic constructions, schemata, scenrios and coordination devices in social interaction; modelling ready plans, explicit planning, pre-teaching plans and time given to plan are useful strategies in foreign language teaching, especially production;

Monitoring – overseeing goal-oriented behaviour

important in any form of goal-oriented behaviour, including language use; monitoring runs on left-over attentional resources, rarely available in the case of foreign language learners; sufficiently important to be enhanced by special strategies, especially in discourse comprehension (negotiation of meaning, interim comprehension checks, question and answer, etc.);

Feedback – using knowledge of the results

essential in modifying our knowledge representations and precision of our communicative strategies; receiving, comprehending and incorporating feedback is indispensable in effective learning, especially reconstructing the language code, i.e. mapping meaning into words and words into meanings precisely; comprehension activities require feedback on meaning whereas production activities require feedback on form; feedback is useful when it comes from a more knowledgeable language user;

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Verbal communication as a universal human activity embedded in various relationships

default settings for verbal communication in the classroom are as follows: verbal communication is about trading meanings; these meanings are generated in our brains; language use serves the purpose of encoding and decoding meanings; verbal communication is quite dynamic and rather unpredictable because based on mutual influence of at least two agents who act constructively; verbal communication has content and relationship components; people are involved in it with their entire bodies and minds so that various information clues are relevant, not just language forms; verbal exchange is an outcome of a vast array of mental processes performed in the context of extensive mental representations activated for this purpose; the role of such mental categories as face, status, power; mutual perceptions, schemata, degree of intimacy, emotions, adjustments, expectations, motives and goals as well as dynamically constructed and updated common ground in the process of alignment are communicative as well as didactic categories; classroom practice of verbal communication must be commensurate in its complexity with the structure of verbal communication, especially the mental set activated by the learners during practice must have the same structure, direction and goal as verbal communication;

The role of the sender:

activation of the sender’s equipment for encoding meanings into words, which involves putting oneself in someone’s shoes and adjusting the message accordingly; constructing the communicative intention as resource demanding; classroom practice must include carving out the communicative intention with controlled processes and encoding the message form with marginal resources of automatic processing, perspective taking and encasting the image of the addressee; the decisive influence of the parameters of the situation, ellipsis and various mental representations dynamically activated for the purpose of communication; processing feedback clues;

The role of the addressee:

activating the decoding equipment for decoding words into meanings; activities involved in the process of decoding the communicative intention include activating various knowledge sources, parsing, computing meaning with all the available clues, inferencing, decoding figurative meaning; controlled processes invested in the interpretation of meaning while processing form at the periphery of attentional resources; monitoring the process of comprehension and processing feedback clues; classroom practice must include focus on these aspects, as well as pre-teaching of relevant information, anticipation, inferencing, and monitoring strategies;

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Situations – the natural, domain- and culture- specific varieties

in addition to service encounters, casual conversations and literature (fiction), the scope of foreign language learning includes professional and academic specialization of present-day communication; a variety of genres, learned as numerous models of discourse, technical knowledge, terminology and domain- specific scenarios and conventions for the target language are included as learning material; contrastive approach is also useful for intercultural purposes;

Life-span the need to adjust language, learning and teaching to the learner’s perspective of stage of cognitive, social and emotional development and communication background knowledge, i.e. to the learner’s personal culture; tapping relevant aspects of whole-person involvement (e.g. arts and crafts, motor activities, body language, music, literature, imagination,), age-specific social roles and level of cognitive complexity, age- specific cultural input (e.g. types of authentic texts and interaction, social referencing, negotiation of meaning, role-play, imitation of role models, scaffolding, joint attention, adjustments, transfer of task responsibility, etc.), interaction (types of activities) and feedback (explicit versus implicit, linguistic versus metalinguistic); Knowledge – activated for recognition and needed in constructive processes of language use

strategies for enhancing declarative knowledge representations are based on input, observation and reasoning; procedural records are developed by comprehension and production, in the same way as syntagmatic and paradigmatic representations, which are developed incidentally, as we use language in communication; to be remembered, information must be meaningful; hence, the need of extensive meaningful input and communicative interaction opportunities; facilitation of foreign language learning involves relevant knowledge activation before the task and/or pre-teaching relevant information to reduce the learner’s uncertainty/anxiety;

Skill – essential in synchronizing operations of language use

skill development results from practice which builds procedural records in memory required on subsequent occasions; practice for language use as skill in communication is not useful when inflexible, i.e. drill-like; varieties of forms and communicative complexity of meaning construction are more conducive to skill development; first and foremost, skill development calls for deliberate, spaced practice, part-whole task strategy and incorporating accuracy into skill practice;

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Discourse - linearization of meaning in language use

to develop discourse competence, the learner needs models of discourse with special focus on discourse plans, syntagmatic constructions, linking words as well as coherence and cohesion markers; resulting from the perspective assumed by the sender is focus on the functional sentence perspective to denote ‘given/new’ contract; the use of orienting discourse devices and conventions for the reader; models of various discourse genres with special focus on their style, terminology, expressions and other generic features; especially spoken discourse (but not only) requires practice in dealing with distant (i.e. supra-sentential) morpho-syntactic markers of coherence and cohesion which have to be computed within working memory constraints;

The role of meaning and content in language use

the role of content as the connecting tissue in verbal communication; this role implies focus on such communicative categories as situations, domains and subdomains, themes, topics, events, discourse genres, scenarios, domain vocabulary and terminology; focus on content requires such elements as learning vast, well-structured factual knowledge of the subject; organizing and memorizing factual/cultural information of the subject, extracting knowledge from target language texts, cooperative learning in the context of language tasks, the use of texts for study purposes, etc.

Task as a unit task is a unit of human activity derived from verbal communication; of language use foreign language teaching requires focus on language-specific and learning rather than any tasks; the first consequence of this role of the task is relevant task selection, especially focus on authentic tasks to be modelled in the classroom, the second consequence is criteria for task adjustment strategies, based on the relationship between the level of the learner’s proficiency, task complexity and conditions of the task; relevant to task difficulty is the learner’s familiarity with the type of discourse and interaction elicited by the task; input for the task (pre-teaching) and guidance through the task can considerably reduce learning problems; Reading and listening

activating previous knowledge of the learner; uncertainty reduction by recognizing the situation/context; evoking the state of anticipation for the information to come; retrieving all kinds of knowledge sources and using them strategically; inferencing on their basis; testing hypotheses regarding meaning against the text; monitoring the process of comprehension; global and local comprehension strategies; memory strategies for the retention of content; memory strategies for the retention of form; text compression and elaboration (refers to vocabulary); reading the same text several times, intensive reading, negotiation of meaning with a more knowledgeable user;

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Speaking and writing

accumulating knowledge about the topic and discourse schemata to provide options for choices in the task; activating knowledge about the speakers, previous communication and discourse schemata; constructing the communicative intention – selection and integration in the form of discourse plan; modelling; rehearsing/ drafting/jotting down ideas as intermediate stages; editing; incorporating feedback information;

Focus on the code

learning the language code is possible only from others; the foreign language learner is a veritable copying machine; teaching strategies must focus on making the forms in one sub-code precise and explicit as well as on forming all-purpose meta- modal representations, i.e. abstract representations suitable for any modality; explicitation of forms is especially helpful in their accurate use in production; transcoding is a learning strategy for the explicitation of modality-specific sub-codes; focus on the code is not the same as learning descriptive, user-external grammar; it includes acquiring procedural knowledge of paradigmatic options for accurate selections of forms in their meaning-coding function, the skill of their accurate automatic integration in comprehension and production and their accurate syntagmatic insertion in sustained discourse; forms from the sender’s perspective are learned and used differently than when they are learned and used from the addressee’s perspective; even from the sender’s perspective alone, production puts different demands on the use of forms in speech than in writing; the same is true about the perspective of the addressee; learning the code of the foreign language involves focus on accuracy, precision involving fine discriminations and certainty as well as self-regulation in its use, consolidation of choices and awareness of its combinatorial potential in use.

6.4. Concluding remarks To return to the main problem of representing language learning for the purpose of foreign language didactics, the initial considerations regarding the status of the field as an academic discipline with empirical and autonomous priorities have led us to an outline of the discipline’s subject matter as a human relationship realized as verbal communication between subjects, who are agents in this constructive, language-specific endeavour. Communicative interaction materializes as two basic processes: comprehension and production either in speech or in writing, supported by a host of more elementary processes, operations and strategies, such as, for example, parsing, segmentation, inferencing, semantization, interpretation and evaluation on the part of the comprehender, and constructing the communicative intention, perspective taking, planning, ellipsis, 298

lexicalization and execution on the part of the producer of messages. The ‘organ’ for verbal communication is our cognitive system for information processing with its specialized subcomponents, such as perception, attention, memory, planning, monitoring, anticipation and retrospection, which is used for the processes of verbal communication as well as reasoning. What makes verbal communication special in the context of human cognitive functioning is the nature and function of language as the code of communication, i.e. a highly organized system of equivalences in different formats for matching meanings to forms and forms to meanings. In this context, language may be regarded as the first human digital invention. It is significant from the point of view of foreign language learning that language, a fairly abstract concept, manifests itself in three states of matter: mental representation, i.e. knowledge, behavioural skill and discourse as external, linear product. Each state requires its own strategies to be developed and cultivated. Verbal communication is a universal phenomenon with sociocultural diversity, which reflects situational and domain-specific varieties of interactions in human networks as well as culturally-shared scripts, scenarios and conventions for coordinating joint actions. Processes of matching meanings to forms and forms to meanings happen instinctively in human beings; they can also happen instinctively in foreign language learners once knowledge and skill deficits are eliminated as a result of learning. On the strength of this conception, certain didactic categories must be posited: content and meaning as the tissue in language learning, situation as the defining category for language use, discourse genre as the material of learning, including plans and lexis, syntagmatic and paradigmatic options in mental representations, practice and the development of procedural records, monitoring comprehension and production, feedback incorporation and attention to form. Primary conditions for foreign language learning involve communicative input, interaction (comprehension and production in speech and writing) and feedback, whereas secondary conditions involve such cultivation strategies as imitation, modelling, guided attention, part-whole task strategy, rehearsal, repetition, scaffolding, participation in authentic tasks, e.g. games and social situations, pre-teaching and uncertainty reduction, priming for the tasks, knowledge activation, skill practice, categorizing and organizing. Metalinguistic information in the form of grammar rules can also be treated as one of the forms of facilitating the learning process, if its function is limited to being a catalyst of meaningful language practice. Memory plays a very significant role in language learning because verbal communication is seen as a complex system of constructive mental operation taking place in the context of extensive knowledge representations, activated for the purpose

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of communicative encounters. Therefore, language users, including language learners, must activate these cognitive information resources to provide them with options for selections and integrations in the spatiotemporal constraints of communicative encounters. Observable language use is only the tip of the iceberg of mental operations which involve strategic knowledge activation, constructing the communicative intention, computing the meaning of the incoming message, perspective taking, alignment, coordination with the interlocutor, monitoring and feedback incorporation, updating the flow of interaction, the image/face of the addressee and one’s own image/face, etc. Under these circumstances, accuracy develops gradually/incrementally and it takes time to develop. Feedback on error may not be instantly effective, but it is indispensable in stimulating the learner’s modification of knowledge representations to approximate the target language norms. To return to the main goal of this monograph, I have presented my path in search of the processes of foreign language use from the perspective of the needs in foreign language teaching in the following stages: 1. First I outlined the complexity of the task of understanding language learning from the perspective foreign language teaching in a brief retrospective sketch of previous developments with view to the gradual process of maturation of the field of foreign language teaching itself. 2. The next step was to choose the route of science, understood and developed as a ‘normal’ science reflecting human cognitive operations, to provide an orientation framework so as to reduce the whole complexity to a more tangible problem space. 3. Considering the goals of the discipline of foreign language learning and teaching, called Foreign Language Didactics, to provide applicative knowledge and transfer to solving practical problems in the educational system, the framework chosen prioritized the autonomous and empirical features of the discipline, which translated into significant constraints on defining its subject matter. 4. As a result of these preliminaries, the discipline’s subject-matter targeted the phenomenon language use by people interacting in verbal communication, i.e. engaged in comprehension and production in speech and writing, an instance of Human information Processing. 5. Because the learner is the central agent of the processes, operations and strategies of language use, a considerable segment of the monograph was devoted to an outline of the main components of human cognitive system for information processing, its components, processes and information structures as the general landscape in which verbal communication takes place. 300

6. The subsequent part focused on verbal communication as a universal human phenomenon, a form of interaction in which meaning performs a causal function, its nature, structure, course and generic varieties in order to define the roles of the senders and addressees in coding and decoding messages. 7. In the next chapter, which brings the whole presentation to its conclusion, I link the outline of language use in verbal communication with its specific instantiations in comprehension and production in speech and writing, also referred to as the four foreign language skills. Implications or, rather, applications for foreign language teaching are specified throughout the chapter. 8. Conclusions contain a systematization of the conception developed in this monograph with special focus of the central questions in foreign language teaching and feasible options in developing strategies which result from this presentation.

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Explanation of terms

ABSTRACTION, IDEALIZATION, MODELLING, INDUCTION vs DEDUCTION, BOTTOM-UP and TOP-DOWN PROCESSES. Abstraction, idealization, modelling, induction and bottom-up processes share the important similarity that the direction of our mental operations is from the basic, primary data to their more generalized form which results from eliminating some elements of the initial pool of information. Abstraction, idealization and modelling work by eliminating some features which we deem irrelevant, enabling us more easily to focus on the relevant ones. Abstraction is neutral with reference to epistemology, whereas idealization (Nowak 1977) and modelling (Johnson-Laird 1983, 2005) can be treated as technical terms in scientific research. Idealization is a bottomup process that produces a representation of the subject matter of the given field in contrast to concretization, whereby a powerful, abstract concept is brought down to a more specific level by having various additional properties (re)inserted, or otherwise taken apart into more specific categories. Modelling is also an essentially bottom-up process but its specific purpose is to factor out the irrelevant elements of the real empirical focus of investigation, e.g. a phenomenon or a process, in order to capture its important components in their relationships in order to understand it better. In this sense, both idealization and modelling can be treated as cognitive tools in scientific research. In the field of language learning and use, induction and deduction take place between the particular and the general with reference to primary data and rules which govern the forms, while bottom-up and top-down processes refer to the inevitable interaction between the structure of the informational stimuli in the environment and our mental processes activated to come to terms with them ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE versus SCIENCE. In discussing the field of foreign language teaching, it seems more justified to use the term ‘academic discipline’ than the terms ‘science’ because the term ‘science’ implies at least three aspects which can make matters too involved for our purposes: a) mature successful science b) natural ‘exact’ science

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c) theoretical and empirical research performed according to a socially accepted program (with certain values and attitudes), which enables scholars to communicate and coordinate their efforts of making sense of the world, as opposed to non-science, pre-science or common sense. I would like to use the third meaning of science, which in our case is still programmatic. The field of foreign language learning and teaching is neither a mature academic discipline nor is it, or can it be, exact simply because it deals with interacting human subjects and their cognitive/social activities which result from human intentionality. The criteria elaborated for sciences about inanimate objects can never be matched by this discipline, nor are they particularly relevant to most of its problems. This, however, does not mean that the whole program for academic disciplines should be undermined. Just the opposite, it introduces a most desirable form of conventional coordination which reduces uncertainty to a tolerable degree. ANTHROPOCENTRIC MODELS. Not to be confused with homocentric models, which assume a privileged place of the human being in the world, anthropocentric models represent cognitive mechanisms and processes as located in the human architecture and accept the same constraints which apply to human cognitive functioning. De Beaugrande (1987) states that it is a purely linguistic idea that language is an isolated faculty. A psycholinguistic view, which I entirely endorse, is that language is a specialization of more general process types. Theories of language use “should be started within the constraints which are known to apply to human processes in general. A theory which deliberately excludes limitations upon resources and memory merits no further consideration because it is humanly unreasonable” (1987: 165). This does not undermine the fact that language is structured, but merely emphasizes that such models must aspire to procedural adequacy, which is to say, they design representations of operations people might plausibly be performing while using language. APPLICATIONS versus TRANSPOSITIONS. When a body of information is taken over from one discipline to another, for example, because of the latter’s hunger for information and conceptualizations, vide the field of foreign language learning and teaching, this is not an instance of applying that knowledge, but of information transfer or borrowing. Motivated applications of a theory can legitimately be performed within the discipline in which they have been elaborated, with reference to the investigated research subject matter. Grucza (1983) makes a distinction between legitimate applications in the above sense and the less systematic borrowing of bodies of information, which I call transfer. 304

BADDELEY’S MODEL OF WORKING MEMORY. In this model, the author posits four components: the central executive is an attention-like limited capacity resource which can process input from any sense modality; the phonological loop is a temporary storage system which holds verbal information in the phonological form; the visuospatial sketchpad holding spatial and visual information the episodic buffer which coordinates information from several modalities (Eysenck 2006, Nęcka et al. 2006, Schraw 2009). Although accepted and often quoted, this particular model of working memory introduces distinctions and categories which are not sufficiently specific for the purposes of representing information processing in verbal communication from the point of view of foreign language learning, in which we not only need the auditory channel for the processing of phonemic input, but also the visual channel for graphemic input – both of which are specifically lingual and context-embedded. The extent of interaction and permeability between various information systems is so characteristic of verbal communication in general and comprehension and production in particular that Baddeley’s conception is not very helpful. CATALYST is an element whose presence is necessary to facilitate or speed up a reaction. In my conception, such a catalytic function is attributed to metalinguistic, or to be more accurate, metalingual information in foreign language teaching, i.e. grammatical rules taught explicitly to foreign language learners. These grammatical rules are represented as declarative knowledge in the learners’ mind so they cannot be activated in skilled language use in comprehension and production. However, they perform a very useful supporting role as a meaningful organizing device, which orients the learner in developing the necessary procedural representations through practice. CAUSE is understood as the occurrence which always precedes its effect and never occurs without it. CODE is an accepted convertible system of representations; coding is converting one system of representation into another (Cherry 1957). CODING – according to Concise Encyclopaedia of Psychology (1987: 202) – “is a general term referring to stimuli and responses. In the study of sensation

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one speaks of the accessory sensory structures which gather the environmental physical energies and thereby fashion a better proximal stimulus for the sensory receptors to work on. After the physical energies are collected, the next step is the transduction of the physical stimulus energy into a neural impulse, after which coding occurs at further neural centres.” Coding is understood as converting one format of representation into another and refers to iconic and echoic representations, associated meaning responses, as well as translation and elaboration of responses, ideas, percepts, images, features, concepts, propositions and schemata. Coding need not only be within the scope of our awareness, or reportable, or available for introspection for identifying structural attributes of the coding responses. In verbal communication, language is used as a coding device for transforming meaning into words and words into meanings. COGNITION is the process which allows the organism to know and be aware. It embraces the processing of environmental information as well as the information represented internally (Rebok 1987), in other words the ability of human (and other) species, with its underlying mental processes and structures, to receive and process environmental information in order to effectively control our thought and action as well as to adjust to the social and natural environment (Churchland 1989). Neisser (1976) defines cognition as the acquisition, organization and use of knowledge. This is something that organisms, particularly people do. Cognitive theories are psychological theories; a non-trivial psychological theory has something to say about what people do in real, culturally significant situations. Cognition comprises all mental activities or states related to knowing and the mind’s functioning, and includes perception, attention, memory, imagery, language, learning, thought processes, reasoning, problem-solving, decision-making, intelligence, developmental processes, and creativity. The account of how people interact with the world constitutes its ecological validity. According to Manis (1971: 7), the word ‘cognitiveʼ refers to ‘man‘s planful, intellective processes in the guidance of his behaviour’ which include learning and memory, concepts, language and problem solving, individual strategies, hypotheses, and intentions. COGNITION and its constructive nature. In contrast to mechanistic views which consider knowledge to be a copy of our experience, the cognitive perspective stresses that our representations of the world are active, highly individualized constructions, determined by our developmental stage, experience, internal representations and motivations, and social environment (Alexander and Winne, eds. 2009, Markus and Zajonc, 1985). Rebok (1987) and Churchland 306

(1989) point out that the human construction of knowledge always involves interactions between the processing subject and the targeted focus of enquiry, so it never allows a purely objective discovery of impersonal reality. The subjects are also guided in their development by the social context in which knowledge is created. At the same time, cognitive psychologists, e.g. Gopnik and Melzoff (1996: 72) stress the verisimilitude of our cognitive representations: ‘The crucial fact about cognitive development, and cognition in general, is that it is veridical, it gives us a better understanding of the world outside ourselves. Purely social- constructivist views discount this fundamental link between the mind and the world.’ Verisimilitude of our cognition can be negotiated via social interaction, especially verbal communication. ‘Thought is objective in the sense that it is made true by a world that is independent of what the thinker takes it to be. For this to be in place the thinker must appreciate that thoughts can be true or false depending on how things are in that world’ (Eilan 2005: 8). Nęcka et al. (2006) state that being individualized does not mean that they are not veridical because if they were, we would be unable to act in our environment. Cognitive psychologists are convinced that out mind is essential in human adaptation, so if it generated erroneous representations, it would be superfluous; it would have never emerged in evolution. Solso (1998: 21) expresses the following point of view: The most evident (principle in cognitive psychology) is that our representation of the world is not necessarily identical to the actual nature of the world. The representation of information is, of course, related to the stimulation received through our sensory apparatus, but is also modified. Modification of information seems to be related to our past experiences, which have resulted in a rich and complex network of knowledge. Thus, incoming information is abstracted (and to some degree distorted) and stored within the subject’s memory system. Such a notion does not deny that some sensory events are directly analogous to their internal representations, but it does suggest that the storage of sensory stimuli may be (and frequently is) subject to abstraction and modification as a function of a subject’s rich and complex web of previously structured knowledge.

Inevitably, we must distinguish between mental representations of something in the environment on the one hand, and illusions, hallucinations or pure imagination on the other hand. COGNITIVE. In view of the abundance of research which can be qualified as cognitive, it will be helpful to distinguish among the following aspects: a) cognitive as an adjective referring to cognition as a phenomenon, investigated at various levels of specificity/order of magnitude, ranging from the neuronal level of the individual brain unavailable to our awareness, via the intrapersonal level of mental representations available to us as phenomenal

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experience and thought, to the level of interpersonal communication, i.e. cognition and behaviour as a social phenomenon; b) cognitive as in cognitive science, the study of mind, understood as an alliance of disciplines dealing with various aspects of cognition, regarded as an interdisciplinary and terminologically compatible endeavour; c) cognitive as in cognitive perspectives or frameworks in cognitive sciences reflecting not only their subject-matter specificity, but also intellectual predilections of individual researchers, e.g. artificial versus human intelligence, modular versus non-modular conceptions of language. COGNITIVE CONCEPTIONS in Foreign Language Didactics. It is quite natural to formulate cognitive conceptions in the field of second/foreign language learning and teaching because human learning, including language learning, is cognitive by definition. However, the adjective ‘cognitive’ has been used with reference to animate human agents as well as inanimate machine objects. What compounds the matter further is that these accounts follow different assumptions about legitimate questions to ask and strategies to use in exploring them. As a result, not only do we have cognitive terms, cognitive models, cognitive conceptions, cognitive theories and cognitive accounts, but also cognitive perspectives, orientations or frameworks. Various (sub)disciplines describe themselves as cognitive, e.g. cognitive psychology, cognitive linguistics, cognitive grammar, cognitive discourse research, cognitive translation studies, not to mention the fact that the field of cognitive science used to be dominated by the computer metaphor of information processing, which simulated some of the human cognitive operations, but did not represent them veridically. COGNITIVE THEORIES and their parameters. According to de Beaugrande, theories of language use ‘should be started within the constraints which are known to apply to human processes in general. A theory which deliberately excludes limitations upon resources and memory merits no further consideration because it is humanly unreasonable’ (1987: 165). A theory of language use must model people, including such human processes as memory, attention and sequential and parallel processing. This does not undermine the assertion that language is structured, but merely prioritizes the criterion of procedural adequacy for the postulated models (de Beaugrande 1981). Models which aspire to procedural adequacy should design workable representations of operations people might plausibly be performing when they use language. There is a clear difference between procedural and logical adequacy: the latter is a criterion in which the only reference is conventional logic. 308

COMPLEX, ILL-DEFINED (also ILL-STRUCTURED) PROBLEMS. Complex problems are characterized by such a vast problem-space, i.e. a vast total set of moves possible in the problem representation, that neither the systematic nor random search for a solution path is useful. Furthermore, while well-defined problems pose solutions which are the same for all problem solvers, ill-defined problems involve specifying the problem itself. The solver is actively, if not creatively, involved at the stage of defining the problem or filling the gaps in his or her perception of it in some other way. There is therefore a possibility of reaching different solutions to the same question, depending on the individual contributions of problem solvers to its specification (Hayes 1978). Simon (1987) stresses that the criterion for such a problem solution is both more complex and less definite, whereas the boundaries of the relevant information are rather vague. COMPREHENSION AS BUILDING A MENTAL MODEL OF THE SITUATION. Jay (2003:273) explains: Text comprehension is a strategic and constructive process whereby the reader uses information in the text as cues to the structure of the events, images, and inferences drawn from the text. One of the major issues in discourse comprehension concerns the need for a situational representation, in addition to a representation of the text itself. During the process of discourse comprehension, readers actively construct a mental model of what they are processing (Johnson-Laird, 1983, van Dijk and Kintsch, 1983). The comprehension of the text depends not only on a mental representation of the text but also on a mental representation of the situation described by the text….The mental model becomes a rich global representation based on reasoning that goes beyond the mere parsing and comprehension of sentences. A mental model is under continuous construction and revision as incoming information and inferences about the text are processed.

COMPREHENSION versus UNDERSTANDING. While attempting to understand some ideas, we try to make sense of the situation or find the underlying propositional coherence in the content presented. When we comprehend discourse, however, we must first decode language by way of parsing and semanticizing it, i.e. structuring and assigning meaning to verbal forms, next by inferring the meaning of unfamiliar items, inferring information not explicitly stated by way of bridging inferences, recognize discourse coherence and cohesion markers to reconstruct the author’s intention. In other words we must decode language forms to identify propositions as well as to understand them, i.e. make sense of them by restoring their underlying connectivity. Non-primary language users experience difficulties in the area of decoding as well as understanding: while decoding, they may have problems resulting from not knowing some forms of the sub-code used in

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the discourse; at the same time, understanding may create general, non-language specific problems resulting from conceptual and propositional complexity. CRITICAL READING – Hedge (2000: 199) expresses the following opinion in this regard: Those who advocate the development of critical reading skills as part of reading curriculum argue that the ability to read critically depends on an awareness of how elements of language can be manipulated by writers, and that language learners need to build this awareness. Critical reading pedagogy requires close scrutiny of the language in order to see what the writer means by the text. There is a particular concern in the case of younger learners, that such ‘language awareness’ should be an important educational goal, and as legitimate to second language as to first language education.

CONSTRUCTION is a common, if not a trendy term in cognitive literature. I understand the term as referring to mental processes/operations consisting of selection and integration. As a result, the product of construction is innovative in that some elements from among the available options have been skipped/passed while some others -selected to be integrated into a coherent whole. CONSTRUCTIVISM, succinctly explained by Schraw (2009: 246), is: the belief that meaning is constructed actively by the learner, rather than simply assimilated in a passive manner. Positivists do not fully endorse constructivism because knowledge is assumed to be objective and stable. Postpositivists endorse a subjective constructivism based largely on individual experience. Most contemporary educators would support a constructivist view of learning in some way, shape, or form.

Schraw himself is of the opinion that knowledge is not completely subjective and unique to the individual. People within a culture share schemata and scripts that guide communication and understanding. CONTROL is an essential term in the systems theory. According to Levelt (1975), the idea of control is to bring the system to the desired goal state. Feedback comes in if the system is able to compare the actual output with the desired output. On the basis of the perceived difference, the system tries to modify the output to eliminate the difference (see also feedback control). As for human beings, control is linked to the regulation of our voluntary behaviour, or self-regulation. CRITICAL REALISM is an epistemic position attributed to Roy Bhaskar. He is critical of positivism and argues that ‘it is the nature of the object which 310

determines the form of its possible science’ (Bhaskar, 1998: 3). In his view, the reality exists independently of us and of our knowledge and/or perception of it. Failure to distinguish between the two is regarded as epistemic fallacy. In critical realism three levels are distinguished: empirical as observed by human beings, actual, existing in time and space, and real as transcendental and more permanent than our perception of it. DISCIPLINES relevant to the field of teaching have been called neighbouring, related, source, tributary, feeder and parent disciplines. Each of these adjectives metaphorically captures the nature of their relationship with foreign language learning and teaching. The most neutral term is ‘neighbouring’ disciplines because ‘neighbouring’ highlights territorial vicinity. Related disciplines are also close, but their affinities are in the subject matter. The remaining terms, i.e. source, tributary and feeder disciplines, sanction resource dependence of foreign language teaching on them. The reason for this dependence is our paucity of information: they provide, or even impose, their own conceptions and other systems of ideas on the less developed field. ‘Parent disciplines’ may be positive in this context, if you look at it this way: parents allow their children to grow, search for their own identity, leave the nest and establish partnerships with their parents. DISTINCTIVE PROPERTIES OF LANGUAGE. Humans have an inborn ability for interfacing finely differentiated vocalizations, elaborate representations (symbolizations) and categorical, hierarchically-organized concepts. The central categories in this system are the event, the action‑based scenario, the actors, the objects and the episode (Anderson, B. F., 1975, Rumelhart and Norman 1987). A proposition consists of such classes as argument, predicate, time, place, etc. and has referents in the mental representation as well as the real world. The assertion (predication) expressed by a proposition is intended to correspond to some pattern in the real world and may be judged as true or false. Children start discovering correspondences between the verbal and the non‑verbal world very early in life. The structure of the verbal world is represented in the form of classes of concepts: nouns representing things, prepositions representing relations in time and space, and verbs representing changes in time and space, etc. The above properties of language, identified with reference to its complexity and internal organization, set it apart from other information systems and outline the scope of verbal communication as a distinctive domain. DELIBERATE PRACTICE. According to Eysenck (2006), prolonged, deliberate practice is essential in the development of any expertise and involves four

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aspects: the appropriate level of task difficulty, informative feedback about the subject’s performance, adequate chances to repeat the task and the opportunity to correct his or her errors by incorporating feedback. DISTRIBUTED PRACTICE, the type of learning in which various sessions are spaced over time, produces a greater amount of longer lasting learning than massed practice, when learning takes place in one crammed session. Sternberg 1996: 260 explains: ..the spacing effect may occur because at each learning session, the context for encoding may vary, and the individuals may use alternative strategies and cues for encoding, thereby enriching and elaborating their schemas for the information.

FACT vs MODEL vs PERSPECTIVE. A distinction must be made between facts, integral parts of the empirical phenomena, considered to exist regardless of our cognitive perspective of these phenomena, their model representations, constructed by way of cognitive selections and integrations, i.e. the processes which actively disregard some elements and focus on others to perceive them in their various relationships, and our perspective of these facts or phenomena, which reflects our angle and purpose; they deliberately capture only some aspect of the phenomena. Although modelling and perspective-taking overlap a great deal, especially as we often try to capture a certain system representation for an explicit purpose, it is worth pointing out that a model enhances our understanding of the phenomenon it represents by highlighting its system and its functioning, whereas a perspective may -but does not have to -do this, especially when it is dedicated to a metaphor of some kind, e.g. of the human cognitive system as a computer; however, its significance may be in the highlighted aspect itself. Needless to say, both are inevitable components of our cognitive functioning since modelling reflects our search for meaning and sense, i.e. coherence in the phenomena, whereas perspective-taking results from our limited resources and our use of metaphors to come to terms with complexity. FEEDBACK CONTROL SYSTEMS can be contrasted with open-control systems in that they guide and correct their responses in their course on the basis of their effects. In contrast, open-control responses are targeted but cannot be modified after their release in light of feedback information. Feedback control systems can be seen as indispensable part of flexible, goal-oriented thought and/or overt behaviour, whereas open-control systems as part of inflexible thought and/or overt behaviour (Anderson, B. F., 1975, Cohen 1977). The ability to perceive, process and incorporate feedback is essential in intelligent learning systems. 312

IMITATION is innate and it is a particularly significant form of behaviour in language use and learning. Gopnik and Melzoff (1996: 129, 130) point out that: … it implies recognition of the similarities between the self and the other, the imitator and the imitated. The imitation of facial gestures, in particular, requires a mapping from visually perceived physical movements to internally felt kinesthetic sensations, the most fundamental of action representations. To genuinely imitate another person sticking out his tongue, for instance, I have to recognize the equivalence between the visual spectacle of his face, an oval with a protruding moving cylinder in its lower portion, and a set of feelings that make up my own kinaesthetic image of my invisible tongue…. The infants productively produce particular types of actions in response to particular types of actions they see in others. ….. Infant imitation also implies some ability to map very simple motor plans onto perceived actions. When the infant imitates a facial expression, she not only recognizes the link between the state of her own face and that of the person she is imitating; she also translates her perception of the face of the other into an intentional action, a kind of simple plan. She acts to bring her face into accord with the face of the other person.’

INDIVIDUAL TREATMENT OF UNCERTAINTY. According to Anderson (1975), we have a preference for moderate uncertainty which has the effect of stimulating growth at the edges of knowledge. We get involved in situations which are slightly discrepant, but there are considerable individual differences in the optimal level of conflict. Creative people prefer a high level of uncertainty, and authoritarian people seem to prefer a low level of uncertainty. Creative people are more willing to accept complexity, both external and internal. They like abstract thought and conceptual adventure and look for significance of facts rather than facts themselves. They are self-confident, they have a high opinion of themselves and are self-sufficient. The authoritarian personality is the opposite. Authoritarians are concerned with conventional behaviour, rigidity of thought processes and depersonalization of social relationships. INDUCTION AND DEDUCTION IN TEACHING GRAMMAR RULES. Induction is the reasoning operation in which we draw conclusions from the particular to the general. In the case of language learning, this means progressing from sample sentences in which certain forms appear to a generalization about forms and their context, expressed in the form of a rule, i.e. a statement about the principle governing the occurrence of the form. Deduction is the reverse process in which we start with the generalization and make inferences regarding the specific instantiations of the rule. In the case of learning grammar, deduction starts with the presentation of a grammar rule, which is subsequently illustrated with various sample sentences. In general cognitive functioning, rules have one

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important advantage: the information they contain in a condensed form is transferrable to other context; in foreign language learning, however, rules do not have a causal function; language use taps knowledge representations (procedural records) which are different from abstract declarative information contained in rules. INFERENTIAL REASONING is one of the central processes in human cognition, especially in reading comprehension. Jay (2003:275) states that ‘it is a concept central to the mental work needed to construct a model of the text. Inferences are used to make bridges from one proposition to another. They are part of the active constructive process of comprehension.’ What from the point of view of the comprehender is inferencing or bridging would, from the point of view of the producer be considered ellipsis. It is tempting to make an analogy with our processing of visual information which comes from a TV scene: pixels, which we process to restore movement, are comparable to verbalized information which our information processing system brings back to coherent unity by dynamic (re)construction. INFORMATION-PROCESSING APPROACH is not a single theory but a general framework for studying cognition as a flow of information across space and the processing system. The system may be animate or inanimate, e.g. a computer, and have inputs, throughputs and outputs. The human organism has a distinct specificity as an information processing animate system and for this reason computer models may be used to simulate its functioning at various levels but certainly not to represent human cognitive functioning as an explanatory model. As for models of language use and learning, information processing models which only have inputs and outputs are inadequate in that they underrepresent the generating and computing mechanisms of senders and addressees. A more specific model must have a comprehension component with its own input and output, a storage component and a production component with an input and output of its own. INTERSUBJECTIVITY is the notion based on the presupposition that ‘subjects can co-ordinate their ‘subjectivities’ (i.e. their mental processes) with other creatures’ subjectivities through affective and emotional processes without having to use explicit representations of these (Gomes 2005:72). LANGUAGE SCIENCES is the term used to cover a plethora of disciplines which investigate language matters, but which do not necessarily see themselves 314

as ‘linguistic’ disciplines. My view is that this is a more appropriate term for what used to be labelled ‘applied linguistics’. LEARNING as defined by Eysenck (2006: 315) is ‘the process of laying down some sort of memory trace’. In my monograph, the general idea of laying down the memory trace embraces exogenous and endogenous information processing, such as a) new experience, mental and motor action, interaction and reflection, resulting in procedural as well as declarative knowledge representations; and b) restructuring and explicitation of the existing knowledge, as well as generating information by way of thought and reasoning processes. We must also posit processes essential from the point of view of learning, connected not so much with a new information trace being added, but with the old information trace being consolidated and/or strengthened, leading to the (subjective) feeling of certainty in the language learner’s mind. Taking the above into consideration, language learning is incremental, i.e. gradual, and it involves transitional representations. Learning is a concept entailed in the notion of cognition while the dividing line is not easy to discern; cognitive processes always leave memory traces and learning is impossible without activating our cognitive equipment. LEVELS OF INTELLIGENCE. According to Anderson (1975), intelligence can be defined as the capacity of a system for modifying its knowledge. Level 1 systems, like plants and some lower animals, only know. They change in knowledge due to an external agent such as differential survival. The level of knowledge is that of the systemʼs ancestors. Innate (genetically transmitted) knowledge has advantages in a world that does not change, which does not require time or capacity for learning. Level 2 systems, like some higher animals, know and learn, and they have some intelligence; knowledge is acquired after the system is constructed, and it corresponds to the systemʼs own experience. Genetic knowledge can be called instinct, while acquired knowledge can be called memory. An extensive memory is required in a rapidly changing world. Level 3 systems, such as higher animals and humans, have a high degree of intelligence: they know, learn, and think. Further adaptability is possible here because they can see beyond experience and predict a future which is unlike the past. These systems demonstrate avoidance behaviour. Although much of their knowledge is innate, knowing, learning, and thinking in humans is possible because of the processing of stimulus information and attention. They attend reflexively to changes in their environment and evaluate them as to their relevance, i.e. importance, significance. Some information is selected on the basis of earlier experience.

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The three levels of intelligence are hierarchically related in humans with level 3 superimposed on level 2, and level 2 superimposed on level 1. People construct sophisticated representations of the world. The hierarchical organization of knowledge is useful in the process of construction. This powerful principle applies both at the level of the human species as well as to the individual. MECHANISM – is a metaphorical term, understood as a system of specialized, yet interconnected parts (or subsystems), a system which uses energy to perform some kind of work to fulfil its functions; the mechanism of foreign language learning in this monograph is viewed as a highly specialized system of subsystems entailed in verbal communication, which, in turn, is entailed in human information processing. This mechanism draws human cognitive energy to perform various operations and transformations on information structures and constellations requisite in language use. MODEL versus THEORY OF LANGUAGE LEARNING. Understanding language learning is tantamount to having a mental model of the phenomenon. Johnson-Laird (1983, 2005) has observed that understanding involves knowing what causes a phenomenon, how to influence, control, initiate or prevent it, how it relates to other states of affairs and how to predict its onset and course; it also involves the awareness of its underlying internal structure. A model of language learning is simply a conceptualization of our understanding of the phenomenon of language use and learning. Some authors use the term ‘model’ as synonymous with ‘theory’ as they clearly overlap; however, following Dubin (1969), I retain the distinction between ‘theory’ as an explanatory system and ‘model’ as a representation. MOTIVATION. According to Norman (1987), motivation in the context of human information processing is understood as a policy of allocating attentional resources. It is not a separate factor, but a combined effect of the belief system, experience, and consciousness. In turn, the role of attention is tantamount to a selection of one out of several simultaneously available external or mental objects. It is a focalization, or concentration, of consciousness. We have finite cognitive resources, so we find it necessary to withdraw attention from some things to deal effectively with others. Motivation can also be understood in a more general, non-technical, meaning as what energizes our behaviour (Temporowski 2003). This understanding is vastly different from understanding the term in Second Language Research (e.g. Dornyei 2005). 316

OBSERVATIONAL LEARNING vs EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING. Both terms are used with reference to input processing in language learning. The preferred term here is ‘observational learning’, a specific form of learning, recognized in cognitive psychology (Rebok 1987) as different from learning via interaction, reasoning or studying. Through observational learning we may acquire knowledge or behaviour, such as a motor response, a moral judgement, or a social rule, simply by watching others. Observational learning involves such processes as modelling, retention processes, reproduction, and incorporating accuracy feedback. In contrast, ‘experiential learning’ is simply too broad: everything makes up our experience, which leaves traces in memory, including observation, studying, action, interaction, thinking, imagery, reasoning, problem solving, etc. ‘Observation’ is sufficiently precise to be juxtaposed to other cognitive activities. OPEN versus CLOSED SYSTEMS. The distinction is significant in modelling language learning and language use at the level of empirical phenomena, relevant to a field with applied goals. As a complex organism, a human being is an open, self-regulating system. Such organisms conduct exchanges with their environment by means of air, water, energy, and information. Their livelihood depends on maintaining these exchanges. People are open systems and members of open systems. In investigating such systems it is necessary to take into account how each system acts with reference to others, recognize their cognitive systems as sensitive to, and permeable by, environmental information, and assume complex reciprocal determination as a notion of causality (Corsini ed. 1987: 525). Closed systems, on the other hand, have impenetrable boundaries and are activated from within: what is needed for their functioning is contained in the system, a kind of perpetual motion machine (Courtright 2007). ORGANIC perspective of language and cognition views development as movement through a series of distinct stages which the organism actively constructs through interactions with the world (Rebok 1987). The organic property in any model of language learning and use emphasizes the unity of the human being and his or her language, first and foremost a) the role of the human being as an agent in language use, and b) the role of human (also developmental) constraints on language learning and use. As pointed out by Rebok (1987: 25), ‘Just as biological processes (breathing, eating, sleeping) enable us to adapt and survive in our changing world, cognitive processes (memory, problem-solving, intelligence) are organized and structured to perform a similar adaptive function.’

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ORIGINALITY versus CREATIVITY. B. F. Anderson (1975: 147) makes a very helpful distinction between these two concepts: An original idea is simply a novel idea, one that no one has come up with before. Creative people produce original ideas, but so do mental patients. A creative idea is an idea that is original and meets certain standards. If it is an invention, it must work; if it is a theory, it must account for data; if it is a work of art, it must communicate… Creativity requires direction.

OPTIMIZING, MODERNIZING and RATIONALIZING FOREIGN LANGUAGE TEACHING. Optimizing is the effort of making something better; yet we do not know ‘better than what?’ Modernizing is an attempt to renew something by incorporating some recent advances, while rationalizing is making something as efficient as possible while realizing the potential and limitations of our intervention. In the case of foreign language learning and teaching, rationalization is based on our understanding of the problem in question, while aiming at the maximum success under the circumstances, within the constraints we are aware of. PERCEPTUAL SET is activated when subjects perform tasks; it embraces the context, task instructions, and the goal/motivation of the subject. PRESENTATION and REPRESENTATION. Miller (1987:9) says: The crowning intellectual accomplishment of the brain is the real world. Physicists and chemists long ago demonstrated that the real world of our experience is very different from the inanimate universe of physics and chemistry. The sounds and colours we perceive, the apparent objects that integrate them, the space in which these objects are located, the values we attach to them, the intentions we attribute to others -all these fundamental aspects of the real world of our experience are adaptive interpretations of the really real world of physical science.

A representation is something that stands for something else. The problem of presentation and representation arises at two levels: a) the level of perceptual presentations of the real world and b) built on top of it, the level of representations with discrete communicable symbols. There is a very intricate relationship between the two rather than a simple one-to-one mapping where the symbolic representation influences the perceptual presentation in subtle ways. PRIMARY INTERSUBJECTIVITY includes forms of interactive behaviours which demonstrate temporal coordination of the infant’s gestures and expressions, such as smiling, gesturing and cooing in rhythm with the other people in their presence (Gopnik and Melzoff 1996). 318

PROBLEM SOLVING involves a) understanding the problem and b) solving it. Understanding the problem is essential because, while its representation affords only some options for solution paths, many difficulties in solving it stem from inappropriate categories employed in its conceptualization. PROCESSES, OPERATIONS and STRATEGIES. From the point of view of our cognitive functioning, we can notice important distinctions in these conceptual categories: processes run obligatorily and considering the ‘tip-of-the-iceberg’ availability of the entire information processing to our consciousness, let alone awareness, we may safely assume that they are largely beyond our voluntary control, remaining implicit in the larger tasks being focused and worked upon. Operations presuppose voluntary involvement of the processing subject. Operations are launched as well as performed by people. Higher cognitive processes, such as reasoning, may be regarded as operations. Strategies seem to be even more closely integrated with our voluntary control in that we evaluate the situation, especially the goal and the available resources to choose a course of action to reach the goal. Some such choices are not really premeditated; when used repeatedly, they may even be located at the periphery of our scope of attention, retrieved as highly practised actions. But this does not undermine their genuinely strategic character. REDUNDANCY is the property of messages in which the number of clues is bigger than absolutely necessary for their recognition and comprehension. Reduced redundancy may hamper communication. SALIENCE. In terms of perceptual process, salience is related to the prominence of the stimulus information both in terms of its size or loudness. Taylor and Thompson 1982: 175 add that salience “refers to the phenomenon that one’s attention is differentially directed to one portion of the environment rather than to others, the information contained in that portion will receive disproportionate weighting in subsequent judgements.” SEGMENTATION in the perception of speech is assigning the structure to the incoming continuous acoustic stimulus by dividing it into segments on the basis of mental representation. SOCIAL COGNITION is more complex than individual cognition. A major source of this complexity stems from the fact that social cognition involves more than just the detection, recognition, retrieval and comprehension. In complex cognitive tasks, subjects go beyond the information given and form impressions,

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they make judgments and attributions, and they draw inferences (Markus and Zajonc 1985). Rebok (1987: 391) defines social cognition in the following way: Social cognitive phenomena include conceptions of self, knowledge of others, social perspective taking and role taking, moral judgements and prosocial behaviours such as empathy. Although all forms of cognition are inherently social, an important distinction can be made between knowing about people and knowing about objects. For example, both objects and people can be acted upon (pushed, hit), but people react less predictably.

Unlike person- object relations, interpersonal relations are characterized by shared, coordinated intentions. STRUCTURE. This important term can be explained with a quote from Kotarbiński 1977:279: Every complex object has a structure, which may be understood as either broader or narrower sense. In the broader sense, we call a structure a system of relations between the components of a whole; in the narrower sense – it is a set of components of a whole and the system of relations between them.

The function of perceiving an entity as a structure is commented upon by Simon (1987:259): Structure is simply the antithesis of randomness, providing redundancy and information that can be used to predict the properties of parts of the space not yet visited from the properties of those already searched. This predictability becomes the basis for searching selectively rather than randomly.

SYSTEM is a self-organizing arrangement of entities, i.e. components, in intricate functional relations to each other, distinguished on the basis of their internal specializations and oppositions. The systems’ components derive their status and meanings from their relationships with other components which they do not have in isolation. A system is usually stratified hierarchically according to the importance of levels (see also open and closed systems). In this monograph the status of a system is attributed to two important elements of human functioning: to our information processing and to verbal communication. As a result, they are perceived as wholes, even though with fuzzy and far-from-tight borders. TASK is a unit of human activity, a structured episode of behaviour which is goal-oriented/purposeful, and which involves dynamic decision-making. It is performed on the basis of instructions received from others or a self-set goal. The task relates to the subjects awareness of what is to be done and to the intention 320

to perform it. The subject has the options of accepting or rejecting the task. As a practical goal, the task orients the subject’s attention and regulates his/her activity as whole. Whether or not the goal of the task is accomplished or not is based on the feedback information. In language learning, there is always some implicit or explicit target language norm for the task. THEORY versus CONCEPTION. In the field of foreign language learning and teaching, the term ‘theory’ has been used both in its technical and non-technical meaning. The technical meaning would entail (Gopnik and Melzoff 1996: 79): ‘a system of abstract causal entities and rules related to one another in coherent ways. It allows a wide variety of coherent predictions, and it leads to interpretations and explanations’. I understand the non-technical meaning as any generalization or conception, interpretation or extended metaphor, i.e. a system of information which highlights an important aspect of our focus of interest. The technical meaning, on the other hand, is tightly integrated with the framework of an academic discipline and refers to the level of this discipline at which generalizations are made about the subject matter of the field. This technical understanding implies greater systematicity and rigour as well as specialized function of explanation as opposed to description or testing. In the linguistic stage, the term ‘theory’ is predominantly used in the sense of ‘a body of generalizations or interpretations’ rather than in its technical meaning as an explanatory system referring to the entire subject mater of the discipline. McLaughlin (1987) and de Baugrande (1987) rightly point out that theories cannot be legitimately transferred from one domain to another. UNDERSTANDING comes from an explanation which, as Givon (2005) points out, refers to a topically unified communication among a group of scholars who share a certain perspective (paradigm) of a given phenomenon. It is organized knowledge of the relations between various facts which makes it a coherent system.

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Index of Authors

A Abelson, R. P. 154 Abrahamsen, A. 83 Adamson, B. 54 Adlof, S. 249 Ahn, J. F. 31, 36 Aitchison, J. 136, 212 Aitkenhead, A. M. 94, 112, 153, 161, 224 Alexander, P. A. 123, 306 Atran, S. 64, 79 Anderson, B. F. 112, 119, 124, 125, 130, 131, 134, 135, 137, 144, 147, 148, 159, 282, 311–313, 315, 318 Anderson, J. R. 152, 153, 161, 164, 217 Andon, N. 56 Anthony, E. M. 43 Arabski, J. 106 Aronson, E. 113 Ashby, F. G. 156 Atkinson, D. 61, 80, 82 Augoustinos, M. 113, 124 Ausubel, D. P. 171, 197 B Baars, B. J. 94, 99, 112, 117, 119, 153, 169, 222, 282, 284 Baddeley, A. D. 146, 282, 305 Balconi, M. 180, 281 Barsalou, L. W. 94, 282, 287 Bechtel, W. 83 Beech, J. R. 161, 164 Beniger, J. R. 96 Benjafield, J. G. 282 Beretta, A. 55 Bever, T. G. 159

Bhaskar, R. 72, 79, 310, 311 Bilodeau, I. 166 Block, D. 64 Boduroglu, A. 145, 146 Bolinger, D. 44 Broadbent, D. E. 140 Brown, D. 44, 49 Brown, D. H. 49 Brown, G. 239 Bruner, J. S. 94, 122, 123, 133, 136, 137, 153, 162, 193, 284 Burden, R. L. 99, 216 Bygate, M. 268 C Cairncross, F. 96 Cairns, C. E. 112 Cairns, H. S. 112 Call, J. 140 Cameron, L. Canale, M. 179 Carroll, D. W. 128, 137, 152, 211, 282, 286, 287 Carroll, J. B. 44 Carruthers, P. 22, 68, 72 Castells, M. 96 Chalhoub-Deville, M. 80 Chalmers, D. J. 117, 120 Chapelle, C. A. 80 Chastain, K. 46, 54 Cherry, C. 127, 194, 226, 305 Chomsky, N. 44 Churchland, P. S. 93–95, 97, 102, 125, 151, 284, 306 Clark, E. 18, 62, 111, 188, 189, 192, 211, 257

353

Clark, H. 114, 151, 185, 208, 211, 257, 265 Cohen, G. 124, 125, 181, 182, 312 Colley, A. M. 161, 164 Collier, A. 72 Cook, G. 54 Cook, V. 20, 61 Cooper, R. L. 44 Corder, P. S. 47, 49, 50 Corsini, R. J. 80, 114, 115, 124, 125, 132, 179, 188, 281, 289, 317 Corson, D. 72 Courtright, J. A. 92, 317 Craighero, L. 191 Craik, F. I. M. 174 Crookes, G. 54, 55, 82, 174, 223 Cruse, A. 196, 197 D Dakowska, M. 42, 44, 46, 49, 64, 80, 88, 145, 179, 223, 236, 281, 285, 289 Dakowski, M. 5 Danks, J. H. 248 Davies, A. 50, 54 Day, R. E. 66, 96 de Beaugrande, R. 168, 224, 304, 308 de Jong, T. 244 Deacon, T. W. 115, 125 DeKeyser, R. 50, 132 Dennett, D. C. 121, 124 Saussure, F., de 151, 220 Diller, K. C. 46 DiPietro, R. J. 154 Dobek-Ostrowska, B. 84 Dornyei, Z. 50, 106, 224, 316 Doughty, C. J. 50, 81, 144 Drews, F. A. 140, 141, 143 Dubin, R. 75, 76, 316 Duff, P. 80 Durso, F. T. 153 354

E Eckman, F. 54 Eilan, N. 192, 193, 307 Elder, C. 54 Ellis, N. 223 Ellis, R. 27, 50, 54, 56, 223, 239 Engels, L. K. 45 Ewert, A. 54 Eysenck, M. W. 94, 95, 111, 112, 116, 117, 120, 128–131, 135, 136, 140, 142, 144–147, 152, 153, 155, 156, 160, 163, 168, 222, 270–272, 282, 284, 305, 311, 315 F Faucher, L. 68 Ferguson, Ch. A. 192, 211 Filipovic, R. 49 Fiske, S. 113 Fitts, P. M. 164, 217 Flower, L. S. 270–272 Fogel, A. 105, 113, 186, 187, 189, 193, 195, 200, 201, 205, 208, 281 Fortune, A. 56 Fries, C. C. 42 Frutiger, A. 126 G Gage, N. M. 112, 117, 119, 153, 282 Gardner, H. 84, 106, 202 Garrod, S. 184, 185 Gaskell, M. G. 123, 211 Gass, S. 50–55, 65, 290 Gathercole, S. E. 145 Gefen, R. 44 Gernsbacher, A. M. 211 Giddens, A. 66 Giere, R. 66, 68, 69, 72 Givon, T. 78, 97, 137, 145, 195, 202, 209, 218, 220, 321 Gleitman, H. 122, 149 Gleitman, L. R. 251

Godfrey-Smith, R. 77 Gomes, J. C. 314 Gopnik, A. 68, 69, 78, 79, 307, 313, 318, 321 Gouin, F. 32, 38 Grabe, W. 54, 55 Graham, S. 269, 270 Gregg, K. 50, 64, 65 Grucza, F. 27, 47, 85, 179, 304 Gruenfeld, D. H. 184 H Hałas, E. 124 Halliday, M. A. K. 47, 48 Hargie, O. D. 206 Hargreaves, A. 96 Harris, J. 49 Harris, K. R. 173, 270 Harsh, W. 49 Hayes, J. R. 270–272, 309 Hedge, T. 256, 270, 272–274, 310 Hempel, C. G. 23 Hewes, D. E. 153, 178, 209, 281 Hill, A. A. 44 Hitch, G. J. 146, 282 Holland, J. H. 81 Holyoak, K. J. 68, 100, 286 Howatt, A. P. R. 33, 34, 39 Hudson, T. 255 Hulstijn, J. 17, 56, 132 I Inhelder, B. 69 Irion, A. L. 161 J Jagodzińska, M. 173 James, W. 140 Jandt, F. E. 182 Jay, T. B. 191, 192, 257, 264–266, 282, 286, 309, 314 Jespersen, O. 33, 37–39

Johnson, F. 44 Johnson, K. 223 Johnson-Laird, P. N. 62, 69, 75, 120, 121, 123, 129, 153, 157, 303, 309, 316 Jordan, G. 50, 71 Jupp, V. 124 K Kamiński, S. 78 Kandiah, T. 44 Kaplan, R. B. 49, 85, 86 Karmiloff-Smith, A. 62, 68, 69, 114 Keane, M. T. 94, 95, 112, 116, 128–131, 135, 136, 142, 145, 146, 152, 153, 155, 160, 163, 270–272, 282, 284 Kellog, R. T. 94 Kelly, L. G. 30, 34 Kintsch, W. 123, 154, 236, 249, 309 Klahr, D. 69 Klix, F. 99, 102, 111, 112, 125, 147 Koch, Ch 94, 99, 112, 117, 119, 284 Kormos, J. 262 Kotarbińska, J. 53 Kotarbiński, T. 320 Krashen, S. 18, 216 Krohn, R. 42 Krzeszowski, T. P. 196, 197 Kuhn, T. 66 L Lado, R. 42 Lamendella, J. T. 44 Langley, P. 68, 78, 168 Larsen-Freeman, D. 50, 81 Leontiev, A. A. 47, 72 Leplin, J. 75 Levelt, W. J. M. 131, 145, 152, 161, 162, 211, 236, 243, 245, 272, 310 Levy, S. V. 137 Lewandowsky, S. 164, 165 355

Lindzey, G. 113 Littlejohn, S. 77, 78 Littlewood, W. 209–212, 270 Lockhart, R. S. 174 Long, M. H. 24, 50, 51, 71, 144, 170, 174, 185 Lyons, J. 182 M Mackey, W. F. 30, 34, 45, 52, 53, 56 Madden, C. 50 Maddox, W. T. 156 Manis, M. 306 Marcel, C. 32 Marckwardt, A. H. 46 Markus, H. 112, 121, 148, 151, 153–155, 165, 306, 319 Matczak, A. 190 Matlin, M. W. 94, 282 Mattelart, A. 96 McCarthy, M. 54 McCauley, R. N. 83 McGrath, J. E. 199, 226 McGregor, D. 22, 100 McIntosh, A. 48 McLaughlin, B. 62, 85, 223, 321 McNamara, T. 80 Meidinger, J. 30 Melzoff, A. N. 68, 69, 78, 79, 307, 313, 318, 321 Miller, E. R. 81 Miller, G. A. 117, 119, 124, 144, 146, 318 Minsky, M. 154 Mitchell, P. 68, 122, 190 Mitchell, R. 19 Morrison, R. G. 68, 100, 286 Moulton, W. G. 42 Musumeci, D. 29 Myles, F. 19 356

N Nassaji, H. 54 Nęcka, E. 94, 99, 112, 133, 284, 305, 307 Nęcki, Z. 225, 262 Neisser, U. 94, 95, 116, 128, 133, 143, 153, 159, 160, 284, 306 Nersessian, N. 69, 75 Neuliep, J. W. 182 Newmark, L. 42, 51 Nilsson, L. G. 99 Noblitt, J. S. 49 Norris, J. M. 80 Nowak, L. 23, 303 Nunan, D. 258 O Olds, S. W. 190–192 Ollendorf, H. S. 30, 31, 36 Oller, J. W. 44, 45, 52, 152, 254 Oppenheim, P. 23 Ortega, L. 19, 80, 144, 145, 220 P Palmer, H. 37, 39–41, 251 Papalia, D. E. 190–192 Paradis, M. 180, 224 Parreren, C. F., van 49 Pawlak, M. 166 Perfetti, Ch. 249 Phillipson, R. 18, 61 Piaget, J. 122 Pickering, M. J. 184, 185, 251 Pieters, J. 244 Piske, T. 34 Pisoni, D. B. 137 Pitt, J. C. 84 Plötz, K. 30–32, 36 Politzer, R. 49 Prendergast, T. 32 Pressley, M. 173 Price-Williams, D. R. 199 Przełęcki, M. 54

Q Quine, W. V. 69 R Raimes, A. 274 Reber, A. 83 Rebok, G. W. 62, 111, 122, 128, 132, 134, 135, 141, 145, 147, 150, 173, 189, 192, 306, 317, 319 Reibel, D. A. 42, 51 Revzin, I. I. 47 Richards, D. R. 49 Richards, J. C. 30, 32, 34, 46, 54 Richards, J. 52 Ritchie, W. 50 Rivers, W. M. 30, 42, 46 Rizolatti, G. 191 Robinson, P. 106, 149 Rodgers, T. S. 30, 32, 34, 46, 54 Roulet, E. 49 Rumelhart, D. A. 112, 113, 123, 128, 133, 153–157, 311 Rumelhart, D. E. 155 S Sacks, H. 265 Saugstad, P. 185 Schaffer, R. H. 62, 68, 190 Schank, R. C. 154 Schegloff, E. A. 265 Schmidt, R. 137, 145, 220 Schmitt, N. 54 Schneider, W. 160 Schraw, G. 112, 114, 124, 161, 163, 165, 233, 244, 305, 310 Searle, J. R. 62, 99 Seedhouse, P. 15, 17, 56 Seidenstrücker, J. 30, 31 Seidlhofer, B. 54, 61 Seliger, H. 50 Selinker, L. 50

Shell, D. F. 90, 94, 95, 98, 99, 112, 144, 157, 161, 167 Shiffrin, R. M. 160 Shore, B. 115 Shugar, G. W. 192 Simon, H. A. 68, 78, 168, 309, 320 Sincoff, J. B. 163 Singer, M. 123 Skehan, P. 106, 223 Skutnabb-Kangas, T. 18, 61 Slack, J. M. 94, 112, 121, 130, 153, 161, 224 Slobin, D. 83 Solso, R. L. 94, 128, 282, 307 Sousa, D. A. 191 Sperber, D. 197 Spolsky, B. 46, 49 Sternberg, R. J. 98, 129, 131, 137, 141, 143, 144, 146, 147, 157, 163, 284, 312 Strayer, D. 140, 141, 143 Strevens, P. 48 Styles, E. A. 120, 140, 142, 143, 153, 161, 282, 287 Swain, M. 179 Sweet, H. 33, 34, 37, 38 T Taylor, I. 18, 192 Taylor, M. M. 18, 192 Taylor, S. 113, 319 Temporowski, P. D. 161, 163, 316 Thagard, P. R. 66, 77, 81, 83, 84, 94, 95, 99, 112, 116, 117, 119, 120, 284 Titone, R. 31, 39 Tomasello, M. 140, 281 Trueswell, J. C. 251 Tulving, E. 147–149 Tuwim, J. 212 U Ur, P. 274 357

V van Compernolle, R. A. 54 van Dijk, T. A. 154, 197, 309 Van Gompel, R. P. G. 251 Velmans, M. 71, 72, 94, 99, 112, 117, 119, 120, 286 Viëtor, W. 32, 36 Vygotsky, L. 163, 193 W Wakefield, J. 196, 205 Wardhaugh, R. 49 Watson-Gegeo, K. A. 81 Werner, H. 122 Whitney, P. 94, 100, 283, 284 Whong, M. 17, 25, 29, 63, 144 Widdowson, H. G. 47–49, 53, 54 Wilkins, W. K. 196, 205 Williams, J. 50 Williams, L. 54

358

Williams, M. 99, 216 Wilson, D. 197 Winitz, H. 34 Winne, P. A. 123, 306 Wójcicki, R. 53, 54 Wojtaszek, A. 106 Wolff, D. 55 Wood, B. S. 188, 189, 192, 194, 211, 282 Wyer, R. S. 184 Y Young-Scholten, M. 34 Yule, G. 182, 239 Z Zajonc, R. B. 112, 121, 148, 151, 153–155, 165, 306, 319 Zamel, V. 270 Ziegler, F. 68, 122, 190 Zuengler, J. 81

Index of Authors

A academic autonomy 52, 53, 83 accuracy 31, 34, 54, 72, 79, 96, 113, 136, 155, 162, 163, 165–167, 180, 190, 192, 201, 223, 245, 246, 255, 263, 268, 275, 276, 281, 284, 285, 291, 293, 296, 298, 300, 317 acquisition 17–20, 24, 33, 35, 37, 42, 45, 49–51, 55, 56, 61, 63, 65, 66, 76, 81, 86, 88, 100, 128, 144, 151, 160, 161, 163, 164, 190, 216, 217, 220, 223, 227, 231, 241, 243–246, 250, 258, 259, 306 activation 16, 57, 61, 97, 117, 143, 145, 155, 159, 207, 208, 225, 239, 243, 260, 283, 288, 294–296, 299, 300 acuity 106, 135, 202, 288 adaptive behaviour 99, 107, 118, 183, 188 addressee 15, 57, 74, 102, 110, 123, 126, 127, 150, 172, 180, 181, 183, 195, 197–199, 201–203, 206–216, 218, 221, 224–226, 232, 234, 237, 238, 249, 253, 256–259, 263, 271, 272, 278, 279, 282, 285, 288, 289, 291, 295, 298, 300, 301, 314 adjacency pairs 200, 208, 264, 265 adjustment 22, 57, 67, 86, 101, 117, 130, 169, 184, 189, 192, 196, 203, 206, 209, 212, 229, 237, 238, 244, 261, 263, 269, 271, 278, 291, 295–197 agency 27, 81, 83, 99, 105, 292 agent 27, 56, 67, 72, 88, 90, 99, 105, 108, 109, 118, 121, 177, 183, 184, 201, 202, 204, 205, 208, 220, 277,

281, 286, 289–293, 295, 298, 300, 308, 315, 317 alignment 184, 185, 237, 238, 278, 288, 295, 300 analogical 92, 113, 114, 125, 126, 129, 132, 134, 136, 138, 139, 150, 157, 177, 180–182, 204, 221, 222, 224, 282, 284 animate/inanimate 64, 70, 74, 79, 80, 90, 95, 99, 115, 116, 179, 304, 308, 314, 318 anticipation 131, 132, 135, 138, 142, 173, 184, 203, 209, 228, 254, 282, 283, 291, 294, 295, 297, 299 applications 21, 25, 27, 48, 49, 51, 57, 58, 65, 73, 84–87, 89, 90, 231, 232, 277, 301, 304 –– a. of linguistics 48 applied 20, 39, 48, 49, 54, 61, 65, 67, 77, 85–87, 90, 93, 231, 315, 217 –– a. goals 67, 77, 231, 317 –– a. level of a discipline 65, 90, 93 approach 31, 32, 34, 39–41, 43, 61, 63, 80, 89, 106, 108, 122, 154, 156, 163, 223, 23, 239, 254, 296, 314 arbitrary 21, 26, 34, 92, 105, 114, 125, 126, 129, 134, 138, 139, 150, 159, 171, 177, 178, 180–182, 196, 201, 204, 208, 212, 220–222, 228, 276, 284, 287 artificial sentences 31 attention, –– voluntary a. 142, 293 –– involuntary a. 134, 142, 293 automatic processes 130, 160, 161, 169, 170, 217, 242

359

automaticity 135, 161, 217, 236, 241, 243, 244, 248, 254, 255, 260, 270 awareness 24, 42, 59, 67, 87, 95, 97, 98, 100, 104–106, 113, 115, 117, 120, 121, 124, 128, 130, 132, 143, 144, 148, 149, 156, 157, 160, 164, 166–170, 174, 183, 189, 190, 212, 222, 228, 236, 246, 272, 280, 283, 198, 306, 307, 310, 316, 319, 320 B background knowledge 70, 164, 195, 226–228, 249, 252, 254, 263, 264, 293, 296 bilingual lists 31, 36 bottom-up 23, 27, 30, 46, 55, 59, 67, 75, 86, 140, 155, 172, 204, 220, 249, 250, 278, 303 boundaries 82, 83, 136, 137, 186, 222, 240, 241, 309, 317 C categorical 92, 125, 137, 149, 177, 198, 215, 222, 281, 284, 311 category 30, 86, 88, 96, 104, 113, 129, 136–138, 152, 156, 158, 198, 211, 217, 227, 249, 266, 281, 299 causal factor 15, 195, 227, 232 causality 78, 79, 114, 116, 317 cause 50, 70, 97, 305 chronological coding 148, 151, 154, 196, 294 chunking 173 classical texts 31, 35 code 27, 39, 40, 41, 44, 73, 91, 92, 99, 100, 102, 105, 109, 110, 112, 127–129, 133–135, 137–139, 140, 150, 159, 172, 177, 180, 182, 185, 194, 195, 200, 204, 216, 219, 220, 223, 226–228, 232, 233, 234, 239, 241, 242, 246, 247, 252, 253, 259, 262, 264, 274, 278, 280, 281, 360

284–287, 289–291, 293, 294, 298, 299, 305, 309 coding 15, 45, 63, 95, 103, 109, 118, 119, 126, 127, 129, 130, 137, 148, 151, 152, 154, 158, 161, 174, 184, 195, 196, 199, 214, 217, 221–225, 228, 236, 237, 249, 253, 262, 271, 279, 280, 282, 285, 291, 294, 298, 301, 305, 306 cognitive –– c. conception of science 68, 72, 308 –– c. curiosity 22, 66, 82, 89, 106, 118, 121, 186 –– c. mechanism 15, 17, 171, 304 –– c. prosthesis 69, 71 –– c. resources 15, 91–93, 100, 106, 109, 114, 117, 124, 140, 142, 143, 147, 151, 155, 160, 161, 167, 183, 211, 288, 289, 292, 300, 316 –– c. schemata 68, 70, 152 –– c. structure 69, 72, 153 coherence 22, 23, 70, 77, 78, 116, 117, 153, 171, 197, 208, 213, 218, 219, 237, 238, 252, 255, 256, 271, 272, 274, 276, 292, 294, 297, 309, 312 coherent 23, 36, 46, 52, 54, 55, 56, 68, 73, 77, 78, 83, 89, 96, 123, 140, 153, 158, 179, 197, 198, 210, 211, 218, 227, 237, 271, 285, 290, 310, 314, 321 –– c. system 56, 68, 73, 77, 78, 83, 89, 321 combinatorial potential 136, 150, 152, 184, 278, 280, 284, 298 communicative intention 16, 103, 123, 162, 172, 184, 185, 187, 195, 197, 198, 202–204, 206–215, 218, 222, 225–228, 235, 236–238, 244, 248, 252, 263, 267, 268, 271, 295, 298, 300 composition 138, 161, 273 comprehension 15, 16, 27, 32, 34, 73, 102, 104, 107, 109, 110, 117,

132, 138, 150–152, 156, 158, 159, 162, 169, 170, 173, 174, 178, 180, 185, 199, 204, 205, 215–219, 224, 231–242, 248, 250–261, 264–267, 273, 275–278, 281, 284, 285, 287, 288, 290–292, 294–301, 305, 309, 314, 319 concepts 16, 20, 21, 24, 43, 59, 68, 71, 77, 78, 81, 88, 100, 116, 122, 123, 129, 132, 144, 145, 147, 148, 151, 153, 155, 156, 158, 159, 168, 172, 177, 178, 182, 190, 196, 209, 210, 215, 222, 223, 250, 256, 257, 279, 283, 294, 306, 311, 318 conceptual chimera 84 consciousness 93, 95, 98, 99, 112, 117, 119–121, 130, 132, 140, 164, 169, 183, 291, 292, 316, 319 continuum 37, 148, 156, 182 controlled processes 157, 160, 212, 217, 295 construction 18–20, 22, 24, 25, 40, 44, 56, 63, 73, 76, 77, 81, 85, 89, 95, 99, 103, 108, 118, 124, 132, 133, 138, 143, 151–153, 158, 162, 163, 170, 172, 179, 183, 192, 193, 200, 201, 206, 210, 212, 214, 215, 221, 224, 225, 227, 228, 232, 235, 236, 238, 244, 245, 253, 265, 270, 271, 274, 278, 280, 294, 296, 297, 306, 307, 309, 310, 314, 316 constructive 15, 16, 27, 49, 53, 56, 57, 62, 68, 74, 81, 87, 105, 106, 108, 109, 113, 118, 124, 132, 133, 135, 136, 138, 143, 171, 172, 183, 184, 186, 197, 201, 202, 204–106, 210, 216, 225, 228, 231, 235, 236, 263, 270, 283, 288, 289, 292, 293, 296, 198, 199, 306, 309, 314 –– c. processes 16, 57, 68, 81, 108, 132, 133, 136, 143, 197, 205, 206, 216, 231, 270, 288, 296, 309, 314

content and relationship component 188, 196, 211, 221, 232, 263, 279, 282, 295 convention 70, 150, 181, 184, 185, 197, 199, 200, 208, 210, 216, 219, 221, 223, 225, 226, 248, 253, 262, 264, 273, 280, 285, 291, 293, 296, 297, 299 conventionalization 193 conversation 32–34, 36, 37, 39, 190, 191, 192, 208, 218, 241, 254, 259, 262, 264–266, 268, 296 coordination 87, 89, 104, 107, 120, 122, 135, 163, 185, 195, 200, 208, 209, 237, 260, 279, 294, 300, 304, 318 co-regulation 183, 193, 208, 209 culture 32–34, 38, 56, 66, 69, 70, 72, 90, 92, 96, 97, 100, 107, 115, 125, 153, 154, 178, 180, 184, 190, 194, 196, 199–202, 205, 206, 208, 216, 219, 226, 237, 240, 246, 253, 269, 270, 278, 281, 296, 310 D decision centre 105, 106, 130, 140, 183 declarative –– d. representations 156, 157, 174 –– d. records 238 decoding 94, 99, 102, 103, 110, 119, 126, 158, 159, 174, 180, 198, 202, 204, 211, 215, 217, 225, 232, 233, 234, 237, 251, 279, 280, 282, 283, 287, 291, 295, 301, 309 decomposition 138, 203 deductive 31 deliberate 18, 20, 21, 41, 52, 66, 91, 120, 125, 149, 150, 164, 165, 168, 181, 217, 228, 239, 241, 244, 247, 254, 265, 296, 311 deliberate practice 164, 165, 247, 311 361

descriptive linguistic model of language 46 digital 96, 125, 126, 221, 282, 299 Direct Method 33, 34, 36, 40 dirigible 99, 106, 140, 279 disciplinary infrastructure 53 discourse 16, 70, 78, 102–104, 110, 132, 139, 144, 151, 152, 154, 155, 162, 167, 170, 171, 174, 178, 179, 183, 190, 196–199, 201, 203, 205, 206, 208, 209, 212, 214–219, 221, 223, 227, 228, 233, 236–242, 244–274, 276, 277, 280–287, 292–292, 296–299, 308–310 dispersal 93, 106 domain 18, 20, 21, 24, 25, 47, 54, 55, 56, 66, 67, 70, 73, 74, 77, 81–84, 89, 91, 96, 102, 105, 108, 121, 125, 139, 146, 147, 158, 162–165, 167, 172, 180, 186, 197, 200, 203, 210, 218, 219, 237, 238, 248, 256, 287, 294, 296, 297, 299, 311, 321 dynamics 15, 77, 100, 101, 121, 142, 156, 184, 207, 211, 259, 270 E echoic 132, 135, 137, 147, 158, 217, 241, 258–260, 294, 306 eclecticism 41, 49, 276 effector cells 98 elaboration 104, 137, 149, 155, 173, 192, 200, 211, 256, 267, 297, 306 ellipsis 107, 202, 203, 211, 237, 238, 295, 298, 314 emancipation 57–59, 86 emitting behavior 94, 179, 180, 189 empirical –– e. discipline 15, 64, 65, 72, 73, 75, 81, 85, 91, 108, 109, 277 –– e. domain 18, 21, 25, 67, 74, 81, 89, 91, 108 362

–– e. constraints 25, 285, 289 –– e. phenomenon 20, 21, 53, 54, 63, 73, 81, 85–87, 90, 232–234 –– e. system 46, 76, 86, 223 encasting 203, 211, 295 encoding 99, 102, 110, 119, 155, 158, 159, 174, 180, 198, 202, 204, 211, 212, 215, 217, 225, 231, 233, 234, 283, 287, 291, 295, 312 entity with borders 96 event 18, 21, 23, 25, 45, 53, 72, 73, 78, 79, 83, 85, 89, 101, 106, 107, 114–118, 120, 123, 124, 135, 136, 145, 147–149, 153, 154, 168, 174, 184, 185, 203, 206, 208, 209, 213, 214, 215, 217, 223, 225, 227, 235, 237, 238, 249, 257, 270, 283, 286, 287, 292, 297, 307, 309, 311, 316 executive system 129, 130, 158, 159, 161 experts 38, 161, 165, 166, 211, 245, 272 explanation 22–24, 31, 34, 54, 61, 65, 67, 69, 77, 78, 80, 81, 85, 94, 183, 184, 258, 303, 321 explanatory theory 24, 50, 51, 86 explicit 17–19, 21, 32, 35, 49, 50, 52, 55, 66, 68, 74, 75, 80, 99–101, 116, 119, 123, 148, 157, 166, 169, 170, 195, 198, 199, 208, 212, 216, 221, 222, 241, 247, 256, 261, 269, 270, 294, 296, 298, 312, 314, 321 extensive reading 250, 258, 267 F face 191, 240, 241, 295, 300, 313 face-to-face communication 35, 42, 207, 209, 241, 264, 265 factual input 174 feature coding 63, 118, 148, 151, 152, 154, 196, 294

feedback 18, 19, 44, 54, 66, 73, 79, 93, 98, 104, 106, 107, 114, 118, 124, 125, 130–132, 134, 139, 146, 159, 162, 163, 165–169, 174, 175, 178, 183, 185, 189, 192, 201, 202, 206, 209, 214, 216, 217, 219, 225, 227, 228, 233, 235, 238, 242, 244, 246–248, 250, 252, 258, 259, 261, 262, 268, 271, 272, 274–277, 279, 282, 285–288, 290, 291, 294–296, 298–300, 310, 312, 317, 321 feedback control system 124, 183, 310, 312 fine-grain 81, 91, 128 Foreign Language Didactics 16, 17, 20, 24, 26, 51, 53, 55, 58, 59, 62, 65, 72, 74, 87, 89, 99, 108, 222, 225, 226, 234, 277, 281, 291, 298, 300, 308 foreign language learning 15–21, 23, 24, 26, 29, 30, 35–37, 41, 42, 44–47, 49, 51–53, 55–59, 62–67, 73, 74, 82–89, 92, 93, 95, 97, 101, 102, 106, 108, 134, 137, 139, 145, 149, 151, 167–169, 171, 174, 178, 194, 214, 217, 220, 224, 226–229, 231, 234, 242, 258, 265, 274, 277, 281, 282, 285–288, 292, 296, 299, 300, 304, 305, 308, 311, 314, 316, 318, 321 frame 48, 147, 153, 154, 184, 193, 201, 211 G generalities 23 genre 70, 102, 203, 208, 211, 216, 219, 224, 237, 238, 249, 255–257, 262, 265, 266, 273, 285, 296, 297, 299 goal-orientation 118, 182, 206, 279, 289 Grammar-Translation Method 30, 32, 34–37 guided system 109, 115, 288

H high-resolution picture 91 hierarchy 23, 72, 77, 94, 95, 100, 109, 114, 119, 125, 129, 139, 147, 148, 153, 156, 161, 170, 172, 196, 197, 215, 226, 241, 244, 270, 272 heterarchy 161 Human Information Processing 16, 27, 81, 96, 97, 101, 103, 109, 111, 125, 128, 131, 135, 139, 141, 143, 145, 151, 153, 166–168, 170–172, 205, 223, 229, 231, 282, 284, 291, 300, 316 humanistic disciplines 79 hybrid processes 74, 132, 160, 161, 177, 221, 243, 283 I iconic 122, 132, 135, 147, 158, 218, 294, 306 idealization 23, 55, 59, 75, 86, 303 identity 24, 26, 27, 53, 58, 59, 61, 67, 76, 80, 82, 83, 87, 104, 108, 115, 121, 124, 136, 138, 139, 151, 155, 172, 178, 180, 183, 184, 186, 188, 190, 198, 202, 205, 207, 210, 211, 214, 219, 221, 222, 223, 235, 249, 264, 280, 311 implications 27, 35, 36, 49, 56, 59, 77, 162, 167, 168, 216, 224, 233, 276, 292, 301 implicit 18, 19, 50, 52, 99, 116, 120, 132, 138, 144, 148, 150, 151, 157, 166, 170, 199, 211, 221, 247, 265, 293, 294, 296, 311, 321 inductive 31–33 inferencing 123, 124, 147, 149, 155, 203, 237, 295, 297, 298, 314 information –– i. society 96 –– i. age 96 input 18, 19, 34, 53, 55, 64, 68, 79, 89, 94, 98, 102, 117, 118, 128, 131, 363

133, 137–139, 150, 151, 153, 155, 166–169, 172, 174, 178, 192, 205, 215, 216, 218, 224, 227, 233, 237, 239–241, 246, 248, 250, 251, 253, 254, 256, 258–262, 264, 265, 268, 270, 273–277, 284–288, 290, 291, 293, 296, 297, 299, 305, 314, 317 instinct 121, 188, 235, 292, 315 integration 63, 66, 89, 106, 112, 117, 122, 130, 133, 140, 156, 162, 163, 164, 183, 197, 199, 203, 210, 217, 235, 236, 237, 243, 244, 260, 263, 267–269, 279, 281, 289, 292, 298, 300, 310, 312 intensive reading 250, 256, 260, 297 intentional behavior 146, 190 intentionality 79, 81, 90, 99, 101, 117, 118, 121, 124, 140, 168, 181–183, 292, 304 interaction 16, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, 27, 33, 34, 50, 53, 55, 61, 62, 65, 67, 70, 73, 74, 79, 81, 85–88, 90, 92, 99, 100–102, 105, 109, 11, 114–118, 120, 123, 127, 128, 130, 131, 139, 140, 150, 151, 157, 167, 169, 170, 172, 177, 178–180, 187, 190, 193–195, 197, 198, 200–209, 211, 216, 219, 220, 222, 224, 227, 228, 232, 233, 236, 238, 240, 250, 252, 257–259, 274, 277, 280–282, 285–288, 290, 292, 294, 296–301, 303, 305, 307, 315, 317 interdisciplinary –– i. endeavor 55, 82, 84, 308 –– i. field 83 –– i. research 83, 84 interface 51, 64, 65, 72–74, 81, 102, 132, 134, 137, 293 interpersonal communication 98, 185, 210, 258, 259, 308 interpretation 20, 43, 61, 70, 74, 78, 81, 82, 88, 104, 106, 107, 123–125, 137, 364

158, 178, 181, 188, 194, 195, 197, 199–201, 203, 206, 214, 237, 251, 252, 261, 278, 295, 298, 318, 321 isomorphic 36, 47, 137 J joint –– j. attention 189, 191–193, 229, 296 –– j. action 209, 299 K knowledge –– k. representations 16, 66, 107, 125, 148, 151, 157, 158, 162, 163, 165, 167, 168, 175, 206, 207, 215, 217, 221, 224, 227, 228, 233, 235, 244, 247, 249, 266, 267, 270, 276, 279–283, 285, 294, 296, 299, 300, 314, 315 L language –– l. code 55, 92, 105, 109, 138, 139, 150, 177, 182, 194, 204, 216, 228, 242, 252, 262, 280, 281, 284, 285, 287, 290, 291, 293, 294, 298 life span 55, 56, 61, 62, 68, 90, 91, 92, 97, 99, 101, 106, 118, 121, 122, 132, 135, 149, 150, 168, 173, 178, 183, 189, 215, 233, 277, 280, 281, 284, 285, 289, 291, 296 –– l. dynamics 101 listening 32, 33, 39, 110, 201, 234, 239, 240–242, 256–258, 260–262, 264, 266–268, 275. 276, 297 living organism 90, 92, 94, 95, 112, 114, 115, 117, 169, 179, 181, 185, 278 M maturational changes 62 mechanism 15, 17, 19, 22, 27, 69, 80, 84, 91, 103, 111, 114, 124, 125,

130–132, 135–143, 148, 167, 168, 170–172, 174, 183, 206, 216, 223, 227, 228, 229, 231, 284, 285, 292, 304, 314, 316 memory –– episodic m. 101, 148–150, 168, 174, 218, 225, 227, 238, 287 –– generic m. 101, 149, 150, 168, 174, 225, 238 –– semantic m. 148, 287 mental –– m. lexicon 155, 215, 251, 294 –– m. model 71, 73, 75, 112, 115, 117, 120, 129, 163–165, 185, 195, 238, 239, 249, 255, 256, 267, 309, 316 –– m. representation 36, 68, 69, 73, 79, 97, 99, 102, 104–106, 109, 112, 117, 118, 122, 124, 125, 134, 137–139, 145, 146, 150, 152, 155, 158, 161, 166, 167, 171–173, 175, 179, 181, 182, 184, 188, 190, 195, 196, 199, 205, 206, 208, 214, 215, 217, 222–225, 228, 233, 235, 236, 242, 246, 247, 261, 262, 278, 280, 283, 285, 287, 288, 290, 292, 293, 295, 299, 307, 309, 311, 319 message 89, 100, 110, 126, 127, 144, 150, 158, 162, 180–186, 188, 192, 197, 198, 201–204, 206, 209–214, 216, 220, 224, 225, 228, 231, 232, 234, 236–238, 241, 242, 249, 255, 257, 258, 261, 263, 269, 270, 275, 278, 281, 282, 284, 287, 295, 299, 300, 301, 319 messenger 94 metamemory 149, 150, 174 meta-modal representation 104, 110, 241, 291, 298 meta-reflection 73, 79 method 24, 30–37, 40–44, 46, 49, 54, 58, 66, 71, 73, 79, 80, 84, 87, 93, 276, 291 methodology 20, 43, 54, 58, 82

macrostructure 152, 154, 155, 208 microstructure 152, 154 modality 71, 102, 109, 132, 135, 138, 145, 147, 150, 197, 204, 205, 215, 222, 290, 294, 298, 305 model 17, 22–25, 30, 46–49, 52, 54, 56, 57, 62, 63, 65, 67, 71–76, 79, 80, 83, 84, 88–90. 93, 94, 99, 105, 110, 112–117, 120, 121, 129, 134, 136, 137, 143, 144, 146, 150, 163–165, 166, 167, 170, 182, 185, 189, 193, 195, 216, 217–220, 223, 244, 238, 239, 241, 246, 247, 249, 255, 256, 258, 259, 261, 267, 268, 273, 285, 293, 296, 297, 304, 305, 308, 309, 312, 314, 316 modeling 47, 67, 70, 76, 93, 134, 163, 167, 200, 220, 224, 246, 259, 265, 268, 293, 294, 298, 299, 303, 312, 317 monitoring 130–132, 143, 146, 149, 160, 192, 214, 228, 237, 238, 252, 263, 279, 282, 283, 288, 291, 294, 295, 297, 299, 300 motherese 192 multiaspectual 158, 276 N networks 74, 81, 89, 90, 92, 96, 100, 102, 111, 117, 126, 147, 167, 178, 179, 183, 186, 187, 194, 199, 205, 215, 232, 234, 267, 278, 292, 299 ‘normal’ academic discipline 21, 66, 80, 81, 82, 84, 85, 87–89 native language 18–20, 30, 32–34, , 36, 37, 42, 134, 138 Natural Method 35, 37 naturalistic epistemology 69 neighbouring discipline/field 17, 25, 26, 30, 53, 82, 311 neurotransmitter 94, 98, 126, 128, 278, 282 365

non-verbal 113, 196, 198, 204, 211, 212, 228, 233, 237–240, 242, 255, 261, 263, 269 norm 18, 61, 70, 104, 107, 150, 152, 159, 164, 166, 167, 174, 175, 180, 184, 189, 199, 201, 204, 205, 209, 225, 229, 237, 242, 245, 262, 264, 266, 271, 275, 280, 287, 290, 300, 321 novices 161, 165, 166, 211, 245 nutrient 92, 97, 98, 116, 138, 185, 200 O ontological commitment 78 operation 16, 17, 21, 23, 25, 27, 36, 56, 57, 63–70, 72, 74, 75, 80, 80, 81, 85, 88, 89, 91, 93, 94, 99, 100, 102, 103, 106, 109, 110, 114–116, 119, 120, 122, 128, 130, 131, 132, 143, 146–148, 151, 157, 158, 160, 167, 171, 174, 178, 179, 181, 183, 201, 203, 204, 206, 212, 217, 218, 220, 223, 227, 231–234, 239, 241, 243– 246, 253, 262–264, 267–272, 274, 279–286, 290, 296, 298, 299, 300, 303, 304, 308, 310, 313, 316, 319 organizing 100, 111, 118, 137, 141, 147, 149, 153, 154, 173, 174, 231, 269, 291, 294, 297, 299, 305, 320 P paradigm 32, 66, 72–74, 79–82, 321 paradigmatic 35, 80, 103, 112, 132, 148, 151, 152, 172, 177, 215, 294, 296, 298, 299 parallel writing 219, 255, 256, 273 para-verbal 196, 237, 240, 242, 261 parsing 162, 235, 237, 251, 252, 254, 257, 295, 298, 309 pedagogy 20, 39, 40, 41, 46, 54, 55, 310 –– language p. 20, 54 366

pendulum swing 46, 110 percept 68, 133, 136, 143, 159, 306 perception 46, 69, 70, 79, 80, 102, 111, 113, 117, 123, 128, 131–137, 139, 145, 147, 150, 152, 155, 165, 169, 172, 173, 187, 188, 197, 202, 204, 205, 207–211, 213, 223, 232, 257, 282, 283, 291, 293, 295, 299, 306, 309, 311, 313, 319 perspective taking 189, 190, 203, 238, 288, 295, 298, 300, 312, 320 phenomenon 15–21, 23, 25, 26, 47, 51–56, 59, 63, 65–70, 73–78, 81, 83–91, 93, 110, 120, 143, 177, 178, 184, 193, 200, 201, 205, 221, 223, 224, 231–234, 289, 299–301, 303, 307, 308, 312, 316, 319, 321 planning 42, 61, 105, 121, 130–132, 141, 146, 147, 160, 183, 190, 192, 212, 217, 219, 239, 240, 243, 246, 263, 267–272, 279, 282, 283, 291, 294, 298, 299 polymodal 294 practical endeavor 53, 58 précis 256, 273 precision 23, 70, 106, 114, 118, 125, 126, 135, 150, 167, 174, 175, 185, 199, 205, 211, 221, 228, 241, 242, 246, 247, 252, 262, 275, 276, 280, 285, 288, 290, 293, 294, 298 predication 117, 279, 311 predictability 111, 152, 172, 173, 188, 203, 207, 320 pre-linguistic stage 30, 35, 42 pre-verbal 102, 103, 198, 200, 204, 212, 213, 238, 244 procedural representations/records 113, 130, 132, 138, 148, 156, 157, 159, 161, 164, 168, 169, 174, 198, 215, 241, 243, 246, 247, 259, 260, 269, 285, 293, 294, 296, 299, 305, 314

production 15, 16, 27, 34, 40, 69, 73, 102, 104, 107, 109, 110, 132, 138, 147, 150–152, 155, 156, 162, 169, 170, 173, 174, 178, 180, 192, 199, 204, 205, 215–219, 223, 225, 231–239, 242, 244, 246, 258, 259, 263, 266, 267, 269, 270, 275–277, 281, 284, 285, 287, 288, 290–292, 294, 296, 298–301, 305, 314 proposition 38, 68, 77, 103, , 117, 122, 123, 129, 132, 145, 148, 151, 155, 157, 162, 178, 196, 197, 210, 222, 237, 257, 266, 267, 271, 279, 306, 309, 311, 314 propositional meaning 158 protean nature of language 62, 231 pure level of a discipline 65, 67 reading 31, 32, 34, 36–39, 57, 92, 110, 154, 160, 168, 201, 234, 239, 240, 242, 248–258, 260, 264, 266, 267, 269, 270, 272, 273, 276, 297, 310, 314 R Reading Method, the 34 reasoning processes 35, 66, 70, 91, 93, 102, 147, 156, 207, 291, 293, 315 recall 148, 155, 159, 173, 203, 225, 228, 254, 256, 268, 270, 271 recognition 43, 47, 48, 83, 104, 109, 116, 118, 123, 133, 135, 138, 148, 152, 153, 167, 182, 191, 199, 203, 215, 219, 247–249, 251, 292, 296, 313, 319 receptor cells 94, 98 redundancy 158, 159, 211, 253, 257, 261, 290, 294, 319, 320 reference 17–19, 24, 25, 31, 37, 43, 45, 47, 48, 54, 59, 66, 74, 76, 79, 80, 89, 109, 116, 117, 130, 134, 138, 142, 148, 149, 168, 169, 180, 181, 182, 184, 192, 196, 211, 214, 220, 225,

231–233, 239, 244, 266, 273, 279, 303, 304, 308, 311, 313, 317 Reform Movement, the 32, 33, 36 rehearsal 142, 146, 147, 149, 163, 164, 167, 173, 217, 228, 244, 246, 248, 268, 293, 299 representation 15, 17, 21, 23, 25–27, 36, 46, 52–56, 59, 62, 65, 71, 73–75, 79, 81, 83, 89, 92, 95, 99, 102, 104, 105, 109, 110, 112, 113, 119, 120, 122, 124, 125. 127–130, 134, 136–139, 143, 150, 152, 158, 164, 166, 167, 174, 177, 179, 181, 182, 196, 197, 199, 205, 217, 218, 220, 222, 224, 233, 234, 240–242, 247, 257, 262, 275, 290, 293, 299, 303, 305, 307, 309, 311, 312, 316, 318, 319 retrieval 104, 145, 147, 152, 155, 159, 161, 171, 174, 199, 218, 243, 247, 319 retrospection 131, 132, 141, 142, 203, 212, 282, 283, 291, 294, 299 rote learning 32, 91, 159, 290 rule 21, 46, 61, 219, 236, 280, 313, 317 S scaffolding 192, 193, 229, 246, 290, 296, 299 scenario 132, 152, 154, 168, 197, 199–201, 206, 208, 216, 229, 237, 246, 296, 297, 299, 311 scientific versus practical reasoning 22 script 132, 147, 152–154, 168, 208, 216, 221, 247, 248, 299, 310, 275 scripted regularities 208 Second Language Acquisition Research 17, 20, 24, 50, 56, 65, 144, 220, 231 second language learning 18, 19, 29, 154 367

segmentation 133, 203, 251, 254, 257, 276, 298, 319 semantization 162, 169, 298 sender 15, 57, 74, 96, 102, 110, 123, 126, 127, 150, 162, 172, 180, 181, 183, 195, 198, 199, 201–203, 207– 215, 218, 221, 224, 225, 228, 232, 234, 237–239, 248, 249, 256–259, 266, 273, 278, 279, 282, 285, 289, 291, 295, 297, 298, 301, 314 sensory register 134, 135 shared knowledge 117, 210, 226, 238, 265 sign 40, 99, 119, 125–128, 134, 139, 147, 150, 171, 178–183, 196, 213, 220, 221, 223, 225–228, 234 signal 40, 94, 95, 179–182, 193, 209, 218, 240, 265, 272, 274, 284 situation 15, 45, 57, 63, 77, 78, 86, 89, 96, 103, 119, 123, 124, 127, 139, 144, 145, 147–149, 153, 154, 163, 168, 169, 171, 173, 174, 180, 184, 185, 187–192, 194, 195, 197, 198, 200, 201, 203, 204, 206–210, 213, 214, 216, 218–220, 222–227, 234, 235, 237–240, 242, 244, 248, 249, 251, 252, 255–257, 259, 260, 262–267, 269, 271, 279, 281–283, 285, 287, 289, 292, 295–297, 299, 306, 309, 313, 319 situational context 33, 34, 58, 103, 182, 204, 207, 210, 213, 218, 225, 237, 238, 249, 257, 273, 279, 286, 287 skill 16, 33, 35, 42, 50, 102, 110, 122, 157, 160–167, 173, 178, 179, 192, 193, 205, 214–217, 223, 228, 233, 235, 238, 242–250, 260–264, 266– 270, 273, 276, 277, 280, 281, 285, 287, 292, 296, 298, 299, 301, 310 social referencing 190, 193, 200, 229, 254, 296 368

sociocultural constraints 184 source discipline 41–46, 48, 49, 51–55, 57, 58, 63, 82 spatiotemporal system 53, 65, 73, 207 speaking 32, 34, 98, 110, 144, 234, 239, 240, 242–244, 256, 259–26, 266–270, 273–276, 298 speech 15, 16, 18, 19, 24, 27, 33, 34, 73, 74, 102, 125, 129, 131, 137, 138, 150, 151, 161, 169, 170, 178, 189, 190, 192, 206, 208, 218, 225, 226, 231–234, 236, 238–240, 242, 257, 258, 260–262, 265, 268, 276, 277, 285–287, 291, 298–301, 319 status 25, 29, 48, 49, 57, 65, 72, 80, 83, 87, 92, 135, 139, 159, 170, 182, 188, 192, 197, 202, 203, 210, 211, 223, 224, 233, 236, 238, 251, 257, 278, 295, 298, 320 stability of focus 76, 110 state-changing system 101, 233, 277, 280 states of language matter, three 280 stimulus 40, 94, 96, 100, 103, 104, 133, 135–138, 141, 144, 158, 172, 173, 179, 182, 215, 241, 250, 257, 293, 306, 315, 319 strategy 15–17, 19, 22, 24, 26, 27, 35, 53, 56–59, 62–65, 68, 74, 91, 101, 106, 107, 118, 122, 128, 132, 141, 142, 146, 147, 149, 151, 162, 163, 165, 166–170, 172–174, 188, 191, 198, 203, 205, 208, 213, 216, 217, 220, 223, 231, 233, 235, 244, 247, 250, 253–258, , 261, 263, 266–273, 275, 279, 283, 285, 290–301, 306, 308, 312, 319 subject matter 15, 16, 21, 23–27, 46, 51–56, 59, 63–65, 67, 70, 73–76, 80–83, 85–87, 90–92, 97, 102, 105, 108, 109, 111, 171, 182, 231, 234,

269, 278, 285, 291, 292, 298, 300, 303, 304, 308, 311, 321 summary 255, 267, 273 symbol 72, 77, 125, 129, 136, 148, 177, 179–181, 204, 221, 222, 318 symbolic –– s. ability 119 –– s. relationship 105, 119, 125, 127 symbolization 112, 119, 125, 190, 284, 311 synapse 94, 95, 284 syntagmatic 35, 103, 104, 112, 118, 132, 148, 151, 152, 159, 162, 172, 177, 198, 199, 212, 215, 217, 221, 228, 235, 236, 244, 245, 294, 296–299 subordinate system 130, 144, 161, 164 synchronization 114, 208, 243, 281 synergetic 45, 70, 117, 170, 293 –– s. relationship 45, 117, 170 system, closed/open 317, 320 T task 16, 21, 24, 25, 47, 51, 52, 62, 64, 66, 75, 76, 89, 93, 106, 107, 115, 118, 119, 124, 129–131, 140–142, 143, 145, 146, 148, 156, 158, 160–169, 172–174, 177, 178, 184, 189, 193, 198, 199, 203, 206, 208, 213, 216, 217, 219, 221, 224, 226–229, 231, 234, 238–240, 241, 243–248, 250, 252–264, 266–276, 286–294, 296–300, 312, 318, 319–321 technique 32, 39, 42, 43, 163 top-down 30, 43, 46, 54, 59, 67, 85, 86, 140, 155, 172, 204, 249, 250, 303 transcription 33, 39, 270 Transformational Generative Grammar 44 translation 30–41, 58, 306, 308 transmission 96, 100, 123, 126, 127, 232

transmitter 94, 98, 111, 119, 123, 126–128, 197, 278, 282 U understanding 15–19, 21–23, 25, 26, 30, 34, 38, 43, 50, 51, 54, 58, 62, 64–70, 75, 76, 82, 83, 85, 86, 88, 92, 93, 99, 107, 109, 115, 116, 123, 124, 129, 144, 145, 149, 155, 160, 162, 164, 167, 168, 170, 178, 182, 187, 192–194, 197, 203, 208, 213, 218, 223–225, 231, 232, 235, 238, 257, 258, 268, 277, 280, 284, 300, 307, 309, 310, 312, 316, 318, 319, 321 unified 55, 88, 321 uniqueness of language 109, 182, 223 unitary concept 93, 223 useful knowledge 93, 223 V verbal –– v. communication 15–17, 27, 45, 56, 58, 59, 65, 73, 74, 88, 91, 93–95, 99–103, 107–110, 113, 116, 117, 125, 127, 132, 135, 139, 143, 144, 148, 150, 151, 155, 156, 161, 162, 164, 168, 170–172, 174, 177–190, 192–211, 213–218, 220–228, 231–239, 248, 249, 256, 258, 259, 262–264, 267, 275–277, 280–286, 291–293, 295, 297, 298–301, 305–307, 311, 316, 320 veridical 69, 79, 112, 136, 307, 308 W whole-person involvement 108, 168, 202, 233, 237, 296 working memory 99, 106, 144–146, 148, 158, 159, 164, 167, 168, 173, 177, 190, 202–204, 217–219, 236, 240, 242, 246, 255, 257, 260, 262, 369

264, 267, 269, 282, 288, 291, 294, 297, 305 writing 15, 16, 27, 30–34, 36, 38, 73, 74, 102, 110, 129, 138, 150,

370

151, 160, 169, 178, 219, 225, 231, 234, 236–242, 255, 256, 258, 264, 266, 267, 269–277, 285, 287, 291, 298–301

5 On models and representations

5 On models and representations

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