Jul 1, 2014 - https://news.yahoo.com/lawmaker-iran-could-quit- nuclear-treaty-143329882.html. 10 Parisa Hafezi, âIrani
July 2014
A Good Deal is Better Than No Deal The Consequences of No Nuclear Deal with Iran Reza Marashi and Trita Parsi
Executive Summary A full cost-benefit analysis of securing a comprehensive nuclear deal must include fleshing out the consequences – nuclear, military, economic, as well as the impact on Iran’s internal and external orientation – of failing to reach a deal. Diplomatic failure will not lead to a continuation of the current status quo. Rather, it will result in a deterioration of the situation with severe military, economic and security consequences. On the nuclear front: §
Rather than reduce the threat of Iran’s nuclear program, the Iranians are likely to escalate their nuclear activities under no deal – and if attacked, an Iranian nuclear bomb will become a near-certainty.
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Limitations to Iran’s nuclear program under the interim deal will likely be reversed – Iran will likely increase enrichment at the 5 percent level and restart 20 percent enrichment, while adding more centrifuges, reducing the IAEA’s oversight of their program and potentially even withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
On the military front: §
Despite a clear political desire to avoid war, the U.S. and Iran will once again find themselves on a path towards such a confrontation.
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Eliminating Tehran’s nuclear program will require a U.S. invasion and occupation of Iran. This will require at least 500,000 U.S. troops and a 10-year occupation. Moreover, it will lead to the death of thousands of U.S. service women and men, tens of thousand wounded, and millions disabled – more than the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan combined.
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War will likely destabilize the entire region in an unprecedented way and further fuel sectarianism and regional rivalries.
On the economic front: §
The cost of a full-scale invasion and occupation of Iran – in the first three months alone – is estimated at $2.8 trillion.
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Oil prices could spike 20 to 30 percent if Iran’s exports fall sharply with serious consequences for the global economy.
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Continued sanctions will cost the U.S. and EU hundreds of billions of dollars in forewent export revenue, as well as hundreds of thousand of job opportunities lost for their respective export sectors.
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The international sanctions regime is likely to unravel if the U.S. is deemed responsible for the collapse of talks. This would break the international consensus the Obama administration carefully built up against Iran.
On the Iranian domestic front: §
If Rouhani has nothing to show for his diplomatic efforts, the political pendulum will swing back in favor of the hardliners – and Iranian pragmatists will back them in an effort to demonstrate that Washington is to blame for diplomacy failing.
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Pro-democracy activists and human rights defenders in Iran warn that they will suffer perhaps their greatest blow yet, potentially setting back their struggle a full generation.
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America enjoys unparalleled soft power among the Iranian population. This American strategic asset will quickly evaporate, however, if war breaks out between the two countries.
Clarity about these points must exist in order to not let the perfect become the enemy of the good. Rather than adhering to the mantra of “No deal is better than a bad deal,” the inverse relationship must be considered: A good nuclear deal is better than war.
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every aspect of the situation – militarily, economically, as well as in the nuclear realm.
Introduction With the July 20th soft deadline only days away, negotiators from the P5+1 and Iran are working overtime in Vienna to secure a comprehensive nuclear deal. It is clear that both sides want a good deal, and they emphasize this point with a common refrain: “No deal is better than a bad deal.” That may be true – but it might not be. Reality is that we do not truly know because the “no deal” scenario has not even begun to be fleshed out.
Nuclear Consequences The nuclear consequences of not reaching a comprehensive deal with Iran are best illustrated through two lenses: the interim nuclear deal that was signed in November 2013, and the likely steps Iran will take to advance its nuclear program if diplomacy breaks down.1
Few doubt that a collapse of negotiations will result in more sanctions and other forms of pressure for Iran. But what are the consequences for the U.S. and its allies? As we have consistently seen since at least 2003, the Iranian government will not stand idly and absorb sanctions, secret assassinations, cyber-warfare, and other forms of pressure. Instead, the track record shows an Iran that responds to pressure with pressure. In other words, if diplomacy falters, our recent history demonstrates a cycle of escalation that will increase.
Nearly eight months after the interim nuclear deal was signed, it is now clear that both sides have benefitted. Both war and an Iranian nuclear bomb have become a more distant prospect. Furthermore, as the Arms Control Association points out, both sides have held up their end of the bargain.2 More specifically, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirms that Iran has allowed significant reductions and monitoring of its nuclear program:3
Before the diplomatic process commenced, this cycle of escalation had already reached the precipice of a military conflict that most Americans and allied nations seek to avoid. Over the past year, both sides have taken a step back from the brink and engaged in real, substantive diplomacy. An important decision is only days away, and the pros and cons of sealing the deal will inevitably be weighed. However, to complete this cost-benefit analysis, the consequences – nuclear, military, economic, as well as inside Iran – of not sealing the deal must be fleshed out.
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No uranium enrichment above the 5 percent level.
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Converted or diluted its entire stockpile of uranium enriched to the 20 percent level. Since January 2014, Iran has reduced this stockpile from nearly 200 KG to zero.
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Refrained from installing or operating any new centrifuges,
1
To read the interim nuclear deal in full, see: http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131124_03 _en.pdf 2 Arms Control Association, “Implementation of the Joint Plan of Action At A Glance,” June 2014. Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/Implementation-of-theJoint-Plan-of-Action-At-A-Glance 3 To read IAEA reporting on Iran in full, see: http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/iaea_re ports.shtml
This white paper shows that a failure to reach a deal will not bring about a continuation of the current status quo. Rather, it will lead to a deterioration of
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nuclear deal is all but guaranteed.4 This includes, but is not limited to, the following:
including its more advanced centrifuges that can enrich uranium more efficiently. §
Refrained from any further construction or advancements of its existing enrichment facilities, as well as its Arak facility that was originally slated to become a heavy water reactor.
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Refrained from building any new enrichment or reprocessing facilities.
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More frequently inspections at nuclear facilities such as Natanz and Fordow, as well as uranium mines, mills, and centrifuge-related sites.
However, these steps are not only significant – they are also reversible. The interim nuclear deal states that each steps is not only voluntary, but also time-bound, with a duration of six months, and renewable by mutual consent. Iran agreed to these first steps to create time and political space for negotiating a comprehensive deal that verifiably demonstrates the peaceful nature of its nuclear program. Without a comprehensive deal, Iran is just as likely to increase the various technical aspects of its nuclear program, as the United States is likely to increase sanctions and other forms of pressure on Iran.
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Iran will increase its uranium enrichment activity and stockpile at the 5 percent level.
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It will resume enriching and stockpiling uranium at the 20 percent level up to – if not beyond – the red line on Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s cartoon bomb.5
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It will reduce all IAEA cooperation and monitoring to bare minimum levels that existed prior to signing the interim nuclear deal.
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It will likely build new nuclear facilities and install newer generation centrifuges. Iran has already stated its desire to do so as part of a comprehensive nuclear deal.6
In other words, each of the three alleged paths to a nuclear weapon that Netanyahu highlighted will become more likely without a comprehensive nuclear deal: enough uranium enriched to the 20 percent level for one bomb; the installation of newer
4
Greg Thielmann and Robert Wright, “The Trouble With ‘Breakout Capacity’,” Slate, June 18, 2014. Available at: http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreig ners/2014/06/iran_u_s_nuclear_negotiations_in_vienna_ why_it_s_critical_to_understand.single.html 5 Olga Khazan, “Netanyahu draws an actual red line…on a bomb cartoon,” Washington Post, September 27, 2014. Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/post /netanyahu-draws-an-actual-red-line--on-a-bombcartoon/2012/09/27/0841941c-08d3-11e2-858a5311df86ab04_blog.html 6 For Iran’s remarks on new nuclear facilities, see: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/24/us-irannuclear-russia-idUSKBN0EZ1JG20140624; For Iran’s remarks on new centrifuges, see: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/08/iranincrease-uranium-enrichment-capacity-supreme-leaderali-khamenei
What are the likely steps that Iran will take to advance its nuclear program if diplomacy breaks down? We do not have to look very far into the recent past to get a clear picture. As journalist Robert Wright and 25-year veteran American diplomat Greg Thielmann note, reversing key steps that were taken as part of the interim
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generation centrifuges, combined with an increased stockpile of uranium enriched to the 5 percent level; and constructing, fueling, and advancing Iran’s plutonium option at its Arak reactor.7
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All of this was enough to run the risk of war one year ago – but it is far from the worst of it. Iran is unlikely to stop at replicating nuclear progress it has already achieved in the past. As former French Ambassador to Iran Francois Nicoullaud notes, if diplomacy falters and the conflict escalates to new and dangerous levels, so too will the progress that Iran strives for with regard to its nuclear program.8 This likely includes, but is not limited to, the following: §
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Begin enriching uranium to the 90 percent level and re-start the weaponization activities that were halted in 2003 – all in an effort to build and test a nuclear weapon.
The likelihood of these scenarios is directly correlated to the threat perception Iran feels vis-à-vis escalation by the U.S. – especially a military attack. In fact, one of the primary drivers behind Iran re-starting its nuclear program in the 1980s and conducting weaponization activities was its threat perception vis-à-vis Saddam Hussein’s Iraq after the Iran-Iraq war.11 Iran’s deep international isolation during those years – including chemical weapons attacks that produced no international intervention or censure – has shaped a generation of decision-makers in Tehran who view security through Iran’s own version of “Never Again.”
Begin publicly debating a withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), with a very real risk of following through.9 Iran has repeatedly stated its refusal to be treated differently than other NPT signatories. Without a comprehensive deal, it will not be able to freely pursue nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the relevant articles of the NPT in conformity with its obligations therein – as called for in the interim nuclear deal.
Without a comprehensive nuclear deal, the U.S. and Iran will likely return to and reinvigorate the cycle of mutual escalation that brought them to the brink of war one year ago. This time, however, extremists in both capitals will be able to point to an empty-handed diplomatic process to reinforce their escalatory policy preferences.
Follow through on its oft-repeated threat to enrich uranium to the 60 percent level.10
Military Consequences
The military consequences of not reaching a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran have been clearly defined by the White House: “You close the door on diplomacy,
7 For more on Netanyahu’s views, see his 2012 speech at the United Nations General Assembly: http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/fulltranscript-of-netanyahu-speech-at-un-generalassembly-1.386464 8 Francois Nicoullaud, “Bad Deal Better Than No Deal?,” LobeLog, July 1, 2014. Available at: http://www.lobelog.com/bad-deal-better-than-no-deal/ 9 Ali Akbar Dareini, “Lawmaker: Iran could quit nuclear treaty,” Associated Press, April 8, 2013. Available at: https://news.yahoo.com/lawmaker-iran-could-quitnuclear-treaty-143329882.html 10 Parisa Hafezi, “Iranian MPs propose bill to enrich uranium up to 60 percent,” Reuters, December 25, 2013.
Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/02/us-irannuclear-uranium-idUSBRE8910VJ20121002 11 Karl Vick, “Blame Saddam: Another Way of Seeing Iran’s Nuclear Program,” TIME, April 19, 2012. Available at: http://world.time.com/2012/04/19/blame-saddamanother-way-of-seeing-irans-nuclear-program/
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Affairs.15 The number of dead, wounded and traumatized American troops would be much higher in a war with Iran – a bigger country with military personnel and capabilities are far superior to prewar Iraq and Afghanistan. As former Bush administration Deputy National Security Adviser Jim Jeffrey quipped: “If you want to be serious about regime change, I give you Iraq 2003. Have a nice day.”16
and you’re left only with a choice between a possible military option or Iran steadily advancing its nuclear program.”12 However, along with war and an Iranian nuclear weapon comes an array of dangerous military consequences that must be fleshed out to truly understand the gravity of not sealing the deal. Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson, former chief of staff to Secretary of State Colin Powell, was unequivocal in his assessment: “So, what’s it going to take to eliminate Iran’s nuclear program? An invasion. It’s going to take 500,000 troops. It’s going to take another 100,000 or 200,000 good allies – not El Salvador. It’s going to require Britain, France, Germany, the Turks, maybe, others, India, who have formidable land forces, and it’s going to take ten years and $2 trillion.”13 In addition to Colonel Wilkerson’s authoritative assessment, military consequences include: §
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An immeasurably negative impact on American troops. The number of U.S troops who have died fighting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan totaled 6,802 as of April 2014.14 Over 52,000 U.S. troops have been wounded in the wars, and over 970,000 Iraq and Afghanistan war veterans have registered disability claims with the U.S. Department of Veterans
A militarized Iranian nuclear program. According to former IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, war might destroy Iran’s major nuclear facilities, but it will persuade it to build a nuclear weapon. He famously said in 2012: “You can bomb their facilities, but you cannot bomb their knowledge.”17 To that end, Iran will likely take unprecedented steps to ensure the safety of its nuclear engineers, drive its program deep into secrecy, and all but guarantee that its nuclear program is reconstituted for the explicit purpose of building a nuclear weapon under the auspices of self defense.
Greg Sargent, “White House to Senate Dems: Your Iran sanctions bill makes war more likely,” Washington Post, December 19, 2013. Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plumline/wp/2013/12/19/white-house-to-senate-dems-youriran-sanctions-bill-makes-war-more-likely/ 13 “Transcript of Col. Wilkerson Speaking on Lobbying with FCNL,” Friends Committee on National Legislation, September 19, 2012. Available at: http://fcnl.org/issues/iran/transcript_of_col_wilkerson_s peaking_on_lobbying_with_fcnl/ 14 For more information on numbers of U.S. troops who have died in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, see Brown University’s “Costs of War” project. Available at: http://costsofwar.org/article/us-killed-0
For more information on numbers of U.S. troops who have been wounded in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, as well as post-combat disability claims, see Brown University’s “Costs of War” project. Available at: http://costsofwar.org/article/us-and-allied-wounded 16 Laura Rozen, “U.S. Iraq Envoy Sees ‘Great Deal of Continuity’ from Bush to Obama,” Al-Monitor, August 9, 2012. Available at: http://www.almonitor.com/pulse/originals/2012/al-monitor/exiting-usenvoy-obama-bushtweed.html# 17 Aibing Guo, “ElBaradei Says Iran To Develop Atomic Weapons If Israel Attacks,” Bloomberg, March 21, 2012. Available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-0321/elbaradei-says-iran-to-develop-atomic-weapons-ifisrael-attacks.html
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§
§
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Unprecedented regional destabilization. The Middle East is already deeply unstable. If a nuclear deal falls through and the U.S.-Iran conflict escalates to previous levels and beyond, it will have a negative impact on Iran’s relations with nearly all other countries in the region – most of which are long-standing American allies. This, in turn, will fuel an already combustible proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia that has already dragged in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, Afghanistan, and Yemen to varying degrees.18 If the sectarian nature of this proxy war increases beyond its already dangerous levels, the instability will likely bleed into the UAE, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey. Instability in the Middle East has been known to transcend borders.
Use of asymmetric warfare capabilities to militarize the Strait of Hormuz. Iran has threatened to disrupt, if not block, the Strait in order to obstruct the transport of the majority of Middle East oil exports.20 It has military speedboats, submarines, missiles, and mines that can carry out such attacks, as it demonstrated in the infamous Tanker War in the 1980s – and today, Iran’s capabilities are much more robust, refined and lethal. Creating this destabilizing effect for weeks or months would come at a time when oil prices are high and the global oil market is tight due to disruptions from Iraq and Libya.
Economic Consequences The economic consequences of not reaching a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran are just as devastating to global security as the military consequences – and they are often inextricably linked. However, the economic costs often go unmentioned when discussing the pros and cons of sealing the deal with Iran. These costs include, but are not limited to:
Use of asymmetric warfare capabilities to increase acts of terrorism. Though it is not entirely clear who perpetrated the bombing of an Israeli tourist bus in Bulgaria and a similar attempt in Cyprus, or assassination plots against Israeli diplomats in India, Georgia, Thailand and Kenya, and Saudi Arabia’s ambassador in Washington, these attacks may demonstrate Iran’s ability to operationalize an asymmetric strategy. Its political, economic and military support for Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad will likely increase as well.19
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Cost of war in the trillions of dollars. Between fiscal years 2001 and 2014, the U.S. has spent over $4 trillion dollars on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan – and the costs of war don't end when the fighting stops. The U.S. has incurred debt obligations by fighting the wars, and
For more on the growing Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry, see Mohsen Milani, “Iran and Saudi Arabia Square Off,” Foreign Affairs, October 11, 2011. Available at: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136409/mohsenm-milani/iran-and-saudi-arabia-square-off 19 Bijan Khajehpour, Reza Marashi and Trita Parsi, “‘Never Give In and Never Give Up’: The Impact of Sanctions on
Tehran’s Nuclear Calculations,” March 2012. Available at: http://www.niacouncil.org/site/DocServer/Never_give_i n__never_give_up.pdf 20 “Iran says it has plan to close Strait of Hormuz,” USA Today, July 7, 2012. Available at: http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/story/201 2-07-07/iran-strait-of-hormuz/56083762/1
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estimates put the interest payments on America’s debt at approximately $1 trillion dollars by 2023, or over $7 trillion by 2053.21 According to the Federation of American Scientists, the likely cost of war with Iran – in the first three months of U.S. action alone – will be between approximately $1.7 trillion for a sustained bombing campaign and approximately $2.8 trillion for a full-scale invasion and occupation.22 The actual costs of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan far exceeded the projected costs. There is no reason to believe that a war with Iran would be any different in this regard. §
output would have "serious consequences" for the world economy.23
Prolonged energy price increase. Regardless of how long it takes the U.S. and Iran to reach the point of war, further escalating the conflict in the wake of diplomacy faltering would cause a significant spike in oil prices that could last for weeks or months. The impact on oil prices should not be underestimated, especially given the fragility of economic recovery in the U.S. and EU. International Monetary Fund Managing Director Christine Lagarde warned that oil prices could jump 20% to 30% if Iran's exports fall sharply, as it would take some time for other exporters to adjust global supplies and stabilize prices. Any such disruption in oil
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Billions of dollars in forewent export revenue for the U.S. In a July 2014 report co-written by the authors of this white paper, our econometric analysis revealed that the U.S. has been by far the biggest loser of all sanctions enforcing nations. From 1995-2012, the U.S. forewent between $134.7 and $175.3 billion in potential export revenue to Iran. For the sake of comparison, Germany was the European country hit the hardest, losing between $23.1 and $73.0 billion between 2010 and 2012, with Italy and France following at $13.6$42.8 billion and $10.9-$34.2 billion, respectively. Moreover, between 2010-2012, sanctions cost the EU states more than twice as much as the United States in terms of lost trade revenue.24
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Hundreds of thousands of jobs lost for the U.S. export sector. There is also a human element to the cost of Iran sanctions to the U.S. economy, measured in terms of jobs needed to support higher export levels. On average, the United States export sector lost between 51,043 and 66,436 jobs per year, and as many as 214,657279,389 in 2008 alone.25
21 For more information on the costs of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as debt obligations and payments, see Brown University’s “Costs of War” project. Available at: http://costsofwar.org/article/economic-costsummary 22 Charles P. Blair, “War with Iran? Revisiting the Potentially Staggering Costs to the Global Economy,” Federation of American Scientists, May 23, 2013. Available at: http://fas.org/blogs/security/2013/05/warwith-iran-revisiting-the-potentially-staggering-costs-tothe-global-economy/
23
Mukesh Jagota, “IMF’s Lagarde Flags Oil Price Threat,” Wall Street Journal, March 20, 2012. Available at: http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702 304724404577293301561222604 24 Jonathan Leslie, Reza Marashi and Trita Parsi, “Losing Billions: The Cost of Iran Sanctions to the U.S. Economy,” July 2014. Available at: http://www.niacouncil.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/07/Losing-Billions-The-Cost-ofIran-Sanctions.pdf 25 Ibid.
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§
source of leverage for the targeted state.”28
U.S.-led sanctions unravel. President Obama himself has stated that the unprecedented sanctions regime against Iran could unravel if the U.S. does not show good faith in trying to reach a comprehensive nuclear deal.26 Some countries could stop enforcing unilateral U.S. sanctions out of frustration with Washington, and others could roll back their own sanctions – most notably, the EU.27 European and Asian countries could be tempted to increase or re-establish their oil imports from Iran. As it stands today, most of America’s Asian allies are unhappy with the status quo, and Europe is divided at best. It is also worth noting that public pressure over the inevitably increasing number of stories, videos and pictures of innocent Iranians suffering as a result of sanctions would also help expedite the unraveling of sanctions, as was the case in Iraq during the 1990s. As former National Security Council director and CIA analyst Ken Pollack notes: “It is a big mistake to assume that the sanctions can be held in place indefinitely. What the experience of Iraq should teach us is that painful sanctions inevitably unravel, and the stronger the sanctions the sooner they unravel. Even more so when the targeted state has massive oil reserves that are a huge enticement for other countries and, therefore, a great
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Increased spending on regional security. Between 1946 and 2010, the U.S. has sent $89 billion in military aid to Middle Eastern governments. Israel is its own category, having received a whopping $123 billion in military aid during the same time period.29 Combined, this $212 billion dollar military investment in the Middle East has been unable to buy peace, let alone stability. These numbers have only increased since 2010. Absent a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran, the U.S. will almost certainly be forced to increase its military aid to Middle Eastern allies in an effort to maintain the regional security framework as best it can. In other words, if the U.S. does not seal the deal with Iran, American taxpayers will be paying even more to double down on a military alliance structure that has proven unable to provide stability or peace.
Internal Iranian Consequences President Hassan Rouhani and his team have bet his presidency on their ability to reach a comprehensive nuclear deal. With all of their proverbial eggs in one basket, these negotiations will help determine who and what will define Iran's foreign and
28
“Candid Discussions: Kenneth Pollack on U.S. Policy in the Middle East,” Foreign Policy Association, April 26, 2014. Available at: http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2014/04/26/candiddiscussions-kenneth-pollack-on-u-s-policy-in-themiddle-east/ 29 “After $300 Billion In U.S. Aid To The Middle East, Still No Stability,” Huffington Post, August 19, 2013. Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/19/us-aidmiddle-east_n_3779275.html
26
“FULL TRANSCRIPT: Obama at Saban Forum,” Haaretz, December 7, 2013. Available at: http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacydefense/1.562259 27 Ellie Geranmayeh, “Détente with Iran: How Europe Can Maximize the Chances of a Final Nuclear Deal,” European Council on Foreign Relations, May 2014. Available at: http://www.ecfr.eu/page//ECFR104_IRAN_BRIEF_AW_(2).pdf
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domestic policies for decades to come. Will it be the security-oriented, confrontational and internally repressive orientation preferred by the Iranian hardliners? Or will the more cooperative, moderate and win-win approach favored by Rouhani and the majority of Iranians take root and prevail? Absent a comprehensive nuclear deal, the internal Iranian consequences will likely include, but are not limited to: §
pendulum will swing back in favor of the hardliners.30 §
Political pendulum swings back to the hardliners – perhaps permanently. The shift in power following Rouhani's election and the interim nuclear deal has by no means cemented a new Iranian outlook. On the contrary, the narrative of Iran's hardliners remains firm and has only temporarily been sidelined: It portrays the West as a brutal, immoral entity out to "get" Iran, deprive it of scientific and technological advances, and keep it dependent on foreign powers. Sealing the deal with Iran will not guarantee further success by Rouhani in his efforts to improve Iran’s foreign and domestic policies, but as in any political undertaking, one must play the odds. Empowering Rouhani’s approach in Tehran through a comprehensive nuclear deal represents an opportunity for the West to maximize this opening, which may be the last best chance at solidifying a new, more collaborative and less hostile orientation among Iran’s political elite. If Rouhani has nothing to show for his efforts, the political
Pragmatists shift their position and back hardliners. We do not have to look very far into our recent past to see what will happen to Iranian pragmatists if their efforts to reach a comprehensive nuclear deal prove unsuccessful. After the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 200 and Iraq in 2003, as well as failed nuclear negotiations with the EU, senior Iranian officials – with the direct support of Supreme Leader Khamenei – reached out to Washington and offered unprecedented collaboration. When their outreach on both fronts was eventually rebuffed by the Bush administration, they were forced to take a backseat to Iranian hardliners who had long argued that if you provide assistance from a position of weakness, Washington interprets it as giving in – and you get negative results.31 The same Iranian decision-makers that masterminded Tehran’s outreach in 2001 and 2003, as well as its nuclear negotiations with the EU, have returned to power with the election of President Rouhani. As a pro-diplomacy, pro-nuclear deal Iranian official told us recently: “The U.S. should know that if nuclear negotiations are not successful,
30
For more on Iran’s post-election political context, see Bijan Khajehpour, Reza Marashi and Trita Parsi, “Extending Hands and Unclenching Fists: Reorienting Iran’s Outlook Beyond the Nuclear Deal,” December 2013. Available at: http://www.niacouncil.org/site/DocServer/Extending_Ha nds_Unclenching_Fists.pdf 31 For more on Iran’s outreach to the U.S. in 2001 and 2003, as well as the failed nuclear negotations with the EU, see Trita Parsi, “Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States,” Yale University Press, October 1, 2007.
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Rouhani and his team will not be sidelined by hardliners – they will turn into hardliners. They truly believe that the degree of flexibility they have shown in these negotiations has demonstrated to everyone – including themselves – that Washington is to blame if talks fail.”32 §
improvement of the relations between Iran and Western powers will gradually remove the warlike and securitized environment from Iran, save the people from their current harsh lives and strengthen the middle class…Many Iranian intellectuals and academics and even Iran's political prisoners, both inside and outside Iran, advocate such a path.”33
Democracy and human rights in Iran will suffer perhaps its greatest blow yet. Akbar Ganji, a journalist and one of Iran’s most prominent political dissidents, has made such a compelling case for this point that it deserves to be quoted in full: “So long as there is an external threat that endangers its survival, no regime will agree to reform itself and become democratic…National security and economic prosperity are prerequisites for the emergence of a democratic regime. Destroying the infrastructure of a nation through harsh economic sanctions and war will not bring about a transition to democracy. Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria are prime examples of the failure of such thinking…A prosperous middle class is the agent for transition to democracy. Crippling economic sanctions only add millions of middle-class people to the ranks of the poor, denying the democratic movement of its most potent element. Under such conditions, everyone only struggles for survival, moral standards and trust decline, and democracy and human rights will be viewed as unaffordable luxury…Step-by-step nuclear accords, the lifting of economic sanctions and the
§
33
Akbar Ganji, “The Iran Nuclear Accord Is Good for Human Rights,” Huffington Post, January 21, 2014. Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/akbarganji/the-iran-nuclear-accord-i_b_4612588.html
32
America loses political capital among Iranians. At present, Iranians are arguably the least antiAmerican population in the Middle East. That could quickly change for the worse in the absence of a comprehensive nuclear deal. While its clear that a majority of Iranians would welcome the improved relations with America that a comprehensive nuclear deal would provide, its equally important to remember that the U.S. lost tremendous political capital among Iranians after the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Skepticism of Washington’s intentions in the Middle East increased, and the Arab Spring reaffirmed for many Iranians their perception of American double standards. To that end, popular Iranian officials like former President Mohammad Khatami and current Foreign Minister Javad Zarif will almost certainly speak publicly about the details of the negotiations, explaining why Washington rather than Tehran is to blame for failure – and a large number of Iranians will likely believe them. This will help evaporate America’s best – and
Interview with Iranian official, July 1, 2014.
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only – asset inside Iran. As Farideh Farhi, Independent Scholar and Affiliate Graduate Faculty at the University of Hawai'i at Manoa, notes: “[There is a] belief by many that Tehran is making its best effort to reach an agreement, even perhaps giving in on some key demands by its interlocutors. This places the Rouhani administration in a good position to blame the U.S. if no deal is reached at least domestically.”34
former chief of staff to Secretary of State Colin Powell, this war would require an invasion of Iran led by 500,000 American troops, take ten years, and cost $2 trillion.
Conclusion This paper does not advocate any specific formula for reaching a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran. Instead, it seeks to inform the debate as the merits of a deal are weighed. Doing so is critical now more than ever precisely because the debate in the run-up to the Iraq war was deeply misinformed – and misinformation leads to costly misperceptions and miscalculations.
The economic disruption of yet another major war in the Middle East will be devastating and likely dwarf the cost of the Iraq and Afghan wars combined.
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Rather than reduce the threat of Iran’s nuclear program, the Iranians are likely to escalate their nuclear activities under no deal – and if attacked, an Iranian nuclear bomb will become a near-certainty.
Needless to say, the nuclear, military, economic, and internal Iranian consequences that both sides would face without a nuclear deal are staggering. Clarity about this crucial point must exist in order for decision-makers and the American public not to let the perfect become the enemy of the good. Rejecting a good deal because it is not perfect – a line some in Congress appear to take – will only lead to an even more imperfect situation under no deal. In fact, rather than adhering to the mantra of “No deal is better than a bad deal,” the inverse relationship must be considered: A good nuclear deal is better than war.
When assessing the consequences of a “No Deal” scenario, it becomes clear that a good deal is better than no deal. The consequences of failing to reach a nuclear accord will be dire for both sides – a true lose-lose scenario. Any notion that a breakdown of talks will lead to a continuation of the current status quo is mistaken. Rather, there will be a deterioration of every aspect of the situation – militarily, economically, as well as in the nuclear realm: §
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The U.S. and Iran will once again find themselves on a path towards a disastrous war. According to Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson,
34 Farideh Farhi, “Rouhani’s First Year,” LobeLog, June 27, 2014. Available at: http://www.lobelog.com/iranrouhanis-first-year/
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