relevance of this question to the problem of evil is ..... OF EVIL. Il? besieged
Keilah if David had stayed in the city.15. That a world in which Saul besieges
Keilah ...
Philosophical
American Volume
Quarterly
14, Number
2, April
1977
III. MIDDLE
ROBERT
MERRIHEW
had not been shot, would President Kennedy he have bombed North Vietnam? God only knows. Or does He? Does even He know what Kennedy would have done ? There is a little known but interesting literature on the general issue exemplified by this question. TF *
In
the
a
i58o's
fierce
controversy
between
erupted
about the relation the Jesuits and the Dominicans between God's grace and human free will. The Jesuits held, among other things, that many human are
actions
not
in
free
the
sense
that
their
are
agents
or causally determined to do them. always be used in this sense in the then does God maintain essay.) How over human history? Not by causally
logically ("Free" will
present control
human determining to believe,1 seemed
in which
He
accordance
actions, but by
with
as
the
causing
Dominicans
His
freely answer
This
plans.
conditional
in
a middle
ledge?between
status God's
between
other
knowledge
kinds of
of the
sort
the
are
that
that sup?
of
creatures
who
ever
whom
made
made
free
choices, choices?
wrong
but The
relevance of this question to the problem of evil is obvious and well known. If He could have, why didn't He? If He couldn't have, that's a good enough reason why He didn't. He could not have done it by causally determining the choices of
was
for
creatures,
then
their
choices
and
acts
would
not
have been free in the relevant sense. But it might seem that if God has middle knowledge, He could have
know?
allowed
creatures
secured
creating
merely
or and His knowledge of the actual; possible of necessary truths, which between His knowledge all follow from the divine nature, and His know? that is ledge of His own will and everything causally determined by His will.2 This paper is about two questions. The first is even for is possible, whether middle knowledge
of
propositions
had
He
none
developed with great ingenuity by Luis de Molina, and defended by other Jesuit theologians, notably Suarez. Their theory includes the by Francisco thesis that God knows with certainty what every possible free creature would freely do in every in which situation that creature could possibly find himself. Such knowledge was called "middle by the Jesuits, because they thought it knowledge" had
that it is not, on the ground
posed to be known by middle knowledge cannot be true. I will examine (in section II) the attempts of Molina and Suarez to explain how God can have and then (in section III) the middle knowledge; account recently offered by Alvin Plantinga, who has reinvented the theory of middle knowledge. Two objections to my position will be discussed in section IV. The idea of middle knowledge emerges in recent discussion because of its philosophical chiefly to the second question relevance that I shall dis? is whether God could have made free cuss, which creatures who would always have freely done right. More precisely: Could God have brought it about that
act
PROBLEM
ADAMS I shall argue
God.
circumstances
that we would
knew
THE
AND KNOWLEDGE OF EVIL
those to
act
sinless
that He freely.
knew
In
section
but
free
V,
by
not
would
therefore,
just
sin
if
we
shall see what light the discussion of middle know? ledge may shed on the question whether God could have
arranged
to have
free
creatures
who
were
all
sinless.
But first of all (in section I) I will try to explain why there seems to me to be a problem about the possibility of middle knowledge.
1An to the debate contribution is Diego De auxiliis divinae gratiae et acutely argued Dominican Alvarez, O.P., (Didacus) humani arbitrii viribus, et lib?rtate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia (Rome, the seventh 1590) ; see especially disputation. 21 believe Molina the term "middle I have given a very simplified account of his originated knowledge" (scientia media). reasons for thinking it appropriate. See his Liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis, divina praescientia, et reprobatione providentia, praedestinatione concordia [hereafter abbreviated, Concordia], ed. by John Rabeneck (O?a and Madrid, 1953), qu. 14, art. 13, disp. 52, m 9-10, and disp. 53, memb. 1, n. 6, and memb. 4, n. 4 (pp. 339f., 360, 394). log
IIO
AMERICAN
PHILOSOPHICAL
QUARTERLY
I In the twenty-third chapter of the first book of Samuel it is written that after David had rescued and the Jewish city of Keilah from the Philistines, settled his men there, Saul made plans to besiege David Keilah in order to capture David. When heard of Saul's plans, he consulted God by means of of
an
which
ephod, divination
was
apparently
that
a
yielded
an
instrument answer
yes-or-no
to
questions. David asked, "Will Saul come down, as The Lord answered thy servant has heard?" men of David Then "Will the asked, affirmatively. Keilah surrender me and my men into the hand of Saul?" And the Lord replied, "They will surrender David his men from evacuated you." Thereupon out in with the result that hid the and Keilah, hills, to besiege him Saul did not have the opportunity in Keilah, did not have and the men of Keilah occasion to betray him to Saul. (I Samuel 23:1 -14,
RSV)
passage was a favorite proof text for the theologians. They took it to prove that God to be true: the following two propositions Saul would be? stayed in Keilah, (1) If David the siege city. (2) If David stayed in Keilah and Saul besieged the city, the men of Keilah would surrender to Saul. David
This Jesuit knew
for it is assumed This is a case of middle knowledge; in (1) and (2) would that all the actions mentioned have been free, in the relevant sense, if they had occurred. If we
versy whether
suppose
that
as
Therefore, comes
determinate
say that (i) and
Suarez would
are
God
we
is omniscient,
cannot
back
those truth."
Suarez to
says,
this, conditionals 3
"the that have
contro?
whole we
should a
see
respectively, pairs that one member fore
(2) and and be
(4),
there? true.
He
thus affirms what has been called the law of Con? But this is a mistake. To ditional Excluded Middle. obtain
the
tion
is not
must
negate
enough the whole
a
of
contradictory
conditional
to negate
the
consequent; as was
conditional,
proposi? one pointed
out by Alvarez.4
Dominican Suarez's opponent, Diego It is true that in everyday speech we might deny (1) by asserting (3), as we may deny a by asserting any belief we hold that is proposition obviously enough inconsistent with it. But we might also deny both of them by asserting, "If David Saul might or might not besiege stayed in Keilah, the city." I believe the case of what Saul would or might have done ifDavid stayed inKeilah provides a
plausible
counterexample
Conditional
Excluded
have
even
found
to
more
the
law
proposed
and
Middle;
of
philosophers counter?
convincing
examples.5
I do not understand what it would be for any of to be true, given that the (i)-(4) propositions actions in question would have been free, and that David I will explain my did not stay in Keilah. incomprehension.
First we must
note
simple yb^knowledge.
that middle knowledge is not The answers that David got
will the ephod?"He surrender you"?are as categorical theologians
from
predictions,
categorical have about ponding
contingent to the
they predict. true
that
supposed
come not
categorical can events,
actual
occurrence
But propositions
in this way.
For
there
never
and
down," understood
"They the
by
were they false. Most
If
predictions. they would
Suarez
(including
philosophers
knowable
But I do doubt that propositions (1) and (2) ever were, or ever will be, true. This is not because I am inclined to assert the truth of their opposites, not Saul would stayed in Keilah, (3) If David the city. besiege
(3), and
of contradictories, must of each pair
will
had this middle that He doubt consistently we that doubt and unless (1) (2) were knowledge true.
(4) If David stayed in Keilah and Saul besieged the men not the city, of Keilah would to Saul. surrender David
be
but
not Molina)
predictions, true be by of
the
(1) and was
nor
even corres?
event
that
(2) are not will
be
an
besieging of Keilah by Saul, nor an actual to David to of Saul by the men of Keilah, betrayal which those propositions might correspond.6 Some other grounds that might be suggested for actual
3 to De vol. 7, p. 85. (All my page references Suarez, De gratia, prol. 2, c. 7, n. 1, in his Opera omnia (Paris, 1856-1878), and volume.) gratia will be to this edition 4 Alvarez, op. cit., Bk. 2, disp. 7, n. 30 (p. 74). See Suarez, De gratia, prol. 2, c. 7, n. 24 (p. 95). 5David of Conditionals," American Philosophical "Four Kinds Lewis, Counterfactuals (Oxford, 1973), p. 79f.; John H. Pollock, was defended in "A Theory law of Conditional Excluded C. Stalnaker, Middle Quarterly, vol. 12 (1975), p. 53- The by Robert Rescher American Philosophical ed. by Nicholas of Conditionals," 2, Studies in Logical Theory, Series, No. Quarterly Monograph (Oxford, 1968), p. io6f. 6 Suarez see his "De scientia Dei futurorum saw this point pretty clearly; abbreviated, DSDFC], contingentium" [hereafter Bk. 2, c. 5, n. 6 {Opera omnia, vol. 11, p. 357).
MIDDLE
AND
KNOWLEDGE
of (i) and (2) are ruled out by the that the actions of Saul and the men of assumption Keilah are and would be free in the relevant sense. The suggestion that Saul's besieging Keilah follows staying there is by logical necessity from David's in It would be more case.7 any implausible to that Saul's suggest besieging Keilah plausible from David's follows by causal necessity staying there, together with a number of other features of in fact obtained. But both of the situation which the
these tion
truth
are
suggestions that Saul's
Since
action
of
have
would
is
necessitation sort
relevant
with
inconsistent
free
the
been
with
incompatible we
will,
assump? free.
seek
might
the non
grounds for the truth of (1) and (2) in necessitating the actual intentions, desires, and character of Saul It does appear and the Keilahites. from the that Saul actually Biblical narrative intended to in Keilah if he could. Perhaps besiege David true is virtue of its correspond? by (1) proposition ence with Saul's intention. One might also suppose that (2) was true by virtue of correspondence with the desires and character of the leading men of if not their fully formed intentions. Maybe Keilah, they
were
cowardly,
and
untrustworthy,
ungrateful.
And I take it that neither the Jesuits nor Plantinga would say that Saul's intentions, or the desires and character of the Keilahites, necessitated their actions or interfered in any way with their freedom of will. But the basis thus offered for the truth of (1) and it is not because (2) is inadequate precisely A
free
agent
may or
necessitating. or change
his
Therefore
the propositions
virtue
intentions,
of correspondence
with
act fail
which the
out to
of character, on them.
act
may
be true by
intentions,
THE
EVIL
III
or what
II I trust that it is clear by this point that there is reason to doubt the possibility of middle knowledge. Those who believe it possible have some explaining to do.
In Molina's the superiority of God's explanation cognitive powers bears the heaviest burden. He holds "that the certainty ofthat middle knowledge comes from the depth and unlimited perfection of the divine knows intellect, by which [God] 9This came to certainly what is in itself uncertain." be
as
known
the
of
theory
it "supercomprehends" more stands about to
merely
pointed
them?that them
than
in rejecting to
comprehension,
than
even anyone, that.11 Molina
free
creatures
that
of
theory
comprehend
already to understand there to be understood,
necessary as Saurez
But
the
sur? that
it under?
is, be
would
them.10
comprehend
out
"supercomprehension."
intellect so immensely all created free wills,
to it God's According in its passes, perfection,
super is
something
that is about it everything and it is absurd to suppose could
God, seems
would
do
more
understand
to want
to say various
under
that
what
possible
to be known, conditions is not there, objectively, but that God's mind is so perfect that He knows it anyway. But that is impossible. The problem to be solved is how the relevant subjunctive conditionals can be true, and nothing that may be said about the
of God's
excellence
Suarez
what
offers
of that problem.
seems
to me
the
type of explanation unsatisfactory of middle possibility knowledge. to
effect,
a
no analysis,
of what to
conditionals
c, who
creature, free
primitive be
may a, which
action,
in a possible
cmay situation
a
Consider ever
exist,
freely s.We
clearly
which
understanding,
not
least
for the alleged in He appeals,
is for the relevant true.
contributes
powers
cognitive
to the solution
anything
doing
to act on, if he is (5) and (6) are enough for David but not will prudent; they satisfy the partisans of middle It is part of their theory that knowledge. God knows infallibly what definitely would happen,
OF
and not just what would probably happen free creatures would be likely to do.8
desires
and character of Saul and the men of Keilah are not (1) and (2) but in Keilah, Saul would (5) If David stayed the probably besiege city. (6) If David stayed in Keilah and Saul besieged the city, the men of Keilah would probably to Saul. surrender David
PROBLEM
do
needs
subjunctive free
possible a and
or
are
possible refrain from
to consider
c,
not as actually existing, but as having "possible being" in the cause (God) that is able to produce c. So
considered,
property
7 a similar point: DSDFC, Suarez makes Bk. 2, c. 5, n. 11 (p. 358). 8 See Bk. 2, c. 1, n. 1-2, and c. 5, n. 9 Suarez, DSDFC, (pp. 343f., 357f.). 9 Molina, Concordia, qu. 14, art. 13, disp. 53, memb. 3, n. 10 (p. 389^). 10 Ibid., qu. 14, art. 13, disp. 52, n. 11, 17 (pp. 341, 345). 11 Bk. 2, c. 7, n. 6 (p. 366L). Suarez, DSDFC,
according
to
(a habitudo, as Suarez
Suarez,
c
puts
it) which
has
a
is
PHILOSOPHICAL
AMERICAN
112
the property of being a possible agent who in s freely do a, or the property of being a in s freely refrain from possible agent who would
either would
a. c has one doing is nothing either
itself, which
property to
these
of
one
have
than
rather
properties
c the
of what cwould other. God has middle knowledge do in s, because God knows which of the two pro? c has.12
perties
one
to Suarez's but perhaps
would object philosophers of merely possible entities,
Many ontology could
a similar
develop
account
of
relevant
the
such an ontology. God's idea conditionals without an existing subject is presumably of c, for example, ascribe to it, as a of properties. And one might the property of being an idea primitive property, if itwere satisfied by anything in s, would be which, satisfied by an agent that freely did a in s. This would have the disadvantage, however, of implying that
c would
whether
in s depends,
of c, but on a property
property That
a
do
consequence
to
on
a
idea of c.
of God's
seem
might
not
?'s
compromise
My principal objection to Suarez's defense of the is not based on of middle knowledge possibility I do not think however. considerations, ontological I have
any
conception,
the sort of habitudo or property to possible
possible other for My
the
primitive relevant
reason
for
least clearly difficult
primitive
with
agents
conditions.
to
to
of
otherwise,
that Suarez
respect
their
ascribes
acts
under
subjunctive that saying
unsatisfactory someone
understanding
it would
of what
to be
conditionals Suarez's
type who
claims
which
I
be
the
it is very to have
seem
not
a
to
have.
In his several published discussions of the "free will defense" to the problem of evil, Alvin Plan tinga in effect, that God can have middle has assumed, in the most recent of these dis and knowledge;
For
proposition
knowledge.
the extent
(A) To worlds
crucial
that it is plausible, not
does
explanation
to our problem
solution
conditionals.
up-to-date solutions
form
for
we
may
that
really
give
It merely offers the expression have
us
truth
the
about
already
the possible
us
a
new
of the
a new
and
of
attempted and considered
rejected. (In fairness it should be said that Plantinga Two points must be does not claim otherwise.) here.
is to be plausible, the kinds that are possible worlds to the truth and falsity of
(i) If the explanation of similarity among to be relevant allowed conditionals
counterfactual that
would
must in any
mirror case
con?
the
our
determine
judgment of their truth and falsity. Some similarities cannot plausibly be allowed any relevance at all. the possible worlds in which David stays in Among for
example,
I suspect
the most
similar
to
is one in which Saul does not world besiege Keilah, and inwhich the subsequent history of David, Saul, and of Israel and Judah goes very much as it did in the actual world. Perhaps in such a world Saul has a slightly different character, or the actual
acts
Ill
counterfactuals."14
There are two important reasons for denying that this analysis establishes the possibility of middle
Keilah,
true.
is of
defense
is that
of
to Plantinga's (i) to be true, according theory, is for the following to be the case : is more similar to some (7) The actual world in which David stays in possible world Keilah and Saul besieges the city than to any in which David stays in possible world Keil?h and Saul does not besiege the city.
siderations
do I think that I have any
Nor
understanding
refute
or
primitive
he has defended this assumption.13 Robert and David Stalnaker Lewis, adopts what he calls "the possible worlds
Following Plantinga
made
of will.
freedom
eussions
explanation
or determine
make
would
these
of
there although to c, except the
properties, or external
internal
QUARTERLY
out
of
character
in a way
that
he
does
not
in
the actual world ;but I doubt that that is as great a dissimilarity as the dissimilarity between a world in there is a siege of Keilah which by Saul (and a world in perhaps a killing of David by Saul) and not not. I would is which there conclude, certainly not have Saul would that therefore however,
12 I believe in De gratia, prol. 2; c. 7, n. 21, 24, 25 (pp. 94-96). views come to, as they are found Suarez's this is what 13The God and Other Minds in Alvin (Ithaca, 1967), ch. 6. In his The Nature of Plantinga's assumption passed unquestioned vol. 70 The Journal of Philosophy, Created?" Could God Have (Oxford, Necessity 1974), ch. 9, and less fully in "Which Worlds I think) to free a part of his larger has attempted it is defended. At the same time Plantinga (successfully, ?1973)? PP- 539~552> has not used the term on the assumption from dependence op. cit., pp. 182-184). Plantinga {The Nature of Necessity, argument of his views. it seems to me very apt for the expression "middle although knowledge," 14The Nature I shall disregard paper op. cit. In the present op. cit., and Lewis, op. cit., p. 178. See also Stalnaker, of Necessity, as all the conditionals that will concern us have are impossible, to antecedents whose do with conditionals having complications antecedents. possible
MIDDLE
AND
KNOWLEDGE
if David had stayed in the city.15 besieged Keilah is in That a world in which Saul besieges Keilah that respect unlike the actual world, is irrelevant to the question what Saul would have done if David the Some similarities between stayed in Keilah. actual to
world
and
other
that
question?for similarities in causal
are
worlds
possible
example, laws and
in people's
dis?
characters.
But we have already considered and rejected the idea of founding the truth of our crucial conditionals on
causal
more
given accord
truth
we
than
would
that
considerations
the
must
of counterfactuals
decisiveness
to
that are allowed
to be not
be
A
mirror.
in which David and Saul stays in Keilah more to the is the similar besieges city perhaps
world actual
in
world
respect
of
Saul's
character
decisions
the
former
than
the
therefore
actual
world worlds
possible to the
explanation. us more reason
is more
latter for purposes if we
explanation, For this to
to
similar
of the
to adhere
conclusion
the
reject
mean
the
would in
analysis
terms
give of
similarity of possible worlds than to abandon our that Saul might have acted out previous judgment of character and so would only probably, not have laid siege to Keilah if David had definitely, stayed in the city. The issue here is a general one, and important. We have a well entrenched belief that
under
person
might
many have
he probably
counterfactual
would is to be
explanation decisiveness
to
acted
out
not have. plausible, similarities
conditions of
a
many
character,
If the possible worlds it must of
not
give
character
such and
behavior as to be inconsistent with this belief. the (B) On the possible worlds theory, moreover, truth of the crucial conditionals cannot be settled soon enough to be of use to God. The chief as for Plantinga importance of middle knowledge, well as Molina and Suarez, is that God is supposed to be guided by it in making decisions about the creation
and
providential
governance
of
the world.
And as Molina and Suarez insist, ifGod is tomake such use of it, His middle knowledge must be prior, 15
not
let us
create.16
as
of God
For
no
some
and
(8) If God created Adam be more moral good of
history
all.
to
many and them, to
According
Adam
are to be explained
particular, of
among
God's
knowledge,
creatures,
are
We
Adam creating instead of at
creatures
free
free
from
were
Eve
and
made.
creatures
free
decisions.
for the sake of
Adam
God
were
them
other
creating
that
choosing
; among
making
creative
that
suppose creatures
free
think
make
God's
(fallen or Unf?llen)
angels
argument, the first
Eve, and
on
depend
Ignoring
decisions
to
and
in
Eve
in part by the truth and Eve, there would than moral evil in the
the world.17
This explanation would be viciously circular if the truth of (8) were later in the order of explanation than the decisions it is supposed to help explain. Here we are dealing with a type of subjunctive that we may call deliberative conditionals. conditionals They factual.
ought For
in
not,
in asserting
strictness, one
of
to be
called
them
one
counter does
not
commit oneself to the falsity of its antecedent. That is because a deliberative is asserted (or conditional a context in of about deliberation entertained) to (try to) make true or its antecedent whether false.
although
to
creatures
what
about
reasons the truth of the conditional pro? positions which are the object of middle knowledge
a
than
Il?
similar
world inwhich David stays inKeilah and Saul does not besiege the city. But we had better not conclude that
EVIL
the theory of middle
otherwise
they
OF
if not temporally, at least in the order of explana? tion (prius ratione, as Suarez puts it), to His
alternatives
characters.
people's
the similarities
to the
relevant
on
or
laws
(ii) Even
PROBLEM
must
relevant and
similarities
THE
In
a
such
asserting
one
conditional
commits
oneself rather to the view that its truth is independ? ent of the truth or falsity of its antecedent. There
is a problem,
not been discussed to deliberative possible
Consider
of
explanation
a deliberative
(9) If I did x, y would Is (9) true? According explanation,
as
conditionals,
worlds
so far
which
in the literature,
that
depends
as
I know
has
about applying
does, Plantinga counterfactuals.18
the
conditional, happen. to the possible on
whether
the
worlds actual
world ismore similar to some world inwhich I do a: and y happens than to any world in which I do # and y does not happen. That in turn seems to
are discussed Similar problems The Nature of Necessity, and Lewis, Counterfactuals, by Plantinga, op. cit., pp. 174-179, op. cit., 72-77. 91-95 16 See Bk. 2, c. 4, n. 6, and c. 6, n. 3, 6 (pp. 355, Suarez, DSDFC, especially 361, 363). 17 I have simplified in the antecedent. is supposed to have known God that there would here, particularly be more moral good than moral evil in the world a ifHe executed with the creation of Adam and Eve. Many of these long series of actions, beginning actions would be occasioned in part by responses He supposedly knew creatures would to earlier actions in the series. freely make 18 Stalnaker would it to deliberative too. Lewis might conditionals apply not; see his Counterfactuals, op. cit., p. 4. PP-
PHILOSOPHICAL
AMERICAN
114
is the actual world. And depend on which world which world is the actual world ? That depends in I do x. Thus the truth of (9) seems part on whether to depend on the truth or falsity of its antecedent. the truth of (8) will depend on whether Similarly creates
God
Adam
and
Eve.
I think it may be possible for a possible worlds to overcome this conditionals theory of deliberative in general, but not in such a way as to difficulty rescue the doctrine of middle knowledge. There is, I presume, a large class, K, of possible worlds that are more
to some
similar
x and
I do
in which
world
being
member
of K,
on which
not
but
member
of K it is. In asserting (9) in the context of delibera? in effect, to the view that the tion I commit myself, actual world is a member of K and that itsmember? ship in K does not depend on which I choose of the This I am deliberating. alternatives among which view
may
well
are
linked
by
for
be a
correct?if, causal strict
x and
instance,
y
law.
and
Adam
and
evil
in the history
how
on
decision
God's some
to
world the
possible
world's in the
earlier
settled
whether free
other
moral
moral
truth of (8)
The
being worlds
moral
than
good
of the world.
actual
according can the actual
been
or
the
is more
there
and
more
is not
there
Eve
depends of K*,
Eve
evil in the history of the world in which God creates Adam and
good than moral than to any world
some
member But
theory. in K*
have
membership of explanation order to create and Adam or none
creatures,
than
we
?Here
Eve, face
and all the old difficulties about middle knowledge, the possible worlds theory does nothing to help us answer this question. At most it explains why (8) is true,
given
that
some
of K*
member
us
Let
decision.
say
that
one
of
God's
is represented inK* if and only if there is alternatives that some world in which He in K* chooses If any
alternative.
the
of
alternatives
among
which
God was choosing is not represented inX*, then the in K* depends on His actual world's membership that
rejecting
prior 19
alternative,
and
Plantinga
insists on
this point
cannot
therefore
in the order of explanation
was
unrepresented no free to make a world
see how
of God's
in K*.
at
creatures
in which
are
actions
that
possible
world,
all, no
are
there
be a member
at all could
alternatives one
For
of K*.
is
alternative not
I do
and
creatures
free
it is free
Since
no evil,19 good morally be a member of K* unless and
morally w, will
a in
there is some feature of w by virtue of which in the free actions of free creatures difference some u
more
are
similar
And the
involve no
v would
u and
worlds
as
free
a reason
be v
than
in w
creatures
at
creatures.
of free
in w, what
all
counting relevant
(in
of w must
such feature
any
existence
for
w
to
surely If
would
there make
w more like a world in which most free creaturely decisions are good ones than like a world in which are bad ones? I most decisions free creaturely in K* conclude that the actual world's membership cannot
be
God's
in
earlier
order
the
some
to make
decision
of free
than
explanation creatures.
There?
fore the truth of (8), on the possible world's analysis, to that cannot be prior in the order of explanation Perhaps it will be objected to me that the parti? sans of middle knowledge need not claim that the truth of (8) precedes God's creative choices in the is enough
It
of explanation.
order
for
their
explana?
the choices. believed (8) prior to making on a in (8) if acted is that belief God My reply before it was settled that (8) is true, then the fact (if it is a fact) that there ismore moral good than tions ifGod
moral
evil
good
luck
in the history than rather
the world
of His
to God's
is due
the
wisdom?whereas
of the theological chief motivation theory of middle that has been the desire to maintain knowledge such happy results of God's dealings with created and that He had freedom are due to His wisdom, no need at all of luck.
is actual.
there is reason to believe that the Furthermore inK* cannot have been actual world's membership than settled earlier in the order of explanation God's
indeed
decision.
there is a class, K*, of possible worlds Similarly that are more similar to some world in which God creates
least one
I think at
But
respects).
y happens than to any world in which I do x and y to the possible worlds does not happen. According of the truth (9) depends on the actual world theory some
QUARTERLY
to His
(The Nature
IV be that may the philosophical Of objections raised against my critique of the theory of middle (A) I have cumstances
be
(i)
If David besiege
op. cit., p.
i66f.).
the most
in our
assumed
and
intentions
to me
seem
relied on the claim
and Saul at Keilah,
decision.
of Necessity,
two
knowledge,
what
character
stayed the city,
example
important.
that
in the cir?
about
David
is true by virtue of Saul's is not
in Keilah,
Saul
would
MIDDLE
AND
KNOWLEDGE
to
but in Keilah, stayed (5) If David probably besiege the city. Suarez has an interesting objection He
THE
in effect,
argues,
(1) is probably commits
that
(5)
can
Saul
would
mean
only
albeit
oneself,
some
with
that
(5) one to
trepidation,
of (i).20 Certainly it would be prag? 1 to assert inconsistent that is matically ( ) probably true and deny (as I do) that there is any way in which (1) can be true. to (1), how? In proposing (5) as an alternative as a not I it understand do claim that (1), or ever, the
any
such
other
is probable.
proposition,
It
a
is rather
that
(10) Saul will besiege Keilah would be probable, given facts that would (definitely, not just probably) obtain ifDavid stayed inKeilah. is an epistemological While term, "probably" it in is used moreover, (5) primarily to characterize dispositions or tendencies toward the truth of ( 1o) that there would be ifDavid stayed in Keilah. (5) does not imply that anyone would know the facts that would probabilify (10), but only that they would obtain, ifDavid stayed in Keilah. This view is consistent with treatment that (5) might receive under either of the two major types of theory of counterfactuals distinguished by Lewis. to a metalinguistic According "a counterfactual is true, it,
only
if its antecedent,
further
premises,
as Lewis theory, or assertable,
with
together its
implies
puts if and
suitable 21
consequent."
Hold?
say that (5) is ing a theory of this type, we might true if and only if (10) would be probable on total evidence constituted of (5), by the antecedent with
together
suitable
able further premises about
Saul's
proposed similar
further
intentions
and
character.
be partly Lewis
has
for the possible worlds theory an essentially treatment
of
counterfactuals
that
in the way that (5) does.22 probability the most serious grounds (B) Probably givings in which
suit?
The
premises.
in this case would
about we
like a piece
my seem
argument to have
of middle
be may confidence
knowledge.
found in what
Suarez
and
the
of
part
ordinary us
to provide
endeavors
Plantinga
thinks
Plantinga
answer
"the
seems
clear:
fairly
indeed
the larger [Smith] would have" accepted bribe;24 and I agree. But what makes (11) true ? Let us note that it to of the class belongs subjunctive conditionals with antecedents
have
that
makes
false have
and
consequents called semi
been
(11) true, I think,
makes is true
consequent not would
be
which
true,
factuals. What
event
to
assumed to be
assumed
and
the
truth
or made prevented, the consequent
is that its
its antecedent
of
less true.
the
likely, My
view
here is in accord with Nelson Goodman's claim that "in practice full counterfactuals affirm, while semifactuals tains
a
that deny, antecedent
between
certain
connection
ob? 25
and
consequent."
My
account of what makes (11) true does not suggest a or in which (1) (2) could be true, since they
way
not
do
true
have
to
consequents
help
make
them
true. account
if my
Furthermore,
is
right,
it was
not settled
that (11) is true before (in presumably the order of explanation) it was settled that Smith was his
going actual
true.
God
I
to be
it as He
for mis?
and
offered,
is part
acceptance see no reason,
could have
enough
perplexes to be any
looks
on
$36,000.
ledge. Another
appeals
II5
(11) Smith would still have accepted a bribe to if the bribe had been drop his opposition,
involve
in cases
EVIL
with convincing examples of it. In one of Plantinga's fictitious examples Curley Smith, a mayor of Boston, has accepted a bribe of to a proposed free? $35,000 to drop his opposition case route. In this is the way following true ?
truth
claim
OF
confidence
speakers,23
to this claim.
true, and that in accepting
PROBLEM
in
the
is supposed
me
therefore,
known
order
of
to make
at
to
since (11) that
suppose
of the truth of (11) early explanation
not type of case, more. There
uncertainty
accept, $35,000, of what makes
all
to make
use of middle
presented not does about
use
of
know?
by Plantinga, seem normally a butcher, what
for example, would have done if I had asked him to sell me a pound of ground beef, although we suppose he would have had free will in the matter.
20 Bk. 2, c. 5, n. 9 (p. 357f.). I am simplifying Suarez, DSDFC, here, but I think not in such a way as to make less plausible. 21 Lewis, Counterfactuals, op. cit., p. 65. 22David "Counterfactuals and Comparative Journal of Philosophical Lewis, Probability," Logic, vol. 2 (1973), 23 Bk. 2, c. 5, n. 8 (p. 357). Suarez, DSDFC, 24 The Nature of Necessity, Plantinga. op. cit., p. 177. 25Nelson Goodman, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast(London, 1954), p. 15.
this argument
P- 437f
AMERICAN
Il6
PHILOSOPHICAL
We say he would certainly have sold me the meat, if he had it to sell. What makes us regard it as certain? Chiefly his character, habits, desires, and and
intentions,
the
me.) There
are
three
dis?
countervailing
have had no motive
(He would
positions.
of
absence
one
views
alternative
to refuse take
might
of this case. One might say that if I had asked the to sell me the meat, butcher (i) he would only probably have sold it to me, though we normally but real chance there would ignore the minute or have been that he would refuse; (ii) he would sold me
have
certainly
I have the
an
rested
of my part a person's
important that what
assumption
that
however,
?although content
with
causal
Humean
For
and
sound
nature
of
theory
views?
and
impossible;
that
would
render
it
V Could
would
to have
arranged
free actions
perform
us
Let
have
the
consider
but first
question
creatures
only on
the
who
right ones? assumption
In that case, we has middle knowledge. sinless free think, He could have obtained might creatures only those that He simply by making knew would always freely do right in those situa? tions inwhich He would permit them to act freely.26 that God
response
Plantinga's
to
this
argument,
he develops with much which than I have space to reproduce not
could creatures
26This vol.
do who
this
there
unless
would
in
fact
are
a
response
greater elegance here, is that God some
behave
is crisply stated by argument replaces (1966), p. 93L* "Will" 27 The Nature of Necessity Plantinga, 28 Bk. 2, c. 4, n. 4 Suarez, DSDFC, 63
(or their speak? has
Roughly its essence)
if and
sense,
trans-world
must
therefore
inescapable
have of
price
have
and
knowledge, some
known
that
created
freedom.
it
that
must
God
true,
does not claim
even
or
true,
is
depravity
it is true, ifHe had middle
known
was
evil
the
that the hypothesis
is plausible.27
He
argues
is
only
that it is logically possible, because he is using it to the view that it is logically possible defend that both God and evil exist. I do not doubt that the latter is logically possible; but religious thought an
seek
account
the
of
between
relations
God
and evil that is credible, as well as logically possible. It is worth asking, therefore, whether the hypo? thesis
of
universal
trans-world
is plaus?
depravity
ible, on the assumptions about truth of conditionals that Plantinga shares with the Jesuit theologians. I think Molina and Suarez would deny that any creature
free
possible
has their
support Suarez
that
. . . and
to
and
omnipotence, to
enough,
depravity with persuasive to "it is alien
denial
holds
the
divine
creature's could
arguments. common the and
perfection
cannot
God
they
of itself
is therefore that
say
free
any
(or
; and
trans-world
incredible
predetermine
free act, in particular [praedefinir?] an honorable and with all [its] circumstances, by His absolute and effective will, the freedom of the created will still being preserved."28 God uses his middle knowledge
intelligible.
God
free creatures
if God only if that creature would do some wrong created it and permitted it to act freely, no matter what else God did. If the hypothesis of universal
doctrine
and
the
proposes
Plantinga
have trans-world essences) depravity. a creature free possible ing, (or in trans-world depravity, Plantinga's
essence)
(iii), if it is
probability
(iii) is plainly
any
nature
is the
some
On
the
of
know
what
in alternative
determination?
alternative
not
them.
certain
views?of
causality, I do
is
assumption
of
either
of the rendering not
my
than (i) or (ii) (iii) ismore implausible I must admit that I am not altogether
alternative
would.
that all possible
hypothesis
must
argument character
and dispositions do not causally determine, they do not render absolutely certain. Alternative (iii) is It still seems to inconsistent with this assumption. me,
none
perhaps
Plantinga
to do so by his have been causally determined or (iii) his character and character and dispositions; not have causally determined dispositions would his action, but they render it absolutely certain that he would have complied with my request. on
that
he would
because
the meat,
QUARTERLY
possible so well,
free and
to make
such
elicit
a
under
which
favorable He
able possible
free
act
outward
divine
the that
course, of
of grace
response, that knows to
act
according of supposes,
effective,
predeterminations
and helps
conditions
every
for
possible
circumstances,
that He
choosing
knows will
and the
avoiding creature would
purpose. every free
This
not pre? honor?
possible creature, there
those
are
in any some
incentives or helps of grace that God could supply, to which the creature would respond favorably he could have responded unfavorably. But though ifwe assume, this is a very plausible presupposition as Suarez does, that the theory of middle knowledge
on the Free Will Defense: A Reply," Nelson The Journal of Philosophy, Pike, "Plantinga "would" in Pike's formulation, but it is clearly middle that is involved. knowledge p. 165 with p. 189. (op. cit.). compare (p. 354).
AND
KNOWLEDGE
MIDDLE
is correct, and that there is an infinite variety of natural and supernatural ways in which God can work
us
on
affecting desires,
without
our
assisting
inwardly,
our feelings
causally
reasoning,
our beliefs
and perhaps
and
our
determining
res?
ponse.29
And possible
to suppose
if it is plausible
of
occasion
particular
that for every
action
are
there
a to
that would elicit divine operations possible favorable free response, is it not also plausible suppose
that
for many
free
possible
and
creatures,
THE
not
for whole worlds full of them, there are to which series of divine those operations possible creatures would respond by always freely doing held that both right, never doing wrong? Molina and
from
preserved
all
elicit
a favorable
could
He
Presumably
free
response
have
done
from
the
(14)
If the hypothesis trans-world of universal is implausible, itmight seem that I offer depravity I deny the possibility theodicy a better alternative. I deny that the of middle because knowledge, are
conditionals
subjunctive
true.
In
I deny that the following is true: particular, If God had acted differently in certain (12) ways, made
He
would
made
wrong
free
In other words,
have but
choices,
had
creatures
none
of whom
who ever
choices.
I deny
that God
could have made
made
free
made
wrong
none
but
choices,
behaved
free
of whom
choices.
If God had acted differently ways, He would probably have He
for
U7
If God had acted differently in certain ways, He would probably have had creatures ever
them.30
same
EVIL
true:
who
sin
others.
relevant
be
(13)
their whole lives by God supplying and aids that He knew would gifts
throughout them with always
were
Mary
OF
free creatures who would always have freely done right. The supposition that He could have done so is burdened with all the difficulties about truth of that afflict conditionals the theory of middle Since (12) is not true, a reproach knowledge. against God cannot rightly be based on its truth. And God cannot know that (12) is true, and cannot rightly be blamed for not using such knowledge. how? My views about the truth of conditionals, ever, do not tend to show that the following could
even
Jesus
PROBLEM
creatures,
on
in certain had better than
the whole,
has.
actually
In fact ( 13) seems to me rather implausible. With? out middle knowledge God must take real risks if He
makes
free
creatures
or
millions,
(thousands,
trillions of risks, if each free creature makes thousands of morally significant free choices). No matter so in running how shrewdly God acted on not risk His would be many risks, every winning But I think (14) is very antecedently probable. These the that plausible. suggest judgments necessity free will
of permitting in creatures
some may
play
evil a
in order part
in a
to have theodicy
put cannot bear the whole weight of it, even is rejected.31 possibility of middle knowledge
if the
University of California, Los Angeles Received January 14, igj6
29 Cf. ibid., Bk. 2, c. 4, n. 5 (p. 355). 30 Molina, Concordia, qu. 14, art. 13, disp. 53, memb. 4, n. 15-24 (pp. 399-405). 31 I am to several, indebted and especially David Lewis and Alvin Plantinga, for discussion and for including David Kaplan, comments on an earlier version of this paper, which was read to an American An abstract Association Philosophical symposium. of the earlier version, "Middle on the in The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 70 (1973), pp. 552-554. Work Knowledge," appeared Endowment for the Humanities. present version was supported by the U.S. National