aipdm design document

CO M MU N I T Y SEL F - R EL IA N CE A NA LYSIS FI NA L R EP O R T

A I PD M D E SI G N D O CU M E N T

Annelies Heijmans Independent Consultant & Researcher (PhD) Saut Sagala Assistant Professor | Institute of Technology Bandung February 2013

CO M M U N I T Y S E L F - R E L I A N C E A N A LY S I S

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Acknowledgement In its attempts to better understand what has been achieved in community resilience and community based disaster risk management in Indonesia, the Australia-Indonesia Facility for Disaster Reduction (AIFDR) supported a study into community resilience and self-reliance in NovemberDecember 2012. While the study does not capture all of the stories and best practice in this field, due to the limited research time, we were extremely lucky to work with two dedicated and professional consultants, Annelies Heijmans and Saut Sagala, who planned and crafted the research, undertook field investigations, developed CBDRM models and completed the analysis that we are presenting to you now. AIFDR would like to thank all of the communities visited for contributing their time, and for sharing their stories and experiences with us. We are also grateful to our interviewees from the National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB), particularly Ir. Bernardus Wisnu Widjaja M.Sc and Drs. Muhtaruddin, BNPB consultant Chasan Ascholani, M.Si, Togu Pardede from Bappenas, Wayne Ulrich and Robert Sulistyo from IFRC, Irina Rafliana from LIPI, Lukman Hakim from Oxfam in Indonesia, Ari Nugroho, Dame Manalu and Dian Lestariningsih from Karina, Amin Magatani from Plan International, Abby Mamesah from World Vision, Prih Harjadi from BMKG, Avianto Muhtadi from Nahdlatul Utama, and academics Jonatan Lassa and Eko Teguh Paripurno. Our utmost appreciation also goes to our interviewees in East Nusa Tenggara (NTT) for their generous and frank contributions and insights, including Ellen and Poli from Caritas Maumere, Eko from Wetlands International, Sylavanus Tibo from BPBD Sikka, Anton from LPTP, Yayo and Ruslan from BPBD Ende, and Roni and Vincent from the Flores Institute for Resource Development (FIRD). From West Sumatra we particularly thank Simon Matakupan from Mercy Corps, Turmizi from SurfAid International, Patra Rina Dewi from Kogami, Jefriyanto, Rumainur and Richard from the West Sumatra BPBD, Zainir Koto and Syafrimen from the Padang Pariaman BPBD, Nurhayati and Fatmiyeti from Limbubu NGO, Budhi Erwanto and Hermansyah from the Kota Padang BPBD. In West Aceh, we particularly like to thank Pak Aria and his colleagues from IBU-FoundationMeulaboh for their contributions and for arranging the interviews with village heads and CBDRMteams in Desa Langung, Desa Gampung Pasir, Desa Kautumbang, and with FORMASIBAB. We highly appreciated the insights shared by H. Teuku Ahmed Dadek, head of BPBD West Aceh, and for explaining the achievements in West Aceh since the tsunami in 2004. In East Java there are many people to whom we are grateful. First of all to Pak Darmawan, head BPBD East Java Province and Pak Sugeng, Director Preparedness and Mitigation BPBD East Java, to Buju Gunjoro, secretary of BPBD Blitar and Kaltian, Emergeny and Logistics BPBD Blitar, Bapak Wiyono, head BPBD Banyuwangi, Pak Suhardi and Ibu Nadif Ulfia from BPBD Bojonegoro, to Akhmad Junaida, Mas Polo, DC and Mita from Yayasan Indonesian Cerdas, to Arif Santoso of Jawa Pos, to Mas Oni from Walhi-Surabaya, Djoni Irianto from PMI-East Java, Abdul Habdi Rashid from Jangkar Kelud, Gendon from Kappala, to the preparedness teams from desa Besowo, Desa Satak, Desa Widang and Desa Solo all in Blitar, to PMI staff in Banyuwangi, CBAT-PMI in desa Sumberagung, Pesanggaran subdistrict, and to Jainal Anis from FPBI Banyuwangi. Finally we are grateful to Dian Octarina for her professional translation skills, patience and pleasant company.


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We further like to thank AIFDR’s provincial DRM consultants, Didik Mulyono (East Java) and Wawan Budianto (West Sumatra), for their insightful contributions to discussions and analysis. Also the invaluable inputs and feedback on interim reports from Ben O’Sullivan, Jeong Park, Piter Edward, and Allan Bell of DFAT’s Disaster Response Unit were highly appreciated. Special thanks is due to the staff of AIFDR especially to Rina Amalia, Trevor Dhu, Tini Astuti, Widya Setiabudi and Elia Surya for managing the field work logistics, for their teamwork during and after field visits, and for their continuing support to improve the quality of this study. We hope that the experiences, insights and ideas from this study will inspire others to contribute to Indonesia becoming safer and more resilient. Please enjoy, On behalf of AIFDR Team: Jason Brown Training & Outreach Manager

Disclaimer: The views presented in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of AusAID/AIFDR or our partners


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Table of Contents Acknowledgement 3 Executive Summary 6 1. Introduction 1.1 Overarching aim and specific objectives of the Community Self-Reliance Analysis 1.2 Definition of concepts 1.3 Research questions 1.4 Conceptual framework 1.5 Scope and methodology for the analysis 1.6 Structure of the report

8 8 9 11 12 16 17

2. Situational analysis of CBDRM in Indonesia – challenges, gaps and needs 2.1 The broader political and institutional context of Indonesia related to DRM 2.2 Local level DRM practices in Indonesia 2.3 Capacity of NGOs to work with government and to link communities with government 2.4 Challenges, gaps and needs

19 19 20 23 24

3. Overview of key findings and observations from the field visits 27 3.1 How is CBDRM defined and operationalized in practice? 27 3.2 How do the various actors view and interact in the (CB)DRM spaces to realize their interests? 36 3.3 Effective strategies to achieve community resilience and building partnerships 41 3.3.1. CBDRM as empowering process towards institutional development 41 3.3.2 CBDRM as a project to establish disaster-preparedness teams linked to CBO-network and BPBD 43 3.3.3 Project-oriented and school-based CBDRM approach 44 3.3.4 Inter-sectoral approach to CBDRM integrating disaster preparedness with livelihood concerns and institutional development - Partners for Resilience 45 3.3.5. CBDRM through faith-based organizations and networks 46 3.4 Conclusions 47 4. Developing a theory of change for achieving community resilience in Indonesia 4.1 A road map for achieving community resilience taking various entry-points and pathways 4.2 Rationale for area selection 4.3 Rationale for the various entry points to communities 4.4 Entry-points at district and provincial level: BPBDs 4.5 Existing NGO-CSO networks at district, provincial and national level as entry-points 4.6. Constraints to the envisioned change 4.7 AIFDR’s role and added value in achieving this change 4.8 Other DRM actors’ roles in achieving this change 5. Evidence-based approaches to CBDRM 5.1 School-based CBDRM approach 5.2 NGO/CSO facilitates community disaster preparedness and linkage building with CBOs and BPBD 5.3. Relief and livelihood recovery as entry-point for comprehensive CBDRM addressing root causes of people’s vulnerability

49 52 54 56 57 58 60 61 61 63 63 64 65


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5.4 Inter-sectoral partnership approach to CBDRM contributing to institutional development 5.5 Key strategies for achieving community resilience 1. Effective CBDRM involves a change in mind-sets 2. Effective CBDRM seeks inclusiveness during the process 3. Effective CBDRM recognizes local people’s perspectives, priorities and their knowledge to deal with adversity with a focus on livelihood resilience 4. Mobilization of social action and effective civil society led advocacy for DRM is effective for making government accountable and a responsible actor in DRM 5. Effective CBDRM builds on different bodies of knowledge 6. Effective CBDRM is linked to, seeks cooperation with, and involves different actors, including government departments towards establishing formal GO-CSO DRR Coordination Bodies 7. Institutionalizing CBDRM in national development planning: further up-scaling 8. CBDRM approaches remain effective and relevant through continuous real-time learning and systematizing knowledge 9. Effective CBDRM seeks creative and innovative funding and support strategies

67 68 69 70 71 72 72

74 75 76 77

References 79 List of abbreviations

84

List of interviews

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Executive Summary This Community Self-Reliance Analysis aims to provide a broad assessment of how different civil society organizations, international and local non-governmental organizations, government agencies, community networks, the private sector and media interact and engage in the disaster management spaces in Indonesia. The analysis is expected to produce evidence-based approaches to CBDRM that are effective and sustainable, and can be considered for AIFDR’s new DRM programme. This analysis conceives CBDRM in the broader political and institutional context of Indonesia and proposes to use the notion of ‘community resilience’ instead of ‘community self-reliance’. Community resilience recognizes the continuous changing nature of disasters in the future, and communities’ abilities to effectively anticipate, respond and adapt to disasters and to transform interactions with government into functioning institutions and good DRM governance. Based on CBDRM literature review, field visits to East Java, Nusa Tenggara Timur, West Aceh, and West Sumatra, and interviews with Jakarta-based organizations, we developed a theory of change for achieving community resilience. The analysis indicates that this may happen through: n

Changing mind-sets about how DRM actors interpret disasters, perceive other DRM actors and practice CBDRM. Focus is on transformational learning and critical reflection instead of education.

n

Change as a result of contradictions in society. We observed that many laws and regulations

on DRM exist that favour community resilience, but that these are not implemented due to constraints within government and between government and vulnerable people. Efforts to make government policies congruent with practice will be target of the change agenda by improving both CSO organisational capacity and GoI organisational capacity through their critical interaction as opposed to viewing them as two parallel isolated tracks. n

A way to influence and change government performance in DRM is to mobilize social

action through strong CSO/NGO networks which engage with government, private sector, knowledge centres at various levels. n

To achieve the three points above, creation of DRM dialogue spaces is required where

the different DRM actors meet, share experiences, coordinate DRM efforts, negotiate and decide about DRM resource allocation. Different strategies are possible ranging from informal workshops towards lobby and advocacy in more formal DRM platforms or in district/provincial parliaments. We see this change happening by fostering community resilience on one hand (bottom-up approach) and building the capacity of government DRM related agencies on the other hand. These two tracks need to be brought together so they will benefit from one another through building linkages, creating dialogue spaces and forging partnerships between communities at risk, (I)NGOs, faith-based organisations, local government, media, the private sector and knowledge centres. These interactions promote mutual understanding and contribute to the democratization of DRM resulting in evidence-based DRM planning and decisions that are context-specific, relevant and appropriate for local communities.


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Interactions are encouraged to take place at different localities and administrative levels where we want change to happen. Therefore we arrived at criteria for area selection and different entry-points pulled together in a road map. We recommend to select: (1) Coastal communities at high risk for tsunami and earthquake taking a multi-hazard perspective (2) Communities frequently affected by hydro-meteorological hazards without excluding other hazards (3) Select communities cluster-wise affected by the same hazard-type taking a landscape approach. Chapter 5 presents four evidence-based approaches to CBDRM that foster community resilience at the local level and have the potential to contribute to institutional development at district/ provincial levels. The four approaches are not exclusive and shouldn’t be perceived as blue-prints. They can be combined, blended or applied in a sequential manner depending on local settings, needs and abilities of the DRM actors involved. The four approaches are based on effective strategies that we observed in Indonesia during the conduct of this analysis and previous research and can be labelled as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4.

School-based CBDRM approach NGO/CSO facilitates community disaster preparedness and linkage building with CBOs and BPBD Relief and livelihood recovery as entry-point for comprehensive CBDRM addressing root causes of people’s vulnerability Inter-sectoral partnership approach to CBDRM contributing to institutional development

The second part of this chapter summarizes the nature of effective and sustainable CBDRM practices through nine key-strategies that should be considered in each of the four approaches to CBDRM mentioned above to achieve community resilience: 1. Effective CBDRM involves a change in mind-sets 2. Effective CBDRM seeks inclusiveness during the process 3. Effective CBDRM recognizes local people’s perspectives, priorities and their knowledge to deal with adversity with a focus on livelihood resilience 4. Mobilization of social action and civil society-led advocacy for DRM is effective for making government accountable and a responsible actor in DRM 5. Effective CBDRM builds on different bodies of knowledge 6. Effective CBDRM is linked to, seeks cooperation with, and involves different actors, including government departments towards establishing GO-CSO coordination bodies 7. Institutionalizing CBDRM in national development planning 8. CBDRM approaches remain effective and relevant through continuous real-time learning and systematizing knowledge 9. Effective CBDRM seeks creative and innovative funding and support strategies


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Introduction Dihilangkan dan diganti dengan: Community Self-Reliance Analysis is commissioned by the AustraliaIndonesia Facility for Disaster Reduction (AIFDR). Community self-reliance refers to the ability of communities to effectively prepare for and mitigate disaster risks. This is assumed to be achieved through partnerships between district disaster management agencies (BPBDs) and CSOs to facilitate community knowledge and behavioural change”. This Community Self-Reliance Analysis aims to provide an in-depth analysis on approaches that foster community self-reliance. The analysis will provide a broad assessment of how different CSOs, NGOs, INGOs, government actors and community networks interact and engage in the disaster management space. The analysis is expected to produce recommendations regarding approaches that the DRM program should trial.

1.1 Overarching aim and specific objectives of the Community SelfReliance Analysis This Community Self-Reliance Analysis is being commissioned to provide an in-depth analysis on approaches that foster community self-reliance. The analysis will provide a broad assessment of how different CSOs, NGOs, INGOs, government actors and community networks interact and engage in the disaster management space. The analysis is expected to produce recommendations regarding approaches that the DRM program should consider for funding. The recommended approaches and pre-requisites for building community self-reliance should be placed within the DRM strengthening Government of Indonesia’s preparedness to respond to disaters should go hand-in-hand with the strengthening of community self reliance.. These two tracks shouldn’t be regarded as separate approaches; the analysis will look beyond the binaries of bottom-up and top-down approaches to reduce risks, and attempt to understand how government, CSOs and communities interact and engage with each other in the various DRM spaces. The specific objectives of the analysis are three-fold as stated in the Terms of Reference: Explore existing approaches for building linkages between government, CSOs and communities These include approaches of the Indonesian Government like e.g. BNPB’s Resilient Villages Programme, and approaches of CSOs and their networks. Particularly the sustainability of approaches will be analysed, and how these approaches could be funded in the future and potentially replicated on a larger geographic scale across Indonesia. These approaches will be described in detail referring to how the approach can be implemented, key factors that may contribute to the success or failure of the approach, and the pros and cons of each approach. Explore how CSOs implement CBDRM and how they interact in DRM spaces The CSOs and networks in Indonesia that implement CBDRM will be mapped with a particular interest in those CSOs and networks that build linkages with government and other DRM actors. This analysis will identify which key capacities are required to link government, CSOs and communities, to create networks and to implement CBDRM in a sustainable way. Based on this analysis, CSOs and networks which have the capacity and interest to lead or participate in building linkages between local government, CSOs and communities will be identified for the purpose of building community self-reliance.


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Identify effective approaches and pre-requisites for building community-self reliance This section will bring together the insights from the two sections above and makes sense of each actor’s role and responsibility in building self-reliant communities. Approaches and pre-requisites for building community self-reliance will recognize political barriers that might exist between relevant DRM actors and strategies to overcome these. The analysis will look for ‘institutional homes’ for DRM and building community self-reliance.

1.2 Definition of concepts The Disaster Risk Concept Note (AusAid, 2012: 2) defines community self-reliance as the ability of communities to effectively prepare for and mitigate disaster risks. This is assumed to be achieved through partnerships between district disaster management agencies (BPBDs) and CSOs to facilitate community knowledge and behaviour change. This definition highlights DRM related support to local communities to enhance their abilities particularly to improve their knowledge and change their behaviour. The term ‘self-reliance’ has the connotation that communities – equipped with sufficient and appropriate knowhow and able to prepare and mitigate disasters in their locality – can rely on their own in times of disasters. This may not be realistic and implies a rather oneway interaction from outsiders to local people. The definition has further a static view on disaster events. We like to propose a different term and definition for the kind of community abilities and relationships with outsiders that we are looking for considering that this analysis conceives CBDRM in a political and institutional context. Communities affected by disasters not only want to be better prepared and mitigate negative impacts, they also want to recover from past disaster events and adapt to new circumstances. The environment in which people live and the nature of disasters change continuously, due to climate change and the mounting vulnerability to which communities are exposed. Communities alone can’t solve all their risk problems. Disasters are complex problems that require collective and multisectoral responses from different agencies and institutions. Therefore local communities need to engage with other DRM actors to influence government’s policy and performance and to demand for safety and protection. Instead of the notion ‘self-reliance’, it is more appropriate to use the notion ‘resilience’ instead, emphasizing that multiple actors have a role and responsibility in providing security and safety before, during and after disasters strike. Community resilience would then be defined as “ability of communities to effectively anticipate, respond and adapt to disasters and transform interactions with government into functioning institutions and good DRM governance”. As said earlier, strengthening community resilience should go hand-in-hand with the Government of Indonesia’s preparedness to respond to disasters. Bringing these two tracks together, is expected to foster resilience at provincial levels and probably even at the national level. In this light resilience means “the ability of institutions – considering the hierarchy of institutions including government policy and practice – to take on roles and responsibilities to provide security and safety in a changing environment’ (after Schoch-Spana, 2008).


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AIFDR is particularly interested in replicable and sustainable CBDRM approaches. Concepts like ‘sustainability’, ‘replication’ and ‘up-scaling’ require further explanation and definition to arrive at a common understanding and to steer the analysis. ‘Replication’ refers to reproducing, repeating or transferring something to somewhere or somebody else. In the context of CBDRM approaches to achieve community resilience, ‘replication’ occurs first in terms of expanding the geographical coverage – e.g. from four villages to adjacent villages, and from one district to other districts. This happens through mobilizing social action and establishing CBO-networks. When increase in geographical coverage is combined with institutional embedding – e.g. when CBO-networks link with functioning BPBDs and coordination among BPBDs exist, then we of speak of ‘up-scaling’. Up-scaling transpires when organizational performance of BPBDs and BNBP improves as well as their DRM-related interactions. Up-scaling refers to replication both in terms of spatial coverage and government’s accountability from local to national level until CBDRM is institutionalized in the national socio-economic and spatial development planning and implementation. The notion of ‘sustainability’ - like in ‘sustainable development’ - originally referred to reconciling environmental, social and economic demands. But what sustainability is, what its goals should be, and how these goals are to be achieved are all open to interpretation. Sustainability is studied and managed over many scales of time and space, and in many contexts of environmental, social and economic organization. In the context of this analysis, we refer to ‘sustainable CBDRM approaches’, meaning embedding (CB)DRM into ‘institutional homes’ and establishing mechanisms that sustain human and financial resources locally and nationally to support (CB)DRM. ‘Institutional homes’ refer to the wide variety of institutions and actors at local, district to national level that take on their roles and responsibilities before, during and after disasters. ‘Institutional homes’ also refer to people’s and government’s mind-sets promoting a culture of safety, and to the performance of DRM actors towards reducing disaster risks and people’s vulnerability to future hazards. The process of embedding CBDRM into institutional homes is referred to as mainstreaming.

Replication - expanding the geographical coverage of CBDRM practice from one community to another through mobilizing social action and establishing CBO-networks (horizontal linkage building) Up-scaling – increase in geographical coverage combined with institutional embedding through horizontal and vertical linkage building between CBO-networks, NGOs and government from district to national level Mainstreaming – embedding (CB)DRM into ‘institutional homes’ and make them functioning by sufficient human and financial resources as well as by political support from the local to the national level


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1.3 Research questions The overall aim for the Community Resilience Analysis is to identify and describe effective and sustainable approaches that link government, CSOs, communities and private sector efforts in DRM with the aim to build community resilience. From the scope of the analysis1 and the literature review on CBDRM in Indonesia we arrived at the following research questions: How is CBDRM defined by different actors and operationalized in practice? This question investigates how the various actors like local people, religious leaders, government agencies, private sector, and other actors conceive, negotiate, and implement (CB) DRM policy, and determine which choices for risk management are made. This question deals with the CBDRM process and explains why different interpretations of CBDRM exist. How do the various actors view and interact in the (CB)DRM spaces to realize their interests? This question investigates what kind of (CB)DRM spaces exist, the power relations among the various actors, how they view each other, and the different approaches they take and capacity they have to engage and interact with one another. This question deals with policy processes which are political and non-linear in nature, driven by diverse interests and incentives. It looks into the obstacles and opportunities for cooperation, for transforming power relations and institutions in favour of marginalized groups to build community self-reliance. This question deals with CBDRM key-outcomes considering social inclusion and gender. What are effective approaches and the pre-requisites for building community resilience? The findings from the previous two questions will steer further analysis into the potential roles and responsibilities in DRM of different actors at the various administrative levels to build community resilience and into effective strategies and approaches to ensure that the different actors take on these roles and responsibilities to make DRM a sustainable effort. In answering above questions, both internal and external process factors will be considered. Internal process factors refer to the mandate, scope and capacity of communities, CSOs and government. External process factors refer to the governance context, institutions and state-society relationships in the selected areas. Communities and CSOs interact with other stakeholders in a particular local institutional setting and governance context. It is through these interactions that interventions and outcomes get shaped. In this light, an actor-orientation is chosen because it offers an analytical framework for studying policy, implementation and its outcomes. It further offers a framework to study both the specificities of particular local settings, and the broader forces and processes of institutional and societal change. The latter is crucial to assess whether or not approaches that are effective in one context are replicable in another context.

1.4 Conceptual framework An actor orientation helps to clarify how DRM policies and interventions are shaped by the various actors involved in CBDRM. The actor-oriented approach starts from the premise that all actors are able to reflect upon their experiences and what happens around them, and use their knowledge and capabilities to interpret and respond to their environment (Long, 1992). People devise ways of coping with life, even under the most extreme forms of coercion. They use their knowledge, skills, influence, aspirations and organizing capacities in their problem-solving, survival and development strategies.

1 AusAID, 2012, Terms of Reference Consultant Team for Community Self-Reliance Analysis


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Although people have alternative options to shape their coping strategies and to formulate their objectives, these strategies are culturally embedded in different perceptions, interests and power relations. This implies that people’s options are favoured or constrained by their social position in society and prevailing cultural norms. Local people’s perspectives on risks and disaster events therefore vary greatly across regions, within villages, and between men and women among others. This results in competing risk and knowledge claims. In the light of building community resilience, this analysis aims to assess how CBDRM interventions add to people’s capability to realize safety and protection by engaging with the broader institutional environment. Communities alone cannot solve all their risk problems and village authorities do not operate at the appropriate administrative level to address all urgent risk problems nor the underlying risk factors. Therefore local people need to engage with the broader institutional context, working across scales and in partnerships. Horizontal linkages with other Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) can be instrumental for early warning, sharing the lobbying workload, portraying shared concerns and for greater legitimacy as local representatives, and it supports in settling disputes and reducing tensions between communities. Vertical connections with authorities and powerholders have the potential that local voices are heard at district, provincial and national level, and to access financial resources for disaster risk reduction. These forms of linkage building refer to ‘social action’, to the ability of local people to make a difference to pre-existing state of affairs or course of events. In this process, four key principles, namely ‘social action’, ‘working across scales’, ‘reworking institutional arrangements’ and ‘partnership approach’ play an important role to foster community resilience through CBDRM. ‘Social action’ rests on the emergence of a network of actors, whether formal or informal, through routines or new organizing practices, and is bounded by prevailing norms, values and power relations. This analysis is not limited to local realities of communities and households. It equally focuses on the constraints put upon ‘social action’ to understand the larger structures in society, which is needed to assess the potential of CBDRM interventions in the proper context (Booth, 1994). The larger structures and constraints are referred to as ‘institutions’. Institutions include traditions, social norms, values, laws and regulations, policies and judicial systems regulating power relations, which are influenced by historical trajectories. Consequently, particular institutional arrangements work in one context but fail in another (Jutting, 2003). Institutions are crucial in regulating – for the better or the worse – access to resources, social protection, livelihood security, the maintenance of social order, and the handling of disputes at the local level (Alinovi et al, 2008). Institutions include power relations, and it is important to understand who benefits from the institutions, who sets the rules, and who is excluded. Disaster outcomes can change these institutions and re-order power relations, the rules and interaction between people (Hilhorst, 2007). What do (CB)DRM interventions do? Governmental and Non-Governmental aid agencies and their interventions are part of the institutional context as well. Local governments, NGOs and their donors do not operate in isolation, but are embedded in their respective context. To improve the conditions of disaster-affected populations, aid agencies formulate policy to express what they want to do and what results they intend to achieve. This section aims to provide analytical tools to study policy processes and interventions. Policy is first of all about ‘objectives’ and the way to achieve them. Usually aid agencies put their interventions in logical frameworks, translating policy into the implementation of activities followed by certain results, assuming a linear relationship between policy and results. However, policy implies more than an expression of what people want to do. Policy is for a large part about ‘framing’: this


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refers to how people use language to give meaning and make sense of events and experiences around them, and how they use language as discursive means to shape people’s beliefs and to convince others (Gaventa, 2006). People use ‘frames’ strategically to deal with actors who do not necessarily share the same values or views, but with whom it is crucial to maintain relationships. The various DRM actors like donors, government officials, NGO networks, media, the private sector and local communities, have their own language, rules, routines and demands (Hilhorst, 2003: 217). They use multiple ‘frames’ to set and use policy to find legitimacy for the organization’s presence and work and to deal with multiple accountabilities. DRM actors need to convince others that what they do is relevant, indispensable and appropriate. They use language like ‘vulnerable groups’, ‘participation’, ‘partnerships’, ‘integrated approaches’ and ‘community resilience’ in official documents to create an image of an active involvement of disaster-affected populations in the interventions, to legitimize the organizations’ existence and their eligibility for funding. Policy documents and logical frameworks, however, hide assumptions about how change happens taking an idealistic view on the desirability and manageability of social change (Quarles van Ufford, 1993). This analysis aims to uncover several of these assumptions. Logical frameworks do not problematize the relationships between the different actors and assume that programme activities are implemented in isolation from local contexts. CBDRM interventions shouldn’t be viewed as planned projects with a defined time-space setting that starts in a village on a blank page. Instead, interventions can best be regarded as part of the flow of events, as a series of encounters where different actors pursue, negotiate, debate and struggle for their interests and agendas to deal with multiple realities (ibid; Bakewell, 2000; Colebatch, 2002). Quarles van Ufford (1993) refers to the ‘political arena model’ as opposite to the ‘logical framework model’. As stated earlier, actors interpret and define the circumstances differently, and risk perspectives vary greatly. As a consequence CBDRM interventions are continuously re-defined and re-shaped according to those actors who can best negotiate their risk solutions. Therefore, interventions inherently produce unpredictable outcomes. ‘Political arenas’ or ‘DRM dialogue spaces2’ are social locations or situations where DRM actors confront each other, resist ideas, debate issues, resources and values, and try to resolve discrepancies in value interpretations and incompatibilities between actor interests. This analysis will reflect on how policy intentions are implemented in practice, how different perspectives on risk and risk reduction shape interventions, and how the various actors use their power to attain their goals. This ‘push and pull’ result in differing CBDRM practice and cooperation outcomes locally. Studying ‘DRM dialogue spaces’ Disasters are events to which political systems must respond, and therefore “within minutes after any major impact, disasters start becoming political” (Olson, 2000:266). The way governments manage disaster risk, respond to and explain disasters, influences their interactions and relationships with their citizens. DRM is an area of public policy, but one that differs a lot from sectoral areas like education or health. DRM is not a sectoral issue but requires the involvement of a range of public sector agencies at different levels of government (Wilkinson, 2012). Governments not only provide goods and services to reduce disaster risks like early warning, shelters, first aid or mangrove belts, they can also engage in activities to influence the performance of others. To examine the institutional influences on DRM policy and practice, it is useful to divide government measures into categories and roles they can play in DRM3: (1) Governments as providers of DRM goods and services; (2) Governments as risk avoiders, meaning refrain from actions that generate risks 2

‘DRM dialogue spaces’ will be used further in this report, as this term may be more acceptable to government actors

3

Wilkinson, E. 2012, Transforming disaster risk management: a political economy approach, ODI Background Note


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(3) Governments as regulators of private sector activity to reduce and avoid risks (4) Governments as promoters of collective action and private sector activity (5) Governments as coordinators of multi-stakeholder activities These different roles involve public sector agencies that are not used to work collectively on crosscutting issues. The nature of collaboration depends on how power is dispersed horizontally and vertically across government4. Decentralization reforms in Indonesia have given greater authority and responsibility to local governments, but not necessarily with the corresponding budgets resulting in so-called unfunded mandates. In addition, local governments have strong incentives to support the interests of local business and other private groups, which are often in opposition to the interests of vulnerable groups. Understanding disaster politics, power relations and incentives is key to assess the ‘room for manoeuvre’ of different DRM actors and approaches to work together to build community self-reliance. DRM is not just the responsibility of governments; resources are also distributed by (I)NGOs, corporations, religious organizations, media, universities, unions and other institutions. These actors interpret disaster events, their circumstances and what is happening around them differently. Local people, NGOs and state-actors use their agency to convince the other of their explanation of events, their risk definitions, whom to blame and how to allocate resources when they negotiate, confront each other about issues, values and resources. They further attach different meanings to CBDRM and to ‘doing CBDRM’. For some, CBDRM means developing technical solutions to improve early warning systems and emergency shelter at the local level, while for others CBDRM is a governance and human rights issue (Wisner & Walker, 2005b). A review of the origins of CBDRM traditions since the 1970s reveals that the CBDRM approach does not exist5. CBDRM practices are embedded in a broader institutional context of state-civil society relationships which constrain or enable local actors to advance their risk solutions. CBDRM is a contested approach with different interpretations and divergent practices. Figure 1. shows the implicit interpretations and worldviews behind the UN-promoted CBDRM tradition laid down in the Hyogo Framework for Action on the left side of the arrows, and the home-grown CBDRM traditions on the right side. In reality, CBDRM practice switches between the two CBDRM extremes as visualised through their features in the continua in Figure 1. Although the UN has recognized the importance of involving local communities in disaster risk reduction, its CBDRM-tradition still resonates a lot with top-down, short-term and isolated responses. In particular, the political connotation that was essential to the original conception of CBDRM has become marginal to mainstream CBDRM practice. Behind a shared CBDRM language, homegrown and mainstream CBDRM-traditions represent different origins that attach radically different meanings to CBDRM and the related concepts. The home-grown CBDRM views disasters as the outcome of weak governance, while the mainstream CBDRM views disasters as external events disrupting and undermining development investments (Bankoff & Hilhorst, 2009). Both CBDRRtraditions support people to build their resilience to disasters. The mainstream CBDRR does so through risk awareness raising, disaster preparedness, physical measures, safety-net mechanisms and institutional reforms, among others, while the home-grown CBDRM regards disasters as an opportunity for social change, therefore viewing CBDRM as a long-term community empowering process to enable vulnerable groups to demand safety and protection. CBDRM is a contested approach, not simply because people cannot agree on a common definition, but because they have different worldviews and intentions in mind that determine their actions. 4

See Draft Political Economy Analysis of DRM in Indonesia

5 Chapter 4 in Heijmans, A. (2012) Risky Encounters: Institutions and interventions in response to recurrent disasters and conflict, PhD thesis Wageningen University


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Figure 1: Nature of CBDRR traditions expressed through their primary features on the continua

Origin

Internationally negotiated

Home-grown, locally negotiated

View on disasters

External event

Matter of vulnerability – Opportunity for social change

Purpose

Reduces people’s physical exposure to hazards

Social transformation

Focus

Natural hazards Integrates everyday livelihoods, restoring normalcy security concerns with preparing for disruption/disaster/conflict

Priority in intervention

Physical measures, early warning, awareness raising life-saving actions

Strengthening community institutions, mobilizing collective action

Participation

Consultation, project-focus

Empowering, process-focus

Levels involved

Multi-level partnerships, harmonious cooperation

Multi-level, multi actor collaboration in power force field

Community

Administrative unit of local government, “common good” approach

Most vulnerable groups, recognizing local elite

Resources

External funds

Locally generated resources, volunta-rism, political commitment, external funds

Longevity

On-off through platforms

Dynamic and adaptive to changing institutional context

The community resilience analysis seeks to understand what meaning different DRM actors attach to CBDRM, which intentions they have that determine their actions, and in what way CBDRM processes reduce, produce or reproduce people’s vulnerability to disasters. This is important to make informed decisions about which processes of building linkages and partnerships should be supported by donors and in what way, and which undesired processes need to be addressed.


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1.5 Scope and methodology for the analysis This research involves different levels of analysis, stakeholders and areas. The focus is on CBDRM practices in Indonesia, and its potential and limitations to build community resilience in partnership with government. The field visits zoom into CBDRM practices in West Aceh, East Java, Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT) and West Sumatra and how disaster-affected populations deal with disaster risks and relate to CSOs, government and the private sector. Levels of analysis Community level: CBDRM efforts are supposed to generate change at the village level in terms of vulnerability reduction, sustainable livelihoods and community resilience. Village authorities and CBOs were interviewed to discuss the local risk context, causes of risks, coping mechanisms and initiatives taken by the community, relations between village authorities and CBOs, nature of risk reduction measures necessary and implemented, effect of these measures, community initiatives to engage with other actors to reduce risk, integration of risk reduction measures into Village Development Planning (Musrenbang) are among key issues. The findings of community level discussions will serve as concrete reference cases for the interviews with stakeholders at higher administrative levels. District level: CSO field staff and managers interact with each other and with other CSOs, government officials, knowledge centres, media and the private sector from the local to the district and even higher administrative levels. This level of analysis draws lessons and insights regarding processes, structures, collaboration, interaction, effectiveness and relevance of multi-stakeholder processes in DRM and fostering community resilience with the district BPBD as key actor.This analysis will further reveal how the actors at district levels perceive CBDRM. Provincial level: At this level, lessons and insights are drawn regarding political decision-making and resource allocation regarding DRM and CBDRM in particularly from national to local levels. Where do top-down and bottom-up DRM approaches meet and what are the constraints to embed CBDRM in government’s mainstream development policies and planning processes. Since the focus is on fostering community resilience and reducing risk at the local level, this research puts local people’s risk perspectives as the entry point and the centre of analysis. This means that the interviews and analysis started at the local level followed by a ‘study up’, mirroring local priorities and risk solutions to policies and DRM practices from district level to provincial and national levels. This reveals disconnects and opportunities in matching DRM policy and responses with local realities. On the other hand, it maps the various expectations and assumptions the different actors have about each other regarding roles and responsibilities in DRM. The research team consisted of two external consultants (one international and one Indonesian) and AIFDR staff who participated in the field visits for data collection and analysis. The consultants bring with them previous research experience on CBDRM policy and practice in different parts of Indonesia like Aceh, Central Java, West Java, West Sumatra, Yogyakarta, Kalimantan, NTT and Maluku which is also used in the analysis. Desktop review In preparation to the field visits, different documents were reviewed: those related to CBDRM policy and practice in Indonesia, and those related to AIFRD’s efforts to design a new DRM programme in Indonesia. AIFDR commissioned several other studies which are relevant for this Community Resilience Analysis, namely a study on Public Finance Management, a Political Economy


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Analysis of the DRM sector in Indonesia, a Rapid Organisational Assessment of the National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB) and of a sample of Sub-National Disaster Management Agencies (BPBD), a Study on Social Inclusion and Gender, and a CBDRM Realist Review. Insights and conclusions from these studies were considered in our interviews and analysis. In addition, a desktop review was conducted on international best practices in CBDRM with a focus on sustainable approaches and/or evidence of CBDRM replication. Field visits and semi-structured interviews Qualitative methods for data collection and analysis were applied like participatory observation, ocular visits and face-to face meetings with key actors using semi-structured interviews. Key informants for focus group discussions and interviews were identified among community representatives, non-government and government institutions at different levels, in collaboration with AIFDR team. We further had interviews with media, faith-based organizations and the private sector. At the village level we talked to CBOs and disaster preparedness teams (youth, women, farmers, fishermen, teachers and health workers), village authorities and informal leaders and religious organizations. At the provincial and district level interviewees come from BPBD, Bappeda, NGOs, media, schools, and university (research centre). The first field visits to West Aceh, East Java and Nusa Tenggara Timur took place from 11-19 December 2012 while the second field visits to East Java and West Sumatra occurred from 21-25 January 2013.

1.6 Structure of the report Chapter 2 presents the state of affairs of CBDRM in Indonesia based on a desktop review and interviews conducted with Jakarta-based organisations. Chapter 3 provides an overview of the key findings collected during the field visits with an emphasis on effective strategies to achieve community resilience that we observed in the field and which we compared with case studies in relevant literature. In chapter 4 we formulated a theory of change and a roadmap based on empirical data and literature that may assist AIFDR to find appropriate entry points and strategies to build linkages among different DRM actors and for creating DRM dialogue spaces to enhance DRM governance in selected provinces. This section elaborates on the rationale for area selection, criteria for community selection, and on the kinds of partnerships that would be most effective in achieving this change. The roadmap will assist AIFDR to identify its role and added value in achieving this change. Chapter 5 will then present various evidence-based approaches to CBDRM that seek interaction and partnerships with other DRM actors and that encourage institutional development. It will detail the nature of strategies and interventions to implement the four tracks to foster community resilience. This section will end with an overview of key strategies for effective and sustainable CBDRM.


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2. Situational analysis of CBDRM in Indonesia – challenges, gaps and needs In 2011, AIFDR commissioned a review of existing CBDRM initiatives in Indonesia to get an understanding of ‘who does what and where’ in the CBDRM space in Indonesia, what the challenges are, gaps and needs are, and to get a clear idea about where AIFDR should position itself. This review forms the basis for this analysis. This situational analysis put CBDRM in the broader institutional and political context of Indonesia to understand the nature of relationships between the government and civil society – particularly at the local level - from a historical perspective. It is based on CBDRM literature review, various NGO reports and on interviews with Jakarta-based organizations conducted in January 2013. The analysis provides an overview of the DRM-landscape in Indonesia since the tsunami in 2004, the progress made regarding CBDRM practices and their key-outcomes, NGO capacities to engage with government, and forms of networks that exist. The chapter ends with the challenges, gaps and needs for the future.

2.1 The broader political and institutional context of Indonesia related to DRM After the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the fall of President Suharto in 1998, Indonesia started political reforms creating new opportunities for a revised relationship between the state and local communities. The New Order’s centralistic and uniform framework was replaced by a new legal framework for the democratisation of local-level politics and village institutions (Antlöv, 2003). During the New Order, Suharto’s central government was in full control in supervising village governance, where the village head was in fact an instrument to the central government. Village heads were directly accountable to the sub-district head, not to the villagers. Village administrations usually consisting of the local elite - enforced policies and decrees formulated in Jakarta. Since they had to be loyal to the state party, Golkar, they were forced to maintain good relations with higher authorities, at the expense of relations with the local population (Antlöv, 2010: 196). According to the new Law 22/1999, the village is no longer under the authority of the sub-district, but became an autonomous level of government. This means that a village can formulate and pass its own village regulations and budgets without the approval from higher authorities. The village administration now consists of a village head, his staff and the Badan Perwakilan Desa (BPD), the village parliament, which is elected from and by the villagers. The village head is no longer obliged to be oriented to the upward government structures, but is accountable to the villagers and to the BPD. The law provides the framework for what is legally possible, but one has to look at how the law gets implemented in practice to know whether the possibilities are realised. Many village governments are not yet aware about the space for own initiatives like DRM measures, while in other villages, the local elite is not yet willing to fundamentally change existing power relations. Aside from democratization, the central government produced a new framework for decentralisa tion, devolving responsibilities and power to the district levels of government. The new governance system does not function uncontested, since lack of understanding of the new responsibilities lead to gaps in planning and implementation among government levels and departments. The institutional context of unclear responsibilities between administrative levels and departments, also regarding DRM, together with a democratization process, offers opportunities however, for civil society groups to find space to manoeuvre to lobby for structural DRM solutions and institutional change. During


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Suharto’s time, civil-society organizations had to operate under heavy regulations and repression, preventing labourers, farmers and fishermen to organize themselves to oppose government policies (Antlöv, 2003), whereas nowadays they are less afraid to speak out their concerns or dissatisfaction. The space for civil society to lobby and engage with government for more structural DRM policies increased since the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. This major disaster event triggered a paradigm shift in the mind-set of the Indonesian Government from reactive emergency relief towards efforts for more pro-active disaster preparedness and mitigations (Barnaby Willitts-King, 2009). Also many new NGOs were established in response to the tsunami with a mandate to assist communities in their recovery and to reduce future disaster risks (Régnier et al, 2008). A month after the tsunami, the GoI was one of the 168 governments worldwide that signed the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA). This provided a push for reform, which coincided with on-going lobby efforts of UNDP and the Indonesian Society for Disaster Management, known as MPBI (Lassa 2011). MPBI is an association and comprises UN staff, government officials, NGO activists and academics. It successfully lobbied for a more proactive DM law to reduce the immense losses like experienced during recent major disasters in the country stressing to look into causes of disasters and not only into impact. This new DM law 24, enacted in July 2007, is integrated in the decentralization policies, meaning that power to formulate DRM policies for its respective territory is delegated to the district and village government levels. The law prescribes that DRM policies should be in line with development policies, and include disaster management cooperation policies with other districts, provinces or cities. Whereas the MPBI was able to mobilize different DRM actors and to successfully advocate for the ratification of the DM Law No 27/2007, its role weakened due to a lack of funding, declining influence and reduction in membership, possibly due to the establishment of a new (competing) National DRR Platform, PLANAS, as mandated by the new DM Law with the secretariat hosted within BNBP6 (Djalante, 2012). PLANAS took an active role and became a leading forum for DRR advocacy between 2007-2009 particularly abroad where PLANAS represented Indonesia’s experience in reconstruction processes following big disaster events (ibid). The role of PLANAS became less clear when DM policy and institutional frameworks were put in place at the national level, and the enthusiasm of its members seems to decrease (Hillman and Sagala, 2011). Vertical links between PLANAS and local level multi-stakeholder networks seem to be non-existing, which forms a gap in the institutional development and DRM performance, since national platforms could gain legitimacy and recognition through the involvement and feedback mechanisms from the grassroots level. The national disaster management framework still contains crucial ambiguities in terms of concepts (exact meaning of disaster management), organisational structure (National and Regional Disaster Management Bodies), process and procedures. These ambiguities affect regional government’s adoption of the framework and its translation into regional policies and instruments. Civil society operating at these local levels can make use of these ambiguities which provide room for negotiating how government from the village to district level could translate disaster risk reduction policy into practice. In next section, we will elaborate on DRM practices at local levels, and their key-outcomes.

2.2 Local level DRM practices in Indonesia Community-based approaches to DRM are relatively new in Indonesia, compared to countries like the Philippines or Bangladesh where CBDRM has proven its value. In Bangladesh, cyclones today only cause a fraction of formerly experienced deaths, thanks to shelters, early warning mechanisms and evacuation, and in finding appropriate risk reduction measures. CBDRM in Indonesia is being 6

PLANAS consists of 3 government agencies, 4 academic institutions, 13 CSOs, 2 media, 5 private sector organizations, PMI and 6 faith-based organisations (Djalante, 2012)


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implemented by a wide range of DRM actors like local NGOs, INGOs, Red Cross Societies, faithbased organizations (NU, 2010), the private sector, universities7 and also BNBP has its ‘desa tangguh’ program. The majority of these actors adopted and adapted the CBDRM concepts that are available internationally like the ADPC Field Practitioner’s Handbook on CBDRM (Abarquez and Murshed, 2004). Local NGOs which are partners of an INGO or national NGO received training on CBDRM based on international CBDRM materials which conceptualize CBDRM as a linear process starting with a risk assessment which includes a Hazard Vulnerability Capacity Assessment (HCVA), the formulation of a communicy action plan including a contingency plan, the formation of a disaster preparedness team and the conduct of evacuation simulations to test the skills and knowledge gained (Nakmofa & Lassa, 2009). Many NGOs assume sustainability of CBDRM by linkage building with BPBDs and by some financial support to realize simple mitigation measures by way of exit strategies. An exit strategy could consist of integrating the community action plan in the village development plan to ensure that village resources could be accessed. In reality, village budgets can hardly accommodate DRM measures and a need exists to look for funds beyond the community level which is often a challenge. BNPB’s ‘desa tangguh’ program follows the same process but on a very limited scale (42 villages nation-wide). Key-outcome of this CBDRM approach is the creation of CBDRM-teams at village level which are able to warn their community-members and to safely evacuate vulnerable groups in times of disasters. The communities that are selected for this CBDRM approach have experienced disaster events in the past. Examples are volcano prone areas like Mt. Merapi and Mt. Kelud where recent eruptions happened, and in tsunami and earthquake affected areas in Yogyakarta, West Sumatra and Aceh. These communities are more likely to be motivated to invest in disaster preparedness than communities which have not yet experienced disasters. Local people are eager to learn skills and approaches that reduce the number of casualties and damage. CBDRM as a project instead of community empowering process Looking at the different CBDRM-traditions in figure 1 (chapter 1), it can be concluded that most DRM actors in Indonesia view CBDRM as a project instead of a community empowerment process. NGOs use the logframe for measuring progress and success. For instance, when CBDRM-teams are formed and evacuation drills are conducted, the CBDRM-intervention is regarded as successful, stressing the usage of participatory tools, enhancement of community early warning systems and evacuation plans - which substantially led to increase community preparedness (Lassa, 2012; Hillman and Sagala, 2010). Viewing CBDRM as a community empowerment process and an approach for institutional development is still rare in Indonesia. The intended shift of the DM law to focus on the underlying causes of disasters and less on their impact has not yet transpired. A key-element of CBDRM policy is that communities need to take an active role in the identification of their risk problems and in the decision-making of what should be done to solve these using terms like ‘participation ’and ‘local ownership’. The project-oriented CBDRM approach actually consists of preconceived activities without room for changes or adaptations based on local risk perspectives. ‘Participation’ rather means involving people in project activities which is assumed to make interventions more efficient, and people are mainly ‘empowered’ in terms of forming community organizations, a type and level of empowerment that poses no serious threat to prevailing power relations (Bebbington et al 2007: 598). ‘People’s participation’ is here not meant to question or confront power inequalities nor to transform institutional arrangements to reduce disaster 7 For example Indonesian Institute of Science, Institute of Technology Bandung and other universities in Indonesia play a role in raising awareness of communities through disaster education and public campaign (Sagala, 2010). These education and campaign are often carried out in partnerships with NGOs, development agencies and/or donors.


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vulnerability, but that people act as volunteers to do the work on behalf of government to save resources. The project-oriented CBDRM approach largely ignores the social, economic and political origins of disaster vulnerability still ‘seeing’ disasters as sudden, external events. When CBDRM implementation gets delayed, NGOs attribute this to ‘communication barriers’ between facilitators and (in)formal leaders in the village. However, CBDRM interventions, like any intervention, involves negotiation, debates and struggles over resources and interests (see conceptual framework) which requires time to arrive at appropriate risk solutions. CBDRM interventions do not start on a blank page, isolated from the broader context. But many NGOs assume they do: instead of exploring the capacities of CBOs, and other forms of social capital, new CBDRM structures are established. NGOs do not fully recognize existing community structures, institutions or local knowledge. Most rural communities in Indonesia understand very well the potential risks; they have their specific coping strategies to deal with threats from natural hazards. Yet, such strategies are not fully integrated in current CBDRM practices while these are crucial when searching for more sustainable CBDRM interventions. Particularly this is due to facilitators’ lack of capacity to contextualize the CBDRM text book into practice. Another weakness observed by Djalante (2012) is that DRM actors at the local level can’t access the abundance of material published on lessons learned, and also systematic learning from past practices is not developed locally by decision-makers. Although communities are involved in the CBDRM process, they don’t seem to experience a shift in mind-set meaning that they still view their vulnerable position in society as unchangeable, accepting prevailing norms, values and institutions that legitimate current relationships and arrangements. Even when CBDRM-teams are linked to local government, it remains unclear how such partnership can guarantee sustainability or achieve community resilience. The CBDRM-teams are not equipped with leadership skills, like lobby and negotiation skills or speaking in public. They often don’t know where to go for additional DRM support. Nevertheless, there are a few good case studies that can be referred to as empowering CBDRM approaches that improve community resilience, like CBDRM practices in Muria Region, Central Java, implemented by four local NGOs linked through the Muria Coalition8, while also the CBDRM approach applied by the Partners for Resilience seems promising. These approaches aim to rework and develop institutional arrangements with government, engage with BPBDs and relevant line departments in their lobby and dialogue efforts, which remains a challenge and require efforts beyond project-timeframes. In Muria Region, Central Java, for instance, decentralisation of powers to the district level makes it difficult for flood-affected communities to address environmental issues and inappropriate land use in their watershed which covers three districts. Land use planning and watershed management are issues still being decided at higher levels. Provinces still have autonomy in spatial planning, public works, and environmental issues, among others, and the national level keeps the responsibility for natural resources. Whereas Pati district has a DRM plan and policy since July 2010, the adjacent districts lack any DRM policy or structure making inter-district cooperation almost impossible. Aside of the lack of knowledge and understanding of the new responsibilities at the various government levels and departments concerning DRR, the decentralization did not result in the decentralization of revenues. This implies that districts can set their priorities but are not sure whether they will have the funding for implementation. This is another constraint for the district government to not invest in big projects like river normalization. In the end, it remains unclear what exactly has been decentralised (Schulte-Nordholt, 2003) which prevent district governments to look beyond investments in 8

See http://www.kerkinactie.nl/site/uploadedDocs/CBDRManditstransformativepotential.pdf


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evacuation shelters and awareness raising initiatives on disaster preparedness. This example shows the importance of institutional reform at different administrative levels and the urgent need of local communities to engage with local government with the support of civil society. However, vertical links between DRR platforms hardly exist, and even district level forum are rare (Djalante, 2012). School-based approaches to reduce disaster risk School-based approaches are applied by NGOs that focus on children as their entry points, such as World Vision (2010), Plan International (2010) and Save the Children. The NGOs with their local partners normally incorporate teachers, children and their parents in the activities. School-based approaches also focus on disaster preparedness through simulations. Often this is supported by mainstreaming DRR into their curricula translated to the local context. Theoretically, this is ideal but it reveals that some teachers would like to have ‘ready-to-use’ materials rather than to develop the local content themselves. In terms of partnership, school-based management (manajemen berbasis sekolah) is applied by involving the department of education, BPBD, the school committee and teachers which later approach and advocate to parliament members. Another approach is by having a headmaster forum at district level where they can share information on school safety and DRM. The school- based approach to CBDRM could also be a stepping-stone to conduct disaster prearedness training in nearby communities.

2.3 Capacity of NGOs to work with government and to link communities with government Many NGOs (local and international) confirm that local government (BPBD) plays a significant role in achieving and sustaining long term community resilience. Yet, NGOs observe that the support from local government to CBDRM is minimal. The usual interaction between NGOs and local government occurs when the NGO initiates CBDRM projects and informs the authorities about this initiative. BPBDs are hardly involved during CBDRM implementation, while on the other hand, some NGOs expect that the CBDRM programmes will eventually be supported by BPBD’s annual budget. Such expectations are not realistic, knowing that many BPBDs are newly established agencies with limitation in staff capacity, financial resources and facilities. Some BPBDs expect NGOs to continue and expand their programs in the district, which is also an unrealistic expectation. Also the presence of INGOs in disaster prone areas raises expectations, since the local government (BPBD) notices that INGOs brings knowledge and programmes to the communities. It would help when NGOs and local government would meet more often and in a more substantial way to exchange their expectations, even when it is just to discover that what each party assumes is impossible. Dialogue spaces, both informal and formal, are very much needed to advance CBDRM practice and policy. Some DRR forum at provincial or district level exist, but many do not function well. Many lack the proper representation from community-based organizations, or have limited financial support, unclear purposes and lack of leadership (Djalante, 2012). There are some good examples where local governments have been linked with communities through CBDRM programs. Communities near Mt. Kelud have been recognized by the local govern ment as active CBOs organized into a network called Jangkar Kelud, which supports disaster preparedness. The interaction between local government and Jangkar Kelud is quite active, and the latter is also active at the provincial level DRR forum. The supporting NGO (Kappala) regarded the communities as active DRM actors, and was able to change the mind-sets of local people towards aware and critical citizens. An uphill community on Mt. Muria was linked by a local NGO to conduct reforestration in cooperation with technical staff of the forestry department while at the same time the CBOs lobby for sustainable land use regulation to reduce landslides and flash floods. They even


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were able to negotiate and have dialogues with (illegal) miners and village authorities (Heijmans, 2012). In Meulaboh and Ende districts, the coastal communities managed to construct sandbags as a mitigation measure against sea waves and coastal erosion with the involvement of local government. However, not so many local NGOs consider it their task to link communities with local governments (Lassa, 2009). Many CBDRM programs end without interaction between communities and local government, because NGOs think that support from local government is limited, so they do not encourage communities to negotiate or engage local government because they don’t want to create false hope. These kinds of NGOs’ mind-sets will not lead to community resilience. A special sector involved in CBDRM in Indonesia are the faith-based organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah and Catholic Church Networks. They are active in the regions where the majority of the population belongs to their constituency where they raise awareness about disasters and enhance preparedness. For this purpose they use existing structures that are embedded in community life: Nahdlatul Ulama f.i. approaches ustadz (cleric) and kyai (chaplain) to convince communities to take part in disaster preparedness activities in East Java. In NTT, Caristas Maumere, the Catholic Church NGO organization approach rural communities to develop their disaster action plan. The advantage of these networks is that contact and trust building – like applied by NGOs – is not necessary because the facilitators live in the community, which allows informal and long term facilitation. Additionally, faith-based organizations can influence members of parliament and govern ment who are their followers to be supportive to DRM. Faith-based organizations easily provide a platform where the needs of the communities can be communicated to local governments and parliaments.

2.4 Challenges, gaps and needs While disaster preparedness has been significantly improved since 2004, challenges remain. The immense area and number of communities in Indonesia exposed to multiple hazards urge for upscaling CBDRM activities. However, the unique context of each community in Indonesia makes it difficult to know how to best replicate CBDRM to promote a culture of safety nation-wide. Differing cultural settings may cause some CBDRM activities succeed in one region but fail in another. Therefore it is crucial to always understand local settings first and to recognize local risk perspectives even when people experience the same disaster event as elsewhere. Additionally, communities often prioritize economic and livelihood concerns and support for addressing the underlying risk factors over preparedness measures resulting in a mismatch between responses offered and people’s urgent felt needs. So far, CBDRM in Indonesia is dominated by external funding, which puts questions about the sustainability of CBDRM approaches on the long run. In addition to that, partnerships between NGOs, CBOs and local government remain limited for the duration of a project since each actor has it’s own mandate and style. The idea to integrate CBDRM activities into local development processes is still a huge challenge since the timeframe of CBDRM activities do not typically meet the development planning cycle. Further, the integration of CBDRM into the development planning process requires high level support, starting from village, sub-district and district government to get engaged in the process and to support the proposed programme. Another challenge is the limited involvement of the private sector and media in supporting DRM in communities. Gaps Majority of NGOs have a limited understanding of the potential of CBDRM approaches, of how to conduct a proper risk assessment using the HCVA tools, and face problems around participation, social inclusion and building linkages with local governments. This gap becomes painfully visible when NGOs are about to end their CBDRM programs. Exit strategies are poorly conceptualized and seem to consist of handing over the program to local governments at district and village level.


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However, the necessary capacities of BPBDs to sustain CBDRM initiatives are not yet in place. In term of resources, communities are told that they could access resources from line departments or through private sector’ CSR programmes. But these are still dreams because not so many CSR programmes support DRR at community level, and also line departments do not easily provide funds for DRM to communities. Partnerships between communities and local government through DRR forum are still rare. There are examples where a forum was created through a formal process (under Governor Bill), but no activities happen like in Nusa Tenggara Timur Province. Additionally, many communities lack the capacities to mobilize effective agency and form networks to negotiate with government. Needs The ultimate goal of CBDRM is to reduce people’s vulnerability and to achieve community resilience, meaning that people are able to optimize and access internal and external resources to reduce disaster risks. Increasing community resilience can be achieved by strengthening people’s existing social and organizational capacities, such as their innate social networks, adat and religious networks, but also by expanding their resources and contacts outside these social networks by seeking connections with power holders as a way to obtain protection. By mobilizing people’s social capital, local communities can attempt to reduce their ‘political vulnerability’; this means that CBDRM efforts could enable people to have a political voice, to gain access to political resources and spaces, positions and to perform their power to achieve safety and security from the local to the national level. There is a trend in Indonesia that CSOs and NGOs increasingly hold government accountable for not adequately addressing disaster risks through various strategies such as inviting government to workshops, creating spaces for dialogues and through media exposure. CBDRM programs should not be limited to village level interventions and disaster preparedness. While some risk problems can be solved at the local level, underlying risk factors should be tackled beyond the community like land use planning, building codes and environmental concerns. Communities can propose, access and link to local development processes or integrate CBDRM in the village development planning. The government of Indonesia is currently going through a paradigm shift from reactive to more proactive responses to disasters. BNPB applies a top-down approach with bottom-up ideas. The top-down approach consists of training province-level facilitators who support the districts with risk mapping, among others. At the same time BNPB promotes the ‘Village Resilience Programme’ at the local level. The latter could be linked to CBDRM practices. However, different views and ideas exist among provincial, district and local government levels on what should be done in terms of DRM. The organisational assessment studies of the BNPB and the BPBD reveal many challenges and a clear need for further capacity building. Government, NGOs and CBOs have to find new ways to engage with each other and to transform hierarchical, oppositional relationships and passive mind-sets due to their histories - into partnerships. The main challenge is to create a conducive environment for dialogue, and for building trust between the government, academia, NGOs, CSO, private sector and its citizens. This requires a dialogue space (platform) in which each actor can share, co-learning to strengthen their capacity, legitimacy and existence in order to pull resources that are available internally (within own district) and externally. There is a need for a paradigm shift within NGOs (local and international), local governments, donors on what goals CBDRM need to achieve. This paradigm shift will require the actors to re-think that CBDRM should address beyond preparedness and start to focus on the underlying risk factors, and to enable the communities to get involved in a dialogue with DRR actors.


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3. Overview of key findings and observations from the field visits The research team visited communities in Kediri and Blitar districts situated near Mount Kelud, an active volcano, communities in Bojonegoro district affected by floods from the Bengawan Solo River, and a coastal community in Banyuwangi district, East Java province, four communities in Sikka and Maumere Districts, NTT affected by tsunami, earthquakes, coastal erosion, flooding, droughts, three communities in West Aceh and three in West Sumatra affected by tsunami, earthquakes and floods. After community visits, interviews were conducted with NGO staff and district-level BPBDs. The findings are structured according to the different levels of analysis starting with the community since local people’s perspectives are the entry-point and centre of the community self-reliance analysis.

3.1 How is CBDRM defined and operationalized in practice? Community-level analysis: local risk perspectives and priorities East Java - We visited four villages (Besowo, Satak, Widang and Soso) that are located on the slopes of Mount Kelud in East Java, which erupted in 2007. The government forced the villagers to evacuate because the BMKG predicted a severe eruption. The villagers reluctantly left their homes; “We have our own indicators for deciding whether to evacuate or not and who should be evacuated”. “We were put in evacuation centers and treated as cattle”. “We just slept and waited to be fed”. “Aid providers could have asked us to cook ourselves. We tried to organize ourselves to change the situation. But we were regarded as helpless victims while we are not”. The relief responses provided by the government were below humanitarian standards, chaotic and corrupt, according to the villagers, and they felt that this should change. These negative experiences formed their motivation to engage with Kappala, a Yogyakartabased NGO, which acted as facilitator to organize the villagers in a more systematic way using their social and motivational capacities while promoting a culture of solidarity-fraternity. Initially, interested people coming from 10 villages attended training on CBDRM which focused on organizing and mobilizing other villagers into Disaster Preparedness Teams. These teams founded Jangkar Kelud in 2008 – an independent, informal organization consisting of organized communities. At this moment 38 villages belonging to three districts (Kediri, Blitar and Malang) are part of Jangkar Kelud with 1820 active members. These members are responsible to replicate CBDRM training in other villages around Mount Kelud and to maintain a level of disaster preparedness through simulations, and sharing experiences through a radio-network. For Jangkar Kelud CBDRM means solidarity, helping each other beyond emergency periods, using their existing capacities and being organized in Disaster Preparedness Teams (Coordinator, Treasurer, Early Warning team (through radio and walky talkies), search and rescue team, training team (especially teachers), health team, kitchen team). Additionally, Jangkar Kelud – based on its negative experience in 2007 – considers its role to lobby and negotiate with districts government to have local villagers’ perspective included in DRM planning and decision-making, to change the mind-set of BPBDs and to enhance their coordination responsibility. A challenge for Jangkar Kelud is to reach the most vulnerable households who live in remote places and who lack resources or time to attend training or meetings. It is Jangkar Kelud’s long-term effort to expand to these areas and to look for people with the capacity to become a local facilitator. We further visited flood-affected villages in Bojonegoro district along the Bengawan Solo River. The


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river originates from Central Java province and overflows annually 5 to 7 times during DecemberMarch, affecting particularly rice fields. The floods coincide with the harvest time which results in economic losses. In 2007, the river overflowed affecting residential areas causing people to evacuate. This happens every 5 years and people are prepared and on alert during the rainy season. Farmers are eager to find budget to close off intake-canals along the Bengawan Solo River when water level rises to avoid water entering and flooding the rice fields. This measure will only work till alert level 2. When the water level will rise higher, this measure will not be effective, but it may just be enough to protect the fields till the rice is harvested. The farmers did not relate the floods to climate change nor did they observe changes in weather patterns. These villages were selected by PMI to implement its CBDRM program aimed to form CBAT-teams and a school-based DRM program to increase DRM awareness among children from grade 4, 5 and 6. The CBAT-teams focus on disaster preparedness in case flood affect the residential area, while the CBDRM program does not consider measures to mitigate flooding of paddy fields which is the priority of the farmers. In Banyuwangi district we visited a coastal community (desa Sumberagung, in Pesanggaran subdistrict) which was hit by a tsunami in 1994 which killed 194 people. Since then communities have become more vulnerable to tsunami as mangroves have been cut, hills were flattened – due to resource extraction – reducing escape routes to higher locations, and the number of houses increased from 100 houses in 1994 to 1000 houses currently. However, fishermen stressed that tsunami is not the only risk to which they are exposed. Coastal erosion and floods increasingly affect people’s livelihoods in a negative way. A physical construction to break waves was ill-designed and intensified coastal erosion instead of mitigating the process. In combination with floods the construction further caused sedimentation in the river mouth, hampering fishermen to get their boats in the sea during low tide. Local people, including fishermen, prioritize risk reduction measures that protect the coast from erosion and reduce sedimentation. They proposed DRM measures in the Village Development Plan which were not approved. They tried to access PNPM funds but many proposals compete to access this fund. It is clear from the short visit that people are exposed to a broader risk landscape than tsunami only, and that people prioritize mitigation measures over disaster preparedness (early warning and evacuation). In West Aceh, we visited three villages: two coastal villages (Desa Langung and Desa Gampung Pasir) near Meulaboh affected by the 2004 tsunami, and one village in the uplands affected by recurrent floods (Desa Kautambang). The people we met in the coastal villages shared their experiences during the 2004 tsunami, but regularly they also referred to traumatized experiences during the past conflict which ended a few months after the tsunami. Compared to Jangkar Kelud in East Java, local people in Aceh Barat were not very critical about the nature of emergency response after the tsunami provided by (I)NGOs and the government. They seem to have a more passive attitude regarding what happens around them and accept solutions and decisions offered by outsiders9. They explained that they are very religious and believe that when they pray, that they will be protected. Only in Desa Gampung Pasir, the village head was critical and disappointed in how district government (land issues) and national government (housing) dealt with their request for re-allocation and to move out of the ‘red danger zone’. They still face acute risk to lose their houses due to coastal erosion. Also right after the earthquake and a tidal wave in 2007, discussions about re-allocation resumed but the government couldn’t provide land elsewhere. Meanwhile they invest in tree planting and installing concrete structures to mitigate coastal erosion. However, these measures only prevent sand to enter the village not the erosion. The village head thinks that ‘wave breaks’ could reduce coastal erosion but these are costly and beyond the capacity of local villagers. Coastal erosion and tidal waves are 9 This impression is based on a very short visit and needs to be validated through other sources


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considered priority risks over tsunami and earthquakes. Since his youth, 1 km of land has been eroded and disappeared in the sea; “if no measures are taken the village will disappear in the sea”. In both coastal villages, people stated that their livelihoods are still not fully recovered since the tsunami. Many fields disappeared or turned into rivers. The soil has been mixed with sand resulting in less harvest and in lesser quality of rice fields. The fields are lower now and easily flooded. Many farmers became fishermen but not all have their own boat. They further mentioned that more extreme weather events (during the ‘east season’) result in shorter periods of good fish catches. This may be attributed to climate change. The CBDRM program implemented in their villages by IBU Foundation did conduct vulnerability assessments (physical, social, economic, motivational) but not much was done with the data collected. CBDRM focused on establishing Disaster Preparedness Teams and formulation of Action Plans, while livelihoods and underlying risk factors did not get full attention10. The Disaster Preparedness Teams and regular simulations are appreciated since people don’t panic anymore and know what to do when they are hit by an earthquake or tsunami (like during earthquake last April 2012). Desa Kautambang in the uplands, is affected by floods annually. It is situated in between two big rivers, and floods last from 5 hours till two days. The floods have a strong current and are therefore dangerous. The villagers observe an increase in frequency of floods. They attribute floods to logging upstream by a company. In neighboring villages the harvest of peanuts was lost, but in Desa Kautambang no major losses or damages occurred; only houses get flooded at a height of 1 meter. People use the school as evacuation centre where they can stay overnight and cook. The DPT/CBDRM team further mobilized community labour to construct ‘bronjong’ (gabions) to stabilize riverbanks and slopes. Resources were generated through the PMPN. The villagers are aware that gabions will not be sufficient to address flooding, but they have no long term plan or ideas. Disaster Preparedness Teams or CBDRM-teams currently exist in 41 villages in 3 districts (all IBU initiated) and members became certified volunteers under the BPBDs. Further, DRR/DisPrep is integrated in school curriculum since many teachers are also member of the DPTs and have knowledge and skills to teach children about what to do when disasters strike. Each CBDRM-team has a coordinator who is member of FORMASIBAB - a network among the 41 villages and initiated by IBU Foundation in October 201011. Most representatives come from the coastal zone. FORMASIBAB meets monthly and mainly exchanges information among members and collects petty cash from each village for times of emergency. However, mostly flood-affected villages consume the petty cash and consequently the coastal villages complained. They formulated policy that a village can only receive ER funds every two years. FORMASIBAB is not yet aware of the added value such network can have or potential roles it can play. It is also not very clear how it will ensure its functioning in the future. In NTT, we visited Sikka and Ende District. In Sikka, we visited two villages (Wolofeo and Reroroja) which were hit by Flores Tsunami in 1992. Wolofeo is located in the uplands and affected by flash floods and drought, while Reroroja is facing severe coastal erosion. Apart from the impact from tsunami, local people refer to previous flooding that affected their villages back in 1970s and 1980s. Together with drought that largely affect their agriculture production, they also expressed their concern on pest attack on their harvests. The district agency for agriculture unfortunately could not

10 IBU Foundation mentioned that ‘Strengthening Livelihoods’ was not part of the project logframe, but dealt with in a separate UNDP programme. 11 Reason for forming FORMASIBAB was because the project ended, and it was assumed that such network would keep the CBDRM teams active. It was part of the donor’s logframe (theory of change).


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provide much assistance to reduce the impact of the pest attack. It is clear that local people are very concerned about their livelihood problems and impacts due to disasters. In Wolofeo village, the local people that were involved in CBDRM are also a group of people that were active in Gapoktan (Farmer Group Association) established by district government. Gapoktan is also a national program by Ministry of Agriculture. Therefore, they are familiar on how to mobilize people and be involved in community activities. They were still at the initial stage of CBDRM activities assisted by Caritas Keuskupan Maumere and Karina NGO. When we visited their village, they were still making plans of “jebakan air” (water trap) and “sumur resapan” (infiltration well) in order to cope with droughts and flash floods. The process of making the plan was assisted by Caritas Keuskupan Maumere which took almost half a year. The trust of the local community to follow the process was strengthened by the fact that Caritas Keuskupan Maumere is part of the Catholic Church Network in which most of the community holds Catholic belief. In the Reroroja Coastal Village, the local people planted mangrove assisted by Wetlands International (WI) that helps as a means against the coastal erosion that largely hit the coastal villages in Sikka. The community tends to be passive in identifying their needs, however they welcome the NGO assistance to them to plant mangrove. The program was providing micro financing – loan program to several households in the village with an obligation for them to raise and take care mangrove on the coasts. The seeds were provided by WI. If the community can raise mangrove successfully, the loan to the community will become a grant and the community does not need to return the money. It is not yet convincing whether the local people could sustain the program without outside assistance. Local people were able to produce a village law on coastal and marine protection in their village. The role of Musalaki (cultural leader) is still influential in the decision making, including in predicting when the planting season starts. However, in the last decade the condition become less predictable since a rainy season could stop abruptly followed by no rain that cause the planted seeds are not able to grow. In Ende, we visited two villages, Watuneso village and Kelurahan Tanjung-Paupanda. Watuneso is located in the uplands and prone to floods, droughts and volcanic eruption. Watuneso is assisted by Lembaga Pengembangan Teknologi Perdesaan (LPTP), a NGO within the Partners for Resilience (PfR) programme. The local people admitted that they were not very clear about the concept of disaster. They mention that the program by LPTP is quite different with what was earlier conducted by other NGOs, since they are trained how to understand hazard and vulnerability and to see risk in a broader sense. In previous NGO programs the communities were only involved in the implementation of the program with little understanding of the context and the purpose of the program. In this village, the role of Musalaki is also influential. They believe that when something happens to their harvest or any disaster occurs, it is due to their inobedience to adhere to cultural norms. Musalaki will know and decide what will happen by identifying the signs from nature. For example, if rains arrive from the low lands, there will be no flooding in their village, while rains from the opposite direction will cause floods. In terms of CBDRM activities, the communities understood and developed community preparedness teams. This is also urged by the district policy on TSBD (Tim Siaga Bencana Desa / Village Disaster Preparedness Team). However, they have not yet formulated any community action related to disaster preparedness. Interestingly, the community and the NGO agreed to install a simple system of biogas from pig husbandary faeces which is very much appreciated by the community. The community identified that pig faeces could cause environmental problems which are solved now by using it as energy source for cooking which they also needed. Desa Kelurahan Tanjung-Paupanda is located in the coastal area of Ende. While the community identifies earthquake, tsunami and flooding as hazards, coastal erosion was the most significant disaster they face. Local people expressed that they were empowered by the CBDRM programme assisted by Flores Institute for Resource Development (FIRD). Previously, in any flooding event, they were just passive, evacuated and waited for government assistance. The local NGO, approached


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them and they started to realize that they could do something to cope with coastal erosion. They started to construct and arrange sandbags along the coast that prevent sea water to wash the coastal sands. They also formed a local community disaster preparedness team consisting of men and women with a division of tasks during emergency situations. In West Sumatra, we visited Kota Padang, Padang Pariaman and Agam Districts. Komunitas Siti Nurbaya (KSN), a CBO, was established by MercyCorps and the Sub-District Batang Arau in August 2010. They are considered to belong to the active KSNs in Padang. After the program ended, KSN has been able to maintain its activity. KSN is most concerned with raising awareness and preparedness for tsunami and earthquake. They received training on first aid and emergency response. However, this CBO also understands that they are at risk to other hazards, such as flooding and landslides. They were able to use PNPM budget to fix an alley that collapsed due to a landslide. With community self-help, they constructed steep stairs uphill which functions as a vertical evacuation route in case of a tsunami. While the stairs are very steep, slippery and look dangerous, it shows people’s awareness of the risks they face. This CBO has strong back-up by village officials, particularly from the village chief while the members of the CBO are mostly head of neighborhoods. So far, even without sufficient funding, the CBO could use a room in the village office provided by the village chief. The CBO involves men, women and youth as their members. The CBO utilizes community-radio to communicate to each other, including communities upstream. When it rains heavily upstream, they can get prepared. On the other hand, when floods affect upstream communities, the CBO send its members to help the upstream community. In the previous flash flood of Padang City, the CBO joined other volunteer groups to evacuate people and assisted in the emergency response. Radio communication (RAPI) is also a network of this community. In Pariaman District, we visited Nagari Balai Naras, Pariaman Utara Sub-District assisted by Limbubu, a local NGO in Pariaman. This coastal community has been trained in tsunami simulation and earthquake preparedness. Limbubu was a partner of a national NGO IDEP and Plan International. The program ended in 2010 which was part of the earthquake response to the West Sumatra in 2009. The community preparedness was conducted with an elementary school located in the same village. A disaster preparedness team (KSB) was formed as part of the program. The KSB members are fishermen, housewives, youth and teachers of the school (who live in a same village). While the members express their interest to participate in any simulation, the KSB seems less active now since there is no more programme by Limbubu or any other NGO. The community was not clear whether they are at risk to other types of hazard. This could be due to the limited focus of the previous programme on tsunami and earthquake. Livelihood concerns were not considered in the program, while the community is concerned with the diminishing fish availability. They don’t know yet what solution they should look for. Partnership with local BPBD or CSO network does not exist. In Agam District, Komunitas Jorong Tiku Selatan is a coastal community that is prone to earthquake, tsunami, floods and strong winds. We met with the KSB of Jorong Tiku Selatan. While the KSB mentioned that there have been many NGOs active in their hamlet since the 2009 West Sumatra Earthquake, KSB was not clear whether these programmes are connected to each other. Furthermore, KSB told that it did not have a partnership with the local BPBD. This hamlet has been selected as one of BNPB Desa Tangguh Programmes in West Sumatra. Under the Desa Tangguh Programme, BPBD and the hamlet leader formed a new KSB, which differed from the previous KSB that was established by a West Sumatra based NGO (Jemari Sakato) which is a local partner of Oxfam. Consequently, double KSB structures exist in this hamlet causing confusion to the community. The community attribute this to the top-down approach that local governments normally take in program implementation. Another example is the recent construction of public toilets by the local government which occurred without consultation with the local community. Three days after the


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construction, the toilet buildings were damaged by sea pine trees which felt due to strong winds. KSB further revealed that also NGOs hardly involves the hamlet leader leading to inappropriate assistance.

Conclusions 1.

Disaster-affected people are not passive victims but willing and able to take on responsibilities to respond to disasters and to invest in longer-term mitigation measures. They are aware of disaster risks, but may not necessarily know what to do during emergencies or to mitigate negative impacts (require access to scientific knowledge for designing appropriate mitigation measures).

2.

Entry-points for CBDRM are people’s real experiences with disasters which highly motivates them to learn new skills and organize themselves into CBDRM-teams to avoid panic and to help each other during emergency without being dependent on immediate outside aid.

3.

Local people are exposed to multiple hazards and prioritize those that threaten their everyday livelihoods.

3.

The most vulnerable groups are identified and categorized as pregnant women, disabled, elderly, the sick and children. Their conditions are recognized during evacuation procedures by CBDRM-teams which consist mostly of the less vulnerable groups (village officials, teachers, local business persons, housewives) who have time and resources to be part of CBDRM-teams. This is in itself not problematic as long as the specific risk perspectives and livelihood needs of the most vulnerable groups are understood and recognized. Unfortunately that doesn’t yet happen (see point 5).

4.

In several instances, we observed that CBDRM interventions did not match with people urgent felt livelihood needs to reduce disaster risk, particularly recurrent flooding and coastal erosion, because emphasis was put on tsunami preparedness. Additionally, existing community structures, local knowledge and risk perspectives are not fully recognized.

5. In some areas CBDRM-teams replicated their skills and knowledge for Disaster Preparedness to other communities and formed CBO-networks that linked to district BPBD. This differs from the Desa Tangguh approach where government officials train others based on CBDRM theory, while CBDRM-teams have real-life experience and have ‘how to do’ skills. However, not all CBO-networks are aware yet of their added value to change and influence the mind-set and performance of district governments while being a critical partner (bottom-up). Some CBOnetworks rather act as a channel of the BPBD to reach government’s services and goods at the community level (top-down). 6.

In other areas, CBDRM-teams were left on their own without a clear exit strategy.

7.

Local communities face many challenges to get support for their urgent structural DRM measures (e.g. gabions, wave-breaks, or reforestation). CBDRM-teams try to include DRR measures in Village Development Plans or use other government programs to access resources (e.g. PNPM). When this is not successful they approach BPBD for institutional support e.g. for endorsement letters to specific government departments or generate petty cash through CBO-networks.


9.

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Involvement of formal leaders, such as village chiefs vary from one community to the other. The reasons for not involving formal leaders at the start of a programme could be to reach vulnerable groups in a community which is not part of the elite. However, it is crucial at a certain point in time to link CBOs with village authorities in order to utilize formal links to local BPBD or other government agencies.

District level analysis: meaning attached to CBDRM by different actors The ‘Desa Tangguh’ programme is implemented by BNPB through BPBDs in 21 provinces (per province 2 pilot villages are selected). Priority areas are coastal villages prone to tsunami and abrasi (coastal erosion).The aim of ‘Desa Tangguh’ is to better prepare communities for disasters. A BPBD officer in Blitar framed the programme as ‘establishing a first aid kit for the community and know where to evacuate to help themselves before outside assistance arrives’. Emphasis is on disaster preparedness rather than on the full range of disaster risk reduction interventions. People trained through this programme are volunteers on whom local government can rely during crisis events. Indicators for a ‘desa tangguh’ reflect the programme’s activities rather than outcomes like community abilities. The ‘desa tangguh’ programme is not a holistic programme but developed as an addition to already existing ‘community resilience’ programmes of other line ministries like fishery, coastal and marine department, Health and Social Affairs assuming that coordinated action is happening. The BPBD in West Aceh attempts to continue the CBDRM programmes that were initiated by NGOs but which have left. The BPBD lacks the capacity to conduct CBDRM training at village level and therefore it trains students from the Teuku Umar University for that purpose and hopes that NGOs will continue their work. The BPBD in Blitar, West Aceh and Banyuwangi do not prioritize tsunami or earthquake, since 50-60% of the district’s area are affected by recurrent floods/ landslides while coastal erosion is also a major risk. BPBDs don’t consider Climate Change Adaptation as part of their mandate. They view BMKG as the responsible agency for CCA. Kappala (East Java) views CBDRM as ‘learning through fraternity, helping each other, changing values, norms, mindsets, and attitudes towards active and critical citizenry’. Disaster-affected people are not perceived as victims, beneficiaries or target groups, but as active citizens. Kappala doesn’t view CBDRM as assistance or a project. Instead Kappala encourages people to become aware of disaster risks and what they can do themselves in order to educate others and to expand people’s preparedness networks but with a critical mindset. The focus of their strategy is hazard-focused and on preparedness sustained by community self-mobilization of human, financial and motivational resources. According to Kappala’s philosophy Jangkar Kelud is also part of Kappala, as are the Merapi community networks. Partners for Resilience (PfR) take a landscape approach to CBDRM linking short-term preparedness to long-term DRR measures working across geographical, administrative and timescales. Three goals are being targeted in PfR interventions: disaster risk reduction, climate change and ecosystem management. Short-term preparedness capacities have been established through a process that aims to make local people aware about what they can do to reduce disaster risks using their capacities. They rely upon different processes: Caritas Keuskupan Maumere (CKM), a church group, approaches the community through Catholic Church networks at the lowest unit level. CKM stressed that it took several months before they could start making community action plans for DRR and CCA since it requires time and efforts to arrive at a common understanding about CKM’s intentions and aims. Wetlands International (WI) supports communities to plant mangroves which are important to mitigate coastal erosion and to strengthen coastal livelihoods through making the environment conducive for breeding fish and crabs. LPTP in Ende made the community aware of the risks that they face and encouraged them that they are able to deal with the risks with their capacities. PfR


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combines disaster preparedness with livelihood strategies as a means to increase people’s capacities on the long term to better cope with the negative impact of disasters. Ibu Foundation views CBDRM as a planned project to raise people’s awareness on how they can prepare for disasters, and as a way to overcome aid dependency. When project and funding ends, Ibu states it can’t continue activities and assumes that networks of CBOs will remain active and sustain activities. Focus is on village level DRR activities with an emphasis on establishing CBDRMteams consisting of volunteers linked to village authorities. Head of CBDRM-team is often the village head. The CBDRM approach is donor-driven rather than bottom-up although in Kautambang (floodprone village) the team managed to get funds from other sources for small mitigation measures like ‘bronjong’. The CBDRM-teams are certified volunteers for the BPBD and organized in a CBO-network FORMASIBAB. FIRD (Flores Institute for Resource Development) is actually a forum of different NGOs. They see CBDRM as community engaged activities and community ability to access resources in reducing disaster risks in their environment. Their strategies are based on networks of NGOs in Flores to achieve the basic needs of the communities. In order to strengthen the community, they try to link the community with the BPBD in carrying out DRM. The program has a hazard-based approach. In communities prone to coastal erosion they encouraged the community to build dikes on the coast with cement bags filled with sands. FIRD promotes the view that the community can reduce risk by themselves as opposed to relying on government assistance. Government lacks sufficient budget to reduce risk and its response mainly consists of relief assistance. Therefore, CBDRM programmes are crucial to fill a gap in government support. The Indonesian Red Cross (PMI) views CBDRM as a shift from emergency relief to open-ended community disaster preparedness. PMI stresses that local people should get an active role in DRM and aims to establish community-based disaster preparedness teams that formulate contingency plans in cooperation with the BPBD, and a community action plan. PMI supports 1 or 2 activities from the risk priority list, while the community is responsible for finding resources for the remaining activities. These can be integrated in the Village Development Plan or through other means. However, the timeframe for implementing this CBDRM process is just one year, which is too short according to PMI staff. PMI considers emergency relief as too limited to address disaster risk, but it struggles to make a shift towards DRM because its organizational capacity and structure do not match yet with the requirements for implementing CBDRM since it was considered a challenge to translate a national CBDRM policy into a localized one. LSM Limbubu is a local NGO in Padang Pariaman that originally started its programme on women and children issues, including trafficking and rape victims. Since 2004 it started with CBDRM with a focus on community disaster preparedness for tsunami. The founder of Limbubu is a nurse in Bukit Tinggi and therefore the NGOs CBDRM has an emphasis on health and first aid during emergencies but also other DRM related activities. Limbubu functions further as a disaster watchdog at district level by monitoring BNPB’s budget allocation for recovery and where the budget has been spent and who benefits from it. However, communities are not involved in this function. Limbubu approaches the community through informal local ways: by talking to people in coffee shops, through Women Quran Recital Groups (majelis taklim) or lottery events (arisan). Limbubu operates an amateur radio. The advantage a local NGO, is that communities can always pass by and ask support when needed. Even when programmes end, the NGO still meets the community through informal meetings in the district. Limbubu runs various programmes for fishermen, disaster preparedness programmes, and a school-based DRR programme through curricula development and imulations involving children, their parents and community people living near the school. Its view on CBDRM is unclear.


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Conclusions 1.

Government and different NGOs attach different meanings to CBDRM varying from increasing people’s capacities in disaster preparedness at village level towards changing mind-sets and performance of district/provincial government to make them responsible actors in DRM, towards addressing the underlying risk factors taking a landscape approach.

2.

For some actors CBDRM is a project that implements the activities mentioned in the logframe assuming that the outcomes and impact are achieved (Ibu Foundation, ‘Desa Tangguh’ e.g.). For others CBDRM is an empowerment process changing mind-sets, performance and institutions without a concrete time and space setting.

3.

Communities, NGOs and district governments all take a multi-hazard perspective and do not focus on one specific hazard. However all interventions could benefit from a more thorough vulnerability and capacity assessment that includes livelihood strategies, power relations and institutional arrangements that produce vulnerability at the village level. Such an analysis of underlying root causes could be compared with the long-term development plans of local government to identify entry points for lobby and negotiations.

4.

The role of NGO facilitators is initially to systematize what people already did in an unorganized way especially when people experienced hazards in the past. The role of government in CBDRM is different: it has the responsibility to protect its citizens and offer protection before, during and after disasters happen. Village authorities and BPBDs can’t do this task on their own. An institutional and legal framework for DRM is being developed but in practice it is still far from ideal. DRM is multi-sectoral in nature and requires the involvement and commitment of many stakeholders and line departments at different administrative levels. This is one of the major challenges of local communities to realize their action plans. It is relatively easy to get funds for training and sometimes a simulation, but for more structural measures (wave breaks, reforestation, re-allocation of houses, coastal protection, etc) it is more difficult (see next section).

Provincial level analysis: meaning attached to CBDRM by provincial actors Provincial BPBD in East Java: The BPBD in Surabaya regards the ’Desa Tangguh’ programme as an opportunity to bring the different line ministries together, by engaging those agencies that run a ‘Desa Tangguh’ programme on their own (Health, Social Affairs, Fisheries, etc). BPBD aims to synchronize the different ‘Desa Tangguh’ programmes in the same place to increase the effectiveness at community level and efficiency by making better use of scarce resources. Currently there is no structure in place and no clarity exists about who is responsible for what concerning the implementation of BPBD’s Desa Tangguh programme. FPBI – Indonesian Disaster Concern Forum. FPBI started as an informal group of students in 1992 in Surabaya (two years before the 1994 tsunami). Some environmental activists founded FPBI in 1998 while they got officially registered in Surabaya in 2008 (after 2004 tsunami and passing of 2007 DM law). The mission of FPBI is to educate students on DRM with the intention that after completion of their studies they could become ‘agents of change’ by sharing their knowledge with local government and vulnerable communities. FPBI espoused to train volunteers in communities at risk on disaster preparedness. FPBI consists of individual members who are professionals and students, and who spend around 20% of their time to FPBI work. Although we asked clear questions, we couldn’t get a clear picture of FPBI’s CBDRM-related work in terms of actual activities, coverage, outcomes, funding sources and network capacity.


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Climate Change and Disaster Management Institution of Nahdlatul Ulama (LPBI NU). NU is a religious organization established in 1926 in Surabaya. Since 2004, NU is pioneering with CBDRM which takes a holistic approach. LPBI-NU integrates environmental issues and climate change adaptation into its DRM agenda through lobby and advocacy from the community level. LPBI-NU supports the drafting of DRM regulations in 8 districts in East Java. These DRM regulations are drafted by CSOs not by the government and aim to make a shift from relief to DRM. LPBI-NU further initiated implementation regulations aimed to allocate more budget for DRM. Each district can draft context-specific regulations according to hazard-type. Mercy Corps in West Sumatra sees CBDRM as a programme that involves and organizes the commu nity through five steps: overcoming resistance, contemplation for change, prepare for change, take action and maintaining change. ‘Change’ implies a transition from community at risk towards a resilient community. These steps resonate with the CBDRM Handbook of ADPC viewing CBDRM as a project. Mercy Corps admits that prior to the 2009 West Sumatra Earthquake, communities were more concerned with floods which happen regularly. Triggered by the earthquake, most of NGOs working in West Sumatra, including Mercy Corps, focused on tsunami and earthquake preparedness. While Mercy Corps realized that multi-hazard perspective is important, they focused on tsunami and earthquake because of donors’ preferences. Climate change adaptation is also a concern of Mercy Corps which is considered in its ‘strengthening livelihood programme’ in rural areas. SurfAid focuses its CBDRM program on coastal communities like Mentawai Island, Siberut Island, Nias Island and Singkil (Aceh). SurfAid invites local government when starting a CBDRM programme to a workshop to socialize the programme to government, other NGOs and the community. However, this initiation does not evolve into a partnership or network between communities and local government (BPBD). Although SurfAid targets coastal communities on islands, it utilizes a number of ways to reach wider communities, including radio talk-shows and educational video showing to communities. Like other NGOs, SurfAid provides small grants to construct evacuation routes and evacuation shelter. SurfaAid further tries to connect downstream and upstream communities through mobile phone when there is rain or flooding. However it was not clear how effective this approach is since mobile phone signals are limited in remote areas.

3.2 How do the various actors view and interact in the (CB)DRM spaces to realize their interests? A number of actors are involved in promoting, implementing and expanding DRM in Indonesia. These actors include national and local governments, civil society organizations, private sectors and media. As a mandate of National Law on Disaster Management (24/2007), Indonesia encourages the active involvement of all actors in DRR to achieve sustainable resilience. This section focuses on how these actors interact and relate to one another in practice. Interaction among government agencies The national agency and local agencies for disaster management, namely BNPB and BPBD, are supposed to take on roles as coordinating agencies in disaster management between line depart ments. However, interaction between line ministries and administrative levels is at times confusing. Mandates, DRM policies, coordination and budget lines are being laid down in regulations and written on paper according to the DM law. In practice however, after the decentralization conflicts arose about which department or programme should provide budget for the range of DRM activities planned and requested from the village level. Currently it is the Department of Public Works which coordinates spatial planning and budgets. Some say this coordination role should go back to Bappenas again which is in the position to mediate between departments and settle disputes. Decentralization hampers the ‘desa tangguh’ project of BNPB as well, since it can’t transfer funds


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directly to village level. Only funds for ER can be directly transferred not for disaster preparedness or mitigation measures. Most difficult is to obtain funds for infrastructural works for DRR, while it is easy to get funds approved for training. The provincial BPBD in East Java views the ‘desa tangguh’ program as an opportunity to bring the different line ministries together by combining and coordinating the various ‘desa tangguh’ programs in one locality. This is expected to make the program more effective and efficient. This will not be easy, but as a start the provincial BPBD could bring the line departments together that have a role and responsibility during emergency response. The BPBD now has a central coordinating role, but SOPs among these agencies differ: e.g. in the SOP for flood response by the military and policy, alert level #1 is the highest danger level, while BPBD use alert level #3 as the highest level. Such a difference hampers coordination and that is why a new shared SOP has to be drafted. A new SOP is assumed to facilitate the drafting of a provincial policy for contingency planning since this also re quires the involvement of all stakeholders. The head of the BPBD expects that this process could be a pathway for better interaction and cooperation among line ministries for the purpose of coordina ting ‘desa tangguh’ support and other DRR measures. It may contribute to BPBDs becoming more legitimate actors with authority. The provincial BPBD in East Java acknowledges the importance of Climate Change Adaptation, but it is unclear which line department should take a lead in this: is it BPBD, BMKG, Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Agriculture, or agencies dealing with water management? The district BPBD of Padang Pariaman realizes that it should coordinate DRM efforts and support DRR mainstreaming in line departments. However, BPBD admitted that this role is still limited. E.g. the contribution of Public Works to build tsunami evacuation routes is still limited. Whereas the Bupati (Head of District) already requested line departments to mainstream DRM, it is still difficult in practice. Line departments assume that any activity related to DRM is the responsibility of the BPBD. BPBD realizes the importance to take a multi-hazard perspective although current focus is on tsunami and earthquake preparedness. Currently, the coordination with NGOs is still poor. While a DRM Forum exists, some NGOs tend to work on their own and therefore partnerships remain a challenge. The BPBD of Kota Padang realizes that community resilience is still a long way in Padang. Staff refer red to the earthquake on 11 April 2012 when people paniced and did not follow guidelines agreed in the previous simulation and training. BPBD believes that the role of NGOs is crucial in reaching and educating communities. However, they see that the partnership of NGO tends to focus on the provin cial level while city-level partnerships are limited. The Provincial BPBD in West Sumatra believes that its role is to strengthen the district and municipality BPBDs in West Sumatra. Coordination with other line provincial institutions in West Sumatra, such as public works, education exist but is still limited. While it admit that West Sumatra is at risk to multi-hazards, most of programmes that BPBD implement focus on tsunami and earthquake preparedness. With the help of BNPB they have had 10 early warning systems installed along the coast of West Sumatra. They also support the BNPB programme of Desa Tangguh in Agam District. Regarding the 5 roles the government could play in DRM (see page 7) we observed that it (1) provides relief goods and services, and is developing its legitimacy as (2) coordinator of multistakeholders activities. The other roles (3) as promoters of collective action and private sector activity; (4) regulators of private sector activity, and (5) as risk avoiders meaning refraining from actions that generate risks, are not visible. Most BPBDs admit the challenge to get the commitment of other line agencies to support DRM and response programmes. During coordination consultations, line agencies agree to provide assistance but the implementation is still weak.


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Interaction between government agencies, NGOs and private sectors BNBP and districts BPBD are in favor of linking/contracting NGOs to implement the ‘desa tangguh’ programme because NGOs have more capacity to do this task. The BPBDs we visited thank their existence largely to NGO involvement and the support of CBO-networks. BNPB is trying to approach private sectors to support its ‘Desa Tangguh’ programme with the corporate social responsibility programme (CSR) that is common in some private companies. Until now, the concept is not very clear how to implement this but BNPB suggests that with the data from mapping of ‘Desa Tangguh’ they are able to direct any assistance to achieve positive impact of the Desa Tangguh programme. Some BPBDs however, have second thoughts about linking with private sector (banks, companies) because their CSR funds just aim to secure their own investments. The private sector, however, comprises large multinational companies as well as local entrepreneurs or farmers who are considered community members rather than representatives of the private sector like e.g. local cooperatives that are part of people’s livelihoods or in a negative sense, small-scale miners and contractors whose activities degrade the environment. The provincial BPBD in East Java carefully facilitated the formation of a provincial DRM Platform – with some distance. Its members are carefully invited and should have a neutral outlook towards local politicians. The CSO-DRM platform consists of 2 universities, PMI, Jangkar Kelud, NU, Jawa Pos, one more private sector and BPBD. NU and universities take the lead in drafting district regulations on DM and ‘desa tangguh’ while the NGOs and CSOs push and lobby to get these approved through legislative bodies like district parliaments. Instead of getting DM legislation through the executive body12, opting for the legislative bodies saves time and resources. This could be a model to draft and pass district legislation on DM elsewhere. These regulations are required to enable BPBD to draft a mid-term development plan that considers DRM, which will also ease negotiations with line departments. The BPBD further welcomes such a Forum to share workloads, and to access pool of trainers/facilitators for capacity building. Provincial BPBD in West Sumatra attempts to involve the private sector in DRM like Padang Cement Factory and Djarum Cigarette Company but involvement is still limited during ER. The provincial BPBD acknowledges the contribution of NGOs in building community resilience in the province. The BPBD prefers to work with INGOs and donors since both provide financial support, programmes and man power. Tosupport partnerships with NGOs it offers to host the secretariat for NGOs in its office. However, BPBD is not clear in directing NGOs to achieve DRR goals in West Sumatra. BPBD in Sikka and Ende – being relatively new agencies – expressed that they currently rely on what NGOs have carried out in the communities. Therefore, their strategies are to continue previous programmes of NGOs. In this light, they focus on the emergency and preparedness process by strengthening community preparedness teams (Tim Siaga Bencana Desa / Kelurahan) and provide certificates to the volunteers of the preparedness teams. Tim Siaga Bencana in fact has been a district program by Bupati of Ende which was endorsed by a district law. However, the support, facilitation and training of DPTs still rely on previous experiences with NGOs. BPBDs have very limited budget for DRR, which limits the strengthening community preparedness programme. NGOs view local people in different ways: from uneducated, unprepared and unaware citizens towards active creative actors. The way NGOs view local communities have consequences for the intervention strategies and goals they formulate. These vary from education, awareness raising and

12 The legal office drafts a new DM regulation which requires consensus among the different line ministries after it needs to be approved by the provincial parliament.


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risk assessments where the NGOs is strongly steering the process, towards a more distant role of the NGO giving CBOs the space to develop their own process. This has implications for sustainability and accountability. We distinguish between two kinds of roles: NGO as project implementer/contractor of government or NGO as empowerment initiator and accompanier to CBOs. At the local level, we observed linkages between different villages through CBOs as a way to replicate short term preparedness, to exchange experiences, to coordinate with government and for lobby and advocacy purposes. Linkage building was done through NGO facilitation or through CBO leaders. Capacity of these networks is limited to disaster preparedness awareness raising and formation of CBO networks. Long-term and more complex structural DRR initiatives are not yet taken up in an organized manner. Only the Partners for Resilience programme offer a broader and more holistic approach to CBDRM that include creation of enabling factors and conditions that support resilience. For example, in Ende District, the communities received assistance on installing biogas systems from pig husbandaries which are important to tackle environmental problems, reduce community costs for fuel replacing firewood as an energy source for cooking. Biogas installation further has a positive effect on people’s health since pig faeces is now stored in containers. The use of biogas may potentially reduce the use of firewood which may have a positive effect on the environment and reduces the risk of flashfloods and landslides. In NTT cooperation between NGOs with a different mandate aims to combine expertise in addressing risks problems (PfR). Sharing among NGOs and understanding that they are working together to achieve community resilience are encouraging them. Since the PfR just started their integrated approach we couldn’t observe and assess yet the added value of such approach. We appreciate – and also the communities – the integration of a livelihoods-lens into DRM beyond disaster preparedness. Media organizations can have the role to pass on warning and educate the people on disasters using print, radio, television and internet. Media reports about disaster events which may influence and move people into action. JawaPos publishes warnings from BMKG even before the government declares the state of emergency. JawaPos is willing to partner with BNBP to increase awareness among the public as long it is news, sexy and useful for the audience. Better is to link with local media which are more open to publish on local disaster events (small scale disaster). FIRD collaborates with Kupang Pos, a local media, to distribute the information of CBDRM activities. Private sector generates its own resources to spend on DRM as part of their Corporate Social Responsibility. YIC for instance – established by JawaPos - ventured into education and networking activities using their capacity of disseminating their publications. It also receives funds from Pertamina.’ Edusaster’ is an activity it runs during emergency time. They send disaster related publications to evacuation centers and work through teachers association and universities. They also collect relief goods through the media which it ships to the affected areas. Mercy Corps has an idea of Public Private Partnership in Disaster Management which encourage the use of CSR funds in DRR. Subsequently, a private sector forum in West Sumatra was established in 2007 with Padang Cement Company. However, it was noted that the involvement of private sector was still limited and was focused on an establishment of task force for ER. It is important to note that the private sector can be subject of CBO/NGO advocacy and mobilization because of the business’ nature of operations that generate adverse consequences and produces disaster vulnerability particularly affecting the environment and labour malpractices. There is not yet a clear and agreed upon partnership between the government and the private sector in DRR efforts. It is an area for further exploration.


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Mercy Corps works with local partners, some of these include Kogami and Jemari Sakato (established local NGOs in West Sumatra). Kogami is a local NGO formed soon after the tsunami in Aceh by a group of volunteers who joined a survey on tsunami impact. Kogami focuses on tsunami preparedness. To strengthen their partnerships, in early years, Kogami conducted workshops with Moslim Preachers so that they could share DRR in their preaching in West Sumatra. However, it did not work as expected since the preaching related the occurrence of disasters to a sin to God which did not motivate communities to care for preparedness. Kogami collaborated with Radio Antar Penduduk Indonesia (RAPI) / (Indonesian Inter-Citizenry Radio). Kogami facilited the establishment of Jaringan Jurnalis Siaga Bencana (Journalism Network on Disaster Preparedness). Through the Journalist Network, Kogami gets some column in local newspapers to disseminate DRR news. Using the network, Kogami also can access local television to conduct talk show on disaster preparedness. Vulnerable groups are not explicitly involved in the programmes only in terms of categories. They are assumed to benefit from programmes and activities but not recognized as marginalized and social excluded (see conclusions 2.1). HCVAs are conducted but actually not used to differentiate in strategies for different community groups. Livelihood strategies to strengthen coping and adaptation strategies are also absent in all programs. Involvement of the marginalized groups tends to be various, some can be active and some are still less. There have been dominant roles of some elites groups and/or some members of the community which have been the focal points in other development activities.

Conclusions 1.

Interaction among actors occur in various ways. Government at all levels realize that external sources, donors, NGOs, private sectors and media are important to enhance the DRM program and to increase community resilience. In advancing CBDRM, BNPB tries to approach this by putting necessary information clear for everyone before they take action where to support the ‘desa tangguh program’. At the local level, the limited resources of BPBD suggests that they are open for any assistance provided by NGO, private sectors and media.

2.

Communication between government from national level (BNPB) to provincial level BPBD and district level BPBD is quite good. However, the decentralization law does not allow BNPB to directly assist or allocate resourcesto district level BPBDs. This becomes a problem since many district BPBDs are new agencies with very limited DRM resources. BNPB can provide direct assistance during emergency situations, while in normal circumstances it can only provide assistance to provincial BPBDs. Therefore DRM programs, including ‘desa tangguh’ have to be channeled through provincial BPBD, which causes mis-coordination and delay in terms of implementation.

3. Partnerships among NGOs are crucial in widening the networks in terms of expertise and coverage, but they can play more advanced role by being a critical policy monitor to advance the interests of vulnerable and marginalized groups. This is in line with the spirit of how Kappala and FIRD relate with communities: they view local people not as beneficiaries but as capable active survivors. Their CBDRM interventions aim to enhance community capacity and awareness on how to take initiative to deal with their DRM related problems


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4.

A community network, such as Jangkar Kelud, has a potential to access material, social and political resources through such network by utilizing the exposure in media, through contacts with NGOs and faith-based organizations and with BPBDs as an entry-point to other government departments.

5.

Faith-based organizations are important nodes and have important networks since they are embedded in communities since a long time. They are trusted by villagers and the communities are familar with their approaches and programmes. Nevertheless, there is limitation that some marginalized people may not be reached well.

6.

The role of the media is under-used by CSOs and NGOs as an instrument to advance community’ DRM agendas and for playing the role as critical policy monitor.

7.

We encourage to further research the role of private sector in DRM considering the multifaceted appearance of the private sector and its potential roles in the different phases of DRM. It is important to look whether shared interests exist to foster resilience for local communities and to consider the interests of the private sector, instead of assuming that only conflicting interests exist.

3.3 Effective strategies to achieve community resilience and building partnerships The main purpose of this analysis is to identify strategies and pre-requisites to achieve community self- reliance in Indonesia. This section will elaborate on the multiple strategies and different disaster characteristics that we observed in the field during this assignment. Some communities received assistance from NGOs to improve community disaster preparedness activities after they experienced large scale disasters, such as volcano eruption (2007) and tsunami (2004). Some other communities experience recurrent slow onset disasters, like drought, floods and coastal erosion which pose a significant threat to people’s livelihoods. The diversity in approaches among NGOs can be further attributed to different views on CBDRM and how to facilitate CBDRM interventions. We summarized the various strategies that we observed in the filed into five different diagrams that illustrate the process of change from communities at risk towards prepared communities and how they linked with other DRM actors. This process is visualized at the left side of the diagrams. Also the kind of activities and nature of support is included that was offered by the NGOs. Below each diagram we discuss the key-elements of the approach and whether it is an effective approach or what its weaknesses are.

3.3.1. CBDRM as empowering process towards institutional development Key principle of this approach is that the outside NGO – KAPPALA – views disaster-affected people not as passive victims but as active survivors with ideas and skills that can be used to reduce their vulnerability. The approach applied by KAPPALA in Kelud-communities is through building trust, informal contacts and stressing a sense of brotherhood and mutual support. KAPPALA aims to empower the community following their experiences of strengthening communities in Mt. Merapi. The diagram shows that KAPPALA is initially an external organization which gains trust and acceptance by the community throughout the process. KAPPALA used the urgent concerns of


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communities after the eruption in 2007 to encourage and convince people that they are capable to better prepare and deal with emergency situations. The approach focuses on disaster preparedness and emergency management before, during and after volcanic eruption through changing mindsets: instead of awaiting outside government support or aid from NGOs, people are made aware of their abilities to systematize early warning and evacuation and how to manage their daily life in evacuation centers. Local people organized themselves into CBDRM-teams which train and facilitate other communities to form CBDRM-teams as well. In this way Jangkar Kelud (JK) expanded its coverage from 10 to 38 villages and represents currently a network of communities across three districts (Kediri, Blitar and Malang) affected by Kelud eruption. Internally, they have support from some village officials who joined as JK members. JK was able to promote the DM law among local government and was instrumental in establishing the BPBD in Blitar. This CBDRM approach mobilizes social action which turned out to be an effective approach to replicate CBDRM in other communities. Jangkar Kelud can sustain its network-activities through voluntary contributions of its members. The CBO-network not only focuses on replicating the approach in other communities and districts, it also aims to improve the performance of the district BPBDs surrounding Mount Kelud, and contributes to institutional development at the provincial level through its membership in the provincial DRM Forum. KAPPALA did not pay attention to people’s livelihood concerns after the eruption or to new risks like landslides, since its focus was on disaster preparedness.


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3.3.2 CBDRM as a project to establish disaster-preparedness teams linked to CBO-network and BPBD Most CBDRM practices that we observed in the field belong to this category13. This CBDRM approach resembles the step-by-step approach in ADPC’s CBDRM Handbook, but focuses on disaster preparedness and in some localities also on mitigating the negative impact of floods through gabions (uplands). The NGOs organize CBDRM-teams in disaster-prone villages and assume sustainability through BPBD’s recognition of these teams as certified volunteers and through the formation of CBO-networks. These networks function as coordination and information channels, and submit DRR requests from the villages to the local government through BPBD. FORMASIBAB for instance – a CBO-network organized by IBU-Foundation in West Aceh - mainly consists of coastal representatives, while 60% of the district is affected by recurrent floods. This generates tensions about petty-cash allocation, since flood-prone communities claim most funds while being in the minority. Weakness of this approach is exclusion of vulnerable groups since risk assessments are limited to hazard assessments and exposure to the disaster risks. Further not all CBO-networks are aware yet of their potential and added value for local communities like Jangkar Kelud is, although the CBDRM-teams are highly motivated and committed to execute their responsibilities. This CBDRM approach does not attempt to make people aware of why they are vulnerable to disasters and to understand the institutional context in which DRM policy and practice get shape. Consequently they don’t get the opportunity to explore their role in DRM beyond disaster preparedness at the local level.

INFORMAL APPROACH/BROTHERHOOD SHARING EXPERIENCES Some communities affected by Kelud communities

Volunteers from 10 villages joined disaster preparedness training

KAPPALA

Focus on disaster preparedness post 2007 volcano eruption to anticipate future disaster

training

facilitation

Later, volunteers became facilitator at own villages and nearby villages

Jangkar Kelud (JK) established as an organized communities disaster preparedness (2008)

KAPPALA became part of communities 4 years facilitation

KAPPALA introduced and involved communities to KAPPALA networks and promotes JK activities

KAPPALA Networks

Resource support: HT system

District DM Law JK sends volunteers to other areas (other parts of Blitar, Merapi), extends their network (resource person in Radio, invited at national events), development own modules.

Establishment of BPBD Blitar Provincial DRR Forum

13 This CBDRM approach is applied by IBU foundation, Mercy Corps, Oxfam, Kogami, Surfaid and FIRD


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3.3.3 Project-oriented and school-based CBDRM approach This CBDRM approach aims to better prepare communities for future disaster events in terms of more systematic early warning and evacuation to safe places, using two parallel tracks in the village. One track resonates a lot with the previous CBDRM approach while the second track uses the school as entry-point. District PMI-staff train volunteers coming from the district. These volunteers can be assigned as village coordinator or school coordinator in a village selected for the CBDRM-project. The coordinators explain the intentions of the CBDRM project with the village head, who will call for a community meeting to orient people on the CBDRM project. In this meeting about 30 people will be selected to form the CBAT team which will receive further training and guidance from the PMI village coordinator. The school coordinator will select 30 children from grade 4-5-6 of the elementary school in consultation with the teachers and parents. People are not really empowered but rather educated. Key-outcome of this CBDRM-approach is a CBAT team responsible for early warning and evacuation of villagers in times of emergency. They get a visible location in the village, a POSKO, where CBDRM materials and alarm-equipment are kept. The village head is responsible for the POSKO. The CBAT team also proposes two DRM measures which will be integrated in the Village Development Plan. The school-based approach makes children aware about the role of PMI during emergencies and the importance to help each other, the importance of first aid and blood donations and the importance of disaster preparedness. The children are taught how to make a hazard map and to participate in simulations. Although this CBDRM-approach increases people’s awareness about what to do in case of an emergency, it does not promote linkage building with DRM actors outside the village. Local people stressed the importance to get support for mitigation measures to protect their livelihoods, which seem to be a crucial missing part in this approach. INCREASE DPT AWARENESS AND SKILLS Coastal communities affected by 2004 Tsunami and upland communities

National NGO with network of local branches 2 years facilitation and training according to project logframe

General DRR meeting and selection of key people based on interest and time

Trains students of to do internship on DRR

HCVA assessment, risk map, CBDRM Action Plan CBDRM-team members are BPBD certified volunteers and replicate CBDRM in new villages identified by BPBD

BPBD

Formation of CBDRM-team and division of DPT roles and responsibilities

Drills using own resources Collect petty cash for relief

Formation of CBO-network consisting of representa-tives of CBDRM-teams in several districts

Coordination


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3.3.4 Inter-sectoral approach to CBDRM integrating disaster preparedness with livelihood concerns and institutional development - Partners for Resilience This CBDRM approach is being developed by the Partners for Resilience (PfR)14, a partnership of NGOs at (inter)national level which we observed in NTT. There Caritas Keuskupan Maumere (CKM), Wetlands International, PMI and LPTP form the local partnership that implements PfR’s programme. PfR applies an intersectoral approach where each NGO select its own entry point provided that the selected communities are affected by the same or related hazard-type and that each NGO will be able to contribute its specific expertise to these communities. Caritas Keuskupan Maumere (CKM) is an organization under the Diocese of Maumere district. CKM uses the Catholic network as an entry point in local communities to raise awareness on disasters. CKM, supported by Karina and Cordaid through the PfR, aims to reduce disaster risk through a comprehensive DRR approach, meaning combining livelihood concerns with disaster preparedness and mitigation. The community raised their livelihoods (farming) concerns which have been largely affected by hydro-meteorological disasters, in particular drought and floods. While the impacts were not visible during the field visits, the communities conserved seeds for next planting season and made plans in constructing water trap and infiltration. The communities partner well with the district Agriculture Department, while its relationship with BPBD is still weak. The advantage of this approach is that it integrates disaster risk and preparedness in people’s livelihoods strategies. Wetlands International (WI) activities in Sikka deal with a whole range of disaster reduction measures. Its entry points are existing CBO networks developed in previous projects. The communities work as farmers and fishermen and are affected by climate-related hazards like droughts and flash floods. Their settlement is further severely threatened by coastal erosion. WI aims to restore the coastal environment through mangrove plantation, which serves both as mitigation of coastal erosion and as a measure to enhance people’s livelihoods since mangroves are favorite fish breeding places. Some households receive loans for running small business and in return they have to participate in the mangrove planting project. If the activities are successful, the communities do not need to return the loan. Lembaga Pengembangan Teknologi Perdesaan (LPTP) activities in Ende are also part of the PfR alliance. LPTP uses the informal structure that exists in the communities as entry point. The communities work as farmers and livestock breeder. They are affected a lot by climate change impacts in terms of changing rainy and dry seasons causing difficulties in deciding when to cultivate their lands. However, during the discussion with LPTP, the community raised concern that they need to tackle the current environmental problems they face due to unmanaged faeces from pig husbandary. Therefore with the help of LPTP the community installed a biogas production system from pig faeces. The production of biogas also helps to reduce the number of wood used for cooking which could later reduce number of tree cutting in the forest. This will reinforce the forest to keep water and reduce run-off that could cause flash flood and trigger land slides. The approach of LPTP integrates livelihood concerns with long-term disaster mitigation strategies by indirectly protecting the environment.

14 This inter-sectoral approach is new for the PfR and subject of a learning trajectory to develop evidence-based DRR policy on how to best integrate humanitarian assistance with climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction.

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BUILDING DISASTER AWARENESS BASED ON NETWORKS OF CATHOLIC CHURCH Communities affected by hydro-meterological disasters (floods, droughts, coastal erosion), tsunami, earhquake.

Selection of key members based on existing farmers groups (Gapoklan)

Issues raised livelihood problems as DRR enabling condition

Formation of CBDRM-team and division of DPT roles and responsibilities

Seeing DRR as whole range of activities in reducing risks, including beyond preparedness measures So far 1 year out of 4 years planned

CKM (Caritas Keuskupan Maumere WI Field Office PMI

Facilitation

LPTP

Partner for Resilience (PfR)

Netherland Red Cross (NRC) Cordaid Wetlands International (WI) Care

Flexibility for communities in raising their priorities, issues and local needs

BPBD

The inter-sectoral approach means that PfR community facilitators assist and support each other at the local level. For example, WI staff supports CKM with technical advice on seed planting. WI has knowledge and skills regarding which types of plants are suitable for conservation given the soil condition. At the same time, when it comes to community mobilization for DRM, CKM was asked to help in disaster preparedness simulations in the communities assisted by WI while PMI provided training on emergency situations. An inter-sectoral partnership approach facilitates knowledge exchange, particularly when this has been agreed upon and formalised at a national level. Such a partnership will further facilitate lobby at a local level with local government since the PfR members work closely with different sectoral (line) departments. In this way they have more entry-points to engage with government than when they would operate as single NGOs.

3.3.5. CBDRM through faith-based organizations and networks Networks of faith-based organizations are used as entry points to engage with communities, like the networks of Nahdatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah and the Catholic Church. Commonly, faith-based institutions have networks that are embedded in the community as well as at district and provincial level. For example, in East Java NU has the capacity to lobby with parliament and local governments since some NU followers are parliament members and local government staff. NU also plays a role to mediate communication barriers and open dialogue spaces between local government, parliament and the community. In Sikka, NTT, it is the Catholic Church network which is influential at community level. The advantage of faith-based organizations is that CBDRM interventions don’t require much time for contact and trust building. Additionally, when a program ends, there is no clear need for


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an exit strategy since the links between community and religious institutions remain. A concern is however the mind-set of religious leaders and how they interpret the occurrence of disasters (as an act of God or an act of mankind?), and how they relate to government (as critical, concerned citizens, or as obedient citizens?).

3.4 Conclusions Effective approaches to enter villages and build trust Each NGO applies a different strategy to enter a community and implement CBDRM. Building trust and understanding between the NGO and the community are very important. ‘Live-in’ and being involved in community’s daily concerns are effective approaches to build trust. This approach is applied by Kappala, Wetlands International and LPTP. Alternatively someone from the community can be chosen and trained as community organizer (CO). Here, trust will be through the relationship between CO and the community. CKM and FIRD apply these approaches. Also existing faith-based networks are recognized and used as entry points for trust-building and community organizing, since these are embedded in community life. Farmers Groups, Youth Groups, Women Groups and Fishermen Groups, are other existing CBOs which serve as entry points for contact building. Build on people’s real-life disaster experiences and risk priorities From the various approaches we observed that real-life experience with disasters motivates local communities to take action and invest in forming CBDRM-teams. This process involves changing mind-sets of communities and mobilizing social action into effective disaster preparedness strategies. The latter range from warning systems, evacuation and managing evacuation centres towards mitigating coastal erosion. In case of meteorological hazards, we observed the importance to integrate DRM in people’s livelihoods concerns. CBDRM requires institutions to mobilize and organize people. These can be existing structures like farmer groups, teacher groups, fishermen, religious groups or new groups like CBATs. To make community organizing effective and sustain people’s motivation, DRM priorities must be set by the community. Some communities prioritize preparedness after experiencing recent large-scale and destructive disasters, while other communities prioritize livelihood concerns related to disaster impact and their efforts to recover from that. Creating and expanding CBO-networks: replication of CBDRM-process When the communities are organized and DRM capacities strengthened, it is important to link them to other communities through mobilizing social action and creating networks. Many NGOs were able to enable CBDRM-teams to replicate the CBDRM-process in other villages resulting in such networks. However, the focus is still very much on disaster preparedness, and on creating channels for emergency relief. The CBO-networks do not necessarily reach the most vulnerable groups. In most cases new CBOs were created instead of using sectoral CBOs or other existing organizations which have existing networks at sub-district and district level like farmers groups or fishermen groups. This potential is hardly used. Only the faith-based organizations make use of their existing institutions. Ability of NGOs and CBOs to reach the most vulnerable groups Based on the field visits we conclude that this issue requires serious attention. NGOs conduct risk assessments using the HCVA tool, but in a very superficial way without a proper analysis. Capacities are not identified and used, while ‘vulnerability’ is interpreted as exposure. This routine can be related to the NGOs ‘ways of seeing disasters’ as external natural events, instead of products of mounting vulnerability with social, economic and institutional dimensions. Ability to bring different stakeholders together

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Among all DRM actors we noticed that particularly district BPBDs show their enthusiasm most to engage with others realizing that (I)NGOs, donors, and the private sector are crucial in developing their capacity and legitimacy. We further found that NU is very effective in bringing different stakeholders together to draft and approve DRM regulations in East Java. But in general CBO/CSOnetworks differ in their ability to engage effectively with BPBD and other stakeholders. Most engage with BPBD for the purpose of coordination and exchange of information. Networking for lobby and advocacy purposes should be further enhanced, since such capacities can potentially extend the communities’ resources that are needed for effective and sustainable DRM; local communities submit proposals to local government for structural DRM interventions but their efforts do not always lead to approval. Capacity building in leadership roles like facilitation, mediation, negotiation, speaking in public, going beyond comfort zones is actually a pre-requisite for institutional development in DRM, not only for CBO-leaders, but also for NGOs. Current CBO/CSO networks are not yet effective to change institutional performance of government and lack the mandate and experience to accompany communities to effectively engage with government. In the next section we will consider these conclusions in our theory of change.

INCREASE DPT AWARENESS AND SKILLS

Communities affected by disaster

Involving cleric and chaplain as facilitator to educate community

training

support Local faith based organization

District level CBO

CBO Networks

National faith based organization

advocacy

partnership partnership

Provincial DRR Forum

Local government partnership

District parliament


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4. Developing a theory of change for achieving community resilience in Indonesia In our conceptual framework we referred to ’institutions’, the larger structures and constraints in society in which CBDRM interventions are being implemented. Institutions are locality specific, influenced by historical trajectories and culture. Consequently, particular institutional arrangements work in one context but fail in another (Jütting, 2003). Jütting (2003) argues to pay attention to the hierarchy level of institutions at stake, and to how institutions at different levels affect each other. Table 4.1 presents a hierarchy of institutions and their time horizon for change. This Table indicates which institutions need to change and what time horizon we need to consider to achieve such institutional change. Table 4.1 Hierarchy of institutions and their time horizons for change (adapted from Jütting, 2003) Examples Frequency of change Effect Examples

Frequency of change Effect

Institutions related to the social structure of society (level 1)

Traditions, social norms, values, gender norms, customs, religious beliefs.

2 – 3 generations but may change faster in times of shocks/crisis

Defines the way a society conducts itself

Institutions related to the rules of the game (level 2)

Rules defining access to resources, property rights, judiciary system, DM law and regulations

10 – 50 years

Defines the broader institutional context and power relations

Institutions related to the players of the game (level 3)

Rules defining governance arrangements, authority, contractual relationships

1 – 10 years

Leads to the forma-tion of organizations, spaces for negotiation

Institutions related to allocation mechanisms (level 4)

Rules related to resource allocation, like social security systems, humanitarian aid

Short term horizon and continuous

Adjustments to prices, outputs, incentives

Level 1 institutions refer to changing mind-sets, beliefs, norms and values. An example of how disasters and shocks could change norms and values is the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami which triggered a change in government’s mind-set from reactive emergency relief towards proactive disaster preparedness. At level 2, the 2007 DM law is an example of new regulations which stipulate f.i. that every person in Indonesia is entitled to social protection and sense of security, in particular disaster vulnerable groups. Interviews, field visits and the desktop review revealed that DRM laws and regulations are mostly in place, but hardly implemented or enforced in practice. The DM law, therefore, provides lobby tools for civil society to encourage local government to enhance its DRM performance. Level 3 institutions refer to the organisational arrangements of responsible government agencies for DRM like a shift from BAPPENAS to BNBP linked to provincial and district BPBDs. However, level 3 also refers to other DRM players (NGOs, faith-based organisations, private sector, schools etc.) which interact with government through platforms or through more informal manners. Level 4 refers to rules and practices of who gets what and where – influencing decisionmaking about whose risk problem is solved with how much budget, when and where. Thinking about change for achieving community resilience, the analysis so far indicates that this may happen through (Eyben et al, 2008):


n

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Changing mind-sets of what we do and know changes social behaviour. Focus is on

transformational learning and critical reflection instead of education. n

Change as a result of contradictions in society. We observed that many laws and regulations

exist that favour community resilience (level 2 institutions), but that these are not implemented due to power dynamics within government and between government and vulnerable people (simply said). Efforts to make government policies congruent with practice will be target of the change agenda by improving both CSO organisational capacity and GoI organisational capacity through their critical interaction as opposed to viewing them as two parallel isolated tracks. n

A way to influence and change government performance is to mobilize social action through

strong CSO/NGO networks which engage with government, private sector, knowledge centres at various levels. To achieve the three points above, creation of dialogue spaces is required where the different DRM actors meet, share experiences, coordinate DRM efforts, negotiate and decide about DRM resource allocation. Different strategies are possible ranging from informal workshops towards lobby and advocacy in more formal DRM platforms or in district/provincial parliaments. Institutions are not static, but change and evolve continuously. The relationship between institutions and actors is mutual and dynamic. People respond to changing contexts and rules. They create, reproduce and adapt institutions, while at the same time institutions govern people’s behaviour and perceptions. Institutions act as a point of reference for actors and they only become effective in everyday practice. People defend and mobilize around practices and institutions that are meaningful to them, or resist institutions and practices that convey or embody meanings they find disagreeable (Bebbington, et al, 2004). Because social actors evoke, negotiate and manipulate the meaning of institutions in their everyday life, institutional change happens all the time particularly after extreme events (Christoplos and Hilhorst, 2009). The 2007 eruption of Mount Kelud resulted in forced evacuation which people experienced as very negative and disempowering. These experiences motivated them to organize themselves into Jangkar Kelud which aims to change the mind-set of both local people and district government, to improve the performance of government and to have a voice in DRR decision-making. Here, we will elaborate on the theory of change for achieving community resilience. We start with setting out what needs to change and what we are trying to change considering a timeframe of 8 years. We focus on changes in mind-sets and organisational performance of community people, NGO staff level and government officials since these actors will likely to be the entry-points for making change happen. Table 4.2. presents potential outcome indicators of these change processes. This table is not complete and rather serves as an example. Outcome indicators should actually be formulated by the respective DRM actors involved at the inception of the new DRM program change15.

15 For this purpose Outcome Mapping can be used, a tool that monitors changes in behavior, relationships, interactions and performance of organizations (see IDRC website: http://www.idrc.ca/EN/Resources/Publications/ Pages/ArticleDetails.aspx?PublicationID=1004


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Table 4.2. What needs to change and what are we trying to change to achieve community resilience? Community level: level: Community ‘Needs to change’ outcome indicators • • • • •

• • • • •

Villagers understand and explain why they are vulnerable to disasters (beyond exposure) Recognition of different risk perspectives within community embedded in social positions Differentiate between sectoral problems (farmers, women, youth, fishermen, landless a.o.) from collective community problems Change passive, obedient mind-sets of CBOs (due to their history) into more active, critical mind-sets Strengthening CBDRM-teams and households’ coping strategies (adaptive livelihoods) – balancing short-term needs (early warning, evacuation, first aid) with long-term interests (lobbying complex DRR measures and CCA) Community understands relevant legislation, regulations and procedures, and their importance Look beyond village level to assess risk problems Mobilizing collective action within and across communities for different DRM purposes Ability to achieve a working consensus on goals and priorities Capacity to take action, chose effective strategies to negotiate and lobby for structural, complex solutions to reduce risks

‘Trying to change’ outcome indicators • • • • • • • • • •

Relationship between village authorities and CBOs – on speaking terms, sense of community Committed and responsible leadership Integrate CBDRM Action Plans in Village Development Plans and village regulations Capacity of village authorities to distribute DRM resources to those most in need, vulnerable and marginalized within the community Integrate everyday livelihood concerns with preparing for disruption, disaster or conflict Regulations exist for community savings or other forms of risk pooling Develop CBO-networks into critical monitors of government policy Ability to resist and oppose undesirable influences Shift from external donor funds towards locally generated resources through lobby and negotiation efforts, and voluntarism Use media effectively to mobilize collective action and legislation (new or adapted institutions)

NGO/CSO level: ‘Needs to change’ outcome indicators

‘Trying to change’ outcome indicators

•

•

•

• • • •

View local people as capable actors not as project beneficiaries or categories of vulnerable groups Capacity to conduct Hazard, Vulnerability and Capacity Analysis considering institutional context (history, future (CCA) projection, and power relations (social exclusion and gender)) Information at both local and landscape level is included in risk assessment including root causes of disaster and livelihood vulnerability Capacity to use risk maps as instrument to exchange risk perspectives among different actors and facilitate dialogue Awareness of inclusion and exclusion of vulnerable subgroups in framing risk problems Able to facilitate local partnerships among communities, local authorities, media, business, universities, etc

BPBD district/provincial level ‘Needs to change’ outcome indicators • • • • • • • •

Develop DRR capacity of BPBD staff (by (I)NGOs) Formulation of DRM/CCA Action Plans and contingency plans preferably with the engagement of communities at risk Accurate, reliable and timely information about danger and behavioural options through linking to BMKG a.o. Treat the public as a capable ally, not as helpless victims Invest in public outreach and attune DRM to values and priorities of local populations (trust building and create feedback/complaints mechanisms) Local level understanding of, and support for, community DRM priorities Establish links, roles and responsibilities between Village-CBDRM-teams and BPBD before, during and after emergency periods Capacity to consider social inclusion and gender in strategic planning, programmes, sectoral coordination and policy development

•

• •

The organisation is able to engage, facilitate and coordinate the full range of partners and stakeholders required for the development and implementation of integrated risk reduction Ensure citizen-participation through CBO-networks at (sub)district level to engage in coordination and decision-making with BPBD, DRM platform members and other stakeholders Inter-sectoral cooperation among NGOs/CSOs and government agencies Existence of ‘watchdog’ groups to press for change

‘Trying to change’ outcome indicators • • •

• •

Human, technical, material and financial resources for (CB)DRM adequate to meet institutional roles and responsibilities Proper land use planning, enforcement of building codes and other DRM regulations Institutional mandates and responsibilities for DRR clearly defined. Inter-departmental and coordination mechanisms function resulting in resources for structural DRR measures or risk avoiding measures (BPBD as legitimate institution for coordinating DRR - authority) Flexibility in budgeting and planning cycles to enable release of financial resources when needs arise beyond emergency periods More flexible and adaptive DRM strategies to acknowledge sub-national variations in capacity, leadership, cultural and political characteristics, etc.


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4.1 A road map for achieving community resilience taking various entry-points and pathways Based on the field visits, existing CBDRM literature, and the recent studies commissioned by AIFDR on organisational capacity of BNBP/BPBD and a political economy analysis of DRM in Indonesia, we see change happening by fostering community resilience on one hand (bottom-up) and building the capacity of government DRM related agencies on the other hand. These two tracks need to be brought together so they will benefit from one another through building linkages, creating dialogue spaces and forging partnerships between communities at risk, CSOs, (I)NGOs, local government, media, private sector and knowledge centres. These interactions promote mutual understanding and contribute to the democratization of DRM resulting in evidence-based DRM planning and decisions that are context-specific, relevant and appropriate for local communities16. Interactions are encouraged to take place at different localities and administrative levels where we want change to happen. Therefore we arrived at criteria for area selection and different institutional entry-points. These can be pulled together into a ‘roadmap’ (maybe more a rotary than a highway) to enhance community resilience on one hand, and good DRM governance on the other hand. Figure 4.1 visualizes the roadmap using various entry-points and pathways at different administrative levels. Over time the different pathways and actors will increasingly interact in the dialogue spaces where they form partnerships for coordination, negotiate and improve institutions, lobby and advocate for sustainable DRM. The figure doesn’t show a linear model since interactions, dialogues and partnerships are complex and unpredictable. We rather promote an iterative process of interaction whereby the quality and nature of interactions improve due to continuous reflection and learning that lead to evidence-based decision-making, policy formulation and institutional development (Knowledge-to-Policy Strategy). DRM dialogue spaces or platforms aim to create space for the empowerment and active participation of stakeholders who intend to search solutions to a shared problem. This can be differentiated into three key strands: “mechanisms for alternative dispute resolution, for adaptive management and as a vehicle for democracy and emancipation (Warner, 2006). It is expected that DRM Platforms result in more acceptable decisions than when stakeholders do not engage with each other (ibid). Of course, creating DRM dialogue spaces also have to deal with several challenges that influence the functioning of these platforms like power relationships, platform composition, stakeholder representation and capacity for meaningful participation, mechanisms for decision-making and the cost of creating a platform (time, energy and funds) (Faysse, 2006). Table 4.3 present possible outcome indicators for the nature of interactions in these dialogue spaces.

16 Evidence that interactions and dialogues between government and civil society lead to good DRM governance is taken from the Philippines where CBDRM has been embedded in development and spatial planning processes, but there are plenty of more local examples like the Watershed Management Forum in NTT, and Jampi Sawan in Pati district, Central Java.


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Table 4.3 Outcome indicators for the nature of interactions in dialogue spaces Interactions and relationships between CBOs, CSO, BPBDs and line ministries ‘Needs to change’ outcome indicators ‘Trying to change’ outcome indicators • • • • • • •

BPBDs or NGOs organize workshops, roundtable discussions on DRM related matters with CBOs to create understanding on DRM needs and roles. NGOs are no longer seen as anti-government, while legislative barriers that hinder GO-NGO cooperation are taken away Ensure that district and provincial networks establish links with grassroots and represent a wide range of groups DRM-actors develop mechanisms to funnel early-warning information, analysis and ideas as well as strategies from local processes into district and provincial deliberations Mechanisms exist to exchange information, lessons learned, research and analysis within and among communities, districts and provincial BPBDs Lessons learned are integrated in policies and practice Partnerships between CSOs and line ministries may speed up implementation, bring expertise on board, safeguard against mismanagement of funds, and lead to capacity building of government

• •

• • •

•

Dialogue spaces function to allow different DRM actors to express their views and pose questions that elicit reflective and critical thinking on DRM Dialogue spaces are used to facilitate, discuss and develop DRM plans, regulations, and ways to better coordinate and cooperate – driver for institutional change (e.g. Watershed Management Forum in NTT) Lobby and advocacy through dialogue spaces result in adjusted district regulations to allocate larger budget for DRM CBOs participate in DRM decision-making and M&E of government DRM programmes More democratic functioning of dialogue spaces may result in improved cooperation of line ministries when they realize that investing in DRM can lead to political capital Dialogue spaces result in evidence-based decisions and change


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4.2 Rationale for area selection Based on our analysis we arrived at the following rationale for area selection: Coastal communities at high risk to tsunami and earthquake taking a multi-hazard perspective. n Communities frequently affected by hydro-meteorological hazards without excluding other hazards. n

The DRM Concept Note focuses on areas that have a high risk for tsunami and earthquake – hazards that cause the largest number of death and injuries in Indonesia. Since it is the GoI’s responsibility to protect its citizens against such events, we fully recognize the rationale to invest in capacity and institutional development of the various DRM stakeholders from local to national level towards better preparedness and mitigation performance. It is true that coastal communities are most prone to tsunami and and it is understandable that they are selected as prioritized areas. We want to stress however, that coastal communities are exposed to multiple hazard risks which are perceived by local communities as equally or more urgent to tackle than tsunami and earthquake risks17. We argue to recognize the broader risk landscape since people’s real disaster experiences and urgent risk problems motivate them to learn new skills, viewpoints and to organize themselves to engage with other DRM actors. People’s motivation is essential to make CBDRM practices relevant, appropriate and effective. We strongly recommend to work in areas that are frequently affected by hydro-meteorological hazards like floods, drought, landslides and flash floods. The rationale for this recommendation is multi-fold. The first argument is obvious: while floods will be prioritized as well drought do not cause a large number of deaths and injuries, they have the largest impact on people’s everyday livelihoods in terms of economic losses. Climate change adds another layer of complexity to people’s existing disaster vulnerability and development challenges: people mention that traditional and current ways to deal with climate risks start to fall short. Farmers face erratic weather patterns and increasing levels of uncertainty regarding their cropping calendars – floods coincide with harvest time, and may affect seedbeds of the next crop. Whereas most farmer groups look for conventional mitigation measures (e.g. structures to close off canals, sandbags, gabions), some farmers groups have started experiments with cropping calendars and adapting mutual labour systems for planting and harvesting18. These experiments would benefit from collaboration with meteorological and agricultural knowledge institutes to invest in knowledge-to-policy strategies to adapt to climate change19. And this brings us to the tactical arguments for selecting areas frequently affected by hydro-meteorological hazards. The second argument is that these types of hazards happen annually and consequently they are on the radar of many different DRM actors: not only local communities, also district and provincial BPBDs are on alert during rainy seasons as are the PMI volunteers, TNI, police, Public Works and the media20. The BPBD in Bojonegoro communicates with upstream and downstream districts along the 17 Fishermen mentioned coastal erosion threatening their houses and climate change as a factor that makes income from fishing more uncertain: extreme winds cause higher waves and change sea currents whereby fish they used to catch moves to different localities that are inaccessible for small boats. 18 See Shah R. and S. Rakshi (2012) Bringing climate models to Indian communities: the first in the field, in: Capacity. Org, Issue 45: 11-13 19 The BPBD in Bojonegoro, East Java, was on alert for two months (December 2012 – End of January 2013) to monitor rainfall, inform communities along the river about water level and evacuation, monitor affected areas and to render relief assistance.


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Bengawan Solo River through the provincial BPBD to get updates on rainfall in Central Java and to know whether the dams will be opened to release water. The BPBD in Bojonegoro won the second price of being the best BPBD in ER, but still has ideas how it could improve its capacity and services to communities. This high motivation of multiple DRM actors is an opportunity to engage with these actors to improve their service delivery and to extend institutional development beyond relief and preparedness. Effective warning, preparedness and emergency relief already require the involvement of many DRM actors, whereas flood mitigation will demand more efforts to change the current institutional arrangements. This fact can be regarded as an opportunity to improve interactions, dialogues and reflective learning among DRM actors that already relate but not yet in an effective or optimal manner. There exists, for instance, the 'Bengawan Solo Water Council', an inter-province forum founded in 2009 with 64 members representing 32 state-actors and 32 non-state actors (Sudarsono, 2009). Different line ministries are member like public works, agriculture, environment, water management and forestry, whereas water user associations, farmer groups, NGOs and the private sector make up the other half of the membership. One of the aims is confidence building among its members. The council identified many responsibilities like proper land use planning and flood management, but hardly has authority (Ibid). The rationale to select an area affected by hydro-meteorological hazards lays in the opportunity to learn from linkage building, creating dialogue spaces and establishing coordination mechanisms and partnerships among a broad range of actors who usually do not interact. These interactions have a sense of urgency, and seem to be more complex than the interactions to improve tsunami preparedness. The purpose is not on forging immediate costly mitigation solutions, but rather on developing and reworking institutional arrangements that shift authority, political will and decision-making power over resource allocation towards government bodies that work closely with communities at risk. Select communities cluster-wise affected by same hazard-type Selecting communities is always a crucial exercise for aid organisations since it involves multiple considerations and pressures to do something in a certain locality and not in another. Two kinds of strategies are essential for the desired change to happen and for sustainability purposes: Cluster-wise selection of communities facilitates the creation of CBO-networks In order to create linkages among communities that have similar experiences with disasters, it is strategically wise to start working in adjacent communities or close to one another to facilitate contact and exchange. Jangkar Kelud for example, expanded from 10 villages affected by volcanic eruption towards a membership across 3 districts in one province. This was possible because people live near each other, know each other through other CBO-networks and they all share the same interests. The experience of FORMASIBAB is however different. This CBO-network consists of communities affected by different hazard-types (tsunami, coastal erosion, floods) which triggered tensions within the network because of differing needs and interests. Based on these experiences we suggest to start with selecting clusters of adjacent villages experiencing the same hazard which facilitates networking. Consider the spatial dimensions of DRM by taking a landscape-approach in case of hydro-meteorological hazard-types In case of hydro-meteorological hazards it is strategically wise to involve communities and actors upstream and downstream and to make connections through CBDRM interventions. The Bengawan Solo Rivers runs through two provinces and many districts. The importance to link disasteraffected areas with the wider landscape and ecosystems is to become conscious about the inter


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action and impact of human activities on the environment in one locality and the consequences of these interactions for other areas. Mitigating floods or drought, like maintenance, protection and improvement of environmental resources, may happen at places remote from the disaster affected areas. A so-called landscape or ecosystem approach tries to identify the actors and factors that have a stake in conflicts and competing claims that may rise between meeting human needs and protecting the resources. Upstream and downstream villages may be affected by disasters in different ways but they may share the same interests to address the underlying risk factors and to engage with government. Other criteria to consider for community selection Literature review and research reveal that (I)NGOS apply a combination of needs-based criteria and result-oriented criteria for community-selection. They both need to show positive results to (back) donors, and they need to proof that their efforts are legitimate by serving those most in need (Koch et al, 2009; Heijmans, 2012). The following criteria are mostly applied: Needs-based criteria: n High-risk areas: communities regularly hit by disasters or exposed to tsunami and earthquake risks n Communities or segments of community belonging to certain groups which are marginalised or excluded due to their economic status, gender, ethnicity, religious belief, political affiliation, or other discriminatory characteristics. n Communities that are least served by other DRM agencies or government n Communities that are increasingly exposed to future disaster risks like (flash-)floods, landslides, floods, slow-onset disasters like drought or pollution due to inappropriate land use and environmental degradation. Result-oriented criteria: n Preferably, community-based organisations like farmers groups, youth groups, women groups, religious groups etc. exist and are active with potential leaders n Preferably, relationship between existing CBOs and village authorities is good n Preferably, certain degree of community cohesion exists These criteria are largely based on assumptions and presuppositions, and often reflect an ideal image of communities rather that the reality discovered later on in the CBDRM process.

4.3 Rationale for the various entry points to communities

The road map mentions relief operations, existing CBOs, faith-based organisations, schools and village heads as possible entry-points in the community to initiate a CBDRM process. Relief operations – Rendering relief is a very common entry-point to new communities to get to know community leaders, to explore local conditions and the capacity and motivation of existing CBOs. Based on experiences with this new community the NGO can decide to initiate a long term CBDRM process or not. It is also a way to expand CBDRM coverage in an area. Existing CBOs – CBDRM promotes the view to recognize existing CBOs, community institutions and structures instead of creating new ones as we observed in many instances during the field visits. In Indonesia, key CBOs are the traditional farmers’ groups (kelompok tani), fishermen’s groups (kelompok nelayan), women’s groups (Pembinatin Kesejahteraan Keluarga - PKK) and youth groups (Karang Taruna - KT). These CBOs are old institutions established during Suharto’s administration, used to channel top-down government programmes under strict military supervision. These CBOs were


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the major instrument to conform these groups to the central government (Antlöv, 2003). Often the leaders of these CBOs are relatives of the village head or other village elite. The new decentralisation policies offer opportunities – combined with motivation of CBO to prepare and mitigate disaster risks - to rework the relationship between CBOs and the Indonesian government. Instead of viewing CBOs as an instrument to conform to government policies, the mind-sets of CBOs can be changed to critically engage with government and to influence government DRM performance. The advantage of working through existing CBOs is because these organizations are familiar to people and are often affiliated to sub-district or district sectoral networks which can be instrumental to mobilize collective action and engage with government. The challenge is that the particular institutional history of these CBOs still influences the attitude, routines and practices of CBOs, village authorities and of the NGOs. Faith-based organizations – These organisations play an important role in everyday life of Indonesian people. Religious leaders play an important role in the community and can be used as a channel to convey new ideas like CBDRM. Faith-based organizations enjoy a large network linking grassroots to higher administrative levels through their constituency in parliament and government. Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, the Catholic Church and the Protestant Church of Indonesia have their specific structures to implement DRM activities. They differ in DRM practice, however, and how they relate to grassroots and government. Schools – This entry-point is particularly effective in communities prone to earthquake and tsunami (Helvetas, 2009). Schools are widely accepted platforms for development and reform initiatives. By imparting DRR knowledge and skills, schools prepare children to cope with future disasters and to help the community plan and implement disaster preparedness activities. Schools play a very important role in dissemination among communities: in particular children and youth can lead awareness campaigns. It is important to partner with education authorities to have DRR incorporated in school curriculum. Village head and authorities – An important entry-point into the community is the village head who should always be informed about the reasons for engaging with the community. Experience learned that when NGOs lean on village heads to mobilize community members for CBDRM activities, it will most likely be the better-off part of the community that will participate. It is recommended for NGO field staff to not affiliate with village heads, or village authorities during the trust-building process, but to move around the village and to engage with all different groups to understand the social relationships between them.

4.4 Entry-points at district and provincial level: BPBDs Whereas CBDRM processes are initiated at the community level, BPBDs at the provincial and district level are other entry-points to initiate a change process towards institutional development. The selection of the districts should match with the criteria for community selection, while the selection of provinces will be done in consultation with BNPB. The field findings showed that the capacity of BPBDs varies a lot: from being recently established (Blitar and Banyuwangi) towards fully operational in emergency response (Bojonegoro) and disaster preparedness (West Aceh). For this reason capacity building and institutional development can be tailor-made depending on needs and local settings ranging from developing DRM capacity of staff, invest in public outreach, attune DRM to priority needs of local people, creating feedback mechanisms, or establish links with CBO-networks and CBDRM-teams at village level. In our view, government (BNBP/BPBD) shouldn’t directly implement CBDRM itself, but support CBDRM initiatives of CBOs, CSOs, NGOs and village authorities to make communities more resilient. This support can be offered in the following areas considering government’s distinct roles in DRM as


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discussed on page 7 (Wilkinson, 2012), considering the outcome indicators of what needs to change at government level within a timeframe of 8 years, and based on what communities expressed that should change in government’s performance: 1.

Support by providing DRM goods and services: relief goods, financing and/or construction of DRR measures that are beyond the capacity of communities and NGOs, like emergency shelters, coastal protection, mangrove rehabilitation, early warning systems, while understanding and considering local risk perspectives.

2.

Support by creating an enabling institutional environment and being responsible actors by improving DRR performance in: n Endorsement and lobby approval of CBDRM proposals with other line ministries and BNPB like e.g. requests for safe housing, gabions and reforestation to mitigate floods. n Risk- avoiding measures and spatial planning like e.g. negotiate flood-avoiding measures when planning/ constructing new highways, re-allocation and construction of schools, hospitals and villages outside ‘tsunami red zones’. n Coordination of multi-stakeholder activities to make DRM activities effective and relevant. Informal platforms and forum could evolve into more formal DRM Coordinating Bodies with representatives from PMI, NGOs, CSOs, and private sector20 n Establish feedback mechanisms to improve performance and reputation. This will help in gaining more authority vis-à-vis different stakeholders and attracting financial resources.

4.5 Existing NGO-CSO networks at district, provincial and national level as entry-points The desk review and field findings revealed that NGOs and CSOs differ a lot in capacity, focus and how they implement CBDRM at the local level. Our analysis further stressed that their capacities to implement CBDRM, to engage with government, and to bring different DRM actors together require serious attention and further enhancement. However, partnering with NGOs, whether they are international, national or local in origin, is an indispensable component of the DRM programme, since they can bridge and link grassroots communities with government. This community resilience analysis took local communities’ perspectives as entry-point and the centre for analysis. Likewise we suggest that the selection of CSOs, local NGOs, national NGOs and INGOs and their networks mirrors the local setting in the areas that will be selected. This involves a mapping exercise of what kind of CSOs, NGOs and networks are present in the selected areas, provinces and district before organizing an open competitive grants programme and targeted grants programmes.


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Faith-based organizations and local NGOs have the advantage that they are embedded in the com munity, or present in the area, aware of local cultural institutions and may know key-stakeholders in the area. INGOs have the advantage that they avail over more resources (funds, staff, access to knowledge, contacts at national level, etc) beyond the selected areas which they can bring in. It is important to not overlook/overrule existing local NGOs and CSO that can contribute to the DRM programme. In general, we suggest to look for the following kinds of partnerships to achieve the envisioned change: Existing partners who have potential to contribute to envisioned change process We recommend to search among AIFDR existing partners and identify those with DRM practices which resonate with the proposed CBDRM road map and have the potential to contribute to the change process described earlier. Select partners with experience in bottom-up facilitation of community empowerment processes One of the effective mechanisms to replicate and initiate CBDRM processes in other areas is the strategy applied by Kappala. It uses CBO-networks like Jangkar Kelud and Merapi CBO-networks to train communities at risk elsewhere since they are credible and skilled resource persons. Also SHEEP (Yogyakarta-based) applies such approach transferring CBDRM strategies from Central Java to Aceh for instance, without losing sights of differing local contexts. They can also act as resource persons to build the CBDRM capacity of other NGOs and Government officials. Seek partners that are open for learning and self-reflection This analysis revealed that most NGOs are not yet aware of the potential of CBDRM taking a more holistic and empowering approach. Training is not an effective method to encourage NGOs and other DRM actors to start doing things differently. However, facilitating reflection on routines, programmes and implementation, is a challenging approach for policy makers and aid practitioners. Shifting from logframes towards accepting uncertainty and unpredictability may initially cause discomfort. However, regular reflections and guidance will eventually lead to proud and motivated staff since relationships between them and local communities will improve. This implies acknowledging people’s interests and agenda-setting as point of departure rather than implementing preconceived projects. Interventions will be designed step-by-step based on knowing just enough about the present while accepting an uncertain future. Through regular actionreflection cycles and sense-making, emerging patterns will be analysed so that in the next actionstep desired patterns can be supported and undesired ones addressed. This way of working and relating to local people offers new ways to keep interventions relevant, appropriate and effective20. Encourage inter-sectoral partnerships DRM is not a sectoral issue but requires the involvement of different kinds of expertise. Partners for Resilience attempt to integrate disaster preparedness with livelihood approaches and environmental protection. In other areas NGOs work in an integrated manner by pulling together different lobby and advocacy needs at community and district level which are supported by one provincial NGO on legal assistance. Each province or district can think of developing integrated partnerships based on needs and availability. Facilitate interaction among partners that usually would not engage At the heart of the proposed change process is the interaction between government, community people, NGOs, private sector a.o. Usually they do not engage with each other but have opinions and biased views about the other which hampers cooperation. By facilitating interaction among


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partners through workshops, platforms or other exchange gatherings, they will be brought outside their comfort-zone but realise that many prejudices are incorrect. These interactions are important to create mutual understanding and improve the nature of interactions.

4.6. Constraints to the envisioned change n

n

n

n n n

n

n

Ministries have no obligation to be coordinated by BNBP/BPBD since the institutional

arrangements (players and rules of the game) does not give BNBP/BPBD the authority to reward or sanction other government departments (Universalia, 2012). The BPBDs have very little power to lobby local governments and Bappeda (Pellini, 2012) Rhetoric of support for DRM is not yet evident in budget allocations for supporting CBDRM at district and provincial levels. There is competition among line departments for resources, power and reputation, and sometimes districts governors may prioritize private sectors’ interests over those of vulnerable groups and communities at risk. Provincial BPBD has difficulty to act as ‘mediator’ between BNBP’s Master Plans and local communities DRR priorities. Will it endorse district BPBD proposals and CBDRM requests? This needs to be further explored during second field visit Slow implementation of bureaucratic reform means that rules, rather than performance, drive most civil servants BPBDs prioritize getting resources for materials and equipment to improve its image (ibid) Line agencies and local governments are aware that their work and tasks are easier when communities (and NGOs) are involved, but there are limited incentives to do a better job and to improve the quality of services. An exception may be the BPBD in Aceh Barat which showed leadership, commitment to learn and improve services. It showed concrete evidence of its preparedness practice. It won the first price as being the best performing BPBD in Indonesia. Many civil society organizations operate un-coordinated and ad hoc, have different views on CBDRM and how to operationalize it in practice. They further compete for resources and may not be necessarily motivated to work together or through networks. This hampers cooperation in the field of DRM. Local leadership, cultural beliefs, relationships between communities and government and their history can constraint change processes. Change processes are unpredictable and are time-consuming.

4.7 AIFDR’s role and added value in achieving this change AIFDR has been working with a wide range of program partners on DRM - both with government agencies at various levels and with civil society organizations (local and international) and is currently the largest bilateral grant donor in the field of DRM in Indonesia. There is a comparative lack of investment in Indonesia’s DRM sector by other donors21. The added value of AIFDR is to fill this niche and to explore effective pathways and approaches to achieve community resilience which could be replicated by other donors and in other areas, or strengthened by complementary investments by other donors.

21 DRM Concept Note, page 24 describes the investments of various international donors – mostly disaster preparedness, but none of them significantly invests in DRM sector.


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Because of past partnerships with (I)NGOs and close working relations with the GoI, AIFDR is wellpositioned to evolve as lead donor in the DRM sector as leverage to promote more concerted efforts of donors, government agencies and civil society. By choosing different entry-points AIFDR can initiate change processes from community to district to national levels and vice-versa, while improving the organisational performance among the different actors. In the course of time AIFDR could bring the different tracks together for regularly reflection and learning about what works and what doesn’t. In this way AIFDR constructs valuable evidence, a knowledge-base and partnerships to replicate effective approaches across a wider geographic area in Indonesia. Much development and humanitarian thinking and practice is still trapped in a paradigm of predictable, linear causality and maintained by mind-sets that seek accountability through top-down command and control, and expressed through logical frameworks in policy design. It is assumed that causal chains are unequivocal and linear, while on the ground it is not always clear what caused what, and risk problems are complex. Many CBDRM interventions designed by government and NGOs follow pre-conceived ideas about local realities which do not always match with local people’s changing urgent needs, their traditions in dealing with adversity and climate risks, and with longterm strategic solutions. Pre-conceived interventions often focus on what aid agencies can offer, not on what local people see as their priority or as appropriate support. Since almost all DRM actors espouse to assist the most vulnerable communities and groups, AIFDR may take its role to encourage critical self-reflection and learning among its key-partners who may not necessarily share similar views on how to best support community resilience. The added value of AIFDR to take a political and institutional approach to make change happen is that partners will be challenged to come out of their comfort-zones and are encouraged to adopt new ways of working, and abandon practices and routines that proved to be ineffective.

4.8 Other DRM actors’ roles in achieving this change So far we focused on communities, government and NGOs involved in CBDRM. There are more actors who (could) play complementary roles, like other international donors, media, scientific agencies (universities, knowledge centres, governmental scientific agencies) and the private sector. n

Other donors also support (CB)DRM programs and to avoid overlap or counterproductive inter

actions, it may be wise to initiate a mechanism to provide learning opportunities, exchange of effective practices, negotiation for complementary and reinforcing DRM strategies a.o. to make optimal use of each other’s investments and to advocate for good DRM governance. n Media organizations can have the role to pass on warning and educate the people on disasters using print, radio, television and internet. Media reports about disaster events, which may influence public opinion and move people into action. Media publishes warnings from BMKG even before the government declares the state of emergency. Jawa Pos e.g. is willing to partner with BNBP to increase awareness among the public as long it is news, sexy and useful for the audience. In general the role of media is not fully utilized, and also media can take on monitoring role on issues. Media include printed press, internet, social media (facebook, blogs) and broadcasted media (TV and radio). n Scientific institutes can deliver services that are crucial to enhance the quality of government’s performance (accurate tsunami and earthquake hazard maps, early warning technology), enhance quality of mitigation measures (techniques for earthquake resistance house construction, techniques for coastal protection infrastructure) or to enhance processes (university departments knowledgeable about environmental impact assessment procedures,


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on legislation, and social processes). n Private sector generates its own resources to spend on DRR as part of their Corporate Social Responsibility. During big impact disasters they usually have their own channels to provide relief goods, and other services. It may be good to explore what types of corporations and business can play an appropriate role in DRM. It is important to note here, that the private sector can be subject of CBO/NGO advocacy and mobilization because of the business’ nature of operations that generate adverse consequences and produces disaster vulnerability, particularly affecting the environment.


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5. Evidence-based approaches to CBDRM This chapter presents four evidence-based approaches to CBDRM that foster community resilience at the local level and have the potential to contribute to institutional development at district/provincial levels. The four approaches are not exclusive and shouldn’t be perceived as blue-prints. They can be combined, blended or applied in a sequential manner depending on local settings, needs and abilities of the DRM actors involved. The four approaches are based on effective strategies that we observed in Indonesia during the conduct of this analysis and previous research and can be labelled as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4.

School-based CBDRM approach NGO/CSO facilitates community disaster preparedness and linkage building with CBOs and BPBD Relief and livelihood recovery as entry-point for comprehensive CBDRM addressing root causes of people’s vulnerability Inter-sectoral partnership approach to CBDRM contributing to institutional development

The second part of this chapter will summarize the nature of effective and sustainable CBDRM practices in nine key-strategies that should be considered in each of the four approaches to CBDRM mentioned above to achieve community resilience: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

Effective CBDRM involves a change in mind-sets Effective CBDRM seeks inclusiveness during the process Effective CBDRM recognizes local people’s perspectives, priorities and their knowledge to deal with adversity with a focus on livelihood resilience Mobilization of social action and civil society-led advocacy for DRM is effective for making government accountable and a responsible actor in DRM Effective CBDRM builds on different bodies of knowledge Effective CBDRM is linked to, seeks cooperation with, and involves different actors, including government departments towards establishing GO-CSO coordination bodies Institutionalizing CBDRM in national development planning CBDRM approaches remain effective and relevant through continuous real-time learning and systematizing knowledge Effective CBDRM seeks creative and innovative funding and support strategies

5.1 School-based CBDRM approach Several NGOs have a core mandate, programmes and experience that focus on children, such as Plan International, World Vision, Kerlip Foundation and Yayasan Lingkar. This approach uses schools as entry points to communities located in high risk areas. This approach has proven to be effective in raising awareness among school teachers, children, parents and in building partnership with adjacent communities (Bastidas, 2011; Helvetas, 2009; GFDRR, 2012). This approach promotes a partnership between Education Departments, BPBD, NGOs and possibly at national level. Figure 5.1 shows the process and actors involved in the school-based CBDRM approach. The red arrow (dialogue space/interaction) suggests that the facilitators of local NGOs actively communicate and lobby with local governments (between BPBD and education department) in updating CBDRM progress, about formation of school-preparedness units for safer schools including high schools, colleges and universities. Teachers and principals can lobby for mainstreaming DRM in


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school curricula. School-based CBDRM approach further involves the right stakeholders to lobby government to comply with building codes and to consider hazard-sensitive spatial planning when new schools need to be constructed. Media can play a supportive role to reach a wider audience in the district who could join lobby activities on building codes.

Figure 5.1 School-based CBDRM approach

5.2 NGO/CSO facilitates community disaster preparedness and linkage building with CBOs and BPBD This is the most common CBDRM approach applied in Indonesia, particularly in coastal areas prone to earthquakes and tsunami. But this approach can also be applied in other areas for different hazard-types. We plea, however, for a more thorough risk assessment using the HCVA tools in an inclusive manner. The risk assessment should be regarded as an instrument to understand the various risk perspectives of differing social groups in a community (see key strategy 2 and 3 in section 5.5). Although this approach aims to organize and mobilize the community towards improved disaster preparedness, there may specific concerns for different groups according to gender, professional background, income level, etc. Also existing and potential capacities should be better explored and utilized before creating new forms of structures and groups. We appreciated the way KAPPALA encouraged Jangkar Kelud to replicate CBDRM in other villages and to create a CBO-network. In other areas we observed the cooperation between a district’s farmers groups association and a local NGO to expand the CBO-network using farmers CBOs as entry point. CBOnetworks have their dynamics –discussions on purpose and priority setting, leadership, division of work, resources, regulations – which need to be facilitated, developed and clarified. CBO-network will need to find their way but can use some guidance at critical moments. CBO-networks link with BPBDs for different purposes: to coordinate emergency operations, to lobby for DRM proposals,


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to enhance the performance of BPBD, or to provide feedback on services. Both parties can benefit from such partnership, especially when CBO-networks become formal member of a district DRR platform, where they can participate in planning and decision-making with BPBD and other relevant stakeholders. This CBDRM approach can serve as a stepping stone to more comprehensive approaches to achieve community resilience and institutional development. Figure 5.2 Community disaster preparedness and linkage building with CBOs and BPBD

5.3. Relief and livelihood recovery as entry-point for comprehensive CBDRM addressing root causes of people’s vulnerability This approach to CBDRM views ‘disasters’ as a product embedded in a societal history that produced patterns of vulnerability to which political (sub)systems must respond. Disasters are an opportunity for social and institutional change. It aims to change people’s mind-sets, both communities and NGO staff, towards a consciousness that DRM is not only the responsibility of governments, scientists and the military, but that local people and civil society have a voice too in reducing disaster risk. However, the government will not change its DRM practice unless people themselves start to engage with government to demand safety and protection against disaster impact, backed-up by the 2007 DM law. Relief and/or livelihood recovery activities are used to build contact and trust between NGO field staff village authorities and various groups in the community. As we observed in the field, relief and livelihood concerns match with people’s urgent felt needs after a disaster hit their locality. People’s motivation to engage with an outside NGO/CSO will be present and for NGO/CSO it is a way to understand the local context, particularly people’s differing risk perspectives and problems.


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Figure 5.3 Comprehensive CBDRM addressing root causes of people’s vulnerability

Through reflective discussions with different social groups22, CBOs, village authorities separately, an inclusive risk assessment and map will be composed that will serve as an instrument for dialogues between different groups within the village, between CBOs and village authorities, and beyond the community23. These dialogues serves to identify and prioritize DRM action points that address practical livelihood needs of people, and those that address current institutional arrangements that rather produce than reduce people’s vulnerability causing insecure livelihoods. This combination is important because people expect to see some immediate gains from their efforts, while networking, lobby and negotiation with government agencies may take a long time and don’t immediately result in tangible outcomes. These lobby activities require the involvement of multi-level institutions and authority. The case in Pati district, Central Java shows how relationships between a district level CBO-CSO-NGO network and the district government around flood mitigation changed during a period of 3 years from oppositional towards agonic relationships, meaning that both parties view each other as a legitimate actor in the DRM dialogue space. They don’t share the same view on disaster risk reduction, but they realize they need to engage with one another to address the floods;

22 ‘Social groups ‘refer to people who share a structural position in society, and their options to cope with disasters are related to that position. We refer to landless day labourers, migrants, plantation workers or other groups who are not organized in the traditional CBOs, and remain invisible for outside aid agencies.. 23 See ICCO, 2012 for examples how risk maps facilitated dialogues and mobilized collective action among communities.in Muria Region, Central Java.


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the district government needed to secure resources to start river normalization which they found in Jakarta pushed by the CBO-CSO-NGO network, while this network is responsible for informing local communities about the consequences of river normalization, particularly those residents that need to be re-allocated24. This particular risk problem became an entry-point for civil society to engage more constructively with government and particularly with the district BPBD towards institutional development.

5.4 Inter-sectoral partnership approach to CBDRM contributing to institutional development The inter-sectoral partnership approach explores disaster risks and people’s vulnerability from a broad range of angles taking a landscape approach. This approach will be very difficult if applied by a single NGO. This approach requires a partnership or a network of NGOs with different expertise, strengths and skills. Inter-sectoral partnerships could consist of organizations with expertise on humanitarian assistance, climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction like PfR intended. Sectoral issues can also refer to expertise in agriculture, health, fishery, or in legal assistance related to issues affecting people’s livelihood. Or, it can be a partnership of NGOs with different skills and mandate, working in different but adjacent areas, and who support each other in mobilizing collective action and lobby efforts to engage constructively with government like Muria Coalition did. Many combinations of inter-sectoral partnerships are possible and depend on local settings. The approach, however, assumes openness and trust among the NGOs and a reflexive capacity to learn and grasp opportunities in a changing context. A landscape approach means that spatial dimensions of disaster risk reduction are considered, like connections between upstream and downstream ecosystems and land use patterns that generate disasters, or that ‘danger zoning’ is considered in coastal areas to reduce risks for tsunami and coastal erosion. Communities welcome approaches that combine risk management with livelihood problems and disaster preparedness. Addressing livelihood problems will increase community motivation to engage with institutions beyond the village, and to learn new skills that will enable them to engage with the wider DRM policy and institutional environment. The PfR in NTT is piloting this approach, while also the Muria Coalition approaches CBDRM in this way. The intersectoral partnership approach establishes communication between upstream and downstream communities facilitated by different NGOs or CBOs that are part of the partnership. Subsequently, CBO- networks can be formed at district level and strengthen its role for lobby. The linkagebuilding and partnerships occur locally between Caritas Keuskupan Keuskupan Maumere, LPTP, and FIRD, while the partnership’s strength is that these NGOs also are active at national level. At this level PfR members share their CBDRM strategies, exchange experiences to learn from each other’s expertise, and share updates on where to look for resources and who to partner with. The inter-sectoral partnership facilitates lobby and advocacy since local level partnerships are linked to higher administrative levels and have many sectoral entry points to engage with the government. Perhaps this is an example of how "desa tangguh" could be operationalized by line departments working together in the same area. An inter-sectoral partnership approach can create DRM dialogues between related actors at several levels which accumulate skills, resources, and lessons that are relevant to transform DRM dialogue spaces from exchange platforms towards more formal inclusive decision-making bodies that benefit grassroots communities.

24 This case is being described in Heijmans (2013).


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Figure 5.4 Inter-sectoral partnership approach to CBDRM contributing to institutional development

5.5 Key strategies for achieving community resilience The review of international best practices in CBDRM focused particularly on strategies that reduce people’s vulnerability to disasters and which lead to up-scaling and sustainable CBDRM. The mechanisms found by Zwi et al (2012) were triangulated and where necessary, key strategies were added. The review identifies nine key strategies for effective CBDRM which are replicable in other contexts: n

Effective CBDRM involves a change in mind-sets

n

Effective CBDRM seeks inclusiveness during the process

n

Effective CBDRM recognizes local people’s perspectives, priorities and their knowledge to deal

n

Mobilization of social action and civil society-led advocacy for DRM is effective for making

n

Effective CBDRM builds on different bodies of knowledge

with adversity with a focus on livelihood resilience government accountable and a responsible actor in DRM


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CBDRM is linked to, seeks cooperation with, and involves different actors, including government departments towards establishing GO-CSO coordination bodies n Institutionalizing CBDRM in national development planning n CBDRM approaches remain effective and relevant through continuous real-time learning and systematizing knowledge n Effective CBDRM seeks creative and innovative funding and support strategies n

Effective

Where possible these key strategies are illustrated with best practices in DRM as a source of inspiration. 1. Effective CBDRM involves a change in mind-sets The CBDRM process involves making significant changes to the mind-sets of disaster-affected populations and to the established ways of working of organizations that support them. This includes changing mind-sets of NGOs and government officials regarding their routines and the way they view and relate to disaster-affected people. Disaster-affected people are not helpless passive victims but active and creative survivors (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989). Instead of viewing them as unprepared, uneducated and unaware of disaster risks, aid providers like NGOs and government agencies should acknowledge local people’s capacities, experiences and coping strategies to deal with adversity. Although local people developed mechanisms to cope with disasters and protect the most vulnerable within their communities, they may attribute disasters to nature and the will of God, or as God’s punishment because of violating traditional or religious practices. These beliefs result in a passive attitude of local people who accept their faith as something normal which can’t be changed. These beliefs and attitudes are not simply a reflection of people’s individual thoughts or their environment, but rather are constructed and embedded in social processes (Hilhorst, 2004). These passive mind-sets can change when “social arrangements that are ordinarily perceived as just and immutable must come to seem unjust and mutable” (Snow, 2004: 383).To make a change in people’s mind-sets possible, community risk assessments are instrumental for changing mind-sets when conducted as a conscientization process (Freire, 1970). A risk assessment consists of a hazard, vulnerability and capacity assessment. A ‘Hazard assessment’ collects data on the behavior of past hazards and tries to project the risks in the future like the consequences of climate change. ‘Vulnerability assessments can be used instrumentally, as an analytical tool to change people’s mind-sets and understanding. In the process of conscientization, ‘vulnerability’ is used to make people understand their current conditions and the reasons behind. ‘Vulnerability’ is an analytical tool to unravel institutional arrangements and power relations, rather than a real-time description of local people’s situation that will disempower and label people as poor, landless, disabled, widow, women, children or elderly. Once people are aware of why they are vulnerable and that unjust conditions are changeable when government acts as a responsible actor, the risk assessment shifts the language towards people’s capacities, emphasizing their ‘agency’. ‘Agency’ includes people’s organisational and motivational resources - terms used by Anderson and Woodrow (1989) in their Capacity and Vulnerability Assessment framework. Likewise, capacities can refer to ‘political resources’ which includes abilities to actively look for connections with power holders outside their social networks, to organize and mobilize effective agency through a chain of agents and community networks. In many ways a disaster is a good entry-point, since people are strongly motivated to do something to increase their resilience (Haverkort et al, 2011). In order to change the mind-sets of NGO and government, different strategies are required like capacity building and training, but also by installing feed-back mechanisms to solicit opinions from


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communities that received support to adapt aid practices. To make genuine change happening in the performance of government institutions, more is needed like civil society-led lobby and advocacy and encouraging partnerships between government and civil society (see key strategies 5, 6 and 7). A different and effective strategy to change people’s mind-sets is including DRR in school curriculum. Based on reviewing CBDRR literature, this strategy is particularly effective in countries prone to earthquakes/tsunami like Indonesia, Philippines, Japan and Nepal. Schools are widely accepted platforms for development and reform initiatives (Helvetas, 2009). By imparting DRR knowledge and skills, schools prepare children to cope with future disasters and to help the community plan and implement disaster preparedness activities. Schools play a very important role in dissemination among communities: in particular children and youth can lead awareness campaigns. It is important to partner with education authorities to have DRR incorporated in school curriculum. 2. Effective CBDRM seeks inclusiveness during the process Communities are not clearly bounded social or geographic units, nor do they solely refer to homoge neous groups with shared interests. Communities are socially differentiated along social, economic and political lines, including gender, religion and ethnicity. Community organizers and facilitators should ensure that all different groups should take part in the risk assessment process in one way or another. Facilitators should not align with one specific group nor should they be satisfied with the involvement of any people who like to be involved, since these are mostly belonging to the less vulnerable or more powerful actors in the village (Haverkort et al, 2011; Allen, 2006; Mansuri & Rao, 2004; Heijmans, 2012). The extent to which risk reduction measures benefit the marginalized, vulnerable groups relates to the ability of facilitators to remain a legitimate and credible actor in the eyes of the different social groups in the village. Legitimacy and credibility are obtained by engaging with different groups and to look consciously beyond the usual existing institutions around which people organise themselves (Heijmans, 2012). Instead of targeting, searching and working with the most vulnerable groups – as often espoused in CBDRR literature – facilitators should engage with vulnerable groups and with village elite and with village authorities, preferably not all at the same time. This is referred to as ‘impartiality’. The nature of relationships among these different groups varies from harmonious, cooperative to antagonistic and intimidation. ‘Impartiality’ refers to the ability of facilitators to bring opposing actors together without having personal prejudices or preconceptions of the actors, in order to reach a comprehensive understanding of the actors’ needs (Vaux, 2001). This means understanding the actors’ risk perspective and risk solutions within their full social and political context, and seeing the connections and power relationships between them. “Impartiality means distinguishing one person from the next, and being aware that many people have an interest in the vulnerability of others” (Vaux, 2001: 20). Through tactical and strategic approaches to community organising, oppositional relationships among villagers, between authorities and villagers, and between men and women can change and improve. Facilitators should create a conducive environ ment for ensuring marginalized groups have their views heard and that these are reflected in the risk assessment. Risk assessments can be conducted with different groups separately and used as an instrument for creating understanding for differing risk positions, to raise awareness about interconnected ness of risk problems within the village or between villages (upstream and downstream) and for entering dialogues and negotiations between marginalized vulnerable groups and village elite and authorities.


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Negative CBDRM outcomes - as noticed by the CBDRM Realist Review - are related to inexperience of NGOs or by ignoring the institutional and political context. Low level of community organization, opposing risks perspectives and interests, lack of formal interactions between key-actors, escaping sensitive political issues at stake by authorities do not lead to a change in the status quo, because local power dynamics are ignored, or NGOs don’t know how to transform oppositional relationships into agonic ones, meaning they can’t bring opponents on speaking terms (Heijmans, 2012). 3. Effective CBDRM recognizes local people’s perspectives, priorities and their knowledge to deal with adversity with a focus on livelihood resilience 25 To ensure that CBDRM interventions will be relevant, appropriate and a priority for local people, it is important to explore and analyse people’s risk landscape. ‘Risk landscape’ refers to the wide range of risks to which local people are exposed, like disaster risks, but also risk as a result of diseases, famine, unemployment, insecure land rights or violence. Local people stress to not only identify the imme diate hazard risks, but also to understand why they are exposed to these risks, referring to the under lying risk factors, and how they deal with these and survive crisis (Cosgrave, 2007; CARE, Groupe URD, WUR, 2013). When the attention of aid agencies would be limited to the occurrence of disasters, they run the risk to be blind for more urgent community concerns which render interventions irrelevant and a waste of scarce resources and energy. For example if NGOs and government would focus on tsunami and earthquake risks in coastal communities, they could be blind for more urgent risks like coastal erosion and recurrent flooding and how this negatively impact people’s land issues and livelihoods. Another important reason to explore people’s risk landscape is to understand the different risk per spectives between and within communities that may cause tensions between groups of people. A proper understanding of all the different perceptions and related social and political connections provides an opportunity to play a role in dialogue and negotiation between different communities and social groups (see previous core pre-requisite). The handbook developed by the ADPC (Abarquez & Murshed, 2004) is mostly applied and adapted by both (I)NGOs and government agencies. The handbook provides guidance on how to conduct a risk assessment with the involvement of com munities. However, the handbook remains silent about how to act as facilitator when different groups of people within the village, or between villages perceive risk differently, have a different explanation of why disasters happen and to whom, or (ab)use participatory approaches for their own agenda-setting. Risk solutions do not necessarily benefit all people in the village in the same way. “ Floods are destructive for upstream villages but a blessing for tail-end villages In Khulm, Northern Afghanistan, for example “floods are destructive” for upstream villagers who invest efforts in flood protection, sandbagging, enforcement of irrigation canals, and in lobbying for flood protection measures at the side of the canal intake. Whereas “floods are a blessing” for downstream farmers who rely on floods to access irrigation water during spring. It is in their interest to maintain good relations with the upstream villagers since they depend on them for drinking and irrigation water. This example shows how people perceive risk differently about the same disaster event, how risk perceptions are embedded in people’s social positions, and how people’s options are related to local institutional settings, in this case on rules of water distribution. Likewise, men and women may perceive risk differently as well and put different priorities to what should happen to reduce risk (CBDRM case study from Heijmans, 2012).

25 Most of this text is taken from the Handbook Resilience 2. published by CARE-Nederland, Groupe URD and Wageningen University. The text of the Handbook and the case studies are based on the PhD thesis of Heijmans (2012).


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4. Mobilization of social action and effective civil society led advocacy for DRM is effective for making government accountable and a responsible actor in DRM The CBDRM Realist Review also mentioned this key strategy for achieving community resilience. Mobilizing social action (or collective action) is often indispensable because village authorities do not operate at the appropriate level and scale to solve underlying risk factors (Allen, 2006). Further, one community lacks the leverage to be taken serious by government institutions. When communities organize themselves into broader issue- or needs-based networks, they are able to share lobby workloads, portray shared concerns and enjoy greater legitimacy as local representatives (Few, 2002; O’Brien et al, 2009; Luna, 2011). Civil society networks make it possible to establish connections outside people’s innate social networks. Vertical connections with authorities and power-holders make it possible for local voices to be heard at district, provincial and national level, and to access national level financial resources for disaster risk reduction. A key pre-requisite for mobilizing effective social action is that CBOs developed leadership skills like facilitation, management, negotiation, mediation, and speaking in public a.o. These skills are indispensable assets and should be part of community capacity development strategies. Mobilizing collective action for lobby and advocacy encourages governance actors to acknowledge the needs of their citizens. A specific strategy is community-led policy monitoring (CPM). In CPM, communities are at the centre of the action – identifying needs and action plans, and challenging the government to provide the right enabling environment and resources for citizens to reduce their risk to disaster26. It is important that NGOs together with local actors explore the institutional context: what are relevant (new) laws, which agency or department is responsible, what are trends in spatial planning processes within government to anticipate new risks; explore the institutional bureaucracies to discover who in the bureaucracy is supporting the people’s agenda, and who is opposing. When local people and facilitators are aware of the institutional context, they are more conscious of how these actors perform their powers in the DRM spaces where social actors negotiate, debate and struggle for safety, protection and secure livelihoods. Because of an increased awareness, the NGO will run less risk of getting entangled in local power-plays. Media play a vital role in supporting or opposing people’s agenda for safety and protection. Media refer to broadcasting, internet, printed publications and social media. People read media for information, to get alerted to any threats to their lives, and concerning corruption or incompetence in government and other actors responsible for people’s safety (Redford and Wisner, 2012). Journalists can question negligence and indifference to respond properly and effectively to disaster risks. They can convince and persuade the public that this situation should change and generate support for such change. It is important to reiterate the same message in as many different ways as possible. On the other hand, media can also report on successful DRR practices and tell how disasters could be avoided. Communities and NGO have to look for media that believe that journalism is more than just daily entertainment, and that in a democracy, journalists have an obligation to support, defend, inform and alert the public (ibid). 5. Effective CBDRM builds on different bodies of knowledge This key-strategy refers to the importance of combining scientific knowledge with local knowledge and DRM-practitioners knowledge. Many examples exists about how these different bodies of

26 See Christian Aid, CAFOD, Trocaire (2007) Monitoring Government Policies: A Toolkit for Civil Organisations in Africa. This is a practical tool to help local organisations plan how they can monitor different government policies and implementation.


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knowledge complement each other, especially when designing early warning systems that link local forewarning signs with scientific indicators facilitated by NGOs and governments. However, the use of local knowledge requires precaution and further examination since it is differentiated, partial and at times conflictive to NGOs and government’s prevailing viewpoints. The question here is not about whose knowledge is correct or incorrect, but how to recognize the social interests and meaning attached to a particular body of knowledge, and how to make sense and reconcile them. The appreciation of local knowledge in CBDRR stems from the realization in the mid-1990s that technocratic and scientific approaches alone cannot reduce losses (IDNDR, 1994). CBDRM handbooks assume that the use of local knowledge will improve disaster risk reduction policies and practice (Abarquez and Murshed, 2004; UNISDR, 2008; Haverkort et al, 2011). Research and evaluation reports on humanitarian assistance regularly conclude however, that aid practice is often based on simplified realities and little on local knowledge and situational analysis (Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri, 2005; Cosgrave, 2007). This refers to the discrepancy between policy and practice, and that it is apparently difficult to grasp people’s local knowledge and risk perspectives. But what is local knowledge actually? The UNISDR distinguishes local knowledge from other types of knowledge in that it originates from the community, that it is disseminated through informal means, it is collectively owned, subject to adaptation, and embedded in a community’s way of life as a means of survival. Most common examples of the use of local knowledge are indigenous warning signals for impending danger and building techniques to withstand typhoons, floods and earthquakes. Local knowledge and practice further refer to mutual help systems like bayanihan in the Philippines, gotong royong in Indonesia to mobilize community labour, to specific values and rituals to create harmony or to justify defence in conflict situations, to routines to dismantle and hide assets, or to farm in groups as a form of protection against violence. However, research into what constitutes local knowledge revealed that local and indigenous knowledge shouldn’t be romanticized, since it is often partial and has its limitations (Heijmans, 2012; Hilhorst, 2004). Local knowledge can be viewed in three ways: n

The first one is the instrumental view that sees ‘local knowledge as a barrel of knowledge’

that can be tapped for reducing risks. This instrumental view resonates with the definition of UNISDR. n

The second view positions ‘local knowledge in contrast to modernization’, assuming that local

knowledge blends nature with culture and that it can inspire resistance to western, colonial or outsiders’ ideas. The revival of ‘adat’ (custom, tradition) in post-Suharto Indonesia fits in this view. ‘Adat’ is associated with history, land and law, with order and consensus. Here, revival of adat has, among others, the strategic purpose to oppose land appropriation by the state for mining, timber, plantations, and transmigration (Henley and Davidson, 2008). In this view, local knowledge is used to oppose government and private sector’s intentions and plans. n

The third view closely relates to the second view: local knowledge as a source of political-

economic empowerment of local people, instrumental to mobilize people. It stresses participatory societal change aimed to address the root causes of people’s vulnerability. This view is linked to the strategy of mobilizing social action (point 5). Further, local knowledge is never purely local. People construct their knowledge through interaction with their neighbours, through social networks, from what they hear on the radio or in the market,


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or through seasonal migration. Some people are much better positioned to obtain knowledge than others, and can make their interpretations of events and processes authoritative in the community. In short, local knowledge is not something neutral which will automatically result in better risk reduction measures. Local knowledge is differentiated and partial. This observation corresponds with the previous key strategy to recognize different risk perspectives. When facilitators are aware of the partiality of local knowledge and understand how actors use their knowledge to legitimize their actions, they will be able to facilitate a process of making sense of the usefulness and relevance of the different bodies of knowledge. Discussions between communities and scientists can improve e.g. early warning systems, but also in the context of climate change adaptation, partnerships between scientists, local government, NGOs and vulnerable communities are vital. All bring their specific bodies of knowledge to the discussion table to find risk solutions that are appropriate for vulnerable communities and enhance the institutional capacity to innovate DRR practice (Christian Aid, 2011). Understanding local knowledge is time-consuming, but when unraveled it generates valuable insights for appropriate and sustainable CBDRM interventions. 6. Effective CBDRM is linked to, seeks cooperation with, and involves different actors, including government departments towards establishing formal GO-CSO DRR Coordination Bodies The root causes of people’s vulnerability to disasters can often be found in national and global political, social and economic structures and trends: weak planning and building codes, inadequate policies governing civil protection and disaster response, inadequate policies on greenhouse gas reduction and climate change, a lack of national welfare system or safety nets, indebtedness and aid dependency (Moss, 2007; Blaikie et al, 1994). Disasters can therefore be understood as the product of a cumulative set of changing institutional arrangements and policy decisions over a long period of time (Olson, 2000; Christoplos et al, 2001; Pelling and Dill, 2009). To reverse these institutional arrangements and decisions, much more is required than community-based work to ensure that people’s lives and livelihoods are resilient to disaster. The change process requires a supportive political and legislative environment in which good initiatives can thrive, be sustained and be multiplied. Actually all DRM actors nowadays acknowledge that a multi-sector, multi-actor and multi-level approach is a prerequisite but they differ in views on how multi-stakeholders should engage. The UN Hyogo Framework for Action promotes CBDRM that engages with multi-stakeholder platforms as a way to enhance public participation and institutional reform in DRM. Multi-stakeholder platforms suppose a harmonious interaction between the government and civil-society actors: the government shapes policies and institutional frameworks, while civil-society actors play a complementary role in supporting vulnerable communities. This approach, however, raises questions about mutual trust, the nature of participation of grassroots people, about representation and power dynamics (Warner, et al, 2002). Multi-stakeholder platforms are best regarded as political arenas where government and civil society debate, negotiate, resist and decide on DRM policies and practices. Instead of viewing CBDRM as a project, it is essential to regard (CB)DRM as a long-term process with results at local, district, provincial and national level objectives. In the various countries in Southeast Asia, multi-stakeholder platforms differ in status and effectiveness. In Vietnam, government-civil society interaction happens mainly at the local level, while in the Philippines, Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Councils exist from national to


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municipality level with representatives from government and civil society enforced by the new 2010 DM Law. These councils are perceived as an avenue for coordination and communication between communities and their (local) government (Torrente, Zhang and Le-Huu, 2008). In Indonesia a national platform exists, PLANAS, but this is still at the level of exchanging information although it may have the potential to evolve into a formal coordination and decision-making body on DRM in the future. DRM is not the responsibility of solely government or local communities: the sustainable up-scaling of community-centred DRM depends on governments and civil society working together across levels and scales (Moss, 2007). 7. Institutionalizing CBDRM in national development planning: further up-scaling Institutional development is a vital part of the disaster risk reduction process (Twigg, 2004). Institutionalizing CBDRM means incorporating it throughout people’s thinking, structures, culture and operations. Local institutions and community organizations are considered major stakeholders in DRM by governments as laid down in the Hyogo Framework for Action, and as such, they should be involved in planning, particularly in integrating CBDRM into development planning and allocation of resources. Particularly in countries with a high poverty incidence aggravated by frequent disasters, it is vital to establish mechanisms for CBDRM to be integrated in national development planning to ensure livelihood security and protection of people’s assets during disasters (Torrente, Zhang & Le-Huu, 2008). Integrating CBDRM into development planning is a strategy to address people’s structural vulnerability to disasters. In the Philippines, pilot sites were selected to institutionalise CBDRM in development planning. This implies: (1) institutional capacity development of key government staff like budget officers, vicemayor/ vice-governor, concerned local legislators and other DRM officers27, (2) integration of DRM into revision of the local land use plan with provincial and local planning chiefs and staff, (3) protocol for early warning system and evacuation procedures developed with village heads and legislative councils, indigenous community leaders, local media and communication groups (ibid). Most of the CBDRM activities in the Philippines are no longer framed as disaster preparedness and mitigation, but take a more holistic approach including socio-economic development issues termed as disaster risk reduction. One lesson from the Philippines is that hazard and risk mapping should become integral part of local land use planning and not a separate activity led by a governmental disaster management agency. A second lesson is that Local Development Councils have the power to allocate 5% of their internal revenue allotment to relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction and other DRM activities – which creates some flexibility and independence from the national level, although the involvement of NGOs is crucial to push government to really implement this 5 %. Overall it is recognized that socio-economic goals of the development process are mostly conceived at the national level and that these need to be linked to priority areas locally (Torrente, Zhang, Le-Huu, 2008). To promote the institutionalization of CBDRM (ADPC, 2008e) the following is recommended: Support initiatives that embrace a holistic and comprehensive approach to DRM at the

n

provincial and district levels (i.e. so that personnel are not focused on relief/response only) and promote a more proactive engagement in DRM. n

Take pragmatic steps (depending upon the context) to address the lack of articulation between the national, sub‐national level and communities by building capacity at the

27 local authorities attended training on how to integrate DRM in local governance (UNDP, 2006)


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sub‐national level through the development of a cadre of dedicated focal persons assigned specifically to DRM. Encourage governments to appoint part‐ or fulltime focal points at sub‐ national level. Furthermore, intensify efforts to support the development of local government structures through institutional development. This would include support to institutionalize DRM planning, particularly at sub‐national level with a wide range of stakeholders working to develop DRM plans at the community level (principally INGOs, LNGOs and the Red Cross Movement) to help overcome challenges these stakeholders face in ensuring that such plans are taken up at the higher sub‐national level and ultimately influence national level plans. Integrating CBDRM in development plans and programmes at all levels encourages increased participation and involvement of particularly sub-national governments, while it also enhances cooperation with NGOs which tend to bypass government mechanisms when implementing CBDRM projects at village level (ADPC, 2008e). 8. CBDRM approaches remain effective and relevant through continuous real-time learning and systematizing knowledge Since each context is unique, it is impossible to produce a standardized guideline for CBDRM inter ventions or strategies to foster community self-reliance. Complexity and local specificity mean that outcomes are not straightforward to assess. Taking an iterative approach to developing, monitoring and evaluating interventions includes the creation of a culture of learning among all relevant stakeholders based on their real-time experience as the appropriate way to deal with uncertainty and unpredictable societal processes (Haverkort, 2011; Heijmans, 2012; CARE-Nederland et al, 2013). Learning and adapting to new circumstances and eventualities requires flexibility, diversification of skills, resources, an open attitude and to link up with new stakeholders. Interventions will follow uncertain and unknown paths. An iterative approach to designing CBDRM interventions means that engaging with local people and understanding their world and act upon findings, consists of a spiral of action-reflection cycles in which the following steps are taken: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Initial observations to understand people’s risk landscape to define the issue, ideally in close dialogue with the actors concerned. To develop a plan of action to improve what is already happening To act to implement the plan To observe the effects of the action in the context in which it occurs (monitoring) To reflect on these effects as a basis for further planning, subsequent action and affect change through a succession of cycles (see Figure 5.61)


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Figure 5.5. Interventions as spiralling cycles of action and reflection (Muir, 2007)

The action-reflection cycles intend to blend local knowledge from grassroots communities with knowledge from aid practitioners developed through their interaction with these communities. These are then linked to formal scientific knowledge systems which all together aim to bring about a positive outcome for local vulnerable and marginalized people affected by disasters. However, not all stakeholders are immediately open to reflection on their practices and routines like government officials, and we can’t assume that all actors are equal partners in the debates. Sharing experiences, open communication, admitting weaknesses, and trust should be regarded as goals in the intervention process in order to attain reliable relationships. Since the essence of fostering community self-reliance is situated in reworking power relations and institutions, the focus of monitoring work is on changes in performance and in interrelationships between actors and between actors and the environment rather than on the cause-effect chains of activities like written in logical frameworks. Community organizations and civil society actors can further use the lessons learned for informed advocacy and to convince government to take action. 9. Effective CBDRM seeks creative and innovative funding and support strategies In wealthy countries most disaster-affected people finance relief and reconstruction from own savings, insurance, family support and taxpayer solidarity. Often governments are well-prepared to provide back-up capital to insurance programmes (Linnerooth-Bayer, 2012). In low and middle income countries this is not possible. Lacking savings and insurance, and in the absent of reliable and solvent governments, those experiencing losses rely on remittances, social safety nets, international aid, selling and pawning of assets, or borrowing from moneylenders. Also governments borrow from international financial institutions and accept funds from foreign donors. In such context, a first step in seeking creative and innovative funding strategies to support CBDRM is to spend funds smarter:


n

n

n n

n

n

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To promote sustainable CBDRM it is essential to generate resources (particularly human and

financial resources) from within the system. Key strategy 4, 6 and 7 have the objective to advocate for a greater share of funding in local development plans and budgets for DRM/CCA. Haverkort et al (2011) observe that a new decentralized system of government funding/ budgeting is beginning to give communities more say over how government funds are spent in their areas making CBDRM more attuned to the needs of local populations and results in less waste of scarce resources – like the example of the Philippines showed. Further, financing CBDRM can be provided at a slower pace and at the time when the system is ready. The nature of CBDRM interventions is that they take time and are demand-driven. Sometimes it is possible to fund CBDRM from unspent humanitarian funds but then lobby and persuasion is needed to adjust the fast delivery conditions into long term objectives. More relief funding should ensure that DRR activities are incorporated into the project design. Another mechanism to spend DRM funds smarter is to promote an integrated, programmatic approach among partners to avoid duplication and wastage of resources, e.g. conduct integrated risk assessments at village level and divide work based on expertise. NGOs and research institutes could invest in cost-benefit analysis as an advocacy tool to make policy-makers realize the advantages of investing in CBDRM.

Many CBDRM interventions attempt to mobilize resources from within the community enhancing responsibility and sustainability. CBDRM-teams e.g. can mobilize so-called emergency & maintenance funds among community members especially when they are affected by recurrent disasters. They develop rules and regulations for the collection of funds in cash or kind. Funds are kept and managed by a treasurer. Funds are used for emergency relief and for maintenance of DRR measures. Sometimes funds are used to organize evacuation drills. In case communities are part of a CBO-network, funds can be generated network-wise or they render support to communities in need based on solidarity. Summarizing – The four CBDRM approaches presented in 5.1 should in the end find ‘institutional homes’ and lead to good DRM governance. However, this will only happen when the four CBDRM approaches apply the nine key-strategies for effective and sustainable CBDRM. Whatever the entrypoints are and initial activities at community-level, the nine key strategies bring the various path ways of the road map together in dialogue spaces, platforms and networks where the different DRM actors increasingly coordinate, plan and decide together on how to address risk problems and how to make the institutional framework function to the benefit of communities at risk.


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Warner, J., P. Waalewijn, and D. Hilhorst (2002) Public Participation in Disaster-Prone Watersheds. Time for Multi-Stakeholder Platforms? Paper for the Water and Climate Dialogue, Irrigation and Water Management Group, Wageningen University Wilkinson, E. (2012) Transforming disaster risk management: a political economy approach, ODI Background Note World Vision (2010) Our School is Prepared to Disaster Zwi, A. et al (2012) Do community based disaster risk management (CBDRM) initiatives reduce the social and economic cost of disasters? CBDRM Realist Review Draft Repor


| PA G E 8 3


| PA G E 8 4

List of abbreviations AIFDR BMKG BNPB BPBD BPD CBDRM CBAT CBO CCA CKM CSO DPT DRM ER FIRD FORMASIBAB FPBI HCVA INGO KSB KSN LPTP MoNE MPBI NGO NTT NU PfR PMI PNPM POSKO RAPI WI

Australia Indonesia Facility for Disaster Reduction Badan Meteorologi Klimatologi dan Geofisika – Meteorology, Climatology and Geophysiscs Agency Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana – National Disaster Management Body Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah - Sub-National Disaster Management Agency Badan Perwakilan Desa- Village parliament Community-Based Disaster Risk Management Community Based Action Team Community-Based Organisation Climate Change Adaptation Charisma Keuskupan Maumere Civil Society Organisation Disaster Preparedness Training Disaster Risk Management Emergency Response Flores Institute for Resource Development Forum Masyarakat Siaga Aceh Barat – West Aceh Community Preparedness Forum Indonesian Disaster Concern Forum Hazard, Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment International Non-Government Organisation kelompok siaga bencana – Disaster Preparedness Groups Komunitas Siti Nurbaya - ???? Lembaga Pengembangan Teknologi Perdesaan – Rural technology Development Foundation Ministry of National Education Indonesian Society for Disaster Management Non-Government Organisation Nusa Tenggara Timur Nahdlatul Ulama Partners for Resilience Palang Merah Indonesia – Indonesian Red Cross Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat – National Program for Community Empowerment Pos Komando- Command and Control Centre Radio Antar Penduduk Indonesia - Indonesian Inter-Citizenry Radio Wetlands International


| PA G E 8 5

List of Interviews No

Date

Institution

1

11-‐12-‐2012

Yayasan Indonesian Cerdas

2

11-‐12-‐2012

3

Name

Position

Jawa Pos

Akhmad Junaida Mas Polo DC Mita Arif Santoso

Board Member Chief Editor JP Books Data manager YIC Secretary Board Managing Director

12-‐12-‐2012

Jangkar Kelud

Abdul Habdi Rashid

District coordinator JK

4

12-‐12-‐2012

Preparedness Team of Desa Besowo

5

12-‐12-‐2012

Preparedness Team of Desa Satak

6

12-‐12-‐2012

Preparedness Team in Desa Widang

Village Head, teachers, housewives, local businessmen, radio operator Village head, farmers, radio operator, teachers, midwife, housewives 5 members of the Preparedness Team

7

12-‐12-‐2012

Preparedness Team in Desa Soso

8

12-‐12-‐2012

Kappala + Jangkar kelud in Blitar

9

13-‐12-‐2012

BPBD Blitar

10

13-‐12-‐2012

Kappala

22-‐01-‐2013

Provincial BPBD Surabaya

Pak Darmawan Pak Sugeng

11

22-‐01-‐2013

WALHI-‐East Java office, Surabaya

Mas Oni

Head BPBD East Java Director Preparedness and Mitigation Director WALHI East Java

12

22-‐01-‐2013

PMI – East Java, Surabaya

Djoni Irianto

Secretary

13

23-‐01-‐2013

BPBD Bojonegoro district

14

23-‐01-‐2013

PMI Bojonegoro

Pak Suhardi Ibu Nadif Ulfia

Head Preparedness Head Logistics

15

24-‐01-‐2013

BPBD Banyuwangi

Bapak Wiyono

Head of BPBD

16

24-‐01-‐2013

PMI Banyuwangi

17

25-‐01-‐2013

Community meeting in Sumberagung Head sub-‐district, head BPBD, TNI, police, male

18

25-‐01-‐2013

19

25-‐01-‐2013

CBAT PMI in Sumberagung, Pesanggaran sub-‐district

FPBI Banyuwangi

Village head and a few members of the preparedness Team Gandong Director of Kappala Abdul Habdi Rashid District Coordinator JK Buju Gunjoro Secretary BPBD Kaltian Emergency and Logistics Gandong Director Kappala

Head District PMI

community leaders 6 female members of CBAT team – midwife, businesswomen, housewife, librarian Jainal Anis

FPBI


| PA G E 8 6

No

Date

Institution

Name

20

10-‐12-‐2012

BNPB

Pak Wisnu Widjaja

21

10-‐12-‐2012

BNPB

Chasan Ascholani

22

14-‐12-‐2012

BNPB

Drs. Mutaruddin

23

14-‐12-‐2012

BAPPENAS

Togu Pardede

24

14-‐01-‐2013

IFRC

Wayne Ulrich

Position Head of Education and Training Center AIFDR consultant

Director of Community Empowerment Hazard Prone Area Section Deputy of regional Development and Local Autonomy Resilience Coordinator

Robert Sulistyo 25

14-‐01-‐2013

LIPI

Irina Rafliana

Researcher

26

14-‐01-‐2013

Oxfam GB

Lukman Hakim

DRR Program Manager

27

15-‐01-‐2013

Karina

Ari Nugroho

DRR Program Manager

Dame Manalu Dian Lestariningsih 28

15-‐01-‐2013

Plan International

Amin Magatani

DRR Program Manager

29

16-‐ 01 -‐

World Vision

Abby Mamesah

DRR Coordinator

BMKG

Prih Harjadi

Deputi

2013 30

16-‐01-‐2013

of

Geophysics,

BMKG 31

28-‐01-‐2013

Nahdlatul Ulama (LPBI-‐NU)

Avianto Muhtadi

Chairman of LPBI-‐NU

Name

Position

No

Date

32

16-‐12-‐2012

Caritas Maumere

33

17-‐12-‐2012

Preparedness Team of Wolofeo

Ellen Coordinator Poli Facilitator Head and two members of preparedness team

34

17-‐12-‐2012

Wetlands International

Eko

35

17-‐12-‐2012

Preparedness Team of Reroroja

15 members of preparedness team

36

17-‐12-‐2012

BPBD Sikka

Sylvanus Tibo

Head of BPBD

37

17-‐12-‐2012

LPTP

Anton

Field Coordinator

38

17-‐12-‐2012

Preparedness Team of Watuneso

5 members of preparedness team

39

18-‐12-‐2012

BPBD Ende

Yayo Ruslan

40

18-‐12-‐2012

41

18-‐12-‐2012

Flores Institute for Resource Development Preparedness Team of Tanjung-‐ Paupanda

Institution

Field Coordinator

Head of Preparedness Section Head of Mitigation Roni Former Chief Vincent Chief Akhsa + 10 members of preparedness team (fishermen, women, youth)


| PA G E 87

No

Date

Institution

Name

Position

42

16-‐12-‐2012

IBU Foundation-‐Meulaboh

Pak Aria

43

17-‐02-‐2012

Desa Langung, Meulaboh

CBDRM-‐team consisting of village head and 12

Head of programmes

members 44

17-‐12-‐2012

Desa Gampung Pasir, Meulaboh

Village head

45

17-‐12-‐2012

IBU Foundation-‐Meulaboh

Pak Aria and team

46

17-‐12-‐2012

Desa Kautambang

Village head and CBDRM-‐team members

47

18-‐12-‐2012

FORMASIBAB

Chairwoman of FORMASIBAB

48

18-‐12-‐2012

BPBD Weste Aceh, Meulaboh

H. Teuku Ahmed Dadek

West Sumatra No Date

Institution

Name

IBU staff

Head BPBD West Aceh

Position

49

22-‐01-‐2013

Mercy Corps

Simon Matakupan

Program Manager

50

22-‐01-‐2013

SurfAid

Tarmizi

DRR Manager

51

22-‐01-‐2013

Kogami

Patra Rina Dewi

Executive Director

52

23-‐01-‐2013

BPBD Province West Sumatra

53

23-‐01-‐2013

54

23-‐01-‐2013

BPBD Padang Pariaman District Limbubu NGO

55

24-‐01-‐2013

Jefriyanto Secretary Rumainur Head of Mitigation Richard Public Relation Zainir Koto Head Syafrimen Secretary Nurhayati Chief Fatmiyeti 10 members of preparedness team Chief

56

24-‐01-‐2013

57

25-‐01-‐2013

58

25-‐01-‐2013

Disaster Preparedness Team of Jorong Tiku Selatan Preparedness Team of Nagari Balai Naras BPBD Kota Padang Preparedness Team of Siti Nurbaya

5 members of preparedness team (including teachers, housewives, fishermen) Budhi Erwanto Head Hermansyah Rehabilitation and Reconstruction 10 members of preparedness team (including neighbourhood leaders, housewives, fishermen, youth)

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