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British Journal of Industrial Relations ••:•• •• 2013 0007–1080 pp. ••–••

doi: 10.1111/bjir.12016

Building Transnational Union Networks across Global Production Networks: Conceptualising a New Arena of Labour–Management Relations Markus Helfen and Michael Fichter

Abstract Academic interest in Global Framework Agreements (GFAs) has grown considerably over the past several years, but the focus has largely been limited to comparing their various clauses and provisions. More recent research has centred on case studies of their implementation. In this article, we move beyond an exclusive analysis of GFAs to a broader conceptualization of steps towards globalizing labour relations, in which GFAs are fundamental. In our heuristic model, a GFA is the negotiated result of interest representation. A GFA creates an arena for the pursuit of global labour relations by defining the content, selecting the actors, delineating the processes and setting the boundaries of labour–management interaction. As a political space undergoing institutionalization, all of these dimensions of arenas are still contested. Although the structural boundaries are fuzzy at the periphery, such arenas reach beyond the organizational entities of the signatory transnational corporation (TNC) to encompass the global production network (GPN). Furthermore, we show how Global Union Federations (GUFs) and their member unions operating in regard to particular GPNs have begun building Transnational Union Networks (TUNs). Using two very different case studies, we argue that structural contingencies and strategic choices intertwine to bring about divergent TUN trajectories: one favouring a limited company-specific internal approach, the other a broader, GUF-led union-building approach. As exemplified by these findings, TUNs in our construction of an arena linking key elements of transnational labour relations are still ‘work in progress’. Our concluding hypotheses reflect this contingency and the need for further research.

Markus Helfen is at the Management Department, Freie Universität Berlin. Michael Fichter is recently retired from the Institute of Political Science, Freie Universität Berlin. © Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2013. Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

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1. Introduction

Since the early 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, international unions have been under considerable pressure to develop new responses to the realities of global capitalism, especially the growth of transnational corporations (TNCs) and the spread of global production networks (GPNs) across national borders and industry demarcations (Fairbrother and Hammer 2005; Hyman 2005). Political lobbying at international institutions to redress the global imbalance of power between labour and capital, such as the bid to anchor a ‘social clause’ in the WTO in the 1990s, has been unsuccessful (Anner 2001; Gumbrell-McCormick 2004: 44 ff.). Instead, a new mid-range policy of Global Framework Agreements (GFAs1) was crafted as a labour relations-based alternative to corporate unilateral and voluntary codes of conduct. Through GFAs, Global Union Federations (GUFs), the sectoral organizations of international unionism, seek to gain recognition from TNCs as legitimate negotiating counterparts, initiate social dialogue and successively, by strengthening unionization, influence HR practices of TNCs throughout their global production networks (Cotton and GumbrellMcCormick 2012; Croucher and Cotton 2009; Fichter et al. 2011; Platzer and Müller 2011; Routledge and Cumbers 2009). As their numbers have grown, there has been a broadening debate among practitioners and academics over GFAs. Much of that debate has focused on the question of whether GFAs have resulted in tangible gains for labour, that is, increased union recognition and collective bargaining. A further insight to emerge from such debates is the importance of networks for unions, both as a policy tool and as an organizational response (e.g. Croucher and Cotton 2009; Davies et al. 2011; Evans 2010; Kidder 2002; Levesque and Murray 2010). Labour has become acutely aware that without its multi-level organized intervention, successful implementation of GFAs is unlikely. We agree with that assessment, but take it a step further by advocating a heuristic model for conceptualizing the interplay of actors and structures in emerging arenas of transnational labour relations. In this model, the outcome of labour–management negotiations, a GFA, creates a transnational arena of labour relations by defining the content, selecting the actors, delineating the processes and setting the scope of labour–management interaction. In our model, the scope of such arenas reaches beyond the organizational entities of the signatory Transnational Corporation (TNC) to encompass the global production network (GPN). Furthermore, we show how Global Union Federations (GUFs) and their member unions operating in regard to particular GPNs have begun building Transnational Union Networks (TUNs). For us, the organization and governance of GFA-related TUNs has a decisive impact on the development of transnational arenas of labour relations. By GFA-related, we are referring to networks that may be created as a means of achieving a GFA or for ensuring its implementation after such an agreement has been negotiated and signed. We define TUNs as a network consisting of at least three collective actors from a larger set of actors © Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2013.

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comprised of GUFs, their national affiliates, works councils and possibly non-union supporters. TUNs are rarely global in reach but are transnational in that they transcend localities and national borders to bring organized labour from diverse institutional settings to interact. A TUN is built across a cross-border economic network structure of different firms, that is, a GPN. Basically, TUNs interact with GPNs at strategically defined nodes (Bonacich 2003) as well as across the institutional distances inherent to a GPN. A TUN lacks a centre of hierarchical authority to achieve collective goals or to control the contributions and resources of the participating actors. TUNs and their governance structures differ, and thus may provide insights as to the kinds of strategic choices they embody. To illustrate our heuristic model, we offer two very different case studies from our own extensive empirical research,2 drawing on the theory of network governance to explain TUN organization. In particular, we will look at the multi-level, multi-actor relationships and flesh out the differences in the organization and governance of both TUNs. Moreover, we go beyond a description of the empirical phenomenon TUN to link our emblematic case types to particular trajectories, from which we derive hypotheses as to the importance of the differing modes of TUN organization and governance. Our empirical findings enable us to capture the dynamic aspects of network governance including insights on the organization of such networks as an outcome of negotiation and bargaining and on their intervening capacities in arena construction. As exemplified by these findings, TUNs in our model of an arena linking key elements of transnational labour relations are still ‘work in progress’. Our concluding hypotheses reflect this contingency and the need for further research. 2. The transnational arena of labour relations

Some scholars have postulated the existence of a global labour regime centred on the core labour standards of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) (cf. Arthurs 2005; Hassel 2008; Haworth et al. 2005). From our perspective, such a view presupposes a state of institutionalization that in practice is non-existent and neglects the politics and interest conflicts of emerging processes of labour–management interaction. In contrast, we would argue that transnational labour relations are still in a nascent, formative stage as far as institutionalization is concerned. As evidenced by the numerous accounts of single-issue campaigns, supply-chain labour disputes, multi-stakeholder initiatives and corporate codes of conduct, the widely differing approaches to regulation present a very fragmented, heterogeneous and patchwork picture of development. In recognition of this reality, we offer a heuristic model postulating the emergence of transnational arenas emanating from GFAs as a more adequate means of exploring the dynamics of transnationalization in labour relations, in which the presence of unions is a decisive factor. Hence, taking the currently formative context of transnational labour relations into account, we argue that the arena concept (Kädtler 2006; © Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2013.

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Müller-Jentsch 2004; and more generally, Strauss 1982) offers a more socially constructed, less static and fixed starting point for addressing the question of globalizing labour–management relations (Cumbers et al. 2008a, b; Levy 2008; Palpacuer 2008; Papadakis 2011; Stevis 2010) than concepts of a global labour regime. We prefer the term ‘arena’ because it is more clearly associated with a political space for collective actors that is still contested and emergent, and hence, more applicable to processes of institutionalization. While we find that the terms ‘arena’ and ‘fields’ are often used interchangeably in this sense (Fligstein and McAdam 2011), in our understanding, ‘arena’ is used to convey a stronger sense of a bounded, dedicated and multi-level political space for specific actors, however weak and contested this construct may still be. Figure 1 below depicts our heuristic model of a multi-level transnational arena of labour–management relations. Admittedly, transnational (and not global) labour relations currently consist of little more than a patchwork of nascent sub-arenas. As our empirical cases show, in actual practice, GFAs and the TUNs that have been formed are indeed ‘works in progress’. They reflect the transitory nature of ongoing processes within an emerging arena of the global governance of labour. In this emerging arena, we can delineate the multi-level relationships within and between two sets of networks, GPN and TUN. Building on this arena concept allows us to show how the evolvement of transnational labour relations is contingent upon the transformative capacity of TUNs. To explain its emergent character and the interaction between its organizational components more fully in the context of GFAs, we will proceed in three

FIGURE 1 The Transnational Arena of Labour Relations.

© Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2013.

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steps. We begin with the GFA arena, which includes a brief history of GFAs, their development and their relevance in laying the groundwork for arena creation. The second and third steps in our presentation are concerned with the two basic organizational components of the arena: first, global production networks, which render the operational and strategic focus for the second component, transnational union networks. Our emphasis is on this latter component and its theoretical underpinnings, making use of a concept of network governance that is open not only to structure but also to political agency and process (Benson 1975; Coe and Jordhus-Lier 2010; Stevenson and Greenberg 2000). Using the GPN concept thus allows us to link the configuration of labour relations within global production to the practices of inter-organizational network governance (Provan and Kenis 2008; Sydow and Windeler 1998). This enables us to specify how institutions and the characteristics of particular GPNs influence the policy options and available modes of network governance for transnational union networks. Underlying our discussion of these basic components of the GFA-related arena is an interest in critically assessing labour’s potential influence on labour conditions and labour relations within GPNs, including issues of structural power, associational power and institutional power (Brinkmann et al. 2008; Silver 2003; Wright 2000). In so doing, we can provide insights into TUN governance as a means to extend unions’ impact on shaping labour relations in GPNs.

3. The GFA-arena: a process approach

The first GFA was signed in 1988. At the end of 2012, there were 88 functional GFAs. Five GUFs3 account for over 90 per cent of all GFAs. The vast majority of GFAs have been negotiated between central management and representatives of labour at TNCs headquartered in the EU. They are designed to institutionalize an arena in which collective bargaining and dialogue between representatives of labour and management can take place on multiple levels. For the GUFs, the specific importance of GFAs as a policy instrument has grown considerably over the past decade. For one, GFAs are regarded increasingly as a primary means of creating space at the local level for organizing and strengthening unions in the subsidiaries and suppliers of TNCs. Second, GFAs as an instrument of labour–management relations bestow greater legitimacy upon GUFs, overcoming their historical lack of having a negotiating arrangement with an ‘opponent’ at the global level (Reutter 1998: 18). In both respects, the practical experiences of negotiating and implementing some 90 different GFAs have instigated a wide range of organizational and political debates, at the heart of which are questions concerning the future of this kind of strategic interaction with management, the role of the GUFs and the relationships among GUFs and their affiliates. These debates are not surprising insofar as the GFA strategy has created its own policy field within the GUFs, competing with the lobbying of © Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2013.

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international institutions and general sectoral activities for its piece of limited resources (Croucher and Cotton 2009; Platzer and Müller 2011). As the number of GFAs has increased over two decades, questions have been raised as to the contribution of this strategy to achieving more collective employee voice in global labour relations and reducing the global power asymmetry between labour and capital. Indeed, the strongest criticism of the GFA strategy within the union camp at both the global and the local level is that it has not facilitated union membership growth nor enhanced union power. Some critics conclude from this analysis that it is better not to negotiate and sign a GFA (cf. Herrnstadt 2007); others, especially within the GUFs, have responded to the shortcomings of an exclusively ‘top-down’ approach to negotiating GFAs by arguing on behalf of networks as a means of involving the key affiliates and optimizing the multi-level use of union power (BWI 2008; IMF 2010; see also Davies et al. 2011; Platzer and Müller 2011: 761). As a policy instrument, GFAs incorporate four dimensions: actors, content, processes and spatiality. In the actor dimension, GFAs are always signed by a representative of the TNC’s central management and by a GUF. This not only gives the GFA a global dimension, it also provides the GUF with recognition and legitimacy. For the TNC, central management is the sole negotiator. Labour, however, may be represented by employee bodies such as works councils or by home country unions rather than by the GUF (Fichter et al. 2011). Actors such as TNC regional directors or subsidiary managers, or possibly major suppliers, and for labour, GUF affiliates at subsidiaries and suppliers are seldom involved directly in negotiations despite the fact that they carry direct responsibility for GFA implementation. While TNCs are prone to use GFAs as a legitimation of their policy on corporate social responsibility and sustainability, GUFs argue that GFAs represent a means of globalizing labour–management relations in their own right. In this respect, it is important to note that the Core Labour Standards as embodied in the ILO’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (ILO 1998) are the generally recognized basis of GFA content. Many agreements supplement this basic coverage by including further issues and referencing additional ILO conventions.4 Procedurally, GFAs also provide in varying detail mechanisms for monitoring the agreement, for conflict resolution and for revision and renewal. These are the interactive feedback–loops and discursive processes of negotiation that reflect the extent of labour–management relations and arena creation. (Fichter et al. 2012; Helfen and Sydow 2013; Walton et al. 2000). Finally, GFAs have a spatial dimension (Castree et al. 2004). They delineate the boundaries within which the GFA is applicable as an instrument for the governance of labour (Cumbers et al. 2008a,b; Riisgaard and Hammer 2011;). With suppliers, subcontractors and other business partners referenced in most of the GFAs (with the exception of the service sector), GFAs are generally directed at reaching beyond the formal organization of the signatory TNC to be inclusive of the more extensive realm of global production networks. © Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2013.

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4. Global production networks

As TNCs bridge spatial, institutional and organizational distances, they evolve into globally dispersed organizational entities, with complex supplier relationships and different, often plural and overlapping forms of contractual arrangements. Since the mid-1990s, a rich and varied body of literature has developed around this phenomenon and its various modes of governance, with the three major threads of analytical arguments characterized by ‘global commodity chains’ (Bair 2008), ‘global value chains’ (Gereffi et al. 2005) and ‘global production networks’ (Coe et al. 2008; Rainnie et al. 2011). We use the term ‘global production networks’ (GPNs), in particular as derived from the analytical framework developed by Henderson et al. (2002: 445–8). Comparatively, the term GPN is more comprehensively defined than the other two terms, covering the whole set of core TNCs, their system component suppliers, second and third tier material suppliers as well as auxiliary and main service units such as design, distribution, information systems, industrial and manpower services and marketing. Moreover, the recognition of socio-political embeddedness and the essential role of labour are both inherent to the GPN concept, despite analytical shortcomings regarding labour as a (collective) actor (Rainnie et al. 2011). Emerging from this is the importance of what Levy has called the ‘contested fields’ of GPNs, ‘in which market and political power are intertwined’ (Levy 2008: 943). A GPN embodies a wide range of differing power relationships which link separate, politically autonomous and culturally distinct institutional settings of labour relations. The employment relationships in each workplace of a GPN are governed on the one hand by the power configurations of relevant actors in the context of a particular institutional setting, usually the local labour market; and on the other hand by the demands and prerogatives of overarching business processes, usually emanating from the lead TNC. As such, GPNs intervene in local labour markets in ways which may reinforce or undermine existing power relations between labour (unions) and capital (management) (Riisgaard and Hammer 2011). Similar arguments regarding such interactions can be found in the business and management literature on micropolitics (Morgan and Kristensen 2006) and in sociological and institutionalist theory on fields (Fligstein and McAdam 2011). The spread of GPNs has been marked by processes of disaggregation and fragmentation, resulting in an erosion of labour standards and labour relations practices as they were developed in an organizationally more integrated context, that is, within clear-cut boundaries of either the firm or the industry (Sydow and Wirth 1999). Outsourcing and expansion based on network forms of co-ordination have been shown to undercut labour standards across sectoral and national boundaries (e.g. Davies et al. 2011; Doellgast 2009; Palpacuer 2008). Together with the asymmetry of power relationships between the local and the global (or: host and home country), such © Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2013.

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restructuring processes contribute in general to fragmentation and representational gaps, albeit with variances in the governance of labour within a GPN and from one GPN to another.

5. Transnational union networks

GUFs are federations; they have statutes, which regulate such matters as membership, income, leadership election, the internal divisions of labour and the delegation of authority. Their periodic congresses set the programmatic agenda for the leadership. GUF membership is comprised of autonomous local or national trade unions representing individual members in one or several sectors. As such, GUFs themselves are only indirectly representatives of the employees of targeted TNCs, as union membership is with their local or national affiliates. This status poses particular challenges for the GUFs: Organizationally, they are unable to draw on hierarchical authority over their member organizations to exercise a leadership role; on the contrary, GUFs are largely dependent on the resources and inputs of their most powerful and internationally active affiliates. And an internationally institutionalized setting of labour relations, negotiations does not exist that could provide GUFs with independent recognition and influence (Reutter 1998). Without institutionally secured recognition and being dependent on its affiliates for resources, a GUF’s role in managing a TUN can be quite challenging with all participants operating under their own organizational constraints and often widely differing policy agendas. To be viable, TUNs must represent a different mode of organizational interaction than traditionally pursued. In conjunction with the GFA strategy, TUNs bring selected actors together to focus resources and intensify inter-union activities towards a particular TNC within the defined space of its GPN. Taking labour–management relations in the governance of GPNs to be the object of GUF policy on GFAs, GUFs need to proceed in three interdependent steps: First of all, they need to identify the strategic nodes in GPN, that is, points of access to the networked workplaces where they already have or can develop the capacity to effectively pursue union activities; second, they need to choose the issues around which they could intervene; and third, they need to muster and organize the necessary resources of power and influence. Instrumental for taking these steps is an appropriate governance of TUNs. While corporations construct their GPN according to business goals and market strategies, TUN must link organizations with differing organizational resources and boundaries as well as varying and, not too seldom, contrary political, social and institutional logics. They may involve global union federations, national and local unions and (European, world) works and company councils as key actors (Anner et al. 2006). And their policy development is always subject to political goal formation, or what © Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2013.

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Walton et al. (2000) — having labour–management negotiations in collective bargaining in mind — call the management of internal differences. GUFs may employ various modes of network governance in order to manage relationships among labour actors. Using the concept of Provan and Kenis (2008), one can distinguish three basic types of network governance: (a) decentralized, collective self-governance; (b) coordination by a lead organization or a tightly knit leading group of organizations; and (c) a network broker with delegated authority. Each of these types may differ according to such factors as the underlying network structure (e.g. resource and power distribution, task interdependence and need for collaboration), the governance mechanism applied to integrate different actors (e.g. based on ideological consensus, pragmatism, inclusion rules and coordination technique) and the role of supportive external relationships (e.g. dependence on third parties, centrality within other policy networks). In the case of TUNs, the lead organization type of network governance would apply when resources and power are disproportionally distributed among the network participants, when integration of different actors is centrally driven and the interaction between the lead organization and TNC management is constitutive.

6. TUN organization and governance in practice

From our research, we present two emblematic cases of TUN governance. Although they are both coordinated by a lead organization (Provan and Kenis 2008, Type 2), they differ markedly. We can distinguish heuristically between those anchored at TNC headquarters and built primarily around such centrally positioned actors; and those that integrally link centrally positioned collective actors at the global level — but external to the TNC — to the periphery, that is, from the global to the local level. The first kind is best characterized by relationships at the global level around TNC headquarters, that is, between (home country) trade unions, internal representation bodies of employees such as works councils and GUFs. The second kind of relationship links the GUF at the global level with the local/national level union affiliates (and vice versa) beyond the home country and TNC headquarters. Besides such TUN-internal relationships between labour actors, we recognize external relationships with other actors (in particular, management, but also NGOs) to be an essential part of the context indirectly influencing the construction and governance of TUN. For this article, we rely on two cases (MetalCorp within the domain of the International Metalworkers Federation (IMF), SecureCorp within the jurisdiction of UNI Global Union (UNI)) that are exemplary ‘most different cases’ (George and Bennett 2005) of these two types of GFA-related TUNs. We have chosen these cases not because they are typical of how labour is actually impacting the implementation of all existing GFAs. Instead, they should be seen as being emblematic of particular structural contingencies and © Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2013.

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British Journal of Industrial Relations TABLE 1 Number and Distribution of Case Interviews with Labour Representatives

Case

Domain of

GUFs

National unions works council employee reps at HQ

Host country unions and employee reps

Total

IMF UNI

3 3

3 1

8 6

14 10

MetalCorp SecureCorp

policy choices leading to different trajectories in the making of labour’s strategies around GFAs. In researching the TUNs around these GFAs, we conducted at least one interview for each group of key actors: global unions (GUFs), trade unions at TNCs’ home countries, European works councils and employee representatives in supervisory boards (where appropriate) and union/employee representatives in host country locations. For these cases, we can draw on a total of 24 interviews with leading representatives of both union networks (see Table 1). The interviews had an average length of 45 minutes and have been audiotaped, transcribed and coded. Since these two case studies are part of a broader comparative case study design, we can contextualize our arguments by referencing additional cases. Between November 2008 and April 2011, we conducted 95 semi-structured interviews with key actors of TUN directly or indirectly involved in 22 of 88 GFAs signed and in force by the end of 2012. Additionally, we interviewed actors in the wider field of transnational labour relations (including civil society organizations, employer associations and academic experts on national industrial relations systems) participated in three workshops for unions and TNCs, respectively (two for the GUFs, one for the TNCs) and conducted four country workshops in Brazil, India, Turkey and the USA with union and management representatives who had participated in the field research.

7. MetalCorp

With some 270,000 employees, MetalCorp is a relatively large manufacturing corporation under the strong leadership of corporate headquarters and with a home country dominated configuration of its production network. Production sites are concentrated in major industrialized countries as well as in several emerging markets such as Brazil, China, South Africa and India. MetalCorp’s vast network of suppliers (c. 30,000) may be conceived as a pyramid, with the most important ones having the status of system suppliers that are integrated by relational contracting. MetalCorp relies on highly skilled labour in all of its manufacturing and assembly processes. While there is evidence of subcontracting and agency employment at MetalCorp, its © Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2013.

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relevance varies noticeably among the different sites. Labour’s representatives seem less worried about this phenomenon than their colleagues at other TNCs in this sector. In the late 1990s, MetalCorp embarked on an ambitious acquisition and restructuring programme that seemed to herald in a new and more global configuration of production and employment. In response, the powerful central works council at corporate headquarters argued that this expansion in turn required a globalization of labour relations within the company. Management agreed to a four-year phase during which such a new configuration would be tested through an internal ‘working group’. Although management set restrictions on the size (cost factor) of the working group, limiting its representativeness, the works council was autonomous in choosing the members. Its goal was to integrate ‘employee representatives from powerful production sites or corporate divisions’ (Müller et al. 2004: 172), such as those in Germany, South Africa, Brazil and the USA. At the end of the four-year test phase in 2002, the working group received formal recognition as a worldwide employee council, and within months, the GFA it had negotiated with management was signed. On the labour side, home country representatives dominated the negotiating team, but it did include representatives from two other countries (Brazil and USA). According to Müller et al., the initiative and the first draft of the GFA came from the central works council, in which the chairperson and his immediate staff are responsible for international issues (2004: 174f). The powerful metalworkers union in the home country was informed of the initiative. It supported the course of action and facilitated information exchanges with union representatives at other companies. But it left all of the negotiating in the hands of the internal corporate actors, all of whom are union members. The responsible GUF, the IMF, was in favour of getting a GFA with MetalCorp regarding this as a chance to revive earlier attempts to engage TNCs in the auto industry (Platzer and Müller 2011: 114). However, it was not invited to participate in the negotiations and was informed that an agreement had been reached only shortly before it was expected to be one of the official signatories (Müller et al. 2004: 179). The employee council negotiators felt this was necessary for ensuring a successful outcome of negotiations, accepting management’s unwillingness to negotiate with an ‘outside party’. In the process, there was some discomfort with the fact that the [GUF] did not sit directly at the bargaining table. (. . .) But we thought [the GFA] is a delicate issue and it would be best to use the established negotiation structures at the [Headquarter]. (Works Council rep)

In the end, the GFA was signed by the IMF (along with the head of the worldwide employee council), with pledges to make sure that the IMF would be ‘on board’ from then on (Müller et al. 2004: 179). Noteworthy is the fact that this procedure was replicated in conjunction with several other GFAs in the jurisdiction of the IMF. The signing of the GFA gave the worldwide employee council a programmatic foundation; but the central works council, © Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2013.

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comprised solely of home country plant representatives, with its resources and institutionalized relationship with central management, has retained its role as the dominant (collective) actor on the labour side in the implementation of the agreement. In a few ‘problem cases’, it has undertaken joint fact-finding missions with management representatives to subsidiaries, and is responsible for evaluating claims of violations and passing them on to management for investigation and rectification. Such activities are concentrated in the office of the central works council leadership, where one of the staff members is responsible for monitoring the agreement and running the communication channels, especially to the members of the worldwide employee council and to employee and union representatives at corporate sites around the globe. The primary focus is on managing complaints reaching the headquarter level in a co-management-like fashion. While the works council staunchly supports ‘the idea to build solidarity among the subsidiaries around the world (. . .) and too, preventing whipsawing is also part of the calculation, in the long run’ (MetalCorp, works council rep), it regards the task of fostering global union solidarity as being the responsibility of the IMF (now IndustriALL). The works council also rejects the notion of becoming a ‘global police unit’ in regard to monitoring the GFA (MetalCorp, works council rep). Its main task, in which it has been rather successful, is to push for and hold the company responsible for improved management processes and contractual relationships with business partners that fully incorporate the GFA norms and procedures. NGOs, initially invited by the works council to be whistle-blowers, have not played any role since then. Outside the inner circle of the works council, representatives from the home country metalworkers union, from corporation sites or unions outside of the home country, from the worldwide employee council and from the IMF/IndustriALL (automotive coordinator), participate to varying degrees in this TUN. As our interviews document, there is a close working arrangement on sectoral issues and a regular and direct exchange of information with the home country metalworkers’ union on the GFA. Other representatives are kept nominally informed — often in cooperation with this union — on issues pertinent to their work, with the intensity of these exchanges depending both on the issue and on personal engagement. But as a works council representative conceded: Communication is a permanent challenge. If you sit at your desk and think about how to reach colleagues worldwide, you start to doubt how this could be accomplished at all. (MetalCorp, works council rep)

There is no inter-organizational network of communication beyond the headquarters level, but bilateral communication between the headquarters level and the local level regarding violations has functioned well. Some 20 cases have been reported, mostly through the IMF, and with only a very few exceptions, they have been resolved through management intervention to the satisfaction of the works council and the worldwide employee council. Only one host country union has an active participant role in this TUN. The © Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2013.

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Brazilian union is quite strong and has its own independent power base from which it can operate. Building on the strength of this union, the importance of Brazil for MetalCorp and on ties that have developed since the early 1980s, the leader of the Brazilian union has attained a seat not only on the worldwide employee council but also on the corporate supervisory board (Müller et al. 2004; Interview Brazilian Metalworker rep). By comparison, the transnational engagement of the US automobile union was until recently not commensurate with its strong position in MetalCorp’s US bus and truck plants and the eminent importance of the US market to MetalCorp. For the IMF, the lessons learned from this case and other similar cases (Fichter and Helfen 2011) contributed to a new action programme 2009– 20135 around the implementation of existing GFAs and the development of organizational strength necessary to bring more corporations to negotiate and sign a GFA. Networks figure prominently in these goals. In its guidelines on networks from December 2010, the IMF recognized the impact of corporate restructuring on collective bargaining and sought to encourage its affiliates from the home countries of TNCs to utilize their core sphere of strength at the workplace in key TNCs to build cross-border cooperation. The network should, ‘wherever possible extend into supply chains, particularly into outsourced or subcontracted parts of the original company’. An important objective of networking, according to the guidelines, is ‘to negotiate with management for recognition which may include financing of networks’, without sacrificing independence (IMF 2010). Basically, the guidelines confirm the primacy of home country unions and/or employee representative bodies in constructing networks or negotiating GFAs. The IMF guidelines defer to countries with ‘good unionization and clear union structures . . . networks are much easier to manage and to develop as in cases where unions are not present at all’ (IMF automotive coordinator 2). As regards the MetalCorp case in particular, IndustriALL as the successor GUF to the IMF is better informed today than a decade ago, not the least because of the past association of the current IndustriALL automotive coordinator with MetalCorp. Nevertheless, as the following quotes illustrate, the power relationships are pragmatically recognized: It’s easiest when there is a strong employee representation at the HQ location which claims ownership for the question of creating and maintaining a network and provides personal capacity for (. . .) organizing meetings, providing a communication platform and contacts. (IMF automotive coordinator 2) Direct connections between subsidiary unions? I have no experience with that. As a rule, when there are problems anywhere in the world, the first thing is to expect help and assistance from headquarters. (IMF automotive coordinator 1) 8. SecureCorp

SecureCorp is the second largest private employer in the world. With over 600,000 employees and operations in more than 125 countries, it is the © Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2013.

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world’s largest provider of security services, which accounts for 80 per cent of its turnover. SecureCorp has substantial business activities in sophisticated and high-risk services for governments and with customers in such sectors as the oil and gas industry, pharmaceuticals and utilities, as well as at airports and major sports events (including the 2012 Olympics) where ‘security is seen as business critical, rather than as a commodity purchase’ (Syedain 2011). Following the completion of a major merger in 2004, SecureCorp has continually expanded primarily through acquisitions, and today, more than half of its employees are in Asia, Africa and Latin America. For a company of its size, it has a comparatively small headquarter staff, which generally allows the operational units a high degree of autonomy. Prior to 2008, this was also the case in regard to labour and employment relations. While corporate headquarters had a stable relationship with the home country union, its North American management was decidedly antiunion. It took a five-year union campaign, initiated in the United States and co-ordinated globally by UNI, along with a complaint to the OECD, to finally convince SecureCorp that its global business would suffer irreparably if it continued allowing subsidiary management to refuse to engage with unions. With the home country union, which had been standoffish regarding the campaign, assuming a mediating role, SecureCorp and UNI signed a GFA at the end of 2008. Despite the preceding years of strife, SecureCorp praised ‘the value in this global partnership’ (UNI 2008). Since then, corporate headquarters has endeavoured to bring all of its global operations into line in regard to labour and employment relations. In the words of SecureCorp, the agreement was designed not only to ensure good employment relations within the company but also to achieve nothing less than to drive ‘improvements in employment standards across the security industry’ (SecureCorp website). For UNI, this agreement was a breakthrough in terms of both its recognition as a legitimate bargaining partner and of setting standards which could be referenced throughout the service and commerce sectors. UNI’s most important segments are retail and wholesale commerce, banking and telecommunications. As with all private services, there is very little in the way of social partnership tradition, on which UNI could build, even in the home country.6 And in privatized services, flexibilization through outsourcing and temporary employment as well as through internationalization, has weakened past union footholds considerably. Many private services are operated at the weaker ends of the supply chain by providing auxiliary services to large corporate and public customers. As a consequence, service TNCs’ subsidiaries themselves are of major concern when it comes to labour standards. The GFA with SecureCorp is also a prime example of how UNI has taken a lead from the social movement unionism of its US affiliate Service Employees International Union (SEIU) (Woodruff 2007) and its organizing experiences, targeting specific TNCs as global players for international campaigns and mobilizing workers and community support in the process. Working closely with key affiliates at major corporate sites to develop strategies © Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2013.

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for local activities, UNI’s goal is to build solidarity networks among selected affiliates and ensure that they are part of the GFA process from the beginning. Even in [SecCorp] which was a much longer campaign and involved a lot more really fighting for a global agreement, we chose our negotiating committee. The negotiating committee, we informed them about every discussion, but we did not inform the whole sector about every discussion. (UNI rep 2)

This emphasis on GUF-led involvement and ‘ownership’ is intended to provide the impetus for successful implementation (‘local ownership’) and trade union recognition. More than any other of our GUFs with a GFA strategy, UNI sees this as a means of overcoming structural and associational weakness by organizing and building new unions. As one UNI representative stated, But, in our case, certainly the ability to freely organise unions is the key goal of a Global Agreement: to enable us to establish that multinationals are going to respect some key elements that allow workers to more easily organise. (UNI rep 2)

SecureCorp and UNI have defined a joint strategy that focuses on selected countries to begin the ‘roll-out’ of implementation. For SecureCorp, implementation of the agreement requires the existence of union organizations, which is often not the case in its business sectors. SecureCorp’s headquarter has pledged to work with its local management staff to prevent interference in UNI supported local efforts to organize. Efforts of this kind are currently in progress in India. With the strong support of the US union SEIU, UNI established links with local partners in India. Usually, Indian industrial relations are marked by fractured unionism in which unions are divided by caste, class, religion and party affiliation (cf. Jha 2008). However, UNI was able to build on work done by SEIU in India. In 2007, the Indian Security Workers Organizing Initiative (ISWOI) was created as a co-operative project of unions at SecureCorp from the rival Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC) and the Center of Indian Trade Unions (CITU). UNI sought to improve basic trade union and collective bargaining skills and promote dialogue with SecureCorp local management. The ISWOI representatives devised an organizing campaign strategy that recognized and respected the organizational jurisdictions of each federation. But there have been tensions between UNI and ISWOI resulting from instances of non-co-operation on the part of local SecureCorp management and the difficulty of getting such problems rectified through the GFA (McCallum 2011). We have an issue of expectations. They [Indian unionists] thought that [the GFA] would solve all our problems. That the company would react. Well, it has actually. It has, but not the way they’d like. We need to show them that this can work. Patience is not easy to come by here though. (Interview with UNI rep 1)

This example from India regarding the challenges of implementing a global agreement locally and in organizing a viable TUN of multi-level co-operation can be supplemented and confirmed by reports from any number of other © Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2013.

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countries, including Brazil (Arruda et al. 2012), Turkey and the United States that were part of our research project. The service sector is indeed highly fragmented and largely ‘union free’. Centres of union power and representativeness comparable to the automobile sector are non-existent; the strategic context for constructing a TUN is considerably different from that found at MetalCorp. Beginning with the need to organize a global public campaign against SecureCorp on behalf of recognition, UNI regards a TUN as an expression of the social movement unionism, which emphasizes mobilizing not only workers but also community support in the process. While the GUF (UNI) in this TUN is the lead actor, with the mandate and the resources to deal with the corporate headquarters directly on a regular basis, considerable strategic importance is attached to the inclusion and participation of affiliates (local ownership): And fundamentally in every case I find, it goes back to very serious basics, do we have a strong local union, can they enforce the contract they have, or can employers undercut standards because they can’t enforce them. (UNI rep 2)

The involvement of a powerful affiliate such as the US union SEIU is essential to this strategy. In the broader context, UNI is faced with the ongoing challenge of local ownership. Involving GUF affiliates from the outset (negotiations) is a first step, but there is also the issue of the GFA’s role in local labour regimes with traditions of more adversarial relations. While in reality, the TUN built upon the GPN of SecureCorp is incomplete, nevertheless, it represents the beginnings of an organizational approach to implementing GFAs that has the potential to contribute to an emerging transnational arena of labour–management relations. In its GUFled union orientation, the goal of the TUN is to impact the implementation of the GFA with SecureCorp by fostering local ownership, integrating affiliates at strategic nodes and initiating efforts to increase union presence (and recognition) throughout the GPN.

9. Discussion

Our intention in this article has been to model an arena of global labour relations built on GFAs and to explore the workings of TUNs in that context. Using theory on inter-organizational networks to shape our presentation of two most different cases, we have shown how these TUNs, each in their own specific way, have been organized and are governed. Furthermore, we have postulated that while these two cases are certainly not representative of the state of labour’s efforts to implement GFAs, they are emblematic of particular structural contingencies and strategic choices leading to contrasting trajectories of labour’s strategies around GFAs. In a nutshell, we have argued that inasmuch as GFAs are negotiated as a bounded framework of norms, standards and procedures by designated actors, GPNs are the relevant organizational entity of economic activity for © Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2013.

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this arena upon which GUFs need to focus their own policy and organizational activities. GUFs can do so by building transnational union networks anchored around GPNs. How such TUNs are organized and governed will depend on the contingencies of GPN structures, on the associational power and the dynamics of power relationships among collective actors in the network, on those relationships at the interface with management and on the exercise of agency within the TUN and in the context of the GFA arena. Understood as a dynamic and recursive process, the impact of TUNs on the governance of GPNs may induce restructuring or policy changes subsequently affecting the organization and governance of TUNs. In the case of MetalCorp, the TUN is governed by the corporate works council. Policy decisions, communication channels and interaction with management are in the hands of the works council leadership and its staff. The GFA is used to pressure management into revamping its operational procedures by incorporating the norms and standards of the GFA. Its procedures for handling complaints and conflicts over alleged violations are fully utilized. The corporate department charged with investigating such cases is monitored regularly. And the works council in conjunction with the worldwide employee council is anchoring the GFA in the master corporate contract for suppliers and subcontractors, thus fixing the spatial reach of the GFA beyond the formal organizational boundaries of MetalCorp. This TUN is corporate centred. It was organized by and has continued to be governed through the offices of the works council, making it undoubtedly an example of a network coordinated by a lead organization (Provan and Kenis 2008). There is a close, and generally productive working arrangement with the home country metalworkers’ union, but this is not GFA-driven; rather, it is part of a more general cooperation on automotive policy. Outside of corporate headquarters, the powerful position of the union at MetalCorp’s major production site in Brazil, and its strong ties to the home country union makes it an important actor in the TUN. Through a membership on the supervisory board of MetalCorp and on the worldwide employee council, the Brazilian union leadership is regularly consulted, so that in the case of Brazil, the position of strength of this union ensures both ownership and broader communication between the central and the local levels. As for the role of the IMF (now IndustriALL), it might best be characterized as secondary and supportive, particularly as it feeds violation reports to the works council. While this GUF may be stepping up its network activities as evidenced by its new action programme and network guidelines, a revision of the basic role it has assumed in the past is unlikely. In this regard, the differences to the TUN around the GFA at SecureCorp could not be greater. Although this TUN is presently of the same type regarding governance, that is, a network co-ordinated by a lead organization, it differs in almost every other way. Its governance is led by the GUF (UNI) and not by an internal corporate employee body. The home country union plays only a limited role in this constellation, although originally it certainly facilitated the opening of negotiations. UNI’s leadership turns on creating an © Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2013.

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understanding of ‘ownership’ of the GFA among the collective participants in the TUN. UNI’s policy of implementing the GFA recognizes the need for management to revise its anti-union stance in many countries, but its major effort with the TUN is to support union organizing in strategically selected countries. In light of the fragmented nature of the service sector — and SecureCorp’s GPN — and the very low level of unionism, this is proving to be a long-term challenge for UNI. Both TUNs provide insights into the ways in which union networking can enhance labour’s collective voice in the governance of GPN. TUNs are essential for managing transnational union relationships which bridge institutional distances and recognize both the differences in GPN structures — distinguished by degree of fragmentation and integration — and the locational and institutional embeddedness of trade union organizations. The selection of adequate modes of transnational union network governance contributes to overcoming organizational problems posed by economic globalization and strengthening labour’s overall role in global governance. Without such an organizational response to the varieties of GPN governance, labour’s collective voice is very likely to remain highly fractured and diffuse, that is, powerless. While the existence of vertically integrated global unions may be regarded as illusionary and even possibly counter-productive in the face of a fragmented production configuration in many industries, TUNs under GUF co-ordination could facilitate union interaction with management on different levels along the fluid structure of GPN in order to bring local and cross-border collective representation into the ‘contested fields’ (Levy 2008) of transnational labour relations. We do not regard TUNs as being ‘problematic’ because they are not (yet) of ‘global scope’ (Croucher and Cotton 2009: 69) in the sense of complete GPN coverage and union inclusion. That is certainly a possible goal, but still very visionary. But they do need to facilitate associational power at crucial nodes of the GPN. As ‘network coordinators’, that is, actors that can deploy their links to various other national actors and networks, GUFs could become effective in coordinating the union side of overall labour–management relations of a GPN and devising adequate responses of organized labour to GPN. In short, we argue that effective input into the governance of labour in GPN network management using both structural and associational power depends on GUF capacity for ‘network governance’ to meet the challenges of cross-border coordination and collaboration problems. Union GFA strategies are still ‘work in progress’. Efforts by GUFs, home and host country unions and works councils, to implement GFAs differ markedly from one agreement to another. But we would argue that the cases we have chosen are emblematic of the strategic questions which GFAs and TUNs raise. Research on these themes, while growing, is just beginning to debate the issues and raise broader questions. As such, we can hardly provide a conclusive answer to what the future holds for GFAs, for TUNs, and least of all for our model of an arena of global labour–management relations. But in regard to the two different types of TUN we have presented, we would © Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2013.

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introduce the following hypotheses: First of all, a TUN under centralized governance of an internal corporate collective actor — such as we found at MetalCorp — runs the danger of pursuing a form of ‘company syndicalism’ (Pries 2010: 219), relegating the responsible GUF to a supporting role and hindering the possibility of actively spreading ownership of the agreement. While the implementation outcome can be impressive, it will not bear a union stamp. Indeed, the GUF will find it difficult to communicate the relevance of the GFA as a policy commitment negotiated and signed by the collective representatives of labour and TNC central management. Moreover, through the GFA standards anchored in TNC contracts with its business partners, the space for trade union organization is there in principle, but not in practice. A works council, or any other internal corporate employee body, cannot — as a GUF could — be counted on to expend the resources to ensure implementation beyond its corporate jurisdiction. Nevertheless, in line with our emphasis on strategic choice and structural contingency, we would further hypothesize that changes in TNC policies wrought by the use of the GFA — in this case managerial extension of such standards as freedom of association and collective bargaining to suppliers — can redefine power relations in the GPN and indirectly or recursively facilitate TUN development. What then constitutes a ‘successful’ TUN? Successful TUN formation and governance may depend on the a priori indeterminate influence of processes (practices) of GPN formation, on the relative strength and involvement of the GUF and key affiliates, and on the political economic environment of participating affiliates. We argue that a TUN which is organized and governed to link the core with the periphery — as it is at SecureCorp — is an essential element of transnationalizing labour relations within an IFA-related arena because it is directed at building union associational power. But it would be unlikely even for a GUF in this constellation to be able to muster the resources to build union power beyond the home country. An effective GFA and TUN policy would seem to turn on refocusing GUF resources and initiating organizational changes — such as those begun at UNI — to give more priority to this policy field. By this, we are not arguing on behalf of the creation of organizationally integrated global unions, but rather for strategically using the new paradigm offered by GFAs to facilitate cross-border cooperation and learning, build union power in local environments and remain flexible enough through network governance to intervene at strategic nodes of GPNs while still leaving room for local practices and approaches. Final version accepted on 14 January 2013. Acknowledgements The research on which this article is based was generously supported by a grant from the Hans-Böckler-Foundation, Düsseldorf. Additional funding © Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2013.

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was provided by the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation, Berlin. The authors are indebted to the anonymous reviewers for their insightful and constructive input, from which we benefited greatly. Appreciation is also given to Sarosh Kuravilla as responsible editor for helping us see this to conclusion, and especially to Joerg Sydow and the rest of our GFA-research team for their continuing support and interest over the past years.

Notes 1. International Framework Agreement is the original generic term; however, the term Global Framework Agreement is more commonly used today. 2. See http://www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/polwiss/ifa_projekt. 3. These are the Building and Wood Workers International (BWI), the International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers’ Unions (ICEM), the International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers’ Associations (IUF), the International Metalworkers’ Federation (IMF) and the UNI Global Union (UNI). In June 2012, ICEM and IMF merged with the International Textile, Garment & Leather Workers’ Federation (ITGLWF) under the name of IndustriALL to form a new GUF. 4. GFAs are available at http://www.global-unions.org. 5. The action programme was confirmed at the 2012 IndustriALL conference on Global Framework Agreements. See http://www.industriall-union.org. 6. ‘Years ago, [SecureCorp] was ready to withdraw recognition of the union. But we’ve a strong organizing clan in [SecureCorp], and we have a very high level of unionization. So the strength comes from our membership, and not from any social partnership’ (Union representative at HQ).

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