need for the state to play a role in welfare provision - with certain caveats. ... 'employment-centred economic growth' could generate the resources necessary to.
The politics and practicalities of universalism: a contributionbased perspective on social protection Naila Kabeer
International Conference: “Social Protection for Social Justice” Institute of Development Studies, UK 13–15 April 2011
1
The politics and practicalities of universalism: a contribution-based perspective on social protection Naila Kabeer School of Oriental and African Studies, London
Since the 1970s, a combination of factors have set in train the apparently inexorable integration of the world’s economies. These include the rising costs of labour in advanced industrialised countries together with rapid advances in information technology and transportation systems which allowed production processes to be broken down and their labour-intensive stages relocated to different regions of the world. Politics have also played a major role in driving the pace and character of globalisation. The ascendance of neo-liberal ideologies, with their celebration of free market forces within some of the most powerful countries in the world spearheaded the liberalisation of their economies and the downsizing the role of the state. The influence of neo-liberal ideologies within the international financial institutions ensured that similar policies were pursued in indebted Third World countries and in the transition from plan to market in previously socialist countries. The growing integration of the world economy is evident in the doubling of trade as a share of global income between 1970 and 2000 (ILO, 2004) and in the large increase in the flows of foreign capital. While official aid has declined in real terms, private capital flows have increased from less than half of total resources flows in developing countries in 1990 to about three-quarters in 2002. Surges in short term capital flows have been responsible for a great deal of the volatility in international capital markets but foreign direct investments have also demonstrated considerable mobility, adding to the insecurity of many countries. The globalisation of financial markets has meant that investment flows move together in response to the same events and shocks, amplifying the effects of volatility. That the scale of integration into the global economy has exposed many countries to the vagaries of the global capital markets has been demonstrated the financial crises which have erupted periodically in different regions of the world. While the current financial crisis is thus only the latest in a series of crisis, it is the most global in its impact. It is also likely to be the most far reaching in its consequences. These crises have played a major role in highlighting the downside of globalisation, the new risks that have accompanied the emergence of new opportunities. They have drawn attention to the need for social protection strategies to be in place on an ex ante basis rather than hurriedly cobbled together in the aftermath of crisis. This has paved the way for discussions about more institutionalised systems of social protection. However, there is little or no consensus on the basic principles that should inform the design of these systems. Instead debates on this issue revealed the 1
‘traditional great divide’ between residual and universal approaches that has characterised debates about social policies more generally (Razavi). The World Bank’s ‘risk management framework’, which applies neo-liberal principles to the question of social protection, represents the residual approach. It defines risk in terms of various categories of shocks to individual, households and communities and markets and regards markets in credit and insurance as the ‘first best’ solution for providing cover against these risks. However, it recognises the imperfections of these markets in many developing country contexts and accepts the need for the state to play a role in welfare provision - with certain caveats. First, the state should not ‘crowd out’ role should private initiatives by markets, communities, NGOs and households but should only intervene where these proved inadequate. And second, the development of markets-based arrangements should remain the long term goal. The ILO’s World Commission on the Social Dimensions of Globalisation offers a very different analysis. It argues that the logic of globalisation is driving countries into ‘a race to the welfare bottom’ as they seek to compete with each other in the bid to attract foreign investment. A global ‘socio-economic floor’ for the global economy was essential to halt this dynamic. While the Commission recognised that ‘employment-centred economic growth’ could generate the resources necessary to finance social protection, it argued that such growth had to be based on effective forms of social security that recognised the volatility of market forces and their failure to guarantee stable incomes: ‘A global commitment to deal with insecurity is critical to provide legitimacy to globalisation’ (ILO, 2006, p. 34). The calls for some form of universal social floor has been taken up by various organisations within the UN, including the ILO, UN-DESA and UNICEF, as well as by various academic and activists involved in this field (Standing, 1999; Van Parijs). The growth of ‘precarious jobs’ that has accompanied globalisation and volatility of global market forces have highlighted the unreliability of markets as a source of social protection. Moreover, the rising insecurities associated with globalisation have underscored the fact that vulnerability is not a class-specific phenomenon: all sections of the population, except the very affluent, are affected by the risks and insecurities associated with global market forces. It was this cross-class solidarity around common concerns that gave rise to universalistic welfare states in many European countries. The recent succession of financial crisis would appear to have laid the grounds for a similar consensus around the need for universalist approaches to social protection. Yet it is by no means clear that such a consensus has emerged either at national or international levels. One of the key lessons from earlier attempts to promote universal social policies in developing countries is the importance of the values and 2
attitudes that prevail in different countries and determine the extent to which there is likely to be broad-based support for redistributive policies. Within democratic systems, such broad-based support is essential for generating the finance for social protection. The paper considers some of the arguments that might help to build this broad based support, drawing in particular on some of the ideas discussed in Lautier (2006). 1. The fluctuating fortunes of universalism The idea of universalism is not new to developing countries. Past experience offers valuable lessons for present challenges, particularly the factors that led to its apparent disappearance from their development agenda for so many years. Most post colonial governments embarked on national building projects through statecentred policy and planning which incorporated the idea of universal social policies as a key element. While social security measures were initially confined to formally employed workers in public sector and large scale private sector enterprises, a minority of the total workforce, the expectation was that the development would bring all workers into the formal labour force and within the reach of formal social security. The central state was envisaged as the primary provider of social services and social security to be financed through some combination of taxation (Beveridge model) and/or contributions (Bismarck model). However, we know that the results were rarely satisfactory. The power of vested interests within largely unaccountable state structures gave rise to highly bureaucratic and dualistic welfare systems which served to simultaneously subsidise the better off, leaving poor and socially excluded groups to cope with deficits and adversity through a variety of patron client relationships. Over time, various factors, including population growth, inflation, and unmanageable fiscal deficits further widened the gap in the provision of social protection relative to social need. The ascendance of the neo-liberal paradigm within the international development community in the 1980s served to frame the form taken by the policy critique of these ‘old’ social policies as well as to limit the range of possible solutions. The critique pointed to the rent-seeking state, bloated bureaucracies, distorted market forces and inefficient, inequitable and unaffordable service delivery systems. The solution was posited in terms of economic growth through liberalised markets and the targeting of limited public resources to those in real need, thus overseeing a shift from universal to residual social policies. The discourse of the ‘new social policy’ relied on concepts that had been around for some time – appropriateness, decentralisation, self-reliance, popular participation, co-responsibility, sustainability, building up local institutions and getting rid of excessive and repressive bureaucracies (Moser, 1992). What was new was the interpretation given to these concepts to make them compatible with the neo-liberal agenda. 3
The new social policy included both reduction in, and decentralisation of, the role of the central state in service provision through the transfer of many of its functions to local level bodies, quasi-independent Social Funds and private institutions, including commercial providers and NGOs. It promised to empower the community by bringing design and implementation processes closer to the poor, , replacing the old top-down supply driven schemes with new, decentralised community-based or community-driven modalities, like Social Funds and, more recently, conditional cash transfers. Public provision would be governed by new rules and procedures explicitly designed to reduce wasteful expenditure and minimize leakage. Principles of ‘co-responsibility’ would build the self-sufficiency of the poor and wean them away from dependency on government handouts. Cost recovery through user fees, co-financing and community participation would help to make social provision affordable. And means-tested or self-targeted provision in place of broad spectrum policies would ensure that scarce resources were directed only to those in real need while minimizing disincentive effects or ‘leakages’ to those who did not meet eligibility criteria. However, the new social policies have done little to counter, and have often exacerbated, the biased provision of social services. A comprehensive review of the available evidence carried out by Reddy and Vandemoortele showed that user fees have been associated with drastic declines in utilisation rates of health and educational services in the countries covered by the study, that the poor and children were most vulnerable, that girls were more likely to be pulled out of school than boys and that child survival rates had declined. It concluded that while user financing of certain social services may be desirable in the name of effectiveness, efficiency and equity, basic social services were not an obvious example: ‘Services that generate strong positive externalities and whose beneficiaries are primarily the poor are not well suited for user financing’. Social Funds have also come in for criticism from various quarters. Critics have suggested that their popularity reflects donor preference for short term, discrete, sectoral and infrastructural programmes which fit into their lending cycles over the provision of direct support for developing or strengthening social protection programmes (Tendler). An assessment of the World Bank’s attempts to promote community-based/community driven development efforts by its own Operation and Evaluation Division came in for very qualified support (World Bank, 2005). It pointed out that Bank-supported projects rarely diagnosed community capacity to undertake particular projects or tailored capacity building to community needs. These were time consuming and long-term processes and did not fit well with the logic of the Bank’s project cycle approach. It concluded that community development projects worked best when they had been initiated by indigenous efforts rather than ‘invented’ by Bank staff. 4
Research into the reliance on private provision as part of new social policies concluded, not surprisingly, that ‘private providers can be as standardizing and insensitive to user needs or local conditions as considered typical of the public sector’ (Tendler, 2000 p. 118). It also suggested that targeting came with its own costs: it did not guarantee against misappropriation of funds, it could fracture social groups by splitting them into categories subject to differential treatment and it lost support from the more affluent sections of society who were required to finance it. In addition, the research suggested that older top down programs appeared to have had more identifiable impacts in reducing poverty in particular countries than those supported by the newer Social Funds while the impact of even broader, more universal entitlements such as the extension of social security to poorer sections and rural areas have had the greatest impact in terms of poverty reduction (Tendler, 2000). Tendler’s conclusion on the basis of her overview of this research is significant. She notes that the recommendations put forward to address the weaknesses of the new social policies would require a significant increase in the finance, personnel, time and effort devoted to their administrative capacity, thereby compromising their acclaimed ‘leanness’ and lower administrative costs. She suggests that the same finance, personnel, time and resources could, if devoted to institutional reform of public administration, provide a more effective means of incorporating concerns with inclusiveness, accountability and equity than reliance on non-state organisations which were likely to be dominated by local elites or private contractors who no mandate to consider the public interest. These arguments are a part of a broader literature questioning the minimal role assigned to the state in the provision of social security and social services in the new social policy and the absence of a coherent and institutionalised strategy. They recognise that many of the critiques of public sector provision under the ‘old’ social policies were well- founded, but that the possibilities for improving state capacity and responsiveness should have been fully explored before embarking on cutting back on the role of the state. These critiques of the new social policy do not necessarily return us to the old state centred model of social provision. Harriss-White (1995), for instance, locates the role of the state within a framework of welfare pluralism. She notes the important role played in social provisioning by markets, community-based institutions and NGOS in the Indian context (and elsewhere) and argues both for the necessity of a role for the state within these fields of multiple providers but also the limitations of states that are not democratically accountable:
5
‘Markets exclude…Markets, even idealised, abstract, efficient ones, respond to demand rather than to human needs and guarantee neither life nor welfare. For these, the state is a necessary – but not sufficient – guarantor. The state is necessary because impoverished households by themselves also cannot guarantee life or welfare, and because institutions of civil society (like NGOs) are piecemeal in scope, under-resourced and imperfectly accountable. The state is not sufficient not because markets are necessary, but rather because the state’s legitimacy does not currently rest in an important way on the guaranteeing of life and decent social welfare….. ’ (p.143). But she concludes her comments with an important caveat: ‘The state may be a flawed institution, but it is the only institution obliged to respond to claims for welfare entitlements. (p. 143)
2. Values and attitudes towards redistributive measures: survey data Despite impressions to the contrary, therefore we have not gone full circle in returning to calls for universalism. Current support for a greater role for the state in the provision of social protection is framed by earlier critiques of truncated statecentred social provision, on the one hand, and growing disenchantment with market-centred residualism, on the other. However, despite the calls for a more nuanced approach to universalism by sections of the academic, practitioner and international development community, progress in this direction has been slow. This is not surprising: universalism inevitably entails some degree of redistribution from the haves to the have-nots within a society. In the context of democratic societies, where such redistribution cannot be effected by state fiat, it requires a shared vision of the good society and broad-based commitment to a state-society contract that embodies this vision. It follows from this that the argument for redistributive social policies has to be located in the sphere of politics and constituency building. It cannot be reduced – as it so often is – to a series of ‘moral precepts and a set of technical instruments’ (Lautier, 2006). As Graham emphasizes, ‘values and attitudes matter for the kinds of protection measures that can be sustained in a society’. Differences in values and attitudes, as captured by various surveys and public opinion polls, certainly go some way towards explaining the residual place assigned to social welfare measures in the US compared to the more central place they occupy within European social democratic welfare regimes. These surveys suggest that inequality has a significant negative effect on subjective well-being of all income groups in Europe, although most strongly among the poor. In the US, on the other hand, the only groups who are made unhappy by inequality are left-leaning wealthy people! The strongest 6
opposition to redistribution comes from those Americans who believe that their society offers equal opportunities to all or who have experienced inter-generational mobility. Support comes from those who believe that chances for mobility are restricted. Graham also notes that the size of the gap between the poor and middle classes and between the middle classes and the rich appears to have a bearing on support expressed for different kinds of policies. The larger the gap between the poor and the middle classes, the weaker the basis for cross-class transfers. Among industrial countries, the US has one of the largest gaps between the middle classes and the poor. It also has one of the most unequal income distributions within the OECD. It would appear, therefore, that neo-liberal solutions which view markets as the most efficient route to human wellbeing and which assign a residual role to the state have emanated from a context with a very high level of tolerance for inequality. Such policies are also likely to have strongest appeal to societies characterised by high levels of inequality. This appears to be supported by Graham’s observation that support for policies which prioritise growth over redistribution in Latin America is higher in its poorer and more unequal countries. However it may also reflect the fact that past experience has made their populations sceptical that government efforts at redistribution policies will be either fair or efficient. The People’s Security Surveys carried out by the ILO in the early 2000s (ILO, 2004) provides another source of quantitative information on how people view ideas about redistribution. Covering around 14 developing and transitional countries, it found very little support for the idea of pure income equality (everyone should have similar incomes), stronger support for the idea of an upper limit to incomes but even stronger support for a minimum income floor. However, where an additional question about whether a preferred option might be for governments to ‘help the poor’ was posed to a sub-sample of countries, they varied between support for a minimum income floor for all and government assistance to the poor. The transitional economies generally came out more strongly in favour of a minimum floor while the developing countries and China came out in favour of government assistance to the poor. Values and attitudes towards redistributive measures: debating the citizen’s income grant Other insights into public attitudes to ideas about universalism are provided by some of the debates that have taken place over versions of the universal minimum social floor in a number of developing countries. One of these versions is the basic income grant argued for by the Basic Income European Network. This would be a universal minimum income guarantee to all individuals in society, regardless of work status, marital status, age or sources of income, to cover basic needs. It would 7
be financed through a system which taxed the rich who did not need such a grant to a greater extent than the poor who did. It would have the advantage of dispensing with the complex and often costly bureaucratic procedures to establish eligibility that are associated with targeted social provision. The second of these proposals is the idea of an employment guarantee: provision of work on public works programmes to all those who present themselves as willing to undertake such work. As the work on offer is generally physical manual labour at less than the prevailing market wage for unskilled labour, this too dispenses with costly procedures to define eligibility. Interestingly, the idea of a basic income grant appears to have generated most interest in South Africa and Brazil. Both have among the most unequal income distributions in the world but both have recently adopted new and progressive constitutions after prolonged political struggle. The contributions to these debates throws interesting light on the sources of both support and resistance to universalism in this form in the two countries. In Brazil, the proposal for a ‘citizens income’ was put forward in the Congress in 1991 by Senator Sulpicy from the ruling Workers’ Party. The proposal suggested that all adults aged 25 or more who earned less than US $150 a month (viz. 2.5 times the prevailing minimum wage) would receive a cash transfer initially equal to 30% and later to 50% of the difference between their income and the minimum level. One immediate source of resistance to the idea was its affordability. The Committee of Economic Affairs modified the proposal to make it more feasible: the transfer would not exceed 30% to be raised when resources became available and it would be phased in gradually, beginning with the older cohorts. The challenge of affordability was thus addressed through the idea of an incremental approach: gradual increases in the amounts of the transfer and in the constituencies covered in pace with availability of resources. However, a second source of resistance to the idea came from public opinion. The 1990s was a period when a series of conditional cash transfers aimed to promote children’s health and education in poorer families had been introduced at the municipal level, and gained federal support. In 2003, President Lula launched the Bolsa Familia programme which unified the four main cash transfer programmes in the country. In 2004, he sanctioned the Law of Citizen’s Basic Income which guaranteed the right of all Brazilians, regardless of socio-economic status, to receive an annual cash transfer. However, attempts by the Ministry of Social Development that was in charge of Bolsa Familia to dispense with the need to monitor compliance with program conditionality and to treat the cash transfer as a citizen’s income was met with strong public resistance (Britto, 2005). When the media reported that the 8
government was failing to verify that beneficiaries were sending their children to school and health centres, ‘opponents from the left and the right united to accuse the government of transforming a genuinely innovative intervention into a mere paternalistic handout’ (p. 15). As Britto comments, it appeared that public attitudes in Brazil valued the idea of ‘coresponsibility’ embodied in conditional cash transfers over a policy which appeared to resemble paternalistic forms of social assistance from the past which they believed had created dependence among recipients. Thus conditionality may have helped to legitimize support among middle class voters. In South Africa, the idea of a Basic Income Grant (BIG) came onto the public agenda in response to the narrow reach of social security. Despite social pensions and child support grants, around 60% of the poor – mainly those between 14 and 60 – were not getting any social assistance at all (Hassim, 2006). The trickle-down effects of the post-apartheid government Growth, Employment and Redistribution had not materialised. The extended public works programme put in place by the government had generated disappointingly few jobs. Unemployment continued to rise. The idea of BIG was put forwarded and supported by an alliance of civil society organisations, churches, academic institutions, some women’s organisations and trade unions, led by COSATU, the country’s main trade union federation. The BIG coalition argued for setting the citizens’ grant at a level that would help to reduce the poverty gap by more than 80%. The grant would be financed progressively through new taxes so as not to put pressure on other areas of expenditure. Their arguments were supported by the Taylor Committee which was set up by the government to come up with proposals for a comprehensive social security system for South Africa. The Committee adopted a comprehensive approach to social protection, but emphasised the need to tackle income poverty first before rolling out medium and longer term programmes to address capability and asset deficits. It argued that programmes to address deficits in capabilities and assets were being compromised by unsustainable levels of income poverty. Poor people could not access health care and primary education ‘because they do not have even the most basic income for transport, food and basic clothing’ (p. 56). Consequently it came out strongly in favour of a basic income grant, suggesting that fiscal capacity could be mobilised without adverse macro-economic impacts. Behind the Taylor Committee’s recommendation was the recognition of the public works programmes could not create enough jobs, regardless of how ‘massive’ the expansion. However, the response from the ANC government was lukewarm. A number of practical objections were put forward: that the country lacked the administrative capacity to take on the management of BIG and that that the government had a 9
responsibility to defend fiscal targets against ‘reckless populism’ that would deter foreign investors. There were also strong normative objections. The chief spokesman for the government stated that the Cabinet’s philosophy was that: ‘Only the disabled or sick should receive ‚handouts‛, whilst the able-bodied adults should ‚enjoy the opportunity, the dignity and the rewards of work‛. The Minister for Land and Agricultural Development expressed concern that BIG would create dependency. She suggested linking it to public works projects to provide the jobless with temporary employment so that the grant would not be a ‘mere handout’. Values and attitudes towards redistributive measures: debating the universal employment guarantee The National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme in India offers a different approach to universalism. The Indian constitution recognises the right to work. Article 39 of the constitution urges the state to ensure that ‘citizens, men and women equally, have the right to an adequate means of livelihood’ while Article 41 stresses that the State ‘within the limits of its economic capacity and development, make effective provision for securing the right to work’. However, for a long time, the ‘guarantee’ embodied in the Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Schemes in India was the only attempt to make good this commitment. The National Employment Assurance programme did not contain any such guarantee. However, pressure had been building up within civil society against the short-term, ad hoc and frequently stigmatising nature of state interventions to reduce poverty. The idea of a nation-wide universal guarantee of work brought together a broadbased movement of progressive political parties, academics, practitioners and activists, many of whom were involved in nationwide campaigns for the right to food, the right to information and the campaign for the unorganised sector. Their efforts bore fruit with the political opening provided by the abysmal failure of the BJP to garner electoral support around the slogan of ‘India is Shining’ in a context where larger numbers of poor people were going hungry. A United Progressive Alliance which came to power in 2004 on a Common Minimum Platform was determined to take to heart the lessons of this failure. The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act which was passed in 2006 guarantees every household in rural India the right to at least 100 days of employment every year for at least one adult member. Employment would be in the form of casual manual labour at the statutory minimum wage. The Bill in principle entitles 40 million rural workers to employment for part of the year. The other key clauses of the Act embody responses to some of the positive and negative lessons learnt from past experience and can be taken as practical elements to transform a formal right into a substantive one.
10
Opposition to the Bill was most vociferously articulated by a small but powerful section of the corporate sector and its allies within government Statistical exercises of India’s National Sample Survey were carried out purporting to show that ‘poor agricultural workers have an unemployment rate of only 1 per cent’ (Business Standard, Dec. 25, 2004). One critic claimed that the cost of the programme would be Rs. 208, 000 (Indian Express, Oct. 23rd) making it almost twenty times more expensive per capita than the Maharashtra scheme, despite the fact that the latter had far more liberal provisions. The solutions put forward by various critics poured further scorn on the scheme. One suggested dropping cash from helicopters would be a more effective route to poverty reduction while another suggested that the ‘first best option would be to do nothing’ (Business Standard, 30th November, 2004). Surjit Bhalla put forward what appeared to be one of the more reasonable suggestions from the Bill’s critics, proposing universal cash transfers (viz. citizen’s income grant) as a preferable alternative to the EGA1. However, as Jean Dreze, one of the key proponents of the EGA, commented: ‘I leave the reader to guess whether this is a serious proposal or just another stick to beat the Act. Be that as it may, the proposal can be easily accommodated. All one has to do is to insert a clause in the Act stating that if the government prefers to pay the equivalent of 100 days’ wages to every household in a particular district, instead of organising public works, it is free to do so’ . (Times of India, 12 August, 2005). It is clear that neither Dreze nor Bhalla believed that the government would take the option of a universal cash transfer seriously, suggesting that the policy environment for a citizen’s income was not particularly favourable in the Indian context. The normative argument for universalism: the politics of interdependence These debates about universalism and the resistance it encounters in a variety of different contexts thus reflect both normative concerns about a culture of handouts – ‘something for nothing’ – as well as practical concerns about affordability. Such concerns have to be addressed if support is to be built for the principle of universalism. We start with the normative foundation of universalism itself and the extent to which it makes sense in different societies. The argument for universalism is generally grounded in some notion of rights. But what are these rights and who defines them? There are constitutions, of course, which commit countries to the principles of human rights. The American Declaration of Independence, for instance, declares: ‘We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights’. But these truths are clearly not self-evident to all while what counts as inalienable rights varies considerably between countries2. The right to some basic level of socio-economic security, while acknowledged by many constitutions in developing countries, is clearly not 11
sufficiently grounded in their political cultures to command the broad-based support needed for redistributive policies. One way forward, as Lautier argues, is to try and pin down what is received in exchange for citizen’s rights in order to guarantee those rights and to make sure they are not handed out as favours. The linking of rights to some notion of contributions would help to provide a more grounded argument for rights. As Lautier points out, it appears far easier politically to guarantee the right to socio-economic security when something tangible is received in exchange than to guarantee a right on the basis of some abstract notion of ethics. The argument for universalism based on a contribution-based approach to rights entails a number of steps. It is easiest to justify in relation to workers because it rests on clearly recognised contributions, if not to the tax revenue, then at least to the economy. The political acceptability for the EGS reflected the fact that it was based on a perceived and familiar social compact by which wages were guaranteed in exchange for labour. Where resistance was expressed, it was not expressed as opposition to the idea of guaranteed employment but as allegations of government corruption and inefficiency in carrying out the scheme. Rights based on the more general basis of citizenship are more difficult to argue for, particularly in places where social support to vulnerable groups has traditionally been granted as social welfare rather than social rights (Lautier). However, universalist principles requires that the right to basic socio-economic security must be acknowledged as the right of all citizens, men, women and children, rather than just the rights of past and present workers. Further steps in the direction of universality would entail other less readily acknowledged, but we would argue, equally vital categories of contributions. One such category is the daily care work that is carried out, mainly by women and girls, on an unpaid basis in the domestic economy. Such work has been persistently sidelined in mainstream analysis of the market economy and yet it is integral to its continued functioning. Extending recognition to the indispensability of unpaid care work not only to the reproduction of human life but also to the reproduction of human labour and capabilities would extend the contribution-based approach to socio-economic rights to large numbers of women and girls who have traditionally been represented in social policy discourse as welfare recipients. The demand for recognition for women’s unpaid care work carries its own challenges. On the one hand, such recognition is essential if unpaid care work is to be act as the basis of claims to socio-economic security. On the other hand, there is a 12
danger that recognition may take a form that reinforces a very conservative view of women’s roles, privileging motherhood at the expense of women’s capacity to participate in the economy, the polity and the wider society. These tensions are evident in some of the discussion around conditional cash transfers relating to the health and education of children. Molyneux argues that the decision to target mothers – rather than fathers or households heads – in conditional cash transfer programs in Latin America reflects a largely instrumental rationale, the recognition that women are more likely than men to use cash at their disposal in the interests of their children. The sums of money are extremely small and, combined with the failure to provide women with any support in their economic roles, serve to reinforce a very traditional gender division of labour, leaving women largely dependent on the goodwill of male providers. Similar concerns are evident in the widespread resistance on the part of many feminists in South Africa to the decision to phase out the state maintenance grant for lone mothers, which had been made up of a separate allowance for mothers and for their children. This was replaced by Child Support Grant directed only at children. It was intended to help the lone caregiver provide for her children but not for her own needs. As Hassim suggests, recognition of the cultural value of caring within the social policy discourse was not accompanied by recognition of the work involved in caring. Burman points out that the logic of the system was to require poverty-stricken mothers to either struggle on their own, turn to charity or pursue the father of their children through the courts for maintenance: ‘And a country that can feel that it has solved the poverty problems of children with such a system is blind to the effects of widespread malnutrition and hardship among women as regards their health, dignity and effects on society’ (p. 66). These concern raises questions about the form that recognition of women’s unpaid care responsibilities should take. How are we to interpret the conditionality attached to social transfers which bind women to care responsibilities when, as Burman points out, most mothers have been found to sacrifice their own well being to ensure the well being of their children? Does the conditionality help to translate welfare assistance into a right by tying it to an obligation, does it merely serve a symbolic function of winning public support or does it express and reinforce a highly conservative view about gender roles within the family? It is worth noting that many of the mothers who benefited from the Bolsa Familia in Brazil appeared to view the cash transfer as a form of citizenship, a recognition of their due as providers of unpaid care for the family (Suarez et al. 2006). At the same time, as Suarez et al point out, the programme makes use of the culture of mothering without considering the need to support women’s own capacity to participate in the wider life of their community. As long as care work is left entirely to the privatized 13
and unpaid efforts of women within the domestic domain, it will stand in the way of women’s full economic, social and political citizenship. If therefore women are entitled to some basic level of socio-economic security on the basis of their citizenship status and unpaid work contributions, then provision must be made for a more collective approach to the care economy which will allow women to exercise their rights as workers and citizens. Moving even further away from a direct one-to-one relationship between rights and contributions is a third and more diffuse category. The range of duties specified by eighteenth century theories of political rights, such defending the nation, participating in political life, paying taxes, can be seen to reflect a vertical model of citizenship, one organised around the relationship between state and society. By contrast, as Lautier points out, the fact of ‘being a citizen’ in today’s world implies a much wider range of duties – ‘socially necessary activities’, including among other things, ‘the duty to educate one’s children, to engage in activities for the elderly, to participate in associative or community activities that affect society as a whole and that may or may not (sports, culture) be related to the economy, to continue one’s studies or receive further training, to preserve the natural environment’ (p. 93). This feeds into what I refer to as a horizontal model of citizenship, the rights and duties that citizens have with regard to each other. Let me draw out the implications of this expanded model of citizenship in greater detail. First of all, it suggests that each and every member of a society contributes to shaping how families, communities and societies as a whole are reproduced over time. Each member of society makes a contribution that goes beyond paid work and each member has an obligation that goes beyond paid work. Furthermore, along with the positive duties that Lautier spells out, duties which permit or require action, we can also add equally important ‘negative’ duties which permit or require inaction: these include the social obligation to refrain from activities and expressions which lead to the disrespect for others, particular those who do not belong to our acknowledged communities, to denial of their humanity and to causing harm to their life and property. What underpins these rights and duties, what makes it imperative that they are recognized and acted on, is the politics of interdependence in an increasingly impersonal world. Although we are in various stages of transition from older forms of society, with their face-to-face communities and acknowledged bonds forged over many lifetimes to larger ‘imagined’ communities constituted of both our familiars and distant strangers, our fates remain inextricably intertwined: if anything, our interdependencies have intensified. Not only do we know much more about what is happening in our own and other societies, but we are increasingly affected by what happens outside our circle of intimates.
14
As a result, our responsibilities and expectations increasingly encompass this wider community. It is not only our own children, elderly, ill and disabled whose welfare must matter to us but all children, elderly, ill and disabled. It is not only our own education and training we must be concerned about but the education and training of our fellow citizens. And it is not only our immediate environment we must take care to preserve but the planetary environment. All ‘imagined’ societies face the challenge of constructing a sufficiently strong sense of belonging among citizens who are strangers to each other that it gives them a stake in the collective future, a willingness to observe those basic obligations that are the other side of the coin to basic rights. Failure to do so expresses itself through both ‘silent’ and ‘noisy’ consequence. The silent consequences, by their very nature, do not tend to command policy attention but research findings provide insights into how they work. For instance, Lister’s research into how young people in Britain understood the idea of citizenship found that those who saw themselves as ‘outsiders’ defined their obligations in far more narrow terms of simply looking after themselves or their immediate families. In Brazil, as Suarez et al have pointed out, many poorer Brazilians do not think of themselves in these terms. This is confirmed by Wheeler’s work in a Brazilian favela: none of those she interviewed saw themselves as members of the larger nation when they spoke of citizenship nor did they have much faith in the government. Few could identify any difference in their lives between dictatorship and democracy. In Nepal, studies show that dalit and indigenous groups, particularly women from these groups, suffered from higher levels of depression and anxiety than higher castes and were far less knowledgeable about their rights or about procedures for accessing public services and faced greater harassment and intimidation on entering certain public spaces. Estate workers in Sri Lanka, largely from the Tamil lower castes, report high levels of alcoholism, a major cause of their poverty, indebtedness, social stigma and higher levels of domestic violence, according to young people and women from the sector. In South Africa, studies reveal that high rates of alcoholism and MA misuse among women and men from the coloured community may explain why Western Cape is reported to have one of the highest rates of Foetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorders in the world. And then there are the noisier consequences of exclusion and alienation, such as crime, gang warfare, riots and civil war, the negative externalities of exclusion which spill over into the rest of society (Kanbur et al; Stewart). In urban Columbia, it was found that most crimes were committed by those who belonged to households with a per capita income below 80% of the national mean. In Pakistan, a member of one of its marginalised communities spoke of the crime and 15
lawlessness that characterised the surrounding environment and added: ‘The people who are wanted by the police, they come from our families. We are the people who become thieves because we are facing scarcity. The thieves do not come from somewhere else, they come from here’ (Kabeer et al.). And in India, a recent government report points out that the main support for the long-standing Naxalite insurgency, now active in around 125 districts spread over 12 states, comes from scheduled caste and scheduled tribes. To sum up, therefore, those who are most excluded from the mutual ties of citizenship express the greatest alienation from the values of citizenship and have least stake in the flourishing of the communities in which they live. It is both just and reasonable to believe that the extension of rights, and the recognition of citizenship status that this implies, must precede expectations of contributions from those who have been historically marginalised. It is here that social protection appears to hold out the promise of creating the basic foundations on which the bonds of citizenship can be established. This is because at its core, social protection seeks to guarantee the minimum set of basic needs that would allow citizens to participate with dignity in the affairs of their society. The importance of the political rationale for social protection has not escaped politicians. In China, the report to the 17th National Congress of the CPC in 2007 stressed the importance of social security as a guarantee of social stability and committed the government to the building of a sound social security system. China has seen a rapid expansion of state-led social protection as it attempts to contain the threat of unrest presented by the growing inequalities in the country. Suplicy justified his proposal for a basic income grant in Brazil in terms of the deep inequalities which characterised Brazilian society and the resulting levels of crime and social alienation. He claimed that the introduction of a basic income grant in some of the poorest and most crime-ridden districts of Sao Paolo led, within a year to higher levels of school attendance by children, expanded economic participation and a diminishing of criminal violence (Suplicy, 2002). What Suplicy does not mention but becomes evident in an evaluation of BF is the extent to which the programme had served to extend a sense of citizenship to some of the country’s most marginalised groups: poor rural women from ethnic minority groups. It is largely men who have identity documents. As women began to collect the necessary documentation to register for BR, they became aware that they were part of a larger social collectivity than their immediate neighbourhood – they started to think of themselves as Brazilian. A similar finding is reported in relation to the Dowa Emergency Cash Transfers in Malawi. Women were set up with bank accounts through a mobile banking system and issued with smart-cards to permit the delivery of transfers. Quite aside from 16
ensuring efficient and prompt delivery, the scheme had an unexpected side effect. An evaluation revealed that women who were targeted for the transfers felt strongly empowered by the legal recognition represented by the identity documents and/or smart-cards issued to them. In focus group discussions, several women stated passionately that before the project it was as if they did not exist in the eyes of the state, but now that they had their ‚papers‛ they had an identity and their government could no longer ignore them (Devereux et al. 2007). In India, civil society advocates for a national employment guarantee claimed that the single most important factor that won them a hearing with the Congress party, then in opposition, was their argument that guaranteed employment was the most effective counter to the divisive communal politics of the BJP. Their argument was summarised in the slogan: ‘Not a trident, not a sword, a right to work is required. Not a trident, not a sword, employment to every hand is required’ (cited in Chopra, 2009). And in Nepal, it is worth noting that a great deal of the ‘peace dividend’ is being invested in social protection measures that will help to unify the country’s fractured citizenship.
The practical argument for universalism: the economies of interdependence Contribution-based arguments for citizenship rights are likely to resonate with people’s everyday experiences of mutual interdependence to a far greater extent than appeals to a abstract ethics. At the same time, emerging evidence of the developmental potential of social protection can further bolster the case for universalism. The likelihood that social assistance to the poor in poor countries might have a productive potential did not play much of a role in the early policy discourse around social protection. Its equation with narrowly defined ‘safety net’ function led policy makers to view public funding for social protection as ‘at best a short-term palliative and at worst a waste of money’ (Ravallion, 2003). This view reflected the belief that social transfers were most likely to be consumed by those living below the poverty line, that they might have disincentive effects on their labour supply and propensity to save and that it might also have disincentive effects on those whose taxes paid for social transfers. This view was underpinned by a particular model of the economy as constituted by atomised individuals and entities driven by self interest and engaged in an unending competition for scarce resources in the context of relatively well functioning markets. Economic behaviour in these models tends to be characterised by constant trade-offs. Such models do not, however, describe the real world where individuals do not live in isolation from each other but are interconnected through in a myriad of social 17
relationships that extend from the family outwards to a wider economy where markets are frequently missing or marked by failures in insurance, information, skills and time preferences which lead to sub-optimal outcomes (Barrientos). Their actions consequently have constant anticipated and unanticipated effects on others just as the actions of others are constantly impacting on them. In the real world, therefore, positive and negative externalities (multipliers, feed-back mechanisms and spill-over effects) are as much a part of everyday life as trade-offs. While some of these can be captured through measurement, together they can add up to an impact that is difficult to measure because it relates to the functioning of the economy itself. While the evidence on the economic impacts associated with social protection is still highly fragmented and piecemeal, it nevertheless points in the direction of this macro-level externality. We discuss different categories of economic impacts in turn. First of all, we have seen how the conditions attached to cash transfers were intended to encourage mothers to invest in their children’s health and education. In this the programmes have been largely successful although it is not clear whether the gains reflect a pure income effect (families now have more money at their disposal) or a gender- substitution effect (the money is at the disposal of mothers) or the conditions themselves. Certainly, the evidence from unconditional cash transfers, such as social pensions in South Africa and Brazil and the Child Support Grant, suggests that the welfare of children are likely to be given greater priority in households where it is mothers or grandmothers who receive the transfer. Such investments in children’s health and education can prepare them to compete more effectively in future labour markets, thereby helping to disrupt the inter-generational cycle of poverty. Evidence from Mexico, which has the longest lasting study of impacts, suggests that the children of Progresa are indeed obtaining better jobs than their parents. Secondly, contrary to fears of a dependency syndrome developing with the distribution of transfers, evidence from around the world suggests that even the poorest families do not simply ‘consume’ these transfers, they invest some of their transfers in productive assets and activities. Investments in productive assets have been reported for cash transfers, both conditional and unconditional. Even the extremely poor who were targeted by Zambia’s pilot cash transfer - the poorest 10% of the population - managed to invest around 29% of their transfers in chickens, goats and agricultural supplies. Similar findings are reported for public works programmes. Participants in Malawi’s ‘Public Works Programme’ (6%) and Nepal’s ‘Rural Access Programme’ were also found to have invested some of their public works income in purchasing small animals (cited in Devereux and Coll-Black, 2007).
18
While some of these investments may represent savings out of the transfers, others reflect the easing of credit constraints brought about by access to regular and predictable transfers of cash. In Brazil, the regularity of the social pension for informal workers and their households allowed beneficiaries to borrow from banks: the magnetic card they used to collect their pension provided evidence of regular source of income (Barrientos and Scott, 2008). Women in receipt of BF transfers also reported increased access to credit (Suarez et al.) while in Namibia, households in receipt of pensions were able to access credit at their local stores. (The other side of the coin to increased investment is reduced disinvestment but there appears to be less interest in what people didn’t do than in what they did). Thirdly, social protection schemes have contributed to labour market activity, not simply through job creation on public works programmes, but through a variety of often unexpected indirect effects. Some forms of transfers can ease the child care constraints on working women. In the case of the mid-day meal scheme in India, female household heads were able to work longer and less interrupted hours because their children were more likely to remain in school. Investment in productive assets may explain household participation increased the likelihood of engagement in microenterprises in Mexico, with somewhat larger effects for female activity (Gertler et al, 2006). Studies from Brazil show that labour market participation by adults in beneficiary households was higher than that in nonbeneficiary households and it was even higher for women. They also suggest that access to cash transfers reduce the number of work days lost to illness by adults. In South Africa as well, receipt of the OAP also appeared to increase the employment options of other members and reduce working days lost through illness. Studies suggest that the pension income received by elderly women in rural households as well as the CSG helped prime age women to overcome income constraints to migration to the city in search of work and made possible support of grandchildren by grandmothers. The longer term labour market potential associated with public works programmes varies considerably with its design. An evaluation of CARE’s Contract Association model in Malawi which combined the provision of public works employment with longer term livelihood promotion through training and savings found that, three years after the programme had ended, women had continued the practice of savings, had higher and more diversified income flows than comparable control groups and had been better able with withstand - and recover from - two major droughts in the intervening period. However, the absence of credit facilities in the area constrained the expansion of enterprises as did the absence of credit, capital and technical knowledge in the South African (McCord). Elsewhere, in South Africa, Nepal and Zimbabwe, where more attention was paid to the transfer of skills, livelihood strategies proved more sustainable. 19
Other positive labour market impacts associated with social transfers has been the expanded choice of livelihoods and increased bargaining power on the part of workers. In Namibia, a basic income grant pilot found that it had reduced the number of women engaging in transactional sex for a living while in Malawi, the DECT reduced the number of family members engaging in ganyu or casual wage work which is among the worst paid and least desirable of occupations. The guarantee of work embedded in Maharashtra’s Employment Guarantee Scheme in the Indian state of Maharashtra was believed to have strengthened the bargaining position of agricultural workers vis-à-vis their employers and reduced the dependence of marginalised groups on landowners for protection and patronage (Echeverri-Gent, 1988; Dreze, 1990). Finally, social protection schemes have had impacts beyond beneficiaries and their households through a range of positive and negative spill over effects. Studies of Progresa noted an increased supply of health and educational services for all households within PROGRESA communities as well as an increase in consumption and productive assets among non-beneficiary households (Angelucci and De Giorgio, 2009; Barrientos and Sabates-Wheeler, 2009). This appears to reflect both behavioural ‘demonstration effects’ as well as the greater possibility of nonparticipating households to access transfers and loans. A number of studies have noted the increase in trade that occurs in rural Namibia and South Africa on days that the social pensions are paid or public works participants get their wages (Lund, 2002; Devereux, 2001; McCord). However, this is often temporary in duration, restricted to pay days or for the duration of the project (Devereux and Coll-Black; McCord). More sustained impacts on local trade appear to be associated with public works programmes that create durable infrastructure. A study of Bangladesh’s Food for Work programme carried out in 1985 is, as Devereux and Solomon (2006) point out, one of the few to attempt a holistic evaluation of its impacts (WFP/BIDS/IFPRI, 1985). It found that participants used their wages to hire others to work on their farms as well as on goods and services provided by the local economy, generating income for farmers and traders. The building of feeder roads helped to link isolated communities with towns and markets, enhancing their access to input and output markets and lowering transaction costs. The results were: agricultural production increased by an average of 27% and per capita household income by about 10% as a result of the direct and indirect effects of the project. More productive employment generated was substituted for very low productivity employment among rural households. Wage employment increased by 13% while self
20
employment declined by about 10% ... (von Braun et al., 1991, cited in Devereux and Solomon, 2006)
Recent evaluations of CARE’s road building projects in Bangladesh found significant overall increases in commercial freight and passenger volumes as a result of improved market integration. There was also evidence of gender differentiated impact in the use of roads (Langworthy, 1999; Gani, 1999). While men continue to make up the majority of users, rates of increase in use by women were much higher. Women and poorer households were also most likely to report increased use of roads for educational purposes and to access NGOs and social services. The evaluation of the CARE programme in Malawi cited earlier also pointed to an increase in commercial activity and increasing traffic as a result of the opening up of new roads. Rural women benefited in that urban traders were now coming to rural areas to buy produce although traders took advantage of their restricted mobility to bargain down the prices they offered. A study of the Rural Roads program in Peru notes the gender-related benefits that result when women are consulted about the design of infrastructure projects (World Bank, 2004). Improvements took place not only in the main roads connecting different communities but also in non-motorised tracks that are most often used by women. In addition, they were found to participate to a greater extent in markets and fairs and to spend less time obtaining food and fuel supplies than before project implementation. An impact survey reported that women felt that the rehabilitated roads and tracks enabled them to travel further, to travel more safely and to obtain additional income. An evaluation of the impact of roads constructed under Nepal’s ‘Rural Community Infrastructure Works’ programme noted a decrease in the price of basic commodities and increased visits to food markets, with powerful implications for food security in market-dependent households (Devereux and Coll-Black, 2007). The irrigation facilities built under the programme doubled cropping intensity and increased crop yields. Studies have also documented some of the negative spill-over effects of social protection but these appear to be less frequent. An evaluation of the PSNP in Ethiopia found that the introduction of cash transfers to poor communities with weak markets had resulted in local food price inflation (Devereux and Coll-Black, 2007). Such inflationary pressures may of course be a transitional effect which will be corrected when traders respond to increased purchasing power. There has been evidence of increased tensions within communities as a result of the targeting of transfers to some households while excluding other that may be only marginally less poor. There is also evidence that the selective targeting of transfers to specific communities can lead to in-migration as others seek to benefit. Impacts that reflect
21
the selective nature of transfers can of course be offset by a more universalist approach. Stepping back from these various categories of impacts and considering them in the aggregate, they suggest that a well designed and universalistic social protection system holds out the possibility of the kind of interconnected, rather than segmented, economy in which market forces are most likely to lead to equitable outcomes. The case for universalism here rests on the need to move beyond projectized and piecemeal approaches to social protection to an institutionalized and economy-wide system, one that provides some minimum degree of predictability in people’s lives. By connecting up people, places and opportunities, a broad-based social protection strategy could contribute to the inclusiveness of growth – allowing all sections of society to engage in saving and investments, to take risks and access credit, to equip themselves for work, to finance the costs of finding work, to creating the incentives for local trade to flourish and easing mobility across occupations and locations in an era of constant change. It is, of course, difficult to measuring the likely aggregate impact of universalising social protection. The closest we can come to measurement is in the case of programmes of sufficiently large scale as to make possible the use of nationally representative household surveys. This was done for Jamaica, Brazil, Ecuador and Mexico. The results show large effects on poverty for Mexico, particularly for the poverty gap and squared poverty gap measures. This suggests that largest impacts are among the poorest. Estimates suggest that cash transfers in Mexico can generate income multipliers that are between 1.5 to 2.6 times the size of the cash transfer, thus constituting a considerable stimulus to the local economy (de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2001). The Jamaican programme reduced the squared poverty gap by 13%. The impact on head count poverty and poverty gap measures were relatively modest in Brazil but the squared poverty gap was reduced by 15 percent. This is consistent with strong association noted between the introduction of CCTs in Brazil and decline in income inequality reported by Paes de Barros, Foguel and Ulyssea. One estimate suggests that child-oriented cash transfers and social pensions were responsible for 28 per cent of fall in inequality during 1995-2004, another suggests that the expansion in education has also played an important role. This fall in inequality should improve the rate at which future economic growth translates into poverty reduction (Soares et al., 2006). Conclusion: incremental universalism (not complete) Given the uneven nature of development across the world, and within different countries, and given differences in political culture, there is unlikely to be a single universal approach to building universalist social protection strategies. Some countries, like Brazil, appear to be favourably disposed towards the idea of a basic 22
income grant, others like India towards the idea of guaranteed employment while still others, like Thailand, have opted for universalising access to health care. The challenge is to combine the principle that everyone is entitled to some basic level of social security (which might vary in different countries) with the principle of diversity of provision to address diversity in needs and constraints. While universal approaches have traditionally been associated with top-down, state driven policies, many originated in lower level schemes and built upwards. The idea of building upwards may be better suited to the uneven conditions which prevail in many developing countries. This would seek to integrate and scale up a multitude of small-scale and localised social security mechanisms which have been put in place to respond to locally recognised patterns of need. However, as Lautier points out, a number of important conditions need to be in place if this approach is to lead to inclusive systems of social protection. First, there needs to be an impetus towards reproduction of ‘good practice’ in a variety of different contexts to test its adaptability. Second, reproduction must occur horizontally as well as vertically so that new socio-economic groups are gradually incorporated rather than the provisions being confined to a homogenous groups. Finally, and most importantly, the state must step in at a given moment to unify the arrangements made to provide a variety of services to different groups. The state’s unifying action is necessary to create policy where there were only projects and to give the system a national dimension. In the absence of such a role for the state, the simple multiplication of apparently similar initiatives may merely disguise and legitimize major inequalities in the quantity and quality of social protection and give them a cumulative character. Bottom up universalisation is only possible if public authorities have the capacity and resources to build up an overall architecture for social protection and define the place of different social protection measures within it.
23
References Barrientos, A (2004) ‘Financing Social Protection’, Paper prepared for DFID. University of Manchester. Britto, T. (2005). 'Recent in the development agenda of Latin America: an analysis of conditional cash transfers'. Manchester: Institute for Development Policy and Management. Graham, C. (2002) Public attitudes matter: A conceptual frame for accounting for political economy in safety nets and social assistance policies’ Social Protection Discussion Paper Series No. 0233 Washington DC: World Bank Harriss-White,. B. (1995) ‘Economic restructuring: state, market, collective and household action in India’s social sector’ European Journal of Development Research Vol. 7(1): 124-147 Moser, C.O. (1992) From residual welfare to compensatory measures: the changing agenda of social policy in developing countries’ Silver Jubilee Paper No. 6. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies Reddy, S. and J. Vandemoortele (1996) User financing of basic social services. A review of theoretical arguments and empirical evidence UNICEF Staff Working Papers. Evaluation, Policy and Planning Series. New York: UNICEF Suarez, M, M Libardoni, M Texeira Rodriguez, A J T Cleaver, S Ribeiro Garcia and W da Silva Chaves (2006) ‘The Bolsa Familia Programme and the Tackling of Gender Inequalities: The challenge of promoting the re-ordering of the domestic space and women’s access to the public space’, prepared for the Ministry of Social Development, Brazil and Department for International Development (DFID), UKBrazil. Sulplicy, Eduardo (2000) ‘Towards a citizen’s income: the advancement of the battle in Brazil’ Keynote address to V111 Congress of the Basic Income European Network, Berlin 6-7 October. Tendler, J. (2000) 'Why are social funds so popular?' in S.J. Evenett, S. Yusuf and W. Wu (eds) Local dynamics in an era of globalisation. 21st century catalysts for development New York: Oxford University Press
24
Notes It is worth noting that while some of those resisting the idea of a universal basic income in South Africa pointed to public works as a preferred alternative, while resistance to the idea of universal work guarantee in the Indian context was accompanied by an expressed preference for a universal cash transfer! 2 Some societies, the US included, have prioritized the negative freedoms associated with civil and political rights but failed to acknowledge the right to some basic level of socio-economic security while former socialist countries generally prioritized the latter at the expense of the former. 1
25
