Submit for China & Global Economy, Revised, January 7, 2003 Accepted, January 17, 2003
China: How to Fight the Antidumping War? Jason Z. Yin, Ph.D. Stillman School of Business Seton Hall University Email:
[email protected] Tel: 973-761-960 Fax: 973-761-9217
ABSTRACT “Dumping” has become a major source of trade disputes among its member countries since the erection of WTO in 1995. China, with 255 investigation cases on its exports, has been the number-one target of antidumping litigation. With its defensive position in the antidumping war, it seems that China and its enterprises have not yet formulated clearly defined strategies in coping with the trade nightmares. This paper analyzes the structure and characteristics of all antidumping cases against Chinese enterprises. Based on the analysis, the paper offers strategic and policy recommendations for the Chinese government and enterprises to be better prepared for the discriminatory provisions in China’s WTO accession protocol and for the escalating antidumping trade disputes to protect the economic and trade interests of Chinese enterprises.
Introduction Since the erection of WTO in 1995, “dumping” has become a major source of trade disputes among its member countries. The number of antidumping cases pending before various legal forums is climbing up rapidly. According to data on antidumping practice of 2002 released by the WTO Secretariat, 21 member countries initiated 330 antidumping investigations against exports from a total of 64 different countries or customs territories. Of the 330 investigations, there were 182 cases initiated by developed countries and the rest of 158 were initiated by developing countries. China, with 47 investigation cases on its exports, was at the primary target of antidumping litigation. It is followed by South Korea (19 cases) and Chinese Taipei (19 cases). For its first seven years from January1, 1995 to December 31, 2001, there were 35 member countries initiated 1,845 anti-dumping investigations against exports from a total of 91 countries or customs territories. United States was the leading country in initiating antidumping investigations (255 cases), followed by India (248 cases) and European Union (246 cases). China was the number one target of AD litigations (255 cases), followed by South Korea (138 cases). Among the total 255 investigations against China,
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27% came from European Union (36 cases) and United States (33 cases), and 33% from two developing countries: India (48 cases) and Argentina (36 cases), as shown in Table 1. China became the 143rd WTO member on December 2001. While celebrating its membership, one of the very first problems China has to deal with is antidumping litigation. Chinese enterprises have been shut off from many industrial sectors as part of antidumping actions against China and suffered major losses in international markets. It is clear that China is in a defensive position in the antidumping war and it seems that China has not yet formulated clearly defined strategies in coping with the trade nightmares. These development calls for serious research attention. In this paper, we examined the major characteristics of all WTO antidumping cases to see what actual and potential problems lurk in its shadows. We then analyzed the structure and characteristics of all antidumping litigations against China. Based on the analysis, we made strategic and policy recommendations for the Chinese government and enterprises to be better prepared for antidumping trade disputes and to better protect its economic and trade interests. Characteristics of Antidumping Actions Analyzing the 1845 antidumping cases filed with WTO in its first seven years, we have found the following five characteristics are of great importance for China to formulate its strategy in the antidumping war. 1. Initiators and respondents Four developed countries, the U.S., EU, Australia and Canada initiated about 90% of antidumping investigations in the 1980s and about 40% for 1995-2001. They are referred as the ‘big four’. Since 1995, four developing countries, India, South Africa, Argentina, and Brazil, became active in initiating antidumping litigations and they account for about 36% of the AD investigations. The four developed countries together with the four developing countries composing the ‘big eight’ in using AD duties measures to protect their markets from foreign competition, as shown in Table 1. The eight members dominated the AD litigation and contributed 76% of total 1845 investigations for the past seven years (WTO, 2002a). In contrast, there are eight major affected parties with 69 cases or above. Among the eight affected parties, six were in developing economies and two (U.S. and Japan) were in developed economies. The U.S., the largest economy and trading partner, was the only member country that played as both a leading initiator and a major defender in the antidumping war. In contrast, China is the single member that was subject to the largest number of investigations with no reported litigation against its trading partners by the end of 2001. South Korea was the second country subject to heavy antidumping litigations. 2. Basis of Determination for Normal Value
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The Chinese economy is in transition from planned economy to market economy. It has undergone far-reaching market-oriented economic reform and trade liberalization. As shown in Table 2, most of the AD investigations against China initiated by the U.S. or EU were either based on non-market economy (NME) or a specified third country market (TM). Meanwhile, other AD investigations were determined on bases of home market (HM), constructed value of factors from a specified country (CV) or cost of production analysis (COP). 3. Duration In the Antidumping Agreement, AD action is designed to be temporary to offset price discrimination against domestic producers. Article 11.3 of AD Agreement states that “any definitive antidumping duty should be terminated on a date not later than five years from its imposition…” unless an (obligatory) review finds that the expiry of the duty would be likely to lead to continued or recurred dumping. However, it was actually used as a long-term non-tariff barrier to prevent domestic producers from trade competition. There were total 42 AD duty orders imposed by the U.S. against China in effect as of December 31, 2001. Among the 42 cases, 10 started to be in effect in 1980s. Dates for two cases related to cotton cloth and towels were in effect as early as 1983. The longevity of the final AD measures imposed constitutes a severe problem. In the U.S. the average duration of final duties was more than 9 years. The oldest duty still is in force for more than 32 years as of 2001. Over 90% of all U.S. measures lasted more than 5 years (Neufeld, 2001). EU duties in force have an average of 3.5 years and some were as long as 8 years. The existence of these long-term orders indicates that the obligations of conduct 5-year reviews of AD duties did not show the anticipated results. In other word, the “sunset provisions” of AD Agreement has failed to significantly reduce the number of duties stemming from the pre-Uruguay era (Neufeld, 2001). 4. AD Duty level Based on the data available on definitive duty imposed, according to WTO Committee’s report on AD practices (March 2002), the average AD duty was 47.6% that U.S. imposed on China reported for the second semester of 2001. The AD duty was about 28.5% on average that the EU imposed on China. It was 9.6% and 6.8% average for the AD duties that U.S. imposed on South Korea and Taiwan respectively for the same time period (second semester of 2001) reported. Overall the average AD duty level imposed was much higher on Chinese firms than on firms from other countries. 5. Final Measure and “Success Ratio” Research has shown that most of the investigations would not necessarily lead to final measure for either lack of evidence of dumping or injury (Neufeld, 2001). In
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contrast to the increased volume of AD investigations, the success ratio, defined as the composition of final measures) is relatively low. According to Neufeld (2001), out of all AD investigations initiated in 1998, only 11.6% resulted in the imposition of final measures. The 1999 data shows even lower ‘success level’ --5.4%. For the U.S. cases, 80% of all investigations ended without final measures were because of lack of injury, and 6.6% of investigations found no dumping. For EU cases, among all investigations without final measures, 22% for no injury found, 26% for withdrawing, and 22% was terminated for expiry of the deadline to impose a definitive measure. In the past seven years, the U.S. and EU have been leading parties frequently imposing final measures on their trading partners, especially partners in developing economies (WTO, 2002b). The very low success ratio demonstrates that the AD actions appear to be a method of harassment with an expectation that the mere opening of an investigation has a significant impact on the imports from the affected country. The petitioners themselves may resume that the investigations will not lead to the imposition of a final measure (Neufeld, 2001). However, China has been most often affected by final measures, being the target of more than 17% of all cases for the period of 1995-2001. The success ratio for AD cases initiated by the U.S. against China was much higher --- 45% (19 impositions over 42 investigations for the second semester of 2001). Part of the reason is that the U.S. treated China as non-market economy. It did not have to establish the case in terms of proof of ‘dumping’ and ‘material injury.’ The high success level may also be a result that the Chinese producers and exporters seldom chose to respond to the charges and to defend own interests before China joined WTO. China: Heavy Price Paid for Its WTO Membership In its WTO accession negotiation, China agreed to fully comply with market access provisions. It has made full commitment to reduce or remove tariff and non-tariff barrier and to open its markets to foreign competition. In addition to its market access commitment, however, China accepted discriminatory treatment in two important areas--safeguards and antidumping, restricting its export policy and behavior. Under certain conditions set forth in the WTO Agreement on safeguards, a country may impose quantitative restrictions on imports. Since this is a major departure from the most basic WTO principle of eliminating all-quantitative trade restrictions and promoting free trade. Most important the country imposing the restriction must demonstrate that increased imports have caused or threaten to cause serious injury to domestic firms producing similar or competing products. Except under special circumstances, restrictions on imports imposed under a safeguard measure must be applied on a most favored nation basis, that is, proportionately on all suppliers. Thus an import restriction imposed under the WTO general safeguard provision cannot be imposed only on goods originated in a single country (Lardy, 2002: 81).
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However, in its entry negotiation, China has agreed to allow WTO members to apply the terms of this transitional product-specific safeguard for a period of 12 years from the time of accession, which are far more burdensome than those that have been imposed on any other country as a condition for WTO membership. Only after 2012, will China be subject to the less onerous provision of the WTO Safeguard Agreement. Clearly, under the terms of the transitional product-specific safeguard clause in China’s protocol of accession to the WTO, it will be fairly easy for the U.S. and other countries to impose restrictions on goods imported from China. During this period, China is disarmed from responding to such restrictions including the unilateral imposition by the importing country of increased tariffs or even quotas. (Lardy, 2002: 82). Clearly, China’s ability to retaliate when this clause is invoked is more restricted than under the WTO safeguard. Once a restrictive quota has been imposed against Chinese imports, there is no requirement for progressive liberalization for the quota over time. Furthermore, China agreed to accept discriminatory terms for antidumping in its protocol of WTO accession, another important area in protecting its trading rights. In the protocol of WTO accession China agreed to allow the U.S. and other WTO members to use the non-market economy (NME) methodology in dumping cases for 15 years from the time of its accession. Thus the U.S. and other WTO members have broad discretion in determining the conditions under which they apply non-market economic provisions in antidumping cases against Chinese firms. As shown in Table 3, the U.S. has treated China as non-market economy in antidumping cases for many years. With the discriminatory provision, the U.S. is going to continue its practice at least until 2015. Overall, China’s WTO membership indicates that the integration of Chinese economy into world market economy and it creates the potential for gains in economic efficiency through fair competition in global market. In addition to the economic gains, China will be able to use the WTO dispute settlement procedure to protect its national interests. Antidumping is an important area that China can use the system to defend itself. In the past, China felt helpless to challenge the dumping charges because it was not a WTO member. Now China can use the WTO antidumping procedure and dispute settlement platform to deal with its trade partners more fairly for dumping charges and to challenge the way that other members apply the non-market economy methodology to it. Nonetheless, the benefits did come with costs. In fact, the price China paid for its membership was quite heavy, especially for the first 12-15 years of its membership. China needs to be fully prepared for a lasting uphill battle in the unfolding antidumping war. The U.S. and EU Antidumping Strategy Against China The U.S. is the leading trade partner for China and it is the one of the nations most actively use antidumping measures against its trade partners. In the 33 cases filed against China by the U.S. government in 2001, 27 cases specified basis of AD determination. Among the 27 cases, 25 were based ‘non-market economy’ (NME) and two were based
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on ‘facts available’. A more detailed data on date of initiation of investigation, dumping margin, and number of firms affected, and basis of determination for 17 selected cases is shown in Table 3. Under the provisions of the US trade law, China has for many years been treated as a non-market economy in antidumping cases. That means that the U.S. Department of Commerce does not determine whether or not a product being dumped in the U.S. market by comparing the price of a good imported from China with price of the same goods sold in China or in a third market. The presumption is that since China is in a transition from a planned to a market-based economy, not all of its domestic prices fully reflect supply and demand. For example, if Chinese government subsidizes heavily some inputs, domestic prices of goods utilizing the inputs will not reflect the true cost of production. In that situation, comparisons of the prices of Chinese goods at home with prices of the same goods sold abroad would not necessarily indicate whether or not a good is being sold at less than “normal value”. Thus US producers could be forced to compete unfairly with a Chinese producer that had access to subsidized inputs. These non-market economy methodology discriminate against China in three ways: a) The labor costs used are much higher than the actual labor cost those prevailing in China. These approaches discount Chinese producers’ comparative advantage over its worldwide competitors b) Firms in market economy sometimes sell their products for less than average total cost, but at price to cover is marginal cost of production. The constructed value method or the U.S. Department of Commerce always includes profit when it calculates normal value. Thus, they can establish that the Chinese goods are sold at “dumping” price. c) WTO rules do not define the market economy conditions. Each member has broad discretion in setting or even changing the conditions under which it applies nonmarket economy provisions in antidumping cases against Chinese firms. Finally, under the U.S. law the decision of the U.S. Department of the Commerce to designate a trading partner as a non-market economy is not subject to judicial review. It puts Chinese government in a difficult position to defend itself in antidumping cases through WTO dispute settlement system (Lardy, 2002). In its WTO accession agreement, China has accepted this discriminatory provision by allow the United States and other WTO members to use the non-market economy methodology in dumping cases for 15 years from the time of its accession. The EU specified AD determination for 4 cases in its 8 cases filed for 1995-2001. All the four cased were determined based on constructed value of factors (CV) of China and price comparison with specified third country market (TM), such as U.S., Mexico and Philippines, which was also based on the assumption that China is not a market economy. More detailed information of 4 cases is shown in the second part of Table 3. The Impact of Antidumping War
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As analyzed above, to a large degree, antidumping has been abused and has variety of negative implications. It creates serious distortion on international trade and fair competition with a damaging effect to exporting firms, especially the exporting firms in developing economies. The AD duty measures or threatening to take retaliatory measures may lead the exporting firms to change production and/or seek for new markets. On the other hand, instead of ‘escape clause’, antidumping has been frequently used as a nontariff trade barrier and protects the domestic market from competition of goods and services imported. It encourages rent-seeking behavior by import-competing firms through trade defense measures. China, as the major AD target, is especially hurt by the AD actions. The Chinese producers are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effect of the AD actions because they lack of international trade experience and financial capabilities than the well-established producers and exporters in developed economies to defend themselves in the international arena. A good example is the AD actions taken by the U.S., South Korea and Japan against China’s garlic export. China is the largest garlic producer in the world with annual output of 59 billion metric ton, which is about 66% of the total world production. China’s fresh garlic export has created major trade disputes with its trade partners, including the U.S., South Korea and Japan in 1990s. These countries have files several antidumping investigations against China. Started from 1994, the U.S. government decided to excise 376.67% antidumping duties on garlic from China for 5 years. In the 5-year review in 1999, no Chinese garlic firms attended the hearing and the high import duty then automatically retained to date. The Japanese and Korean governments have taken or threat to take similar actions. The sharp increase in duty and the sanction have resulted in sharp decrease of China’s fresh garlic export. Consequently, Chinese garlic producers and garlic exporters have become the immediate victims of the antidumping actions. China’s Antidumping Actions After years of receiving dumping charges from Western countries, China promulgated Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Provision on March 23, 1997 with immediate effect. The aim of the regulation is to hit back with its own antidumping and countervailing duty laws. Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (Moftec) is in charge of initiating dumping investigation and reporting the findings and State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) is in charge of investigation of industrial injury. According to the requirements for WTO membership and the promise China made in its WTO accession agreement, China promulgated a revised antidumping and anti-subsidy provision on November 26, 2001, in which, it specified the legal procedures for investigation and administrative ruling. Chinese enterprises, learning from their counterparts in other countries, have increasingly invoked antidumping regulatory measures to curb the impact of imported products. China has started 21AD investigations against some of its trading partners since 1997 and 7 cases after China became a WTO member in November 2001.
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Receiving complaints from nine domestic newsprint companies, Moftec and SETC started an antidumping investigation in December 1997. The investigators concluded that the invasion of newsprint from the U.S., Canada and South Korea had serious material injury for Chinese newsprint industry. Newsprint prices dropped 9.1%, the total profits of the nine companies dropped 88%, leading to inventory buildup and large-scale layoffs. Moftec and SETC issued its final verdict of China’s first antidumping case in June 1999, imposing punitive antidumping tariffs on newsprint imports from the U.S., Canada and South Korea. The antidumping tariff rate for each country was based on a normal price, which is determined based on the CIF value of the product. Due to the variation in costs and market prices from company to company, the U.S., Canada, and South Korea were subject to tariff rates of 78%, 57-78%, and 55% respectively (Ning and Ross, 2001). To protect its chemical producers against cheap imports, Chinese government has taken several anti dumping measures against its trading partners. November 2000, Moftec imposed antidumping duties of 32% on acrylic ester imports from Japan and the U.S. for a five-year period. Imported acrylic ester imported from Japan and the U.S. exceeds 29% of Chinese market in 1999 (Mollet, 2001:20). Moftec imposed provisional antidumping duties on imports of methylene chlorides from six countries and the duties range from 28% to 75% (Chemical Week, August 22, 2001, p.15). China has a major trade conflict with Japan over imports of PVC (polyvinyl chloride) to Chinese market. Japanese chemical industry exports about one-third of total Japanese PVC products to China. As part of punitive penalty, China turned away Japanese cargo of PVC in May 2000 from ports in southern China in retaliation of Japanese import restrictions imposed on leeks, mushrooms, and towels from China (Mollet, 2001). In the past, Chinese companies seldom responded to foreign antidumping investigation. In 2002, the response rate on foreign antidumping investigations has been improved to 70%. The response rate for dumping charges from the U.S. and E.U. was raised to 100%. Recently, Chinese enterprises won four out of five cases in their responding to antidumping investigations filed in the U.S. (Xie Yuandong, 2002). It indicates that China is exhibiting an increasing willingness and forceful efforts to use its antidumping laws to protect its industries and enterprises. Strategic and Policy Options for China and Chinese Enterprises Based on the above analysis, the following strategic and policy suggestions are offered for Chinese government and Chinese enterprises involved in international trade. Active Use of Antidumping. It has become clear that WTO antidumping agreement has not been implemented as it was intended to temporarily offset unfair competition arising from price discrimination and to provide remedy to the related injury. In practice, it has been used as safeguard measure to protect domestic producers from open competition. When China’s exports to the U.S. increased substantially in many sectors in the 1980s and 1990s, the related U.S. manufacturers suffered from the sharp increase of imports of
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low-price goods. The U.S. also suffers from the increasing trade deficits. In response, the U.S. government increased its AD measures against China more than any others countries. Those AD actions can be justified. However, many of the dumping allegations made by the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) against China had little linkage to the alleged “injury” and the AD duties were reinforced for extensive long time periods. It indicates that those AD actions were taken as a harassment tactics to deter or block the imports from China. The Chinese enterprises should realize that the intrinsic problem embodied in WTO AD agreements and the practice and prepare themselves for both eventualities (dual tactics). On the one hand, they should acknowledge that it is common practice that the governments subsidize exports in some sectors and/or some products were in fact sold in foreign markets at a price lower than their “normal value.” Such ‘dumping’ creates market distortion with damaging effects on trade and competition. On the other hand, they should be aware that antidumping can be used as trade protection measures by importing countries which encourages rent-seeking behavior by domestic firms producing competing products. Assistance in Antidumping Actions. Quite often the Chinese producers and the exporters are the direct victims of AD actions. They usually do not have the experience of international marketing and its legal framework, have little expertise to predict the international trade relations and limited financial capabilities to defend themselves in AD investigations. Very often an on-going AD case or a mere threat to open an AD can induce the producers to withdraw their exports although they may own the case if they choose to fight on. And the importers are scared off by the possible prolonged battle and seek alternative sources of supply. Additionally, the producers and exporters have much less capability to absorb the negative economic consequence caused by AD duties and other retaliations than well-established exporters in developed economies. In many cases, the exports from China sharply declined or completely stopped after AD investigations or AD duties imposed. The Chinese government should provide AD-related legal and administrative service to the domestic producers and exporters. The government should help them be better organized and to be better trained for taking AD actions, and assist them to respond to alleged charges and to apply for investigation against foreign dumping and other unfair competitions. Being Active in the Antidumping Club. As discussed earlier, antidumping has no longer a weapon solely used by developed countries. More and more developing countries have become the signatories of WTO AD agreements and have aggressively armed with AD code and use it as a major instrument for regulating imports. Argentina, India, and South Africa were the pioneers, each having initiated more than a hundred AD cases since the WTO was formed. They have become active members in the international AD club and have quite effective in protecting their trade interests. Many other developing countries, such as Brazil, Mexico and Chile, are increasingly playing active
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roles in the AD war to protect their domestic markets from international competition. China should learn from those developing countries. Chinese government and Chinese enterprises should closely monitor its own markets for possible dumping behavior of foreign companies and related industrial injury. Instead of being the AD targets passively, it should be armed with its antidumping regulations and be more active in initiating AD investigations against unfair trade practice of their trading partners, while encourage and assistant Chinese firms to actively defend themselves in litigations against them, especially the litigations from the ‘Big Four’ mentioned above. Reform of AD Agreement. A growing tendency can be found that developed economies use AD measures against imports of specialized commodities or products from China, such as the U.S.’s import of Chloropicrin from China was shut down with its duty enforcement. AD measures are also used against some major Asian companies, which are often major suppliers to a region or even the world markets. As Prusa (1999) pointed out, “ …it often seems that just when developing countries begin to efficiently operate and become more competitive in a particular markets, industrialized countries shut down those precise markets…” In current format, antidumping turns out to be a policy of anticompetition rather than pro-competition and discriminating against developing economies. WTO AD Agreement needs reform to undo its tremendous negative effects on exports from developing economies. Chinese government should actively promote and participate into the reform of WTO AD Agreement and its ill-fated applications. First of all, the requirements for opening an AD investigation should be tightened by raising the threshold for the determination of ‘dumping.’ Given the significantly lower labor costs and other factor endowments, there should a different dumping margins set for developed and developing economies. Furthermore, as Neufeld proposed (2001), unjustified AD investigations should be eliminated. A stricter test of injury should be conducted before the opening of an investigation and the injury determination should be more on a firm-specific basis. Conclusions It is less debatable that WTO accession will lead China to greater potential for economic efficiency and will benefit Chinese consumers. China’s trading partners have and will lift most of their quantitative import restrictions on a range of products from China. China can resort to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism to protect its trade interests and is able to participate in multilateral negotiation on trade rules and trade liberalization. China’s long-term gains from accessing foreign markets, however, could be eroded by its acceptance to discriminatory provisions in safeguard and antidumping areas and its embattlement of the escalating antidumping war. A trading partner can invoke productspecific safeguard in the next 12 year to impose restriction on Chinese imports based only on “market disruption or threat to market disruption” without proof of “injury.” And the other trading partners can take actions to prevent diversion of China’s exports to their countries even without establishing evidence of market disruption. Any trading partners in the next 15 years can use non-market economy methodology to bring dumping charges
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against China. These discriminatory provisions can be serious threats to the exports of Chinese enterprises. China had already been the target of antidumping actions before its WTO accession. Coping with antidumping actions of its trading partners presents a greater challenge for China as a new WTO member with commitment to fully comply with market access provisions. It would be particularly difficult for China in the short and medium terms to implement its commitment to open up its market to foreign competition. But China now is in a more favorable position in protecting trade interests than ever before. Before WTO accession, China was helpless to challenge antidumping litigation. Now as a WTO member China can use WTO trade dispute settlement mechanism to challenge its trading partners that do not apply fair procedures or the decision-making process is not transparent. China can also challenge its trading partners if they do not use the nonmarket economy methodology in a non-discriminatory manner to all non-market economies. Besides defending itself, more importantly, WTO membership enables China to actively initiate antidumping investigations against foreign companies to protect its vulnerable industries and to bring the disputes to WTO for settlement. China and Chinese enterprises need to formulate its antidumping strategy and to be fully prepared for the antidumping war. With a clearly defined strategy and proper organizational resources, China will be able to maximize its benefits as a WTO member and to minimize possible damages in the antidumping war.
REFERENCE Lardy, Nicholas R. (2002). Integrating China into the Global Economy, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C. Mollet, Andrew (2001). “Making Greater Use of Antidumping Duties.” Chemical Week. New York (August 29-September 5): 20 Neufeld, Inge Nora (2001). “Antidumping and Countervailing Procedures – Use or Abuse? Implications for developing Countries.” United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: Geneva, Switzerland. Policy Issues In International Trade and Commodities Study Series No. 9 Ning, Susan and Ross, Lester (2001). “Perfecting Protectionist Procedures: An update on China’s Antidumping Regulations.” The China Business Review. Washington (May/June): 42-43. Prussa, T.J. (1999). “On the Spread and Impact of Antidumping.” NBER Working Paper Series, Workng Paper 7404, 1999. World Trade Organization (2002a): AD Initiations: Reporting Party vs. Affected Country From 01/01/95 To: 31/12/2001.
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World Trade Organization (2002b): Committee on Antidumping Practices. Semi-Annual Report Under Article 16.4 of the Agreement. United States (18 March, 2002), European Communities (28 February, 2002). Xie Yuandong, “China calmly fights antidumping battles,” People’s Daily (Overseas Edition), December 14, p. 3.
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Table 1 Antidumping Cases for Major Reporting Parties and Affected Parties For 1/1/1995 to 12/31/2001 Affected Party Reporting Party Argentina Australia Brazil (95) Canada E.U. India S. Africa U.S. Subtotal of above 8 Total cases Investigated
China 36 13 11 10 36 48 15 33
South Korea 8 11 3 7 21 17 13 19
U.S. 9 6 15 11 6 13 7 -
202
99
67
74
59
54
255
138
102
96
79
74
India 1 3 1 4 24 7 15 10
Total Cases initiated 167 139 95 102 246 248 156 255
48
64
1408
71
69
884
Taiwan Japan Indonesia Thailand 9 2 2 2 9 4 15 11 2 2 1 2 5 2 3 2 14 8 8 13 15 16 8 11 4 1 5 3 16 24 12 4
Data source: WTO Committee on Antidumping Practices, 2002.
Table 2 Antidumping Determination Against China and Taiwan (Report for period July 1-December 31, 2001) Basis of Determination* NME HM TM CV COP FA NA Total AD Cases**
Against P.R. C. U.S. E.U. 25
Against Korea U.S. E.U.
Against C. Taipei U.S. E.U.
6
1
4
1
3 6 2 23 29
1
3 5
1
2 3
12 17
1 2
4
2 33 60
4 8
Data Source: WTO Committee on Antidumping Practices, 2002. Notes: * Basis for determination codes HM – Denotes use in the Home Market in determining normal value TM – Denotes use of a specified Third country Market CV – Constructed Value of factors from a specified country COP – Indicates a Cost of Production analysis FA – Indicates Facts Available NME – Indicates use of Non-Market Economy methodology NA – Not available ** In some cases more than one determination method can be used.
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Table 3 Selected Antidumping Actions Initiated by the U.S. Against China For the period of July to December 2001 Product
Car Windshield Glass Brake Rotors Cased Pencils Certain Carbon Steel Pipe Creatine Monohydrate Folding Gift Boxes Folding metal Chairs and Tables Foundry Coke Products Fresh Garlic (3 cases) Freshwater Crawfish Tail Meat Heavy Forged Hand Tools (3 cases) Honey Hot-rolled Steel Flat Products Persulfates Presved Mushroom (4 cases) Steel Concrete Reinforcing Bars Tapered Roller Bearings Integrated elec. Lamps Ferro Molybdenum Gas-fuelled pocket lighters Zinc Oxides
Date of Initiation
Prov. Measures Dumping Margin
Dumped Imports Basis of as % Domestic # of Firms Determination Consumption charged Antidumping Actions by the U.S.
3/27/2001 11/27/2000 1/26/2000
.05-125% 0.00% 53.65%
NA NA NA
2 firms 3 firms 33 firms
NA NME NA
6/21/2001
0-36.42%
NA
3 firms
NA
3/16/2001 3/19/2001
8.13% 14.05-164.75%
NA NA
1 firm 3 firms
NA NME
12/3/2001
0-134.77%
NA
2 firms
NA
03/18/01
76.19-214.89%
NA
4 firms
NME
08/24/01
NA
NA
7 firms
NME
26/12/01
7.23%
NA
27 firms
NME
11/07/00 08/02/01
0.00-98.77% 22.05-67.44%
NA NA
5 firma 3 firms
NME NME
05/01/01 08/20/01
64.20-90.83% 0-119.02
NA NA
3 firms 2 firms
NME NME
11/07/00
0-121.33%
NA
28 firms
NME
01/30/01
20.89-59.98%
.02%
1 firm
NME
1.76%-3.84% NA Antidumping Actions by E.U.
2 firms
NME
11/29/01
02/08/01 11/09/00
0-66.1% 3.6—43.5%
NA 43.3%
NA NA
05/05/00
NA
1.3%
NA
09/18/01
NA
18.4%
NA
TM (Mexico) HM/CV TM (USA) HM/CV TM (Philippine)
Data Source: World Trade organization, Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, G/ADP/N/85/USA (March 18 2002).
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TM (USA) HM/CV
