Comedic Departure: A Rhetorical Approach to Humor

Comedic Departure: A Rhetorical Approach to Humor Theory by Christopher Adamczyk, B.A. A Thesis In Communication Studies Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Texas Tech University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts Approved Mark Gring Chair of Committee Katie Langford Patrick Hughes Mark Sheridan Dean of the Graduate School

May, 2014

© 2014, Christopher Adamczyk

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS First and foremost, I cannot thank my parents enough for pushing me to pursue the type of life that makes me happiest. Dad, thank you for always expecting more of me than I was willing to give; pushing me to the edge. Mom, thank you for telling Dad to not push so hard when I needed a break, and thank you for always being my biggest fan. I owe you both a fishing trip and dinner, respectively. I love you both. Moreover, a special thanks to all of my close friends and acquaintances without whom I would have finished this thesis months ago. I would not have it any other way. GUNS UP!

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TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS………………………………………………..ii ABSTRACT………………………………………………………………..vi PROLOGUE…………………………………………………………..........1 I. CURRENT LITERATURE AND IMPLICATIONS………………….5 History of and Processes within Rhetorical Studies on Humor…………………...5 Current Landscape of the Field…………………………………………………..13 Theories of Superiority…………………………………………………………..13 Theories of Relief………………………………………………………………..15 Theories of Incongruity…………………………………………………………..18 Problems Resulting from Theoretical Division………………………………….20 Effects on the Criticism of Humorous Artifacts…………………………………22 Humor Theory as A Priori Proof………………………………………………...26 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………….28

II. THE HISTORICAL RHETORCIAL-METHOD………………….31 Criticisms of the Historical-Rhetorical Method…………………………………32 The Historical-Rhetorical Method Outside of American Academia……………37 The Simultaneous use of History and Rhetoric…………………………………40 Rhetoric and Historiography…………………………………………………….45 Continuity and Discontinuity……………………………………………………47 The Selection of Theory…………………………………………………………50 iii

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………….…52

III. SURVEY………………………………………………………………54 Structure………………………………………………………………………….54 Classical Theories of the Humorous……………………………………………..56 Plato……………………………………………………………………...56 Aristotle………………………………………………………………….66 Cicero……………………………………………………………………85 Medieval and Renaissance Theories of the Humorous…………………………102 Trissino and Madius…………………………………………………….104 Erasmus…………………………………………………………………107 Modern Theories of the Humorous……………………………………………..115 Hobbes and Hutchenson………………………………………………..115 Bergson…………………………………………………………………119 Burke……………………………………………………………………121 Spencer and Freud..……………………………………………………..123 Morreall…………………………………………………………………125 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………...126

IV. COMPARISONS AND IMPLICATIONS…………………………128 Theories of Incongruity and Theories of Superiority…………………………..129 Theories of Incongruity and Theories of Relief………………………………...132 Theories of Relief and Theories of Superiority………………………………...135 Implications of Connections Characterized by Incongruity……………………138 iv

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 A Theory of Departure…………………………………………………………139 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………...141

V. IMPLICATIONS ON RHETORICAL CRITICISM……………...144 Recap of Historical Problems…………………………………………………..144 The Aim of Departure Theory………………………………………………….145 The Nature of Language………………………………………………………..147 Context and Criticism…………………………………………………………..149 Context and Humorous Artifacts………………………………………………153 Departure Theory as Solution………………………………………………….155 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………...158 VI. EPILOGUE……………………………………………………………….………160 The Potential of Future Research……………………………………………….161 Limitations……………………………………………………………………...164 Closing Thought………………………………………………………………..166

BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………………….167

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ABSTRACT The theoretical study of humor via rhetoric and philosophy has been an enterprise undertaken by a plethora of individuals. Beginning in ancient times and continuing on until the present, this continuous study has produced numerous frameworks in which to study the humorous process. This essay explores many of the most notable of these theoretical approaches in an attempt to search for commonality, and in turn a new theoretical understanding of the comic. The result of this survey points towards an understanding of humor which is rooted in the enthymematic assumptions of the context in which it is created, thus opening a new avenue of understanding in regards to both humor theory and humorous texts.

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PROLOGUE In the words of Marvin Herrick, “the theory of comedy in general is one of the most elusive and tenuous among all theories of polite learning, and certainly the theory of what makes people laugh is the most baffling element in comedy.”1 These words still ring as true today as they did when they were originally published, and to be certain, within the field of rhetorical study of humor and comedy, not much has changed since Herrick penned those words in 1949. In fairness, however, philosophers and rhetoricians alike have struggled to define and articulate countless concepts since the very beginning of educated thought, many of which seem to possess an inherent importance to the essence of humanity that the study of humor cannot easily emulate. In reference to this backgrounding of the study of humor, George Meredith in Essay on Comedy wrote, “comedy was never one of the most honored of the muses…it rolled in shouting under the divine protection of the Son of the Wine-jar, as Dionysus is made to proclaim himself by Aristophanes.”2 The result of this contrast between humor and other ideas can be seen not only in the rhetorical literature written over the centuries, but also in modern writings, as well as in the foci of the field of rhetoric. Simply put, humor dwells in the shadow of conceptual giants. For this author, the simple fact humor finds itself in such a situation is what has piqued curiosity regarding the topic. To argue humorous material does not play a 1

Marvin Herrick, “The Theory of the Laughable in the Sixteenth Century,” The Quarterly Journal of Speech 35, no. 1 (1949): 1-16. 2

George Meredith, Essay on Comedy. (Lewisburg: Bucknell, 1998), 4-5. 1

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 significant role in the day-to-day life of a significant majority of individuals would truly be a mistake. From satire pertaining to politics to situational comedies commenting upon social norms, it is difficult to find any situation which humor does not eventually broach. The comedic enterprise approaches even the tragic events of September 11, 2001 nearly as quickly as they occur. In this case, Gilbert Gottfried, a well-known American comedian famous for appearing on Comedy Central’s roasts, performs at the Friars Club Roast of Hugh Hefner three weeks after the events of 9/11. While on stage near the end of his act, Gottfried jokes that he must leave soon because he does not want to miss his flight and the airline told him "they…have to stop at the Empire State Building first."3 While this joke receives little acclaim from the audience at the roast or from the media at large, and eventually results in Gottfried becoming a comedic pariah for an extended period of time, it still demonstrates the power of humor to both comment upon and challenge closely held perceptions of even the most traumatizing events. Regardless of the outcome Gottfried’s joke garners, it still forces a discussion. With such power at its disposal, it is surprising that humor finds itself in a situation where the academic world is unable to fully articulate what it is exactly that makes humor work, and moreover, what factors contribute to its effectiveness. While many write on humor’s role in particular contexts, there stands a striking hole in rhetorical research regarding the linguistic processes that drive comedy. This void

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Katsilometes, “In retrospect, Gilbert Gottfried’s 9/11 joke was maybe ‘too soon’,” Las Vegas Sun, last modified February 23, 2011, http://www.lasvegassun.com/blogs/kats-report/2011/feb/23/retrospect-gilbert-gottfrieds911-joke-was-maybe-t/ 2

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 presents a tantalizing opportunity to explore humor at deeper level; one which will not only allow a more thorough understanding of comedy to be obtained, but also allows such an understanding to enhance other areas of the rhetorical enterprise. This potential not only intrigues me, but points to an obvious need in rhetorical research while striving to fill it. Currently, however, this void remains apparent, and as this essay argues, humor yet sits in the shadow of conceptual giants. Despite this presumptive weakness, humor has found itself mulled over by a countless number of the greatest minds in the history of academia. From Plato to Burke, and even among our own contemporaries, the subject of humor has oft proven irresistible to discourses on the nature of rhetoric, earning itself mention in many of the well-known writings on rhetorical theory. Perhaps this is due to the slippery nature of humor itself; or to the reality that “few sweeping generalizations can be made about humor that are neither controversial or trivially false.”4 Doubtlessly, the fact that humor leaves so much of its nature veiled in ambiguity makes it a tempting object to analyze, even if such work is basic at best. In light of such a reality, this essay seeks to fill the chasm left by previous rhetorical writers. The accomplishment of this task lays in several steps, and in turn, chapters. Chapter One of this thesis articulates, in a detailed manner, the problems inherent in the current study of humor through a review of recent literature and thought on the matter. Such a discussion includes an overview of problems inherent in the current

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Tony Veale, “Incongruity in humor: Root cause or epiphenomenon?,” Humor 17, no. 4 (2004): 419-428. 3

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 divisions of comedy theory, issues found in the critique of humorous artifacts, as well as problems found in the execution of practical studies on the nature of humor. Moreover, a discussion of such literature and the problems inherent within it leads to the illumination of a course of research that aims to help eliminate many of these issues. Chapter two of this thesis seeks to further articulate the methodological approach needed to embark down the path illuminated in Chapter one. Namely, an approach to a historical-rhetorical survey of major theoretical writings on comedy is articulated and justified as the most appropriate course of action. Chapter three comprises the analysis articulated in Chapter two. This survey ranges from writings by Plato to work done in the modern period by authors such as Morreall. Chapter four gives a detailed analysis of the survey Chapter five undertakes in an effort to search for commonalities between previous humor theories, and in turn, articulates a new approach to the understanding of the fundamental mechanisms at work in the humorous process and concludes with how these mechanisms relate to the effectiveness of humor in given situation.

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CHAPTER I CURRENT LITERATURE AND IMPLICATIONS This chapter explores current literature on the subject of humor and its relationship to rhetoric. Specifically, this chapter articulates the current state of the field in regards to writings on humor and comedy, outlining both the structure of comedic theory as well as prevalent approaches to the criticism of comedic artifacts. Naturally, this process begins by tracing the history of scholastic approaches, both rhetorical and from fields closely related to rhetoric, regarding humor. Through an analysis of said scholarship, this chapter is then able to identify specific trends found within the study of humor and in turn analyzes the effect of these trends on the enterprise of comedic scholarship, thus allowing suggestions pertaining to how these problems may be mitigated through research to be made.

History of and Processes within Rhetorical Studies on Humor Michael Mulkay, in On Humor, argues that when writing on humor “there are inherent difficulties and the constant danger of misinterpretation.”5 Echoing on this sentiment, Leacock, in his book Humor and Humanity, writes that “it is difficult to make a definition of humor, or of the ludicrous, or any cognate terms, short enough for easy

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Michael Mulkay, On Humor: Its Nature and Its Place in Modern Society. (Cambrige: Blackwell, 1988), 7. 5

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 understanding, without leaving out important considerations.”6 This difficult to escape characterization of humor in many ways has led directly to the landscape of the field. Particularly in the modern era, the vast bulk of scholarship that attempts to touch on humor in some manner merely results in an anthology of past theoretical approaches or critiques of humorous artifacts. With the exception of small minority, little has been done further articulate the base functions of humor’s operation. Throughout the early twentieth-century the primary approach to the study of the humorous finds itself in the propagation of vast collections of philosophical writings on humor. Examples of this include works such as Stephen Leacock’s Humor and Humanity and Lane Cooper’s An Aristotelian Theory of Comedy, both of whose primary aim is the assembly and analysis of previously discussed theories, not the further articulation of humor theory. The propagation of such anthologies opens the door for another type of humorous scholarship. Namely, anthologies of comic theories allow the writing of critiques of humorous artifacts to become much more widespread, particularly within the contemporary context, and especially within the field of communication and rhetoric. John Limon’s widely popular book Stand-up Comedy in Theory, or, Abjection in America is a prime example of such scholarship. Interestingly, much of the recent rhetorical scholarship on the humorous, such as Limon’s, also finds itself drawing on theoretical frameworks that are not expressly humorous in nature, thus leading to the practical outcomes of both an intermixing of humorous and non-humorous theoretical

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Stephen Leacock, Humor and Humanity. (New York: Henry Holt and Company,

1932), 3. 6

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 frameworks as well as scholarship on the humorous which draws upon virtually no humor theory. Although this practice does not intrinsically discredit scholarship, at face value, it does little to further articulate the inner mechanisms of comedy. In a sense, it seems as if the study of the comedic within language finds itself traveling in a spiral which begins with creating collections of humor theory, moves on to using these collections to critique, and again turns to creating collections when it seems as if the critiques have collided directly with the slippery definition of humor. Samuel Cox argues: Humor lies in a forged tale; in puns and phrases; in ambiguities of sense; in an odd trope; in a sly question; in a smart answer; in a quirkish reason; in a shrewed intimation; in cunning diversion, clever retort, bold speech, tart irony, lusty hyperbole, plausible reconciliation of contradictions, acute nonsense, counterfeit speech, scenic representation of persons or things, affected simplicity, presumptuous bluntness, lucky or strange hits, crafty wresting of obvious matter to the purpose, and rovings of fancy and wingdings of language.7 It is from the endless complexity of humor, highlighted by Cox in Why We Laugh, that this cyclical nature of the study of humor derives. Thus, whenever an author composes theoretical approach to humor, it seems to instantly appear nuanced when seen in relation to the majority of comic situations possible. For example, Plato’s writings on the nature of humor, which tend to focus on feelings superiority felt by the user of humorous material, show nuances when viewed in context with the sheer volume of potential humorous situations. The result, simply put, is that Plato’s ideas on the comedic fail to account for certain situations, such as an instance where an individual finds humor in the location of an object which has been misplaced. Although Plato certainly attempts to 7

Samuel Cox. Why We Laugh. (New York: Benjamin Blom, 1969), 15. 7

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 formulate a universal explanation for the inner-workings of the humorous, the practical application of the theory outside of the initial Platonic purview appears dubious at best. Beyond this, the continuous multiplication of comedic contexts and forms for the transmission of the humorous also creates a difficult obstacle to surpass. Theories, once created, run the risk of quickly falling by the wayside as a result of the proliferation of new humorous modalities, or ways in which humor can transmit. The emergences of new ways to transmit the humorous are difficult to predict phenomena, and often results in the creation of a myriad of previously non-existent comedic forms. Perhaps the most prominent, as well as recent, example of this can be found in the emergence of stand-up comedy in the English speaking world during the mid-twentieth century, particularly within the United States. This particular form of transmission features a single individual, known as a comedian, who, in some form or another, conveys a humorous monologue to the audience. Mintz describes stand-up comedy as a “live performance in which a comedian tells jokes and/or behaves in a manner designed to generate laughter, or ridicule…at topics and social issues familiar to the audience.”8 More specifically, David Marc argues that the practice of stand-up comedy should be considered restricted to performances in a club or concert environment.9 Although it is possible that this type of interaction is found at the base level of a vast number of comic forms, such as theater or clowning, its emergence as the form of comedy associated with 8

Lawrence Mintz, “Stand-up comedy as social and cultural mediation,” American Quarterly 37, No. 1 (1985): 72. 9

David Marc, Comic Visions: Television, Comedy, and American Culture (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 1998), 10. 8

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 well-known comedians, such as George Carlin or Richard Pryor, is a far more recent phenomenon. Limon, in Stand-up Comedy in Theory, or Abjection in America, argues that most American stand-up comedy can trace its roots to the 1950s and 1960s, a time when approximately 80% of well-known comedians were males with Jewish, heterosexual male backgrounds.10 It was these performers who started the stand-up comedy revolution in the 1950s, helping to “demolish the old order of vaudevillian shtick.”11 The mainstream of stand-up did not long stay in the control of prominent comedians, however, and slowly new styles and approaches to the humorous helped to give context to countless comedians beginning in the 1960s and continuing on until the present. When viewed through the analogue of American stand-up comedy, the quick emergence and dominance of new forms of the comic, as mentioned previously, becomes a much easier concept to grasp. While many of the characteristics of American stand-up comedy are similar to previous forms of the comic, the new characteristics adopted by stand-up comedians (such as primary reliance on voice) fundamentally changed the practice of the art of comedy within the American context. As stated earlier, this presents a challenge for scholars who wish to theorize about the nature of comedy. New forms of the comedic fundamentally challenge older theories of the comedic due the tendency of comic theories to use immediate humor as a lens through which to view the idea of 10

John Limon. Stand-up Comedy in Theory, or, Abjection in America. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), 1-2. 11

James Sullivan. 7 Dirty Words: The Life and Crimes of George Carlin. (Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 2010), 3-4. 9

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 comedy. In this light, theories propagated in the immediate time before the stand-up revolution of the 1950s are suspect when juxtaposed with stand-up itself. For example, Henri Bergson’s famous Essay on Laughter, first published in 1900, seems to fall short in the explanation of stand-up comedy insofar that its focus is found in the idea of laughter as social corrective, as well as the “mechanical juxtaposed over the living.”12 Critchley argues that “Bergson’s account of laughter really comes alive when one thinks of silent cinema,” and then proceeds to give several examples of silent movie stars enacting principles within Bergson theoretical framework.13 Considering that Bergson’s book was published in 1900, a time which also saw the birth of cinema in America, it stands to reason that many of his conclusions regarding the nature of humor would tend to coincide with that burgeoning enterprise. Moreover, vaudeville and slapstick, the other dominant forms of humor at that particular time also seem to be exceptionally well-described by Bergson, given their physical nature and focus upon contrary activity. Thus, when taking Bergson’s theoretical framework and attempting to apply it to the newer humorous form found in stand-up comedy, it becomes a perfect illustration of one of the consistent problems in the study of humor. As new modes of humor are developed, existing theory is gathers together, finds itself analyzed, and is used in an

12

Simon Critchley. On Humour: Thinking in Action. (New York: Routledge, 2002), 55-56. 13

Simon Critchley. On Humour: Thinking in Action. (New York: Routledge,

2002), 57. 10

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 attempt to account for previously nonexistent forms. However, in the effort to rationalize the new forms, and certainly the humanities proclivity is to focus on its immediate surroundings, focus is nearly unanimously given to explaining new forms, as opposed to expanding older forms. Limon stands as exemplar of this process when he writes in the introduction of his book that his scholarship “does not exploit stand-up, but attempts to provide it with a theory – or a first approximation of one.”14 After this, he comments on his hope that his writing help to serve the future history on and discussion of stand-up comedy, illustrating a focus on the current. Although this propensity does not in any way invalidate the countless works of scholarship that have been written which somehow touch on the humorous, it is certainly in this manner that those who have studied humor over the years have failed to reach any far-reaching or long lasting conclusions on the nature of humor. Jacob Levine writes that “it is easy to understand why there is so much disagreement about humor; no pattern of human behavior is so full of paradoxes,” and given the inherent problems that the study of humor consistently presents to those who wish to study it, it is not difficult to understands this disposition.15 Interestingly, this has led a plethora of scholars to argue due its slippery nature, there can never be a single, unified theory of humor.16 In many ways, these considerations may be comedy’s saving grace. Many 14

John Limon. Stand-up Comedy in Theory, or, Abjection in America. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), 1. 15

Jacob Levine. Motivation in Humor. (New York: Atherton Press, 1969), 1.

16

Maurice Charney, introduction to Comedy: A Geographic and Historical Guide, ed. Maurice Charney (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2005), 2. 11

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 scholars echo the theme that taking humor seriously is a striking paradox, and with all possible candor, it is not difficult to understand why.17 In the mind, humor is naturally associated with what is funny, absurd, trivial, or even frivolous; in short, it can easily be viewed as an antithesis to true desire for understanding. Humor’s ability to be easily confounded with other types of study no doubt contributes to this. Cox discusses how humor finds itself cast in different light throughout various contexts, such as within the discussion of wit, sociology, race relations, body type, nationality, and art.18 Despite the vast amount of characterizations of humor across these contexts, however, Cox argues that “humor only differs in degree, not in kind.”19 This argument not only highlights how humor molds easily to the discussion of other topics, but also helps to affirm that, despite the widespread morphing of humor, there are still fundamental concepts that draw the entire enterprise together. Those underlying concepts are often easily overlooked in favor of other pursuits, however, and barring this ability of humor to reflect its user or its student, it is entirely possible that it may have merely become the toy of psychologists (as in, what are the psychological mechanisms of laughter), rather than the sphinx of rhetoric. Truly, what makes the rhetorical study of humor so intriguing lies in humor’s propensity to be found present in nearly every possible rhetorical context associated with humanity compounded with the elusive nature of a stable definition and theory. Frank MacHovec writes that “it is ironic that we are daily exposed to humor, and the world’s 17

Jerry Palmer. Taking Humour Seriously. (New York: Rutledge, 1994), 1-7.

18

Samuel Cox. Why We Laugh. (New York: Benjamin Blom, 1969), 19-28.

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Samuel Cox. Why We Laugh. (New York: Benjamin Blom, 1969), 18. 12

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 literature abounds with examples, yet humor eludes precise definition.”20 This is abundantly true. The cycle of humorous writing discussed earlier has given a vast aggregate of theoretical writing on humor, yet has not yielded a unified theory. Rather, numerous theories, each as unique as the author who formulated them, are the mainstay of humor scholarship. A survey of all of the theories ever proposed about humor would reveal the sheer magnitude of the task at hand when pontificating on what humor is, and how it relates to rhetoric.

Current Landscape of the Field The nuanced nature of the study of humor, however, has not prevented modern academics from trying to categorize existing theories of humor into easily defined groups. Surprisingly, as often is the case with humor, when one sits down in an attempt to familiarize him or herself with sum writings on humor, it becomes difficult to not pick up on certain, albeit small, commonalities that flow between many of the theories. The practical result of this phenomenon is the categorization of theoretical humor into three distinct categories: superiority theories, incongruity theories, and relief theories.

Theories of Superiority Superiority theories are generally considered the oldest conceptions of the nature of linguistic humor within the Western context. Generally, it is the Greeks, specifically Plato, who deserve credit for the proliferation of this theoretical leaning, although the 20

Frank MacHovec. Humor. (Springfield: Thomas, 1988), 1-2. 13

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 defense of this style continued on well after the demise of much of classical thought.21 Many authors, such as Critchley, argue that superiority theory maintains a tight hold on the study of humor until at least the beginning of the 18th century.22 Theories embodied by this school of thought tend to assert that we laugh because of our feelings of superiority over other people.23 In essence, this theoretical leaning posits that humor derives from “a sudden glory arising from a sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves by comparison with the infirmity of others…which would be forbidden to the virtuous guardians of Plato’s philosophical city.”24 Superiority theories do not simply limit themselves to feelings of superiority over others, however. Theoretically laughter could also induce itself through feelings of superiority over our former selves as well, and thus allows for humor to aid in personal growth and development. Pertinent examples of a superiority theory in action find themselves many societies’ basic humor. Richard Wiseman, creator of Laugh Lab, a quest to find the world’s funniest joke, provides an example for this type of theory in the following joke: A woman goes into a cafe with a duck. She puts the duck on a stool and sits next to it. The waiter comes over and says: “Hey! That's the ugliest pig that I have ever 21

John Morreall. The Philosophy of Laughter and Humor. (Albany: SUNY, 1987), 1-7. 22


2002), 3. 23



2002), 3. 14

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 seen.” The woman says: “It’s a duck, not a pig.” And the Waiter says: “I was talking to the duck.25 In this example, the superiority manifests itself in the relationship between the hearer of the joke and one of the characters within the joke itself. In particular, the punch (sometimes called the punch line), or the second part of the joke intended to create the impact, or realization, of humor, helps to create a feeling of superiority over the character of the joke by the hearer of the joke.26 Simply, by creating the illusion that a character in the joke, the lady with the duck, is ugly enough to warrant description as a pig, introduces a dynamic of superiority, which in turn results in those listening to the jokes sharing in this sense of superiority via finding an air of humor in the exchange.

Theories of Relief Relief theories tend to be a more recent phenomenon within the field of humor theory, with most relief theories not appearing until the advent of Freudian psychology and the ripples it sent streaming across the academic world. Despite this, however, the true beginning of relief theories of humor traces back to the work of Hubert Spencer, who described laughter as “pent up nervous energy.”27 Furthering Spencer’s assumption on the nature of the humorous, Freud theoretically treats humorous outbursts as the “venting 25

Wiseman, “Freudian funnies,” Laughlab, http://www.richardwiseman.com/LaughLab/super.html 26

Barry Blake. Playing with Words: Humor in the English Language. (Oakville: Equinox, 2007), 3-4. 27


2002), 3. 15

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 of excess nervous energy.”28 In many respects, the origins of these types of theories are by no means rhetorical insofar as their conception does not find itself within the field of rhetoric. In many ways these theoretical descriptions of humor relate little to rhetoric beyond their incidental relation to the nature of language. Thus, in a manner of speaking, they assume that language, or communication in general, as humor can finds cause through scenarios beyond language and in turn plays a vital role in the regulation of the biological via the mechanism of humor. In this sense, the way a society uses language, and thus rhetoric, relates to this particular theoretical approach, albeit in the loosest of senses. Despite this, the implications and spill-over of these theories into the field are certainly worth noting. In particular, viewing these theories in the context of humor theory in general could be most advantageous. In essence, when viewed in a rhetorical light, relief oriented theories help to explain how humor, as well as amusement, is the offshoot of discourse induced uncertainty. For example, the rhetorical viewpoints of Brown and his “Rhetoric of Social Intervention” would easily absorb this perspective on humor. Although Brown does not explicitly discuss humor within his writing, Brown’s notions of discourse-constructed ideologies being challenged by intervention would certainly fit well will the nervous release of tension, through humor. Relief theories in general attempt to put forth a universal causation in regards to humor, thus making all instances involving laughter explained by the theories in some way. However, it is still possible to find specific instances of humorous exchange that

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Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 express the theoretical school of thought particularly well. Richard Wiseman, again, provides an example to help illustrate a Freudian approach to the study of humor. A newly ordained priest is nervous about hearing confessions and asks an older priest to observe one of his sessions to give him some tips. After a few minutes of listening, the old priest suggests that they have a word. “I’ve got a few suggestions,” he says. “Try folding your arms over your chest and rub your chin with one hand.” The new priest tries this. “Very good,” says his senior. “Now try saying things like 'I see', 'I understand' and 'Yes, go on.'” The younger priest practices these sayings, too. “Well done,” says the older priest. “Don't you think that's better than slapping your knee and saying: “No way! What happened next?”29 In this example we can see an illustration of a humorous exchange that could help release excess energy, or tension, within specific situations. Wiseman argues that relief theories “represent another way in which people can release their pent-up thoughts in a socially acceptable way,” and thus release tension pent up within the mind. In the above example, those most inclined to laugh at the joke would be individuals who have experience the circumstances directly due to their identification with the tension discussed in the joke. Thus, those most inclined to find humor within the joke would be those who hear confession, namely, priests. This joke would not only allow them to release nervous energy in regards to the hearing of confession, but also nervous tension resulting from the inability to discuss said confessions. Moreover, this joke also illustrates relief theory insofar that it is not difficult to imagine the younger priest finding humor, and thus mental relief, in the veteran priest’s response to his inquiry.

29

Wiseman, “Freudian funnies,” Laughlab, http://www.richardwiseman.com/LaughLab/freud.html. 17

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 Theories of Incongruity Incongruity theories are currently the most numerous within the field of study. Finding their genesis in a modernist philosophy of language, specifically in Francis Hutcheson’s Reflections Upon Laughter, written in 1750, Incongruity Theories reflect a manner of approach to language that is far more methodological than the aforementioned schools of thought.30 Critchley, a proponent of these theories, argues that “humor is produced by the experience of a felt incongruity between what we know or expect to be the case and what actually happens in the joke, gag, jest or blague.”31 Thus, incongruity based theories trace the origin of linguistic humor to a perception of some form of incongruity.32 Importantly, incongruity theories also require that processes take place within an interaction that both the joke teller and the audience recognize. Joking, from this viewpoint, is a “specific and meaningful practice that the audience and joke teller recognize” and that “in order for the incongruity of the joke to be seen as such, there has to be congruence between joke structure and social structure.”33 In other words, this school of thought sees the cause of humor as the chasm between an expectation perceived in mind and actuality, expressly within a situation recognized by more than one

30


2002), 3. 31


2002), 3. 32


33


2002), 4. 18

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 participant as potentially humorous. That being said, the majority of these theoretical standpoints tend to focus on incongruity within language itself, and discuss little about incongruities outside of the spoken or written word. Perhaps the most obvious example of this theoretical leaning is in the act of standup comedy. Simply, stand-up comedy easily entails a situation that is expected to be humorous and rife with incongruity. For example, George Carlin’s well-known routine “Modern Man” from the book When Will Jesus Bring The Porkchops illustrates this point well: I'm a high-tech low-life. A cutting-edge, state-of-the-art, bi-coastal multi-tasker, and I can give you a gigabyte in a nanosecond. I'm new-wave, but I'm old-school; and my inner child is outward-bound. I'm a hot-wired, heat-seeking, warmhearted cool customer; voice-activated and bio-degradable. I interface with my database; my database is in cyberspace; so I'm interactive, I'm hyperactive, and from time to time I'm radioactive. Behind the eight ball, ahead of the curve, ridin' the wave, dodgin' the bullet, pushin' the envelope. I'm on point, on task, on message, and off drugs. I've got no need for coke and speed; I've got no urge to binge and purge. I'm in the moment, on the edge, over the top, but under the radar. A high-concept, low-profile, medium-range ballistic missionary. A street-wise smart bomb. A top-gun bottom-feeder. I wear power ties, I tell power lies, I take power naps, I run victory laps.34 In this example we find a large quantity of incongruity within a context that is expressly understood to be humorous. Phrases such as “high-tech low-life, “new wave but old school,” and “in the moment, on the edge, over the top, but under the radar” provide a measure of verbal incongruity insofar that the juxtaposition of opposites is not a typical pattern of speech. Moreover, the presentation of this routine in an oral form (stand-up comedy), as in Carlin’s 2005 HBO special Life is Worth Losing, also provides a measure 34

George Carlin. When Will Jesus Bring the Pork Chops? (New York: Hyperion,

2004), 3. 19

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 of incongruity within a context of expected humor. This aspect of incongruity derives from the use of poetry, which comprises the modern man routine, within the context of stand-up comedy, an arena which is not traditionally poetic. Thus, the presentation of poetry within this context produces an atmosphere on incongruity, which in turn, according to incongruity theories, opens the door for potential humor.

Problems Resulting from Theoretical Division As it stands, these are the primary divisions of theoretical lenses in the linguistic study of humor that are acknowledged by modern scholars. Although theories, when penned, do not always agree with one another, the theoretical clustering of ideas will tend to follow these lines, thus giving some semblance of structure to the study when retrospectively viewed from the context of this essay. Within these divisions are further theoretical subdivisions that are all in turn find definition by the base idea of the overarching theory. For example, divisions within incongruity theory are readily spotted and often discussed by humor scholars and include such notions as incongruity by resolution, incongruity by timing, incongruity by expression, and incongruity by structure.35 While all of these theoretical sub-arguments share incongruity at the base level, their disparate approaches to how such incongruity manifests itself within the comic situation vary vastly. This not only is indicative of the division within the study of humor, but also of loose connection found even within categorized sub-disciplines of the field. It is precisely such division that makes the study comedy independent of its subject 35

Simon Critchley. On Humour: Thinking in Action. (New York: Routledge, 2002), 6-14. 20

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 matter difficult at best. Other examples of sub-theoretical discord find themselves outside of incongruity theory. For instance, two theories on humor that are contained within the superiority group may not discuss superiority in the same manner, such as the Aristotelian and Platonic approaches. Each of these theoretical approaches presents the theme of superiority at their core, thus causing them to relate to one another than to a competing theory with, for example, incongruity at its core. That being said, however, the difference between the two that becomes apparent when they are juxtaposed with one another is marked. While Plato discusses humor derived from superiority as springing forth from specific differences in personality and purpose of the soul, Aristotle discusses humor via superiority as fundamentally rooted in seeing others an inferior. Thus, while these theoretical approaches certainly relate to one another by virtue of the theme of superiority, they still present a vast amount of difference in their approach to the description of the functions and mechanisms at work within the humorous enterprise. While these divisions found within the study of humor produce an atmosphere conducive to the study of humor from a nuanced perspective that is artifact centric, they do little to produce any further, or deeper, understanding of the nature of humor itself. In other words, while using a specific theoretical writing to analyze a comic situation may help to explain such an artifact in terms of the theory used, such an endeavor does little to expound on humor or its relationship to language and communication. Thus, we find ourselves again within the cycle of study in humor that leads from nuanced theory to critique and back again to nuanced theory derived from previous theories. 21


Effects on the Criticism of Humorous Artifacts How this process can be detrimental to the pursuit of a deeper understanding of humor, however, is best visible if observed through particular examples of particular cases. For instance, Don Waisanen’s essay entitled A Citizen’s Guides to Democracy Inaction: Jon Stewart and Stephen Colbert’s Comic Rhetorical Criticism provides an example of how comic theory within the field is used to further the understanding of an artifact without promoting a deeper understanding of humor itself. In this work, Waisanen discusses how the discourse of Jon Stewart and Stephen Colbert, two leading comedians who provide commentary on contemporary events, can be further explained by a comic, rhetorical analysis. In order to achieve this, the author uses Kenneth Burke’s notion of the comic frame in order to attempt a deeper understanding of the chosen discourse, and in turn concludes that the comedians successfully “reframe American political discourses using the three strategies of parodic polyglossia, satirical specificity, and contextual clash.”36 From these categories, as well as a deeper analysis of dialogue from the shows, Waisanen concludes that “Stewart and Colbert are models for the way in which playfulness can create space for civil political engagement. They teach their audiences to identify the logomachies of contemporary politics and media, which are always lurking in the symbolic nature of human affairs. As such, there is rhetorical and

36

Don J. Waisanen, "A citizen’s guides to democracy inaction: Jon Stewart and Stephen Colbert’s comic rhetorical criticism." Southern Communication Journal 74, no. 2 (2009): 119. 22

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 humanistic value in their practices.”37 Thus, what we see through this analysis of a comic artifact from the standpoint of a rhetorical comic theory is simply the wholesale acceptance of the theory in order to further a specified viewpoint on the artifact itself; in this case that it provides a beneficial social commentary and critique. Although this argument in many ways helps to explain the chosen objects of analysis in a deeper manner, they do little to expound on why these comic strategies are effective, or even, if so desired, how they could be applied outside the context from which they arose. Another example of this finds itself in the essay Saying “Ain’t” and Playing “Dixie”: Rhetoric and Comedy in Judge Priest, written by Gilberto Perez. In particular, this essay discusses how the character Judge Priest from the movie Judge Priest, a movie produced in 1934 and set in the time immediately after the American Civil War, asserts that the success of many films derives from the identification that finds itself between the audience and the characters. Importantly, however, the author argues that a major aspect of the creation of such identification finds itself in the use of humor. Perez writes that “the films close identification with the judge, and what he represents – the good and the not so good, the humanness of his character and the racism of his milieu – is combined with the distance of comedy.”38 The ability of the audience to connect with the character of Judge Priest is not only indicative of their desire to also be humane, but also of their 37

Don J. Waisanen, "A citizen’s guides to democracy inaction: Jon Stewart and Stephen Colbert’s comic rhetorical criticism." Southern Communication Journal 74, no. 2 (2009): 136. 38

Gilberto Perez, "Saying "Ain't" and Playing "Dixie": Rhetoric and Comedy in Judge Priest." Raritan 23, no. 4 (2004): 52.

23

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 realization of the similarities between their own time period and the context of the films setting – particularly the aspect of racism. This realization, Perez argues, helps them to engage the problems of their own world, and it is comedy that helps aid in this process. He writes that “comedy disturbs hierarchy. It brings down the high and gives play to the low. It recognizes the injustices of the hierarchy and holds them up to laughter.”39 Thus, again, what we see through this essay is another description of how humor can aid in particular processes in society by virtue of its various characteristics. As opposed to the previous study discussed, A Citizen’s Guides to Democracy Inaction: Jon Stewart and Stephen Colbert’s Comic Rhetorical Criticism, Perez’s essay does not tautologically approach the matter with any particular comic theory in mind, but begins with the principle that humorous rhetoric can help to expose discrepancies between truth and reality. “Comedy of Rhetoric takes place in the realm of the imperfect,” he writes, and “it recognizes that society has plays and that rhetoric must work with the flaws of society.”40 Thus, humor is primarily a tool of the discoverer of discrepancy (which certainly holds echoes of incongruity theory) in this approach. These assumptions, however, find themselves little discussed by the author and not explored or elaborated upon in any meaningful manner. Simply, they are assumed as true and then, in turn, used to analyze and cast judgment (again, political) upon an artifact.

39

Gilberto Perez, "Saying "Ain't" and Playing "Dixie": Rhetoric and Comedy in Judge Priest." Raritan 23, no. 4 (2004): 53. 40

Gilberto Perez, "Saying "Ain't" and Playing "Dixie": Rhetoric and Comedy in Judge Priest." Raritan 23, no. 4 (2004): 54.

24

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 This propensity for rhetorically oriented works to gloss over the theoretical implications of humor in favor of a discussion centered on something external to humor is not limited to essays that discuss more modern objects of analysis. Humor as Rhetoric and Cultural Argument, by Stephen Smith, for example, attempts to analyze an entire genre of humor in order show how humor can provide a catalyst for change in society, as well as serve as an argument for such a change. Specifically, Smith surveys humor produced in the southern United States, spanning from the colonial era to the modern era, and how it pertains to class, as well as race. In essence, Smith argues that the humor produced in the region both served as contributor to social change as well as an indicator that such change had taken place.41 As time progressed, he argues, humor became “no longer a vehicle for demeaning poor whites or a tool for controlling blacks,” but that “today’s writers present a much more egalitarian argument premised on the virtues of the ‘common folks.’”42 Thus, from this viewpoint, much like the argument of Perez, humor can be seen as serving a vital role for and as affecting change within society. Once again, however, there is little discussion of the implications of this assumption, as well as very little defense of the truth of the assumption about the nature of humor. The maximum extent of Smith’s discussion on the nature of humor comes when he writes that “humor is a part of the interpretation of life” and that “humor is often forceful and persuasive… and

41

Stephen A. Smith, "Humor as rhetoric and cultural argument." Journal Of American Culture 16, no. 2 (1993): 51. 42


Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 one of the more effective means of argument and persuasion in popular culture.”43 Although Smith makes a point of highlighting that his essay is “grounded in the belief that the stories we tell and hear influence our view of the world and that stories have unique narrative logic often more powerful than arguments,” there is no argument of connection between the power of the story and the persuasiveness of humor.44 Thus, what the reader is left to do is either imply the connection or assume the connection between the humor and the persuasive power of the stories is merely incidental. Neither of these potentials helps to illuminate the deeper nature of the humor at work within the analysis or makes an effort to connect to humorous potential discussed in other essays focused upon different contexts. In this case, again, what the reader finds is an artifact centric analysis of humor that uses a patchwork of assumptions on humor in order to advance a specified viewpoint on selected discourse. Humor Theory as A Priori Proof From this brief survey of rhetorical work on humor, another problem inherent with the study of humor arises. Namely, the use of an a priori selected theoretical framework or assumption about the nature of humor does little to explain the nature and mechanisms of humor in language. Moreover, readings of studies which incorporate the idea of humor on some level make it abundantly clear that many of these frameworks find themselves selected based on their ability to mesh with, and advance, a pre-existing 43



Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 argument. This fact not only seems contrary to the enterprise of criticism, if we assume that theoretical frameworks mean to illuminate discourse and not advance opinion, but equally detrimental to the study and understanding of humor itself. The sheer number of various, competing, and often contradictory theories put forth on the nature of the comic makes the selection of a theoretical approach tenuous at best. For example, if one was to replace the assumptions on humor found within Smith’s Humor as Rhetoric and Cultural Argument with, for instance, the Platonic assumptions on the nature of the comic, the entire nature of Smith’s argument must change, or risk falling apart. Given the lack of consensus between theories, this fact seems to beckon authors to engage the topic of humor more effectively before adopting a theoretical stance. Beyond this, given humor’s undeniable connection to language, other prudent action would involve exploration of the assumptions about language underlying a humor theory and the rhetorical theory with which it finds use. In all fairness, this thesis must admit that practice of rhetorical criticism is also hindered by disagreement about the nature of language. Thus, the analysis of any given artifact intrinsically involves the selection of a theoretical framework that meshes with some preexisting notion. Wichelns, at the birth of modern criticism, writes that “Rhetorical Criticism lies at the boundary of politics (in the broadest sense) and literature; its atmosphere is that of public life, its tools are that of literature, its concern is with ideas of the people influenced by their leaders. The effective wielder of public discourse, like the military man, belongs to social and political history, because he is one

27

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 of its makers.”45 This nature of the study of rhetoric forces the critic into a situation where they must acknowledge and deal with their own assumptions. The simple fact that countless critics throughout history do this is what has helped generate the vast amount of diversity in the field of communication, and with rhetorical theory and criticism in particular. Long standing discussions on the nature of rhetoric and language not only drive the field forward, but also force critics to explore the implications of theory before adopting it as a mode of analysis. Unfortunately, critics do not follow this same process when rhetoric turns its eye to the study of humor, a field which not only possesses all the enigma of rhetoric, but also layers it over with the slippery nature of comedy. The next step in the study of humor certainly involves a deep discussion of the relationship of humor to language, humor theory to humor theory, and humor to criticism. Although, as mentioned previously, a vast amount of work has been done by scholars in order to categorize and collect humor theory, such as John Morreall’s The Philosophy of Laughter and Humor, little work has been produced which compares, contrasts, and attempts to streamline humor theories in order to discover, imply and construct a deeper sense of the nature of the comic. Thus, the goal of this research is to undertake such a task.

Conclusion This chapter provides an overview of many aspects regarding the rhetorical study of humor. Primarily, its focus lies in discussing the recent history of, and approaches to, 45

Herbert Wichelns, “The Literary Criticism of Oratory,” In The Rhetorical Idiom: Essays in Rhetoric, Oratory, Language, and Drama, 5-42. n.p.: 1958. 28

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 the study of comedic theory and comedic artifacts. Through the analysis of this material, it has become possible to articulate and recognize particular trends found within the study of humor. Specifically, through a discussion of practices found in the compiling of humor theory, an illumination of the cyclical nature of comedic theory is obtained, thus drawing attention to problems inherent in the criticism of humorous artifacts. This includes, but is not limited to, a stagnation in the production of new theoretical approaches to humor, as well as harsh implications on the criticism of humorous artifacts, such as those discussed above. The practical call of this analysis is found in the need for a deeper, and more detailed, study of humor theory and it relationship to rhetoric to be undertaken. Importantly, such an undertaking will not only fill in a much needed gap of analysis within humor theory, but will also provide direction into how to most effectively produce rhetorical criticism in regards to a humorous object. Such a discussion would also enhance the practice of rhetorical criticism itself insofar that finding a manner which better allows the scholar to match humor theory with rhetorical theory and artifact in an effort to produce a more holistic view, and understanding, of discourse will allow the explorations of multiple dimensions. Just as rhetorical theory must be justified and tailored to the exploration of particular artifacts, so must humor theory, as an extension of the rhetorical, be conceived as interconnected with other thought within an argument, and not as an external form of justification or enhancement of an argument. In short, the task of a deeper exploration of the comic will aid in the construction of a new approach to the criticism of humorous artifacts that is rooted in a discourse’s myriad of implications. Thus, with the current state of comic theory, as well as the problems inherent in 29

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 the critique of humorous rhetorical artifacts, laid forth, this essay seeks to highlight and provide critique of the major rhetorical writings on humor, thus allowing an overview of the polemics of humor to be articulated, as well as discussed in manner that allows for commonalities and deeper mechanisms to be understood. Following the evolution and flow of these theoretical ideas and structures, this essay will then become able to highlight themes that exist between the theories and ideas that underlie the entire study, but may not be readily apparent, as well as provide well defined insight into the criticism of comedy.

30


CHAPTER II THE HISTORICAL-RHTORICAL METHOD The second chapter of this thesis aims to lay forth a methodological approach to a survey on major rhetorical writings regarding comedic theory. Chapter one makes clear he need of such an undertaking through its analysis of both the history and current state of rhetorical humor studies. Major reasons that drive the need for such a survey include compilation of major writings on the comedic enterprise without critical analysis of said writings, as well as the propensity of rhetorical research to use theories of humor as little more than justification for a priori assumptions about rhetorical artifacts. A critical survey of humor theory which draws out the fundamental linguistic mechanisms of humor helps to solve these issues in two ways. First, such an analysis helps to provide new approaches to the understanding of the comedic instead of further compiling what has becoming stagnate theory, as well as providing a rhetorical understanding of humor not rooted in quantifiable social science. Secondly, the results of such a survey help to push the critique of humorous artifacts in a direction that respects the true role and function of humor within them. Thus, in order to assure that this thesis carries out such a task in the most proper manner possible, this chapter summarizes and reviews major writings on the historicalrhetorical method of rhetorical scholarship. First, this chapter discusses common criticism of the rhetorical-historical method in order to quell concerns regarding its use and validity. Particularly, this portion of the chapter helps to establish the historical-rhetorical method within its proper context. Secondly, this chapter reviews literature pertaining to 31

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 the execution of the historical rhetorical method in order ascertain the nuances of its proper use. Two major aspects of this include the selection of theoretical texts this chapter analyses and the order in which the thesis analyzes these texts.

Criticisms of the Historical-Rhetorical Method In order to accomplish the task set forth in Chapter one, this research will be required to embark upon a less than often used method of rhetorical scholarship. Namely, this thesis must undertake an historical survey of significant rhetorically oriented work found in the area of humor studies in order to gain a better understanding of the fundamental nature of humor and how it potentially works within various discourses and contexts. Although this is not an oft used manner of rhetorical inquiry within the contemporary, and particularly the American context, the historical-rhetorical approach provides the most adequate mode of analysis to engage the questions posed by this essay. Criticism of this approach is not unheard of, however, and a common theme found within the long line of historical scholarship is one which pronounces the inadequacies of “mere historical scholarship” insofar that it cannot stand alone without the practice of criticism.46 Wrage, in Public Address: A Study in Social and Intellectual History, writes of historical-rhetorical scholarship writes that “is likely to result in an assortment of isolated, episodical, or even esoteric information which can make little claim to the advancement of the students general culture,” thus helping to construct a

46

M. Lane Bruner. "(E)merging Rhetorical Histories." Advances In The History Of Rhetoric 9, (2006): 175. 32

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 stance that holds historical-rhetorical scholarship as unfounded in its own right.47 While Wrage does not necessarily see the historical study of an issue or field as useless or unneeded in totality, he certainly argues that when left alone to its own devices such a study can be difficult to justify within a context where scholars expect to infer ideas beyond mere facts. Hart, in Contemporary Scholarship in Public Address: A Research Editorial, argues that “treating the history of public address as an endless assemblage of individual speakers and their individual rhetorical tics is a conceptually sorry enterprise,” and that “such a history becomes an intellectual version of People magazine and we, its readers, become voyeurs or, worse yet, idolaters.”48 This argument presents a harsh caricature of scholarship that focuses on history. It is a false characterizing of it as the equivalent to gossip in part due to its perceived inability to add anything meaningful to scholarly discussion. This is the height of post-enlightenment folly. It is from simplistic arguments like these from which a long history of scholarship leery towards the historical leaning springs; to be certain; it contains a justifiably valid concern. If all scholarship designs itself simply to state a known fact, then it would be difficult to imagine advancement in any field, including rhetoric, as being a viable course of action. In the end, it is difficult to deny that the mere recitation of historical fact does not lead to any deeper understanding of the rhetorical when we do not explore such fact at a deeper level. Despite this, there is certainly need for rhetorical history, lest a void be 47

E.J. Wrage, “Public Address: A Study in Social and Intellectual History.” Quarterly Journal Of Speech 33, No. 4: 451. 48

Roderick P. Hart, "Contemporary Scholarship in Public Address: A Research Editorial." Western Journal Of Speech Communication 50, no. 3 (1986): 287. 33

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 left within rhetorical scholarship itself. Robert Gunderson, in Reflections on History and Rhetorical Criticism, writes that “though historians still claim much of the world’s knowledge as their particular academic oyster, they have not specialized in the history of speechmaking, or in the study of how words and symbols are used to influence behavior and events, thus leaving rhetorical scholars free to write their own history.”49 The absence of such a history within the rhetorically related disciplines, particularly history, beckons the rhetorician to write, and at the very least consider the role of, as well as need for, forms of rhetorical history in regards to the various topics discussed in the field. In many ways the role of history within the rhetorical context is both needed and necessary, with their seeming divorce in the contemporary era being a story contrary to the historical norm. Gunderson touches upon this fact when he writes about rhetoric and history in ancient mythology: Mythology personifies history and rhetoric in Clio and Calliope, daughters of the awesome Zeus and Mnemosyne, goddess of memory. As muses, these sprightly and somewhat saucy sisters promoted epic poetry and oratory. In classical mythology they resembled identical twins, but in the departmentalized world of today, they resemble separate disciplines. Yet there is still an important similarity. Both rhetorical critic and historian must pry beneath the surface of events to discover the social, psychological, and economic forces motivating behavior.50 The presence of historical precedent in regards to the intermingling of rhetoric and history helps to further highlight the potential and validity of such forms of research. 49

Robert G. Gunderson, "Reflections on History and Rhetorical Criticism." Communication Education 35, no. 4 (1986): 408. 50


Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 What seems of particular interest is the similarity of goal, what Gunderson refers to as the need to look beneath the facts that exists between aspects of the two modes of research. From this, it stands to reason that the intermingling of rhetorical and historical methods of scholarship are co-beneficial. Perhaps the best know writing on this subject is found in Barnet Baskerville’s Must We All Be “Rhetorical Critics?,” which is written in defense of historical scholarship of rhetoric at a time when the field is increasingly being pushed in the direction of criticism. Baskerville’s primary focus is not on the importance of historical scholarship in and of itself, but instead is laid upon “emphasizing that the work of the historian of public address and that of the rhetorical critic are complementary, that both are worthy scholarly enterprises, and that neither should be elevated above the other in our academic scale of values.”51 Moreover, he describes the effort to separate the critic and historian as a “singularly profitless endeavor” as a result of their interconnectedness and, upon closer inspection; this is a difficult argument to surmount.52 Baskerville continues on to provide a myriad of situations where the line between history and criticism is blurred to the point that a distinction is difficult to distinguish. “The historian who goes beyond the production of a mere chronicle must interpret,” he argues, “and this,

51

Barnet Baskerville, "Must We All Be 'Rhetorical Critics'?" Quarterly Journal Of Speech 63, no. 2 (1977): 107-108. 52

Barnet Baskerville, "Must We All Be 'Rhetorical Critics'?" Quarterly Journal Of Speech 63, no. 2 (1977): 110. 35

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 surely, is a critical function.”53 Conversely, the critic who attempts to explore contextual influence upon rhetorical choices, while not writing a pure history, straddles the same line, and it is because of this “the critic who has the greatest familiarity with the history of his subject – its foremost practitioners; its movements, eras, forms, and changing canons of judgment – is best equipped to discern quality in individual works.”54 Lloyd Bitzer’s The Rhetorical Situation also provides compelling evidence that the relationship between history and criticism may have been hastily characterized within rhetorical scholarship. In this essay, Bitzer argues that “the presence of rhetorical discourse obviously indicates the presence of a rhetorical situation” insofar that “a particular discourse comes into existence because of some specific condition or situation which invites utterance.”55 Although Bitzer is not asserting that history creates discourse (thus subjugating rhetoric to history), he does assert that a situation gains its “characteras-rhetorical” from the contextual reality that generates it.56 The implication here is that while current events do not directly build rhetorical discourse, they do provide an element of characterization and, if Bitzer is correct to the fullest, an ideal course of action for any given rhetor to follow. With this vantage point in mind, it is difficult to contend that

53



Llyod Bitzer, “The Rhetorical Situation.” Philosophy and Rhetoric 1, (1968): 1-

56

Llyod Bitzer, “The Rhetorical Situation.” Philosophy and Rhetoric 1, (1968): 3.

14.

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Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 historical and contextual understanding provides no illumination in the study of rhetoric, particularly when scholarly research moves beyond the simple recounting of events and engages in an attempt to understand historical contexts at a more personable level. Thus, the attempt to understand exigency within a rhetorical situation, and in turn history and context, must surely amplify the effectiveness of criticism of all types.

The Historical-Rhetorical Method Outside of American Academia Interestingly, outside of the American academic context, the division between history and rhetoric does not contain the same theoretical chasm. In his essay (E)merging Rhetorical Histories, Michael Bruner discusses the relationship between rhetoric and history in regards to the American and European academic contexts. Perhaps the most startling difference between the two approaches, argues Bruner, is the complete lack of the notion of a field of rhetoric in the world of European academia. He writes that while American scholars were debating the relationship between criticism and history, “it was the absence of a similar debate between rhetoricians and historians in Europe that, at least in hindsight, seems striking.”57 This does not mean, however, that there was disagreement in the non-European context. Instead of a schism between rhetorical scholars studying speech over the role of historical and contextual facts in the study of rhetoric, as in the American school of thought, European scholarship found its focus, and thus its disagreement, in the study and role of language, style, and argument (thus circumscribing

57


Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 the practical role of rhetoric).58 The practical result of this is that the American approach “was generally blind to the crucial importance of semiotics, structuralism (and later poststructuralism), and the unintentional and ideological dimensions of rhetoric.”59 In other words, while the focus that American scholarship was taking certainly allowed it become much more practical at face value, the absence of a strong connection with outside context (such as social conditions or history) prevented it from taking a deeper look into the nature of discourse at large. Conversely, the European approach seems to lack a certain practicality.60 While this reference to two varying rhetorical traditions may seem trivial at first glance when viewed in light of a methodological discussion, a further investigation of these differences reveals quite the opposite. What are most important to bring to light from this juxtaposition of two schools of thought are the scholars and works produced within the European context. Names such as Foucault, Derrida, and Saussure, born of the European tradition, find themselves celebrated in the contemporary culture of American rhetorical criticism for their approaches to the discussion of language and communication, and in turn, their ideas on rhetoric, despite the breadth of their overall scholarly focus. Poignantly, these scholars, as well as others whose writings have become prevalent, did not consider themselves rhetoricians insofar as the American academic 58




Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 context defines the practice of rhetoric. Instead, scholars like Foucault, whose work is so heavily used by postmodern oriented rhetorical critics, was seen as an historian; arguably, one with a sociological leaning. Thus, from this we can begin to see the close relationship that can exist between the rhetorical and historical approaches if the two methods are allowed to intermingle and interact with one another. This is not to say that the historical, in and of itself, is an acceptable method to approach the study of particular aspects of rhetoric (although such work can be necessary at times), but instead to acknowledge that “all subjects of rhetorical study are inherently historical, whether they occurred one minute or a thousand years ago.”61 This, in the end, is the chief explanation for the success of rhetorical thought from varied traditions finding a warm reception in American scholarship. If the schism between history and rhetoric were as deep as some writers would have the field believe, and if the effort to unite history and forms of rhetoric was truly a “profound mistake” and history and rhetoric should pursued and judged by “varying criteria,” as Bruce Gronbeck asserts, then it is difficult to imagine any measure of success for rhetoric grown of an historical tradition.62 Instead, we find quite the opposite. While in many respects the effort to purge history still remains strong, references to historically rich rhetoric abound in writing.

61

Stephen E. Lucas, "The Schism in Rhetorical Scholarship." Quarterly Journal Of Speech 67, no. 1 (1981): 20. 62

Bruce E. Gronbeck, "Rhetorical History and Rhetorical Criticism: A Distinction." Speech Teacher 24, no. 4 (1975): 310. 39

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 The Simultaneous use of History and Rhetoric It seems then that the true task at hand, at least methodologically, is to articulate a characterization of a functional manner to approach the historical and rhetorical simultaneously. While Gronbeck argues for the inability of criticism to merge with the historical, he does attempt to provide a set of simple guidelines for approaching either enterprise. Historical-rhetorical writing, he argues, has three main goals: appreciation, generation of theory, and historical explanation.63 The appreciation of the historical, he argues, is rooted in humanity’s “insatiable desire to know and understand its collective past.”64 Thus, in order to feed this curiosity, works primarily composed of historical fact find themselves needed. Historical explanation follows much in this same line. Gronbeck argues that human beings are enamored with searching for “systematic, predictive generalizations” about the world around them, which in turn leads them to search for explicative factors related to historical events.65 Thus, historical-rhetorical scholarship, on some level, should aim to accomplish this goal as well. While these two goals do help to provide historical-rhetorical scholarship a measure of legitimacy at face value, the most important point that Gronbeck proposes find itself in an argument for the generation of theory. From this point of view, historical-

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Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 rhetorical work provides a platform for theoretical implications to be discovered, and in turn tested, thus giving historical-rhetorical work a “pre-scientific function.”66 While the diction of this argument may initially seem foreign to the field of rhetoric insofar that it invokes thoughts of a more rigorous scientific method, further examination shows the basic principle to be accurate, particularly when seen in terms of the historical-rhetorical. Rhetorical theorist in general provide a prescientific function, whereas rhetorical critics can be seen as providing an echo of the scientific function itself via the use and implication of theoretical arguments and justifications within the analysis of any given rhetorical artifact. Although such a characterization may draw the scorn of some rhetorical critics due to the implication of a sort of a priori framework, it is important to remember that this is not the sole argument presented. Moreover, while some works of criticism may be used to validate or invalidate a particular, expressly stated and selected theoretical argument, it is important to remember that other works of criticism, such as close-textual analysis, which would counter argue that meaning and theory emerges from the artifact, still in most cases are supporting previously drafted theoretical work, albeit in a far more indirect and open manner. It is in this way, though loose it may be, that criticism can help to provide justification for the existence of a theory and that the rhetorical-historical, via its ability to produce theoretical insight, plays a vital role in all aspects of rhetorical thought in general, thus aiding in the justification for its existence as a methodological approach.

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Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 James Darsey, in his essay Must We All Be Rhetorical Theorists?: An AntiDemocratic Inquiry, which stands as a decades after response to Baskerville’s Must We All Be Rhetorical Theorist, responds quite negatively to this characterization of the process found deep within the field of rhetoric. Through a discussion of the process highlighted above, which focuses in particular on Hart’s discussion of six problems found in rhetorical scholarship, Darsey determines that to follow a paradigm in which theory justifies criticism and, conversely, criticism justifies theory, is truly to follow the lead of social science.67 While Darsey writes this in an attempt to move criticism away from this practice or at the very least urge rhetorical critics to consider writing that does not strip artifacts down to their bare essentials, the mere existence of his essay confirms the existence of such a process working within the field of rhetoric. Simply, it is Darsey’s response to the reality that he sees which confirms the discussed. In essence, Darsey asserts that rhetorical critiques should highlight the “uniqueness” of a rhetorical object, as well as discuss its relative value in society from a “humanistic standpoint,” which is an argument that rings true with countless critics.68 It does not, however, discredit the practice of theory, and instead simply justifies the practice of non-overtly-theoretical criticism (though it would be difficult to argue that criticism can exist on its own without theory) being a needed for scholarship. Thus, it seems that the answer to Darsey’s question “must we all be rhetorical theorists?” is “no,” but with the caveat that some us of 67

James Darsey, "Must we all be rhetorical theorists?: An anti-democratic inquiry." Western Journal Of Communication 58, no. 3 (1994): 166. 68

James Darsey, "Must we all be rhetorical theorists?: An anti-democratic inquiry." Western Journal Of Communication 58, no. 3 (1994): 168. 42

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 must be. In the end, the theoretical-critical process remains as a necessary, if sometimes shunned, enterprise. Gronbeck’s theoretical justification for the existence of a history centered approach to rhetoric distinctly ties it to theoretical rhetoric more than any other aspect of the field. Whereas other scholars who write about the role of history in rhetorical scholarship seem to be chiefly concerned with niche environments of history within criticism and the expansion of such arguments to the rest of the field, Gronbeck argues for a rhetorical-historical method extrinsic to criticism as a whole, thus allowing for theoretical inroads to manifest themselves. This, by far, is the most important characterization of those he presents in Rhetorical History and Rhetorical Criticism: A Distinction. While the notions of rhetorical-historical scholarship as rooted in appreciation and historical explanation are certainly noble endeavors, they do not seem to provide any special meaning beyond merely existing to exist. In other words, rhetorical scholarship simply based upon historical explanation or appreciation falls victim to the characterization that others have given rhetorical-historical methods in general, namely that this approach lacks sufficient dimension for adequate rhetorical criticism, for it does not judge the worth or quality of a speech or speaker. The implication here is that these two criteria pale in comparison to the generation of theory due to the theoretical’s propensity to have effect upon all aspects of rhetorical scholarship. This viewpoint is particularly poignant when seen in light of the AmericanEuropean rhetorical schism discussed previously. Viewed through the loose model implicated by Gronbeck, what can be seen as happening is a theoretical discussion, 43

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 rooted in social circumstance and history, making its way to and enriching rhetorical criticism within another context. While there is some difficulty in seeing this process as flowing naturally due to the academic, and in many aspects cultural, separation of the two contexts, as well as our propensity to view thought within our own context as paramount, when a wide enough view is taken of the cross-cultural dialogue occurring over time, it becomes easy to implicate pre-scientific/scientific (again, these terms are used loosely) processes in the growth of the field of rhetoric as a whole. With this in mind, the importance of historical approaches in use in conjunction with the rhetorical becomes a much more obvious link. Importantly, traction for theoretical viewpoints and extra dimensions of analysis are not the only by-products of this process. Rhetorical criticism, as mentioned in the previous chapter, often turns a blind eye to the practice of critics using a critique to push what is arguably, in many cases, unsubstantiated opinion (particularly in regards to humor). Gunderson writes that “Rhetoricians, like other folks, are biased. Bias begins the instant one discovers relevant information. Those who claim to be objective usually have deceived themselves; or perhaps they may be simply insensitive.”69 However, he continues on to assert that “historical research can encourage a certain humility, a quality sometimes wanting in critics” and that “diligent scrutiny of primary sources will help prevent historical critics from misreading events.”70 Thus, we can begin to further understand the balance that historical perspectives can help to bring

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Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 to the study of rhetoric.

Rhetoric and Historiography The subject matter, goals, and approach of this thesis are particularly conducive to the use of a historical-rhetorical methodology. As mentioned earlier, this thesis seeks to overview major theoretical writings on the nature of humor in an effort to deduce new theoretical implications as well as provide a more sustained direction for those who engage in humor research to follow. This task is particularly well suited to a historical approach which, as highlighted, allows for theoretical emergence as well as provides starting points for the beginning of analysis by rhetorical critics. The primary difference between the methodological intentions of this thesis and the majority of arguments for historical-rhetorical scholarship lies in the substance of the primary sources surveyed. While most arguments for historical scholarship centers upon the need for surveys of what can be seen as more obvious rhetorical artifacts, such as collections of oratory or instances of public discourse over a period of time, the present research intends to survey theory itself. Although this approach presents a different path at face value than other approaches to the historical-rhetorical, it certainly presents a worthwhile interpretation of the principles presented by Gronbeck as well as a needed approach to humor theory via rhetoric. In regards to this, Carole Blair and Mary L. Kahl discuss the need to revisit large bodies of rhetorical, as well as related, theory in their essay Rhetoric and Historiography: Revising the History of Rhetorical Theory. “The historian of rhetoric occupies an 45

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 authorial role that is arguably the equivalent to that of the rhetorical critic,” they posit, and “while the critic’s traditional concern is ‘practical’ discourse and the historian’s province is ‘theoretical’ discourse, their roles are essentially similar.”71 This point of view again exemplifies the importance of the relationship of theory to historicalrhetorical scholarship, but also highlights a new road of study. Namely, instead of historical-rhetorical research being limited to the analysis of large segments of rhetorical artifacts, Blair and Kahl open up the enterprise the analysis of “theoretical discourse” as well. The justification provided for such an inclusion of theoretical discourse finds itself within the sheer amount of rhetorical theory at large. They argue that while “historians of rhetorical theory have traditionally considered their cannon to be a given,” the actual process of the determination of relative importance is far more complex, and thus in turn important to understand.72 Although the authors do not argue for a “rejection of traditional histories of rhetoric,” their observation does call for a “more reflective attitude towards designating materials as rhetorical theories.”73 In short, the process of historical-rhetorical analysis would not only allow the potentiality of the emergence of new rhetorical theory to take place, but allows the scholar engaging in the task to

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Carole Blair and Mary L. Kahl, "Introduction: Revising the History of Rhetorical Theory." Western Journal Of Speech Communication 54, no. 2 (1990): 148. 72



Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 undertake a deeper look into the process of text selection, as well as any “discourse” that may take place between the texts. Thus, in the end, a primary point of such analysis is “not to limit but to expand the domain of historical rhetorics” through engaging theories inter-textually and at face value.74

Continuity and Discontinuity In order that this task is undertook by the author with some semblance of method, Blair and Kahl discuss many factors that must be considered before embarking on theory based historical-rhetorical analysis. Two of the most important factors to consider find themselves in the way that theoretical writings are organized, once chosen. The authors argue that, generally, histories organize by either continuity or discontinuity, where continuous histories “present the field as a singular path of development or influence through time” and discontinuous histories “recognize major discontinuities in the development of rhetorical theories and maps large synchronous blocs or ‘systems’ of rhetorical theory.”75 Thus, what we find are two views, one dominated by chronological thought, and one dominated by a clustering of similar ideas, each presenting their own unique set of problems. Continuous histories are generally the most prevalent way of approaching the writing of an history of rhetorical theory. In the Western context, this manner of approach 74



Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 generally finds its genesis in the birth of Greek philosophical thought, particularly in the writings of Plato and, in turn, all work which in some manner stems from the writings of Plato, whether in an attempt to refute or support it. This process, however, is an exemplar of the primary flaw of continuous history. “The most important consequence,” argues Blair and Kahl, “is that the historian frequently eliminates from his/her consideration those historical theories or aspects of theories that do not resemble the original concept.” With this in mind, when looking at the traditional approach to the study of rhetoric in the Western world, what we find is a Greek centric path that eliminates, in most cases, the study of theory which little relates to the work of Plato somewhere in its lineage. Thus, the term “non-Western rhetorics” finds itself used in regards to the frameworks which do not fit in this system. As a result of this, anthologies of rhetorical theory that are produced eliminate theory which is not directly related, or relevant, to the original work, potentially weakening the overall understanding of how rhetoric works. Exemplar of this method is the work The Present State of Scholarship in the History of Rhetoric, by Lynee Galliet and Winifred Horner, which traces the art of rhetoric from the classical period to the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Discontinuous histories, while generally immune to the major flaw of the continuous, is not without its own problems. Blair and Kahl write that while “the discontinuous organizing theme appears to solve the problems of the continuity pattern, it actually falls prey to some of the same difficulties” due to need to elaborate upon similarity.76 Specifically, just as in the previous mode of organization, this method finds

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Carole Blair and Mary L. Kahl, "Introduction: Revising the History of 48

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 the need to choose theoretical frameworks for inclusion based upon their ability to “fit” with other frameworks chosen. The practical result of this is that “those rhetorical theories that may differ from most others, therefore, may be overlooked or artificially made to fit a particular historical pattern. In regards to this propensity, Schlib writes that there is a “tendency in many historians – including historians of rhetoric – to see particular texts merely as embodiments of some thesis about the past that they wish the flesh out.”77 In the end, what generally presents itself is a proclivity under this model to exclude approaches which do not fit the accepted categories, as well as a more driven desire to flush implications out of theoretical approaches, which are tenuous at best instead of accepting the work at face value.78 An example of a discontinuous approach is in Carl Burgchardt’s anthology Readings in Rhetorical Criticism, which organizes a cross section of major works in the field of rhetorical criticism by category, such as close textual criticism or genre criticism, with no eye to the chronological process at work behind these works. The practical result of the dichotomy of these two systems finds itself in the necessity of the historian to choose either one or the other when approaching their task. While an ideal method would provide a way of research that eliminated the potential marginalization of given theories, such an approach would also require that the all Rhetorical Theory." Western Journal Of Speech Communication 54, no. 2 (1990): 152. 77 John Schlib, "Differences, Displacements, and Disruptions: Toward Revisionary Histories of Rhetoric." Pre/Text: A Journal Of Rhetorical Theory 8, no. 1-2 (1987): 34. 78


Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 potential rhetorical theories were listed and discussed simultaneously and without reference to one another, thus making this an impractical endeavor in nearly any regard. In turn, “regardless of the choice of organizing principle, histories of rhetoric are faced with a challenge” concerning “principles of organization and discontinuity…inclusion and interpretation.”79 When approaching the study of rhetoric with a historical lens, these issues must be considered and weighed so that the most effective approach for the given situation is uncovered. While “neither method is to be defended as superior,” it can be certain that in particular instances one path may be more advisable than the other.80

The Selection of Theory A second important factor that Blair and Kahl argue we must consider when engaging in the historical-rhetorical approach of theory deals with selection of theory for inclusion in any given analysis. In particular, they assert that rhetorical theories for historical analysis should not be selected using criteria espoused by other fields. “Although rhetoric is clearly related to other disciplines,” they write, “to evaluate rhetorical theories in relation to those [other] disciplines is a questionable enterprise.”81 Doing so not only grants dominance of judgment to the deciding field, but also runs the

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Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 risk of further driving off presumably outcast rhetorical theories. Although it is prudent to grant that in many cases outside disciplines can help to guide the discovery of new theory, this interplay should never breach the threshold of mere support. The authors write “to allow…any other discipline to sit in judgment of a rhetorical theory endangers the uniqueness and purpose of rhetorical theorizing. There seems no inherent difficulty in situating rhetoric's history within a larger frame of intellectual history as long as rhetoric retains its own standards for evaluating its own theoretical principles.”82 Underscoring the importance of this point is the need for the rhetorical-historical critic to holistically choose what to analyze, particularly in regards to theory. To allow outside criteria to guide this process runs the risk of warping the results, or, in extreme cases, the production of a flawed conclusion. The dangers of such an occurrence are readily apparent, with the point not being that rhetorical theory is unrelated to outside factors, but instead these factors are varied and worthy of investigation.83 The method provided by Blair and Kalh for historical-rhetorical research involving theory provides the ideal manner to approach the study of humor theory and its relationship to rhetoric. Through the previous discussion, this thesis shows not only the validity of not only theoretical research, but also how rhetorical and theoretical research can greatly benefit from a historical approach. At the simplest of levels, the goals of this present study mesh with historical-rhetorical modes of study in a myriad of ways. First,

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Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 the intent to overview humorous and comic theory in an effort to search for deeper theoretical meaning aligns well with the enterprise discussed by Balir and Kahl in Rhetoric and Historiography. While Blair and Kahl specifically discusses the ideal process in the selection of a rhetorical history while little touching upon the actual analysis of these theories, their call for scholarship in the history of rhetorical theory stands as a catalyst for the type of research done presently. With this call to action, as well as their process of selection and consideration, followed, the potential of this essay to illuminate deeper aspects of the theoretical, in a process alluded to at length by Gronbeck, becomes possible. Thus, methodologically this survey of humor theory will move forward using the historical survey method described by Blair and Kahl in order to draw out theoretical implications as described by Gronbeck.

Conclusion As previously outlined, another goal of this essay is to shed light upon more effective approaches to the rhetorical criticism of humorous artifacts. While this may not seem directly connected to the method described above, a strong connection between the two exists when viewed in light of Gronbeck’s discussion of the prescientific function of rhetorical history. Namely, if one function of rhetorical history is to “produce theory” which in turn provides the rhetorical critic more substance to approach any given rhetorical artifact, then it stands to reason that theoretical insight gleaned from a historical-rhetorical analyses of theory would essentially serve the same function. It is in this manner, then, that the present study can use the implications of this thesis to guide 52

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 the rhetorician in what can be seen as a new path of rhetorical criticism where humorous artifacts are concerned. In the words of Michael Bruner, “there is serious rhetorical work to be done; there is a need for serious rhetorical criticism; and perhaps an even greater need for more ‘effective’ critiques of…rhetorical history.”84 This chapter outlines the realm of the historical-rhetorical method in many ways. Importantly, it answers criticisms of the historical-rhetorical method through discussions of such criticisms and examples of the historical method serving a vital part of a myriad of academic contexts. Moreover, this chapter also provides important methodological concerns that must be acknowledged before research in this form is undertaker. Specifically, this includes discussions concern both the selection and order of texts. This discussion enables this research to proceed into Chapter Three, whereupon the method and methodological concerns of the historical-rhetorical method will be viewed in context with humor theory, thus allowing a survey of said theory to be undertaken.

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CHAPTER III SURVEY This chapter presents a general overview of major rhetorical and philosophical writings on humor, particularly those that are most pertinent to the general purpose of this thesis. Namely, this requires the chapter to focus upon theoretical approaches to humor that form the basis of the study at large. Such an endeavor allows for an examination of the theoretical and philosophical roots at the base humor studies today. For example, an analysis of writings that give structure to superiority theory not only allow for a deeper understanding of that particular genre, but also provides the researcher a starting point from which relationships with other theoretical genres can be explored. This process provides a detailed timeline and map of the evolution of rhetorical thought on humor and offers a deeper understanding of how the phenomenon of humor via language has previously been theorized. Moreover, the sum of this writing provides a general idea of possible implications of rhetorical thought and discerns a standpoint that allows future theorists to observe which portions of humor theory have been subject to theoretical evolution and which have not. A task as such aids in the main objectives of this thesis insofar that it allows for the intertextual analysis of humor theory, which in turn leads to a deeper understand of the humorous and illuminates the path of the critic.

Structure Blair and Kahl, in their essay Introduction: Revising the History of Rhetorical 54

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 Theory, discuss two important factors that are important to consider regarding surveys of rhetorical theories. They argue that the manner of organization serves as an important point of consideration.85 As previously discussed, the potential approach to organization finds itself split between organizing through chronology and by similarity of subject matter. This thesis explores theories chronologically, beginning with Plato and ending with 20th-century theory. Approaching the survey in such a manner is the most conducive to achieving the goals of this writing, particular the generation of intertheoretical insight, resulting from the elimination of the discussion of a priori theoretical organizations. In other words, organization of this thesis via the divisions already present in humor studies (superiority, incongruity, and relief) produces a tendency to overlook deeper theoretical meaning that is not highlighted. Blair and Kahl assert that text selection must be meaningful and uninfluenced by outside factors.86 To this end, the texts analyzed by this thesis includes major writings on the nature of humor within the Western context. While there is no intention to exclude other theoretical frameworks, the practicality of analyzing the immediate context is the task at hand. Moreover, given the lack of meaningful rhetorical analysis via a survey of humor theory, this presents the most needed task to be completed. Not only does it present the potential to revolutionize the overall view of comic theory, but it also serves as a starting point for the analysis of theories outside of the Western context. 85



Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 Also important to consider is the scope of humorous artifacts analyzed by rhetorical critics. Within the American context the majority of analysis is done on material produced within the context, thus the need to explore the theory which is directly involved in this process. While theory from outside of the Western context certainly provides enticing endeavors for future understandings, it stands to reason that theory drawn from the same context provides the most immediate, as well as most meaningful, impact.

Classical Theories of the Humorous Within the Western context, the original genesis of thought regarding the relationship between rhetoric and humor is found in the writings of the Greeks and Romans. While there is little doubt that humanity pondered issues of the humorous before this, works by Plato represent the first time scholars record such thought in a manner that allows it to be passed down. Thus, Plato’s writings represent the primary location to start an investigation of comedic theory in general. This is particularly true when considerations regarding this author’s desire to approach this survey from a continuous and chronological standpoint, in turn allowing for connected strains of thought found throughout history to present themselves. In particular, this section explores the writings of Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero in an in depth manner.

Plato When approaching the topic from the standard Western academic viewpoint, 56

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 Plato, as with many philosophical and rhetorical concepts, generally receives acclimation as the first to produce major writings touch upon the nature of humor.87Interestingly, the predominant viewpoint presented in Plato’s take on humor is disdainful. John Morreall, author of “The Philosophy of Laughter and Humor,” asserts that in Plato’s view, humor and laughter often direct themselves at “vice, particularly self-ignorance, in people who are relatively powerless.”88 Thus, in a manner, Plato’s standpoint on humor could be characterized as one rooted in the necessity of the presence of some form of superiority. In other words, at least one participant in a situation deemed humorous must have feelings of superiority to some portion of the world around them. This portion is not limited to people, however, and could also be logically extended to objects that also elicit feelings of superiority regarding themselves or the people they represent. Excerpts from Plato’s dialogues that help to form this characterization of his view on humor are few in number considering their proportion to the corpus of Plato’s writings. What he writes on the matter, however, is significant. Plato’s chief description of humor and comedy, and its subsequent divisions, is found in the dialogue Philebus. Plato asserts, through the character of Socrates, that in any given comic situation the soul experiences a mixture of sensations. He writes: SOCRATES: Then again, do you remember how spectators of a tragedy sometimes feel pleasure and weep at once? PROTARCHUS: Yes indeed. 87

John Morreall. The Philosophy of Laughter and Humor. (Albany: SUNY, 1987), 10. 88

John Morreall. The Philosophy of Laughter and Humor. (Albany: SUNY,

1987), 10. 57

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 SOCRATES: And if you take the state of our minds when we see a comedy, do you realize that here again we have a mixture of pain and pleasure? PROTARCHUS: I don’t quite take your meaning. SOCRATES: No, for by no means, Protarchus, is it easy to understand that we are regularly affected in in this way on such an occasion. PROTARCHUS: It certainly does not seem easy to me. SOCRATES: Still, the obscurity of the matter should make us all the more eager to grasp it; we may make it easier for people to realize the mixture of pain and pleasure in other cases. PROTARCHUS: Pray go on. SOCRATES: We mentioned malice just now; would you call that pain of the soul or what? PROTARCHUS: Yes. SOCRATES: Nevertheless one will find a malicious man pleased at his neighbors’ ills. PROTARCHUS: Undoubtedly. SOCRATES: Now ignorance, or the thing we call stupidity, is an ill thing. PROTARCHUS: Well? SOCRATES: That being so, observe the nature of the ridiculous. PROTARCHUS: Be kind enough to tell me. SOCRATES: Talking generally it is a certain kind of badness, and gets its name from a certain state of mind. I may add that it is that genus of the species ‘badness’ which is differentiated by the opposite of the description at Delphi. PROTARCHUS: You mean ‘Know thyself,’ Socrates? SOCRATES: I do. Plainly the opposite of that would be for the inscription to read, ‘By no means know thyself.’ PROTARCHUS: Of course. SOCRATES: Now, Protarchus, that is what you must split into three parts; see if you can. PROTARCHUS: How do you mean? I am quite sure I can’t. SOCRATES: Do you mean that I must make the division here and now? PROTARCHUS: That is what I mean, and indeed, I beg you to do so. SOCRATES: If any one does not know himself, must it not be in one of three ways? PROTARCHUS: How so? SOCRATES: First, in respect to wealth, he may not think himself richer than his property makes him. PROTARCHUS: Plenty of people are affected that way, certainly. SOCRATES: But there are many more who think themselves taller and more handsome and physically finer in general then they really and truly are. PROTARCHUS: Quite so. SOCRATES: But by far the greatest number are mistaken as regard the third class of things, namely possessions of the soul. They think themselves superior in virtue when they not. 58

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 PROTARCHUS: Yes indeed. SOCRATES: And is not the virtue of wisdom that the mass of men insist on claiming, interminably disputing, and lying about how wise they are? PROTARCHUS: Of course. SOCRATES: And certainly we should be justified in calling such behavior as evil. PROTARCHUS: Undoubtedly. SOCRATES: Well now, Protarchus, it is this that we must once more divide, by bisection, if we mean to see that curious mix of pleasure and pain that lies in the malice that goes entertainment. How then, you will ask, will we make our bisection? All persons who are foolish enough to hold this false opinion about themselves fall, I think, like mankind in general, into two classes, those who are strong and powerful, and those who are the reverse. PROTARCHUS: Indubitably. SOCRATES: Then make that your principle of division. Those whose delusion is accompanied by weakness, who are unable to retaliate when laughed at, you will be right in describing by the epithet ‘ridiculous’; to those who have the ability and strength to retaliate you will most appropriately accord the epithet ‘formidable’ and ‘hateful.’ For ignorance in the strong is hateful and ugly; is fraught with mischief to all around, and so are its copies on stage, but weak ignorance ranks as the ridiculous, which in fact it is. PROTARCHUS: You are perfectly right. All the same, I am not yet clear about the mixture of pleasures and pains here. SOCRATES: Well, take first the nature of malice. PROTARCHUS: Pray continue. SOCRATES: Both pain and pleasure can be wrongful, I imagine? PROTARCHUS: Unquestionably. SOCRATES: And to delight in our enemies misfortunes is neither wrongful nor malicious? PROTARCHUS: Of course not. SOCRATES: Now we said that ignorance is always an evil? PROTARCHUS: That is so. SOCRATES: Then if we find in our friends imaginary wisdom and imaginary beauty, and the other delusions which were enumerated in our threefold classification just now, delusions that are ridiculous in the weak and hateful in the strong – if we find this disposition in its harmless form in our friends, shall we adhere, or shall we not, to my statement of a moment ago, namely that it is ridiculous? PROTARCHUS: Certainly we shall. SOCRATES: And do we not agree that being ignorance, it is evil? PROTARCHUS: Undoubtedly. SOCRATES: And when we laugh at it, are we please or pained? PROTARCHUS: Plainly we are pleased. SOCRATES: And did we not say that it is malice which makes us feel pleasure in 59

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 our friend’s misfortunes? PROTARCHUS: It must be. SOCRATES: The upshot of our argument then is that when we laugh at what is ridiculous in our friends, we are mixing pleasure this time with malice, mixing, that is, our pleasure with pain, for we have been agreed for some time that malice is pain in the soul, and that laughter is pleasure, and that both occur simultaneously on the occasions in question. PROTARCHUS: True. SOCRATES: Hence our argument now makes it plain that in laments and tragedies and comedies – and not only those on stages but also in the tragicomedy of life – as well as on countless other occasions, pains are mixed with pleasures.89 Here we can see that Plato’s overriding assumption about the character of humor is that it contains both a mixture of pleasure and pain, much like other ideas that exist in Plato’s time. However, what seems to stand out most starkly in this argument is Plato’s insistence that malice is consistently present with humor and comedy. Plato argues, in essence, that an individual must feel more powerful, or superior, to another person or object in order for him or her to see humor in a situation in which they are involved. Once a situation meets this condition, the catalyst for Plato’s comic situation finds itself in the perception of false beliefs in the weaker individual’s mindset by the stronger. This perception in turn causes feelings of superiority to become increasingly evident, thus helping pain, caused by malice (superiority), and pleasure, caused by the ridiculous, to intermingle. Cameron Shelley’s view on the platonic notion of humor helps to illuminate Plato’s assertions. In particular, Shelley, in Plato on the Psychology of Humor, expands the understanding of Plato’s comic catalyst: feelings of power or superiority over another.

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Plato, The Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1961), 1128. 60

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 In accord with the majority of scholarship regarding platonic characterizations of humor, Shelley begins by arguing that, in Plato’s view, “laughter…is a bodily pleasure. It is provoked by the pain generated when others gratify our desire to see them suffer misfortune. It is problematic because it is always mixed with pain and because it is easy to over-indulge.”90 From this viewpoint the disparity between what is thought of oneself and one’s true character is not merely something that is perceived, but is something that is actively searched for by an individual’s psyche, thus making it dangerous to indulge because of its propensity to serve as a hotbed for pain and malice. Shelley’s relation of Plato’s view of humor to the propensity to overindulge helps to explain why it would provoke such a harsh representation in Plato’s work, which as a whole presents forms of moderation and non-indulgence as ideals, as well as the underlying purpose of Plato’s caution. An example of this caution towards the indulgence of humor finds itself in Plato’s Republic. It is in this dialogue that Socrates characterizes Thersites, a man prone to buffoonery via his laughter, as having “…lived the life of an ape.”91 Looking elsewhere in the dialogues, one can infer even more about Plato’s attitude toward humor and comic situations. In the Republic, Plato singles out laughter as dangerous and in a manner implies that it may be prudent to avoid humor when possible, or at least to approach it with a sense of moderation. In particular, when discussing how city guards should act, Socrates argues that they “must not be prone to laughter, for 90

Cameron Shelley, “Plato on the Psychology of Humor,” Humor 16, no. 4 (2003): 352. 91

Plato, The Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1961), 575-844. 61

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 usually when we abandon ourselves to violent laughter, our condition provokes a violent reaction.”92 Here we find Plato not necessarily arguing for the strict avoidance of laughter, but certainly suggesting that it should be handled with moderation. Comedy and humor, it seems, provide an avenue for any individual to indulge in their own feelings of power and superiority over another in addition to opening the door to malicious intent becoming the dominant characteristic of such humor. Moreover, this excerpt from the Republic suggests that violent, uncontrolled laughter provokes a violent response. This argument is indicative of Plato’s characterization of humor found in Philebus. In essence, it seems to support the notion that hatefulness can factor into the formula of humor.93 In Philebus, Socrates discusses how the parts of humor, when realized in the weak with regards to the powerful, can lead to an individual being regarded as hateful by those in their immediate context. It is not a stretch to conceive of misplaced laughter, especially that which is unchecked, provoking a less than friendly response from an individual with the true ability to respond. Though this may not be the logical outcome of all cases of humor in excess, the potentiality of its existence is something of which Plato seems to be well aware. To further understand the interplay of these Platonic attitudes towards humor and comedy, any additional dynamics that are at play within the theory beg exploration. Particularly, while it is clear that Plato cautions against humor in excess, what seems to 92



Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 get lost beneath that message is that, in some form, humor and comedy are intrinsic to the nature of humanity. In a manner, they are not merely something that an individual chooses to notice or possess, but instead are the product of forces which are fundamental to the nature of humanity. This is perhaps one of the more perplexing aspects of Plato’s view on humor, insofar that it alludes to disdain but allows for ever-presence. The explanation of this phenomenon finds itself in the previous discussions of this section: the perception of superiority and power over another. Again, Shelley helps to further explain the issue at hand. To him, the perception of disparity between what one thinks himself or herself to be and what he or she truly are as the base element of comedy, is a massive simplification of the issue at hand. In order to truly grasp the dynamics at play in a platonic comic situation, the dimensions of soul and purpose begs consideration. Plato, Shelley argues, sees humor as rooted in the type of soul any given individual possesses. He writes, “The enjoyment of humor for good or ill is dictated by what sort of person is doing the enjoying. In other words, different kinds of people find different…things funny, but one such sense of humor is healthy, whereas the others are unhealthy.”94 Thus, the complexity of a platonic theory of humor is bolstered through this added dynamic. In short, to Plato, humor and comedy are rooted not only in perception of discrepancy driven by superiority and power, but also in the type of person one is, and in turn, the type soul an individual possesses. In Republic, Plato identifies three distinct types of people: The philosophic

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Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 person, the appetitive person, and the spirited person.95 Between these three types of people are three different types of souls with three different intrinsic lifelong pursuits. For example, a spirited person has a “combative spirit which drives him to value honor and victory over other above all else.”96 With these new factors considered, Plato’s humor, although still caused by the presence of a dominate perception, becomes nuanced by the interplay of differences between souls. Each type of person finds humor in others having objectives that they do not consider relevant. For example, a spirited person may find humor in a philosopher who is not concerned with victory, but rather seemingly mindless thinking. By looking in the dialogues, it is possible to find examples of situations where many of these dynamics play out. Perhaps one of the more amusing examples possible finds itself in Plato’s Euthydemus while Plato is recounting an exchange between Ctesippus and a group of sophist. He writes: DIONYSODOROUS: If you will answer my question, I will soon extract the same admissions from you, Ctessipus. You say you have a dog? CTESIPPUS: Yes, a villain of a one. DIONYSODOROUS: And he has puppies? CTESIPPUS: Yes, and they are very like himself. DIONYSODOROUS: And the dog is the father of them? CTESIPPUS: Yes, I certainly saw him and the mother of the puppies come together. DIONYSODOROUS: And he is not yours? CTESIPPUS: To be sure he is. 95 95

Plato, The Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1961), 575-844. 96 96


Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 DIONYSODOROUS: Then he is a father, and he is yours; ergo, he is your father, and the puppies are your brothers. EUTHYDEMUS: Ctesippus, let me ask you one little question: you beat this dog? CTESSIPUS: (Laughing) Indeed I do; and I only wish I could beat you instead of him. EUTHYDEMUS: Then you beat your father!97 From this passage we can see many of the humorous Platonic principles at work. Firstly, with this view of the source of a Platonic theory of humor in mind, it becomes far less complicated to understand why Plato cautioned against humor in excess, as well as to explain confounding aspects of the way in which the dialogues discus comedy. Simply, any individual must expect to find what is not relevant to their way of living to be, in many ways, potentially humorous. To Plato, this is merely one aspect of how the human soul works. Good virtue, however, rails against overindulgence in this natural activity. Moreover, humor, which necessarily involves some amounts of pain, can become nonvirtuous, often to the point of provoking a violent response from those to whom the humor is directed, if the proper circumstances are present. All in all, Plato’s conclusion appears to be that, although humor does cause a measure of pleasure within the soul, by virtue of its relationship with laughter, it also has potential to cause pain via malice, which is a component of the ridiculous. In essence, the Platonic baseline attitude towards humor presents a particularly cautious approach. Humor finds itself represented as typically improper, though not necessarily unavoidable. Thus, it should be avoided and not indulged in if possible, but conversely, not shunned in totality. Humor and comedy, though not fully disdained, do not appear to be readily 97


Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 encouraged.

Aristotle Being Plato’s student, Aristotle’s approach to the humorous enterprise follows much the same trail as Plato’s theorizing, though it is not a mere rewording, as many authors have contended. Unfortunately for modern scholars, though, Aristotle’s seminal work on humor presumably named Comedia and situated as the second book of Poetics, has been lost to the ages, with only secondary resources left to even allude to its existence.98 Despite its loss, many scholars have attempted to piece together a general idea of what the second book of Poetics would have said through an analysis of such secondary sources. Interestingly, many of these attempts focus on the likelihood of the second book of poetics finding its deepest characteristics rooted in the mechanism of incongruity. Perhaps the most notable writing on the subject is Aristotle on Comedy: Towards a Reconstruction of Poetics II. In this book Richard Janko argues that a reconstruction of Aristotle’s lost writings on comedy would include incongruity as a centerpiece of comic theory, thus asserting that “humor is derived primarily from the illogical and the unexpected.”99 Thus, he writes, the second book of Poetics would, in all likelihood, have incongruity presented by humorous means causing “irrational statements or acts function 98

Perks, Lisa. Ancient roots of humor theory, Humor: International Journal of Humor Research, Vol 25(2), 2012. pp. 119-132. 99

Richard Janko, Aristotle on Comedy: Towards a Reconstruction of Poetics II. (Los Angeles: California, 1984), 95. 66

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 to transform and distort reality.”100 In short, the juxtaposition of the comically absurd with some other overriding notion creates a form of incongruity, this allowing comedy to be viewed in contrast to a perceived reality. Building off this, Janko argues that, in the Aristotelian sense, comedy achieves its aim chiefly through laughter, and in turn highlights many forms of linguistic incongruities which are set forth in various writings by Aristotle. Namely, he asserts that Aristotelian laughter arises “from speech and actions,” and that from speech “it arises in seven ways.”101 These seven manners of creating laughter through comedy are homonym (when the same word has two or more different meanings), synonym (when two or more words have the same meaning), repetition (continually using the same word with the same meaning), paronyms (adding or subtracting something extraneous in regards the original term), diminutives (trivializing or making ridiculous), alteration (when a word is partly altered), and parody (when language is altered to make something absurd).102 Janko’s argument that Aristotelian humor arises as a result of these seven devices (homonymy, synonym, repetition, paronym, diminutive, alteration, and parody) supports his notion that the second book of Poetics would have relied heavily upon forms of incongruity as the basic element of comedy. In essence, each of these situations has the

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Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 potential to result in the creation of a humorous situation by virtue of the fact that they highlight incongruity in some form. These incongruities range across a wide spectrum of possibilities, from the very simple, such as a homonym which suggests an incongruous meaning in an individual’s mind, to the complex, such as a parody which suggest an incongruous form of reality. Thus, in Janko’s work we can see the importance of incongruity as a mechanistic function in not only a reconstructed Comedia, but also the breadth of other Aristotelian writing which at the very least gives humor a passing glance.103 Janko, however, has not been the only scholar to conjecture that Aristotle spoke at length on incongruity in his lost Comedia, though certainly he may have the most persuasive argument. Other places where a sense of Aristotelian incongruity presents itself include George Campbell’s writings on the topic. Campbell seems to suggest that incongruity would be a necessary aspect of Poetics II through a close reading of Aristotle’s surviving discussions on the ridiculous found in other works.104 Herrick discusses how many other Aristotelian scholars who have written on Aristotle’s humor, such as Lord Kames and Thomas Twinning, have also produced work on Aristotle’s Poetics that implies incongruity would have been a substantial basis of Aristotelian comic

103

Lisa Perks, “Ancient roots of humor theory.” Humor: International Journal of Humor Research 25, no. 2 (2012): 122. 104

George Campbell, The Philosophy of Rhetoric. (Edinburgh: Thomas Turnbull,

1819), 15. 68

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 theory.105 In short, there is a breadth of scholarship that seems to suggest Aristotle used incongruity as a foundation for the inner workings of humor. Fortunately, what work of Aristotle’s that does remain provides a wealth of knowledge regarding his ideas on humor, allowing a majority of the writings on Aristotle’s humor to not be merely educated conjecture. Being Plato’s student, Aristotle’s approach to the humorous enterprise follows much the same trail as Plato’s theorizing. This being so, it is important to realize Aristotle’s notion of humor is not simply a mere rewording of what Plato wrote. Instead, an Aristotelian theory of humor and comedy seems to adopt the underlying attitude of a Platonic theorist, but justifies this base attitude in a fully different manner. Morreall writes that “Aristotle agreed with Plato that laughter is essentially derisive and that in being amused by someone we are finding that person inferior in some way…Although Aristotle did not go along with Plato’s recommendation that we should suppress laughter generally, he did think that most people overdo joking and laughing.”106 A close reading of the works where Aristotle discusses humor and comedy helps to articulate and highlight the implications of an Aristotelian theory of humor. Much as Plato does in Philebus, Aristotle makes sure to describe comedy and humor through its composition. The Aristotelian descriptions of the subparts of comedy are found in Aristotle’s Poetics. 105



1987), 10. 69

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 As for comedy, it is (as has been observed) an imitation of men worse than the average; worse, however, not as regards any and every sort of fault, but only as regards one particular kind, the ridiculous, which is a species of the ugly. This ridiculous may be defined as a mistake or a deformity not productive of pain or harm to others; the mask, for instance, that excited laughter is something ugly and distorted without causing pain.107 From this passage we can begin to see where Aristotle differs with Plato. Although the articulations of humor by Aristotle are still rooted in the ridiculous, and in turn the ugly, he does not argue for humor necessarily being destructive. Instead, Aristotle perceives humor in a far more neutral light than Plato. This shows itself primarily through Aristotle’s description of humor as rooted in the ugly but not as a contributor to pain. This is in definite contrast to the Platonic view, suggesting humor’s potential to cause pain via malice or superiority. Simply, where Plato sees pain intrinsically bound to comedy, Aristotle does not appear to concur. This difference in compositional lineage does not change the cautious attitude towards humor. In Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle expands on his characterization of the humorous during a discussion on particular actions that must manifest neither in deficiency nor excess. He writes: The kind of people on is speaking to or listening to will also make a difference. Evidently here also there is both an excess and deficiency compared to the mean. Those who carry humor to the excess are thought to be vulgar buffoons, striving for humor at all costs, and aiming rather at raising a laugh than at saying what is becoming and at avoiding pain to the object of their fun; while those who can neither make a joke themselves nor put up with those who do are thought to be boring and unpolished. But those who joke in a tasteful way are called readywitted, which implies a sort of readiness to turn this way or that; for such sallies are thought to be movement of the character, and as bodies are discriminated by their movements, so too are characters. The ridiculous side of things is not far to 107

Aristotle. The Basic Works of Aristotle Poetics, ed. Richard McKeon. (New York: Random House), 1459. 70

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 seek, however, and most people delight more than they should in amusement and in jesting, and so even buffoons are called-ready witted because they are found attractive; but that they differ from the ready witted man, and to no small extent, is clear from what has been said.108 Echoes of Plato are readily apparent within this description of the humorous. Particularly, the attitude of cautiousness and near disdain is readily apparent. Aristotle seems to outright argue against the use of humor in excess, calling those who embrace this practice “vulgar buffoons.” Unlike Plato, however, Aristotle never draws a direct connection between pain and comedy. Rather, Aristotle lists humor and comedy as a product of both the ugly and ridiculous. In other words, language that is humorous, to Aristotle, manifests chiefly as ugly without causing pain. This is starkly opposed to Plato who sees humor and comedy intrinsically bound to pain. Despite differences in compositional lineage, as mentioned earlier, the underlying attitude towards humor and comedy remains nearly unchanged between Plato and Aristotle. However, it is important to note that to Aristotle it is not nearly the humor itself that causes those who act with wit to be condemned, but rather the fact that the goal of receiving laughter in response to what is said can itself stand of the way of a speaker speaking what is “becoming,” or noble. In other words, humor, to Aristotle, has the potential to block proper language and truth, which it may convey. He does not merely shun it as a contributor to malice. In essence, both Aristotle and Plato seem to be arguing for humor’s base characteristic being rooted the nuances of a given contextual situation. Thus, while humor 108

Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Terence Irwin. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1999), 50-51. 71

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 and comedy may not be smiled upon by either philosopher (Plato argues that it is rooted in pain while Aristotle refers to excessive humorists as vile buffoons), they both allow for its obvious existence in the world through their description of the phenomenon. Interestingly, this reluctant acceptance of the state of affairs with regards to humor is justified in a different manner by Aristotle than by Plato. While some scholars, namely Shelley, have argued in favor of Plato’s humor finding explanation through the relative dynamics of his conception of the types of souls, Aristotle seems to a take more pragmatic approach by inferring the inner working of humor from the world around him. Within his discussion of comedy in Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle writes: To the middle state belongs also tact; it is the mark of a tactful man to say and listen to such things as befit a good and well-bred man; for there are some things that befits such a man to say and to hear by way of jest, and well-bred man’s jesting differs from that of a vulgar man, and the joking of an uneducated man from that of an educated. One may see this from the old and the new comedies; to authors of the former, indecency of language was amusing; to those of the latter, innuendo is more so; and these differ in no small degree in respect of propriety. Now should we define the man who jokes well by his saying what is not unbecoming to a well-bred man, or by his not giving pain, or even giving delight, to the hearer? Or is the later definition, at any rate, itself indefinite, since different things are hateful or pleasant to different people?109 From this we can begin to see another of the underlying differences between Platonic and Aristotelian characterizations of humor. Instead of alluding to notions of comedy finding a well-spring in the varying types of soul, Aristotle approaches the matter by characterizing any given individual’s humor as rooted in the type of a person someone is in addition to a measure of an individual’s practical experience. The implications of this 109


Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 different train of thought are many, but perhaps the most important of these finds itself in the way these two ideas on the origin of humor and comedy affect the teleological end of comedy itself. Simply, when humor is argued to be rooted in the notion of an externally fixed soul, then humor, which is said to be the recognition of some superiority of the other souls, must be fully rooted with malice and pain, and in turn shunned in totality. In short, the telos of humor is either directly or indirectly malice. Unlike Plato, the Aristotelian approach, which does not find grounding primarily in the soul and superiority, seems to allow for an entirely different approach. In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle continues: The kind of jokes he (a given person) will listen to will be the same; for the kind he can put up with are also the kind he seems to make. There are, then, jokes he will not make; for the jest is a sort of abuse, and there are things lawgivers forbid us to abuse; and they perhaps should have forbidden us to make a jest of such. The refined and well-bred man, therefore, will be as we have described, being as it were law to himself.110 Thus, the Aristotelian approach, rather than having comic dynamics rooted in the soul, pushes us to understand the comedic in a manner that allows some measure of practical experience to enter the question. The type of person one is in an Aristotelian theory takes on many aspects. Aristotle refers to education, age, generation, and whether one is wellbred or not as all having some impact on what one will find amusing, and in a manner, this seems to imply that, in addition to the more eternally perceived aspects of one’s personality (the soul), humor is also in no small measure affected by the contextual world around it. The end of this combination results in each individual treating his or her own 110

Aristotle. The Basic Works of Aristotle Poetics, ed. Richard McKeon. (New York: Random House), 1000-1001. 73

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 sense of humor “…as if it were law unto himself.” This source difference between these two bound, yet unique, theoretical writings on humor also help to highlight another distinction that exists between the two: the characterization of the proper use of humor and the comic. As discussed previously, the Platonic stance on the proper use of humor is one of rejection. Although Plato does seem to accept its existence reluctantly, he does so in a manner that implies the human world would be better if individuals would steer clear of the comic enterprise in general. In contrast, Aristotle’s approach, again inferred from Nicomachean Ethics, does not overtly shun the existence of the comic. In a far more pragmatic approach, Aristotle writes: …being as it were law unto himself. Such, then, is the man who observes the mean, whether he be called tactful or ready witted. The buffoon, on the other hand, is the slave of his sense of humor, and spares neither himself or others if he can raise a laugh, and says things none of which a man of refinement would say, and to some of which he would not even listen. The boor, again, is useless for such social intercourse; for he contributes nothing and finds fault with everything. But relaxation and amusement are thought to be a necessary element in life.111 From this, the closing of Aristotle’s discussion of humor found in Nicomachean Ethics, we can begin to discern the Aristotelian notion that there is a proper place and a proper amount of humor pertaining to particular people as well as to particular situations. Although Aristotle does not come nearly close to fully outlining the parameters of all possible individual contexts ( this may have been lost along with the second book of Poetics), it would be safe to assume that they would be inextricably bound both the type of people involved within a comic situation as well as their worldly experiences. 111


Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 Moreover, within these situations, the ideal amount and type of comedy are under constant assault by both buffoons and the boorish, which respectively either overuse or misunderstand/underuse humor, thus turning their back upon the humorous ideal and mean. In book three of On Rhetoric, Aristotle helps to expand on this idea in regards to how it would function within in a given context, namely, judicial rhetoric. He writes: As for humor, since it seems to have some use in debate and Gorgias rightly said that that we should spoil the opponents’ seriousness with laughter and their laughter with seriousness, the number of forms of humor have been stated in Poetics, of which some are appropriate for gentlemen to use and some are not. Each speaker will take up what suits him. Mockery is more gentlemanly than buffoonery; for the mocker makes a joke for his own amusement, the buffoon for the amusement of others.112 Here, within the context of judicial types of speech, we can begin to see the parameters of how humor needs to manifest in a specified situation. Although it is argued that humor has many potential functions within the forensic situation, Aristotle still insists upon it being used in the proper sense in regards to who is creating humor, thus hinting at an idealized for of humor. Moreover, he discusses a type of humor, mockery, and implies that it would be more appropriate for it to be used within the judicial context by a gentleman than buffoon. In short, each speaker should “take up what suits him,” and in turn create comedy and humor which is fitting and appropriate to the mean whilst avoiding the excess of buffoonery. Despite the fact that Aristotle calls for the need of proper humor, there is little doubt that this was a less-than-often achieved goal in his time, given the Aristotelian tone towards humor. The propensity to misuse and misunderstand humor, and perhaps 112

Aristotle, On Rhetoric, trans. George Kennedy. (New York: Oxford, 2007),

248. 75

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 humor’s underlying purpose, is no doubt the source of Aristotle’s platonicesque, cautious attitude towards the use of humor. Although the Aristotelian ideal of how humor should manifest does exist in thought, it is difficult to argue that he would not have felt some large measure of pessimism towards any given individual’s ability to achieve it. Thus, Aristotle’s repeated characterization, and nearly condemnation, of humor in general as “buffoonery” can be seen most nearly as a critique on society’s inability to reach one of Aristotle’s many golden means. Aristotle’s propensity to discuss the comic within the contexts of the poetic and metaphor also allows for another interesting insight about it. As quoted earlier, Aristotle discusses the aspects comprising humor in Philebus in a manner which characterizes them as “ugly without causing pain,” thus laying forth humor and the comic as a species of the ugly. In On Rhetoric Aristotle discusses, in a section pertaining to the poetic, how metaphors should derive from what is beautiful. He writes: And the source of the metaphor should be something beautiful; verbal beauty, as Licymnius, is in the sound or in the sense, and ugliness the same; and thirdly there is what refute the sophistic argument: for it is not as Bryson said that nothing is in itself ugly, since it signifies the same thing if one word is used rather than another; for this is false; one word is more proper than another and more like the object signified and more adapted to make the thing appear ‘before the eyes.’ Moreover, on word does not signify in the same way as another, for in this sense we should also posit on as more beautiful than another, for both signify the beautiful or the ugly but not solely as beauty or ugliness.113 From this we can see Aristotle’s argument that particular words and phrases, when used within a metaphor, are more proper for the situation at situation at hand. In essence, this 113


249. 76

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 means that specific words and phrases, particularly those that seem poetic, help to build a more accurate image of reality when used within the “proper” context. Further on in the section pertaining to poetics found within On Rhetoric, Aristotle discusses frigidity found in poetics by writing, “The fourth kind of frigidity is found it metaphors; for there are inappropriate metaphors, some because they are laughable (comic poets, too, use metaphor), some because they are too lofty and tragic And they are unclear if farfetched…these too, are poetic.”114 Thus, when viewed in conjunction with other Aristotelian writings on humor, Aristotle’s argument in On Rhetoric helps bring into focus the manner that humor works as a “species of the ugly.” The comic, as a type of metaphor or poetry, is most clearly evident as the improper use of words at a time when more suitable words or utterances are available. In a metaphoric sense, this misappropriation of the proper word can create a less than beautiful, or even, arguably, ugly, metaphor. In a more practical sense, this process enacts itself in the manner that Aristotle discusses humor in Nicomachean Ethics: As one individual not using the most proper wording for themselves pertaining to a given situation. Simply, through avoiding the ideal, or, as Aristotle may argue, the median, words can begin to become comic. Moreover, it is the misuse and misunderstanding of such erroneous language that can become the prime cause of any given person being viewed by their peers are either vulgar buffoons or boorish. To this point, this essay has explored Aristotelian notions and mechanisms of

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Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 humor found within the basic works of Aristotle, as well as their implications on the proper use and characterizations of humor and comedy. Other scholarly work, however, also helps to illuminate aspects of Aristotle’s comic theory that is difficult to discover at face value. Notably, Leon Golden, in his essay entitled Aristotle on Comedy, argues for necessity of the notion of comic catharsis, or intellectual clarification, in the understanding of Aristotle’s comedy.115 Specifically, comic catharsis is defined as “the clarifications of the ‘indignation’ we feel in regard to those incidents of unjustified good fortune and those examples of inappropriate and incongruous behavior in human existence which do not cause pain.”116 Thus, in this view, an Aristotelian theory of the comic must also necessitate that one glean something new about the reality around them from the comedy itself. Golden, however, is not the only academic to argue for the existence of a cathartic aspect in Aristotle’s comic theory. Lane Cooper, in An Aristotelian Theory of Comedy, also argues for a form of catharsis present in the comedic writings of Aristotle. Cooper, however, does not merely limit this catharsis to intellectual clarification of a understanding of reality, but also opens them up to the realm of morality and emotion. He argues that “to Aristotle, almost any emotional excess is objectionable, and in need of restraint. But if we must find in the list two emotions equally common with pity and fear,

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Leon Golden, “Aristotle on Comedy,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 42, no. 3 (1984): 283-290. 116


Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 and especially capable of relief through comedy, why not take anger in envy?” 117 Thus, Cooper lays out additional framework for the workings of catharsis in comedy by suggesting that humor cannot only bring intellectual clarification, but also clarification and relief in regards to the proper amount of emotion to be filled with at a given time (in this case, anger and envy), thus allowing it to be both emotionally and morally cathartic. He continues: “Now, it is obvious that, if you succeed in making an angry or an envious man laugh with pleasure. He ceases for a time to be angry or envious. Thus, anger and envy find themselves in a position which comedy can easily push away. There can be no doubt that comedy does have an influence of the sort.”118 Cooper also writes of the possibility of an intellectual form of catharsis being present within Aristotle’s writings on humor. Specifically, Cooper presents a take on Aristotle’s notions of humor that suggests an alternative to pleasure being the sole end of humor. He writes that “In the foregoing we assume that the end of comedy is pleasure. But there is another possibility, if the definition in the Tractate is worth considering – if it has more than a superficial relation to the works of Aristotle, and particularly to the Ethics.”119 Although the relationship of Aristotle’s thoughts in Ethics to intellectual

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Lane Cooper, An Aristotelian Theory of Comedy With Adaptation of the Poetics and a Translation of the ‘Tractatus Coislinianus.’ (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1922), 65-66 118

Lane Cooper, An Aristotelian Theory of Comedy With Adaptation of the Poetics and a Translation of the ‘Tractatus Coislinianus.’ (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1922), 65-66. 119

Lane Cooper, An Aristotelian Theory of Comedy With Adaptation of the Poetics and a Translation of the ‘Tractatus Coislinianus.’ (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1922), 68. 79

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 catharsis rooted in comedy may not be easily discernible, Cooper manages to draw the two together in convincing fashion. He argues that, to Aristotle, the ultimate, ethical goal in life is not pleasure, but instead “the highest activity of man is found in the life of philosophic contemplation, the speculative life.”120Although this is not goal solely focused upon pleasure, such a fact does not preclude the possibility that pleasure, as well as satisfaction, derives not from its pursuit. In fact, to Aristotle, Cooper argues, quite the opposite is true; the achievement of true philosophical contemplation, it being the foci of all human desire, can bring its own pleasure. It is the interplay of humor with this noblest of endeavors that allows for comedy to become a factor in Cooper’s version of comedic intellectual catharsis. He writes, “Yet in the last analysis (in Ethics), he writes of recreation not as an end in itself, but as a means to an end. This end, once more, is the free play of our highest faculties in the life of contemplation. In this way he would think that comedy in providing us with its specific pleasure, and by arousing laughter, gave vent to certain passing emotional states, and left us free for the serious concerns of life.”121 Thus, we see how intellectual catharsis could possibly interact with other forms of catharsis related to humor. In a sense, Cooper is arguing that humor and comedy not only allow for the proper balancing of emotions,

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Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 but also balance the human spirit in order to allow an individual’s mind to focus on its one true desire: philosophical clarification. Cooper’s notion of Aristotelian intellectual catharsis via comedic enterprise, however, differs in its teleological form. As laid out, his cathartic objective is, in a sense, to create a condition conducive to the production of catharsis. From this point of view humor becomes transitively related to intellectual catharsis; merely incidental and not causal. Alternately, at its base value, Golden argues for Aristotle’s comedy to be defined as “the mimesis of an ignoble action which is complete and has magnitude…it accomplishes, through representations of incidents which evoke our indignation, the intellectual clarification of such incidents.”122 In this view, Aristotle’s proper comedy, and humor, must bring about an understanding, or clarification, of some aspect of the world that was previously not understood through its proper use by a given individual. Simply, the telos of Golden’s take on the matter is not one aims for creating the proper conditions, but instead one that allows for a direct connection between comedy and the cathartic process. Humor, from this vantage point, is one of the processes that allows for intellectual catharsis, and in turn links directly with philosophical inquiry. Golden expands upon this idea in his piece by elaborating upon the process in which humor allows something about the world to clarify itself to those who either use it or hear it (comic intellectual catharsis). He argues that in order for a comic situation to evoke a listener’s indignation, two primary criteria must make themselves apparent.

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Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 These “two specific criteria are: 1) They (comic situations) must manifest some dimension of unjustified good fortune or of inappropriate or incongruous behavior; and 2) such incidents (which can be described as examples of error or ugliness) must be presented in such a way that they do not generate any painful feelings on the part of the audience but are clearly recognized as forms of the ridiculous.”123 Thus, in order for a proper comic cathartic situation to take place, there must be some disparity between and expectation and reality so that such a disparity may, in a sense, illuminate the shadows of external reality that may be present. Golden has not been the only scholar to assert that Aristotelian comedy may be geared towards aiding intellectual clarification; other scholars have written work that lends itself to the same implication. For example, Morris Engel, in the essay Fallacy, Wit, and Madness, discusses how posing logical dilemmas, along with their solutions, in an absurd form may have possessed a value for the classical audience that reflects itself in the theories and writings themselves. Engel asks: But why did writers of logic manuals emulate Aristotle for so long? Did they perhaps recognize something in this practice that now escapes us? And is there perhaps some inner connection between fallacy and humor or wit that Plato understood very well and that Aristotle simply took for granted but that is in danger of being over looked by us – a connection that throws some needed light on the phenomena?124 Aristotle, and in turn Plato, Engel reckons, were masters of using humor and the absurd to help illuminate intellectual matters, in this case logical assumptions and teachings. The Leon Golden, “Aristotle on Comedy,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 42, no. 3 (1984): 283-290. 123

124

Morris Engel, “Fallacy, Wit, and Madness,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 19, no. 4 (1986): 226. 82

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 implication here is that it was with the distinct presence of comedy that, arguably, some form of catharsis makes itself manifest to those who were willing to partake in the endeavor. In many ways, both Golden’s and Cooper’s approaches, despite their disagreements, can be seen as indicative of Aristotle’s argument in Nicomachean Ethics where it is put forth that much humor, even if it is improper humor, derives from the disparity between expectation and reality where expectation is the proper course of action for a given individual (the mean, so to speak) and reality is more often than not the extremes of buffoonery or the boorish. Atop this established dynamic, Golden proposes that in order for the humor to be proper in the Aristotelian sense one must be able to identify and understand the chasm that exists between the flawed and proper ideas, thus helping them understand some truth about the world around them. Cooper, on the other hand, allows for humor to establish such a dynamic, which is amiable to the production of such a catharsis, as well as helping individuals to ethically and morally balance their humors. Moreover, both of these respective arguments, as well as their connection to Aristotle’s theorizing in Nicomachean Ethics, can be seen as hearkening back to the notion of incongruity discussed earlier in this section on Aristotle. Again, much conjecture on the nature of Aristotle’s lost writings on comedy has focused on the likelihood of the centerpiece of the theory resting upon ideas of incongruity. The echoes of this argument readily appear not only within Aristotle’s writings themselves, but also within the scholarship surrounding more nuanced ideas from within Aristotle’s work, such as catharsis. Cooper writes: “If we admit the reality of comic catharsis, we must 83

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 grant that the effect proceeds from the use, in comedy, of dramatic suspense, and from the arousal and defeat of our expectations in various ways.”125Thus, in a manner, comic catharsis, whatever its form may be, is the result of incongruity between reality and expectation. Interestingly, this same base principle of incongruity can also find basis within the relationship with Nicomachean Ethics. It is important to remember, however, that these cathartic principles are the idealized version of Aristotle’s humor. Aristotle does not intend them to be the soul form of humor, but only that which exemplifies comedy’s proper use (as opposed to the depths of buffoonery). Much as Plato cautioned against the use of humor despite the existence of a proper context for its use, Aristotle also dominantly discusses humor in terms of its misuse, though not as apprehensively. He adopts Plato’s pragmatic view of humor by way of seeing this misuse, yet idealizes it when used properly. Moreover, the absence of pain in Aristotle’s description helps to redirect attention to the mere presence of something ridiculous without a need to distrust it. In short, Aristotle’s writings on the matter wish for the user of humor to avoid its extremes and remain ready-witted and tactful, and in turn be able to use humor to discern truths, be they moral, emotional, or ethical, about the world.126 The implications on rhetoric of these two similar, yet varying, classical views on

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1987), 14. 84

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 the humorous provide intriguing insight into the philosophical and rhetorical context in which they are born. Plato’s arguments, as well as Aristotle’s, call for a light-handed use of humor in rhetoric. Moreover, both prescribe an ideal use of humor. This suggests an idealized use of language and rhetoric in general. The rooting of Plato’s argument in the soul and Aristotle’s argument in types of people, as well as superiority, suggests rhetoric in general is rooted in some larger notion of perfection as well. In the Platonic sense, humor derives from differences between souls and their purposes, and rhetoric, being the articulator of humor, is also seen as a discerning the truth of the world via the soul, and in turn the divine. In short, humor may have been a tool of rhetoric to find external truth in the world. Aristotle’s view is not much different, although its root in character and catharsis suggests a slightly different perception of rhetoric. To be certain, however, these two schools of thought are coming from within the same evolution of discourse on the subject. This is doubly true when considering the close relationship between Plato and Aristotle. Regardless, while humor and rhetoric are still both tools for finding truth in the world within these respective schools of thought, Aristotle argues they should center on finding clarification through moderation and the juxtaposition of ideas rather than Plato’s argument for the ultimate form that exists in the minds of the gods.

Cicero Perhaps one of the most well-known rhetoricians and orators in all history, Cicero helped to craft many of the most recognizable aspects of the rhetorical world as it is today. This, however, is not Cicero’s only contribution to academic world. In addition to 85

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 his writings on the nature of rhetoric and aspects of the ideal orator, Cicero also wrote at length on humor, its proper uses, and its place within oratory. Morreall argues that “Cicero was…keenly interested in philosophy, and believed that philosophy and rhetoric should be combined. (Thus), he examines the use of humor in public speaking, discussing such techniques as exaggeration, sarcasm, and punning, and such philosophical topics as the nature of humor and the ethics of its use.”127 Interestingly, Cicero represents one of the most notable non-Greek classical writings on the nature of humor, and in its turn provides the possibility to grant one who studies it the ability to see humor from a slightly different perspective. Despite this different cultural base, however, much of the consensus regarding Cicero’s writings on humor point towards it being an eclectic gathering of pre-existing, as well as contemporary, writings. Cooper argues that Cicero was “a well-read critic himself, who assimilated all the learning of his age, and was grounded in the writings of the Socratics. Cicero…no doubt combines elements from several or many originals, unless he borrowed them from a theorist who had already combined them.”128 Evidence of this can also be found within Cicero’s writings as well. When discussing the nuances of laughter, he writes:

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1987), 17. 128


Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 As to the first, what laughter is: by what means is it raised, wherein is consists, in what manner it bursts out, and is so suddenly discharged that, though we are willing, we have no power to stifle it, and in what manner it all at once takes possession of our sides, out mouth, our veins, our eyes, our countenance – Let Democritus explain all that. They are not my present purpose, and if they were, I should not at all be ashamed to say that I did not know them.129 By referencing Democritus’ expertise (though Cicero does not seem to respect it), he is not only showing his familiarity with the contemporary discourse on humor, but also showing the reader, both modern and ancient, that he is willing to grant expertise in the area of humor to others over his own opinion. With this in mind, the notion that Cicero may have bundled together many ancient theories easily implies itself. This seeming transfer of philosophical and rhetorical theory was not merely limited to ideas on the humorous, however, and many have argued that Greek themes made their way into the Roman thinker’s work. Raymond DiLorenzo, in his essay The Critique of Socrates in Cicero's De Oratore: Ornatus and the Nature of Wisdom, argues that Cicero has “read Plato in a certain way. He believes that Plato’s Socrates is not the representation of the perfect philosopher.”130 Moreover, in the essay Aristotle and Cicero: Rhetorical Stlye, Ralph Pomeroy compares the rhetorical style of Aristotle to that of Cicero and in turn finds many parallels between the two theorists.131If we grant

129

Cicero. On the Ideal Orator, trans. James May and Jakob Wise. (New York: Oxford, 2001), 191-196. 130

Raymond Lorenzon, "The Critique of Socrates in Cicero's De Oratore: Ornatus and the Nature of Wisdom," Philosophy and Rhetoric 11, no. 4 (1978): 248. 131

Ralph Pomeroy, "Aristotle and Cicero: Rhetorical Style," Western Speech 25, no. 1 (1961): 25-32. 87

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 DiLorenzo’s argument, as well as the presence of parallels outlined by Pomeroy, then the idea that Cicero had more than a passing familiarity with Plato’s work (De Oratore, after all, is modeled after the dialogues), thus allowing the possibility of influence to exist, must be entertained. In fact, Meador discusses how much of the scholarship on Cicero concludes that his works present little, if any, revolutionary new views on philosophy and rhetoric, and how they instead compile preexisting works which Cicero then subjects to his own thought.132 In light of this, Meador argues that “we are not obligated, therefore, to consider Cicero’s treatises as mere translations and compilations…he intends to give us his views while expounding on the system of the Greeks.”133If true, it is likely that this influence also finds itself within Cicero’s writings on comedy and the humorous as well. Thus, it would be reasonable to expect at least some overlap with pre-existing theories of humor. Given the time period in which Cicero lived and those texts which would have been available to him, there is little doubt that this characterizations of humor, whether directly or indirectly, ultimately can trace its primary lineage to the writings of Aristotle and Plato (though other influences, as argued previously, are doubtlessly present).134 Particularly, this characterization derives from Aristotle’s writings on the comedy and

132

Prentice Meador, “Humanism in Cicero,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 3, no. 1

(1970): 1. 133


(1970): 2. 134

Marvin Herrick, “The Theory of the Laughable in the Sixteenth Ceuntury,” The Quarterly Journal of Speech 35, no. 1 (1949): 1-16. 88

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 humor, meaning that its root tends to identify with humor induced from a mechanism that is not necessarily rooted in the external notion of soul, but instead in something more connected to everyday, experiential reality. Given what some scholars have referred to as Cicero’s oratorical bias, it is not difficult to understand why his theory closely resembles Aristotle’s.135 Namely, both thinker’s major works on the art of rhetoric, On Rhetoric for Aristotle and De Oratore for Cicero, are explicitly geared towards building a basis for the most effective way to construct oratory, and not necessarily the theoretical underpinnings of language itself (though inferences about this can be made from the writings). Given this similar subject matter, it would be foolish to not allow for at least some degree of overlap on the part of Cicero. Cicero’s ideas are not a mirror image of Aristotle, however, and though he deserves credit for elaborating and condensing many of Aristotle’s notions, this should not lead to the characterization of his writings on humor as unsubstantial.136 The Ciceronian approach to understanding humor presents itself in a particularly structured way. Specifically, within De Oratore, Cicero’s seminal works on the art of oratory, he presents five main questions that can be asked about humor in regards to speaking. He writes: “Regarding laughter, there are five main questions to be considered. First, what is its nature? Second, what is its source? Third, should an orator want to stir up laughter?

135

Ralph Pomeroy, "Aristotle and Cicero: Rhetorical Style," Western Speech 25, no. 1 (1961): 25-32. 136


1987), 17. 89

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 Fourth, to what extent? Fifth, into what categories can the humorous be divided?”137 To the first question, Cicero provides a quick treatment. He insists that those who wish to learn more about the nature of humor itself will not find solace in what he has to say, and instead, implores the reader to “let Democritus see to this” because it does not bear to Cicero’s purpose.138 In essence, this is a non-answer on the part of Cicero, and suggests that he was either unable or unwilling to answer the question to its fullest extent. Moreover, it also provides additional evidence for the assertion that Cicero himself was less concerned with the theory of humor and more concerned with its practical use (though theoretical implications can still be drawn from this). Cicero’s response to the second question, what is humor’s source, provides a much more substantial answer as well as a far more open window into his ideas on humor. Here, Cicero’s character Caesar talks of humor in what is a dominant classical approach used by both Plato and Aristotle: by discussing its constituting parts. In regards to this, he writes: The seat, the region, so the speak, of the humorous – for this is the next question – lies in a certain dishonorableness and ugliness. For the only, at least the most important, way of making people laugh is to point out and mark something dishonorable in a way in a way that is not itself dishonorable.139

137

Cicero. On the Ideal Orator, trans. James May and Jakob Wise. (New York: Oxford, 2001), 186. 138


Cicero. On the Ideal Orator, trans. James May and Jakob Wise. (New York: Oxford, 2001), 180-182. 90

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 Here, in Cicero’s breakdown of the humorous, we again see the idea that ugliness comprises the majority of the concept appear. Unlike those who wrote before him, however, Cicero does not elaborate on how ugliness is itself constituted. Instead, he equates ugliness with dishonorableness. The notion of ugliness as dishonorableness, and thus humor as drawing attention to such dishonorableness, would have presented a strong argument to Cicero’s Roman contemporaries. Much of this is due to the influence of the Roman notion of universal law, which Cicero expounds up in both De Oficiis and De Oratore. In the essay Rhetoric and Humanism in Cicero, Meador discusses the notion of universal law in Roman thought. He writes that “Originally, to the Romans, universal law meant no more than law common to the nations…they could find particular usages (of law) common to separate communities. By codifying these, they could arrive at rules which were commonly acceptable.”140 Thus, to the Romans, there seems to have been an idea of civic behavior that would have undoubtedly been very dishonorable, perhaps even ugly, with which to break. Extrapolating from this idea, we can begin to conceive of Cicero’s theoretical, and no doubt Greek based yet Roman inspired, idea of humor as being rooted in proper public conduct of one who would call his or herself a Roman. Thus, in a manner, humor finds itself within one who chose not, or was ill equipped, to follow such law. Cicero, however, discusses the idea of universal law as something far more

140


(1970): 2. 91

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 expansive than merely right and wrong within the public sphere. Cicero elaborates upon this concept upon most thoroughly within De Oficiis. Here, in a discussion concerning dishonesty in commerce bargaining between cities, Cicero argues that despite the fact that such dishonesty is not outlawed by civil law; it should still be avoided because of its detrimental effect upon the common bond of man.141 In regards to this, Meador argues that “the basis of distinction here is moral: universal law derives its sanction from the law of nature, and principle of the law of nature is respect for the common bond of mankind.”142 The implication on Cicero’s theory of the humorous here is an expansion upon what he concludes in regards to the civil aspect of universal law. Namely, just as breaking from civil law is dishonorable to Cicero, so to would have been breaking from the more external law that pertains to the common universal bond between men. Thus, humor, in the Ciceronian sense, derives both from ugliness and dishonorableness in civil affairs as well as the universal “law of nature.” The third and fourth questions that Cicero poses about the nature of humor, should an orator want to stir up laughter and if so to what extent, generally are components of the same argument. Cicero clearly comes out in support of the use of humor by those speaking in public. He writes: Next, to come to the third point, it is indeed clearly fitting for the orator to stir up laughter; either because cheerfulness by itself wins goodwill for the one who has 141

Cicero. De Oficiis, trans. Walter Miller. (New York: Loeb Classic Library, 1913), book 3/ 17,69. 142


(1970): 2. 92

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 excited it; or because everyone admires cleverness (often just a matter of one word!) especially of someone who gives a retort, and also not infrequently of someone who provokes another; or because laughter crushes the opponent, obstructs him, makes light of him, discourages him, defeats him; or it shows the orator himself to be refined, to be educated, to be well-bred; and especially because it soothes and relaxes sternness and severity, and often, by joking and laughter, dismisses offensive matters that are not easily refuted by argument.143 From this, we can begin to see how vital a component of speaking humor is to Cicero. Particularly, what seems most apparent in the Ciceronian characterization of the use of humor in oratory is its persuasive power and appeal. Here Cicero discusses how humor in oratory, presumably debate oriented oratory, has the power not only to garner goodwill from the audience, but also to obstruct and discredit the opponent. This not only serves as an example for Cicero’s concern with the effective use of oratory, but also aids in showing, to Cicero, humor was not merely incidental to language. Michael Volpe discusses the persuasive potentiality Ciceronian humor in his essay The Persuasive Force of Humor: Cicero’s Defense Caelius. Through the analysis of Cicero’s “rhetorical tour de force” trial defense of Roman citizen Marcus Caelius Rufus, he determines that: Cicero’s humor appealed directly to the humanity of his audience. It revealed strengths and weaknesses of the Roman character. Not only did humor help to set the scene, but it actually became a form of persuasion. Through humor more than anything else Cicero undermined his opposition. Through humor he revealed the prosecutions weakness while he concealed his own.144

143


Michael Volpe, “The Persuasive Force of Humor: Cicero’s Defense of Caelius,”The Quarterly Journal of Speech 63, no. 3 (1977): 311-323. 93

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 Thus, through Volpe’s argument we can further see how humor, to Cicero, can play a central role in the persuasive enterprise. Volpe continues his argument by providing a practical example, the trial on Marcus Caelius Rufus, of how Cicero uses humor not only to construct his own affability, but also to discredit his opponent. In many ways, this cavalier approach to the use of oratorical humor stands in stark contrast to the previously discussed manuscripts regarding the topic. Whereas Aristotle, as well as Plato in particular, caution strongly against the excessive use of humor, Cicero seems to be for more welcoming of is presence in any oratory. The extent to which this is true finds itself in Cicero’s answer to the fourth question: to what extent should an orator stir up laughter? This particular topic, as opposed to the previous questions, encompasses a large amount of Cicero’s musings on comedy. Clearly, this was not an issue to be taken lightly, as Cicero writes “…to what extent an orator employs the humorous must be considered with the utmost diligence.”145 Cicero begins by a discussion of matters which do not respond well when subjected to ridicule. He argues that Neither conspicuousness or wickedness that is linked with crime, nor, on the other hand, conspicuous misery makes people laugh when ridiculed…Moreover, one should be particularly considerate when an audience holds someone in high esteem, and not rashly lash out at those who are loved. It is especially important, then, to practice the last kind of restraint when you are joking, so that they things easiest to make fun of deserve neither great hatred nor exceptional pity.146

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Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 From this, we can begin to see what Cicero believes should and should not be joked about. Particularly, it seems that Cicero chiefly bases the distinction of what should and should not be joked about in the intersection of those things with other strong emotions. For example, if a particular person arouses a strong sense of pity from the audience, Cicero seems to believe that an attempt to direct ridicule at such an individual would cause what could be termed as an emotional conflict of interest. Thus, in a manner, the extent to which an orator should joke in situations as such would be severely limited, though certainly not forbidden. These ideas of topics which one should not joke about further develop as Cicero answers the fifth and final question in regards to the nature of humor: into what catagories can the humorous be divided? Expanding on the idea that there are topics which should not be joked about, he argues: “In this regard, let us not just prescribe that you shouldn’t say anything insipid – the orator must also avoid two kinds of jokes, even if they would be extremely funny; namely, the sort that buffoons makes and those of mimes.”147 Thus again we find the theme of excessive buffoonery being frowned upon. However, to fully understand this, Cicero argues that we must first “turn out attention towards the actual types of the humorous.”148 Cicero, unlike Aristotle, discusses humor in a manner that divides it into two

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Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 types. He writes that, “There are two kinds of jokes, one which is based on things, the other on words. Whatever is wittily expressed consists sometimes in an idea, sometimes only in the language used. But people are most delighted with a joke when the laugh is raised by the idea and the language together.”149 Morreall simplifies this expression by arguing that Cicero divides humor into “humor in what is being talked about, and humor arising from the language used.”150It is from this distinction that excess humor can be described both as buffoonery, which arises from works, and the humor of the mime, which arises from actions. With this division set forth, Cicero begins the process of discussing to what extent each category is necessary. First, he touches upon humorous situations that are derived from imitation; a category which he believes should be handled with the greatest caution. He writes that “while this whole category is humorous within itself, it must be handled with caution. For taking imitation too far, just like being obscene, is something that actors, mimes and mimics do. The orator should employ imitation slyly, so that the hearer imagines more than he actually sees…In addition, the orator must also give proof of his good manners and modesty by avoiding dishonorable rules and obscene subjects.”151 From this, we can begin to get a sense of Cicero’s hesitation to use mimicry. Though he

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1987), 17. 151


Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 readily admits that it is humorous at face value, he also argues for its association with the obscene and thus could be counterproductive to its persuasive value. Due to this, he suggests that any orator who wishes to engage in imitation should do so just enough to let the audience fill in the blank with their own thoughts, thus implanting the idea but avoiding the backlash. In reference to humorous situation resulting from combinations of words, Cicero argues that the primary stumbling point is falling into buffoonery. He writes that “Humor residing in sayings, on the other hand, is brought to you by some clever point in word or thought…the orator at all costs must avoid sharp-wittedness of the buffoonish type.”152 Despite this assertion, however, Cicero admits that it is often times difficult to find the line between witty humor and buffoonery. As a result, he lays several guiding rules forth in regards to the most effective use of humor which derives from words and sayings. He argues that “…we should not consider it necessary to utter a witty saying every time an opportunity is offered,” thus implying that buffoonery is in part a function of joking too often.153 Moreover, Cicero argues that “jokes which are applied to the wrong people, neat as they may be, are by nature buffoonish” in addition to implying that ridiculing an individual “for no good reason” should be avoided by the good orator.154

152




Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 From these various maxims on the proper use of humor which derive from words and sayings, we can deduce that, to Cicero, the proper amount of humor with regards to sayings seems to draw from the context in which the communication occurs. In essence, although Cicero argues certain types of jokes are generally unnecessary, their usefulness will increase and decrease depending on the situation and it is up the orator to decide if they should be used or not. To wit, Cicero writes: So the practice of taking the occasion into account, and restraint and moderation when we are actually employing our sharp-wittedness, together with economy of use in witty sayings will distinguish the orator from the buffoon; as also will the fact that we orators utter them for a specific reason, that is, not to seem funny, but to achieve something, while buffoons go on all day without any reason at all.155 Thus, the use of obscene humor finds itself under the power of the orator’s decision. From this discussion of the use of humor by an orator, as well as the extent of the use of humor by an orator, we can begin to understand how Cicero views the use of humor. Interestingly, the overriding conclusion here is that humor is primarily a persuasive tool to get an agenda accomplished. Although Cicero argues for the use of “proper” humor within given situations, it remains wholly unclear if proper use entails that it is morally wrong to misuse humor, or if improper humor is only humor that is persuasively ineffective. The closest that Cicero comes to implying that humor relates to anything external come when he writes that “Our good sense, then, and our dignity will restrain us, and determine when we can utter witticisms. I only wish that we had an art

155


Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 which could teach us these qualities, but we are ruled by our nature.”156 This, however, merely alludes to the need for humor to subject itself to common sense, and not necessarily an overarching moral code. By doing this, Cicero gives a purpose to humor that is beyond the mere accidental discovery of incongruous realities (perhaps even reality with truth) in and about the world. Again, this is most likely tied to his oratorical bias and a desire for practicality. When discussing how to craft a persuasive message well, he writes “It is also pleasant and often tremendously useful to employ humor and witticisms…I have very often seen a great deal accomplished in trials by good cheer and witticisms.”157 Thus, to Cicero, humor is a tool for persuading despite the fact that it is, in many ways, rooted in an Aristotelian notion of juxtaposition and character (incongruity). In essence, this is Cicero taking older notions on humor and re-appropriating them for his own purposes. Simply, though Cicero may or may not see value in the older ideas on humor, he truly sees no true harm in the use of it for a purpose outside of this. Certainly, as mentioned earlier, the excessive use of humor can cause one to appear buffoonish, which one should avoid at all costs, but when used in excess in a crafty way it can become useful for any manner of situations.158

156



Lisa Perks, “The Ancient Roots of Humor Theory,” Humor: International Journal of Humor Research 25, no. 2 (2012): 115. 99

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 Despite the lack of explicit moral direction found within Cicero’s writings on humor, he does admit that humor can arise from discussions of matters that are serious. He writes that “every witty utterance derives its wit sometimes from the content and sometimes from the words. You should remember, however, that each and every commonplace that I may touch upon as a source for the humorous can, generally speaking, also serve as a source for serious thoughts.”159 Thus, we see that humor, in a manner is, in the Ciceronian sense, not only subjugated to the ridiculous, but is incidental to the serious (though it may not always aid in the resolution of the serious unless it is skillfully used). In regards to this notion, Campbell argues that “a serious manner commonly adds energy to a joke,” thus suggesting that Cicero not only understood some aspect of humor’s relationship to seriousness, but also that seriousness also has its own respective effect upon humor.160 Moreover, in regards the use of a serious tone in a nonserious manner, Perks writes that to Cicero “it is through incongruity not only among a speakers statements, but between the tenor of a speakers statements and a speakers character than an audience can be startled into laughter.”161 This suggests that, on some levels in the Ciceronian model, incongruity between seriousness and the witty can allow humor to become incidental to seriousness.

159


George Campbell. The Philosophy of Rhetoric.(Edinburgh: Thomas Turnbull,

1819), 44. 161

Lisa Perks, “The Ancient Roots of Humor Theory,” Humor: International Journal of Humor Research 25, no. 2 (2012): 112. 100

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 Another implication that results from the division Cicero presents between the types of joking and their respective proper uses is also apparent. Importantly, this division suggests a necessary difference between language and the ideas that it represents, for if the language and ideas were one, then there would be no need to divide the humorous enterprise in such a way. This is a marked difference from the previous two theories discussed (Plato and Aristotle) in that allows for a dissonance between language and actuality. Though it is unlikely that Cicero is arguing for pure relativism via his rhetoric of humor, he seems far more open to differences in understanding. Whereas Plato and Aristotle argue for difference in understanding and humor being related to differences in soul and character respectively, Cicero allows for this more, and in a sense his theory is very much a further articulation of an Aristotelian-like view. Aristotle argues for difference in language connected to reality as being the source of humor, while Cicero argues that humor, while it can arise in the manner that Aristotle sets forth, also arises from semantic, or symbolic, differences as well. He further articulates this in De Oratore: “The most common kind of joke is that in which we expect one thing and another is said; here our own disappointed expectation makes us laugh. But if something ambiguous is thrown in too, the effect of the joke is heightened.”162 Interestingly, although Cicero allows for a wider breadth in his identified types of humor, likely a product of his semantic inclusion, his assumptions also seems to hold a form of incongruity as it center, much as the Aristotelian theory. In all likelihood, this, as discussed before, is a product of

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1987), 17. 101

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 influence from the earlier theories. To be certain, this is not suggesting that Cicero read Aristotle directly, as there is much debate on this topic. What is being suggested, however, is that Cicero is certainly affected by schools of thought to which Aristotle subscribed, particularly the Peripatetic approach. While the scrutinizing of Cicero’s background does seem particularly harsh given his academic background, the argument made in this thesis does not necessitate that Cicero read Aristotle directly.163 Cicero’s rhetoric of humor has different implications on rhetoric as a whole than the previous two discussed. While the theme of superiority, as well as pursuit of truth as purpose, continues, there seems to be a much larger degree of openness to a non-specific use of humor. Humor derives from the superiority of some ideas over others, but to use it as a means to an end that is not truth is acceptable. In some senses, this almost approaches a theory of incongruity. Finding this attitude in Cicero’s discussion on humor suggests that his attitude towards the practice of rhetoric may be quite similar. Ciceronian rhetoric via humor then is considerably more open to sophistic ideals of rhetoric. Yes, rhetoric is a method truth and order, but to use it for purposes outside of this, perhaps in service of the state, is far more acceptable to Cicero than to either Plato or Aristotle.

Medieval and Renaissance Theories of the Humorous With the end of the classical era of thought a great change in not only the Western way of life occurred but also in the conceptions of Western thought. In many ways,

163

Ralph Micken, introduction to Cicero on Oratory and Orators, transl. J.S. Watson (Cardondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986), xlvi-xlvii. 102

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 however, the influence of classical thought on time periods after it can be particularly palpable, as many of the great thinkers who wrote after the fall of the Roman Empire still invested much time in study of the classical texts available. This is particularly true with scholarship that emerges in the late Medieval and early Renaissance era, and as a result, also holds true with the study of rhetoric and philosophy. As a result, the study of the humorous, as it derives much of its existence from the study of rhetoric and philosophy, also finds itself still allowing classical texts to dominate the discussion. In the centuries after the classical era, Cicero’s De Oratore remained as the most referenced and used book on the art of public oration and rhetoric. Although it is likely that other works were referenced, such as St. Augustine’s De Doctrina Christiana and the works of Plato, there is little doubt that De Oratore was still viewed as the seminal work on the communicative art. James Murphy, in his essay Cicero’s Rhetoric in the MiddleAges, argues that “Cicero has long had a widespread reputation as a rhetorician. Indeed, beginning with Horace and Quintilian, his reputation was maintained in a continuous reputation of superiority through the Roman Principate, the Empire, the patristic age, the Middle-Ages…even a cursory survey of medieval allusions to Cicero indicates that he is viewed as the unquestioned ‘master of eloquence.’”164Thus, as Cicero’s ideas on language and rhetoric long outlasted Cicero and his context, it is safe to assume that, in large part, his ideas on humor lasted with it. The lack of innovative writings on the nature of the humorous in the centuries

164

James Murphy, "Cicero’s Rhetoric in the Middle Ages," Quarterly Journal Of Speech 53, no. 4 (1967): 1. 103

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 following the end of the classical era lends itself to this notion. In large part, new discussions on the nature of humor came to an abrupt halt. This state of affairs persisted until the early 16th century where innovative variations of classical themes finally start to appear. Although these emerging variations still favor classical modes of interpretation, they also attempt to expand the already existing theories. In order to fully investigate the sum of these writings, this section explores the work of Trissino, Madius, and Erasmus, each of which produce the most noteworthy writings on humor during this time period.

Trissino and Madius The most notable example of such an approach to defining the nature of humor is found in the work of Trissino, a 16th-Century Italian writer. Within his work, many challenges to the ancient notions of humor and comedy emerge. Importantly, Trissino argues against the ancient notions of humor as rooted in character, soul, and some form of truth. In many ways, this can be seen as a response to the Western rediscovery of Aristotle’s works in the late 11th-Century.165 Instead, he proposes that the pleasure of laughter is chiefly physiological and finds its source in the senses of sight, sound, touch, taste, smell, or memory of hope.166 Despite this, Trissino’s argument does not necessitate that all sensations are to be humorous. To this end, Trissino argues that if “the object 165

Perry, Jacob, Jacob, Chase, Theodore Von Laue. Western Civilization: Ideas, Politics, and Society (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company, 2009), 261-262. 166

Marvin Herrick, “The Theory of the Laughable in the Sixteenth Ceuntury,” The Quarterly Journal of Speech 35, no. 1 (1949): 5.

104

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 presented to the senses has some mixture of ugliness, it moves laughter, as an ugly distorted face…moves laughter at once, and those things especially cause laughter form which better qualities were hoped.”167 We can see from this that although the notion of ugliness as the catalyst of humor is maintained from the classical theorist, the comic, as caused by the ugly, emerges from the senses instead of ideas and language itself (though language in and of itself could be amusing as well). Trissino, however, is not the only upstart 16th-century theoretician to challenge the all-encompassing validity of classical texts. Marvin Herrick, in his essay The Theory of the Laughable in the Sixteenth Century discusses the contributions to the field of rhetorical humor of the writer Madius. He argues that Madius, while still very attached to the Aristotelian and Ciceronian ideas of ugliness, or turpitude, in humor, also determines to add an extra component to the theory: unexpectedness.168 In his De Ridiculis, Madius further elaborates on this by characterizing the unexpected as astonishment, wonder, or surprise. Herrick argues that Madius established humor as “in need of something more than merely the ugly juxtaposed against the true.”169 “Anything ridiculous, if heard too many times, brings loathing rather than delight. Moreover, if the ugliness in ridicule

167

Marvin Herrick, “The Theory of the Laughable in the Sixteenth Ceuntury,” The Quarterly Journal of Speech 35, no. 1 (1949): 4. 168

Marvin Herrick, “The Theory of the Laughable in the Sixteenth Ceuntury,” The Quarterly Journal of Speech 35, no. 1 (1949): 5. 169


Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 persists after the surprise ceases, we do not keep on laughing,” Herrick argues.170 Moreover, Madius suggests that laughter should result more from suggestion than outright expression, thus suggesting that humor, in addition to unexpectedness, also benefits from a form of subtlety. Madius’ formulation of the nature of humor seems to contain far more of the ancient ideals than that of Trissino. This reluctance to abandon the past does not, however, keep him from building upon it. While clinging to the ancient ideas of humor rooted in language via juxtaposition, he is also willing to entertain Trissinonian ideas of humor with roots physiologically in the senses. In many ways, Madius represents a crossroad in the study of the humorous and its relationship to rhetoric. It is here that we can begin to see the coming changes in the approach of humor study while still being in the world that has its roots in the ancient enterprise. While the themes of humor used by Platonist and Ciceronian thinkers still exist with these two frameworks, it is apparent that they are far less rooted in the ineffable ideals and far more rooted in the physical and observable. This is not to say that older approaches did not allow for humor to flow from these sources, but only that the change of focus from external to physical occurs in this time frame. Thus, in a manner of speaking, the thinkers on humor start making a turn that allows humor to be physically rooted with characterizations of the external, as opposed to externally rooted with characterizations of physicality.

170

Marvin Herrick, “The Theory of the Laughable in the Sixteenth Century,” The Quarterly Journal of Speech 35, no. 1 (1949): 1-16.

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Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 Erasmus Perhaps the first major text to deal with the subject of the ridiculous to be composed since the classical era is written by Desiderus Erasmus. It is in what is arguably one of Erasmus’ most famous essays, The Praise of Folly, that the ideas of humor and absurdity are again talked about at length for the first time in centuries, helping to signify a revolution in humanity’s academic thought. The Praise of Folly, written in 1509, what many have deemed “Erasmus’ most popular production.”171 In brief, Erasmus writes his work as an encomium, or eulogy, which is a form of speech that is well drawn out in classical rhetoric. It is not, however, Erasmus’ intent that it be taken at its face value. Kathleen Williams, in the introduction of Twentieth Century Interpretations of The Praise of Folly discusses how Erasmus’ work falls into the category of “mock eulogy” that was prevalent in the work’s contemporary context. Many writers beyond Erasmus used this form of writing, which intends to be frivolous and satiric, at the time, including Dryden, Pope, and Swift.172 In essence, this style of writing intends to help approach what society sees as unworthy topics in a serious manner via the use of satire. Erasmus himself suggests that there is value to this form of writing when he penned “I believe that I have treated folly in a way not altogether foolish.”173

171

Kathleen Williams, introduction to Twentieth Century Interpretations of The Praise of Folly, ed. Kathleen Williams (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1969), 1. 172



Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 The “not-altogether-foolish” manner of writing that Erasmus adopts in The Praise of Folly is in many ways a by-product of the manner in which he writes the work. Instead of Erasmus himself being penned as the one who praises the absurd, he allows for the praise to be given by a female personified version of folly, thus allowing folly to praise itself. In reference to this, Walter Kaiser, in his essay entitled The Ironic Mock Encomium, writes: What would have been astonishing to the reader of 1511, however, is the fact that the ridiculous is praising itself. Fools had spoken before this and foolishness had been praised; but never before had a fool praised foolishness. Erasmus great originality, then, was to make Stultitia both the author and subject of her encomium, to conceive of “Moriae” of being simultaneously both objective and subjective genitive. Thus, “The Praise of Folly” only translates half of the title: it might more accurately be rendered as “Folly’s Praise of Folly.”174 Thus, what we as readers find in The Praise of Folly is a discussion of the absurd given by the absurd, which, in essence, presents a new way of discussing the absurd. Through doing this, Erasmus is not only reinvigorating the discussion of humor, particularly irony, in Western thought, but is also attempting to give rise to a new approach to irony and satire. Building upon this, Kaiser argues that Erasmus is constructing this new approach to the absurd based upon Platonic ideals that he would have been familiar with by virtue of the existing body of knowledge. He writes that the source of Erasmus’ inspiration most likely finds itself in “a passage in the Apology…that comes astonishingly close to the technique of the encomium: this is the passage about the oracle at Delphi, where Socrates

174

Walter Kaiser, “The Ironic Mock Encomium,” in Twentieth Century Interpretations of The Praise of Folly, ed. Kathleen Williams (Englewood: Prentice Hall, 1969), 78. 108

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 claims he is the wisest of men because he knows that he is ignorant.”175 It is from this notion of wisdom coming from the realization of foolishness that Erasmus likely began his argument. This evidences itself further by the apparent familiarity of folly herself with this particular Platonic writing.176 Such a passage, however, does more than merely highlight the emergence of a new type of humorous writing. Such a reference also helps to underscore the importance Erasmus attributes to the works of the great classical writers. Not only do we find Erasmus seeking comedic basis in older forms of Platonic thought, but it is possible to find other themes taken from classical writers. In addition to Plato, Erasmus also utilizes ideas introduced by Quintilian, Lucian, Aristotle, as well as others.177 Thus, with this mind, we can further see the connection that still existed between Renaissance humor theory and classical thought. Just as with Trissino and Madius, the work of Erasmus strides towards developing new attitudes towards the comic while using classical works as foundation. With the work of Erasmus seen within the context of its contemporary theoretical



177

Walter Kaiser, “The Ironic Mock Encomium,” in Twentieth Century Interpretations of The Praise of Folly, ed. Kathleen Williams (Englewood: Prentice Hall, 1969), 84.

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Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 world, one question remains: What is it that The Praise of Folly says about humor and the absurd? In comparison to earlier works which deal with the subject matter, Erasmus' work presents a far different approach. Unlike works by thinkers such as Plato or Cicero, The Praise of Folly is not solely classical philosophical in tone, but is composed purely as a satire of its contemporary world. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the work is written as if it is a work of oratory being given by Folly herself, thus making it a piece that not only stands apart in style from earlier works, but in format as well. As a result of this manner of writing, the majority of pertinent information in regards to the topic at hand flows in an implicated manner from what is contained in the text rather than outright understood. The general consensus on Erasmus’ view of humor in The Praise of Folly errs towards seeing Erasmus convinced that the absurd (folly) underpins all things in a civilized world, and to be sure, it is early in the work that we find evidence of this. As soon as Folly begins her discussion of the nature of herself, she dictates that: However mortal folk may commonly speak of me (for I am not ignorant of how ill the name of folly sounds, even to the greatest fools), I am she – the only she, I may say men rejoice. On great and sufficient proof of this is that the instant I stepped up to speak to this crowded assembly, all faces at once brightened with a fresh and unwonted cheerfulness…just as commonly happens when the sun first shows his splendid golden face to the earth…and thus what great orators elsewhere can hardly bring about in along, carefully planned speech, I have done in a moment, with nothing but my looks.178 Despite the manner of writing Erasmus adopts, which needless to say is far different than what this thesis explores, what is readily apparent is the all-encompassing characterization that he gives to the personification of folly. Through the course of the 178

Desiderius Erasmus. The Praise of Folly trans. Hoyt Hopewell Hudson. (New York): The Modern Library, 1941), 7. 110

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 work, Erasmus discusses the presence of folly in many distinct contexts, including, but not limited to, philosophy, law, religion, wisdom, gambling, grammar, as well as wildlife. Folly is not only put forth as desirable by all who come into contact with it, but is also seen as nearly as “common as the sun’s rays.” In regards to The Praise of Folly, Johann Huizinga, in his essay The Comedy of Life, writes, "Wisdom is to folly as reason is to passion. And there is much more passion than reason in the world. That which keeps the world going, the fount of life, is folly...All enjoyment and amusement is only a condiment of folly," in order to highlight Erasmus' attachment to the notion of everpresent absurdity. 179 Unlike those who write before him, Erasmus does not give a strict technical definition to the idea of folly, or the absurd. Instead of giving such a definition, he simply leaves the characterization as it is above: ever present and conducive to happiness. When the question of division arises, Erasmus merely has a quick, flippant response, which in turn simply refers back to the original characterization. He writes, “And let no one expect that, after the manner of these ordinary orators, I shall expound myself by definition, much less divide myself. For it is equally unlucky to circumscribe with a limit her whose nature extends so universally or to dissect her in whose worship every order of being is at one.”180 The only time that Erasmus remotely begins to discuss the source of humor is when he allows Folly to speak that she was born out of wedlock as a child of Pluto and 179

Johann Huizinga, “The Comedy of Life,” in Twentieth Century Interpretations of The Praise of Folly, ed. Kathleen Williams (Englewood: Prentice Hall, 1969), 63. 180


Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 youth.181 What develops within this particular passage is perhaps one of the first attempts to try to define humor in a manner that is fundamentally different from the classical notions of dividing humor into parts. Instead of attempting to dissect the comic, Erasmus instead sidesteps the question and opts rather to simply point back to his early argument of the all-encompassing nature of humor. This insistence is not only indicative of the coming change of mindset in the academic world, but also helps to outline what may be a new cultural attitude towards the use of humor. Previously, particularly in classical society, the comic and humorous were in many ways seen as a practice that, while not completely unacceptable, should be thoroughly guarded against. Mary Leech, in the essay That’s Not Funny: Comic Forms, Didactic Purpose, and Physical Injury in Medieval Comic Tales argues that “in the ancient world, philosophers considered comedy as the lowest form of rhetoric, a careful balancing act creating pleasure in laughter without being offensive.”182 Thus, the near acceptance of the comic in all things is, in many ways, an emerging, novel approach. Continuing on this theme, in The Praise of Folly and Its Background, Leonard Dean discusses how Erasmus’ use of irony and satire in a constructive manner not only helps to highlight the changing theory of humor, but also aids in the view of a developing new appreciation of the power of humor found in the contemporary culture. He writes

181


Mary Leech, “That’s Not Funny: Comic Forms, Didactic Purpose, and Physical Injury in Medieval Comic Tales,” LATCH: A Journal for the Study of the Literary Artifact In Theory, Culture, or History 1, no.1 (2008), 105. 112

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 that "...irony may be serious...it may be the most accurate and direct mode of expression for complex ideas. For the moment we may remind ourselves simply that in a continued irony several different attitudes are kept in balance to produce a meaning that is larger and in a sense more precise than that produced by a narrowly direct statement."183 Despite this sense, it would entirely improper to argue that classical theorists did not grasp irony or satire, and even more flawed to assert that the ancients did not have at least some appreciation for the use of humor, and in turn to argue that Erasmus was the first to break into the genre. The classical writer Horace is widely acknowledged to be the first great satirist and ironist.184 In fact, there is strong evidence to support that The Praise of Folly itself finds its inspiration in the classical ironist Lucian.185 Hoyt Hudson, in the essay The Folly of Erasmus, argues that it is from Lucian that Erasmus draws the idea of “learned parody.”186 He writes: Not in Lucian alone, but everywhere in the body of classical and modern literature, we find fun generated out of the very modes and techniques of learning itself. This fun may not be made by one who is himself ignorant of scholarship…The author must have gone far enough in some discipline to handle 183

Leonard Dean, “The Praise of Folly and its Background,” in Twentieth Century Interpretations of The Praise of Folly, ed. Kathleen Williams (Englewood: Prentice Hall, 1969), 41. 184

Dustin Griffin. Satire: A Critical Reintroduction. (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1994), 6. 185


Hoyt Hudson, “The Folly of Erasmus,” in Twentieth Century Interpretations of The Praise of Folly, ed. Kathleen Williams (Englewood: Prentice Hall, 1969), 26. 113

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 easily the most technical terms and to pursue the most highly approved methods, even though he plans to pursue them ad absurdum.187 Irony and satire, then, are not Erasmus’ primary contribution the topic at hand. The Praise of Folly uses techniques of knowledge gaining and challenging that have been at play for centuries. Thus, what seems to be new in Erasmus’ context is the ability to see humor as something more than inappropriate rhetoric. Not only does Erasmus see it as underlying a vast majority of life’s aspects, but he also views it as a powerful manner in which an individual can make his or her voice heard. Dustin Griffin argues that Erasmus specifically wrote The Praise of Folly to target those who were not “lacking in learning or wit and who recognize that literary trifling can lead to something more serious.”188 This, however, seems to be the full extent of the implications that Erasmus’ work has in regards to the nature of humor. The Praise of Folly, instead of elaborating more on its comic musings, which point to humor as all-encompassing and powerful, extends its discussion instead to a satire of its contemporary society. While this is not surprising given the world within which Erasmus lived, it does leave the theoretically minded reader looking for a more detailed explanation which finds itself no-where in the work. Importantly, however, The Praise of Folly does represent a turning point in thought regarding the humorous which becomes more readily apparent after it becomes well-

187

Hoyt Hudson, “The Folly of Erasmus,” in Twentieth Century Interpretations of The Praise of Folly, ed. Kathleen Williams (Englewood: Prentice Hall, 1969), 26. 188

Dustin Griffin. Satire: A Critical Reintroduction. (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1994), 77. 114

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 known.

Modern Theories of the Humorous Perhaps the most marked change in the study of humor takes place during the modern era, beginning with Hobbes’ and Hutchenson’s writings at the dawn of the Enlightenment. Unlike the transition found between the Classical and Medieval periods where approaches to humor generally stay firmly rooted in the past with the occasional addition of new theoretical principles those roots, the modern period sees a boon in new thinking regarding the humorous. Particularly, while many ideas regarding the humorous seems to fall into the same theoretical genres seen before, what stands as most striking is the reluctance to base these approaches upon older theoretical notions. Thus, while ideas that fit well into either superiority or incongruity make appearances, they appear to do so in a vacuum, making little or no reference to previous ideas that root themselves in the same type of proof. Moreover, it is during this time period those theories rooted in the idea of relief first make an appearance. In order to fully draw out these theoretical orientations, as well as search for their connections with past orientations, this section explores that writings of Hobbes, Hutchenson, Bergson, Burke, Spencer, Freud, and Morreall.

Hobbes and Hutchenson Most ideas, once formulated, do not die easily. Long existing theories on humor, besieged by the dawn of modernism, continued to be pondered upon my many great 115

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 thinkers. Many of the older Platonic ideas of humor found the heart of their continuation in the writings of Thomas Hobbes. Perhaps in response to new ideas on the purpose and source of humor, he writes in Human Nature, “I may therefore conclude that the passion of laughter is nothing else but a sudden glory arising from sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity in others, or with our own formerly.”189 This statement is a strong avocation of the ideas of superiority set forth by Plato. To Hobbes, when we see a deformity in another in comparison to ourselves, we find humor in it. In other words, we find pleasure in our superiority to those seen as inferior to ourselves. His insistence that this is source of humor, however, does not necessitate his embrace of the practice. He writes in Leviathan, “And therefore much laughter at the defects of others is pusillanimity, for the great minds one of the proper works is, to help and free others from scorn; and to compare themselves only with the most able.”190 This, in conjunction with his formal theory of humor, suggests that Hobbes, like the ancients, maintains a somewhat cautious view of humor in which humor’s ability to show us truths, in Hobbes’ case truths about ourselves, hides behind the potentiality of harm to the individual and humanity. Thus, the implication upon rhetoric of humor is a mildly Neo-Platonist echo: Humor, and thus rhetoric, is to discern the truth of the self, and in essence, to improve upon the self. Francis Hutcheson provides a strong counterargument to Hobbes in support of the

189

Thomas Hobbes. Human Nature. (New York: Oxford, 1994), 75.

190

Thomas Hobbes. Leviathan. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), 27. 116

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 growing view that humor is not rooted merely in some form of superiority. In Reflections Upon Laughter he argues: If Mr. Hobbes’ notion be just, then, first, there can be no laughter on any occasion where we make no comparison of ourselves to others, or of our present state to a worse state, or where we do not observe some superiority to ourselves above some other thing: and again, it must follow, that every sudden appearance of superiority over another must excite laughter, when we attend to it. If these conclusions be false, the notion from whence they are drawn must be so too.191 This blatant challenge to the entire basis of a platonic superiority theory of humor is truly symptomatic of the great change occurring in the field at the time, arguably beginning with Erasmus. It represents not only a challenge to the ancient roots of humor theory, but also to the ancient ideas of rhetoric itself. After this challenge to Hobbes at the beginning of Reflections Upon Laughter, Hutcheson proceeds to provide several examples of humor that he argues are not in any way explained by Hobbes’ theory of humor. In the end, Hutcheson comes to the conclusion that having feelings of superiority are neither necessary nor sole causations of humor.192 His ability to produce this proof discredits many of the prominent theoretical writings on the nature of humor that exist previously. Symbolically, this represents the demise of many things. First and foremost, superiority based theories of humor from this point on will become far less prominent and revered in academic circles. Extrapolating of this, however, one can begin to see the end of a self, or soul, centered theory of rhetoric 191

Francis Hutcheson. Reflections Upon Laughter, and Remarks Upon the Fable of the Bees. (Anchorage: Nord, 2011), 1-11. 192


1987), 26. 117

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 in general. Hutcheson’s attack of the predominant theory of humor not only helped to bring its downfall, but also opened a vacuum that needed to be filled with some alternative theory. This was a task that he was willing to embrace wholeheartedly, driving him to produce his own alternative theory. In section two of Reflections Upon Laughter he argues: That then which seems generally the cause of laughter is the bringing together of images which have contrary additional ideas, as well as some resemblance in the principal idea: This contrast between ideas of grandeur, dignity, sanctity, perfection, and ideas of meanness, baseness, profanity, seems to be the very spirit of burlesque; the greatest part of our raillery and jest in founded up it.193 With the rejection of a superiority theory of humor, Hutcheson chooses to fill the void with a theory rooted in incongruity, much like that which finds itself in Aristotle. Humor, he argues, arises from the perception of two images, or ideas, that are in some way contrary. Thus, the incongruity between expectation and reality becomes an essential part of humor. Hutcheson perhaps describes it the best when he writes, “According to this scheme, there must necessarily arise a great diversity in men’s sentiments of the ridiculous in actions or characters, according as their ideas of dignity or wisdom are various.”194 The implications of this challenge to older platonic forms of humor theory on 193

Francis Hutcheson. Reflections Upon Laughter, and Remarks Upon the Fable of the Bees. (Anchorage: Nord, 2011), 1-11. 194


1987), 30.

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Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 rhetoric in general are sweeping. Superiority, traditionally being rooted in some form of truth in turn implies that rhetoric, and thus humor, serve a purpose in some way bent to the truth as well. Plato argued for the truth of soul. This pursuit required that humor, in its true form, be as such. Incongruity, however, merely asks for a difference of interpretation, much as is found in Aristotle’s writings. Thus, under theories focusing on incongruity as root, two persons having different expectations about the word “dog” will give rise to humor in the proper situation. Under the platonic paradigm, the humor would have arisen from a feeling of superiority of one definer to the other, which, as Hutcheson showed, is difficult to sustain. The more sematic approach of incongruity abandons the necessity of truth in humor for juxtaposed ideas and differences in interpretation, thus suggesting the ruler of humor, rhetoric, must be the same way.

Bergson This new approach to humor opened the door for many new ideas about humor. Certainly, one of the more prominent writings on humor produced during this period was penned by Henri Bergson. Bergson, however, provides an interesting read into the idea of incongruity. He writes: In a word, if a circle be drawn around those actions and dispositions—implied in individual or social life—to which their natural consequences bring their own penalties, there remains outside this sphere of emotion and struggle—and within a neutral zone in which man simply exposes himself to man’s curiosity—a certain rigidity of body, mind and character that society would still like to get rid of in

119

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 order to obtain from its member the greatest possible degree of elasticity and sociability. This rigidity is the comic, and laughter is its corrective.195 In essence, Bergson is suggesting that societies use comic incongruity as a way of maintaining themselves. Thus, the incongruity arises when a person behaves different from the norm that a society constructs. Laughter, Bergson argues, is a method for a society to correct what it otherwise considers socially unacceptable behavior. This allows for variations in senses of humor that pair well with incongruity and suggests a constructivist view of the rhetoric of humor. Interestingly, however, Bergson does not argue for a constant external normality that society should follow, thus allowing his theory to work well when applied to any cultural context. Simply, Bergson spends time describing a comic mechanism, but not necessarily a comic purpose. Interestingly, this notion of humor as a social corrective, or as a social argument, is a notion that has persisted beyond Bergson’s modern proposition. Jerome Zolten, in his essay Black Comedians: Forging an Ethnic Image, argues for humor as a method of cultural definition. In one sense, humor attempts to force a group towards being perceived in a certain way, while conversely being used by the same group in an attempt to define itself.196 This highlights the ability of humorous incongruity as a social corrective to be used as a tool in order to discourage behavior, thus supporting Bergson’s assertions in a manner.

195

Henri Bergson. Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic, trans. Cloudesley Brereton. (New York: Macmillan, 1928), 3-22. 196

Jerry Zolten, “Black Comedians: Forging and Ethnic Image,” Journal of American Culture 16, no. 2 (1993): 65-75. 120

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 This understanding of humor not only supports the rhetorical implications of an incongruity theory of humor, but also attempts to give a purpose within a modern context. With the backgrounding of the Platonic understandings of humor and the triumph other methods of understanding, rhetorical humor no longer was assumed to have a bend towards truth as it predominantly did in earlier centuries, thus leaving incongruity as seemingly existing simply to exist. Such an attempt to give incongruity a purpose is symptomatic of this condition, and moreover shows a drifting of the purpose of rhetoric itself.

Burke The great rhetorical thinker Kenneth Burke continues in this line of thought. In Perspective by Incongruity: Comic Correctives, he argues: In the motives we assign to the actions of ourselves and our neighbors, there is an implicit program of socialization. In deciding why people do as they do, we get the cues that place us with relation to them. Hence, a vocabulary of motives is important for the forming of both private and public relationships. A comic frame of motives, as here conceived, would not only avoid the sentimental denial of materialistic factors in human acts. It was also avoid the cynical brutality that comes when such sensitivity is outrages, as it must be outraged by the acts of others or by the needs that practical exigencies place upon us.197 Thus, Burke sees the comic frame, and in turn humor, as related in some manner to socialization. Moreover, this relationship of the incongruous comic frame to socialization stands as distinct from other relationships with socialization insofar as it characterizes itself as easier for an individual to maintain. Burke continues: 197

Kenneth Burke. On Symbols and Society. (Chicago: Chicago, 1989), 261-267. 121

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 The comic frame, in making the man a student of himself, makes it possible for him to ‘transcend’ occasions when he has been tricked or cheated…In sum, the comic frame should enable people to be observers of themselves, while acting. Its ultimate would not be passiveness but ultimate consciousness. One would transcend himself by noting his own foibles. He would provide a rationale for locating the irrational and nonrational.198 In this we see Burke’s argument on the nature and purpose of humor complete. Not only, he asserts, is humor a social corrective, but it also serves to help us understand and interpret difficult circumstances in life. This reasoning, which sees humor as intrinsic to socialization and action correction, establishes itself strongly within the late modern writings on humor. The incongruous nature of Burke’s argument for comic frame in relation to humor is marked and difficult to miss. In the tradition of Bergson, he argues for humor based incongruity as a way to socialize and maintain societal norms, but he also expands upon this and brings the same notion down to a distinctly more individual level. Not only, he argues, does the comic frame work on a societal level, but it also helps us deal with our own shortcomings and misgivings. It is via the comic frame, and humor, Burke asserts, that we are able to assess failures and untenable circumstances in our life and, in turn, make them acceptable. The implications of this argument go much further than the implications found in Bergson’s writing. Humor, and rhetoric, in this view, becomes a method for altering the reality of some concrete event that occurred. The comic frame, being of rhetoric, suggests that rhetoric is an acceptable method of constructing different viewpoints on some

198

Kenneth Burke. On Symbols and Society. (Chicago: Chicago, 1989), 261-267. 122

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 concrete substance. Thus, with Burke the rhetoric of humor, and rhetoric, have trekked far from the ancient notions of truth and found themselves in a land of incongruous definitions. This reasoning that sees humor as intrinsic to socialization and action correction finds itself frequently used within the late modern writings on humor and is indicative of the writings of the time.

Spencer and Freud Also articulated in the time of the proliferation of socially based incongruity theories of humor are relief theories. More psychologically based than incongruity and superiority theories, relief ideas still had a significant impact on the humorous rhetorical world, as they often find themselves the basis of many current arguments which look to humor for answers. Perhaps the two most prominent theorists from this tradition are Herbert Spencer and Sigmund Freud. Spencer, being the earlier, argues that laughter: Draw(s) off a portion a portion of the surplus nervous excitement. If, as above explained, the quantity of mental energy generated is great than can find vent along the narrow channel of thought that is open to it; and if, in consequence, it is apt to produce confusion by rushing into other channels of though; then, by allowing it an exit through the motor nerves into the muscular system, the pressure is diminished, and irrelevant ideas are less likely to intrude on consciousness.199 This represents a turn from humor based in predominately in meaning for an idea of humor that roots overall in physiology and psychology, which Freud further articulates in Humor. He writes, “I think, therefore, that the possibility I have suggested, namely, that 199

Herbert Spencer, “On the Physiology of Laughter”, in The Philosophy of Laughter and Humor, ed. John Morreall (Albany: SUNY, 1987), 99-110. 123

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 in a given situation the subject suddenly effects a hyper-cathexis of the super ego, which in turn alters the actions of the ego, is one which deserves to be retained.”200 To Freud, laughter and humor are outlets for excess psychic energy which are summoned for a particular task but eventually not needed for that purpose.201 Though not explicitly meant to be rhetorical in nature, relief theories, such as Freud’s and Spencer’s, offer an interesting implication on how a modernist perspective sees the relationship of humor and rhetoric. Nervous tension, for example, builds in the mind by discourse to which an individual is exposed. The reasons for a tension build-up could be numerous, but what is more important is that when the expected end of the attention fails to actualize, the spare nervous energy expels itself through laughter, or humor. As mentioned earlier in this essay, an interesting compatibility for Relief theories of humor finds itself in Brown’s Rhetoric of Social Intervention (RSI) model. In the RSI model, an ever interacting collaboration of attention, need, and power combines to form an individual’s ideology.202 An ideology can be change via an intervention in any one of the three base elements of the model. In conjunction with the RSI model, relief is seen as a reaction to discourse aimed at such an intervention that ultimately fails.

200

Sigmund Freud, “The Joke and its Relation to the Unconscious,” in The Philosophy of Laughter and Humor, ed. John Morreall (Albany: SUNY, 1987), 112. 201

Sigmund Freud, “The Joke and its Relation to the Unconscious,” in The Philosophy of Laughter and Humor, ed. John Morreall (Albany: SUNY, 1987), 112. 202

Susan Opt and Mark Gring. The Rhetoric of Social Intervention: An Introduction. (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2009), 15-26. 124

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 Morreall Perhaps the most modern and comprehensive theoretical writing on humor and the absurd was produced by John Morreall. In Taking Laughter Seriously he argues for a reconceptualization of humor in a manner that will be able to explain all incidents of humor simultaneously. He argues that all laughter and humor springs from “a pleasant psychological shift.”203 More specifically, he writes: The first feature (of humor) is the change of psychological state involved in laughter situations…to laugh we must be caught off-guard by the change so that we cannot smoothly adjust to what we are experiencing …The second feature of laughter which must be added to our characterization of laughter situations is that the psychological shift is felt as pleasant.204 This is an attempt by Morreall to synthesize all previous theories on humor into one statement. Certainly, the theory he puts forth demonstrates an ability to account for explanations proposed by other theories. It possesses a psychological aspect, a shift that allows for incongruity and incongruity which allows for superiority. Implications of this theory, despite its attempt to be all inclusive, still bear a striking resemblance to those implications of relief and incongruity rooted theories. Its ambiguity and non-particular nature allow for a drifting of humorous and rhetorical notions. Thus, humor becomes relative and exists so long as one gains psychological pleasure from what is being communicated linguistically. The base of humor, then, is pleasure gained from language, and rhetoric truly avoids the need for any purpose. With Morreall we come to the most modern comprehensive attempt to theorize on the nature 203

John Morreall. Taking Laughter Seriously. (Albany: SUNY, 1993), 40-45.

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John Morreall. Taking Laughter Seriously. (Albany: SUNY, 1993), 40-45. 125

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 and purpose of humor. From Plato to Morreall, we can observe how notions of the rhetoric of humor have changed along notions of the mechanics and purposes of rhetoric itself. In addition to this, however, we are also able to observe those elements of humor theories which seem to be present in all theories.

Conclusion This chapter examines major writings on the rhetorical nature of humor, as well as writings that deal with theoretical and abstract aspects of humor itself. In particular the sections describes major works, beginning with Plato and stretching to Morreall, which have had a significant impact on the understanding, as well as scope, of humor theory as it pertains to rhetoric. This method of survey, primarily established by Blair and Kahl in Introduction: Revising the History of Rhetorical Theory, allows for an overview of significant theoretical-rhetorical writings to be carried out in a manner which pays proper attention to the intrinsic implications of the structure of such a survey. Importantly, this chapter also enables particular developments that take place throughout the historical study of humor to be viewed within chronological context. Thus, the development of theoretical frameworks related to the notion of psychological relief finds itself discussed not simultaneously with other schools of thought, but instead in line with its own chronological development. These aspects of Chapter Three are particularly important when one views them in light of the goals and purposes of Chapter Four. The next step of this thesis finds itself in the analysis of the texts which Chapter Three puts forth. Viewing these texts in a chronological manner draws out specific trends that emerge over time, allowing 126

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 particular intertextual relationships to more easily articulate themselves. It is from such trends that commonalities found between all humor theories emerge, thus guiding the formation of a base level understanding of the inner workings of humor to be attained. Such a base level understanding not only revolutionizes how academics view the process of humor, but also suggests new approaches to the rhetorical understanding of communicative objects.

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CHAPTER IV COMPARISONS AND IMPLICATIONS Chapter Four of this thesis evaluates the survey and in turn draws conclusions which help further develop a deeper understanding of the theoretical nature of humor. In particular, this chapter seeks out and articulates connections found between diverse schools of thought regarding the nature of humor, explores their implications, and seeks worthwhile comparisons. While traditional approaches to the study of humor emphasize the need to categorize theoretical approaches into existing systems, this thesis digs deeper, locating strains of thought and conceptual principles which connect seemingly unrelated approaches to understanding thought on the comedic. Specifically, this chapter analyzes similarities that exist between larger humorous frameworks, such as Theories of Superiority and Theories of Relief. Approaching such an enterprise from the standpoint of comparative theory, where specific and individualized theories are the common currency, may at face value seem like the simplest approach. However, this thesis avoids becoming bogged down in the nuanced differences of individual theorist by instead approaching the comparison of theory through the lens of larger frameworks, in turn allowing individual theorists that Chapter Three mentions to stand exemplar of larger theoretical frameworks. In essence, the discussion of individual theorists gives substance and breadth to the understanding of larger rhetorical frameworks regarding humor, in turn allowing this research to approach the juxtaposition of such large frameworks from a standpoint not strictly based upon textbook definition, instead of from the general character of primary sources comprising the frameworks. 128

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 With this in mind, this thesis now analyzes similarities that find themselves between theoretical humor frameworks. Specifically, this research expressly identifies trends which appear throughout the history discussion on humor. While the seemingly most logical place to look for such trends to emerge would be within the classically oriented theories of superiority, this research also takes the step of retrospectively applying more modern theories of the humorous to frameworks found within the past in order to avoid chrono-centric bias.

Theories of Incongruity and Theories of Superiority The juxtaposition of the theoretical groupings of Incongruity and Superiority provides the most obvious starting point for this analysis. While Theories of Relief do provide interesting insight on the humorous, an initial side by side analysis of the two selected frameworks provides the opportunity to uncover conceptual similarities that derive from an almost continuous development of theory, as Superiority and Incongruity Theory spring from much of the same classically oriented Greek philosophical tradition. Theories of Relief, on the other hand, spring from a more recent social-scientific (specifically psychological) tradition, thus providing a less interconnected grouping than the other two. As the previous chapter outlines, Theories of Superiority find their genesis in the ancient suppositions of the Greeks, primarily Plato. Theories embodied by this school of thought tend to assert that we laugh because of our feelings of superiority over other

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Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 people.205 Theories of Incongruity, on the other hand, are born of the age of reason, in many ways embodying scientific search for cause and effect. In general, incongruity based theories trace the origin of linguistic humor to a perception of some form of incongruity, which in many ways reflects the modernist environment that spawned them.206 Although, at face value, these theoretical models appear disparate in their relationship, they are in many ways intimately connected. Namely, this interconnectedness draws itself from the philosophical continuity found between these two schools of thought. Specifically, such continuity exists as a result of argument/counter-argument dualistic nature of Western academia that has developed over the course of the past millennium. The arguments from which Theories of Incongruity arise derive in a myriad of ways from the Greek driven theories of the previous era, representing a simplification of the ideas therein. The story of rhetoric has long been characterized by counter argument (thesis-antithesis) with older conceptions of the functions of discourse. Herrick writes in The History and Theory of Rhetoric that “Plato’s criticisms of rhetoric were themselves answers to someone else’s claims about its power and usefulness, and Locke’s view often has been answered as well.”207 Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the same interplay exists within the rhetorical characterizations

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Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 of humor. The question standing, then, is one which asks what continuities and similarities exist between these two theoretical models. Certainly, the most outstanding undercurrent that runs between these two models finds itself in the base function of incongruity. Clearly, the notion of incongruity is the basest element found within incongruity theory. Its presence in Theories of Superiority, however, is slightly more difficult it explicate, though doubtlessly existent. This is not to argue that Theories of Incongruity can absorb Theories of Superiority in totality. What is meant by a base element of incongruity is merely that when an individual or individuals engage in humor, there must be some aspect of unexpectedness, or incongruity with expectations, that is present. This differs from the general argument found within Theories of Incongruity in that it does not assert incongruity as the cause of humor, but merely says it is indicative of humor’s presence. Consider the Platonic conception of Superiority Theory. As articulated in the previous chapter, Plato’s theoretical approach roots itself in the relative superiority felt between different types of souls.208 In this formulation of the theoretical approach, some aspect of incongruity is also present in the relative expectations found between types of souls. While the judgment of a failure to reach expectation is seen as superiority by Plato, as well as other Superiority Theorists, this sense of superiority is, in essence, simply the perception of the presence of disparity. In short, arguments for superiority are in fact

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Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 arguments for incongruities with the notion of hierarchical superiority placed upon them by those theorists who penned of them. This is not to argue that superiority is invalid in any way, but only to view incongruity as the fundamental aspect of Theories of Superiority, as well as Theories of Incongruity.

Theories of Incongruity and Theories of Relief The theoretical models of Relief and Incongruity represent the next two most closely related modalities for approaching the understanding of humor. While they do not necessarily flow from the same argument/counter-argument tradition, they find their overlap in the chronological closeness of their genesis. While Theories of Superiority were first articulated in the Classical Era, Theories of Incongruity, as well as Theories of Relief, were initially articulated in what are generally viewed as modern times. Thus, it is reasonable to expect to find at least some connection between them, even if it is a minor undercurrent driven by their contextual similarities. Theories of Relief, as demonstrated in Chapter One, assume that language as humor finds its basis through scenarios beyond language, and in turn plays a vital role in the regulation of the biological via the mechanism of humor. Freud and Spencer argue, generally, that humor serves as the “venting of excess nervous energy.”209 At face value, this stands in stark contrast to the argument presented by Theories of Incongruity, which argue that the incongruous nature of expectation versus out experienced reality is the

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Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 primary cause of humor. Yet, upon further examination this seems not to be the case. This relationship articulates itself easily through the use of an exemplar situation. Take, for instance, the joke given as an example of Theories of Relief in Chapter One: A newly ordained priest is nervous about hearing confessions and asks an older priest to observe one of his sessions to give him some tips. After a few minutes of listening, the old priest suggests that they have a word. “I’ve got a few suggestions,” he says. “Try folding your arms over your chest and rub your chin with one hand.” The new priest tries this. “Very good,” says his senior. “Now try saying things like 'I see', 'I understand' and 'Yes, go on.'” The younger priest practices these sayings, too. “Well done,” says the older priest. “Don't you think that's better than slapping your knee and saying: “No way! What happened next?”210 The obvious presence of relief in this joke presents itself when the imagined priest finds humor in his relief at not feeling as if he is the only priest who is far too interested or excited about listening to his parishioner’s confessions. To relief theorists, this laughter represents the release of nervous tension regarding his uncertainty with how to properly hear confessions. While this understanding of the joke, if accepted at face value, certainly does explain the physical manifestation of laughter, it poorly explains the linguistic and social mechanism that lead to the release of such energy. Yet, just as we found the signature of incongruous action at the heart of Superiority Theory, the same signature can be found at the heart of Theories of Relief. Namely, I argue that the communicative trigger for the release of excess nervous energy, which Relief Theorists argue for also, finds it root in the process of incongruity. In the scenario detailed above, the nervous energy released as laughter is released as a result of 210

Wiseman, “Freudian funnies,” Laughlab, http://www.richardwiseman.com/LaughLab/freud.html. 133

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 a variety of incongruities. For example, if the joke causes laughter because it is physically being told by an older priest to a younger priest, the incongruity between the younger priest’s expectation of advice and what the older priest actually says would be the trigger for the release of laughter. This conception also works to explain the joke in situations outside of the confessional situation as well. It is probable that those who have experienced the act of confession from the perspective of the confessor would also find humor in this joke. Moreover, it is likely that pent up nervous energy pertaining to the act of confession exists in many individuals who engage in such an activity. The joke gives a window into the uncertainty on the side of the priest, creating a moment of incongruity between expectation and reality, which in turn drives a situation where excess energy is realized via laughter. Thus, incongruity also finds itself in the base triggers that Relief Theorists argue for. This, of course, is not to argue that incongruity always causes the release of pentup nervous tension. Simply, all this thesis puts forth is that communicative incongruity will be present at the moment of relief-fueled humor, but not necessarily be the cause of it, as certainly many situations exist where communicative incongruity is present in, but does not produce, humor. Despite this, discourse, as the constructor of the character, though perhaps not the reality, of many situations can thus be implicated in the making of a situation where an individual feels tense, and in turn may allow a release of tension via laughter. This thesis argues that the construction of a tense situation will inherently imply the presence of incongruity.

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Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 Theories of Relief and Theories of Superiority Discerning the relationship between Theories of Relief and Theories of Superiority presents a slightly more difficult prospect. While the contrast and comparison of Theories of Incongruity to both Theories of Relief and Theories of Superiority present a limited degree of logical continuity, the connection between Theories of Relief and Theories of Superiority are tenuous at best. Certainly, they bind together via their mutual interest in explaining the humorous enterprise, but outside of this connection there seems to be little in common. Superiority is born of the Greek philosophical tradition, a far cry from the relatively recent birth that Relief finds in the rise of Psychology. Moreover, while “psychology” linguistically reflects the Greek notion of psyke, or soul, Relief’s focus on nuanced particulars found in individuals stands in contrast to Superiority’s focus on broader themes, often reflected in the notion of the external. Despite this, it remains possible to discern at least some theoretical connection between the two schools of thought, even if it does not derive from chronological progression or evolution of thought. In many way, the possibility of Relief Theories in part helping to explain Theories of Superiority stands as in interesting point of exploration. This is particularly interesting when considering the Platonic and Aristotelian conception of humor being rooting in degrees of separation. As stated in Chapter Three, the general Platonic argument for the cause of humor roots itself not only in the perception of discrepancy driven by superiority and power, but also in the type of person one is, and in turn, the type of soul an individual possesses.211 Similar to this

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Cameron Shelley, “Plato on the Psychology of Humor,” Humor 16, no. 4 135

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 argument, Aristotle implies that humor is rooted in degrees of separation between types of people, with scholars such as Leon Golden arguing that a form a catharsis may also find itself at the heart of comedic interaction.212 With this understanding of Plato’s and Aristotle’s approach to comedy laid out as an exemplar of Superiority Theory in general, their connection to Theories of Relief becomes clearer. Again, this forces us to ask what is the base trigger of the presence of comedy found in the Superiority based interaction. Theories of Superiority argue that a sense of superiority is what causes humor, yet it fails to fully identify any mechanism that triggers such a reaction. Relief driven theories offer a tantalizing solution to this issue. Namely, viewing relief as a potential trigger for superiority based humor helps to fill in many of the potential gaps left by Theories of Superiority. For instance, imagine a situation where a teacher finds humor in a wrong exam answer provided by a student. According to a Superiority Theorist, the teacher could laugh at this answer out of his or her own feeling of superiority. While this certainly helps to give a superficial explanation, such an explanation is hollow and certainly has difficulty explaining many situations beyond this particular instance. If we accept relief as the trigger of superiority-driven laughter, however, the understanding of the situation changes drastically. In such a circumstance, we see that the teacher’s relief at knowing they are more intelligent than their students, (2003): 353. 212

Lane Cooper, An Aristotelian Theory of Comedy With Adaptation of the Poetics and a Translation of the ‘Tractatus Coislinianus.’ (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1922), 65-66 136

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 and thus have knowledge to still provide to them, triggers a feeling of superiority that can in turn create a sense of humor and thus allow a venting of nervous energy. While this thesis certainly argues that such an understanding of the reliefsuperiority trigger relationship helps to explain a myriad of situations, it also understands the limitations of such an explanation. Certainly, the argument does allow for a connection between the two theoretical frameworks, but seems to fall short as an explanatory model for many comedic situations. A deeper connection must be present. The most obvious connection finds itself in the conclusions of the previous two sections. Specifically, I argue that the primary connection between Theories of Incongruity and the other two theoretical frameworks is some base element of incongruity between expectations and reality. While such a connection is not readily apparent between Theories of Superiority and Theories of Relief, this link must be transitively true, as both schools of thought share this nature with a third. Again, this is best drawn out through the use of an example. Returning to our previous exemplar, where a teacher finds humor in an exam answer given by student, illustrates this point well. While we have already confirmed the potential of a sense of superiority serving as the trigger in superiority rooted humor, a more poignant connection between the two opens itself up when we consider the presence of incongruity. Namely, instead of relief becoming the potential trigger of such humor, incongruity stands as the root trigger. Thus, the teacher laughs as a result of the incongruity between expectation and reality, in this case expectations regarding an exam answer and the actual answer given, which in turn allows room for relief to enter. This 137

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 model not only provides a deeper connection between all three theoretical frameworks, but also opens up the understanding of the situation insofar that it allows for the possibility of various interpretations. For instance, while humor may be the product of relief, it also could be the product of the teacher merely finding an unexpected humorous connection between the answer and some other instance in his or her life, or perhaps it finds its genesis in discrepancy between the answer and question itself due to the student filling in the answer incorrectly. From this viewpoint, a base element of incongruity stands as the dominant connection between Theories of Relief and Theories of Superiority as well.

Implications of Connections Characterized by Incongruity Upon review, the one aspect of humor theory that seems to be ever present is some aspect of incongruity. This is not to say an incongruity theory of humor, akin to those discussed previously, is that which this thesis accepts, though. To do so would be a mere misinterpretation of conclusion based on similarity of diction. It is wise to agree with the assertions of many in the past who have written on humor and concluded that incongruity is not the cause, or sole catalyst, of comedy. Merely, what this thesis argues here is that incongruity is a necessary aspect of humor, not that incongruity is the cause of humor. While there is insufficient evidence to label it as causal, there is enough evidence to allow for its presence in all humorous exchanges. Clearly, we see that incongruity, wherever it occurs, will not necessarily cause humor. Take, for example, a scenario where a couple decides to spend a weekend at a 138

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 secluded cabin in the wilderness. While embarking on whatever adventures they choose to indulge in they must consistently go in and out of the front door of the cabin. Generally, this is a benign affair that leads to nothing more than a trip down the stairs to the car. Yet, in one instance, the couple opens to door not to find a sunny day, but instead a large bear sitting on the porch. Frightened, they slam the door and remain indoors for the rest of the evening. This situation provides an example of how incongruity within a situation may not always lead to humor. Doubtlessly, the couple experiences little in the form of amusement at finding a bumbling bear upon their porch, thus showing how incongruity (they did not expect the bear) does not necessarily always lead to an amusing state. This being asserted, this thesis still maintains that wherever humor occurs incongruity will be present in some form. For example, the same couple may find themselves looking back upon this situation only to find humor afterwards. Their laughter at the situation serves to highlight the incongruity despite the fact that said incongruity does not serve as an immediate trigger. From this point of view, incongruity, then, is symptomatic of humor; an echo of the presence of the perceived absurd.

A Theory of Departure For the sake of simplification, this phenomenon from here on shall be referred to as Departure Theory in order to easily distinguish it from Incongruity Theory. Where Theories of Incongruity view the incongruous act as being causal to humor, a Theory of Departure can be seen as simply viewing incongruity as necessary to the formation of humor. The communicative act, from this point of view, departs from the expectation of 139

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 the receiver, thus enabling the potentiality of humor. Importantly, this implies that, while incongruity is necessary, the departure from the expected is merely one necessary aspect of the successful formation of the humorous. Consider superiority theory, for instance. In all formulations of the theory some aspect of incongruity will be present. Be it incongruity between types of soul, as Plato may argue, degree of closeness to truth, or between styles of living, as Aristotle may argue, the primary, underlying mechanism found in all situations is incongruity. Thus, while one individual may find the cause of humor in their felt superiority, the reduced meaning of this is simply that there is incongruity between what they expect an individual to be like and what they are finding to be reality. Superiority theories, in essence, are all incongruities with the notion of hierarchical superiority placed upon them by those theorists who articulated them. This is not to say that superiority is invalid in any way, but only to argue that superiority cannot possibly explain all instances of humorous interaction. Thus, due to the presence of incongruity within these theories, the inner workings of superiority theories present themselves as being reliant on incongruity at the basest of levels. With this abstract explanation of superiority by incongruity, the question of incongruity as causal is, again, inherent. Incongruity may be at the base of superiority theories, but does it cause the humor to be elicited? This, however, as addressed earlier, is not what this thesis proposes. Incongruity, as asserted previously, is not causal for humor. Thus, feelings of superiority can cause humor when incongruity is present, but certainly not at all times. At risk of being repetitive, the argument here is simply that where humor 140

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 is present, including superiority based humor, so will be incongruity in some form, though the converse may not be true in all cases. Thus, superiority theories can in many ways be subsumed under the theoretical orientation of departure. Lastly, we address Relief Theory. As discussed earlier, the sum of Relief Theories, especially those of Spencer and Freud, point to release of tension or psychic energy relate to some situation where the energy is no longer deemed necessary. Discourse, as the constructor of the character, though perhaps not the reality, of many situations can thus be implicated in the making of a situation where an individual feels tense, and in turn may allow a relief of tension via laughter. This essay argues that the construction of a tense situation will inherently imply the presence of a form of incongruity. In essence, it is the incongruity between what an individual either desires, expects, or perceives and the reality of the discourse surrounding the event that causes tension to build up and allows for the potentiality of humor. Thus, incongruity, and in turn departure (due to the mere potentiality of humorous release) envelops relief.

Conclusion This conclusion uncovers and recognizes a timeless aspect of humor. If anything garners itself from the above survey of humor theories and conclusions drawn therein, it must be that when a particularity is read into a theory it will eventually cause that theory to not account for at least some aspect of humor. Thus, superiority, incongruity, relief, and a pleasant psychological shift, as asserted by Morreall as causes of humor, will always encounter some degree of resistance from real world application. However, 141

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 incongruity as symptomatic of potentiality, the essence of a Theory of Departure, does not argue for causal relationship, but invites one who partakes in humor to understand its nature more thoroughly. Surely, this is not to argue that all other theories are invalid. It is doubtless that many theories do function well within a myriad of contexts. The notion of theoretical departure merely invites the theorist to accept that any humor arguing particularity invites the characterization of their own rhetorical arguments. In short, particularity opens the door for shading theory with the tinge of social context. Naturally, the more nuanced a theoretical approach is, the greater the probability of it excluding potential scenarios. Humor, then, must be seen as nearly enthymematic. Bitzer argues that the effective enthymeme is one in which the speaker does not necessarily “lay down his opinions, but lets the audience supply them out of its stock of opinion and knowledge.”213 If we are truly to understand the nature of humor, and in turn how to properly critique and understand its purposes from the standpoint of rhetoric and communication, we must accept that whatever understanding the audience of comic material has of humorous discourse at hand is intrinsically bound to their contexts. The implication here is that a deep understanding of an audience’s background, including social context, life experiences, politics, spiritual beliefs, and countless other considerations, must be grasped in order to fully understand the function of departure within a given situation. It is unabashedly true that incongruity via departure can function in a myriad of ways within a given situation. Through understanding the aggregate potential of these 213

Lloyd Bitzer, “Aristotle’s Enthymeme Revisited,” The Quarterly Journal of Speech 45, no. 4 (1959): 407. 142

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 processes, and in turn attempting to determine which form of departure tends to be the dominant catalyst in such various scenarios, not only does a deeper understanding of the humorous process emerge, but also a sturdier foundation upon which to build consensus, and critiques of the plurality of humorous scenarios. Humor finds cause in particular linguistic, as well as communicative, components for different people, and certainly will always be rooted in assumption, understanding and definition. It is these factors that must combine with the root phenomenon of departure to produce humor. The conclusion here must be that the catalysts of the comic can vary wildly from situation to situation. This does not affirm or deny the existence of an external truth in regards to comedy, but merely argues that humor potentially arises within degrees of differences in understanding, though it is not necessarily bound to them. Thus, the academic should study comedy with an understanding of its context and the context of the theory with which it is scrutinized, allowing it to maintain its mythic status as the sphinx of rhetoric. In the words of Henri Bergson: “The greatest of thinkers, from Aristotle downwards, have tackled this little problem, which has a knack of baffling every effort, of slipping away and escaping only to bob up again, a pert challenge flung at philosophic speculation.”214 To truly recognize and understand the elusiveness of humor is to take the first step toward understanding it more deeply.

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Henri Bergson. Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic, trans. Cloudesley Brereton. (New York: Macmillan, 1928), 2. 143


CHAPTER V IMPLICATIONS OF RHETORICAL CRITICISM With the main purpose of surveying and analyzing the aggregate theoretical approaches to humor completed, this thesis seeks to explore the implications of the analysis on the realm of Rhetorical Criticism. Specifically, this chapter identifies particular paths in critiquing humorous artifacts that stand out as more fruitful when considered in light of these contentions. Through articulating such an analysis, this thesis provides a path to more effective criticisms and understanding about how humorous rhetoric functions and works to produce amusement. Importantly, this discussion helps to overcome many of the issues found in the critique of comedic discourse highlighted in the first chapter.

Recap of Historical Problems As discussed in the first chapter, the critique of humorous discourse has long been challenged with a set of problems that result from a limited understanding of humor. In many ways, the theoretical division of humor into tripartite Theories of Superiority, Theories of Incongruity, and Theories of Relief propels this issue by fragmenting the conceptual understanding of humor. How this process is detrimental to the pursuit of a deeper understanding of humor, however, is best observed through particular cases provided in the first chapter via the examples of Don Waisanen’s essay entitled A Citizen’s Guides to Democracy Inaction: Jon Stewart and Stephen Colbert’s Comic Rhetorical Criticism, Saying “Ain’t” and Playing “Dixie”: Rhetoric and Comedy in 144

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 Judge Priest, written by Gilberto Perez, and Humor as Rhetoric and Cultural Argument by Stephen Smith. Particularly, these essays highlight the practice of using comedy theory as an a priori proof that merely supports a preconceived argument. For example, Stephen Smith argues that humor in the American context is used to degrade minority cultural groups and uses Plato’s postulating on the topic of humor in order to support his assertions as well as subsequent arguments. This practice not only seems contrary to the enterprise of criticism, if we assume that theoretical frameworks mean to illuminate discourse and not advance opinion, but equally detrimental to the study and understanding of humor itself. The sheer number of various, competing, and often contradictory theories put forward on the nature of the comic makes the selection of a theoretical approach tenuous at best, thus driving the selection of easy to work with frameworks.

The Aim of Departure Theory An understanding of humorous discourse driven by Departure Theory serves to alleviate many of the issues present in the criticism of comedic artifacts. This is primarily due to the theory’s approach to understanding the humorous. Instead of attempting to comprehend the humorous in a matter that is prescriptive (necessitating that certain circumstances cause humor), Departure Theory synthesizes disparate approaches to humor developed over time, simplifying them down to common elements present in all three theoretical approaches. In this manner, Departure Theory avoids layering contextual necessities on top of the theory. 145

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 Once the contextual necessities are eliminated from the theoretical understanding itself, theory can be applied into a myriad of disparate contexts. This thesis argues that most theoretical approaches to humor have been intimately bound to their context. For example, Henri Bergson’s thoughts on humor tend to emulate the dominant form of media at the time of his writing: Silent film.215 Such a reality makes application of theory outside of its original context tenuous at best, though not impossible. Departure Theory, on the other hand, avoids this snare by searching for continuity, holism, and connection between all humor theories in an effort to not let context determine theory, but instead to let theory explain context. Departure Theory simply argues that at the basest of levels humor is nearly enthymematic insofar that we can only be certain that incongruous circumstances may give rise to humor and that humor necessitates an incongruous circumstance. With this in mind, it becomes difficult to accept the practice of using any humor theory in the analysis of humorous artifacts, as Departure Theory allows for the critic to explore working mechanisms in humor in addition to context. An effort as such lets the functions and mechanics of humor to emerge from the situation, rather than layering presupposed notions over the situation. This emergence, in turn, serves to highlight important aspects of the rhetorical situation at hand, as well as the incongruities that stand out as important to those involved in the interaction.

215

Simon Critchley, On Humour: Thinking in Action, (New York: Routledge,

2002), 57. 146

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 The Nature of Language An approach to humor from the perspective of Departure Theory also tends to mesh well with the nature of language itself. In essence, language as a system is a series of complex relationships between ideas, in many cases expressed through colloquialisms, metaphor, and a myriad of literary devices. Michael Reddy argues that we tend to view the communicative process through the lens of what he refers to as “The Conduit Metaphor.” Within this metaphor ideas are viewed as things, words (or other communicative actions) are viewed as containers, and the rhetorical process is sending.216 Epistemological implications aside, this argument works well with how we generally perceive language. Namely, we use words to describe concepts that we accept as real (whether we realize it or not), thus allowing words to become more than sounds or scribbles and become carriers of meaning. In the abstract, this model presents few problems and forms a neat, clear cut approach to the understanding of idea transmission. Practically, however, the system encounters a much messier reality, particularly when it forced to act chronologically. Language, just as all things, progresses and changes through time, leading to a myriad of varying definitions contained within the same word-vessel. A simple glance at any dictionary serves to further this point, and the phenomena itself, dubbed semantic drift by

216

Micahel Reddy, The Conduit Metaphor, in Metaphor and Thought, ed. by A. Ortonoy (Cambridge: University Press, 1979), 15. . 147

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 Richard Weaver, resists attempts to force words into static definitions.217 Further complicating this reality is the layered meaning words form when combined together in stories, myth, dialogue, metaphor, and law. Metaphor serves as a paramount example of how such devices can serve to complicate language. Lakoff and Johnson assert that “our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature.”218 Such an argument compels us to consider how this reality affects day to day understanding of conversation, as well as how language works within society. Perhaps the most important implication drawn here relates to the importance of cultural context regarding language. Namely, if we assume that metaphors are cultural constructs, then we must allow that understanding the cultural context of rhetoric is essential to understanding the full meaning of the rhetoric itself. Referencing this reality, Lakoff and Johnson write that “in actuality, we feel that no metaphor can ever be comprehended or ever adequately represented independent of its experiential basis.”219 Moreover, Richard Weaver argues that “facility with words bespeaks a capacity to learn relations and grasp concepts; it is a means of access to the

217

Richard Weaver, Language is Semonic, ed. Richard Johannesen, Rennard Strinckland, and Ralph Eubanks (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1970), 49. 218

Geroge Lakoff and Mark Johnson. Metaphors We Live By, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980), 3. 219

Geroge Lakoff and Mark Johnson. Metaphors We Live By, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980), 19. 148

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 complex reality.”220 In short, in order to comprehend intricacies in language, some knowledge of the context that generates a specific rhetoric begs understanding.

Context and Criticism A cursory review of historical attitudes towards the practice of rhetorical criticism also serves to exemplify the importance of understanding of language in relation to the situation in which it finds its genesis. Wrage, in his well-known essay Public Address: A Study in Social and Intellectual History argues that “ideas attain history in process, which includes transmission. The reach on an idea, its viability within a setting of time and place, and its modifications are expressed in a vast quantity of documentary sources. Man’s conscious declarations of thought are embodied in a mosaic of documents…of these, not the least either in quantity or value…are the lectures, sermons and speeches.”221 Here we find Wrage arguing for the study of rhetorical discourse because of its ability to embody and reflect the circumstances from which it is created, in turn showing its importance. The implication here, of course, is that since discourse so easily caries social circumstances surrounding its creations, an understanding of this circumstances is necessary to fully appreciate the discourse itself. In response to this reality, Wayland Parrish, in The Study of Speeches, elaborates at length upon the virtues 220

Richard Weaver, Language is Sermonic, ed. Richard Johannesen, Rennard Strinckland, and Ralph Eubanks (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1970), 48. 221

Ernest Wrage, Public Address: A Study in Social and Intellectual History, in Readings in Rhetorical Criticism, ed. Carl Burgchardt (State College: Strata Publishing, 2010), 29. 149

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 that a rhetorical critic must possesses in order pursue the critical task to the fullest extent. He writes, “Since the purpose of a speech is to work persuasion upon an audience, we cannot properly explain or evaluate it until we have learned a great deal about the occasion which called it forth, the speaker’s relation to the occasion, the resources available to him, and the climate of opinions and current events amidst which he operated.”222 Thus again we see that deep knowledge of the surrounding circumstances calls to the critic of rhetoric. To answer this call, Parrish asserts that the critic much be educated well in history, politics, and liberal studies as well as be willing to consult encyclopedias, biographical dictionaries, and histories, but with the “understanding that they do not replace a well-furnished mind.”223 Here we find Parrish arguing that in order to fully appreciate and explicate a work, the critic must essentially be a scholar in a myriad of fields that are contextually based. Moreover, Parrish lays forth a suspicion that even Aristotle sees the qualified listener as “a person of good education, sound sense, and judicious temper.”224 The suggestion that the critic should be a student of context also finds itself in more modern and well-known (to the contemporary student) writings on the nature of criticism. Lloyd Bitzer, in his landmark work The Rhetorical Situation, writes “In order

222

Wayland Parrish, The Study of Speeches, in Readings in Rhetorical Criticism, ed. Carl Burgchardt (State College: Strata Publishing, 2010), 37. 223



Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 to clarify rhetoric-as-essentially-related-to-the-situation, we should acknowledge a view point that is common place but fundamental: a work of rhetoric is pragmatic; it comes into existence for the sake of something beyond itself; it functions ultimately to produce action or change in the world; it performs some task.”225 In essence, Bitzer argues that rhetoric exists for a purpose beyond simply existing. Namely, rhetoric exists to do/act. Importantly, however, for rhetoric to do, it must hinge upon “the context of meaning.”226 The implication here is that the rhetorical critic must have an understanding of the situational constraints in order to fully comprehend why a particular piece of rhetoric works (in the mechanical sense) in a particular way. Again, we find the continuation of an understanding regarding the importance of context in communication. We continue to find such an implication even in particularly contemporary approaches to the explication of rhetoric. Raymie McKerrow’s Critical Rhetoric: Theory and Praxis stands as an exemplar of this. Through a discussion of the nature of critical rhetoric (one that is divorced from the Platonic notion of truth), McKerrow also leaves open the implication of contextual importance. “As a theory,” McKerrow argues, “Critical rhetoric examines the dimensions of dominance and freedom as these are exercised in a relative word.”227 To help fully elaborate upon the implications of such a

225

Llyod Bitzer, The Rhetorical Situation, in Readings in Rhetorical Criticism, ed. Carl Burgchardt (State College: Strata Publishing, 2010), 48. 226

Llyod Bitzer, The Rhetorical Situation, in Readings in Rhetorical Criticism, ed. Carl Burgchardt (State College: Strata Publishing, 2010), 47. 227

Raymie McKerrow, Critical Rhetoric: Theory and Praxis, in Readings in Rhetorical Criticism, ed. Carl Burgchardt (State College: Strata Publishing, 2010), 96. 151

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 rhetoric, McKerrow articulates eight principles explaining its operation. Of importance in this discussion is McKerrow’s third principle: “Rhetoric constitutes doxastic rather than epistemic knowledge.”228 Namely, this argument drives the reader to view rhetoric as constructed from belief or opinion, in stark contrast to the more traditional Platonic truth conceptions of the subject. Furthermore, the author writes “…critical rhetoric celebrates its reliance on contingency, on doxa as the basis for knowledge, on nominalism as the ground if language meaning is doxastic, and critique viewed as performance.”229 Again, despite the chasm of disparity found between McKerrow’s approaches when compared to those discussed previously, the same implication exposes itself. While authors have highlighted the importance of knowing context as a result of rhetoric being situation, McKerrow takes it a step further, declaring rhetoric to be relative in the fullest extent, thus necessitating that the critique not only be aware of all things proposed thus far but also be intimately aware of power dynamics both in the artifact and his or her own work. Even from a cursory glance (by this author’s own admission) at several of the landmark writings on the nature of rhetorical criticism, a trend of the need to see context as intimately related to effective criticism can be easily seen. This is certainly is not meant to discredit other, less prevalent, approaches to criticism. Simply, this highlighting serves to demonstrate the importance of knowing the context of a rhetorical argument. As we see, knowing context leads to an ability to understand the inner workings of a 228



Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 rhetorical object. Particularly it displays possible reasons for its creations, helps to explain is directional nature (why is structured in a certain way and not another), and offers potential reasons for is appeal to an audience.

Context and Humorous Artifacts As argued in the previous section, context is of vital importance to the enterprise of rhetorical criticism. While this role does not seem generally ignored by most criticism produced in the field to date, what stands out in striking fashion, as noted previously, is the blatant lack of contextual discussion in the criticism of humorous artifacts. This thesis demonstrates that much of this problem traces to conflicting theoretical approaches to humor, but there is also little doubt that much of the problem also lies in the “slippery” and often polarized nature of humor. Namely, a discussion of other types of speech be it political, religious, philosophical, interpersonal, economic, or any combination therein, possess a discussion of contextual influence, often leading to a discussion of intent and effect, and shows itself far more easily. Humorous rhetoric, especially discourse the rhetor expressly intends to be humorous, provides a difficult challenge. While general intention is more clearly cut in traditional rhetoric, humorous discourse often times purposely uses double meaning, misleading plots, and suggestion to elicit a reaction from the audience that doubtlessly may find itself contradicting what would be expected. A poignant, if not vulgar, example, finds itself in the day to day interactions between close friends. Imagine a situation where two friends are together. One says, “I thought you were going to finish eating that plate of 153

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 food?” and the other replies, “Go fuck yourself,” only to elicit raging laughter from both. This hypothetical, though certainly not farfetched, instance provides an example of how humor dabbles in feigned intention and double meaning. Certainly, to know why each participant finds humor in this situation requires a deep knowledge of the contextual circumstances and the relationship between the interactants. This need for knowledge provides a challenging invitation for the critic, as humor is often utilized in the most nuanced of situations. Resulting from this reality is the practice of applying a vaguely fitting theoretical framework to a situation allowing it to point in the direction the critic wishes. With further inspection, we see that the three major frameworks traced in Chapter Three all easily apply and “explain” this comedic instance. Theories of Superiority potentially explain this exchange through an argument which precludes that both individuals find faults in the other’s attitude. The individual leveling the insult laughs at his or her friend’s inability to comprehend the insult, while the target of the insult laughs at his or her friend’s failure to keep composure. Incongruity Theory simply argues that both laugh at the unexpectedness of the phrase “go fuck yourself” in response to a seemingly standard question. Lastly, Relief Theory argues that the insulting phrase triggers the release of nervous tension pent up within the body, be it a result of the surrounding circumstance or from some other, previous situation. Thus, we see that all previous theories find an ability to loosely explain the situation at hand. Importantly, this instance also demonstrates how the aggregate of theoretical approaches to humor can easily be chosen to characterize a situation in whatever manner the critic chooses. 154

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 Yet, it is difficult to deny that this approach leaves a hollow center to the critical enterprise. Without a clear understanding of the events, attitudes, relationship, history, and power dynamics surrounding this situation, labeling it an exemplar of any particular framework is an exercise in subjective reasoning at best and it is an aggressive defense of opinions-as-truth, at worse. Despite the long history of approaching thought on the humorous in this way, the reality of this situation, both demonstrated here and in the examples provided in Chapter One, clearly calls the rhetorical critic to consider an alternative approach to the analysis of comedic artifacts.

Departure Theory as Solution A Theory of Departure used as the primary approach to understanding the comedic enterprise serves to alleviate this problem in a variety of ways. Importantly, we must remember that Departure Theory calls the observer of humor to understand the difficult nature of humor by driving us towards viewing humor outside of the cause-effect dichotomy. While this theoretical approach admits the existence of incongruity at the heart of every humorous situation, it stops short of declaring incongruity as causal (with the effect being humor), significantly separating it from Theories of Incongruity that declare incongruity as causal.230 Instead, Departure Theory argues that incongruity is nearly enthymematic; an echo of the humorous interaction. Such an understanding bars the critic from using Departure Theory as justification for the furthering of an a priori opinion by not proposing a prescriptive framework. 230


2002), 3. 155

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 Consider the exchange used as example in the previous section. This thesis demonstrates how the three major frameworks of Theories of Superiority, Theories of Incongruity, and Theories of Relief easily apply to an understanding of this instance without the knowledge of any contextual information. Departure, however, requires that the critic understand circumstances surrounding the creation of humor via incongruity. Namely, while incongruity argues that the perception of incongruity creates the humor, a departure oriented approach argues for no incongruous causality, in turn pushing the critic to understand which contextual circumstances call forth the perception of incongruity by those involved in the humorous exchange. Thus, looking at the example of two friends where one replies to “I thought you were going to finish eating your plate of food” with “Go fuck yourself,” we see that Departure Theory cannot simply state that incongruity causes the circumstance. Alternatively, it must seek to first understand the situation at hand, and then explore the history of the situation and the implications of such a history. Through doing this, the critic opens a window into the context of the situation, giving him or herself an understanding of which rules, expectations, and guidelines must be held as prevalent, in turn allowing for an appreciation of boundaries that are expected to be violated. Once these general facts about the situation are uncovered, what leaves itself in front of the critic are a set of incongruities that no doubt are in some way related to the comedic exchange. Through the exploration, juxtaposition, and articulation of these incongruities, a deeper understanding of the circumstances driving humor in a given context make themselves visible. Of particular interest is this method’s ability to discern between personal 156

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 perceptions of humor and larger societal trends. For purposes of distinguishing between the two, this thesis will refer to personal conceptions of humor, specifically instances where a single individual finds humor in a situation that others do not deem funny, as Particular Humor, and to instances where a vast group of people find humor in a situation as General Humor. By virtue of its insistence at exploring the contextual circumstances surrounding a humorous instance, a Theory of Departure gains an ability to distinguish between these two forms of humor, in turn leading to deeper and more nuanced conceptions of how the rhetoric of comedy operates. This is a feat that no previous approach to either understanding or critiquing humor has found itself capable of accomplishing, and in many ways has been one of the driving factors behind the reckless critique of humor in order to further an a priori opinion. This reality also invites the critic to consider further conceptions of the types of humor in their quest to analyze comedy. Particularly, humorous discourse divides itself based upon general intent into three categories. The first category is labeled Intended Humor and defined as rhetoric that is expressly intended (whether successful or not) to be humorous in nature. Perhaps the most fitting example of this finds itself in the practice of stand-up comedy. The second category is Incidental Humor, which this thesis defines as humor that is a component of a larger discourse that is not expressly intended to be humorous. An example of Incidental Humor would be a joke found within a president’s State of the Union Address. While the intent of the overall speech is certainly not to garner a humorous reaction, jokes can find use within the situation to further particular points. The final category for the critic to consider finds itself in Unintentional Humor 157

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 and is defined as discourse that causes humor without intending to. An example of this type of humor would be found when an individual says or does something that causes another to laugh while not fully understanding why others perceived humor in what was said. These three categories aid the critic in understanding the contextual circumstances surrounding a situation. Where a result is easily found in a comedic exchange (namely, humor is generally the result), intent can be more difficult to discern. These categories allow the critic a starting point. While exploring Intentional Humor, such as stand-up comedy, it becomes more important for the critic to understand social norms, as the humor is intended for and targeted at a large cross section of society. Incidental Humor behooves the critic to explore more nuanced details within a humorous instance, as a joke may target particular differences, be intended to be misunderstand by portion of the audience, or be intended to dismiss topics well known within the group itself. Finally, Unintentional Humor pushes the critic to explore at length incongruities that were violated and what they mean to the audience, as it implies that particular beliefs may be held more loosely than previously thought.

Conclusion This chapter elaborates upon the implications that a Theory of Departure creates regarding the practice of rhetorical criticism. Mainly, we find that Departure Theory stands apart from other approaches to understanding humorous artifacts via its insistence at avoiding the cause-effect dichotomy. Instead, when viewing humor with Departure 158

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 Theory, the critic must make a concerted effort to fully understand the context, thus flushing out important incongruities, which in turn allow them to more fully understand how humor operates within a particular instance. Helping the critic in this endeavor are the concepts of Particular Humor, General Humor, Intended Humor, Incidental Humor, and Unintentional Humor, which provide systems of and understandings of various potentialities and give the critic a base starting point from which to work. While this task may be daunting, requiring the critic to be well versed in many studies, it is certainly the only way to avoid the blatant misconstruing of humor in order to either force it to fit into a layered theoretical model or to force it to support a previously held opinion. In short, a Departure Theory serves to solve many of the problems latent in the criticism and understanding of humor.

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CHAPTER VI EPILOGUE This thesis accomplishes many tasks related to the rhetorical pursuit of understanding humor. Primarily, its goal is to trace rhetorical thought as it relates to comedy from the Platonic conception of rhetoric to present day, teasing out and articulating lines of thought which stand as commonplace through all theoretical approaches. The practical result of this endeavor is the articulation of a Theory of Departure, which presents a new and distinct approach to the understanding of humor. I the turn to reinterpreting the standard approach to criticizing humorous artifacts by using Departure Theory as the framework in which criticism operates. The practical result of the task performed in this work is an approach to humor that allows the critic to explore intricate relationships between all aspects of the rhetorical-situation-characterized-as-humorous. Approaching criticism in this manner provides an opportunity not only to find buried implications about the culture in which the humor operates, but also gives an opening for the field of rhetoric to more closely understand the interplay of incongruities within comedy itself. Thus, we find that this new approach to humor theory found in a Theory of Departure is not only an understanding that aids in the conception of humor, but one that synthesizes diverse theoretical approaches while helping to further understand the role of context in rhetoric. With such a result in view, the aims of this thesis are considered justifiably complete.

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Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 Potential of Future Research The potential directions of future research that results from the conclusion of this thesis are many. Such a plethora of possible directions is owed to Departure Theory’s ability to understand comedic exchanges at the most fundamental level, allowing the critic to build meaning atop a framework that is not already inhibited by previous assumptions. Perhaps the most intriguing avenue of future research lies in Departure Theory’s ability to illuminate trends currently unknown to the field. Through immersing oneself in contextual details, a series of critiques driven by Departure Theory focusing on a particular time period and culture possess the ability to bring forth humorous trends, both helping the understanding of mechanistic humor and of the time period in general. This is helped in particular by the conceptions of Particular Humor, General Humor, Intentional Humor, Incidental Humor, and Unintentional Humor that this thesis proposes. Namely, these conceptions allow the critic to conceive of humorous situations in a manner that divides outliers from the socially accepted norm. In the end, the ability to do this teases out trends latent in a particular context. Another potential research option opened by the arguments within which this thesis finds itself is the ability to support the conclusions of previous theoretical approaches to humor. This, of course, in no way means to discredit the conclusions that point to the necessity of a Theory of Departure. It must be remembered this thesis argues that previous approaches to humor have already be tainted by their attachment to the context in which they find their genesis. For example, it has been argued that Bergson’s conception of humor is intimately tied to the beginning of cinematic comedy. Departure 161

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 Theory offers the unique ability to approach humorous texts from the past with an eye for only contextual importance. Thus, any conclusions formulated will inherently support or refute contemporary theories of the artifact, in turn guiding how the theoretical approach is best used in the future. Another fascinating possible future course of research resides in the reevaluation of previous conclusions found in rhetorical criticism of humorous artifacts. While the task would certainly be daunting, the conclusions of an enterprise that undertakes this task would no doubt fully redefine and alter the body of knowledge regarding humor. Moreover, it offers the unique opportunity to evaluate approaches to understanding the humorous in an effort to find potential caveats to Departure Theory that could increase its overall ability to understand how humor works within the world. Beyond this, reevaluating past conclusions about the nature of humorous artifacts would help to clear the field of potentially flawed interpretations; an endeavor whose value cannot be undervalued. Other, more complex, future research potentialities aim towards further developing an understanding of the “form” that humor takes. While past studies, such as Victor Raskin and Salvatore Attardo’s General Theory of Verbal Humor, which focuses primarily on a script theory of humor, have failed at attempting to articulate such a form, Departure Theory’s ability to view humor from the basest elements opens the possibility of such an endeavor being successful. While it would still be tremendously unwise to argue for causality, regardless if it is from form or theory, the prospective existence of forms of the comedic would illuminate the humorous enterprise in a myriad of ways. 162

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 Perhaps of the utmost importance, such understandings would help to illuminate prevalent manifestations of humor in particular contexts. For example, in the modern, American context, stand-up comedy appears to be a dominant form of the comedic. The exploration of the construction and layering meaning of this form hold the potential to yield insight into both the society in which it is used as well as into normal a customs with regards to humor. Certainly, such an endeavor is not to propose that there is a finite number or forms that humor can take, or that rhetoric in such forms must cause humor. The pitfall of previous attempt to discern a form of humor mainly lies in the narrow scope from which the approach originates and the definite claims that they seem to make. When approached from the standpoint of Departure Theory, the understanding of forms of humor must necessarily rest upon the potential for incongruity. Thus, forms manifest as social layers found over the top of such potentialities. Moreover, such layering must be constructed mutually among members of cultural groups or contexts, who deem instances of humor as appropriate or inappropriate. The success of enterprise is must be determined by its ability to highlight incongruities present in the context as was as with in intercontextuality of the situation. The success of such an enterprise also raises the potential of constructing a grammar of humor. Reminiscent of Kenneth Burke’s A Grammar of Rhetoric, a grammar of humor would serve no only to explicate dominate forms of humor in the modern context, but also provide insight into how such forms function. The construction of models and processes of humor would moreover allow the critic explore the intersection 163

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 of Departure Theory and social applicability, in turn opening the door to the interplay of genuine understandings of humor with rhetorical criticism. Most importantly, however, the immediate direction research must take is to provide a sample criticism through the lens of Departure Theory. The process of creating a criticism as such serves to both test the practicality of Departure Theory as well as provides a window to further refine the grammar introduced by this thesis. Completion of such task behooves the critic of rhetoric and humor to further apply concepts proposed by Departure Theory into disparate situation, thus further driving out understanding of humor. Contexts for application need not only be found within the modern setting. Fruitful ground for critique which adds to the present literature on humor can be found in any context, and it is certain that the more wide ranging such critique the more adequate an understanding of humor becomes.

Limitations Despite the clear importance of arguments found within this thesis, there still remain potential areas of future improvement. The most outstanding example of this finds itself in the thesis’s sole focus on primary texts form the Western philosophical context. The decision to include only these texts was made in order to narrow the scope of the writing, as well as to provide a starting platform that relates to the majority of work already publish in the field. This is not, however, meant to marginalize other nonWestern understandings and conceptions of humor. While it would be worthy to test Departure Theory in a context outside of Western humor, and certainly this author would 164

Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 look to uphold the theory’s assertions, we must also remain open to the potentiality of different conceptions of humor working in a framework fundamentally different from what is discussed and concluded in this thesis. Other limitations found within this thesis pertain to the texts from the Western framework that were selected. Particularly, there is little doubt that the breadth of texts left out of this analysis could be listed ad nausium. Certainly, the ability to add more texts would be welcome by this author, though uncertainty remains regarding the ability to change the practical conclusions of the thesis. Mainly, the potential addition of texts would no doubt help to refine the conception of Departure Theory. While this does stand as a limitation, this author hopes the potentiality of future research discussed in the previous section will serve to mitigate the effect of these limitations. Although I do not view the lack of a causal function for humor in Departure Theory as a limitation, the potential that others may view this as a limitation must be acknowledged. Simply, the only response that can be given to such a criticism of this work is that humor must be allowed to flow and work in its own manner. Forcing a causal function upon it serves to distort or dismiss potential lessons that can be learned from how humor works, and allows for the mischaracterization of texts in order to serve such a causal function. Thus, the most fitting course of action must be to allow the understanding that while causal functions in many humorous instances may match one another, the possible existence of outliers behooves us to be open to other potentialities. Thus, the theoretical approach of a Theory of Departure must not allow the cause-effect

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Texas Tech University, Christopher Adamczyk, May 2014 dichotomy to dictate its perspective on comedy.

Closing Thought The task which this thesis embarks upon allows, the rhetorical theorist and rhetorical critic to have a more full view of comedy in general. Such a viewpoint exposes us to far more knowledge about not only the function of humor, but the humorous condition in general. There is little doubt that such sweeping pronouncements tempt the academic to cease pursuing understanding the phenomena at hand. This is not the intention of this thesis. It is my wish that the theoretical proposals found in these pages drive the rhetorical community to be further intrigued by the inner workings of comedy. In essence, this thesis and Departure Theory itself intends to serve as a platform for further exploration of humor not only for the sake of understanding, but also the potential the comedy holds in regards to improving the culture around us.

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