The role of trade unions in corporate social responsibility initiatives 8. December 2003 European Trade Union Institute
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY BETWEEN PUBLIC POLICY AND ENTERPRISE POLICY
Thomas Bredgaard
Aalborg University Department of Economy, Politics and Administration Centre for Labour Market Research (CARMA) Fibigerstraede 1 DK-9220 Aalborg
[email protected] www.socsci.auc.dk/~thomas ph. +(45)96358169 fax. +(45)98155346
1. Types of CSR approaches
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is not a new phenomenon (Segal et al 2002; Sobczak 2003). In early industrial societies of the 18th century, before the emergence of the welfare state, some private, paternalistic enterprises internalised responsibilities for their employees, often on the basis of an unwritten social contract (social security in return for loyalty). Motives for CSR were often both religious and ethical beliefs of the owner or fear of labour unrest and radicalism.
Once again, albeit with different motives and substances, CSR is in vogue. It has become one of the cherished buzzwords and expectations of modern business management in post-industrial economies. Some governments are pushing hard to relieve the public sector of some of its former burdens and to forge public-private partnerships. The EU is appealing to the European business community to take on board CSR. Political consumers are on the rise staking new demands on private firms. It seems that modern business managers are under stakeholder siege.
CSR is defined by the European Commission as “a concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interactions with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis” (European Commission 2002, p. 3). The concept of CSR is nonetheless vague, ambiguous and multidimensional. To provide some clarification, CSR initiatives can be classified as either emanating from the bottom-up (enterprises as initiators) or from the top-down (governments as initiators) and according to their focus, either on societal responsibility or on labour market responsibilities.1 Four types of CSR, which should not be seen as mutually exclusive, can then be identified:
1
In focussing on the initiators of CSR and the substance of CSR initiatives, an advantage of the typology is that it allows for comparisons of CSR between different national labour market and welfare regimes. When CSR is defined as voluntary business initiatives on top of national laws and regulations, the possibilities for cross-country comparisons are invalidated, since differences between national welfare and employment regimes in Europe are immense. What count as voluntary social responsibilities in one country, is often considered a legal obligation in another country.
2
Figure 1. Typology of CSR approaches Initiator
Bottom-up (business driven)
Top-down (government-driven)
Focus
Societal
(1) CSR between business and
(3) CSR between business and
responsibilities
society: Philanthropy, stakeholder
government: Add value,
value, triple-bottom line reporting,
transparency and coherence to
supply-chain management, codes of
existing business practices; persuade
conduct, ethical investments
more companies to join
Labour market
(2) CSR in business: Focus on labour (4) CSR between labour market
responsibilities
supply, human resource management, policy and business: Focus on labour human capital; internal CSR
supply and labour demand, social integration; internal and external CSR
This first type of CSR found its modern expression in US type business-driven initiatives towards society (such as philanthropy, stakeholder value, corporate codes of conduct, supplychain management, triple-bottom line reporting, ethical investments etc.). This type of voluntary CSR could be interpreted as the functional equivalent to the lack of a universal welfare state. The second type of CSR is similar, but focus narrowly on the labour market responsibilities of the firm, especially in relation to recruitment, maintenance, development and phasing out of labour. This type of CSR cut across national differences and relates to the human capital, human resource management and internal responsibilities of individual firms. In both types the role of the state and public authorities is limited, which distinguish them from the last two types. The third type of CSR is government driven and focus on societal responsibilities. It can especially be found in the European Commission approach to CSR (cf. European Commission 2001, 2002), the Dutch (SER 2001) and English approach (DTI 2001, 2002). Here governmental authorities attempts to add value, transparency and coherence to existing business initiatives and use communication as an steering instrument to persuade more enterprises to join. The fourth type of CSR is also government driven but narrowly focussed on labour market responsibilities in relation to supply and demand for labour. Compared to the second type (bottom-up and societal
3
responsibilities) there is more emphasis on social integration of unemployed and inactive, i.e. external social responsibilities.
Denmark, which provides the case study for this article, is an example of the type four government-driven approach to CSR, which is narrowly focussed on labour market responsibilities. CSR was launched as an official government program in 1994. A number of political and social initiatives were taken from the top-down and involved decentralised actors in public-private partnerships. The main policy objectives have been to improve labour market integration for the marginalized and long-term unemployed and to reduce workplace exclusion. Since the initiative came from the political-administrative system in Denmark, rather than the business community, the Danish case allows for a discussion of the role of the public sector in CSR, a discussion that has generally been neglected in mainstream CSR literature.2
As a government program, CSR creates new reciprocal relations between public authorities and private enterprises. This paper address the question of how instrumental links can be established between public policy and enterprise policy. The Danish case shows some of the possibilities and limitations of (soft) government intervention into the operations and behaviour of private enterprises. The main question is how links can be forged between public policy instruments and business interests to alleviate labour market problems in a voluntary manner and without undermining the capitalist market dynamic. To understand links between public policy and enterprise policy we cannot rely on traditional interpretations of politics and society, where state and market are often seen a functionally opposed logics. We need to construct an alternative and integrated theoretical framework that, on the one hand, identifies the way public policymakers construct programs to influence the business community by other means than ‘command-and-control’ regulation and, on the other hand, opens up for understanding private enterprises as more than rational agents motivated by short-term profit gains. Such a framework is proposed in this paper.
From the perspective of a universal welfare state, CSR is about making the business community responsible for problems, which traditionally have been regarded as public responsibilities, e.g. 2
The ETUC in its resolution on CSR from October 2001 even noted that CSR “…reflects the contraction of the role of the public authorities, with the promotion of open coordination, ‘soft laws’ and benchmarking to the detriment of regulation”.
4
long-term unemployment and workplace exclusion. CSR, therefore, breaks traditional boundaries of the state and market and implies new divisions of responsibilities between public and private actors. However, the nature of the flexicurity mix in Denmark, in which private employers have traditionally been exempted from responsibilities in case of unemployment, sickness and workplace injuries, makes Denmark a critical case on the extent to which private enterprises will adopt CSR in a voluntary manner.
The paper is organised in two parts. First, the special nature and characteristics of CSR as a government program in Denmark is described, second, an analytical framework for linking public policy programs and business interests is presented. An important conclusion is that acknowledging the different roles, programs and policy instruments available to the state and public authorities transcend the dichotomy between voluntarism and coercion, characterising much CSR debate. Voluntary CSR create free-rider problems, sporadic adoption and easily develops into a marketing exercise for the business community, which will not alleviate common societal problems. ‘Command-and-control’ regulated CSR would make the business community negative opponents, rather than positive partners. The paper suggests other types of policy instruments transcending the dichotomy.
2. The Danish case: CSR between labour market policy and business
Danish labour market policy problems are not unique. Since the 1970's, unemployment in most European societies has risen to unprecedented levels and has led to persistent long-term unemployment. Even if some, especially smaller European countries (notably Austria, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands and Norway) succeeded in reducing unemployment considerably in the later part of the 1990's (cf. Auer 2000), unemployment, social exclusion and employment policies have remained high on the agenda of most European governments. European labour markets are said to be confronted by common policy challenges such as persistent unemployment, demographic changes, new family structures, the changing world of work, gender inequalities etc. (cf. Lødemel and Trickey 2001; Schmid and Gazier 2002; Clasen 1999; Safarti 2001; The European Commission 2000). A plethora of different policy responses have been launched and CSR is proposed to be one way to reach the ambitious strategic objectives formulated under the Lisbon European Council (2000) to become “the most competitive and
5
dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion” (cf. European Commission 2000, 2001, 2002).
In Denmark, the idea of CSR was introduced by the Ministry of Social Affairs in 1994 and quickly won general acceptance by all political parties, the social partners, NGOs and the business community. It has developed into one of those modern buzzwords that everyone is in favour of possibly because no one is able to define it precisely. Ambiguous, vague and changing objectives is a natural feature of political decision-making that secures political support from different corners, allows for compromises and makes it possible for different actors to read their interests into political programs (Stone 1997). CSR in Denmark is both a vision (a future expectation) for a more integrative welfare state; a new type of labour market in which segmentation is alleviated; and a business strategy to respond to legitimate stakeholder expectations.
The explicit objectives of the Danish government are related to labour market and social policy; to reduce risks of exclusion from ordinary employment by ‘prevention and ‘retention’ and to increase the labour market participation of the long-term unemployed and inactive by ‘integration’. Hence, CSR can take two forms: (1) Internal social responsibility: Preventing workplace exclusion, e.g. by health and safety procedures and different types of personnel policies and/or actively retaining persons in risk of exclusion, e.g. by reducing long-term sickness leave and establishing informal jobs for employees with reduced work ability. (2) External social responsibility: Integrating long-term unemployed, the inactive and persons with permanently reduced work ability, e.g. by establishing wage-subsidised jobs on special conditions or job training.
The immediate background to the introduction of the concept of CSR in Denmark was the public campaign ‘Our Common Concern’ that was launched by the Ministry of Social Affairs in 1994. The campaign attempted to persuade enterprises to internalise responsibilities for employees in risk of exclusion and the unemployed, instead of externalising the human and economic costs of a flexible and mobile labour market with liberal hiring and firing policies (in terms of sickness, burnout, unemployment etc.) to the welfare state. The campaign implied a shift from traditional supply-side interventions (aiming a creating more mobile and flexible unemployed) towards
6
demand-side interventions (creating a more inclusive labour market with ‘room’ and ‘use’ for everyone). It thereby touched upon historical-institutional balances of the Danish labour market; first, in emphasising the need to regulate adverse consequences of firm behaviour and, second, in calling for a new set of boundaries between the state and the market (i.e. a new mix of responsibilities between public and private actors).
Danish labour market policy is a relatively new policy field, which did not emerge with a separate identity until the 1960s. Before that labour market policy had been an appendix to social and welfare policy. The social partners with few exceptions regulated the labour market without political interference. Through negotiations and encompassing collective agreements they still regulate issues that are regulated by law in other European countries. The social partners ensured a highly flexible and mobile labour market without much political interference while the state for its part ensured relatively generous social security in case of unemployment, sickness, old-age etc. (cf. Madsen 1999; Jørgensen 2002). Private enterprises were expected to pay corporate taxes on time and abide to legalisation on environmental protection, health and safety, corporate disclosure etc. Otherwise, hiring and firing regulations have been lax; corporate managers have to a large extent been free to decide on the use of labour; and have only contributed minimally to unemployment and sickness benefit schemes. Fully-fledged CSR in effect would mean a new division of responsibilities between public authorities and the business community. But CSR was exactly created upon the tradition for self- and co-regulation on the labour market and, thus, respect for the professional autonomy of both social partners and the enterprises.
As in other countries, the state did not use traditional ‘command-and-control’ regulation to enforce CSR. Public authorities therefore had to persuade the business community to take on board CSR, making them realise that social responsibility was a ‘common concern’ among all relevant stakeholders (the public sector, the enterprises, local communities, voluntary associations, unions etc.) (cf. Rosdahl 2002). From the outset it was stressed that CSR did not involve quota schemes or sanctions to force enterprises to participate. Voluntarism became the main principle. The objective of public campaigns was, therefore, to raise the awareness among enterprises that it was in their own interest to take on board social responsibilities, hitherto the responsibility of the public sector. Adequate voluntary business action would ward off the risk of
7
public intervention (cf. Haufler 2001).3 The main messages of the CSR policy program are illustrated in this quote from a former senior civil servant in the Ministry of Social Affairs:
"The public sector will have the final responsibility; participation must be voluntary; a close cooperation among partners must be established; everyone must gain; the public authorities must be able to service the enterprises" (Bakdal 1995: 209).
The quote suggests that CSR does not result in private enterprises taking over former public responsibilities, but only that enterprises are applying their comparative advantage in assisting the public and the society in relieving problems of workplace exclusion and unemployment. The responsibility of public authorities is to lay down a framework where it becomes possible and attractive to act in a socially responsible manner.
We now have a first indication of the objectives of CSR as a government program and the main strategy for implementation. But where did CSR come from and which political and societal problems were CSR seen as a solution to? To answer this question we need to understand the labour market situation in Denmark in the early 1990s and how it changed in the later part of the 1990s.
In the early 1990s, unemployment had reached historical highs at 12% of the labour force and social expenditures for sickness leave and pre-pension were described as ‘exploding’. There was widespread fear of ‘dropping a whole generation on the floor’, which due to persistent unemployment, lack of qualifications and the negative psychological consequences of unemployment would possibly never be integrated on the labour market. Political worries were mounting that the employment crisis would result in a ‘two-third’ society, meaning that one third of the population were permanently excluded from employment and the labour market, which would possibly lead to a breakdown of solidarity between the hard-working middle-classes and the unemployed (blaming the victim) and thus further compound the financial crisis of the universal welfare state (Social Commission 1993).
3
If private enterprises would not voluntary respond adequately to public calls for social responsibility, the programmakers of the Ministry of Social Affairs threatened to enforce quota-schemes and sanctions upon the business community. Whether business managers have seen this threat as serious and when the criteria of inadequate business response have been violated is difficult to say.
8
CSR was in this context pushed forward to tackle immediate social policy problems of rising social expenditures and as a way to forge a new alliance behind the universal welfare state. CSR was seen as an element in the strategy to create a more Inclusive Labour Market (ILM). A more inclusive labour market with ‘room and use for everyone’ is a political vision for a less segmented and less polarised labour market in which public-private partnerships are forged to avoid workplace exclusion and long-term unemployment. The initial idea was to establish a ‘third labour market’ that could act as a ‘transitional phase’ and give the unemployed some work experiences, self-confidence and renewed qualifications by job-training, education and subsidised jobs on special conditions. As a political strategy, the ILM was the compromise reached by the dominant labour market actors to counter more radical demands for work sharing and a universal citizens wage scheme.4
The Ministry of Social Affairs found inspiration in the EU and Anglo-American discourse on ‘business ethics’, ‘corporate social responsibility’ and ‘stakeholder values’. These new management buzzwords could increasingly be observed in mainly multinational corporations in UK and USA in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and in the discourse of Jacques Delors on the ‘Social Dimension’ of the EU and his appeal to the European business community to fight social exclusion in 1993. There were also a number of local initiatives in Denmark in which private enterprises, municipal authorities and social partners were trying to establish new social partnerships. By blending these types of inspiration the initial policy program of the ILM and the first campaigns on CSR could be launched (cf. Hardis 2001; Bredgaard 2003).
At the same time as the Ministry of Social Affairs launched the first campaigns on CSR, the ministry of Labour launched a new labour market reform. The labour market reform combined a new policy mix of Keynesian fiscal policy and active labour market policy, which together with an international economic upswing marked the way towards a considerable improvement of the labour market situation in Denmark. Already in 1995, the economy improved and unemployment continued to fall to a historic low of 5% of the workforce in 2001. The problem definition of the
4
In this paper the Inclusive Labour Market (ILM) is understood as a umbrella concept of CSR, which emphasise a wider group of actors than just public actors and private enterprises and include social responsibilities of public institutions and organisations, the social partners and municipal authorities. CSR is thus an instrument, targeted at private enterprises, to reach a more inclusive labour market.
9
(former social-democratic led coalition as well as the current liberal-conservative) government has changed in line with this improvement of labour market conditions. The overriding aim is now to increase effective labour supply.5
Interestingly enough, CSR and the ILM has stayed on top of the policy agenda and managed to survive the changing perception of policy problems. This can be explained by the elasticity and plasticity of the concepts making them suitable to target different problem definitions and policy agendas. It also reflect the fact there is seldom a causal relationships in political decision-making between problem definitions, problem solutions and policy effects (Cohen, March and Olsen 1972; Kingdon 1984).
CSR has now been rephrased as a program to activate the ‘latent labour supply’ and to avoid future lack of labour supply. Shifting from ‘passive’ to ‘active’ employment policies, public expenditures on income support are expected to decline and the revenue base of the welfare state to increase. As a public policy, CSR has shifted from social policy towards employment and economic policy,6 which makes the business case for CSR essential in convincing, persuading and re-orienting enterprises to take on board CSR. In this economic universe two interrelated arguments for the rationality of CSR are often put forward:
(1) Stakeholder approach: With economic globalisation, new ICT and media exposure a broader range of actors than shareholders and employees have a stake in the decisions of enterprises and should be involved accordingly. The wider range of actors, like sub-contractors, consumers, public authorities and NGOs, are presumed to be predisposed for enterprises acting in a socially and environmentally responsible manner (cf. Freeman 1984). Social responsibility can then be used in public relations to gain a better image and reputation in front of stakeholders. In the final analysis, this will come out on the economic bottom line. The main weakness of
5
Even despite the fact that employment conditions have worsened considerably since late 2002, and the unemployment rate have now started to climb again (from 4,5% in the second quarter of 2002 to 5,6% in the second quarter of 2003). The government is therefore currently at pains trying to convince the public that the strategy of increasing effective labour supply is still on the mark and that the unemployment situation is only temporary and soon the demographic composition of the workforce (with smaller youth cohorts and large shares of the workforce around the retirement age) will result in lack of labour supply. 6 This shift is also reflected in the fact that the new liberal-conservative government when assuming office in late 2001 moved the policy areas of CSR and the ILM from the Ministry of Social Affairs to the Ministry of Employment.
10
stakeholder theory, however, is that it presents a universal theory of the firm supposedly applicable to all types of enterprises. We still need to contextualise the theory and determine its relevance for types of enterprises, markets and environments. The assumption would be that stakeholder theory is most relevant for knowledge intensive and modern enterprises, which are dependent on a ‘good’ public image and ‘high’ ethical standards. In this light is should not come as a surprise that existing economic and management research so far has been inconclusive in identifying an empirical correlation between CSR and economic performance (cf. Griffin and Mahone 1997; McWilliams and Siegel 2000, 2001). The line of causation is also unclear: Does firms behave in a socially responsible manner because they are economically successful or do they become economically successful because they behave in a socially responsible manner?
(2) The second economic argument for CSR is clearly related to the stakeholder argument and focus on the direct economic returns from corporate social performance. Enterprises performing internal social responsibilities will in return get more committed, loyal and productive employees and a larger recruitment base. Consumers, investors, public authorities and civil society organisations will positively acknowledge enterprises marketing their CSR practices. Even external social responsibility will (in theory) create direct economic returns. A necessary condition is that public authorities provide economic subsidies to enterprises (or the person). When labour supply is scarce, firms will, in addition, have a natural interest in increasing effective labour supply by integrating unemployed who are not as effective or experienced as the core labour force. Thus, CSR can be ‘sold’ to the business community as being in the short- and long-term economic interests of enterprises and not only as a question of ‘correct’ political and normative attitudes. Yet the adoption of CSR policies by the business community is very much an article of ‘faith and conviction’ rather than hard empirical evidence.
We have now briefly described the when, what and why of CSR in Denmark, and need to consider whom the concept cover. In Denmark, the target group covers everything from mentally or physically handicapped, senior citizens, ethnic minorities, the unskilled, the long-term unemployed and persons in rehabilitation or pre-pension schemes. In brief: Everyone who is not 100% effective! Many of these groups have previously only to a limited extent been targeted by active labour market and social policy. But public authorities cannot reach the target groups directly. Policymakers and administrators must act indirectly through the assistance and ‘good
11
will’ of the enterprises. That presumes some element of harmony between public policy instruments and the behavioural and attitudinal dispositions of private enterprises (cf. the next section). A three-pronged relationship between public authorities, enterprises and the target groups emerges, which makes target group intervention more difficult than in traditional policy program, where there is a direct relationship between public authorities and target groups.
Therefore, traditional ‘command-and-control’ regulation was not seen as appropriate. CSR in Denmark (as almost everywhere the government has taken an active part) was launched as a persuasion program. By information campaigns, appeals to the moral consciousness of enterprises and awareness rising, public authorities attempt to change the attitudes and behaviour of private enterprises. Motivation programs that aim at the economic interests of enterprises supplement the persuasion component. Wage subsidy schemes like the flexible jobs and soft jobs scheme7 have been established to speak to the economic incentives of enterprises and lower the perceived gap between wage and productivity of persons with reduced work ability. For those enterprises that do not lack the will but the capacity to perform CSR, public activity programs aim at meeting enterprise (and individual) deficits of resources and competencies (e.g. public assistance in establishment of national and regional networks of enterprises, different types of consultancy organisations, establishment of local coordination committees for a more inclusive local labour market, and administrative service delivery for enterprises through municipal authorities).8
7
Municipal authorities provide flexible jobs in the private as well as the public sector to persons with permanently reduced work ability. The wage subsidy amounts to ½ or 2/3 of normal wages (not exceeding the minimum wage). Municipal authorities in turn receive a state reimbursement of 65% of expenditures for flex-jobbers, which should make it an attractive financial option compared to rehabilitation (50% state reimbursement) and pre-pension (35% state reimbursement). Soft-jobs are provided for persons already receiving social pensions (i.e. pre-pension). Currently around 20.000 flexible jobs have been created - primarily in the public sector - and with a rather sharp rise in the last couple of years, while the soft-job scheme has stagnated around 6.000 jobs each year. 8 Social partnerships is one of the main mechanisms to establish a common agenda for CSR. The Ministry of Social Affairs early on in the campaign decided to invite prominent business leaders to join the debate on CSR. National and regional business networks were established to find inspiration and identify common interests and solutions. Only later were representatives of interest organisations invited to join the debate on CSR. That happened with the 1998 Law on the establishment of Local Coordination Committees (for a more inclusive labour market) in each and every municipality. These committees have an equal representation of social partners (local representatives of the Danish Employers Confederation and the Confederation of Trade Unions) and municipal representatives and are innovative in so far as municipal social policy had prior been clinically cleansed from corporative influence (cf. Larsen et al 2001; Andersen and Torfing 2002a, 2002 b). Special task-organisations have also been formed to disseminate information and best-practice and to educate and advice various stakeholders on CSR and the ILM (like the Copenhagen Centre, the National Centre for the Inclusive Labour Market and Dissemination Centre Aarhus).
12
The policy program of CSR in Denmark is not a single policy instrument, but a number of different and complementing instruments. And in line with the improving labour market situation since the mid-1990s, the instrumentation of the policy program has changed from persuasion and increasingly towards economic motivation programs and public service delivery. Public authorities are now to a greater extent trying to change the behaviour of enterprises by speaking to their economic interests and by alleviating lack of capacity and resources, rather than lack of knowledge (due to insufficient information and attitudes).9
As may have become evident, implementation of CSR does not involve traditional administrative implementation of pre-defined and clear objectives and with a clear hierarchical relationship between policymakers and administrators. CSR are almost everywhere constructed as experimental implementation (cf. Matland 1995) involving trial-and-error, policy-oriented learning and evaluation. Public policymakers refrain from ‘command-and-control’ regulation and instead hope that ‘best practice’ and the ‘good example’ will gradually lead to more standardised and uniform business responses. Enterprises may for their part quite easily adopt the idea and manipulate and interpret it for their own purposes. The voluntarism of CSR may, however, also led to non-participation and re-labelling of existing practices under a new heading.
We have now travelled through the contextual landscape of CSR in Denmark. In what follows, I shall take a brief voyage through the theoretical landscape of public policy analysis and neoclassical economics so as to arrive at an analytical and instrumental understanding of how public policy programs and enterprise interests can be linked.
3. Analytical framework for studying CSR between public policy and enterprise policy
The analytical challenge is to establish instrumental links between public policy and enterprise policy, i.e. binding societal and policy objectives to firm attitudes and behaviour. There is, however, not a strong tradition for uniting the understanding of public and private actors neither
9
This partly changing mode of implementation is in agreement with empirical findings on CSR in Denmark. Between 1998 and 2000, the social responsibility of enterprises was found to have increased in some areas, especially in relation to retention of employees with long-term leave due to sickness or reduced working ability and in relation to integrating persons by the flexible jobs and soft jobs schemes. The reason for increased CSR was mainly found in legislative changes and changes in the business cycle rather than changing attitudes of the workplaces (SFI 2002, p.8).
13
in public policy analysis nor economic analysis, on the contrary, the state and the market are traditionally perceived as functionally opposed by different logics. Firms are seen as rational units for profit maximising behaviour, while public authorities are seen as pursuing the ‘common good’ by application of regulations and neutral administration, thereby enforcing enterprises (and individuals) to conform.
In political science (and its sub fields of policy analysis or policy studies) as well as public administration, the unit of analysis has traditionally been the political process and the management and organisation of the public sector. Even though implementation research is interested in how public policies are executed and how implementing agents are performing, the private enterprise is seldom an object of study (for exceptions see Hjern and Hull 1987; Hjern and Porter 1981). If they are there is a tendency to see them as inferior and subordinate to public actors (Hjern and Hull 1985). However, private enterprises are equal (if not superior) partners to public authorities in CSR policies. Political processes in modern societies are often so complex and policy problems so intractable that an extensive interplay between public and private actors is necessary (Hernes 1978).10
Neo-classical economic theory, on the other hand, traditionally sees public policy as external disturbances and impediments to the smooth functioning of the ‘invisible hand’ of free market forces (Friedman 1962). The underlying idea of economic rationality presumes that enterprises have precise and operational objectives; that decision-makers have perfect information; that they can list and operationalise alternatives and objectively measure costs and benefits; and on the basis of this knowledge select the most optimal course of action. This rational decision-making model has been discarded as unrealistic and even inappropriate for political decision-making (cf. Simon 1945; Lindblom 1965; Stone 1997) and is also difficult to uphold other than as an ideal for economic decision-making (Cyert and March 1963). Of course business managers are concerned with the economic viability and interests of the firm and attempt to calculate costs and benefits of possible courses of action. This is but one type of rationality. In other situations, 10
Especially since World War II, states in western industrialised countries have increasingly sought to regulate and control enterprise behaviour, while enterprises have increasingly sought to influence public policy-making. The neoliberal counterrevolution of the 1980's and 1990's which emphasised state withdrawal from the market and introduction of market mechanisms in the public sector has not necessarily meant a clearer and more demarcated relationship between the state and the market (cf. Majone 1997). The jurisdictional origin of ‘public’ and ‘private’ tells us little about the actual interplay and relationships between actors and institutions in modern capitalist societies.
14
business managers will be more influenced by norms, values and traditions (i.e. normative rationality) or by the fact that there is no other course of action than to abide by public expectations or public policy (i.e. coercive rationality) (cf. Etzioni 1975). Most enterprises have more than one objective and these objectives may sometimes be conflicting between different departments, groups of employees and individuals in organisations.
There is not yet any consistent paradigmatic frameworks to counter the simple neo-classical model of the firm and the economy, even if different strands of thought have emerged, like the behavioural theory of the firm (Cyert and March 1963), stakeholder theory (Freeman 1984) and the corporate social responsibility and responsiveness framework (Bowen 1953; Carroll 1979, 1999; Ackerman and Bauer 1976). An alternative approach to neoclassic economic theory would start from the assumption that enterprises are political actors and that public authorities are pursuing other types of policy programs than regulative or coercive programs. When the public is trying to intervene in corporate behaviour by means of economic motivation programs, persuasion programs and public activity programs, this intervention can be seen from the firm perspective as something else than ‘undue interference’ with firm managers right to manage and the autonomy of enterprises. The public sector may try to influence not only the short-term economic interests of firms, but also the perception of long-term economic interests, which point towards common interests in a socially cohesive and just society.10 If future profits can be anticipated it becomes arbiter whether expenditures are calculated as a cost or an investment (Ackerman and Bauer 1976). The firm is not a monolith operating in isolation from the political environment and political expectations. And when policymakers are addressing policies towards private enterprises, they attempt to anticipate the possible action and reaction of the enterprises and construct policy programs on the basis of these anticipations (besides from responding to political pressure of business organisations and potential rewards in terms of re-election). 10
Interests are not objective and pre-defined by the actors or the functional requirements of the ‘system’ or the economy. We should depart from both Marxist conception of ‘objective’ interests and from the neoclassic understanding of fixed preferences, which also is reflected in rational choice theory. Interests should rather be seen a continuously changing and adapting to different cognitive and external impulses. Conflicts of interests are normal and a defining element of politics. Politics is basically represented by competing perceptions of the ‘common interest’ or the ‘common good’ and by creating agreement between private and collective interests. But private interests need modes of representation and mobilisation to gain legitimacy and power (cf. Stone 1997). In turn collective interests and organisations affect the interpretation of private interests (Hall 1986). Firm managers for instance are not representatives of their own private interests but of organisational interests. The collective actor preference of a firm manager is therefore the result of the interaction between the definition of organisational interest, normative role expectations to the firm manager and his/her own definition of identity in the capacity of being a manager (cf. Scharpf 1997).
15
Policymakers have at least four types of generic programs and instruments at their disposal (cf. figure 2 below). One of them, regulative programs, have been effectively abandoned in most government-business relationships on CSR. To enforce unwanted regulation upon private enterprises would – not only in Denmark - be perceived as unthinkable; an inappropriate attack on the historically established right to manage; and a crumbing of the behavioural autonomy of enterprises.11 In the literature on policy design (cf. Lowi 1972; Linder og Peters 1987; Peters and Nispen 1998, Vedung 1998a, 1998b) only three types of policy instruments have traditionally been identified: (1) the stick (regulation), (2) the carrot (economic incentives) and (3) sermons (information and persuasion). To this typology I add a fourth instrument: Organisation (public activity programs) (cf. Hood 1983; Jørgensen 1990). Each generic instrument and its subtypes have different advantages and disadvantages in different contexts. However, the selection and use of policy instruments is not a technical exercise in choosing the most rational and effective instrument in a given situation so as to solve certain objective problems, it is fundamentally a political process. The strategy of voluntary participation of enterprises in CSR illustrates the point. First, other types of policy instruments with a more coercive nature are effectively abandoned from the beginning (e.g. quotas, sanctions or more restrictive recruitment and lay-off policies). Second, the chosen instruments must be in accordance firm managers perception of economic interest and other behavioural dispositions of the enterprises or else try to change these perceptions. Third, in accepting voluntary participation of the business community, policy makers are accepting great variation among enterprises and even non-participation (free ride).
11
The business community hold unparalleled economic power in most western industrialised societies and political power often flows from economic power. The business community have a ‘privileged position’ in policy-making, both individually and through the involvement of strong interest organisations in policy formulation and implementation. In capitalist societies there is a positive social construction surrounding the business community, that it is assisting the public sector in reaching valuable goals of national welfare, economic prosperity and social vitality. Political decision-makers are generally under strong pressure to implement favourable policies towards target-groups that are perceived as powerful and as contributing to positively valued national goals (and conversely to coerce and sanction negatively constructed and weak target-groups) (Schneider and Ingram 1993; Stone 1997). Elected politicians in democratic market economies generally try to avoid policies that discourage the owners of capital from investing and expanding production. To attain re-election politicians must generally secure economic prosperity (Hall 1986). The power and social construction of private enterprises, thus, set narrow limits to the available choice of policy instruments and mode of implementation.
16
Figure 2. Types of policy programs and policy instruments
Dominant policy
Regulative
Motivation
Persuasion
Public activity
programs
programs
programs
programs
General rules
Economic
Communication
Organisation
incentives
instrument Positive
Permission/
Subsidies/
Information/
Expansion of
motivation
Contract/
Grant
Encouragement/
public services
Rights
Appeals
Negative
Prohibition/
Tax/
Misinformation/
Reduction of public
motivation
Command/
Dues/
Discouragement/
services
Control
Fines
Threat
Means of control
Behavioural control Incentive control
Attitudinal control
Implementation
Resistance from
Uncertain effects
Low efficiency and Success depends on
problems
policy addresses
and coordination
control
and violation of
problems
norms
Supply control
attractivity/over- or under-investment possible/exclusion of the ‘needy’
Different types of policies entail different types of power and control to regulate the behaviour of target group and addresses; (1) regulative programs use legal authority and legitimacy to permit or forbid, (2) motivation programs use monetary means to reward or withhold, (3) persuasion programs encourage or discourage and (4) public activity programs expand or reduce public services. CSR policies almost without exception are created upon positive motivation to secure legitimacy and acceptance of policy intervention, rather than compliance and control, and, therefore, includes elements of choice.
The addresses of CSR policy programs (in casu the private enterprises) have their own political interests, standardised repertoires of action and political-ideological ambitions that complicates direct behavioural control. CSR is an experimental policy program, implying that not control and compliance, but evolution and learning, should be indicators of successful implementation. CSR policies are potentials that create different possibilities for action and a need to adjust objectives and means of implementation (Majone and Wildavsky 1979; Browne and Wildavsky 1983). Therefore, implementing agents are granted discretion and flexibility in implementation (cf.
17
Rothstein 1998). Policymakers have a marginal influence on the behaviour and actions of private enterprises. They must seek to identify the set of decision that they can marginally influence by public policy programs and tip these decisions in the desired direction (Elmore 1985).
First, firm adoption of public policies depend on whether corporate managers perceive adoption as economically beneficial, i.e. whether the program theory is perceived as having a positive cost/benefit relationship. But policies will not only be assessed on short-term consequences but also long-term economic consequences. Motivation programs speak directly to the economic interests of private managers; promising more productive, loyal, and satisfied employees from internal social responsibility and promising reduction - if not elimination - of the wageproductivity gap from external social responsibility.
Second, public policies are also evaluated by private enterprises on grounds of political legitimacy and normative consonance, i.e. firms may adopt policies even if they do not identify a positive cost/benefit relationship, but if the find policies legitimate, fair and justified (cf. Rothstein 1998). Conversely, firms may reject policies on political-ideological grounds, even if they identify a positive cost/benefit relationship. This degree of acceptance, tolerance, cooperation or confrontation from private enterprises is positively influenced by the extent to which public policies respect the relative behavioural autonomy of enterprises.12 This firm interest, however, often collides with regulative programs attempting to enforce and sanction behavioural control.13 Persuasion programs play a vital role in informing and convincing enterprises to take on board CSR by referring to both ‘objective facts’, ‘common problems’ and common normative values and norms. Thus, the public refrains from direct behavioural control and attempts at indirect attitudinal control and self-regulation.
Third, private firms will have an interest in increasing their competencies and resources (personnel, knowledge and economic resources) in so far as these are requirements for fulfilling economic interests. As cooperative entities, as organisations, firms must rely on well-educated 12
The ‘right to manage’ is, however, not static or untouchable. Numerous struggles have been fought between the labour unions and the employers to determine the content and jurisdictional boundaries of co-determination and labour rights. 13 Some types of public regulation may nonetheless be actively sought by an industry, e.g. traditional economic regulation of markets (common rules, criteria for access and profits) (Stigler 1971) or a level playing field, in which the market may reward firms performing above minimum social and environmental standards.
18
employees, organisational knowledge, administrative and fiscal resources in order to be well functioning. Public authorities may use public activity programs to supply firms with a supporting organisational infrastructure, consultancy services, educational opportunities, infrastructure, labour etc. Thus, the public sector can compensate for lack of competencies and capacities on part of the firms, which is often relevant for small- and medium-sized firms.
This logic and the set of instrumental relationships between public policy programs and corporate interests are illustrated below (figure 3). Motivation programs correspond to (shortand long-term) economic interests of enterprises and aim at increasing the degree of acceptance of public intervention. Persuasion and regulative programmes both attempt to pressure enterprises to adopt CSR policies, but from different angles. Persuasion programmes speak to the cognitive and normative side of enterprises by using information, persuasion, manipulation and reference to common values and norms, while regulative programs speak with legal authority to enforce, control and sanction direct behavioural change. Public activity program, finally, speak to the capacities of enterprises by helping enterprises overcoming lack of competencies and resources.
Figure 3. Logic of instrumental links between public policy programs and firm interests:
Policy programs and business interests
P U B L I C P O L I C Y P R O G R A M S
Motivation program
Accept
Economic interests
B U S I N
Persuasion program
E S S
Pressure Regulative program
Behavioural autonomy
I N T E R E
Public activity program
Help
Competencies and resources
S T S
19
The analytical possibility of instrumental links between public policy and enterprise policy, does not automatically lead to operational links between public policy and corporate social responsibility. Whether a positive interplay between public and private actors emerges depend, one the one hand, on a number of contextual factors in firm managers perception of whether public policies are in accordance with economic interests, behavioural autonomy and need for competencies and resources, and, on the other hand, on national traditions and acceptance of public interventions in the economy. Therefore, CSR both varies between nations and within nations. Variations in CSR approaches (cf. figure 1 above) and their causal explanations have, however, so far been largely neglected in mainstream CSR literature.
20
4. Conclusions
We need theoretically informed empirical research on the business-society relation and the external and internal impediments to corporate social responsiveness (Frederick 1994), preferably in a comparative perspective. Point of departure should be in the idea of ‘corporate social responsiveness’, i.e. the capacity of enterprises for actual social performance and actions rather than process or philosophical-ethical demands for responsibility in certain areas of corporate activity (cf. Ackerman and Bauer 1976; Carroll 1979). The question is how (rather than why) enterprises perform social responsibilities and with what effects.
The CSR literature still leaves us somewhere in the wilderness probing questions like: Does social responsibility only refer to voluntary actions beyond the requirements of the law? Does social responsibilities extend beyond immediate economic interests? Are firms required to anticipate future social needs or only to act upon current expectations of the environment they operate in? How much action is needed to satisfy the label of social responsibility? In which policy areas are CSR relevant and appropriate? What role should the state play? Are there tradeoffs between improvements for one group implying a loss for another group (zero-sum games)?
There are no easy and straightforward answers to any of these questions. Answering them should possibly not even be done in advance, since social responsibility is contextually evolving within the framework of time, environment, and the parties involved (Sethi 1975). This is why we need theoretically informed empirical research of the level and character of CSR in different (national) settings. Different types of CSR approaches (cf. figure 1) evolves in relation to the traditions and challenges of specific welfare and labour market regimes (cf. Martin 2001), and can probably not be exported from one context to another. Therefore, the Danish approach to CSR and Danish experiences should not be applied as ‘best practice’ or ‘worst practice’ in another context. Two analytical generalisations can nonetheless be derived.
First, the bottom-up approach to CSR, whether focussed on societal or labour market responsibilities, can easily evolve into a marketing exercise for modern and multinational enterprises, disassociated from the public policy problems, which gave birth to the concept. This is especially true in relation to integrating persons outside the labour market (social inclusion).
21
The incentives of enterprises for making workplaces more inclusive of persons with long prior unemployment records and reduced working ability are insufficient if the motivating force is reduced to social philanthropy. Economic subsidies and/or a regulatory framework are necessary to compensate for employers perceived loss of productivity. Increasing numbers of enterprises will possibly find the business case for performing internal social responsibility attractive, especially in a knowledge-driven economy where the size of the labour force is shrinking due to demographic changes. However, internal social responsibility will not necessarily create a more inclusive labour market. The intensification of personnel policies like life long learning, employability and job security for the core labour force may assist in increasing employers’ general demands for qualifications and competencies. Persons outside the labour market may find it increasingly difficult to gain a foothold on the ordinary labour market. Thereby, enterprises presumably performing social responsibilities may actually assist in further polarising life and job chances between insiders and outsiders. This illustrates that CSR is not always creating win-win situations.
Second, if CSR is a response to common societal problems, the state and public authorities should not be regarded as any other stakeholder, but take on an active and offensive role in the CSR debate. The state (and the social partners) should not refrain from regulating the externalities of business behaviour or establish high minimum standards (a level playing field) upon which the business community can perform CSR. The state, moreover, has an important responsibility in creating favourable framework conditions for CSR, i.e. stimulating and facilitating CSR by persuasion programs, motivation programs and public activity programs. Finally, the state has a separate responsibility as employer (creating socially responsible public institutions) and as market actor (attaching social obligations to services contracted-out or bought from the private sector), thereby leading CSR by its own example. The are by implication numerous instruments for policy implementation that goes beyond the simple voluntary-coercive dichotomy; for instance economic motivation programs (e.g. wage subsidy schemes, corporate taxes, fines or subsidies on health and safety), regulative programs (e.g. social clauses in public tenders and contracting-out agreements, social chapters in collective agreements to establish jobs on special conditions for persons with reduced work ability), persuasion programs (individual advice, certification and reporting schemes, obligations to inform etc.) and public activity programs (e.g. administrative assistance to enterprises taking an interest in social responsibility).
22
Each type of policy instrument should be carefully evaluated in terms of efficiency, costs, acceptance, control and sanction mechanisms and tried out in practice. Instruments can also be applied in combination depending on the problem definition and desired outcome of designers as well as the wishes and experimental qualities of implementing agents, but to define CSR exclusively by voluntary participation of stakeholders it to throw the baby out with the bathing water. Which may have been exactly the hidden agenda of actors opposing the concepts.
23
References
Ackerman, Robert W. og Raymond A. Bauer (1976): Corporate social responsiveness: The modern dilemma, Reston, Virginia: Reston Publishing Company. Andersen, John and Jacob Torfing (2002a): Netværksstyring i kommunernes arbejdsrettede indsats - delrapport om de lokale koordinationsudvalg, Aalborg: CARMA. Andersen, John and Jacob Torfing (2002b): ‘ Det rummelige arbejdsmarked og de lokale koordinationsudvalg - nye vitaminer til det inkluderende velfærdssamfund?’ pp. 87-117 in Jørgensen et.al.: Arbejde og politik - undervejs med CARMA 2002, Aalborg: CARMA Årbog 2002. Auer, Peter (2000): Employment revival in Europa: Labour market success in Austria, Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands, Geneva: ILO. Bakdal, Biørn (1995): ‘Virksomhedernes sociale engagement – Et initiativ fra Socialministeriet om ansvar, frivillighed og samarbejde’, Nordisk Sosialt Arbeid, 3-95, 209-212. Berman, P. (1978): ‘The study of macro- and micro-implementation’, Public Policy, 26(2), 157184. Boll, Joachim og Anette Kruhøffer (2002): Virksomhedernes sociale engagement Årbog 2002, København: Socialforskningsinstituttet 02:19. Bowen, Howard R. (1953): Social responsibilities of the businessman, New York: Harper and Brothers. Bredgaard, Thomas (2003): ‘The inclusive labour market - Denmark in an European context’, article in Henning Jørgensen, Herman Knudsen and Jens Lind, eds. Labour and employment regulation in Europe, Sage Publications (forthcoming). Browne, Angela and Aaron Wildavsky (1983): ‘Implementation as mutual adaptation’ ch.. 10, Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky (1984): Implementation, University of California Press (1. Ed. 1973). Browne, Angela and Aaron Wildavsky (1983): ‘Implementation as exploration’ ch. 11, Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky (1984): Implementation, University of California Press (1. ed. 1973). Carroll, Archie B. (1979): ’A three-dimensional conceptual model of corporate social performance’, Academy of Management Review, 4, 497-505.
24
Carroll, Archie B (1999): ’Corporate social responsibility: Evolution of a definitional construct’, Business & Society, 38(3), 268-295. Clasen, Jochen (1999): ‘Beyond social security: the economic value to giving money to unemployed’ pp. 151-179 in European Journal of Social Security, vol. 1, no. 2, 1999. Cohen, M.D., March, J. og J.P. Olsen (1972): “A garbage can model og organizational choice” i Administrative Science Quarterly, 1972. Cyert, Richard M. og James G. March (1963): A behavioural theory of the firm, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall. DTI (2001): Business and Society: Developing Corporate Social Responsibility in the UK, UK: Department of Trade and Industry. DTI (2002): Business and Society – Corporate Social Responsibility Report 2002, UK: Department of Trade and Industry. Elmore, Richard E. (1985): ‘Forward and backward mapping: Reversible logic in the analysis of public policy’, s. 33-71 I Kenneth Hanf og Theo A.J. Toonen, red. Policy implementation in federal and unitary systems – questions of analysis and design, Dortrecht: Martinus Njihoff Publishers. ETUC (2001): ‘Corporate Social Responsibility in a legislative and contractual framework’, Resolution adopted by the ETUC Executive Committee, 10-11 October 2001, Brussels. European Commission (2000): Social policy agenda, COM(2000) 379 final, 28.6.2000. European Commission (2001): Green Paper - Promoting a European framework for Corporate Social Responsibility, COM(2001) 366 final, 18.7.2001. European Commission (2002): Communication from the Commission concerning Corporate Social Responsibility: A business contribution to Sustainable Development, COM(2002) 347. Etzioni, Amitia (1975): A comparative analysis of complex organizations: On power, involvement, and their correlates, New York: The Free Press. Frederick, William C. (1994): ‘From CSR1 to CSR2 – The maturing of business-and-society thought’, Business and Society, 33(2), 150-164. Freeman, Richard E. (1984): Strategic management – A stakeholder approach, Marshfield, Mass.: Pitman Publishing. Friedman, Milton (1962): Capitalism and freedom, Chicago: University of Chicago Press (3. Ed. 2002).
25
Griffin, Jennifer and John F. Mahon (1997): ‘The corporate social performance and corporate financial performance debate: Twenty-five years of incomparable research’, Business and Society, 36(1), 5-31. Hall, Peter A: (1986): Governing the economy: the politics of state intervention in Britain and France, Cambridge: Polity Press. Hardis, Jeanet (2001): ‘Er det hot eller not? Om skabelsen af fænomenet sociale partnerskaber’ pp. 46-68 in Grus, no. 65, 2001. Haufler, Virgina (2001): A public role for the private sector - Industry self-regulation in a global economy, Washington D.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Hernes, Gudmund (1978), red. Forhandlingsøkonomi og blaninggsadministrasjon, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. Hjern, Benny og David O. Porter (1981): ’Implementation structures: a new unit of administrative analysis’, Organization Studies, 2, 211-227. Hjern, Benny og Chris Hull (1982): Implementation research as empirical constitutionalism, s. 105-117 i European Journal of Political Research, 10(2). Hjern, Benny og Chris Hull (1985): ’Small firm employment creation: An assistance structure’ s. 131-157 i Kenneth Hanf og Theo A.J. Toonen, red. Policy implementation in federal and unitary systems – Questions for analysis and design, Dordrecht: Martin Nijhoff Publishers. Holt, Helle (2000): Corporate social responsibility in a Danish context, København: Socialforskningsinstituttet, working paper 15:2000. Hood, Christopher C. (1983): The tools of government, London: MacMillan Press. Hull, Chris og Benny Hjern (1983): ‘Policy analysis in mixed economy: An implementation approach’ s. 295-312 i Policy and Politics, Årg. 11, Nr. 3. Hull, Chris og Benny Hjern (1987): Helping small firms grow – An implementation approach, London: Croom Helm. Høgelund, Jan og Anette Kruhøffer (2000): Virksomhedernes sociale engagement Årbog 2000, København: Socialforskningsinstituttet. Ibsen, Flemming (1999): ’Er det rationelt for virksomhederne at påtage sig et socialt ansvar?’ pp. 35-45 in Tidsskrift for Arbejdsliv, vol. 1., no. 2, 1999. Jørgensen (1990): Virksomhedspolitik og offentlig politik’ paper til Nordiska Statsvetarforbundets kongress, Reykjavik, 15-19 Aug. 1990.
26
Jørgensen, Henning (2002): Consensus, cooperation and conflict - the Policy-making process in Denmark, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Kingdon, John W. (1995): Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies, 2. ed., New York: HarperCollins College Publishers (1 udgave 1984). Larsen, Flemming, Nicolai Abildgaard, Thomas Bredgaard and Lene Dalsgaard (2001): “Kommunal aktivering. mellem disciplinering og integration”, Aalborg: Aalborg University Press. Larsen, Mona og Hanne Weise (1999): Virksomhedernes sociale engagement. Årbog 1999, København: Socialforskningsinstituttet. Lindblom, Charles E. (1965): The intelligence of democracy, New York: Free Press. Lindblom, Charles E. (1977): Politics and Markets – The world’s political-economic systems, New York: Basic Books. Linder, Stephen H. og B. Guy Peters (1987): ’A design perspective on policy implementation: The fallacies of misplaced prescription’, Policy Studies Review, 6(3), 459-475. Lipsky, Michael (1980): Street-level bureaucracy, New York: Russel Sage Foundation. Lowi, T.J. (1972): ’Four systems of policy politics and choice’, Public Administration Review, 32, 298-310. Madsen, Per Kongshøj (1999), Flexibility, Security and Labour Market Success, Employment and Training Papers 53, Geneva: ILO. Majone, Giadomenico and Aaron Wildavsky (1979): ‘Implementation as evolution’, ch. 8, Pressman Jeffrey and Aaron Wildavsky (1984): Implementation, University of California Press (1st ed. 1973). Majone, Giadomenico (1997): ‘From the positive to the regulatory state: Causes and consequences of changes in the mode of governance’, Journal of Public Policy, 17(2), 139-167. Martin, Cathie Jo (2001): ‘It takes two to tango – Corporate decisions to join social parnterships’, pp. 61-83, Carsten Kjærgaard and Sven-Åge Westphalen, eds. From collective bargaining to social partnerships: New roles of the social partners in Europe, Copenhagen: The Copenhagen Centre. Matland, Richard E. (1995): ‘Synthesizing the implementation literature: The ambiguityconflict model of policy implementation’ s. 145-174 I Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 5(2).
27
Mazmanian, Daniel A. og Paul A. Sabatier (1981) red.: Effective policy implementation, Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books. McWilliams, Abagail og Donald Siegel (2000): ’Research notes and communications: Corporate social responsibility and financial performance: Correlation or Misspecification?’ pp. 603-609 in Strategic Management Journal, 21. McWilliams, Abagail og Donald Siegel (2001): ’Corporate social responsibility: A theory of the firm perspective’ pp. 117-127 The Academy of Mangement Review, 26:1. Minstry of Labour et al. (2001): Brug for alle - Danmark 2010 og et mere rummeligt arbejdsmarked, København: Arbejdsministeriet. Peck, Jamie (1996): Workplace - The social regulation of labour markets, New York: Guilford Press. Peters, Guy B and Frans K.M. Van Nispen (1998): Public policy instruments - Evaluating the tools pof public administration, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Pressman, Jeffrey og Aaron Wildavsky (1973): Implementation, University of California Press. Rosdahl, Anders (2002): The Policy to Promote Social Responsibility of Enterprises in Denmark, Working Paper 10:2002, Copenhagen: The Danish National Institute of Social Research (SFI). Rosdahl, Anders and Hans Uldall Poulsen (2003): Lederne og det sociale engagement, Copenhagen: Socialforskningsinstituttet 03:05. Rothstein, Bo (1998): Just institutions matter - the moral and political logic of the universal welfare state, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Safarti, Hedva (2001): ‘Labour market vs. social protection - what challenges for social actors in Europe?’ Paper presented at IIRA 6th European Congress, Oslo, June 25-June 29, 2001. Scharpf, Fritz W. (1997): Games real actors play – Actor-centered institutionalism in policy research, Oxford: Westview Press. Schmid, Günther and Bernard Gazier (2002): “The dynamics of full employment - Social integration through transitional labour markets”, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Schneider, Anne and Helen Ingram (1993): ‘Social construction of target populations: Implications for politics and policy’ s. 334-347 I American Political Science Review, 87(2). Segal, Jean-Pierre, André Sobczak, Claude-Emmanuel Triomphe (2002): Corporate social responsibility and working conditions, Final Report for the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, Université Européenne du Travail, Paris.
28
SER (2001): Corporate Social Responsibility – A Dutch Approach, Sociaal-Economische Raad: Royal Van Gorchum. Simon, Herbert A. (1945): Administrative behaviour, New York: Free Press. SFI (2002): Danske arbejdspladser - Plads til alle? Resultater og perspektiver fra Socialforskningsinstituttets forskning om arbejdsmarkedets rummelighed, SFI 02:6. Sobczak, André (2003): Codes of conduct in global supply chains: A new regulation model for labour relations, Invited paper for the 13th IIRA World Congress, Freie Universität, Berlin, 8-12. September 2003. Social Commission (1993): Arbejde og velfærd – Forslag til en ydelses- og aktiveringsreform for midtergruppen, København: Socialkommissionen. Stigler, George J. (1971): ‘The theory of economic regulation’, The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 2(1), 3-21. Stone, Deborah (1997): Policy paradox: The art of political decision making, New York: W.W: Norton & Company. Torfing, Jacob (1999), “Welfare with workfare: recent reforms of the Danish welfare state” Journal of European Social Policy 9(1): 5-28. Torfing, Jacob (2000), Towards A Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regime? A framework for analysing the changing face of Danish labour market policy, Working paper no. 4, Aalborg: CARMA. Vedung, Evert (1998a): Utvärdering i politik och förvaltning, Lund: Studenterlitteratur (2. udgave, 1 udgave 1991). Vedung, Evert (1998b): ‘Policy instruments: Typologies and theories’ s. 21-59 i Marie-Louise Bemelmans-Videc, Ray C. Rist og Evert Vedung, red. Carrots, sticks and sermons – Policy instruments and their evaluation, London: Transaction Publishers
29
