Cross-border regionalism or elite phenomenon

Cross-border regionalism or elite phenomenon? Euroregions’ dilemma facing re-bordering trends in crisis Martin Klatt Center for Border Region Studies, University of Southern Denmark, Sønderborg, Denmark

Border regions as laboratories of European integration reflect processes and give rich empiric material to assess progress, resilience as well as challenges and obstruction to European integration. To ease cooperation across the border, so-called Euroregions have been established across virtually all European borders; a first wave in the 1960s and 1970s being followed by a second one after the fall of the iron curtain in the 1990s. In the 21st century, some Euroregions have formed European Groupings of Territorial Cooperation, applying a new European legal tool to incite more commitment of the partners to actual functional integration across the border. The official narrative declares Euroregions as the bottom-up dimension of European integration. At the same time, the Schengen system of open borders is challenged by undocumented migration and perceived security threats, where EU member states reintroduce border controls to demonstrate that they are “in control”, accompanied with more voiced demands of neo-nationalist movements for a devolution of power from the EU back to the nation states. In this paper, I will use the Danish-German case to assess the cause and impact of these trends within the border regions. Do borders function as a trigger for renewed Euroscepticism, as a continuous representation of otherness in spite of de-bordering trends experienced during the last decades? Or is there a conflict between local politicians, who have come into the dilemma of re-bordering trends initiated from the political centre, which threaten their own agenda of creating ever more integrating cross-border regions, not the least with the aim to create development and growth in a perceived competition of regions in the EU? In consequence, it is time for a thorough examination of European border regions, Euroregions, Eurodistricts and EGTCs to assess the development of new borderscapes in these laboratories of European integration. Euroscepticism as a regional phenomenon Euroscepticism, here broadly defined as ‘contingent and conditional opposition to European integration as well as total and unconditional opposition to it’, 1 has not yet been regionalized as a phenomenon, as it is usually referred to as either general opposition, opposition to specific policies, national Euroscepticism or connected to social class in relation to the cleavage between cosmopolitan “winners” of globalization vs. groups on the social periphery perceived as “losers”. 2 To have a closer look at (border-) regional Euroscepticism, it is important to realize that social practices in border regions are not restricted to political cross-border governance and activities incited by EU funds. Border regions can be characterized as laboratories of European integration. Border realities are not just physical lines demarcating countries. Borders are a product of history and reflect and influence social practices. While borders without doubt are social constructions and thus are always open to changes and reinterpretations, social science has been rather uncritical in accepting the bordered territory as a bordered study object, especially when collecting or using empirical data. Therefore, a focus should be put on the borderlands’ populations rather than the border as 1

Taggart, P. (1998) A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European Party Systems. European Journal of Political Research, 33, 363-388., 364. 2 On the Euroscepticism debate see Leconte, C. (2015) From pathology to mainstream phenomenon: Reviewing the Euroscepticism debate in research and theory. International Political Science Review, 36, 250-263., on the EU as a cosmopolitan project see Schönlau, J. (2010). "The Committee of the Regions The RECON Models from a Subnational Perspective." RECON Online Working Paper Series(10): 1-25.

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phenomenon. A borderland’s population is all too often categorized (and divided) purely by citizenship or place of residence. Thus, social science risks falling into the nationalist trap using the state as a framework to characterize a population and homogenize its identity. As a result, the multiplicity of individuals’ spatial identities might not be recognized. The concept of national identity overrides other expressions of identity: localism, regionalism or even national indifference, depending on the specific circumstances. 3 To accommodate this issue, border scholars have introduced the terms ‘national’ and ‘transnational borderlanders’, 4 ‘regionauts’ 5 and ‘border surfers’ 6 to describe the more complicated reality of borderland populations, which are more difficult to identify individually as well as collectively. All three terms relate to the borderland population’s social practices across the border: ‘transnational borderlanders’ are the opposite of ‘national borderlanders’. While the latter are unicultural, often unilingual, and rarely cross the border, transnational borderlanders are bicultural, bilingual and have social relations across the border. The term ‘regionauts’ leaves the area of biculturalism and evaluates border crossing social practices only, focussing on rational choice (i.e. cheaper housing, better job opportunities) and ‘exotic’ experience. Regionauts “move in both the physical and mental landscapes of a region”,7 hereby they explore the differences and opportunities created by the border. Still, Löfgren uses it to describe people identifying with the cross-border region, in this case the Øresund region. 8 To apply the concept to all borderlanders (and border-crossers) profiting from different opportunities on the other side of the border, Terlouw introduced the term ‘border surfers’, where border crossing practices are reduced to frequent and temporary affairs that aim to profit from price and cost differentials, based on an intensive knowledge of the societies on each side of the border. 9

Cross-border cooperation – de-bordering the border regions European integration has been a story of de-bordering, but borders have been quite persistent and have continued to be the physical expression of state sovereignty, reflecting the complicated reality of the EC and EU of shared sovereignty between member states and supranational institutions. Even the de-bordering process of the Schengen agreement has not resulted in a borderless EU. Quite contrary it is constantly challenged by competing political elites, who construct otherness to demonstrate efficiency and strength of dealing with alleged threats to security. This has resulted in re-bordering processes by these political elites “taking charge”, when “emergency narratives call for immediate action, forceful measures and direct interventions”. 10 Thus, while generally considered a success, the Schengen system has been challenged by

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Applegate, C. (1999). "A Europe of Regions: Reflections on the Historiography of Sub-National Places in Modern Times." American Historical Review 104(4): 1157-1182, Paasi, A. (2002). "Bounded spaces in the mobile world: Deconstructing ‘regional identity’." Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie (Journal of Economic & Social Geography) 93(2): 137-148, Zahra, T. (2010). "Imagined Noncommunities: National Indifference as a Category of Analysis." Slavic Review 69(1): 93-119. 4 Martinez, O. J. (1994). Border People. Life and Society in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands University of Arizona Press. 5 O'Dell, T. (2003). "Øresund and the Regionauts." European Studies: A Journal of European Culture, History and Politics 19: 31-53, Löfgren, O. (2008). "Regionauts: the Transformation of Cross-Border Regions in Scandinavia." European Urban and Regional Studies 15(3): 195-209. 6 Terlouw, K. (2012). "Border Surfers and Euroregions: Unplanned Cross-Border Behaviour and Planned Territorial Structures of Cross-Border Governance." Planning Practice and Research 27(3): 351-366. 7 Löfgren, O. (2008). "Regionauts: the Transformation of Cross-Border Regions in Scandinavia." European Urban and Regional Studies 15(3): 195-209, p. 196. 8 Ibid. 9 Terlouw, K. (2012). "Border Surfers and Euroregions: Unplanned Cross-Border Behaviour and Planned Territorial Structures of Cross-Border Governance." Planning Practice and Research 27(3): 351-366. 10 Scuzzarello, S. and C. Kinnvall (2013). "Rebordering France and Denmark Narratives and Practices of BorderConstruction in Two European Countries." Mobilities 8(1): 90-106.

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the pressure of undocumented migration into (and within) the EU, as well as by the threat of terror. 11 This has a direct effect on border regions. From Border- to Cross-Border Regions? New cross-border opportunities as well as specific European policies accompanying EU de-bordering should have led to a transformation of border regions into cross-border regions. The idea to establish integrated cross-border regions has been theorized in the core EC countries since the 1970s, with the Euregio and the Basle Region as prominent examples. 12 Today Euroregions, Eurodistricts and “European Groupings of Territorial Cooperation” span all internal and most external border regions of the EU. But are they really cross-border regions? Oscar Martinez’ defines an integrated borderland as a cross-border region, where economies are functionally integrated and residents perceive themselves as members of one social system. 13 German regional scientist Peter Schmitt-Egner has developed a 13-stage model of cross-border integration, where transnational regions have developed a common living space inbound, as well as a common action space outbound, which includes horizontal cooperation with other regions and vertical integration both from a bottom-up nation state perspective as well as a top-down European perspective. 14 Research on cross-border regions in Europe indicates clearly that these bodies do not meet these standards. Their role within European multi-level governance has been acknowledged, i.e. as policy entrepreneurs, facilitators of cross-border cooperation, and implementers of cross-border projects, but researchers have conceded their often limited opportunities of promoting actual integration and their limited public visibility, as well as the fact that a Euroregion’s inhabitants often are not aware of its pure existence. 15 11

Pastore, F., et al. (2006). "Schengen's Soft Underbelly? Irregular Migration and Human Smuggling across Land and Sea Borders to Italy." International Migration 44(4): 95-119, Lax, V. M. (2008). "Must EU Borders have Doors for Refugees? On the Compatibility of Schengen Visas and Carriers' Sanctions with EU Member States' Obligations to Provide International Protection to Refugees." European Journal of Migration & Law 10(3): 315-364, Klepp, S. (2010). "A Contested Asylum System: The European Union between Refugee Protection and Border Control in the Mediterranean Sea." Ibid. 12(1): 1-21, Trauner, F. and S. Wolff (2014). "The Negotiation and Contestation of EU Migration Policy Instruments: A Research Framework." Ibid. 16: 1-18, Hadfield, A. and A. Zwitter (2015). Analyzing the EU Refugee Crisis: Humanity, Heritage and Responsibility to Protect. Politics & Governance, Cogitatio Press. 3: 129-134, Funk, M. (2016). "Trickery in Dublin's shadow." Forced Migration Review(51): 19-20, Stavropoulou, M. Ibid."Refugee protection in Europe: time for a major overhaul?": 7-9. 12 Malchus, V. v. (1975). Partnerschaft an europäischen Grenzen. Integration durch grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit. Bonn, Europa Union Verlag. 13 Martinez, O. J. 1994. Border People. Life and Society in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands Tucson London: University of Arizona Press. 14 Schmitt-Egner, P. (1998). 'Grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit' in Europa als Gegenstand wissenschaftlicher Forschung und Strategie transnationaler Praxis. Anmerkungen zur Theorie, Empirie und Praxis des Transnationalen Regionalismus Grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit in Europa. Theorie - Empirie - Praxis. G. Brunn and P. SchmittEgner. Baden Baden, Nomos: 27-77, here 64-66. 15 Scott, J. W. (2000). Euroregions, Governance, and Transborder Cooperation Within the EU. Borders, Regions and People. M. v. d. Velde and H. v. Houtum. London, Pion: 104-115, Anderson, J., et al., Eds. (2003). New Borders for a Changing Europe: Cross-border Cooperation and Governance. Cass Series in Regional and Federal Studies. London, Frank Cass, Blatter, J. (2004). "From 'Spaces of Place' to 'Spaces of Flow'? Territorial and Functional Governance in Cross-border Regions in Europe and North America." International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 28(3): 530548, Heddebaut, O. (2004). The EUROREGION from 1991 to 2020: an ephemeral stamp? Cross-Border Governance in the European Union. O. Kramsch and B. Hooper. London and New York, Routledge: 70-87, Kramsch, O. and B. Hooper, Eds. (2004). Cross-Border Governance in the European Union. Routledge Research in transnationalism. London and New York, Routledge, Houtum, H. v., et al., Eds. (2005). B/ordering Space. Border Regions Series. Aldershot, Ashgate, Perkmann, M. (2007). "Policy entrepreneurship and multilevel governance: a comparative study of European cross-border regions." Environment and Planning C-Government and Policy 25(6): 861-879, Asheim, B. T. and J. Moodyson (2008). The Öresund Region: A dynamic region in Europe due to interregional collaboration? La cooperacio transfronterera a la UE Barcelona, Institut Universitari d'Estudis Europeus, Dupeyron, B. (2008). L'Europe au défi de ses régions transfrontalières. Expériences rhénane et pyrénéenne. Berne, Peter Lang, Gabbe, J., et al. (2008).

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The Danish-German case, trapped in Euroscepticism, nationalism, state-ism and systemic non-compatibility ”Die neue deutsch-dänische Geschichte hat bereits begonnen und wird 2014 ihren ersten Höhepunkt erleben, wenn die deutsch-dänische Jugend, Kultur und Wirtschaft sich grenzüberschreitend begegnen, um die gegenwärtige Zusammenarbeit zu feiern – und sie für die Zukunft weiter auszubauen. Denn nur zusammen können wir unser gemeinsames Ziel erreichen: unsere Grenzregion zu einer Wachstumsregion werden zu lassen.” 16

This quote, taken from the (now defunct) homepage of a large Interreg project for the region (Dybbøl 2014), reflects the Danish-German narrative of post-WWII reconciliation, a narrative which has been widely used by politicians and stakeholders as a driver for more regional cooperation across the border and the establishment of a return to history cross-border Euroregion Schleswig in 1997. 17 It sends the message of a favourable cross-border perspective for youth, culture and business to together create an integrated crossborder growth region. But does it reflect the reality of social practice? Institutional setup The Danish-German Euroregion was a latecomer. Danish-German historiography had predominantly been a historiography of national conflict until the end of the 20th century, resulting in bordering processes until Denmark joined the EC in 1973. The reality of cultural and national diversity across the region was canonized (and re-bordered) in national majorities and respective minorities on either side of the border to secure stability of national identity and minimize challenges to the physical placement of the border. It was this fear of a disturbance of the national balance in the border region, rather than Euroscepticism, which continued to have a significant influence on Danish border region politics, even after gaining EC membership. It led to a rejection of regional German advances to establish institutionalized cooperation in the form of a Euroregion or a cross-border spatial planning commission. Regional and national Danish politicians preferred a non-institutional case-to-case approach to cross-border cooperation as it appeared to be better feasible and suitable in light of the perceived imbalance of power between “large” (West-) Germany and “small” Denmark. 18 “Euroscepticism” as such did not really influence this development, as Cooperation Between European Border Regions. Reviews and Perspectives Baden Baden, Nomos, Liikanen, I. (2008). "New Neighbourhood and Cross-Border Region Building: Identity Politics of CBC on the Finnish-Russian Border." Journal of Borderlands Studies 23(3): 19-39, O'Dowd, L. (2010). "From a 'borderless world' to a 'world of borders': 'bringing history back in'." Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 28: 1031-1050, Beck, J. and B. Wassenberg, Eds. (2011). Grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit leben und erforschen (Band 2): Governance in deutschen Grenzregionen. Studies on the History of European Integration. Stuttgart, Franz Steiner Verlag, Klatt, M. and H. Herrmann (2011). "Half Empty or Half Full? Over 30 Years of Regional Cross-Border Cooperation Within the EU: Experiences at the Dutch–German and Danish–German Border." Journal of Borderlands Studies 26(1): 65-87, Andersen, D. J., et al., Eds. (2012). The Border Multiple. The Practicing of Borders between Public Policy and Everyday Life in a Re-Scaling Europe. Border Regions Series. Aldershot, Ashgate, Terlouw, K. (2012). "Border Surfers and Euroregions: Unplanned Cross-Border Behaviour and Planned Territorial Structures of Cross-Border Governance." Planning Practice and Research 27(3): 351-366. 16 “The new German-Danish history has already begun, and it will experience its first climax in 2014 when the GermanDanish youth, culture and economy will meet across the border to celebrate the current cooperation – and further increase it for the future. We can achieve our common goal only together: to turn our border region into a region of growth.”. Dybbøl 2014, [online] Available at: [Accessed 23 June 2015]. 17 Klatt, M. (2006). Fra modspil til medspil?: grænseoverskridende samarbejde i Sønderjylland/Schleswig 1945-2005. Aabenraa, Institut for Grænseregionsforskning. 18 Klatt, M. (2004). Regional Cross-border Cooperation - Ideological vs. Practical Approach. Narva and the Baltic Sea Region. K. Brüggemann. Narva, Tartu University Narva College: 391-400, Klatt, M. (2006). Fra modspil til medspil?: grænseoverskridende samarbejde i Sønderjylland/Schleswig 1945-2005. Aabenraa, Institut for Grænseregionsforskning.

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regional politics was enacted by politicians (and parties) supporting the EC and Danish membership, but a difference became visible between a very pragmatic Danish approach on case-to-case cooperation vs. a more idealistic, integrative, institutional German approach. This changed, though, when Danish national associations, appearing as self-understood protectors of “Danish-ness” in the borderland, mobilized a violent subliminal Euroscepticism including anti-German feelings in a considerable part of the population when the concrete plans for establishing the Euroregion were made public in early 1997. Incidentally this occurred at the same time when Denmark debated joining the Schengen cooperation, resulting in a conspicuous alliance of right- and left-wing Euroscepticism. In practice, the Euroregion was established after all, but “Euroregion” was reduced to “Region” in the name, and Danish “Sønderjylland” added to “Schleswig”, which was perceived to be too German by many Danes. Furthermore, any reference to Europe, European identity or a commitment to a united Europe was omitted in the relevant agreements. 19 Governance In spite of these impediments, the Region Sønderjylland-Schleswig followed the usual setup of euroregional governance, comprising a board, a small secretariat to cater for daily work and an advisory assembly of delegates from the members’ elected councils as well as some non-political stakeholders. In the first ten years it proved to be an advantage to have only one Danish member, Southern Jutland County, with a strong institutionalization and financial sustainability. Southern Jutland County used the Euroregion to outsource some functions in the health care system to German operators, such as cancer treatment and ambulance services. It also used it for para-diplomatic activities with German sub-state institutions to promote its interests in the border region. The Euroregion also tried to obtain administrative control over the DanishGerman Interreg program, but without success. The Euroregion has lacked impetus after the Danish administrative reform of 2007, though, when the counties were dissolved to be partially replaced by institutionally weak regions. It has still coordinated a few cross-border activities especially in the field of culture, but has now foremost developed into a knowledge centre on cross-border issues. Concrete political initiatives have become scarce after the members decided to dissolve the assembly of the Euroregion in 2011, considering it to be ineffective. 20 Since the Millennium parallel cross-border networks and agreements have been established, resulting in a networked structure of cross-border cooperation rather than a spatial organization. This has resulted in frequent meetings and conferences, but not in concrete agreements on sustainable cross-border integration or resource sharing. Policy initiated practices For the Danish-German context a core cluster of Interreg participants can be identified.21 It is especially the region’s institutions of higher education, as well as the border municipalities of Flensburg, Aabenraa, Tønder and Sønderborg that are central actors in the network. 22 The institutions of higher education have participated in various Interreg projects since Interreg I (1991-93), including a large scale project stretching over two funding periods (III and IV), “The Knowledge Region”, specifically aimed at just this. Unfortunately, the 19

Damsgaard, J. I. (1999). Der må være en grænse - osse mellem gode naboer. En analyse af modstanden mod oprettelsen af det grænseoverskridende samarbejdsorgan Euroregion Slesvig. Aarhus, University of Aarhus. MA, Klatt, M. (2006). Fra modspil til medspil?: grænseoverskridende samarbejde i Sønderjylland/Schleswig 1945-2005. Aabenraa, Institut for Grænseregionsforskning, Yndigegn, C. (2012). "Reviving Unfamiliarity—The Case of Public Resistance to the Establishment of the Danish–German Euroregion." European Planning Studies 21(1): 58-74. 20 Klatt, M. (2013). Euroregion Schleswig, Sønderjylland/Schleswig, Sønderjylland – Schleswig, Syddanmark – Schleswig-Holstein. Von der Grenze zur grenzüberschreitenden Region? 1200 Jahre Deutsch-Dänische Grenze. Aspekte einer Nachbarschaft S. B. Frandsen, M. Krieger and F. Lubowitz. Neumünster, Wachholtz: 313-328. 21 (Javakhishvili-Larsen, forthcoming). 22 (Javakhishvili-Larsen, forthcoming).

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project has not resulted in measurable collaborative research activities, though, as joint publications of researchers of these institutions are few, indicating that the immediate border region is generally bypassed in international research cooperation. 23 Furthermore, joint study programs launched successfully in the 1990s have since either separated or been silently dismantled in recent Danish expenditure saving rounds in the education sector. Development has been similar in the business sector. Several Interreg-projects targeted business cooperation across the border. One of them was a joint business strategy, 24 and another one resulted in the establishment of a cross-border business management office based at the Chamber of Industry and Commerce in Flensburg. Likewise, Interreg IV supported “The Danish-German Region (den dansk-tyske region)”, the largest Interreg project ever in the region, which was to create a cross-border business region around six regional strengths: sustainable energy, tourism and leisure economy, health and welfare technology, food industry, logistics and the transversal topic knowledge. 25 In 2012, a joint logo was revealed to be used in the whole region to develop a common identity. However, today Den dansk-tyske region’s website is closed and the logo has sunk into oblivion. As already mentioned above, the Danish-German border region’s shared history has not always been an asset for strategies of de-bordering. 26 In a large Interreg project named “Dybbøl 2014”, it was attempted to re-narrate the 150 years of past history as a story of re- and de-bordering, to construct Dybbøl as a common ‘lieu de memoire’ for both Danes and Germans (and the respective national minorities), combined with the vision of a de-bordered cross-border region for people and business. 27 On this occasion, a summer school for young Danes and Germans from the region was arranged (jUNGzuSAMMEN – “young together” in both Danish and German) to get some discursive input from the future “Schleswigians” on their perspective on the future development of the cross-border region. The summer school was deemed a success, but it also was obvious that most of the participants had an affiliation with one of the region’s national minorities or otherwise belonged to the minority of transnational borderlanders in the region. Members of the political parties’ youth organizations, except for the minorities’ political parties, remained absent, or, as one of the organizers explained: “Wir rennen offene Türen ein” – we are breaking into open doors. 28 Many other cross-border projects focusing on people-to-people activities and culture have been implemented, a cross-border cultural region being the latest.29 This cultural region, however unique in Europe according to its proponents, is nothing but another pool to raise money for cultural projects. A general strategy for the development of the fabric of cultural institutions in the border region has not been elaborated. 30 The Danish-German development is not entirely different from other European cross-border regions. Also in the Dutch-German context, the border prevails as a distinctive factor for people’s lives; and cross-border governance is rather within the framework of (EU-) policy entrepreneurship than cross-border integration 23

Makkonen, T. (2015). "Scientific collaboration in the Danish–German border region of Southern Jutland–Schleswig." Geografisk Tidsskrift-Danish Journal of Geography: 1-12. 24 Schack, M. and T. Dall Schmidt (2005). Grænseoverskridende erhvervsstrategi for Region Sønderjylland-Schleswig. Aabenraa, Institut for Grænseregionsforskning. 25 http://www.vaekstcentret.eu/entwicklungslinien.html?&L=1 (3 Jun 2016). 26 Klatt, M. (2006). Common, Cross-Border Regional History as an Approach to People-to-People Cooperation and Cross-Border Regional Integration. Borderland Identities. Territory and Belonging in Central, North and East Europe. M. Hurd. Eslöv, Gondolin: 109-146. 27 Klatt, M. 2016. Dybbøl 2014: Constructing familiarity remembrance? In European Borderlands. Living with barriers and bridges, eds. E. Boesen & G. Schnuer, 30-46. London New York: Routledge. (forthcoming, Oct. 2016). 28 Ibid. 29 Kulturministeriet (2013). Kulturaftale/Kulturvereinbarung 2013-2016. Copenhagen, Danish Ministry of Culture. 30 www.kulturfokus.dk (7 June 2016).

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and region-building. 31 In the Nordic context, where cultural and linguistic barriers are considered to be rather low compared to other European border regions, cross-border governance is not explicitly institutionalized via Euroregions or even EGTCs, except for the Øresund Region of Copenhagen and Malmö. Cooperation is achieved by applying the Interreg rationale, and technical barriers are deemed important.32 In Central East European cases, participation in Euroregions varies and depends highly on personal commitments. 33 In the Finnish-Russian case, identity-building for the Karelia cross-border regions have proved to be difficult. 34 New Schengen borderscapes? Social practice outside formalized cooperation Institutional and spatial cross-border region building in the EU has proved to be difficult and not very effective. Prevailing legal, administrative, linguistic and cultural borders have been quite persistent. Nevertheless, the de-bordering of the EU’s internal borders has definitely had an effect on cross-border interaction and EU borderscapes. How have borderlanders coped with the reality of not regularly controlled borders? For the Danish-German case, since the implementation of the Schengen agreement in March 2001, border crossings have increased in manifold ways. As far as we can assess it, though, residents of the border region have reacted differently. Many locals on the Danish side began to lock their front doors, cars and stables out of fear of increasing crime. The Germans, on the other hand, celebrated the opening of the border at the border crossings and were surprised over Danish reluctance to do likewise.35 Still, after a moment of insecurity, many border residents apparently took the opportunity to discover their new backyard, meeting new neighbours and thus developing a new understanding of borderlands space. 36 Also local shopping behaviour changed. While Danes by tradition mostly bought alcoholic beverages and candy before, it now became more popular to purchase other goods. However, preferences for some products remained national. As an example, most Danes would not buy any German dairy products, vegetables and meat. 37 All in all, a trend to take advantage of generally cheaper German consumer prices as well as from services like hairdressing and car maintenance has increased Danish the level of cross-border interaction of Danish borderlanders, but also of Danes residing in a considerable distance from the border. According to Flensburg’s tourism director Gorm Casper, for example, overnight stays of Danes in Flensburg increased by 139 % from 2011-2015. 38 Nonetheless, not everybody sought to take advantage of the new opportunities, and 31

Strüver, A. (2004). 'We are only allowed to react, and not act': eurocrats' strategies and borderlanders' tactics in a Dutch-German cross-border region. Cross-Border Governance in European Border Regions. O. Kramsch and B. Hooper. London and New York, Routledge: 25-40, Strüver, A. (2005). "Spheres of Transnationalism Within the European Union: On Open Doors, Thresholds and Drawbridges Along the Dutch--German Border." Journal of Ethnic & Migration Studies 31(2): 323-343, Strüver, A. (2005). Bor(der)ing Stories. Spaces of Absence along the Dutch-German Border. B/ordering Space. H. van Houtum, O. Kramsch and W. Zierhofer. Aldershot/Burlington, Ashgate: 207-222, Perkmann, M. (2007). "Policy entrepreneurship and multilevel governance: a comparative study of European crossborder regions." Environment and Planning C-Government and Policy 25(6): 861-879, Perkmann, M. (2014). The Emergence and Governance of Euroregions. The Case of the EUREGIO on the Dutch-German Border. Cross-Border Cooperation Structures in Europe. Learning from the Past, Looking to the Future. L. Dominguez and I. Pires. Brussels, Peter Lang: 95-109. 32 Medeiros, E. J. R. (2010). "Old vs recent cross-border cooperation: Portugal-Spain and Norway-Sweden Medeiros Old vs recent cross-border cooperation." Area 42(4): 434-443. 33 Medve-Balint, G. and S. Svensson (2012). Explaining Coverage: Why do Local Governments in Central Europe join (or not join) Euroregions? The Border Multiple. The Practicing of Borders Between Public Policy and Everyday Life in a Re-scaling Europe. D. Jagetic Andersen, M. Klatt and M. Sandberg. Farnham, Ashgate: 219-243. 34 Liikanen, I. (2008). "New Neighbourhood and Cross-Border Region Building: Identity Politics of CBC on the Finnish-Russian Border." Journal of Borderlands Studies 23(3): 19-39. 35 Andersen, M. L. (2004). Grænsen i hverdagen - grænsen i hovedet. Sønderborg Aabenraa, Museet på Sønderborg Slot/Institut for Grænseregionsforskning, pp. 14-15. 36 Ibid., pp. 20-21. 37 Ibid., pp. 35-37. 38 Jyske Vestkysten, 30 October 2015.

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not all social activities became adapted to the new borderscape. For example, people only seldom crossed the border to join sports clubs etc., and both older data (from 2004) and more recent data reveal that most Danes still only have superficial social contacts to people south of the border. 39 Economic gain has remained the major incitement for Danes to interact across the border, whereas German borderlanders’ motives for cross-border social practices are more difficult to assess. Shopping is motivated by the experience of difference: there are other products and a different shopping atmosphere in the cozy Danish small cities. 40 Cross-border commuting surged in 2005-2008, when the Danish labour market experienced a shortage of labour in some sections, mainly construction, the health sector and some services. Attractive wages were a decisive pull-factor, but also “soft” factors such as a better workplace climate. 41 Nevertheless, social contacts across the border appear to remain superficial, as about three-fourths of the members of a sample of borderlanders interviewed in 2012 acknowledged that they did not have any friends or relatives on the other side of the border. 42 While the majority of the borderland population continues to live in cross-border indifference, some interesting changes can be recognized among the region’s two “national” minorities. Historically, the minorities represent the dissenters of the 1920 plebiscite. Contemporary policy makers (and many researchers) identified minority members as people who have a German identity, bonds to Germany and would have preferred that their homes were part of Germany. Vice versa, Danes in South Schleswig continued to believe in their home region’s inherent Danish-ness, dreaming of its eventual reunion with Denmark. These idealized concepts of a clearly bordered minority identity remained relatively unchallenged until the 1980s. Since then, more and more minority youth have rebelled against being put in a national cage, arguing that their identity reflected regional components and was not an ‘either-or’, but a ‘both-and’. This more realistic way of explaining minority identity has gradually been accepted widely within both minorities. Furthermore, both minorities have developed a close cooperation on issues of minority policy and regional development at political level, 43 supported by a study acknowledging their potential in developing crossborder cooperation. 44 Thus it is not surprising that especially the minorities have voiced strong criticism over the re-introduction of border controls and are very sensitive to other re-bordering trends in the region.

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Andersen, M. L. (2004). Grænsen i hverdagen - grænsen i hovedet. Sønderborg Aabenraa, Museet på Sønderborg Slot/Institut for Grænseregionsforskning, pp. 23-24; http://issuu.com/regionsyddanmark/docs/gr_nsepanel, 8 June 2016. 40 Bygvrå, S. (1995). Grænsehandel - under skiftende forhold. Grænsen i 75 år. H. Becker-Christensen. Aabenraa, Institut for Grænseregionsforskning: 233-243, Bygvrå, S. (2007). Personal Interaction in European Border Regions. Aabenraa, Institut for Grænseregionsforskning. 41 Buch, T., et al. (2009). "Cross-Border Commuting in the Danish-German Border Region - Integration, Institutions and Cross-Border Interaction." Journal of Borderlands Studies 24(2): 38-54, Klatt, M. (2014). "(Un)Familiarity? Labor Related Cross-Border Mobility in Sønderjylland/Schleswig Since Denmark Joined the EC in 1973." Ibid. 29(3): 353373. 42 http://issuu.com/region-syddanmark/docs/gr_nsepanel, 8 June 2016. 43 Kühl, J. (2011). Von der Abgrenzung zum Miteinander 1955-2010. Zwischen Grenzkonflikt und Grenzfrieden. Die dänische Minderheit in Schleswig-Holstein in Geschichte und Gegenwart. L. N. Henningsen. Flensburg, Studieafdelingen ved Dansk Centralbibliotek for Sydslesvig: 207-318. 44 Malloy, T., et al. (2008). Competence Analysis: National Minorities as a Standortfaktor in the Danish-German Border Region. "Working with each other, for each other". Bozen/Bolzano, Europäische Akademie EURAC Research, Malloy, T. (2010). "Creating New Spaces for Politics? The Role of National Minorities in Building Capacity of Cross-Border Regions." Regional & Federal Studies 20(3): 335-351, Klatt, M. (2013). National minorities as a model for cross-border integration. Lessons from Schleswig. Grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit leben und erforschen. Integration und (trans-)regionale Identität. Beiträge aus dem Kolloquium "Grenzen überbrücken: auf dem Weg zur territorialen Kohäsion in Europa", 18. und 19. Oktober 2010, Strassburg. J. Beck and B. Wassenberg. Stuttgart, Franz Steiner Verlag. 5: 301-320.

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Schengen challenged – Euroscepticism or Unfamiliarity? This story of de-bordering did not pass by unchallenged. While Euroscepticism until recently used to be a symptom of the extreme political fringes only in Germany, it has featured high in Denmark since the country joined the EC in 1973. In all the eight Danish plebiscites on European integration, the ‘No’-side mobilized between 37 % and 53 % of the voters. Fears of de-bordering together with demands for re-bordering have figured in Eurosceptic plebiscite campaigns. Historically, the Danish border region of Southern Jutland was considered to be pro-European, as it had a stable voting behaviour since the 1920s, with Social Democrats and the agricultural, right-liberal party Venstre receiving most of the votes. Usually it deviated considerably to the ‘Yes’-side in all but the latest of the plebiscites. Southern Jutland also profited economically from being geographically close to Germany and the European market. A political narrative of ever-improving contact, dialogue and cooperation has dominated Danish-German relations, on the national level as well as in the border region. 45 However, in the recent elections to the European Parliament (2014) and the Danish national parliament (2015), the Eurosceptic right wing Danish People’s Party Dansk Folkeparti (DPP) scored their best results in the border districts, becoming the strongest party with well above 30 % of the votes – because the locals wanted the border to be closed, according to the vice mayor of the border town Tønder. 46 The region also had a higher ‘No’-vote than national average for the first time in the December 2015 plebiscite on the removal of the Danish opt-out on Justice and Home Affairs. In the following I will evaluate this significant political change assessing the role of Euroscepticism, but equally of EU border region policies and border region governance, to explain the failure to create sustainable cross-border regions with stable frameworks to counteract re-bordering trends in periods of crisis. Danish Euroscepticism, especially with relation to the open border, had already been voiced in the political debate surrounding the Schengen treaty and the establishment of the Euroregion; 47 but remained quiet in the following decade. The Danish economy boomed, while the Euroregion de facto remained without power. Subliminal Euroscepticism did not articulate itself in the region, while on the national level the Socialist People’s Party, having previously been the strongest proponent of left-wing Euroscepticism in Denmark, became a pro-EU party. On the right wing, the DPP had been advocating a return to border control in every national election campaign, arguing mostly with a perceived increase in organized cross-border crime – an increase that never could be documented by statistical evidence. The DPP had supported the right-wing government elected in 2001 but remained without influence on Danish EU politics the government needed their votes for a reform of the early retirement scheme in 2011. 48 Political horse-trading resulted in the decision to introduce permanent customs controls on the borders. While the government ‘naïvely believed that an internal national debate on border control could be kept away from the attention of an international audience’, 49 it turned into a major international crisis for Denmark. Especially German, but also other international media suddenly focused on “little Denmark”, a country else largely absent from international news and still enjoying a reputation of not only housing the “happiest people of the world”, but also of being a liberal, open, social welfare society. Opposition was voiced strongly by German politicians of the border region, but also by the Danish minority and its political party, the South Schleswig Voters’ Association (Südschleswigscher Wählerverband, SSW).

45

Latest by a chief official of the Schleswig-Holstein government in Flensborg Avis, 8 March 2016. Berlingske Tidende, 10 January 2016. 47 Klatt, M. (2006). Fra modspil til medspil? Grænseoverskridende samarbejde i Sønderjylland/Schleswig 1945-2005. Aabenraa, Institut for Grænseregionsforskning, Yndigegn, C. (2012). "Reviving Unfamiliarity—The Case of Public Resistance to the Establishment of the Danish–German Euroregion." European Planning Studies 21(1): 58-74. 48 Wind, M. (2012). "The blind, the deaf and the dumb! How domestic politics turned the Danish Schengen controversy into a foreign policy crisis." Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook: 131-156. 49 Ibid., p. 133. 46

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The dilemma of the Danish government, as explained by Marlene Wind,50 was not the substance of the agreement, which remained unclear for a couple of months, but its communication in the Danish media and the fact that it broke the previous consensus of the major Danish parties to keep the right-wing and left-wing critics out of influence on Danish EU politics. The defence of Schengen, free movement and the European project as such had to come from outside the government, in this case academics, foreign correspondents in Denmark, the Danish industry and a few former politicians with a strong pro-EU stand. 51 Furthermore, the deal was struck by finance minister Claus Hjorth Frederiksen without prior consulting the Ministry of Justice, Germany or the European institutions. Additionally, the National Commissioner of the Danish Police rejected the argument that increased cross-border crime required more border control. 52 The social democrats, originally not totally against increased border controls, reacted quickly when taking power after the September 2011 elections and stopped the customs control on the border. After this short-lived episode, the threat of border controls has remained a constant footnote of crossborder political activities. The situation is aggravated by the apparent standstill or rollback of cooperation, in spite of a narrative of continuing cooperation and good dialogue being reiterated after the Danish minority party SSW joined a Schleswig-Holstein government coalition in 2012: i) When confronted with central government demands to reduce health expenditures, the Region South Denmark decided to cancel the agreement with German health services from 1 January 2017 on, as treatment capacities in Denmark were now considered sufficient. The use of German ambulances and a German rescue helicopter in South Denmark has also declined significantly after a similar Danish health infrastructure had been established. ii) The two universities in the border region, the University of Southern Denmark and the Europauniversität Flensburg, have developed joint study programs since 1993. Bureaucratic issues increasingly “divorced” most of these, so that at present only one Danish-German program in International Management is of truly cross-border character, including cross-border enrollment plus teaching and diplomas being offered by both universities. Even this program has been threatened, though, because the Danish ministry of higher education refused to continue to fund this program in case teaching only took place at the campus of Europauniversität Flensburg, which had been the practice since the program’s start as it was the most practical solution for the students. iii) Cross-border traffic infrastructure was considerably reduced. A cross-border express bus, inaugurated with Interreg funding, has been discontinued because of technical issues: The German buses in use had to be wheelchair accessible and were thus less comfortable for non-handicapped travellers than the Danish buses used on the route, while the Danish buses were not accessible for wheelchairs or parents with prams. For rail traffic, the only direct high speed ICE connection from the border region to Berlin was discontinued in December 2015. For buses, Flensburg used to be integrated in the Southern Jutland County tariff, but was reduced to a special international zone in 2007, excluding it from off-peak hour rebates. Cross-border passenger ferry boats were stopped because of different security standards on both sides of the border. A cross-border infrastructure and transport commission did not produce more than a list of desirable projects, none of which was new to stakeholders on either side, but no concrete action plan to implement any of them. iv) The management as well as the musicians refused merging the two symphonic orchestras of the region, for reasons not convincing to an outsider.

50

Ibid. Ibid., p. 135. 52 Ibid., p. 135. 51

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v) New initiatives like a joint cross-border-region public health insurance card, announced profoundly in November 2013, 53 have not come beyond the preliminary planning state. Eventually, when Denmark actually introduced permanent police presence with random checks at the major border crossings in January 2016, this did not come as a surprise but manifested the return of state-ism in the (cross-) border region. Public opinion’s different mainstream reaction to the migratory pressure of autumn 2015 has estranged border region residents from one another. While German mainstream discussants (and official politics) maintained a “welcome culture” during the second half of 2015, the migratory pressure was met by restrictive Danish policies from the very beginning. “Scare-campaigns” were launched by Danish politics in Middle Eastern newspapers to discourage refugees from travelling to Denmark. Furthermore, allowances for foreigners residing in Denmark who are not able to support themselves were cut, and there were political proposals to body search incoming refugees for money, gold and jewellery to be confiscated as a contribution to the costs of their stay. At the EU level, Denmark opposed acceptance rates as well as a joint EU migration policy. Just recently, Danish Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen of the liberal party Venstre proclaimed in his speech on the Danish Constitution Day that Denmark was the world’s best society to live in, as employment grew, unemployment fell, there was economic growth and the number of asylum seekers in May 2016 was the lowest per month since 2012. 54 While the tangible threat to public order, precondition for introducing border controls within the Schengen system, has remained dubious, controls are costly. The Danish railways tax the costs of their precheck of passengers travelling to Sweden to 130,000 €/day. 55 Costs of controls on the border to Germany are estimated to 29 mio. € for 2016. 56 Because of overburdening the police, since June the Danish militia Hjemmeværnet (literally “Home Defense”) has been assisting the Danish police; in camouflage uniforms, but not bearing arms. Nevertheless, DPP continuously argues for complete 24/7 controls at all border crossings, using the military to support the police, dog patrols and more. Moreover Immigration Minister Inger Støjbjerg has announced to sharpen controls including transport company liability for cross-border bus and train operators, whenever deemed necessary. On the Danish-Swedish border in the Øresund Region the consequences of rebordering have been even harder. Here, together with the construction of the fixed road and rail link across the border, a lot of political emphasis has been put on creating a true cross-border metropolis. 57 Commuting as well as other forms of cross-border interaction have increased significantly due to the frequent and fast rail connection. Copenhagen airport, located directly at the bridge between Copenhagen and Malmö, has definitely become Southern Sweden’s international airport, too. It was here that the reintroduction of border controls started, abandoning more than 60 years of open borders between Denmark and Sweden. Due to carrier liability, Danish Railways chose to use the airport station as a checkpoint for passport or photo ID controls of all of

53

Flensborg Avis, 1 November 2013. http://www.altinget.dk/artikel/her-er-lars-loekkes-grundlovstale (6 June 2016). 55 Politiken, 28 Dec 2015. 56 According to Danish minister of Justice Søren Pind, Der Nordschleswiger, 14 June 2016. 57 Matthiessen, C. W. (2004). "The Öresund Area: Pre- and post-bridge cross-border functional integration: The binational regional question." GeoJournal 61(1): 31-39, Asheim, B. T. and J. Moodyson (2008). The Öresund Region: A dynamic region in Europe due to interregional collaboration? La cooperacio transfronterera a la UE Barcelona, Institut Universitari d'Estudis Europeus, Löfgren, O. (2008). "Regionauts: the Transformation of Cross-Border Regions in Scandinavia." European Urban and Regional Studies 15(3): 195-209, Schönweitz, M. (2008). "The Öresund Committe. Cross-border institution-building in the Baltic Sea Region." NORDEUROPAforum 18(2): 75-94, Matthiessen, C. W. (2010). "The Öresund bridge : planning for a cross-border metropolis of Copenhagen (Denmark) and Malmö-Lund (Sweden)." Questiones Geographicae. Series B: Human Geography and Spatial Management 28(B 1): 49-58. 54

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the about 30,000 daily rail passengers. 58 Through trains were cut at this station, which has a metro-station design of two tracks only without any switches or side tracks. Passengers have to detrain and cross a bridge to the other platform, where their IDs are checked and scanned by a private security firm, before they can retrain to continue to Sweden. Commuting time from Copenhagen to Malmö has doubled from 45 minutes to one hour and a half during rush hours, congestions at the gates might even result in a two-hour trip. This major setback for the Øresund cooperation has been a thorn in the eye of the Danish government. Still, attempts to negotiate with Sweden on a joint “Nordic” border control to assure free passage across the Øresund have not led to success. On the contrary, both the Danish People’s Party and the Conservatives criticized Sweden for not having the refugee situation under control and called a joint Nordic passport control for illusionary. The DPP even argued for Denmark to introduce permanent and total border controls for travellers entering Denmark from Sweden. 59 Results and effectiveness can be interpreted. According to the Danish police, 887,995 persons were controlled at the borders from 4 January to 20 May, resulting in 1,336 persons denied entry and 143 persons charged with human trafficking. 60 The police have admitted, though, that these 143 include family members of refugees and humanitarian activists, the share of professional traffickers being much lower. The controls have not resulted in significant numbers of arrests or charges against other forms of cross-border crime. The police themselves have not really assessed the controls’ effectiveness, but rather voiced criticism including denouncing the controls as symbolic policy. 61 South Jutland police confirmed in June 2016 that there was no correlation between a decrease of crime in the region and the border controls, as most of the perpetrators had always been residents of the region. 62 Nevertheless, political support for the controls has remained continuously high in Denmark. Of the political parties, only the left-liberal Radikale Venstre and the new left-wing Alternativet are outspokenly against border controls. Business has been sceptical, but does not consider the present soft form of random controls to be a serious impediment for trade and growth. Opinion polls also indicate continuous support for the measure: In a Gallup poll conducted in the first week of January, only 21 % thought that the controls should be abolished again, while 55 % wished them to be permanent. 40 % thought that all persons crossing the border should be checked, instead of random checks only. Support for controls was considerably higher among center-right voters, and only marginally lower in the border region. 63 Approval rates have continued to be high after about half a year of control. In an opinion poll of the Norwegian institute Norstat for the Danish net-paper Altinget, 66 % expressed their support to prolong border controls to two years, only 22 % thought this was a bad idea. 64 While 98 % of the Danish People’s Party supported continuing border controls, also 84 % of the ruling liberal party Venstre’s voters, and even less (63 %) of the Social Democrat’s voters did. Only the supporters of the left-liberal Radikale Venstre and the new leftist Alternativet have a clear majority against continuing border controls, while the leftist Socialist People’s Party and Enhedslisten are divided. The north German daily Flensburger Tageblatt, definitely not supporting the border controls,

58

Estimate, based on Statistics Denmark figures for 2014 and 2015, http://www.statistikbanken.dk/statbank5a/default.asp?w=1680 (15 June 2016). 59 Berlingske, 6 February 2016. 60

https://www.politi.dk/da/aktuelt/nyheder/resultat_af_den_midlertidige_stikproevevise_graensekontrol_ved_den_dansk_ tyske_graense.htm (2 June 2016). 61 In Jyllands-Posten, 9 April 2016. 62 In Der Nordschleswiger, 14 June 2016. 63 Results in Berlingske Tidende, 14 January 2016, p. 8. 64 http://www.altinget.dk/artikel/graensekontrollen-er-blevet-populaer (2 June 2016).

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commented “Dänische Begeisterung über Kontrollen kennt keine Grenzen” – there is no limit (border) to the Danish enthusiasm on (border-) control. 65 As in 2011, Schleswig-Holstein politicians heavily criticized the Danish decision to introduce border controls. Some politicians, such as the Flensburg based social democrats and Green party members of the Schleswig-Holstein diet, co-organized demonstrations for an open border (and a humane refugee policy) across the border. Also SSW chairman Flemming Meyer repeatedly criticized the Danish measure. Again, it was only Flensburg’s “Danish” Mayor Simon Faber who expressed his understanding, as well as he claimed that he had convinced the Danish government to refrain from total control. Later on, also the SchleswigHolstein government or more explicitly SSW minister Anke Spoorendonk claimed to be the decisive actor that had prevented the worst, i.e. complete border control including carrier liability. A social democrat, member of Flensburg city council and chairman of the council’s technical committee, actually resigned from the cross-border municipal committee of Grænsetrekanten, the “Border Triangle”, because he would not travel to Denmark anymore unless the controls were lifted again.

Conclusion: New borderscapes – or persistence of indifference? The implementation of the Schengen treaty created new borderscapes in European borderlands. The dismantling and destruction of border control posts, the opening of new crossings previously closed, new public transport connections crossing the border as well as the new feeling of just crossing over like into any other different town or landscape have definitely changed the perception of European borderlands, or have they? Statistical data on passenger as well as freight traffic document that cross-border interaction has increased across all borders within the Schengen-zone. More in-depth research on cross-border social practices, though, reveals many impediments to factual cross-border integration and region-building, as well as the persistence of legal, administrative, linguistic and cultural borders. The majority of cross-border interactions are incited by exploiting cost and price differentials instead of politically incited cooperation. For the labour market, open borders should create new opportunities of cross-border integration, as the border crossing has become much easier, dependable and less time consuming. Still, the number of crossborder commuters, understood as people who work on a permanent basis in another country than their country of residence, remains small. For 2006/2007, only about 780,000 border region residents were documented as commuters across a border within the European Economic Area. 66 Intensive cross-border commuting is characteristic of three regional cross-border labour markets only: The greater Luxemburg area and the Basle and Geneva metropolitan regions. In all three there are clear economic incitements to cross the border for work, low linguistic barriers and thriving regional economies. At the political level, cross-border regions are not sufficiently institutionalized to function as policy coordinating bodies or even cross-border governments. Functional cooperation reveals the state’s decisive rule as norm-setting body, both legally and culturally. Euroscepticism as such does not appear to have had an influence on this lack of cross-border interaction. Resilience to engage in border crossing social practices cannot be explained by tides of Euroscepticism only. Unfamiliarity as well as the lack of necessity contributes to maintain national preferences. A certain form of exposure to perceived external threats is sensed stronger in border regions, as the external ‘other’ is more present in the periphery than in central regions of a state. This may result in a general lack of trust in globalization, cosmopolitanism and diversity, expressed by mistrust, blaming European integration and 65

Flensburger Tageblatt, 2 June 2016. Nerb, G., et al. (2009). Scientific Report on the Mobility of Cross-border Workers in the EU-27/EEA/EFTA Countries. München/Sopron, MKW Wirtschaftsforschung GmbH Empirica Kft.

66

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demanding a re-bordering. Even in the Danish-German case, Euroscepticism remained subliminal and only expressed itself in crisis and elections, not in actual cross-border politics. Regarding factual cross-border cooperation, the Danish-German development indicates a “home first”approach by the relevant systemic actors. Though never outspoken, there is reluctance to give up institutional power to a cross-border institution or even an institution in the neighbouring country. The only exception is some institutional flexibility when solving bottleneck problems. Additionally these examples demonstrate the systemic difficulties in applying cross-border solutions between highly developed and regulated welfare state administrations. Experiences of other Euroregions confirm these tendencies of a case- and project oriented approach to cross-border cooperation, while integrative strategies of cross-border region building have failed. This applies to border regions with a comparatively strong presence of Euroscepticism, but also to regions were Euroscepticism is absent from the political discourse. Lastly, social border crossing practices develop independently from institutional frameworks, political directions and policy targets. Neither does “Euroscepticism” seem to have an influence here. Border crossing practices are difficult to quantify and to qualify. A borderland’s population’s behaviour can definitely be incited (and changed) by economic incentives, as well as open borders increase interaction. Still, our knowledge on borderlanders’ behaviour remains limited. It is characterized by transnational behaviour as well as border surfing, but also by continuing indifference or even directly hostile attitudes.

Klatt, M. 2016. Dybbøl 2014: Constructing familiarity remembrance? In European Borderlands. Living with barriers and bridges, eds. E. Boesen & G. Schnuer, 30-46. London New York: Routledge. Leconte, C. (2015) From pathology to mainstream phenomenon: Reviewing the Euroscepticism debate in research and theory. International Political Science Review, 36, 250-263. Martinez, O. J. 1994. Border People. Life and Society in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands Tucson London: University of Arizona Press. Taggart, P. (1998) A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European Party Systems. European Journal of Political Research, 33, 363-388.

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