2.2.4) Case study 1: Invisible Children and the Lord's Resistance Army. 30. 2.2.5) Case Study 2: Crisis and Recovery Mapping and Analysis (South. Sudan). 32.
Consolidating Post-‐DDR Reintegration and Peace-‐building: Opportunities for the Use of New Information and Communications Technology in Africa Report by Guy Lamb, Orly Stern and Marina Reyskens
With contributions from Gregory Mthembu-‐Salter and Karusha Naidoo
29 November 2013
Table of contents
List of Acronyms INTRODUCTION DDR and ICT: The potential nexus Objective of the study Analytical framework Methodology Institutional information Structure of the report SECTION I: ICT AND SOCIAL MEDIA IN AFRICA 1.1) ICT usage and growth in Africa 1.2) The use and expansion of social media in Africa SECTION II: ICT USE IN RELATED FIELDS 2.1) Responses to natural and humanitarian disasters and ICT 2.1.1) Natural disaster warning systems 2.1.2) ICT and humanitarian crises 2.1.3) ICT and the monitoring of potential humanitarian and natural disasters in Africa 2.2) Conflict early warning, violence monitoring and ICT 2.2.1) Conflict early warning systems 2.2.2) ‘Big data’ and violence prevention 2.2.3) ICT and situations of violent conflict 2.2.4) Case study 1: Invisible Children and the Lord’s Resistance Army 2.2.5) Case Study 2: Crisis and Recovery Mapping and Analysis (South Sudan) 2.2.6) Case study 3: Geospatial analysis and the monitoring of human rights abuses 2.3) Post-‐conflict reconstruction and ICT 2.3.1) Overview of ICT use in post-‐conflict reconstruction 2.3.2) ICT, public administration and governance 2.3.3) ICT and health 2.3.4) ICT and education 2.3.5) ICT, refugees and remittances SECTION III: ICT FOR DDR IN AFRICA 3.1) Historical overview 3.2) Recommended ICT tools and approaches for DDR 3.2.1) Specific recommendations 3.2.2) Constraints and considerations CONCLUSION NOTES
3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 8 9 13 18 19 19 21 25 27 27 29 29 30 32 33 35 35 36 38 38 40 42 43 45 45 46 52 53
2
List of acronyms ACCU AAAS AU BOSCO CEWARN CEWS CRMA D&R DDR FTR GSM ICT IDC IDP IGAD ITU LRA NGO PSC SMS TDRP VRS UNICEF USSD
Anti-‐Corruption Coalition Uganda American Association for the Advancement of Science African Union Battery-‐Operated Systems for Community Outreach Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism Continental Early Warning System Crisis and Recovery Mapping and Analysis Demobilization and reintegration Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration Family Tracing and Reunification Global System for Mobile Communications Information communications technology International Data Corporation Internally displaced person Intergovernmental Authority on Development International Telecommunications Union Lord’s Resistance Army Non-‐governmental organisation Peace and Security Council Short message service Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program Viral Record System United Nations Children’s Fund Unstructured supplementary service data
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INTRODUCTION
DDR and ICT: The potential nexus The international donor community and development agencies have been financing and supporting the design and implementation of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) interventions in post-‐colonial Africa for more than four decades. Experience of such programmes has consistently revealed that DDR is a highly complex phenomenon. Its success is dependent on the ability of the intervention to overcome a multiplicity of obstructive factors and dynamics, many of which are beyond the control of the DDR programme financiers and developers. Consequently the results of many DDR process have been unsatisfactory. DDR has also been a voracious consumer of resources, as it is a labour intensive excise that has typically been pursued in challenging environments. Hence, there is a continual need to consider additional tools and methods to enhance the implementation and positive outcomes of DDR processes. Information communications technology (ICT) offers potential benefits for DDR programming. The reason for this is that currently, accesses to and use of ICT is expanding exponentially, particularly in relation to the Internet and mobile phones. The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) estimated that in 2013 38.8 per hundred inhabitants of world made use of the Internet, which was a five-‐fold increase since 2002. The growth in the use of mobile phones has been astonishing, increasing from 15.5 per 100 inhabitants in 2002 to an estimated 96.2 in 2013. The most innovative ICT growth has been in the use of Internet-‐ enabled mobile phones and social media applications. A range of service delivery sectors has enthusiastically embraced ICT. The experience of ICT usage, and the instruments devised in these areas may offer some useful insights for current and future DDR programming. There is also increasing academic and applied interest in the use of new types of ICTs to bolster development and reduce violence. Current research is still in the speculative and embryonic stages, and targeted ICT applications have typically been designed and implemented as pilot or experimental initiatives. Further knowledge generation and analysis in this area is imperative given the pervasive and persistent nature of armed conflict and fragility of peace settlements, particularly in Africa. Critically, the expanded use of ICT and social media was an important element in the mobilization of people for the pro-‐democracy movements and protests in North Africa and the Middle East during the 2011 ‘Arab Spring’, which according to a 2012 World Bank report resulted in: “The downfall of four heads of state, protests by millions of people in 16 countries, the deaths of at least 43 journalists and approximately 40,000 protesters, and entirely new evidence of what is possible when citizens exercise the power of their connectivity to demand recognition of their rights.”1
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Objective of the study Given this state of affairs, this study seeks to contribute to the debate and on the manner in which ICT, including social media platforms, could be used to promote peace by specifically supporting the process of reintegrating former combatants and their dependents into post-‐war societies, with a specific focus on Africa. The objectives of this study are as follows: • To generate knowledge and stimulate debate on the role of ICT and ICT-‐ enabled social media in promoting peace-‐building and conflict transformation in conflict-‐affected countries, particularly in Africa where technological innovation is nascent but rapidly evolving. • To generate recommendations on the potential use of ICT and ICT-‐ enabled social media in promoting effective DDR. Analytical framework The principal focal area of this exploratory study is that of DDR interventions in Africa, and how ICT approaches and tools could possibly be used to constructively facilitate more effective reintegration of ex-‐combatants into civilian life. The main target audience are the designers and implementers of DDR programmes (as well as financiers). This study will firstly approach the issue at hand by assessing the ICT environment in Africa in order to determine the practical boundaries and challenges of designing and implementing ICT approaches and tools on this continent. Secondly, the study will assess the use of ICT in fields that have direct relevance for DDR, particularly those that are geared towards promoting development, reducing harm and alleviating socio-‐economic stress and suffering. In particular it will consider the fields of disaster and humanitarian relief, early warning, violence prevention, refugee reunification and repatriation, as well as post-‐ conflict reconstruction. Thirdly, this review of ICT in select sectors will be used to identify potential ICT and social media interventions for current and emerging DDR programming in Africa, particularly with respect to key DDR programming needs, which can be delineated as follows: Risk and security Ex-‐combatants are a group that has the potential to undermine peace-‐building efforts, and possibly even bring about a return to war. Hence, it is essential for those responsible for the management of the DDR process to be able to monitor and track security developments and dynamics (that may have an impact on ex-‐combatant behaviour) in the areas in question, in real-‐time. Coordination and Contemporary DDR programmes typically involve a wide
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monitoring of assistance to beneficiaries Communication with beneficiaries
range of service providers. Constant coordination and monitoring in this regard is essential to reduce overlap, as well as identify gaps and weaknesses in support. In order to ensure that the DDR support that is being provided is adequately meeting the needs of the ex-‐ combatants, DDR programme personnel should be able to easily contact and communicate with beneficiaries. Payment logistics Most DDR programmes entail cash payments to ex-‐ combatants and their dependents. Facilitating such payments is logistically challenging in environments where there is limited or no banking or money transfer services. Delays in providing payments may result in frustration among ex-‐combatants, which could escalate to violence. Support for social Ex-‐combatants often access their social networks in order networking to secure employment or pursue other means of income generation. Reintegration assistance could be significantly enhanced if tools to support social networking were introduced. Monitoring and Regular tracking and analysis of the implementation of the evaluation DDR process vis-‐à-‐vis its objectives are critical to improving the possibility of successful outcomes. Methodology A combination of in-‐country field research (in Uganda, South Sudan and the Republic of Congo) and secondary research was used to pursue the project objectives. Both research approaches were qualitative in nature, with the principal method of the field research being key informant interviews. A workshop on the use of ICT programming in DDR and related areas in Africa was held in Durban, South Africa in March 2013 with ICT and DDR specialists with a view to providing additional insights on the relevance and applicability of ICT and social media for DDR. The main recommendations from this workshop have been incorporated into this report. Institutional information The World Bank’s Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program (TDRP) have sponsored this study. The TDRP is a multi-‐donor initiative that has been established to support the return of ex-‐combatants to civilian life in Africa. Given the limited resources available for DDR initiatives, the TDRP has a strong interest in developing more affordable and efficient DDR programming, with ICT applications having the potential to provide such solutions. Such a study is of interest to the World Bank in general as this financial institution is already playing a significant role in ICT infrastructure development, providing support for policy and sector reforms and for private sector investment for mobile communications in Africa, including conflict-‐affected countries. The Institute for Security Studies (Pretoria, South Africa) and the University of Cape Town’s Safety and Violence Initiative (Cape Town, South Africa), undertook the research for this study.
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Structure of the report This report is divided into three sections. Section I provides an analysis of ICT growth and usage in Africa (and trends in this regard). Section II reviews ICT approaches and applications in fields that have direct relevance to DDR. Section III considers the constraints and prospects for the implementation of plausible ICT interventions with respect to existing and emerging DDR programmes in Africa, and provides recommendations in this regard.
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SECTION I: ICT AND SOCIAL MEDIA IN AFRICA
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1.1) ICT usage and growth in Africa In recent years innovation in ICT has been progressing rapidly, principally in the areas of mobile telephony, Internet interaction (particularly social media), and the integration of the two technologies. This innovation has been in ICT hardware (internet-‐enabled mobile phones, smart phones and tablets), ICT software (Internet browsing, messaging and ‘apps’) and in ICT network access (mobile phone infrastructure, connectivity and bandwidth). The global distribution of new ICTs is however uneven, with there being a significant ‘digital divide’ between wealthy industrialised nations and the developing world, particularly in Africa. Nonetheless, the ITU holds the optimistic view that improved ICT connectivity in poorer nations will likely narrow the gap between the haves and have-‐nots. 2 This view is based on the significant improvements in ICT infrastructure and bandwidth that have taken place throughout much of Africa since 2000. This was mainly due to extensive market liberalization in the mobile phone sector and private sector investment of US$28 billion in ICT between 2000 and 2010. This investment has resulted in “the share of the African population living within range of a mobile signal mushrooming from 20 per cent to around 70 per cent.”3 ICT growth has also been facilitated by the installation and laying of both terrestrial and submarine fibre optic cables. In mid-‐2012 it was estimated that such ICT infrastructure was within reach of 40% of Africa’s population.4 These developments have resulted in increased broadband access, which is swiftly superseding dial-‐up as the principal fixed-‐line method of accessing the Internet in many African cities. Broadband access for mobile phones has also improved through the more widespread availability of mobile data and third-‐generation (3G) broadband services.5 However, the cost of mobile communication services remains prohibitively high in Africa, and is on average ten times higher than costs in South Asia. In addition, a study by Chabossou et al6 of mobile usage in 17 African countries indicated that increased use of mobile phone services was largely dependent on higher levels of education and income, which suggests that there will be constrained mobile phone penetration in countries with low human development indices, which is particularly relevant for a number of countries in sub-‐Saharan Africa. Nonetheless, chart 1 below, which is based on ITU data, shows a positive trend towards greater access to mobile phone technology, with mobile phone subscriptions per 100 people having quadrupled in the developing world since 2005. A similar trend is observable in Africa, but the growth trend appears to be slowing in recent years.
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Chart 1: Mobile-‐cellular subscriptions per 100 inhabitants 140,0 120,0 100,0
Developed
80,0 60,0
Developing
40,0
Africa
20,0
World
-‐ 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012* 2013* Mobile-‐cellular subscriptions per 100 inhabitants
(Source: ITU) Mobile penetration (and the rate thereof) in Africa is not homogenous, and varies from region-‐to-‐region (as reflected in Map 1 below), with the highest penetration predominantly being in Southern Africa, North Africa and some countries in West Africa. In East Africa, Kenya is experiencing relatively rapid growth in mobile phone penetration, along with Sudan and Uganda. Access and use of mobile phones in the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia) and parts of Central Africa (Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic and Burundi), however has remained consistently low in recent years due to the prevalence of armed conflicts, instability, government restrictions and exceedingly high ICT costs. It is important to note that the vast majority of mobile phone subscribers in Africa make use of prepaid packages. Map 1: Mobile phone penetration in Africa, 2011
(Source: Blycroft Publishing, 2012) The digital divide is particularly stark with respect to Internet usage with the ITU estimating that close to 77% of individuals in the developed world will use the Internet in 2013, while it is anticipated that less than a third of people living in the developing world will use the World Wide Web in the same year. The situation in Africa is even starker where only 16% of the population made use of
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the Internet in 2013. However, it is important to note that Internet usage in Africa has dramatically increased since 2005 when it was just over 2%.7 A recent study on Internet usage and access in 11 African counties by Research ICT Africa indicated that such a state of affairs was due to a severe lack of computers and smartphones and the high price of Internet connectivity.8 This has been exacerbated by inadequate fixed line telephone infrastructure and the dominance of GSM (Global System for Mobile Communications) mobile phone technology, which has had limitations with respect to data transmissions. 9 However, the ICT Africa study found that there had been a significant upward trend in the use of mobile devices to access the Internet in recent years. These findings are supported by ITU data, which indicates a significant increase in active mobile-‐broadband subscriptions since 2010 (see Chart 2 below). Such progress in Africa has been supported through various ICT initiatives: Digital Opportunity Task Force, United Nations ICT Task Force, African Connection and Ministerial Oversight Committee, African Telecommunications Union, African Advisory Group on ICT, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, African Information Society Initiative, Global Business Dialogue on e-‐ Commerce, Global Information Infrastructure Commission, as well as various regional bodies’ policy initiatives.10 Chart 2: Active mobile-‐broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants
Developed Developing
2013*
2012*
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
Africa 2005
140,0 120,0 100,0 80,0 60,0 40,0 20,0 -‐
World
Mobile-‐cellular subscriptions per 100 inhabitants
(Source: ITU) Mobile Internet access does vary between countries, with some countries having more than two-‐thirds of the population over the age of 15 accessing the Internet via a mobile phone, such as Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Namibia and South Africa. Uptake of mobile Internet usage in other countries, such as Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda has been limited, where less than 10% of the population make use of the Internet.11 According to the International Data Corporation (IDC), worldwide shipments of ‘smart connected devices’ (tablets and phones) have increased markedly in recent years. Such shipments grew by 29.1% in 2012 compared to 2011, with more than one billion devices being shipped in 2012 with a combined total value
11
of $576.9 billion. The IDC expects that tablet shipments will surpass desktop PCs in 2013 and portable PCs in 2014. In relation to emerging markets, the IDC reported that volumes in shipped smart connected devices increased by 41.3% in 2012, with the tablet volume increasing by 111.3% and smartphone volume by 69.7% (compared to 2011). It is predicted that these shipments will increase by between two and three times by 2017.12
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1.2) The use and expansion of social media The global use of ICT social networking and social media sites has increased exponentially in recent years, accompanied by a wide variety of social media platforms, each with its own functional, content and/or language specialization. For example, Facebook, the most popular social network platform internationally, had 12 million users in 2006, which by the end of 2012 had grown to over a billion users. Twitter has experienced similar growth, expanding from 1,000 users in 2006 to more than 500 million in 2012.13 Chart 3 below graphically represents the usage trend in some of the major social media platforms (Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn and Google+) globally. Charts 4, 5 and 6 also represent global trends and provide social media usage details in terms of gender, age and education respectively. Chart 3: Growth in global social media usage (millions of users) 1200 1000 800
Facebook
600
Twitter
400
LinkedIn
200
Google+
0 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
(Source: http://dstevenwhite.com) Chart 4: Global social media usage disaggregated by gender (2012) 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%
Male Usage Female Usage
Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn
(Source: www.ignitesocialmedia.com)
Google +
13
Chart 5: Global social media usage disaggregated by age (2012) 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0%
0-‐17 yrs old 18-‐24 yrs old 25-‐34 yrs old 35-‐44 yrs old 45-‐54 yrs old 55-‐64 yrs old Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn
Google +
65 +
(Source: www.ignitesocialmedia.com) Chart 6: Global social media usage disaggregated by education (2012) 70% 60%
Less than HS Diploma
50% 40%
High School
30%
Some College
20%
Bachelors Degree
10%
Graduate Degree
0% Facebook
Twitter
Data for Google + is unavailable
LinkedIn
(Source: www.ignitesocialmedia.com) As of May 2013 the leading social media sites/applications were: Facebook (1.11 billion users); YouTube (1 billion users); the predominantly Chinese sites, QQ (700 million users) and Qzone (600 million users); Twitter (500 million users); Google+ (over 400 million users); and LinkedIn (225 million users). In Russia the leading social media site was VKontakte (190 million users), and in Iran it was Cloob (1 million users).14 Map 2 provides a graphical representation of the most popular social media sites by country in 2013. Map 2, however, does not provide a comprehensive picture of social media use in Africa, which is increasing. Facebook is the most popular social media platform with 50,4 million users (March 2013)15. Table 1 below provides a list of the countries with the highest number of Facebook users in Africa.
14
Map 2: Map of the most popular social networking sites by country, June 2013
(Source: http://vincos.it/world-‐map-‐of-‐social-‐networks/)
Table 1: Top 10 countries in Africa: Facebook users (total) March 2013 Country Algeria DRC Egypt Ethiopia Ghana Kenya Morocco Nigeria South Africa Tunisia
Internet users as % of the total Number of Facebook users population 2012 figures 2013 figures 14 4,322,820 1.2 891,150 35.6 13, 010,580 1.1 310,940 14.1 1,465,560 7.2 1,886,560 51 5,250,340 28.4 5,357,500 39 5,534,160 39.1 3,436,720
(Source: www.socialbakers.com) Chart 7: Top 10 countries in Africa: Facebook users disaggregated by gender (March 2013) 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%
(Source: www.socialbakers.com)
Male Usage Female Usage
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The increased popularity of Facebook in Africa can be partially attributed to the launch of the ‘Facebook for Every Phone’ app in 2011, which had been designed “to offer a fast and rich Facebook experience to users anywhere in the world” on more than 3,000 Java-‐enabled mobile devices.16 More specifically, the app, which is a simplified version of the web-‐based social media platform that can be accessed via feature phones (also known as ‘dumb’ phones). Such phones are in common use throughout Africa. According to Nicola D’Elia, the Africa Growth Manager for Facebook: African Facebook users do not, in the main, use laptops. They use their phones. And these are not smart phones… So our focus is to deliver great products for feature phones. That means changing the design… it means a lot of things. We think this will drive user growth and engagement… we also want to drive traffic to local apps which the app developers can then monetise… We know that mobi is the starting point. Not everyone can use apps, although we want to get to that. But we know that people want to connect with their friends, and we want to make that possible.17 Figure 1: Images of Facebook for Every Phone App
There are other social media platforms in use, but they are typically country specific (with some reach into other African countries), such as Mixit, which was developed, and is predominantly used in South Africa. On average, Mixit has 9.3 million active users in South Africa and close to 600,000 active users in other countries.18 Nevertheless. WhatsApp has recently surpassed Mxit to become the most dominant instant messaging application on the African continent.19 As a further indication of the uptake of social media, a 2012 study undertaken by Research ICT Africa indicated that users of Internet-‐enabled phones were using these devices more to access social media applications than to send emails.20 Video, audio and image sharing sites and applications have also gained popularity worldwide. Many such sites/applications have been linked to the principal social media sites, especially Facebook and Twitter. YouTube, with 1 billion users, is one of the more popular video/audio file-‐sharing platforms, with Instagram (100 million users) and Flickr (87 millions users) being amongst the most popular image (photo) sharing platforms. A similar dynamic also exists with chat applications that employ text, voice and video chat interfaces that are often connected users’ social media.21
16
A host of new and innovative mobile phone and Internet ‘apps’ are being developed on a daily basis, with there now being close to one million ‘apps’ available globally.22 There has also been exponential growth in both the number of individuals downloading apps, as well as in the number of apps that each individual uses each day. A study by Flurry Analytics indicated that in the last quarter of 2012 that iOS (Apple) and Android smart phone users (with Internet access) made use of 7.9 apps a day. In May 2013, the Apple iTunes online ‘App Store’ recorded a grand total of 50 billion app downloads since the creation of the store in July 2008. The ‘app’ economy, which has only been in existence for the past five years is now estimated to generate annual revenues of US$25 billion.23 In Africa, one of the most influential ICT technology in this area are mobile money transfer systems, which are increasingly being used for financial transactions and large-‐scale disbursement of development assistance in post-‐ conflict/violence settings. A key example of this was the use of M-‐Pesa, (which had been developed by Safaricom, Kenya’s leading mobile phone services provider) by development agencies to provide support to some affected communities in the aftermath of the 2007/08 Kenyan electoral violence. Critically, mobile money transfer systems can also be used to facilitate the transfer of remittances from diaspora communities. 24 There have also been examples where mobile phone technology has been used in an attempt to inform unemployed people of available jobs. Examples cited are pilot projects in Gaza and Bangalore, with some moderate successes being reported.25 Given this noteworthy ICT progression, it has now become substantially easier (compared to five years ago) for individuals and entities throughout the world to access electronic data, publish or share information, and interact on the Web. This can be virtually instantaneous from wherever an Internet connection exists. These developments have had profound implications for the manner in which people communicate with each other, express opinions, organise activities and events, socialise and even mobilise others towards specific objectives. These dynamics have also created: new marketing opportunities for the business sector (over-‐and-‐above the app economy); advocacy and fundraising prospects for non-‐profit organisations; data for researchers from a wide variety of fields with interests in human dynamics and communication; and expedient mechanisms for emergency response/disaster management agencies, as well as for the humanitarian and development assistance community.
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SECTION II: ICT USE IN RELATED FIELDS
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2.1) Responses to natural and humanitarian disasters and ICT
2.1.1) Natural disaster warning systems Natural disaster warning systems have been in existence for decades, and have typically related to destructive meteorological phenomena, such as hurricanes, cyclones, storm/tidal surges, floods and tornadoes; as well as volcanic eruptions, earthquakes and tsunamis. Some of the systems have a forecasting or predictive component with the objective of providing ‘early warning’ of impending disaster. However, the occurrence of highly destructive natural events is particularly difficult to accurately forecast, which has meant that false alerts have been issued on occasion. Other systems issue alerts to potentially affected communities at the initial onset of the destructive phenomenon, but this provides for very limited response time. The use of ICT has increasingly gained prominence in such systems, particularly in terms of issuing alerts and advice where a variety of ICT media is utilised to warn a large and widespread population of the impending disaster. This is particularly important given significant increase in the number of natural disasters since the mid-‐1990s as depicted in Chart 8 below. Chart 8: Natural disasters reported: 1975-‐2011
(Source: http://www.emdat.be/natural-‐disasters-‐trends) Tsunami warning systems have received considerable attention in recent years, especially in relation to ICT, and offers useful insights into the advantages and challenges of such systems. Tsunami warning systems seek to precipitately identify the formation of tsunamis and issue warnings to vulnerable populations in an attempt to prevent deaths, injuries and damage to property. Prior to recent ICT technological advances, such systems were mainly based on seismic movement (earthquakes) detection instruments. However, current systems now adopt a multi-‐sensor ICT-‐based approach, incorporating seismic sensors, as well as tide gauges and buoys anchored to the ocean floor (that monitor water
19
temperature and pressure) that transit data to warning centres for analysis, often via satellite communication.26 Integral to these systems are communications infrastructure and networks to ensure the effective dissemination of the warnings. 27 Multiple modes of communication (such as sirens, radio, text messaging, television, email, fax and social media) are typically used to issue tsunami warnings, which often include the projected path and arrival times of the tsunami. Local authorities and emergency response personnel are then usually responsible for implementing evacuation plans.28 Figure 2: Archetypal tsunami warning system
A key example of such a system is the Hawaii-‐based Pacific Tsunami Warning System, which is the culmination of the joint efforts of 26 states in the Pacific region. 29 The further development these systems received more impetus following the 26 December 2004 tsunami that killed close to 250,000 people, mainly in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand and India. Hence, in June 2006 the Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning System was established by a number of countries bordering on the Indian Ocean with the support of UNESCO. It consists of 25 seismographic stations relaying information to 26 national tsunami information centres. There have been technical challenges in relation to the warning infrastructure. For example, buoys with tsunami sensors have been disabled by extensive algae growth, damaged by fishermen and stolen by pirates.30 There have also been some tragic teething problems. For example, in October 2010 seismic sensors off the coast of Indonesia issued a tsunami alert. However, the affected population was not adequately warned, and as a result more than 500 people died due to the tsunami. This was due to a combination of: the closeness of the epicentre of the underwater earthquake from the Indonesian coastline (which meant that the first tsunami arrived within minutes of the alert being issued); poorly installed and maintained land-‐based siren system (which was not triggered in some areas); and the alleged inaction of local authorities.31 Similar technical problems were encountered in April 2012 in Indonesia when warning sirens in “the last mile” malfunctioned in many of the high-‐risk areas.32 Nonetheless warnings
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were issued via other communication channels, including broadcast text messages over mobile phone networks. Social science analysis of natural disaster warning systems have suggested that “the human factor, as well as the need for preparedness, planning, continuous public education, a sufficient legal framework, coordination and arrangements between stakeholders and human resources development [are needed] in order to be ready in case of emergency, are still often neglected and ignored”.33 In the case of Indonesia, developmental and cultural challenges were encountered in establishing early response measures and capacity at the local level. Researchers from the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit found that progress was hampered by inadequate national guidance and distribution of information about the importance of tsunami early response. They also noted that civil society organisations were wary of technology-‐based early warning, and preferred natural warning signs.34 Similarly, another study on the Indonesia tsunami warning response found that “practitioners engaged in early warning and disaster risk reduction operate in contexts shaped by multiple stakeholder agendas and face considerable challenges in negotiating diverse needs and priorities”.35 The limitations of the effectiveness of ICT with respect to other natural disaster warning systems have also been identified. For example, in the aftermath of Typhoon Ketsana (which affected the Philippines, Vietnam and Cambodia in October 2009), Mike Goodhand from the British Red Cross reported that in many poor areas, access to the Internet, as well as radio and television was inadequate. Therefore he suggested that “[a]id agencies must work with communities to find out which methods of communication work for them at the time of an emergency and run simulation exercises to put this into practice. Often mobile phone text messages or even sending people out into the streets with megaphones…prove to be most successful.”36 However, it is important to note that: “most mobile networks [in disaster-‐prone countries] are not designed to support mass public dissemination”.37
2.2.2) ICT and humanitarian crises
Since the muddled humanitarian response to 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami there has been the emergence of increasingly innovative and open-‐source ICT initiatives and platforms in order to (in a transparent manner): share and manage information of varying degrees of accuracy about crises; determine where priority assistance is required; as well as coordinate and monitor the relief efforts of a myriad of humanitarian and disaster response agencies. This has been aided by the entry into force of the Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources for Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations in 2005, which substantially reduced the regulatory obstacles to the trans-‐border use of telecommunication equipment for humanitarian relief operations.38 Central features of these platforms have been ‘crowdsourcing’ and online crisis mapping. Crowdsourcing essentially entails the acquisition of online (email and
21
social media) and mobile phone generated information (from the affected areas), as well as technical assistance and resources from an extensive group of people, typically volunteers. Where appropriate, this information is displayed on a geospatial-‐mapping interface, sometimes referred to as a ‘crisis map’ in order to assist with relief efforts. It is important to note that in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina (2005), with a lack of effective official relief, “the online media proved a new way for those affected by the crisis to connect with sources of help” and for many people, “informal knowledge” from trusted social contacts was the most important source of information.39 The use of ICT in crisis and humanitarian relief situations appears to have gained even more momentum after the disaster relief response to the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti, which resulted in the deaths of more than 200,000 people. Open source ICT platforms were central to the management and coordination of relief efforts in Haiti, with “almost all relief agencies, UN bodies and military actors including the US Southern Command embrac[ing] Twitter, Facebook, wikis, websites and mobiles in their work to coordinate, collaborate and act upon information from the ground generated by victims.”40 A key innovation during the early stages of the Haitian relief efforts was the compilation of detailed and accurate maps of Haiti (as there were only out-‐dated maps at hand) through online collaboration of expert mapping volunteers (using OpenStreetMap software) that were mainly part of Crisis Commons. Crisis Commons defines itself as “a global community of volunteers from technology, crisis response organizations, government agencies, and citizens that are working together to build and use technology tools to help respond to disasters and improve resiliency and response before a crisis.”41 Three of the most prominent platforms that have been consistently utilised in this sector are: the Sahana Free and Open Source Disaster Management System (Sahana), Ushahidi and Google Crisis Response. Experts from the ICT industry (mainly volunteers) designed these platforms in the midst of crises where there was an urgent need for timely and reliable information. Figure 3 below provides a snapshot of the three platforms. Figure 3: Snapshots of Sahana Ushahidi and Google Crisis Response applications
Sahana was created amidst the response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, and was used by the Sri Lankan government to track and manage requests for assistance, coordinate the relief efforts, as well as reunite missing persons with
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their families. Updated and amended versions of Sahana have been used in a variety of crisis response situations over the past decade.42 Ushahidi, which means “testimony” in Swahili, was developed in 2008 to map Internet-‐based and mobile phone reports of post-‐election violence in Kenya from ‘citizen journalists’. Ushahidi has been extensively used over the past five years to map various forms of violence, crises and disaster relief efforts, from ‘crowdsourced’ information. The platform also provides a subscription based ‘crowdfeed’ feedback function.43 Additionally, Ushahidi has been used for non-‐ crisis mapping purposes, such as for restaurant reviews, crime and corruption reporting, as well as health care availability. Google Crisis Response was initiated in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina (2005) and has successively been used in a variety of subsequent disaster relief efforts. As with the other two platforms mentioned above, Google Crisis Response “seeks to make critical information more accessible” during the crisis and response efforts, including satellite imagery, missing persons registries and maps. It also has the capacity to facilitate the transfer of online donations to relief organisations working in the affected areas. Importantly, it is able to assign teams of specialist employees to respond to ICT crisis needs where appropriate.44 Table 2 below provides a listing of some of the crisis contexts in which these two platforms have been utilised. Table 2: Examples of when Sahana, Ushahidi and Google Crisis Response have been used Sahana Sri Lanka tsunami (2005) Kashmir earthquake (2005) Philippines landslides (2005) Cyclone Sidr, Bangladesh (2007) Peru earthquake (2007) Bihar floods, India (2008) Chengdu-‐Sitzuan earthquake, China (2008) Cyclone Nargis, Myanmar (2008) Haiti earthquake (2010) Colombia flooding (2011) Japan earthquake/tsunami (2011) Hurricane Irene, USA (2011)
Ushahidi Kenya post-‐election violence (2008) Gaza conflict (2009) Swine Flu map (2009) Chile earthquake (2010)
Google Crisis Response Indonesia (Jakarta) flooding 2013 Hurricane Sandy USA (2012) Wildfires, USA (2012) Russia floods (2012)
Haiti earthquake (2010) Togo elections (2010)
Philippine floods (2011) Earthquake, New Zealand (2011) Japan earthquake and tsunami (2011) Hurricane Irene, USA (2011)
Egypt parliamentary elections (2010) DRC crisis (2011-‐12) Mexico elections (2012) Kuban floods, Russia (2012) Ukraine parliamentary elections (2012) Syria crisis map (2011-‐13)
Floods, Australia (2011) Floods, Pakistan (2010) Deepwater Horizon oil spill (2010) Hurricane Katrina, USA (2005)
Mobile phone text messaging platforms have been an essential ingredient in disaster and humanitarian relief operations, as they provide the means for
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communicating with crisis-‐affected areas where internet access and fixed line telecommunications are limited, and in the facilitation of crowdsourcing and crowdfeeding. The main platforms in this sector are EpiSurveyor, RapidSMS and FrontlineSMS, with the latter arguably being most widely used in Africa. FrontlineSMS was crafted in South Africa and Finland in 2004/05 and is a relatively simple system, free, open-‐source system that can be managed from a laptop. This software is also widely used in development assistance, the management of mobile money and public health interventions. 45 There has been some criticism of the value of crowdsourcing in the context of humanitarian and disaster relief operations, as it can increase the digital noise and clutter and contribute to information overload at times when rapid responses are required. Therefore, crowdsourcing can be counter-‐productive if badly managed.46 Alternatively, where there is limited participation from the crisis-‐affected communities, decisions may potentially be based on partial and/or inaccurate information. In addition crowdsourcing can be open to manipulation by organised criminal groups, who seek to profit from the influx of donations and development assistance. In any event, an information officer who was deployed during the disaster relief operation after the Haitian earthquake pertinently reflected: “Most coordination happens at physical meetings…Online tools provide an important forum and source of information for those who can’t make it in person.”47 There are significant challenges to the effective use of ICTs in crisis situations. Given the pressure of time to respond as rapidly as possible, combined with an absence of an ICT oversight body, initial ICT systems implementation is often comprised of a series of unilateral and jumbled interventions. This, according to the ICT for Peace Foundation, leads to “unnecessary duplication, fragmentation and significant frustration”. Further to this, internationally renowned peacemaker, Martti Ahtisaari has suggested that: “ICTs in the field do not always work as promised or expected due to technical problems, the reluctance of individuals to share information and complex information management architectures that severely impede information flows.”48 In addition, mobile phone and Internet access is often limited in populations affected by the crisis, which exacerbated by limited electricity supply makes it difficult (if not impossible) to use desktop computers and charge mobile phones and laptop computers. In some cases the mobile phone masts are destroyed by the natural disaster. In addition, the ICT for Peace Foundation, using the Haitian earthquake as an example, noted that: “Disaster-‐affected communities remain largely passive recipients of information, having to deal with, amidst significant trauma, competing information on aid delivery and services. Beyond the hype, the majority of those affected by the Haitian earthquake were off the radar of ICTs.”49
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2.1.3) ICT and the monitoring of potential humanitarian and natural disasters in Africa There are a number of multi-‐country early warning systems that focus on Africa and gather and analyse data linked to a range of potentially disastrous phenomena, such as droughts, floods, fires, earthquakes and tsunamis. This information is then communicated to affected governments and relevant international and regional disaster relief agencies. Examples include: Regional Integrated Multi-‐Hazard Early Warning System for Africa, and Asia and the Famine Early Warning Systems Network. Nonetheless, these systems primarily develop and maintain forecast modelling and disaster mapping, and produce regular reports to assist their respective stakeholders with decision-‐making and response. The scope of their work, however, does not appear to include the use of ICT in the issuing of warnings of impending disaster, which is presumably the responsibility of the governments concerned. National disaster management early warning systems have been established in many African countries, which have embraced varying degrees of technological sophistication. This has largely determined by the relative economic wealth of the countries in question. For example, South Africa, one of the better-‐resourced Africa nations, has a disaster management system that makes use of a sophisticated ICT system, which incorporates mobile phone, Internet and satellite technology, amongst others. It is, according to South Africa’s National Disaster Management, “an all encompassing IT solution that relates to various aspects of Hazard Analysis, Vulnerability Assessment, Risk Reduction and Contingency Planning, Incident Reporting Systems as well as Early Warning Systems.”50 By comparison, South Sudan, which is one of the poorest countries in Africa, has a Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management, which makes very limited use of new ICT tools in its work. Mobile phones are employed to communicate with those residing in disaster-‐prone areas. Radio broadcasts are used to warn communities of potential dangers and impact. Such announcements (where time allows) are also announced in person at community meetings, which is still felt to be a key means of communication.51 Nonetheless, there are indications that ICT is being incrementally embraced in South Sudan, particularly on issues related to food security. For example, the High Frequency South Sudan Survey uses tablets to collect information about market prices and exchange rates, as well as household data and information on population perceptions. This project emerged in response to the need for real-‐ time, high frequency data in order to monitor the various stress factors endangering the transition to peace and stability in South Sudan. Enumerators in four cities complete regular surveys on tablets and transmit the results over the mobile phone network.52 The pilot phase ran in Juba, Malakal, Rumbek and Wau from February 2012, through to May 2012. A quarterly household survey is also conducted in 360 households in South Sudan, in which information is collected on demographics, household resources and assets, news sources, market
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conditions, household hunger, food consumption and citizen perceptions on their living conditions and on government service delivery.53
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2.2) Conflict early warning and violence monitoring and ICT Drawing from the ICT innovations in early warning systems relating to natural disasters, some researchers have suggested that ICT and social media may be able to enhance conflict early warning. The OECD 2009 assessment of conflict early warning systems is regularly cited, which indicated that most intergovernmental and non-‐governmental early warning systems “have not gone beyond the use of email and websites for dissemination and communication technology for data collection…[and] continues to lag far behind in adopting new technologies and Web 2.0 applications”.54
2.2.1) Conflict early warning systems
Conflict early warning systems have been in existence for decades, and seek to provide timeous alerts of impending violent conflicts with a view to promoting interventions to prevent the outbreak of widespread violence. Such systems typically collect and analyse data (from a wide variety of sources) against a set of indicators, and then forecast potential outbreaks of violence conflict. A wide range of early warning models and systems have been developed since the mid-‐ 1990s (particularly after the 1994 Rwandan genocide), ranging from mere descriptive analyses, to well developed mathematical and computer models. Governments, universities, intergovernmental organizations, think tanks and development assistance agencies have developed these early warning models and systems. A variety of conflict early warning systems have been designed and implemented by intergovernmental organisations and non-‐governmental organisations in relation to Africa. For example, the African Union’s Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) collects and analyses data related to conflicts in Africa. The Chairperson of the AU Commission reportedly uses the analysis “to advise the [AU] Peace and Security Council (PSC) on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security in Africa and recommend the best course of action.” The AU purportedly makes use of six the following information gathering tools:55 Africa Media Monitor Collects of real-‐time information from a large variety of media sources CEWS Portal Facilitates the sharing of information with the early warning mechanisms of relevant regional organisations in Africa Indicators and Database of baseline information for risk assessments Profiles Module Africa Reporter Interface for the submission of incident and situation reports from AU field missions and Liaison Offices Africa Prospectus Forecasts of risk and vulnerability susceptibility, which is informed by a series of indicators Live-‐Mon Geo-‐localization of news reports in order to display them in a mapping format
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All of the prominent regional economic community organisations in Africa have developed an early warning system, which vary in terms of methodological sophistication. One of the more prominent regional early warning systems is the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), which provides early warning support (data collection, assessment and response options) to the Member States of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda). Its main area of focus has been cross-‐border pastoralist and related conflicts. CEWARN is increasingly making make use of a diverse range of more up-‐to-‐date ICT, such as sms and social media (namely, Facebook, Twitter and Tumblr).56 In order for conflict early warning systems to have a positive impact they need to be linked to processes and mechanisms that will rapidly instigate appropriate conflict prevention responses. However, the track record of early warning systems eliciting effective early responses has arguably been patchy at best. Thus is due to the apparent sacrosanctity of state sovereignty, “along with a range of personal, institutional, and political shortcomings that affect decision making”.57 Wulf and Debiel succinctly outlines this dynamic using the example of the African Union, which is: Hamstrung in its decision-‐making by a number of barriers, not least the political divergences over the criteria of when and where not to intervene. A certain tension exists between Article 3 (sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states) and Article 4 (intervention under grave circumstances) of the [African Union] Charter. The decision not to intervene is not primarily a question of the availability of information on potential or on urgent violent conflicts – the major purpose of early warning systems – but of disagreement about the application of these two articles of the Charter.58 In many cases early responses have been operationalized on the basis of government intelligence briefs (and not on the basis of early warning models) or have been instituted due to blatantly obvious signs of impending large-‐scale violence. Therefore, this suggests that many early warning systems can be more aptly described as glorified conflict analysis mechanisms. A key example of current interest in determining whether advances in ICT may be able to reduce the ‘warning-‐response gap’ of conflict prevention is the 2013 publication by the UN Development Programme and the International Peace Institute titled: ‘New Technology and the Prevention of Violence and Conflict’. However, the case study chapters, apart from providing a modicum of anecdotal evidence about the initial accomplishments of some micro interventions, are not able to make a strong case linking ICT definitively to the prevention of violence conflict.
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2.2.2) ‘Big data’ and violence prevention
One of the principle chapters in the UN Development Programme and the International Peace Institute publication mentioned above intriguingly speculates on the meaningful role that ‘Big Data’ (massive quantity and diversity of high frequency data, which requires new, sophisticated methods of managing, processing and curating) could play in preventing future violence conflicts.59 In relation to ICT, ‘Big Data’ can include, for example, electronic user content from social media postings and interactions, text messages, online searches, purchases and even the location of mobile phone calls. A basic assumption of many ‘Big Data’ analysts is that certain data trends are indicative of certain types of human behaviour, and hence future events, such as large-‐scale violent conflict can be potentially forecasted. However, the correlation between online postings and actual human behaviour is a moot point. According to a recent article in Foreign Policy, “the tools of big-‐data science, such as the Apache Hadoop software framework, do not immunize us from skews, gaps, and faulty assumptions.”60 The ‘Big Data’-‐conflict prevention linkage appears to have been inspired by the UN Global Pulse’s white paper titled ‘Big Data for Development: Opportunities and Challenges (2012)’ 61 and recent counter-‐terrorism and crime reduction interventions based on intelligence analysis derived from ‘Big Data’. The use of ‘Big Data’ is likely to considerably enhance conflict forecasting where the necessary data evaluation expertise and capacities exist, but it does not address the structural problems of inadequate early response. In addition, in regions that are prone to conflict, such as in sub-‐Saharan Africa, facilities and expertise to process, exhibit and analyse ‘Big Data’ are often in short supply.62
2.2.3) ICT and situations of violent conflict
The use of ICT has been exceedingly useful in monitoring situations after the outbreak of violent conflict, particularly where oppressive governments censor and/or manipulate more traditional forms of communication media. In such instances, crowd-‐sourced data can be used to track, map and analyse reported atrocities and human rights abuses. Uploaded videos (often via YouTube) provide a more nuanced depiction of the dynamics, realities and consequences of the conflict. Such information also allows for more insightful and balanced reporting by international media, and generates powerful evidence for use in advocacy campaigns for peacekeeping and peace-‐making interventions. As indicated in the previous chapter, ICT was effectively used in monitoring and mapping violence that directly followed the Kenyan elections in 2008, and was extensively used by NGOs, international organisations and media outlets to monitor violence in the DRC, as well as in North Africa (particularly Egypt and Libya during the ‘Arab Spring’ and the pervasive violence that followed). This technology is now also being used in relation to the internal conflicts in Mali, Somalia and the Central African Republic.
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The civil war currently unfolding in Syria has seen the extensive generation and use of various forms of ICT outputs by civilians, conflicting parties, journalists and international organisations. ICT data has depicted violations of international humanitarian law (such as the alleged use of chemical weapons), massacres, military campaigns and large-‐scale destruction of civilian neighbourhoods. The conflict has also been extensively mapped using open source software, such as Ushahidi (see Map 3 below). ICT data, particularly images and video have provided sufficient evidence for outside experts to ascertain the origins of the weapons that are being used in the Syrian conflict. A key example is that of ‘Brown Moses’, an unemployed UK weapons enthusiast who identified the use of Croatian arms by rebels, which lead to the expose of State-‐sponsored clandestine weapons trafficking to Syria.63 Map 3: Violence mapping in Egypt and Syria Egypt (February – April 2011)
Syria (18/3/11 – 2/5/13)
http://blog.standbytaskforce.com
https://syriatracker.crowdmap.com
2.2.3.1) Case study 1: Invisible Children and the Lord’s Resistance Army Some of the ICT interventions of an international NGO, Invisible Children in relation to the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) have arguably received the most social media recognition in terms of the use of ICT in relation to violence conflict. The most well known Invisible Children ICT campaign was ‘Kony 2012’. Kony 2012 campaign In 2012, Invisible Children released a half hour video aimed at drawing international attention to the LRA and its leader, Joseph Kony. In simple terms the video provided an account of the history of the conflict in northern Uganda, recounting some of the violent acts of the LRA, documenting the plight of the abducted children and the ‘night commuters’. The video went ‘viral’ on social media and had received close to 100 million ‘views’ on YouTube by early October 2013.
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The key success of this campaign was that it directly resulted in US President Obama signing into law the Department of State Rewards Program Update and Technical Corrections Act of 2012, which increased the scope for the US government’s War Crimes Rewards Program (WCRP). Under this program the rewards of up to $5 million are offered for information “leading to the arrest, transfer, or conviction of fugitives such as Joseph Kony of the Lord’s Resistance Army”.64 However, despite the video’s unprecedented campaigning success in the US, the initiative was subject to severe denunciation in Uganda and elsewhere. It was criticised by many Ugandans as being misleading and providing an inaccurate portrayal of the current situation in Uganda. A number noted that the video was “ten years too late” – depicting a conflict-‐riddled northern Uganda that was the reality years prior, but which was not at all reflective of the situation at the time.65 Figure 4: Kony 2012 campaign images
The motives of Invisible Children have been repeatedly questioned within Uganda, with many claiming that the video was a publicity stunt designed to encourage Western audiences to donate money to the organisation. Questions were asked about the extent to which the funds received as a result had actually found their way to Ugandan children.66 Some claimed that a key failing of the film was that there was no participatory approach allowing local stakeholders the opportunity to make comments and queries.67 However not all of the reports were negative. Some pointed to the success that the video had had in bringing international attention to the LRA problem. The video was felt be a valuable tool for Uganda to use in rallying external support on this issue.68 The point was made that “dialogue – even if provocative – is good dialogue.”69 In March 2013 on the anniversary of the launch of the Kony 2012 campaign Invisible Children launched a follow-‐up video in which they showcased the success of the campaign and the projects that had benefitted from the donations to the campaign, which included: the building of radio stations; the expansion of their early warning radio network; outreach activities and the construction of a rehabilitation centre for children affected by LRA activities.70
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Invisible Children’s LRA Crisis Tracker Invisible Children’s LRA crisis tracker mainly focuses on the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR) where the LRA continues to operate. This application maps out information about LRA movements and attacks on a publicly available online platform. The Crisis Tracker also collects information about occurrences using an early warning radio network. Figure 5: LRA Crisis Tracker ‘screengrab’
About 30 communities have been equipped with high frequency radios and use these to report particulars of any incidents.71 These selected communities are able to report information from their neighbouring communities and areas.. Reports received are supplemented with information from United Nations and NGO data, as well as with other first-‐hand research.72 The information is then collated and presented on an online platform, available at www.lracrisistracker.com. Information is presented graphically using both a map and a timeline, and details are provided on the platform about the dates of attacks, number of deaths, abductions, as well as escapes from the LRA. Questions have been raised about the Crisis Tracker’s capacity to make a tangible impact in the LRA affected areas. Internet connectivity is poor in the affected areas of the DRC, and few in the population have access to the online platform. Nonetheless, when the platform determines that LRA attacks are imminent, warnings are sent using the high frequency radios. However, concerns have been raised about the appropriateness of collecting information about attacks and LRA movements, if this information is not directly used to stop the attacks. 2.2.3.2) Case Study 2: Crisis and Recovery Mapping and Analysis (South Sudan) In 2009 in South Sudan, UNDP launched the Crisis and Recovery Mapping and Analysis (CRMA) project in partnership with the National Bureau of Statistics,
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where the project was officially housed. The CRMA is a platform that collates and displays data concerning human security onto maps for easy visualisation. The project’s aim is to “provide an enhanced information base to strengthen the existing multi-‐sectoral planning, coordination and monitoring for more effective governance.” 73 That is, to assist the government to govern better and humanitarian actors to better respond to threats, by supplying accurate and geographically relevant information.74 Data is collected from various sources and is captured and digitised. The data is categorised, and is broken down into issues and themes in a refined analysis. Mapping is the second aspect of the data categorisation and information is divided into geographic areas and displayed on maps using symbols, colour coding, numbering and indicators. The platform allows for the layering of data (i.e. layering various different indicators onto the same map screens), which makes it possible to explore correlations between different indicators. For example, one might layer rainfall, cattle numbers and incidents of violence in a particular geographic area, allowing for correlations to be drawn. Actual data can also be layered and compared with community perceptions.75 One of the key objectives of the programme is to identify conflict triggers within communities. Inter-‐community conflicts often have their origins in disputes over livelihoods, livestock, the economy or the lack of services. CRMA representatives engaged with communities and ascertained community perceptions of critical gaps and pressing issues affecting the areas. They collected as much data as possible, through various means – including focus groups and interviews with community elders. Community data is then digitised and integrated into the database. This process reportedly allows for community input into the assessment processes.76 The visual maps assist affected communities to better understand the inter-‐ related nature of crisis-‐related factors. According to UNDP, this tool has also prompted community members to devise their own peace-‐building solutions.77 The visual nature of the tool also makes it appropriate for work with illiterate populations. 2.2.3.3) Case study 3: Geospatial analysis and the monitoring of human rights abuses In 2006, as part of investigations into alleged atrocities in the Darfur region in the Republic of Sudan, the American Association for the Advancement of Science’s (AAAS) Geospatial Technologies for Human Rights Project sourced and analysed high-‐resolution (commercial) satellite imagery of conflict-‐affected communities in Darfur. Images of before and after alleged attacks by forces reportedly aligned to the Sudanese government in 28 specific areas were assessed between 2003 and 2007.
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According to the AAAS, in three-‐quarters of the cases, the affected communities had either been destroyed or camps for internally displaced persons established.78 The AAAS project resulted in the creation of ‘Eyes on Darfur’ an interactive website-‐based campaign driven by Amnesty International. The campaign used satellite imagery from 12 communities in order to advocate for greater international pressure to respond to protect human rights in Darfur.79 Figure 6: Satellite images of Shangil Tobay village, Darfur 10 March 2003
18 December 2006
The AAAS has pursued similar projects in Syria (for Amnesty International). In addition, it has also used other forms of satellite technology, such as meteorology, volcanology, sea ice monitoring, mining, and agricultural management to monitor human rights abuses. For instance, Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer was recently used to reveal continued gas flaring in the Niger Delta area, which is in violation of a 2008 moratorium.80
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2.4) Post-‐conflict reconstruction and ICT 2.4.1) Overview of ICT use in post-‐conflict reconstruction There is a growing body of literature denoting the potential advantages and benefits of ICTs and social media in post-‐conflict societies. In this regard, there is a prevailing view that ICT can “strengthen government operations, help civil society to build/re-‐build community networks and democratic movements, and communicate the reconstruction progress to a wide range of stakeholders.”81 In addition, it has been contended that ICT can promote reconciliation through information exchange and dialogue between local communities.82 Mobile phone technology, in particular, is increasingly becoming a critical component of reconstruction efforts, as mobile phone companies are often among the first industries to re-‐invest in post-‐conflict countries. The stabilisation of telecommunications infrastructure has substantial benefits for the economy, as it facilitates improved communication; promotes service delivery and potential job creation; trade; as well as imports and exports. Post-‐conflict environments are typically prone to localised conflict and violence, and hence ICT mapping platforms that make use of crowdsourcing have been used (on a limited scale) to monitor such potential conflicts (as the basis for a violence reduction response). Such platforms can also be used to: determine where priority reconstruction assistance is required; coordinate and manage the implementation of development aid projects and interventions; as well as provide means by which affected communities can provide feedback. Mapping has been effectively used in post-‐conflict Liberia to monitor land disputes, elections, as well as security and crime. However, such mapping initiatives are only sustainable if there are medium-‐ to long-‐term resources (both human and financial) to maintain them.83 In June 2013 the infoDev programme within the World Bank released a thought-‐ provoking report on the role of ICT in the development of an “information society” in five countries that were in the process of convalescing from periods of prolonged violent conflict, that is: Afghanistan, Timor-‐Leste, Liberia, Rwanda and Tunisia. The report noted that the “experience of conflict, however, has significantly affected how the ICT sector has developed in different countries, and so significantly shapes the developmental approach required looking forward.”84 The report further emphasised the various constraints to the use of ICT in such countries, and stressed that only a handful of post-‐conflict countries potentially have the appropriate combination of ICT infrastructure, policy environment and human resources to harness ICT potential in order to promote significant economic growth. Further to this, the study found that: “Not many countries can fulfil the ambition expressed in many national ICT strategies, to become a communications hub within their region. Small countries with limited educational facilities are unlikely to become centres of ICT innovation…”85 The analysis of the five case studies in the infoDev report reveals that there has been
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mixed and rather limited use of ICT in facilitating post-‐conflict reconstruction in these countries. Taking the findings of the infoDev study into consideration, this section of the report seeks to contribute further evidence on the use ICT in post-‐conflict environments, with a particular critical focus on ICT usage in South Sudan and Uganda. 2.4.2) ICT, public administration and governance ICT is increasingly being used to encourage greater accountability of post-‐ conflict governments, promoting active citizenship, as well as facilitating improvements in government service delivery. Initiatives in this area have typically been brought through the active support of international donors and international organisations. Some prominent examples are outlined below. ICT is increasingly being used to improve the process of birth registration. In Uganda, for example, the Mobile Viral Record System (VRS) was developed for the Uganda Registration Services Bureau by UNICEF and Uganda Telecom. The VRS uses mobile phone technology for birth registration procedures. Local community leaders, that are endorsed by national government and have the requisite training, register children’s births through the use of a mobile phone. This birth registration information is then uploaded to a central government directory of births and deaths.86 Mobile VRS uses an unstructured supplementary service data (USSD) protocol. The technology is based on Rapid SMS technology -‐ using a variety of menus on phones. Originally, a problem encountered by the programme was that many local leaders did not use Uganda Telecom, the original network partner. This led to challenges around them constantly switching phones and SIM cards. To deal with this the project now spans across mobile phone networks. However there have been resultant challenges around uniformity and streamlining across the networks.87 A similar approach to birth registration was adopted in Liberia. That is, the Crisis Management Initiative and the Liberia Ministry of Health and Social Welfare rolled out a process where electronic forms on smartphones were used for birth registrations (while at the same time maintaining the traditional paper-‐based system). Essentially, data from birth registration forms gathered from the general town chiefs by the district health officers was entered into the electronic forms on the smartphones and then instantaneously transmitted.88 Also in Uganda, U-‐report, which was launched in May 2011 by UNICEF, provides citizens with an opportunity to give feedback on a range of topics relating to governance and service delivery. Anyone who wants to participate may register by SMS. Users (called ‘U-‐reporters’) are sent questions by SMS, asking for specific information relevant to their own communities. U-‐reporters respond by sending free text messages with answers to the questions. Their texts are analysed, interpreted and then shared on U-‐report.89 If necessary, follow-‐up questions are
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disseminated. At the time of the research, in excess of 150 000 people were participating in U-‐report, with the average poll response being approximately 20 per cent of U-‐report users.90 U-‐report conducted its surveys across all networks and they have a reserved short-‐code (8500).91 The data collected by U-‐report is relayed to the relevant government departments and agencies for response and referral. Local administrations are reportedly given a month to deal with problems reported.92 The results of U-‐ report investigations are subsequently broadcast on the radio and printed in the print media.93 UNICEF and other aid organisations use the information collected to determine where to concentrate their areas of operation. They also use this to obtain community feedback about the effectiveness of their programming.94 Similarly in South Sudan, the World Bank established the South Sudan Mobile Phone Survey in 2010 with the custodianship being subsequently transferred to the Catholic Organisation for Relief and Development Aid. The project established a national phone survey in ten South Sudanese cities to ask people questions drawn from the Afrobarometer survey. The objective of this project was to establish a dataset of people’s opinions, which could be used by civil society organisations for lobbying purposes to improve governance. Mobile phones were distributed to 1,000 participating households. Participants were provided with mobile phones solar chargers, as well as ten South Sudanese Pounds per month as an incentive (certain groups were given double the amount per month in order to determine if this made a difference to attrition). 95 Interviews were conducted monthly, asking questions in Arabic, Dinka, Nuer or English (where appropriate). Information was collected about people’s economic situations, their health, security, as well as other development related topics.96 A key problem with the programme was the high attrition rate of the participants. After six months the number of participants fell from 1,027 to 600. Following personal visits to the participant’s households, participation increased to 857, but decreased again after three months. This was attributed to the mobility of the South Sudanese population; some participants selling their mobile phones or encountering hardware problems; and an absence of transparency, namely that those who participated in the survey were never provided with the survey results. Mobile phone network quality did also undermine the effectiveness of the programme.97 Also in Uganda, mobile phone technology has been used to facilitate the monitoring and reporting of alleged corrupt activities. In this regard, the Anti-‐ Corruption Coalition Uganda (ACCU) has undertaken independent budget and government spending monitoring in eight districts in Uganda. It uses women, volunteer monitors that submit reports via mobile phones. In the latter part of 2012 there were a total of 640 monitors (80 from each participating district) who monitored government spending in their own communities. They report on when the services are inadequate, and when public service funds are allegedly being misspent or embezzled.98
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Volunteers also report on teachers that are habitually absent from work and on the availability of medicines in clinics. Monitors submit reports via a free SMS to the ACCU’s ‘inbox’ in Kampala. On average, the ACCU receives 60 messages a month. However, the effectiveness has been constrained by the low level of literacy of some of the volunteers.99 2.4.3) ICT and health ICT is increasingly being used in the health sector in post-‐conflict areas in Africa particularly with regards to monitoring health related incidents and medical supplies, as well as the provision of treatment information and health advocacy.100 For example, systems involving the use of Internet-‐enabled mobile phones have been pursued in Rwanda and Uganda. In Rwanda the Treatment and Research AIDS Centre within the Ministry of Health instituted TRACnet in 2005. It is an online/mobile phone a system that allows medical practioners that are involved in the implementation of anti-‐ retroviral (ARV) care programmes to submit reports and access relevant patient history and treatment information.101 Similarly in Uganda, the Ministry of Health, UNICEF and the World Health Organisation established M-‐Trac, which also makes use of mobile phones to track health related issues, including pharmaceutical supply stocks (both incoming and outgoing) and disease outbreaks.102 For example, M-‐Trac was used extensively to report on the July 2012 Ebola outbreak. Text messages are used to communicate key information between district health centres and a central server. There is also an SMS complaint hotline. M-‐Trac was originally piloted in approximately 170 health facilities in the districts of Gulu and Kabale. Plans were in the pipeline to roll this programme out to all Uganda’s 5,000 health facilities and 8,000 local medication distribution centres.103 Also in Uganda, Text to Change is an NGO that uses mobile phone technology for a variety of health services and interventions (mainly text messages). Examples of their projects include: health support to pregnant women and persons being treated with antiretroviral medication; awareness around HIV/AIDS; and hand washing.104 2.4.4) ICT and education Studies on the use of ICT in the educational sector in Africa reveal that newer ICT technologies have not been widely integrated in formal learning educational institutions in Africa, despite many governments having developed national ICT policies that prioritize the use of ICT in education. The main reasons for this have been: policies not keeping pace with changes in technology; and a lack of generally unsupportive ICT regulatory framework and infrastructure “detailed implementation plans or commitment from government to implement them.”105 In recent years there has been a rapid expansion in the availability of online courses (distance learning) that is available to residents of African countries.
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However, enrolling in such courses typically requires financial resources (for fees) and a stable Internet connection. A report by infoDev on the use of ICT in the education sector in Africa indicated that there had been, with a few exceptions, very limited use of ICT in the provision of both secondary and tertiary education. According to infoDev: “Generally speaking, the capacity of African universities to lead the process of integrating ICT in education, as has been the case in most of the developed world, is woefully inadequate. They lack access to infrastructure, affordable and sufficient bandwidth, and the human resource capacity to exploit the technology…The exceptions are universities in South Africa, and most of those in North Africa, where they have well-‐ developed international relationships along with access to high-‐speed connectivity”.106 The lack of ICT incorporation in the education sector is more pronounced in post-‐conflict areas in Africa. Where interventions do exist that are typically limited to small-‐scale pilot interventions. Some examples of such education-‐ related ICT interventions are outlined below. In November 2012 the UNESCO-‐China Funds-‐in-‐Trust project on “Enhancing Teacher Education for Bridging the Education Quality Gap in Africa” was launched. Representatives from eight African countries were participating in the project, five of which could be categorised as post-‐conflict countries, namely: Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Liberia and Uganda. The aim of the project, which used ICT and mobile-‐learning, was to improve “the capacities of Ministries and key teacher training institutes in the area of pre-‐ and continuous teacher training and development.107 At the time of compiling the report, the project was in the “needs assessment” phase. In Liberia, iLab was established in May 2011 with funding from Humanity United to be educational space to provide ICT related training and “assist IT professionals as well as organizations and institutions in their efforts to more readily share information using ICT.” 108 The target group for training has subsequently expanded to young women, aspirant journalists, entrepreneurs and public relations officials. iLab has provided training in the use of ICT hardware, as well as in the active use of social media, such as blogging.109 In Uganda, UNICEF and the Ministry of Education and Sports have developed a mobile phone platform (EduTrac) to monitor developments within primary schools. SMS questions are sent to primary school teachers, with SMS responses being free of charge. Questions are sent to teachers each week on a range of subjects, such as: learner attendance school management meetings; whether government grants have been received; school safety; as well as nutrition, health and sanitation in their schools.110 The SMS data is collated, and sent to district governments. Referral pathways are developed to ensure follow up from relevant government officials district. At the time of the research there were 1,400 schools from 14 districts that were involved in the EduTrac project. It was
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anticipated that another 600 schools would join from the Karamoja area. There were approximately 5,000 teachers that participated in EduTrac. On average there was a 30 per cent reply rate to questions that are sent, which was largely due to no incentives being provided for participating teachers.111 2.4.5) ICT, refugees and remittances ICT and social media is increasingly being used in relation to responding to the needs of refugees and the reunifying families after periods of arms conflict. For example, in 2008 Microsoft entered into a partnership with the Office for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to assist this agency to expand the use of ICT in its refugee operations. This partnership programme provided refugees with the opportunity to acquire ICT skills, and access ICT hardware (with technical support) “in rural, camp-‐based settings and hosting communities”. There has also been a specific focus on improving ICT access and training in schools in refugee areas.112 Another innovative ICT response has been Refugees United that developed an online, global registration “search tool” for the families of missing refugees in 2008. It is a freely available reportedly secure service that is even accessible by entry-‐level mobile phones.113 In South Sudan, the Rapid Family Tracing and Reunification (FTR) was piloted by UNICEF and partner organisations in 2013. It is an open-‐source tool used to collect information for family tracing and reunification of unaccompanied and separated children in situations of emergencies. Mobile phones and netbook computers are used to capture the personal information of children at refugee/IDP camps. This information is sent to an online central database that can be accessed by key stakeholders involved in the FTR process.114 In northern Uganda, an evangelical organisation, Battery-‐Operated Systems for Community Outreach (BOSCO) headed by Father Joseph Okumu established ICT youth centres in IDP camps in 2005. These centres make use of “low-‐power, solar powered computers connected to a high-‐speed, long-‐range Wi-‐Fi [point-‐to-‐ point] Internet connection.”115 The computers are designed to utilise less power than ordinary desktops and allow for only basic Internet browsing capability. The point-‐to-‐point system (via a network of radio towers) allows for the sharing of heavy content without excessive use of bandwidth. Voice-‐over Internet Protocol (VoIP) is also used for voice communication. BOSCO has subsequently expanded their reach to communities outside of IDP camps. In 2010, BOSCO received the Google award for rural connectivity, and with support from Google they were able to move into all war affected districts. Computer and ICT training is provided at the centres for community members. Some programmes have been translated into the local Acholi language. Interested youth are connected with ‘pen pals’ in other camps. Primary and secondary school syllabi have been uploaded, which can be used by children, as well as their teachers.116 Similarly, since 2009, War Child Holland has established and maintained ICT ‘resource centres’ in in IDP camps in northern Uganda. These centres have
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subsequently been rolled out to other remote communities. The centres are equipped with computers, power outlets to charge mobile phones, books and play areas for children. The centres are open to all, but are specifically geared towards youth. Computer training is offered to those who require it. The computers in the centres are waterproof and durable, and use solar power. However, War Child Holland reported that solar power is not always sufficient to operate all of the equipment in these centres.117 In Somalia, ICT has facilitated the transfer of remittances from the Somali diaspora to displaced family members with Somalia. For example, Dahabshiil, which originated in Somalia as a general trader in 1970s (and has become an international money transfer company) facilitates such remittance transfers, where clients can use an online and text message interface to track the status of the transfer. In delivering the funds traditional Somali clan systems are used locate and confirm the identity of intended recipients in refugee camps and remote areas, but this is complemented by the use of the Internet and sms.118
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SECTION III: ICT AND DDR IN AFRICA
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3.1) Historical overview of DDR and ICT usage For more than a two decades most DDR programmes have been comprised of an information technology foundation, namely electronic databases, which have been of varying sophistication. These databases have characteristically included the particulars of those ex-‐combatants that had been earmarked to receive demobilisation and reintegration support and benefits. Such databases have typically been used to account, monitor and verify the implementation of DDR-‐ related programmes. However, there has been a distinct lack of consistency in the design and utilisation of such databases. In the case of the Multi-‐Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), for example,119 it was noted that: “implementing standardized M&E [monitoring and evaluation] systems, registration procedures, and common databases across all MDRP-‐participating countries also proved impractical and unfeasible.”120 This was largely due to: the involvement of a variety of technical agencies; differing objectives of the country programmes (which had design implications for the databases); and a lack of relevant technology (such as biometrics).121 In recent years, ICT (particularly mobile phone and satellite technology) has been increasingly integrated into these database systems to allow for the transfer of data between remote or mobile DDR facilities and a central database. The most recent cases have been in the DRC and South Sudan. In South Sudan, for instance, the ICT-‐enabled database is referred to as the Information Counselling and Referral System (ICRS). Information is transferred between DDR registration centres and a central database via a very small aperture terminal (VSAT) network, which is comprised of a two-‐way satellite ground station. The ICRS system also includes information on counsellors and service providers. ICRS case managers are therefore able to search the database in remote sites in order to advise the DDR beneficiaries on the most appropriate assistance and support to meet their specific needs.122 Beyond databases, the wider use of ICT in Africa in DDR programming has been rather limited. There has been negligible ad hoc piloting of small projects that make use of ICT, primarily mobile phone technology, but such approaches have been peripheral to the main DDR exercise. Some DDR national commissions and international DDR agencies have however established websites on their respective DDR programmes to share information and promote their activities. Internet-‐based forms of social media have typically not been included in DDR programming Africa, mainly due to infrastructural and socio-‐economic constraints. Rather officials and agencies responsible for designing DDR programmes have generally utilised more traditional forms of ICT, particularly radio. The attraction of radio is that in many DDR contexts, a significant number of households tend to have access to radio. The lack of, or inadequate supply of electricity has been a major obstacle to more ‘on-‐the-‐ground’ ICT programming in Africa over the past 15 years. DDR operations have frequently had to rely on generators for power in rural areas
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(and even in urban areas in some countries). This has had severe implications for the use of contemporary ICT, which requires a stable and reliable power source. In addition, there was deficient or non-‐existent national ICT infrastructure in most countries. Where Internet access and mobile phone services existed, the high costs were often exorbitant, which prohibited the inclusion of ICT components in DDR interventions. Added to this, reported high levels of illiteracy, linguistic diversity amongst the ex-‐combatant population, as well as unfriendly and uncertain ICT policy environments, combined with an acute lack of ICT specialists, also stymied the use ICT programming in DDR.
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3.2) Recommended ICT tools and approaches for DDR
As indicated earlier in this report, mobile phone penetration and Internet access is gaining momentum in Africa. The implications of this are that ICT approaches in DDR programming that a decade ago would have seemed impractical and unrealistic are now potentially feasible. This is arguably supported by evidence of the constructive use of ICT in early warning, humanitarian and disaster relief, as well as post-‐conflict reconstruction. An assortment of DDR programmes are currently being planned, implemented or wound-‐down in at least 14 African countries. The country programmes that are in existence, but are in the latter stages of completion or are in a state of relative inactivity are: Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Uganda. Considerable DDR interventions are presently being pursued in: Côte d’Ivoire, Somalia, South Sudan and the Republic of Sudan. The Comoros, Libya and Mali are areas of emergent or prospective DDR programmes. 3.2.1) Specific recommendations Below are some possible applications of current ICT tools and techniques for DDR operations in Africa, which draw from the experience of ICT programming in the fields of early warning, humanitarian and disaster relief, and post-‐conflict reconstruction. Mapping DDR programmes are often implemented in complex environments; involve large numbers of beneficiaries who congregate or settle in a variety of locations; and are supported by a multitude of service providers. The mapping platforms that have been developed in response to natural and political crises (such as Ushahidi) would allow DDR programme staff to more comprehensively monitor and coordinate DDR activities, as well as share information with others and respond to emerging problems. DDR is often pursued in environments where not all armed groups are party to the peace agreement and/or DDR arrangements. The actions of such armed groups have the potential to undermine DDR gains. Hence mapping platforms provide a useful tool to monitor, and possibly mitigate the activities of such groups (as in the case of the LRA Crisis Tracker). Text message DDR interventions have typically been implemented in reporting and situations characterised by inadequate communication querying between programme staff, service providers and
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Mobile money
Family reunification services
ICT resource centres
beneficiaries. That is, reintegration support is provided, but soliciting regular feedback from beneficiaries has been arduous or impossible. This lack of real-‐time information has meant that programme staff and service providers have often not been timeously informed of programmatic problems and unintended consequences. If such information were available then it would be possible for the necessary adjustments to be made. Text message (sms) reporting and querying systems would allow for generation of such real-‐time information. This type of system would also have the potential to enhance accountability between DDR programmers, service providers, beneficiaries, and associated community members. In addition, the system could be used to expose alleged corruption and mismanagement of DDR resources. The disbursement of reintegration funds is a logistical and security challenge in most settings. Mobile money provides a more efficient, cost effective and secure method of dispensing stipends to ex-‐combatants and/or their dependents. Precedents have already been set in this area. Prolonged periods of armed conflict generally result in ex-‐combatants being separated from their families. Hence, the ICT platforms that have been designed for refugee reunification with families have direct applicability in the DDR context. The establishment of ICT resource centres (that also provide ICT training) in communities where ex-‐ combatants are settling would allow for the implementation of a range of ICT programming. Such a centre also has the potential to bolster relations between ex-‐combatants and other community members.
3.2.2) Constraints and considerations The applicability of such ICT tools and approaches in DDR programming is however, ultimately underpinned by the ICT infrastructure, ICT availability and the culture of ICT use in the target country. That is, the majority of the tools listed above only have utility where a significant portion of the identified population are able to access and use ICT. In addition, it is essential that this population be receptive of this technology, as well as has the propensity to
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interact via an ICT hardware interface. Below, the relevance of such tools and approaches will be considered with respect to the 14 African countries with existing or emerging DDR programmes ICT infrastructure and availability The ITU has published indicators that are useful in this regard, such as: percentage of individuals using the Internet; mobile phone subscriptions; and the price of mobile broadband devices as a percentage of gross national income (GNI); and the ICT Development Index (IDI). The IDI is “a composite index combining 11 indicators into one benchmark measure that serves to monitor and compare developments in ICT across countries.”123 The IDI indicators include: fixed-‐telephone subscriptions; mobile telephone subscriptions; international Internet bandwidth per Internet user; percentage of households with a computer; percentage of households with Internet access; individuals using the Internet; fixed (wired)-‐broadband subscriptions; wireless-‐ broadband subscriptions; and three proxy indicators for ICT skills (adult literacy, gross secondary enrolment and gross tertiary enrolment). Table 3: Countries with DDR programmes and ICT indicators Country
Rank 2012
IDI 2012
Rank 2011
IDI 2011
% of individuals using the Internet (2012)
Existing DDR programmes in Africa Angola 139 1.68 138 1.63 16.94 Burundi n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.22 Central 156 1.00 155 1.00 3.00 African Republic Côte d’Ivoire 137 1.70 135 1.66 2.38 Democratic 147 1.31 146 1.30 1.68 Republic of Congo Republic of 140 1.66 140 1.58 6.11 Congo Rwanda 141 1.66 143 1.54 8.02 Somalia n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a South Sudan n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a Sudan 119 2.33 118 2.19 21.00 Uganda 130 1.81 130 1.72 14.69 Emerging and future DDR programmes in Africa Comoros 138 1.70 134 1.68 5.98 Libya n/a n/a n/a n/a 19.86 Mali 144 1.54 144 1.43 2.17 (* 500MB prepaid) (Source ITU)
Youth user penetration (2012)
Mobile subscriptions per 100 people (2012)
Mobile broadband handset prices (% of GNI)* (2012)
36.3 3.2 7.3
48.61 25.66 23.39
28.4 n/a n/a
5.9 4.3
96.27 28.01
n/a 126.4
14.2
101.18
14.0
18.4 3.6 31.6 43.7 n/a
50.49 n/a 18.82 60.49 45.92
17.5 n/a n/a 6.9 23.3
13.9 41.7 5.4
32.33 148.19 89.55
n/a 4.1 19.6
At a cursory glance the indicators in the table 3 (above) suggest that the opportunities for using ICT tools and approaches are not entirely favourable in most of the 14 African countries. All countries listed in the table have an exceedingly low and sluggish IDI, and fall into the ITU’s ‘least connected’ countries category (countries with an IDI of 2.33 or less). With the exception of
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Angola, Sudan, Uganda and Libya, only a small minority of the population in the listed countries make use of the Internet, most of which are well below the developing world average is 30.7%. Nonetheless, the ICT infrastructural and access constraints are likely to be less of an obstacle to international agencies that seek to use ICT for project management and monitoring purposes. The reason being is that in most cases these agencies generally source and construct ICT systems to support their work as a standard operating procedure. The privileged use of such resources does not, however, address the ‘crowdsourcing’ and ‘crowdfeeding’ requirements that are fundamental to some of these ICT methodologies. Culture of ICT use Despite the high cost of mobile broadband handsets (the developing world average is 11.1% of GNI), there is significant mobile phone usage in the majority of the listed 14 countries. This suggests that there is the potential to design ICT programming that makes specific use of mobile phone technology. However, drawing from the experience of implementing tsunami early warning systems, the manner in which individuals in each of countries use and view mobile phones should be carefully analysed prior to the design of such interventions. Voice over data In a number of African contexts (particularly in sub-‐Saharan Africa), mobile phones are primarily used for voice calls, with the mobile phone network having limited capacity for data transfer (including Internet access), and/or data costs are exceedingly expensive. In the Republic of Congo, for instance there is high mobile phone saturation, but penetration for data services was only 3% in 2012. 124 Interviews with ex-‐combatants in Brazzaville revealed that if they possessed a mobile phone, then it was usually a dumb or feature phone, and it was mainly used for voice calls. Two pertinent examples of ex-‐combatant comments in relation to the use of mobile phones are as follows: According to Frank Euloge Mpassi, a former Ninja commander who currently works for a state institution called the Délégation Générale Chargée de la Promotion des Valeurs de Paix et de la Reparation des Lequelles de Guerre: Most ex-‐combatants are illiterate. I think very few uses the Internet. I use it, because I am a spokesperson for the Ninjas and am therefore in the communications business. But there is no way to use the Internet to be in contact with ex-‐combatants. No! The authorities speak to us, and then we contact the ex-‐combatants. We ring them and we use text messages. That works, since most ex-‐combatants have phones. Though there is the problem of electricity. And buying units… It is expensive. If our leader [Ntumi] wants to talk to us, he calls us and talks to us. But the phones… They are all bugged!125 According to Bernard Bakissa Mampassi a former Ninja commander:
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I have two phones. Maybe they can use the Internet. I don’t know. I just use them for phone calls and text messages. To contact other ex-‐ combatants, we use phones or word of mouth. But the authorities are listening… I hear strange echoes.126 Similarly, in South Sudan, due to high levels of apparent illiteracy, most people with access to mobile phones almost exclusively use them for voice calls, rather than SMS or Internet access (due to high costs and allegedly unreliable quality of data services). 127 For example, SMS makes up only one per cent of MTNs revenues in South Sudan.128 Smart phones are not widely used, and are mainly the preserve of the economic elite. Nonetheless, the staff of the DDR commission had previously attempted an ad hoc text message communication campaign,129 but this reportedly had negligible impact.130 In addition, in much of rural South Sudan, it was reported that beneficiaries of development assistance programmes generally prefer in-‐person communication to text or phone calls, as there is still widespread suspicion and mistrust of ICT.131 In contexts where mobile phones are predominantly used for voice (and there is a reluctance to embrace text messages), there are additional ICT tools that can be used to facilitate DDR programming, such as Interactive Voice Response (IVR). This form of technology uses “pre-‐recorded voice prompts and menus to present information and options to callers, and touch-‐tone telephone keypad entry to gather responses. Modern IVR solutions also enable input and responses to be gathered via spoken words with voice recognition.”132 Mobile money matters The use of mobile money is mixed throughout much of Africa (see figure 6 below), but has gained impetus in recent years, especially in countries where the vast majority of people do not have a formal bank account. 133 Critically, according to World Bank 2012 data, mobile money is relatively popular in at least five of the 14 African countries with DDR programmes, with more than a quarter of all adults reporting the use of mobile money in Sudan, Angola, Somalia, Uganda and the Republic of Congo.134 Previously, in the DRC, mobile money was used for reinsertion support for ex-‐combatants with some degree of success.135 Hence, mobile has considerable potential for DDR programming in these countries, and possibly others.
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Figure 6: Percentage of adults using mobile money in Africa, 2012
(Source: www.worldbank.org/globalfindex) Social media: national versus global As table 4 (below) reveals, the level of social media penetration (in terms of Facebook accounts) is relatively low in all of the 14 African countries with existing or emerging DDR programmes. This is understandable given the high cost of data, combined with low levels of Internet access. Social media applications are not widely used by individual ex-‐combatants and their dependents. The possible exception is Libya, which has a third of the population accessing the Internet, relatively low mobile broadband prices and a significant proportion of the population making use of Facebook. Table 4: Facebook users in countries with existing or emergent DDR programmes Country Number of Facebook Facebook penetration users (Dec 2012) rate (Dec 2012) Angola 645,460 3.2 Burundi 41,900 0.4 Central African Republic 163,780 3.2 Côte d’Ivoire n/a n/a Democratic Republic of 903,020 1.2 Congo Republic of Congo 107,640 2.5 Rwanda 188,800 1.6 Somalia 123,480 1.2 South Sudan n/a n/a Sudan n/a n/a Uganda 562,240 1.7 Comoros 19,940 2.7 Libya 781,700 13.9
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Mali 212,020 1.4 (Source: http://www.internetworldstats.com/africa.htm) The fundamental value of social media for DDR programming is its advocacy and fundraising potential in developed countries and among diaspora communities. The ‘Kony 2012’ campaign by Invisible Children (detailed in an earlier section of this report) displayed the considerable positive impact that a well-‐defined and orchestrated social media campaign against the Lord’s Resistance Army in Central Africa had in the United States. Therefore social media, if effectively used, can add considerable worth to DDR programming. It can potentially result in increases in donor funding and other resources. It can also contribute to more nuanced reporting on ex-‐combatants and the DDR process within the international mainstream media.
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CONCLUSION
This report has presented both the opportunities and challenges of using ICT for DDR programming in Africa. It has shown that new forms of ICT have some relevance and applicability for such programming. However, the impact of this technology should not be overstated, and it should not be seen as a panacea that will solve the structural and endemic problems that have persistently plagued DDR interventions in the past. New forms of ICT, like all earlier forms of this technology, have limitations. They are likely to be of valuable to DDR programme personnel, as they can provide a extensive array of convenient tools for project management, asset and financial control, real-‐time monitoring of implementation efforts. This technology will also has the potential to facilitate more effective and regularised communication with, and feedback from, beneficiaries. The usage of new forms of ICT by former combatants in Africa has been largely confined to the use of mobile phones. These phones have typically been used to make calls, and in some instances to send text messages. Social media does not appear to be widely used. But social media does have considerable value in raising awareness; providing insight; and stimulating debate and conversations among international social media communities, particularly in the diaspora. Consequently, where new ICT is incorporated into DDR programming in the future, it is essential that mobile phone technology (particularly that which is in common use in the targeted countries) be the backbone of these interventions. Further to this, it is imperative that such ICT solutions be relatively simple, resilient and is based on open source technology in order to promote sharing of information.
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NOTES 1 Zack Brisson & Kate Krontiris, Tunisia: from revolutions to institutions, Washington DC, World
Bank: 2012. p 20. 2 International Telecommunications Union, 2008. ICTs in Africa: Digital Divide to Digital opportunity, http://www.itu.int/newsroom/features/ict_africa.html [accessed 02 August 2012]. 3 African Development Bank Group et al, Handbook on Infrastructure Statistics, December 2011, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/AfDB%20Infrastructur e_web.pdf 4 Hamilton Research, Africa’s Fibre Reach Increases By 32 Million, To 40% of Population, 2012, http://www.africabandwidthmaps.com/?p=3144 5 Peter Lange, 2011 Africa -‐ Internet, Broadband and Digital Media Statistics, http://www.budde.com.au/Research/2011-‐Africa-‐Internet-‐Broadband-‐and-‐Digital-‐Media-‐ Statistics-‐tables-‐only.html?r=51 6 Chabossou, Augustin et al., (no date) “Mobile Telephony Access & Usage in Africa,” Centre d’Etudes, de Formation et de Recherches en Développement (CEFRED), Université d’Abomey Calavi, Benin, The Edge Institute / Research ICT Africa (RIA), Université de Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, (online), www.cprsouth.org/wp-‐content/uploads/.../Christoph%20Stork.pdf. 7 ITU, Statistics, http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-‐D/Statistics/Pages/stat/default.aspx. 8 Enrico Calandro, Christoph Stork and Alison Gillwald, Internet Going Mobile. Internet Access and Usage in 11 African countries, Research ICT Africa Policy Brief No 2 2012, September 2012. 9 Blycroft Publishing, 2012 Africa Mobile Factbook, 15 March 2012, http://www.blycroft.com. 10 Chetty, Matthew, (no date). “Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs) for Africa’s Development,” NEPAD Ministerial Conference on Science and Technology for Development (online), www.nepadst.org/doclibrary/pdfs/doc08_112003e.pdf [accessed 23 May 2012]. 11 Enrico Calandro, Christoph Stork and Alison Gillwald, Internet Going Mobile. Internet Access and Usage in 11 African countries, Research ICT Africa Policy Brief No 2 2012, September 2012. 12 International Data Corporation Worldwide Smart Connected Device Market Crossed 1 Billion Shipments in 2012, Apple Pulls Near Samsung in Fourth Quarter, According to IDC, March 26, 2013, http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20130326005216/en/Worldwide-‐Smart-‐ Connected-‐Device-‐Market-‐Crossed-‐1 13 D Steven White, Social Media Growth 2006 to 2012, http://dstevenwhite.com/2013/02/09/social-‐media-‐growth-‐2006-‐to-‐2012/ 14 Craig Smith, How Many People Use the Top Social Media, Apps & Services? http://expandedramblings.com/index.php/resource-‐how-‐many-‐people-‐use-‐the-‐top-‐social-‐ media/ 15 Africa Telecoms Online, World Bank estimates 50 million facebook users across Africa, June 2013, http://www.africatelecomsonline.co.za/yahsat/press-‐room/world-‐bank/world-‐bank-‐ estimates-‐50-‐million-‐facebook-‐users-‐across-‐africa 16 Van Grove, Jennifer, 2011. “Facebook for Every Phone App Launches for 2,5000 Mobile Devices, 12 July, http://mashable.com/2011/07/12/facebook-‐for-‐every-‐phone/ [accessed 31 July 2012]. 17 Comments during a panel discussion, AfricaCom 2012, Cape Town, November 14th, 2012. 18 Mixit, Mixit statistics, October 2012, http://site.mxit.com/files/MxitStatistics.pdf. 19 IOL, Figures show changing IM landscape, July 2013. http://www.iol.co.za/scitech/technology/telecoms/figures-‐show-‐changing-‐im-‐landscape-‐ 1.1552767#.UicPj5IweCk 20 Enrico Calandro, Christoph Stork and Alison Gillwald, Internet Going Mobile. Internet Access and Usage in 11 African countries, Research ICT Africa Policy Brief No 2 2012, September 2012. 21 Craig Smith, How Many People Use the Top Social Media, Apps & Services? http://expandedramblings.com/index.php/resource-‐how-‐many-‐people-‐use-‐the-‐top-‐social-‐ media/ 22 NUI Galway, Study Underway to Measure the Impact of the App Economy, 9 May 2013, http://www.nuigalway.ie/about-‐us/news-‐and-‐events/news-‐archive/2013/may2013/study-‐ underway-‐to-‐measure-‐the-‐impact-‐of-‐the-‐app-‐economy.html 23 Simon Khalaf, Flurry Five-‐Year Report: It’s an App World. The Web Just Lives in It, 3 April 2013 2013, http://blog.flurry.com 24 Diane Coyle and Patrick Meier, New Technologies in Emergencies and Conflicts: The Role of Information and Social Networks, Washington, D.C. and London, UK: UN Foundation-‐Vodafone
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