Dissociation, memory and suggestibility in ... - Wiley Online Library

APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY

Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 15: S49±S73 (2001) DOI: 10.1002/acp.834

Dissociation, Memory and Suggestibility in Adults and Children MITCHELL L. EISEN1* and STEVEN J. LYNN2 1

California State University, Los Angeles, USA State University of New York, Binghamton, USA

2

SUMMARY The present article reviews research and theory related to dissociation, memory, and suggestibility in adults and children. We examine various manifestations of dissociation (e.g. trait versus state accounts of dissociation, pathological versus non-pathological dissociation), the different ways that memory and suggestibility are de®ned and measured across studies, and the extent to which dissociation is related to suggestibility as a function of the de®nition and measurement of relevant constructs. Finally, we examine the relationship between dissociation and children's resistance to misinformation, provide a critical review of the strengths and limitations of the extant literature, and suggest directions for future research and theoretical developments in the ®eld. Copyright # 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Controversy surrounding the validity of children's allegations of abuse and legal cases related to false, repressed, and recovered memories have focused considerable attention on children's memory of traumatic events (Lindsay, 1998). This wave of interest in trauma and memory has fueled considerable speculation regarding the role that dissociation plays in how adults and children process traumatic experiences (see Putnam, 1997 for a review). Early on in the false memory debate, dissociation emerged as a widely accepted explanatory mechanism for reported memory lapses and distortions in cases of child sexual abuse (see Brown et al., 1998 for a review). Clinical theories of trauma, dissociation, and memory have been driven in large part by anecdotal reports and case studies of traumatized adults (Spiegel, 1991) and children (Terr, 1991) who reported dissociative experiences that adversely affected their memory for personally experienced traumatic events. Clinical theories have garnered support from research that revealed gaps in adults' recall of traumatic and/or abusive events experienced in childhood (Williams, 1994), as well as more general or non-speci®c gaps in the autobiographical memory accounts of adults who report a history of childhood abuse (Edwards and Fivush, 1998). However, controversy continues to surround the question of whether these memory gaps are speci®c to, or enhanced by, traumatic experiences and dissociative mechanisms or, are instead part and parcel of `normal' memory (Loftus, 1993; Shobe and Kihlstrom, 1997). Another area of controversy is whether memories that are purportedly dissociated or walled off from normal conscious introspection are potentially retrievable in unadulterated form and content or are, instead, subject to the vagaries of memory decay and distortion that Correspondence to: Mitchell L. Eisen, Department of Psychology, California State University, Los Angeles, CA 90032, USA. E-mail: [email protected]

Copyright # 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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M. L. Eisen and S. J. Lynn

characterize mundane processing of information. Controversies aside, the study of dissociation has fascinating implications for understanding the nature of attention and memory. The present article describes what is currently known about the interrelationship of dissociation, memory, and suggestibility in adults and children and provides a useful framework to guide future research and theory development. In the course of our discussion we will: (a) present a number of different conceptualizations of dissociation and dissociative phenomena, (b) distinguish pathological and non-pathological dissociation as well as situational versus trait accounts of dissociation, (c) explore a variety of ways that dissociation can potentially affect event memory and resistance to misinformation, and (d) examine the relationship between dissociation and memory errors in the context of a variety of different false memory paradigms. DISSOCIATION: DEFINITIONS AND DEVELOPMENT Contemporary conceptualizations of dissociation vary greatly. The construct of dissociation has been used to describe a wide range of experiences and symptoms (see Cardena, 1994). The DSM-IV de®nes dissociation as a `disruption in the usually integrated functions of consciousness, memory, identity, or perception of the environment (American Psychiatric Association, 1994, p. 477). Other commonly cited de®nitions include: `The lack of the normal integration of thoughts, feelings, and experiences into the stream of consciousness and memory' (Bernstein and Putnam, 1986, p. 727), à compartmentalization of experience' (van der Kolk et al., 1996, p. 306), and a form of cognitive avoidance (Carlson, 1997). Central to each of these conceptualizations is the idea that dissociation involves a degree of separation of thoughts or memories from conscious awareness and/or discontinuity in the ¯ow of consciousness. Although a common de®nitional core can be identi®ed, the literature in this area is complex and can be dif®cult to assimilate insofar as the construct of dissociation has been invoked to describe both a pervasive trait that can be observed and measured across time and settings, as well as a `peritraumatic' or situationally bound response to extreme stress or trauma (a so-called `dissociative state') that can occur independent of pre-existing personality or constitutional factors. Additionally, dissociation has been conceptualized in terms of pathological and non-pathological variants. We begin our review with a consideration of the literature on pathological versus non-pathological dissociation and trait versus state accounts of this construct. Non-pathological dissociation Dissociative phenomena are widely believed to be a normal aspect of everyday life (see Lynn and Rhue, 1994). In order to better understand pathological dissociation, it is ®rst necessary to describe non-pathological dissociation that does not necessarily re¯ect serious psychopathology. According to Putnam (1995), a child's dissociativity can be de®ned as ` . . . a function of the frequency and duration with which the individual spontaneously enters into a dissociative state of consciousness in naturally occurring situations' (p. 585). Non-pathological dissociation encompasses experiences in which attention is deeply absorbed or focused (e.g. watching a beautiful sunset), and there is a loss of awareness or degradation of monitoring of internal states and external activities. Copyright # 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 15: S49±S73 (2001)

Dissociation and suggestibility

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Two pervasive traits associated with nonpathological dissociation in adults and children are absorption (i.e. the ability to set ordinary reality aside temporarily while engaging in fantasy: Tellegen and Atkinson, 1974), and fantasy proneness (i.e., longstanding history of profound imaginative involvements: Wilson and Barber, 1978, 1983; Lynn and Rhue, 1988). Fantasy and imaginal activities are thought to have a dissociative dimension involving a loss of awareness of external events, problems in reality monitoring, the feeling of being on àutomatic pilot', and vivid daydreaming. In support of the link between dissociation and imaginal activities, are ®ndings that dissociation, fantasy proneness, and imaginative involvement are at least moderately intercorrelated. Green et al. (presentation to the annual meeting of the American Psychological Association, San Francisco, CA, 1991) administered a measure of fantasy proneness to 1249 college students, along with four of the most widely used measures of dissociation and found that the measures of fantasy proneness and dissociation correlated in the range of 0.47 to 0.63. Segal and Lynn (1992±1993) also found evidence for moderate correlations (r 0.40±0.44) between two measures of dissociation and scales of daydreaming and poor attentional control. Finally, Rhue et al. (1996) found that a measure of childhood dissociation was correlated at 0.54 with a childhood fantasy inventory and 0.39 with a measure of fantasy proneness adapted for use with children. Pathological dissociation In contrast to relatively benign dissociation associated with escapist fantasy and daydreaming, for example, pathological dissociation is thought to have serious long-term personal repercussions (Putnam, 1985). Pathological dissociation is characterized by disturbing symptoms that include depersonalization, amnesia, identity confusion, and derealization. These symptoms can be so severe and disabling that they can lead to a diagnosis of a dissociative disorder (Putnam, 1997; Steinberg, 1994). Pathological dissociation has consistently been linked to a history of trauma (Lilienfeld et al., 1999; Waller et al., 1996). The idea that there is an intimate connection between trauma and dissociation can be traced to the turn of the twentieth century when Janet (1919/1925) proposed that dissociation involves a defensive segregation of memories, or what he called `disaggregated memories'. Janet observed that when individuals are overwhelmed by traumatic events that clash with existing schemas of safety, for example, they are often unable to incorporate the events into their narrative memory, and subsequently avoid thinking about the trauma-related information altogether. Janet dubbed this process `phobia of memory' (Janet, 1919/1925) and contended that the continued avoidance of trauma-related cues insured that the highly charged memories would be splitoff from ordinary consciousness, leading to dramatic pathological symptoms such as amnesias and ``multiple personalities'' in extreme cases (see van der Hart and Freidman, 1989 for a review of Janet's theory). Over the past two decades, investigators have documented a strong association between dissociation and a variety of traumatic experiences. These experiences include severe childhood sexual and physical abuse (Briere, 1992; Chu and Dill, 1990; Putnam, 1989), witnessing a violent death during childhood (Putnam et al., 1986), combat exposure (Brende, presentation at the Conferance for Multiple Personality Disorders and Dissociative States, Chicago, IL, 1986), and rape in adolescence or adulthood (Coons and Milstein, 1986). However, it should be noted that speci®cation of the precise role of trauma in engendering dissociation and other manifestations of psychopathology is limited by the Copyright # 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.


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fact that many of the studies in this area have relied on retrospective reports and have not examined the role of other potential contributing factors such as the nature of the family relationships in which abuse or violence is rooted. A dimensional versus typological perspectives on the trait of dissociation Until recently, it was widely believed that non-pathological and pathological dissociation represented ends of a single continuum of a normally distributed trait in the population (see Sandberg and Lynn, 1992). In fact, most research instruments designed to assess the trait of dissociation were originally based on a dimensional model of dissociation (DES: Bernstein and Putnam, 1986; Adolescent Dissociative Experiences Scale, A-DES: Armstrong et al., 1997; Child Dissociative Checklist, CDC: Putnam et al., 1993; Children's Perceptual Alteration Scale, CPAS: Evers-Szostak and Sanders, 1992; Trauma Symptom Inventory, TSI: Briere, 1995). In contrast with the view of dissociation representing a single dimension, Waller et al.'s (1998) analyses of data from a multi-site study provided support for the proposition that there may be two distinct ways that dissociation presents as a measurable trait. Their study revealed that certain patients experience symptoms that are reported by only a small minority of the general population. Speci®cally, a subset of eight DES items (The DES-T subscale of the DES) re¯ects a pathological form of dissociation that is taxonic in nature, rather than continuous. This typological perspective is consistent with the existence of two distinct types of dissociative tendencies: Pathological and non-pathological dissociation. THE DEVELOPMENT OF DISSOCIATION IN CHILDREN A common view of pathological dissociation is that it is initially an adaptive strategy that becomes habitual at some point, leading to conditioned dissociative reactions that prevent adequate processing and integration of information related to highly stressful or traumatic events (Koopman et al., 1994; Lynn and Rhue, 1994; Speigel, 1991). Perry et al. (1995) contend that enduring trauma engenders information processing and memory de®cits. According to Perry's evolutionary/neurobiological perspective, a child's typical initial response to overwhelming threat is to freeze. When suf®ciently terrorized, Perry proposes that the freezing response can evolve into a complete dissociation, and the virtual cessation of cognitive processing. Perry and his colleagues add that continued trauma can sensitize a child to the hyper arousal, leading to a pattern of dissociative responding under stress. Perry's conceptualization is based on the idea that a child's brain changes in a use dependent manner in response to patterns of neural activation cued by experience (Perry, 1994, presentation at the 41st Annual Meeting of the Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, New York, 1994). Perry proposes that speci®c patterns of neural activation associated with acute responses to trauma (e.g. dissociation) are likely to be consolidated on the neural level and predispose the child to develop dissociative disorders over time. Perry's position is consistent with a growing consensus in the area of developmental cognitive neuroscience that early repetitive or chronic stress can lead to long-term changes in known neural mechanisms related to memory, which, in turn, are associated with dissociation (see Nelson and Carver, 1998 for a review). Studies that can be considered supportive of Perry's viewpoint have reported the following results: Copyright # 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.



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(1) The younger children are when they ®rst experience trauma, the more likely they are to develop dissociative disorders (see Putnam, 1997). (2) Severe traumas are associated with greater levels of dissociation in children (Putnam, 1997). (3) Increased levels of dissociation in adulthood are associated with self-reports of abuse and trauma in childhood (Bremner et al., 1994; Carlson and Rosser-Hogan, 1993; Chu and Dill, 1990; Marmer et al., 1994; Putnam and Trickett, 1997). (4) A history of exposure to extreme stress (such as childhood physical abuse) increases the risk for stress-related symptomology when re-exposed to traumatic stress later in life (see Bremner et al., 1994, for a review). (5) Prolonged exposure to trauma can engender more routine or automatized patterns of dissociative responding (DiTomasso and Routh, 1992). Perry's view is compatible with the idea that dissociation degrades information processing and impairs memory. The most commonly identi®ed memory-related symptom of pathological dissociation in children is amnesia for a traumatic event (Putnam, 1997). However, more general compartmentalization of thoughts, feelings, and aspects of the self, which is purported to occur in response to traumatic experiences, has been argued to create pervasive gaps in autobiographical memory, and episodes of `time loss' (Putnam, 1997). According to Putnam, discontinuities in memory associated with pathological dissociation render a person vulnerable to plausible suggestions that ®ll gaps in autobiographical memories. Putnam also notes that highly dissociative children (and adults) are prone to chronic feelings of depersonalization and derealization that lend a dream-like quality to experiences and autobiographical memories. Accordingly, dissociative propensities would be expected to engender dif®culties in source monitoring and uncertainty regarding recollections in general, and problems with reality monitoring of historical facts and life events in particular (see Putnam 1995, 1997 for reviews). In short, pathological dissociation would be expected to impair memory, rather than rendering it impervious to alteration over time. Diathesis-stress Some children may be more vulnerable than others to the adverse affects of extreme stress or repeated trauma. A diathesis-stress model of dissociation rests on the assumption that traumatic events alone are not necessarily suf®cient to elicit chronic dissociative reactions. Rather, traumatic events, in combination with other factors such as innate biological differences (Putnam, 1995), can constitute a diathesis that predisposes some children to develop dissociative disorders. In support of extreme fantasizing as one such diathesis, Rauschenberger and Lynn (1995, `Fantasy proneness, negative affect, and dissociation; unpublished manuscript,' 2000) found that a history of fantasy proneness (e.g., intense and often prolonged fantasizing) during childhood placed persons at risk for signi®cant dissociative pathology. Rauschenberger and Lynn (1995) found that 17% of the fantasy prone persons exhibited signs of serious psychopathology. In their second study (Rauschenberger and Lynn, unpublished manuscript, 2000), 33% of fantasy prone persons were also diagnosed as having a dissociative disorder (Dissociative Disorder Not Otherwise Speci®ed) based on an individually administered structured interview. Lynn and his colleagues speculate that if escapist imaginal activities become habitual ways of coping with a variety of stressful Copyright # 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.


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circumstances, by way of stimulus generalization, the individual is likely to experience memory problems such as `missing time' and even more profound amnesic episodes. However, it is extremely dif®cult to predict which children who are highly imaginative daydreamers will develop pathological dissociative traits or symptoms over time. Attachment has been proposed as another diatheses for pathological dissociation. Barach (1991) hypothesized that severe disruptions in attachment stemming from an unresponsive primary caretaker elicit dissociative responses in some children. Liotti (1991) maintained that disorganized attachments lead to an increased vulnerability to develop dissociative disorders, a contention supported by research (Ogawa et al., 1997) indicating that disorganized patterns of attachment in infancy are related to dissociation scores in late adolescence. In a prospective study, Carlson (1998) also found that disorganized patterns of attachment in early childhood were related to scores on a measure of dissociation in adolescence. TRAIT VERSUS PERITRAUMATIC DISSOCIATION As noted earlier, dissociation is described not only as a pervasive personality trait, but also as a situationally bound response to an external event that disrupts cognitive processing. At a theoretical level, potential memory problems have been associated with a general propensity to dissociate. However, as alluded to above, memory problems have also been noted in conjunction with stress-related responding that can purportedly induce a dissociative `state' that compromises the encoding of the details of a traumatic event as it unfolds. Marmer et al. (1996) coined the term peritraumatic dissociation to describe a dissociative response that occurs during or in the aftermath of a traumatic or highly stressful event. Peritraumatic dissociation can encompass the following: (a) poor memory for a speci®c event, (b) vague or fragmented recollections, (c) complete amnesia for the experience, and (d) other signs or symptoms of dissociation including derealization, depersonalization, and confusion about the sequence of events. A growing body of research with combat veterans (Marmer et al., 1994), victims of natural disasters (Koopman et al., 1994), bystanders to human violence (Classen et al., 1998), and survivors of motor vehicle accidents (Harvey and Bryant, 1998) indicates that peritraumatic dissociation is a signi®cant risk factor for the development of posttraumatic symptomatology. Theoretically, peritraumatic dissociation can be evidenced in any person confronted with a suf®ciently stressful stimulus, regardless of the individual's preexisting cognitive or personality functioning. Further, this dissociative response may be entirely unique to a particular situation, resulting, for example, in an individual not attending to, or `blocking out' information delimited to a speci®c moment in time. Accordingly, a peritraumatic dissociative response may or may not affect other elements of information processing, and may or may not lead to further complications down-the-line. Although support for peritraumatic dissociation is limited by its primary reliance on correlational data based on retrospective reports of peoples' responses to traumatic experiences, we believe this construct is useful in terms of identifying a number of potential memory problems associated with individuals' discrete responses to highly stressful and/or traumatic events. In the remainder of the article we will argue that regardless of whether dissociation is conceptualized as a more or less discrete response to a traumatic event, or as a relatively stable trait, dissociation can result in memory problems and increased suggestibility. This Copyright # 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.



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view differs from accounts of dissociation that imply that memories are somehow segregated yet imperishable and unaffected by ordinary processes of memory distortion and decay. The discussion that follows will focus on the link between dissociation, impaired memory, and increased suggestibility in children.

PERITRAUMATIC DISSOCIATION, MEMORY, AND SUGGESTIBILITY Studies with adults (Christiansen and Loftus, 1987, 1990; Christiansen and Nilsson, 1984; see Shobe and Kihlstrom, 1997) and children (Goodman et al., 1986; Peterson and Bell, 1996) indicate that recall of traumatic experiences is not generally compromised relative to non-traumatic events (Byrne et al., this issue), and that the central details of highly stressful experiences are remembered better than peripheral elements of the experience. However, we will examine four scenarios in which a dissociative response could potentially impair children's memory for a traumatic event. Dissociation prevents adequate encoding of the event If a child consciously or unconsciously engages in cognitive avoidance and distraction tactics (i.e. dissociation) that de¯ect attention from a traumatic event as it unfolds, then she would fail to adequately encode the details of the experience into declarative memory. If a memory was never encoded as a coherent narrative, then how could it be retrieved and accurately reported at a later date? It could be argued that it is impossible to create an accurate memory under such conditions. Van der Kolk et al. (1996) suggest another possibility: that dissociated imprints of memories are retrieved as sensory fragments that have little or no linguistic component and can be woven together to construct a coherent, accurate narrative memory of the traumatic experience. However, this possibility strains credulity in that the reconstruction of events from memory fragments, feelings, and intuition is considered by many experts to be one of the most common antecedents of false memory formation (see Loftus, 1997 for a review). Memory inaccuracy looms as an even greater possibility when the basic limits on children's ability to encode, organize, and retrieve, complex information apart from the context in which the event occurred are considered. It is true that even very young children (3±5 years of age) can provide accurate reports of novel life events after considerable delays of months, or even years (see Fivush, 1993 for a review). However, it is also the case that younger children have less conscious control over their memory (Kail, 1990) and often need assistance from adults to retrieve memories out of context and report them in a narrative form (see Fivush, 1998 for a review). Even healthy non-dissociative young children are highly dependent on adults' assistance to retrieve and jointly reconstruct decontextualized memories of routine nonstressful events (Fivush, 1993). When children are asked to recall the details of traumatic events, they might need considerable help from adults to just make sense of the experience, let alone retrieve and reconstruct the details of the event. If a child dissociates in the face of trauma and is limited to encoding decontextualized fragments and feelings, as van der Kolk et al. (1996) contend, then the process of jointly reconstructing a coherent narrative should be all the more problematic, rendering the child more vulnerable to the effects of misleading information and other suggestive in¯uences. Copyright # 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.


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Normal forgetting should take place when a memory is isolated and never rehearsed Case studies (Hewitt, 1994; see Fivush, 1998, and Reviere, 1996 for reviews) reveal that even severe traumas experienced by very young children can be associated with the retention of clear memory fragments. However, if dissociation at the point of encoding involves the compartmentalization and subsequent avoidance of memories, then rehearsal of memories should be effectively prevented. It is widely accepted that some form of rehearsal is necessary for memories to be stored and maintained over time. Fivush and Shwarzmueller (1995) contend that preventing the rehearsal of memories related to childhood trauma though mechanisms such as dissociation or repression should lead to normal forgetting over long periods of time. Therefore, even when isolated elements of the event are encoded and retained in declarative memory, the details of these memory accounts should fade over time, like òrdinary' memories, rendering recall of an intact and accurate narrative memory increasingly less probable. If `dissociated' memories fade like ordinary memories, it would undermine the contention that dissociated memories can be somehow recoveredÐoften many years after the eventÐby techniques such as hypnosis (see Spiegel, 1995), unsullied by the usual vagaries of memory. Dissociation results in defensive distortions in memory In an effort to come to terms with ordinary non-traumatic events, it is generally accepted that children and adults tend to generate somewhat inaccurate accounts of experiences to better ®t their sense of self and view of the world (Hirt et al., 1999). As experienced events become increasingly incongruent with an individual's schemas of their self and the world they live in, the likelihood of consciously or unconsciously altering the interpretation of events increases. When events involve an unthinkable trauma, the likelihood that children may generate their own inaccurate accounts of what occurred in order to integrate the otherwise unfathomable information into their existing world view increases dramatically (Pynoos et al., 1995). Pynoos et al. (1997) found that when there is an actual violation of the physical or psychological integrity of the child, efforts are made to down-regulate physiological arousal or pain and engage in fantasies that allow the child to feel a physical distancing from what is happening and to even feel it is not happening to him or her, thereby decreasing a sense of active participation. Pynoos notes that (ìmagined or intended interventions become inextricably part of the memory network associated with the experience' (p. 278; Pynoos, 1997). Theoretically, peritraumatic dissociative responses that limit what factual information is encoded as the event is experienced should contribute greatly to the malleability of these memory reports. Pynoos's research (see Pynoos, 1997) illustrates that the unfolding of children's memories of traumatic experiences (e.g., sniper attack on school playground) traced within hours, days, weeks, and months after the event represent dramatically altered versions of the experience. Post-trauma elaboration Christiansen (1992a,b) notes that the compelling nature of highly stressful experiences motivates continued mental review of events in order to make sense of what was experienced. Christiansen refers to this operation as post stimulus elaboration, and maintains that this process is fundamental to the consolidation of memories of stressful Copyright # 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.



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events. Expanding on Christensen's theory, Eisen and Goodman (1998) introduced the concept of post-trauma elaboration, and suggest that there may be a critical time immediately after the trauma when the memory has yet to be consolidated and the child is most suggestible and vulnerable to the effects of misinformation. Eisen and Goodman assert that a peritraumatic dissociative response that signi®cantly limits what information is encoded, should increase the child's level of uncertainly about what did and did not occur, and therefore heighten their dependency on adult assistance to make sense of what transpired. Eisen and Goodman (1998) propose several possible scenarios as to how post-trauma elaboration might lead to accurate or inaccurate memories for the event. By far, the most positive scenario would be that the child is able to discuss the event with a caring adult and jointly construct a relatively accurate narrative memory compatible with their existing schemas of the world. However, Eisen and Goodman note that the assistance of a caring adult does not guarantee that accurate memory construction will follow. In an effort to buffer the effects of an otherwise horri®c explanation of a traumatic event, a well-meaning adult might try to use the child's confusion and uncertainty to protect them by helping him or her to create a less emotionally toxic yet fundamentally inaccurate interpretation of what occurred. Alternatively, a manipulative adult might take advantage of the child's confusion and deliberately mislead the child in order to cover up improper conduct such as abuse, or to turn the child against other adults, as can occur in a custody dispute. Finally, a misguided or incompetent forensic interviewer might suggest plausible explanations for what happened and, together with the child, jointly construct an inaccurate narrative account that con®rms the interviewer's preconceptions. In summary, peritraumatic dissociative responses to extreme stressors should logically impair a child's ability to recall the event accurately and theoretically make her more vulnerable to suggestive in¯uences when recalling the experience. For ethical reasons, it is impossible to evaluate hypotheses regarding peritraumatic dissociation and suggestibility in the laboratory. However, it is possible to examine suggestibility and dissociation with trait measures of dissociativity, in the laboratory. In the following section we describe how the construct of suggestibility is de®ned and measured in applied memory research and examine the relationship between dissociation and suggestibility in the context of a variety of different research paradigms. SUGGESTIBILITY The term `suggestibility' is applied to an array of phenomena that range from hypnotic responsivity to simple gullibility (see Eysenck and Fureanaux, 1945; Roediger, 1996; Schooler and Loftus, 1993 for reviews). In applied memory research, the term suggestibility is used as an index of susceptibility to misleading information (Schooler and Loftus, 1993) or, more generally, the tendency to make errors in determining the source of a recollective experience (i.e. confusing what is merely imagined with an actual historical occurrence). Johnson et al. (1993) distinguished between internally generated sources of recollective experiences (e.g. imagination, fantasies, and confabulation), and externally generated sources of such experiences (e.g. actual perceived events, others' recollections, newspaper stories). Johnson and Raye (1981) identi®ed cues that help individuals to infer the likely source of a memory. For example, compared with memories for imagined events, Copyright # 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.


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memories for perceived events include a relative abundance of perceptual information (e.g. sound, color), contextual information (e.g. spatial, temporal), semantic detail, and affective information (e.g. emotional reactions). Accordingly, a memory with a great deal of visual and spatial detail and contextual information would most often be judged as something that was actually perceived (Johnson et al., 1989). By and large, this decision strategy works quite well, and leads to accurate source monitoring in many situations. However, in situations in which: (a) an imagined event is perceived as very clear and vivid, and (b) few details of a perceived event can be recalled (e.g. due to distraction or stress), source monitoring problems and related memory errors are especially likely to occur (Hirt et al., 1999). Problems in source monitoring can also lead to dif®culties in distinguishing between events that actually occurred and events that were merely suggested by misinformation provided after an event. For example, participants continue to report misinformation from a post-event narrative even after they are told that the information is false (Lindsay, 1990). In some cases, subjects actually claim to remember in considerable detail the presentation of items in the original event, when the items were in fact only mentioned in the post-event narrative (Payne et al., 1996). Because highly dissociative individuals are thought to be more prone to making sourcemonitoring errors in everyday life, the report of dissociative experiences would be expected to be linked to increased suggestibility and risk of false memory production. Theoretically, this effect should be greatest for individuals who exhibit pathological dissociation. In the next section, we review the relationship between trait measures of dissociation and recall errors that arise in the context of a number of different paradigms that include the direct provision of misinformation and/or repeated imagining of counterfactual events. Loftus's childhood misinformation paradigm Loftus and her colleagues have devised a false childhood memory paradigm (originally named the memory implantation paradigm) that provided a demonstration proof that false memories for a never-experienced childhood event can be created (Loftus, 1993; Loftus and Pickrell, 1995). In the original study, Loftus asked the older brother of a 14-year-old boy to suggest a false memory about an event (being lost in a shopping mall) that was alleged to have occurred when the younger boy was 5 years old. After listening to the older brother's story, the boy was asked to write about his memory of the suggested false event (and of three other true events from his childhood) once every day for 5 days. By the end of this process, Loftus reported that the boy described the false event in detail and with great con®dence. Variations of this procedure have been used successfully by other investigators (Hyman and Billings, 1998; Hyman et al., 1995; Hyman and Pentland, 1996; Qin, 1999). Hyman and Billings (1998) examined the relationship between dissociation, as measured by the DES, and the acceptance of suggested early autobiographical memories using the Loftus (1993) memory implantation procedure. Hyman and Billings reported a moderately strong relationship between DES scores and the acceptance of false memories (r 0:48). Wilkinson and Hyman (1998) reanalyzed Hyman and Billings' data to examine the relationship between false memory creation and several different aspects of DES scoring. These investigators found that the acceptance of false memories was moderately related to the items that make up the depersonalization (r 0:37) and memory Copyright # 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.



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failure (r 0:41) factors of the DES. Surprisingly, Wilkinson and Hyman did not examine the association between the acceptance of false memories and pathological dissociation taxon scores as measured by the DES-T subscale of the DES. In a similar study, using a variation of the same research paradigm, Qin (1999) reported a statistically signi®cant relationship between the acceptance of suggested memories and both overall scoring on the DES and DES-T subscale scores (r's 0.23). Interestingly, Qin found that participants who quali®ed for pathological dissociation taxon membership, based on DES-T scores (Waller and Ross, 1997), did not report greater con®dence or perceived clarity associated with false memories than individuals who were not taxon members. However, taxon members were more likely to have subjective experiences of false memories and provided more units of information in association with their false memories than did non-taxon members. Imagination in¯ation An interesting variation of the childhood misinformation paradigm involves ìmagination in¯ation' (Garry et al., 1996). Studies in imagination in¯ation show that providing instructions to participants to imagine a childhood event that was never experienced in `real life' can engender an increase in con®dence that the event actually occurred (Garry et al., 1996; Heaps and Nash, 2000; Paddock et al., 1998, Study 1; but see Clancy et al., 1999; Paddock et al., 1998, Study 2). Using a version of the imagination in¯ation paradigm, Paddock et al. (1998) reported a positive relationship between scoring on the DES and enhanced certainty regarding imagined events that did not occur in reality. More speci®cally, the authors reported correlations (range 0:20 to 0.35) between enhanced con®dence for imagined nonevents and the 9 individual items that comprise the dissociability factor of the DES. Based on these data, Paddock et al. asserted that high DES scorers seemed to be more prone to interpersonal in¯uence when suggestions were made to imagine counterfactual events as if they were real. Unfortunately, Paddock and his colleagues did not examine DES-T scores. The DRM paradigm Roediger and McDermott (1995) provided a compelling demonstration of false recognition effects in a list-learning task (Deese, 1959). The paradigm they devised has inspired numerous studies and has come to be widely known as the Deese/Roediger±McDermott paradigm (DRM). In the DRM paradigm, participants are presented (auditorily) with a series of lists of thematically related words such a bed, rest, wake, doze, dream, pillow, and so forth, which are all thematically related to non-presented words such as sleep. They then are administered an oral recognition test consisting of the words actually presented in the experiment, `critical' non-presented words that are thematically related to the presented words (e.g. sleep), and a series of non-presented, thematically related, words. Using this paradigm, many participants (approximately 70%, on average) falsely recognize thematically related non-presented words with a high degree of con®dence. Since the initial research was conducted, numerous investigators have successfully replicated Roediger and McDermott's seminal ®ndings (e.g. Mather et al., 1997; McDermott, 1996; Norman and Schacter, 1997; Payne et al., 1996; Reed, 1996; Robinson and Roediger, 1997; Seamon et al., 1998; Tussing and Greene, 1997; Winograd et al., Copyright # 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.


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1998). A number of studies have examined the relationship between dissociation and false recognition errors on the DRM task. Winograd et al. (1998) reported that DES scores were positively related to remember judgments for non-presented, thematically related words on the DRM task (r 0:34), although the authors failed to examine DES-T scores in this context. However, contrary to the ®ndings of Winograd et al.; Eisen et al. (presentation at the 3rd biennial meeting of the Society of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, Boulder, CO, 1999) and Qin (1999) failed to ®nd evidence for a relationship between dissociation, as measured by any key index of the DES (including DES-T scores), and false recognition errors on the DRM task (see Table 1). Misleading questions The relationship between dissociation and memory errors has been examined in the context of studies that expose participants to biased and/or suggestive questioning techniques. This methodology has been used more frequently in children's than in adults' eyewitness suggestibility research because children's tendency to accede to suggestive questions is arguably the the most common antecedent of false allegations of abuse (Ceci and Bruck, 1993). Schooler and Loftus (1993) proposed that errors in response to misleading questions should be related to poor memory and a lack of attention to detail (see also Gudjonsson and Clarke, 1986). The authors contended that individuals who have dif®culty remembering the details of an event they witnessed would be less likely to notice that post-event information contained in a misleading question is inconsistent or discrepant with the event they witnessed than individuals who have good initial recall of the event. Putnam (1997) has observed that because dissociative individuals exhibit memory problems and lack con®dence in their recollections, they are vulnerable to the effects of misinformation. Putnam's hypothesis is consistent with Gudjonsson and Clark's (1986) theory of interrogative suggestibility, which proposes that individuals who are less con®dent in their memories are more likely to acquiesce to misleading questions. According to Putnam, discontinuities in memory associated with pathological dissociation render the individual vulnerable to plausible suggestions that ®ll the gaps in autobiographical memory. We were able to locate only one published study done with children that examined relations between measures of dissociation and suggestibility as assessed by errors on misleading questions (Eisen et al., 1998). In this study, children were tested in the context of an inpatient hospitalization designed to assess allegations of maltreatment. As part of the medical assessment, each child received an ano-genital examination to assess overt signs and symptoms of physical and/or sexual abuse. Three to ®ve days later, the children were questioned about the exam using an interview protocol that included both factual and misleading questions related to the event. In addition, the children received a battery of tests that included two measures of dissociation. All children over the age of 5 were administered the Children's Perceptual Alteration Scale (CPAS: Evers-Szostak and Sanders, 1992), while all children over 11 years of age were administered the Adolescent-Dissociative Experiences Scale (A-DES: Armstrong et al., 1997). In addition, the parents and caretakers of all children who were available were administered the Child Dissociative Checklist (CDC; Putnam et al., 1993). Eisen and his colleagues examined several different indices of children's event memory and suggestibility including, correct responses and errors (errors of commission and Copyright # 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.



Depersonalization CDC

Absorption DES

Wilkinson and Hyman (1998) 0.05

Eisen et al. (1999) 0.13 Platt et al. (1998) 0.03 Winograd et al. (1998) 0.34* Eisen et al. (1999) 0.11 Qin (1999) 0.01 Wilkinson and Hyman (1998) 0.03

Wilkinson and Hyman (1998) 0.04 Qin (1999) 0.03

DRM Intrusions: remember judgements for critical lures

Wilkinson and Hyman (1998) 0.37* Eisen et al. (1999a,b) 0.03y

Eisen and Carlson (1998) 0.24* Eisen et al. (in press) 0.18*

Eisen and Carlson (1998) 0.23* Eisen et al. (in press) 0.13 Wolfradt and Meyer (1998) 0.53*** Merckelbach et al. (2000) 0.29**

Errors on misleading questions

Wilkinson and Hyman (1998) 0.05

Wilkinson and Hyman (1998) 0.41*

DES Factor:

Heaps and Nash (2000) 0.34** Paddock et al. (1998) 0.17 Paddock et al. (1998) 0.32**

Imagination in¯ation: increased con®dence in non-events

Wilkinson and Hyman (1998) 0.41*

Qin (1999) 0.23*

DES-T

Memory Failure DES

Hyman and Billings (1998) 0.48** Qin (1999) 0.23*

DES

False memory acceptance

Continues

Classic misinformation paradigm

Table 1. Correlations between various indices of suggestibility and measures of dissociation, visualization, absorption and fantasy proneness

Dissociation and suggestibility S61



Hyman and Billings (1998) 0.36*

Hyman and Billings (1998) 0.23

False memory acceptance

< 0.05. < 0.01. p < 0.001. udy done with children.Q21

ICMI VVQ

CEQ

IDQ

CIS

VMIQ

VVIQ

TAS

CPAS

A-DES

Table 1. Continued

Heaps and Nash (2000) 0.06 Paddock et al. (1999) 0.16

Paddock et al. (1999) 0.16

Imagination in¯ation: increased con®dence in non-events

Merckelbach et al. (2000) 0.07

Eisen et al. (1999a,b) 0.57y Eisen et al. (1999a,b) 0.09y Eisen and Carlson (1998) 0.14 Wolfradt and Meyer (1998) 0.54*** Heaps and Nash (2000) 0.27

Errors on misleading questions

Platt et al. (1998) 0.04

Wingrad et al. (1998) 0.04 Wilkinson and Hyman (1998) 0.21*

Winograd et al. (1998) 0.14

Platt et al. (1998) 0.13

DRM Intrusions: remember judgements for critical lures

Tousignant (1984) 0.23*

Tousignant (1984) 0.22

Classic misinformation paradigm

S62 M. L. Eisen and S. J. Lynn



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omission) on misleading and speci®c questions related to both central and peripheral details of the medical exam. These investigators reported that none of the dissociation measures employed were consistently related to the various indices of memory and suggestibility examined. More recently, Eisen Goodman, Qin, and Davis (1999a,b) replicated this study with a substantially larger sample of children (N > 400), improved the procedures used to assess children's memory and suggestibility, and included an additional measure of dissociation (the Dissociation Scale from the Trauma Symptom Checklist for Children-TSC-C). In this effort, the investigators examined children's event memory and performance on misleading questions related to three different events (a medical exam, a game played with a research assistant, and a meeting with a psychologist). Preliminarily analyses of these unpublished data again indicated that the measures of dissociation used (CDC, A-DES, CPAS, TSC-C), were not were not consistently related to the various indices of memory and suggestibility examined across the three events. Eisen and Carlson (1998) and Eisen et al. (in press) examined the relationship between dissociation and errors in response to misleading information in college students. In each of these studies, students took part in a staged event and then returned one week later to be administered a structured interview that included both highly suggestive, misleading questions and factual, non-suggestive questions about the event. In each study, pathological dissociation, as measured by scoring on the DES-T sub-scale of the DES, was signi®cantly related to errors in response to misleading questions. Further, in both studies, errors in response to misleading questions were somewhat more strongly related to DES-T scoring than overall DES scores. It is important to note that in both studies neither overall DES scores nor DES-T sub-scale scores were related to errors on the speci®c, nonsuggestive questions designed to assess event memory (see Table 1). Misleading questions using the GSS According to Gudjonsson interrogative suggestibility involves `the tendency of an individual's account of events to be altered by misleading information and inter-personal pressure within an interview' (p. 155; Singh and Gudjonsson, 1992). Gudjonsson and his colleagues developed the Gudjonsson Scale of Interrogative Suggestibility (GSS; Gudjonsson, 1984) to predict which individuals will be susceptible to highly suggestive questioning during a police interrogation (e.g., Gudjonsson 1984; Gudjonsson and Clarke, 1986). The GSS involves three phases. First, the participants read a story. Next, they are presented with 20 questions, 15 of which are highly suggestive misleading questions related to the story. Errors on these questions make up the Yield 1 scale for the GSS. Finally, the participants are given negative feedback about their performance and asked to answer the questions again. Changes in responses following the negative feedback comprise the shift scale of the GSS. Two studies (Merckelbach et al., 2000; Wolfradt and Meyer, 1998) obtained evidence for a relationship between DES scores and suggestibility as measured by the GSS. Wolfradt and Meyer (1998) reported a surprisingly large correlation between the DES and GSS scores (r 0.53), whereas Merckelbach et al. (2000) reported a more modest correlation between the two measures (r 0.29). The magnitude of the latter correlation was more in line with the more modest effect reported by Eisen and his colleagues (Eisen and Carlson, 1998; Eisen et al., in press). Copyright # 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.


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In summary, there appears to be a fairly consistent small to moderate relationship between dissociation (as measured by the DES) and recall errors in studies that employ a variety of different paradigms. The most notable exception to this pattern of ®ndings is the mixed results obtained in studies that employ the DRM paradigm. The disparity in research outcomes may be due to the fact that false recognition on the DRM task is more fundamentally related to encoding errors (see Roediger et al., 1998 for a review), rather than source monitoring problems, or errors due to the explicit provision of misinformation. Notably, very few studies have been done with children, and it is unclear how the adult ®ndings will generalize to younger age groups. Non-pathological dissociation and memory errors Measures of vividness of visualization have been found to be related to the production of memory errors across a variety of suggestibility paradigms (Hyman and Billings, 1998; Dobson and Markham, 1993; Tousignant, 1984; Qin, 1999; Winograd et al., 1998). However, this relationship is not consistently evident across all measures of visual imagery, and also appears to vary depending on the suggestibility paradigm employed (see Table 1). For example, among the studies we reviewed, the most commonly used measure of visualization capacity was the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ: Marks, 1973). Whereas the VVIQ was found to be related to false memory formation (Hyman and Billings, 1998) and errors in response to misleading questions (Heaps and Nash, 2000), the VVIQ was not signi®cantly correlated with performance on an imagination in¯ation task (Heaps and Nash, 2000) or with remember judgments for critical lures on the DRM task (Winograd et al., 1998). Absorption (i.e. the tendency to become involved or absorbed in everyday\activities) has also been found to be correlated with measures of visual imagery (Lynn and Rhue, 1988). Platt et al. (1998) examined the relationship between absorption and memory accuracy in relation to hearing about the verdict in the OJ. Simpson trail. Platt and his colleagues reported that scores on the TAS were inversely related to the accuracy of the participants' memories for this event. Hyman and Billings (1998) also reported a small correlation between scoring on the TAS and false memory creation that did not reach statistical signi®cance (see Table 1). Non-pathological dissociation and responses to misleading information We could ®nd only three studies that investigated the relationship between measures of non-pathological dissociation and responses to misleading questions. Eisen and Carlson (1998) failed to ®nd a relationship between absorption as measured by the TAS and errors in response to misleading questions. Similarly, Merkelbach et al. (2000) failed to obtain evidence for an association between interrogative suggestibility and fantasy proneness as measured by the Creative Experiences Questionnaire (CEQ: Merckelbach et al., 1998). However, in the single exception to this pattern of null ®ndings, Wolfradt and Meyer (1998) found that the TAS was related to interrogative suggestibility (r = 0.54). In summary, vividness of visualization has been found to be related to the production of memory errors in the laboratory, but the ®ndings in this area are not entirely consistent across studies. Unfortunately, no studies have examined the relationship between visualization ability and errors in response to misleading questions. Studies that have examined the relationship between absorption and various types of suggestibility have also Copyright # 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.



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failed to yield consistent results, and evidence linking these constructs is weak. It is important to note that we could ®nd no studies done with children that have assessed the association between non-pathological dissociation and indices of memory or suggestibility. CONCLUSIONS The research on trauma, memory, and dissociation suffers not so much from a dearth of theory or explanatory models, as much as a lack of well-controlled research. The hypothesized ways that memory is affected by neurobiological mechanisms, exposure to a traumatic event, and the variables that contribute to resilience versus vulnerability are, to varying degrees, speculative. Further, although the ®ndings reviewed imply that there is link between the experience of a traumatic event, dissociation, and memory problems, the strength and interpretability of the evidence can be criticized on the following grounds: (1) The ®ndings that support an association between early trauma and later dissociative psychopathology are largely correlational in nature. Accordingly, it is not at all clear whether trauma precedes dissociative symptomatology or whether pre-existing `dissociative' coping strategies (e.g. cognitive avoidance) and tendencies are exacerbated by the experience of trauma. (2) A similar problem in identifying a cause±effect relationship is evident with respect to the correlational relationship between dissociation and memory. Poor memory functioning may not necessarily be a symptom of dissociation, but rather a vulnerability factor related to the development of trauma-related pathology. For example, individuals who have innate memory de®cits may also exhibit dif®culty processing complex information associated with traumatic events and, therefore, be more vulnerable to peritraumatic dissociation and more serious long-standing dissociative symptoms. Clearly, prospective studies are needed to clarify these issues. (3) Prospective studies are also needed in order to address the fact that the data that support an association between childhood abuse, memory problems, and later psychopathology are largely based on the retrospective reports of adults, and therefore are subject to memory and report biases (Lilienfeld et al., 1999). Studies that vary the demand characteristics and procedures used to elicit memories and dissociative experiences, and that examine the in¯uence of agreeableness, acquiescence, and related response sets and personality variables would represent worthwhile contributions to the literature. (4) De®nitions of dissociation in the literature are often ambiguous and do not specify whether dissociation is: (a) regarded as pathological, (b) a trait-like propensity, or the response to a single traumatic event or more chronic exposure to highly stressful events, and (c) regarded as nothing more than cognitive avoidance or dif®culties encoding traumatic events. (5) In particular, the construct of peritraumatic dissociation could bene®t from additional elaboration and speci®cation, particularly regarding the nature of the purported dissociative state that is elicited by trauma. It is imperative that future studies provide clear operational de®nitions of dissociation so that it can be determined whether there are different antecedents and consequences of diverse manifestations of dissociation including amnesia, feelings of unreality, and depersonalization. Copyright # 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.


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(6) In general, very little is known about the way traumatic experiences are processed. The assumption that avoidance of trauma-related cues at the time of a traumatic event constitutes a defensive response has not been subjected to rigorous empirical test. Additionally, much needs to be learned regarding the antecedents of problems in encoding versus retrieval of trauma-related information, and under what circumstances gist versus peripheral memories are subject to memory distortions. More attention could be usefully devoted to explicating: (a) the motivational and reinforcing aspects of the avoidance of traumatic stimuli and cues (i.e dissociation), (b) the role played by attributions and interpretations of traumatic events in mediating memory de®cits and buffering stress-related sequelae, and (c) the role of social support or a positive family environment in mitigating dissociative reactions. (7) Perhaps the most glaring de®ciency in the literature is the scant number of studies of actual children. It is not altogether clear that research on adults will generalize to children insofar as prominent developmental differences demarcate these groups. As noted above, only two studies have addressed dissociation and false memories in children, and both investigations used memory paradigms that were focused on children's responsiveness to misleading questions. No studies have examined the relationship between dissociation in the context of (a) methodologies likely to evoke source monitoring errors or (b) studies that have examined the relationship between suggestibility effects and non-pathological forms of dissociation. (8) Major obstacles must be overcome before a seamless integration of the child and adult literatures is possible. First, the distinction between pathological and non-pathological dissociation is not as well delineated in children and adolescents as in adult populations (Hornstein and Putnam, 1992). For example, the high levels of imaginative involvements and excessive daydreaming that might resemble trance experiences in adults are more normative in young children (Putnam, 1997). Putnam (1994) also maintains that normal children often display dissociative behaviors such as imaginary companionship that would be considered abnormal in adult populations. Furthermore, certain relatively well-adjusted children engage in intense and prolonged daydreaming, elaborate complex fantasy worlds, and invent imaginary characters with distinct personality attributes. As a result, it can be extremely dif®cult to differentiate highly imaginative children who engage in adaptive daydreams and fantasy from children who use fantasy excessively as a habitual coping mechanism that places them at risk for the development of dissociative disorders. Future prospective studies should be conducted to identify variables associated with predicting which highly imaginative children will develop pathological dissociative traits over time. Second, studies that incorporate reliable and valid measures of key constructs of nonpathological as well as more pathological dissociation are needed. A major obstacle faced by researchers working with children is that measures of the construct of dissociation do not correlate consistently with one another. For example, Eisen et al. (1999a,b), reported that the A-DES and the CPAS were positively correlated (r 0.66), but the CDC shared very little variance with either the A-DES (r 0.28) or the CPAS (r 0.00). The lack of consistency in the assessment of dissociation across instruments may re¯ect a lack of agreement about how dissociation is manifested and should be measured in children. For example, the authors of the CPAS designed their scale to address the potential relationship between dissociation and eating disorders, whereas the authors of Copyright # 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.



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the A-DES did not take this relationship into consideration. In contrast to both of these instruments, the CDC is a parent report behaviour checklist. Unfortunately, there are few available indices of non-pathological dissociation (e.g. imaginative involvement, absorption, visual imagery) in children, and those measures that are available are not well established. This creates a major obstacle for researchers working in this area. Not surprisingly, we could not ®nd any studies that examined nonpathological dissociation and resistance to misleading information in children. Although children (and adults) with dissociative disorders clearly show disruptions in memory (Putnam, 1995), no empirical studies of suggestibility have focused on pathological dissociation per se, apart from the more normative aspects of this construct. Surprisingly, most of the published studies that have examined dissociation and suggestibility make no mention of data related to pathological dissociation. For example, although most adult studies in this area have used the DES to assess dissociation, the (easily derivable) DES-T scores are rarely reported. This omission is notable, if not remarkable, considering the widely accepted distinction between pathological and non-pathological dissociation. Third, measures that relate speci®cally to theory-driven hypotheses would be welcome. For instance, Freyd (1996) has proposed that sexual abuse by a primary caregiver represents a special type of betrayal that engenders coping to block awareness of the abuse. Freyd avers that dissociation of the memories of the abuse is necessary in order to maintain normal attachment and survive in the family unit. Although betrayal is posited to lead to memory loss, Freyd proposes that other types of trauma, unrelated to betrayal, should improve memory for the traumatic experience (e.g. extra-familial sexual abuse or other traumatic experiences). Empirical data have not, as yet, substantiated the hypothesis that memories for interfamilial sexual abuse experiences are more poorly recalled than extra-familial sexual abuse or other forms of abuse or childhood trauma. Scienti®c studies based on reliable and valid measures are needed to examine the interrelationships among betrayal, trauma, attachment and children's memory and suggestibility. In research on attachment and betrayal it will also be important to assess the stress-buffering effects of social support as well as the quality of the family environment independent of abuse. Whereas the extant literature is de®cient in certain respects, there are also indications that dissociation at the time of a trauma, and when expressed as a more enduring `trait', is likely to be associated with memory de®cits and distortions. Relatedly, there is reason to believe that memories that are purportedly `dissociated' and are later `recovered', in psychotherapy or elsewhere, are mutable and subject to mundane processes of memory reconstruction. In fact, the limited available evidence implies that dissociative individuals are more prone to accepting misinformation than their less dissociative counterparts, although precisely when and under what circumstances this occurs has not, as yet, been pinpointed. Over the past hundred years, the study of dissociation has been characterized by vast ¯uctuations in interest from the scienti®c community, ranging from outright neglect to guarded fascination (see Lynn and Rhue, 1994). Today, dissociative phenomena rank among the most perplexing puzzles on the scienti®c frontier. It is our hope that cognitive scientists will be at the vanguard of efforts to more ®rmly establish the study of dissociation as a legitimate area of inquiry, and that this effort will illuminate fundamental mechanisms of memory, the manifold immediate reactions and long-term adaptations to traumatic events, iatrogenic in¯uences in psychotherapy, and vulnerability to misinformation in adult and child populations. Copyright # 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.


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