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Dynamicity and dialogue Perspectives from Functional Discourse Grammar J. Lachlan Mackenzie
VU University Amsterdam The article surveys how Functional Discourse Grammar (FDG; Hengeveld & Mackenzie 2008) has responded to Simon Dik’s call for a functional grammar to have ‘psychological adequacy’ and draws parallels to similar initiatives from other approaches. After a brief history of what has later come to be known as cognitive adequacy, the impact of psycholinguistic notions on the architecture of FDG is discussed and exemplified with emphasis on how FDG confronts the tension between the static nature of a pattern model of grammar and the dynamicity of the communicative process. The article then turns to four ways in which FDG has responded in recent years to ongoing work in psycholinguistics. The first concerns how the incrementality of language production, i.e. the gradual earlier-to-later build-up of utterances, has inspired FDG’s coverage of fragmentary discourse acts and its Depth-First Principle. The second, pertaining to the role of prediction in language comprehension, is reflected in the countdown to a clause-final position PF. The third is priming, involving the reuse of elements of structure at all levels of analysis: this interferes with the mapping of function onto form in ways that have been explored in FDG. The fourth is dialogical alignment, the manner in which participants in dialogue mutually accommodate their language use; this has led to new understandings of the respective roles of FDG’s Conceptual and Contextual Components. Taken together, these developments have moved FDG towards modelling dialoguing interactants rather than an isolated speaker. Keywords: cognitive adequacy, dialogical alignment, Functional Discourse Grammar, incrementality, priming
1. Introduction1 Communicative dynamism (CD), the notion that has inspired this Special Issue, originated with a series of Czech scholars working on Functional Sentence . The work for this article was partially funded by grant FFI2013-40517-P from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness. English Text Construction 9:1 (2016), –. doi 10.1075/etc.9.1.04mac issn 1874–8767 / e-issn 1874–8775 © John Benjamins Publishing Company
Dynamicity and dialogue
erspective, notably Firbas, who defines CD as applying to a linguistic element of P any rank (within the ‘sentence’) and as indicating “the relative extent to which such an element contributes towards the further development of the communication” (1992: 7–8). Although Firbas’s discussions of CD do at times mention the speaker,2 this is typically done with respect to her attitude to the content of her sentences and not as an integral part of a theory of language production. Nevertheless, there is room for a reconsideration of dynamism as being characteristic of the development and time course of utterances in an approach that recognizes the roles of speaker and hearer in dialogue and takes on board findings and reflections that have emerged from the interplay between functional linguistics and (experimental) language psychology. One such approach is Functional Discourse Grammar (FDG; Hengeveld & Mackenzie 2008, 2014). The model of grammar proposed in the FDG literature adopts a top-down architecture, taking the speaker’s communicative intention as its starting point, passing through various levels of grammatical structure and culminating in the articulation of the utterance. Although the grammar does not claim to provide a model of speakers’ actual behaviour, it nevertheless does seek to reflect psycholinguistic evidence in its basic architecture (Hengeveld & Mackenzie 2008: 2). The notion that FDG should heed findings from psycholinguistics derives from the fact that it is rooted in the work of Simon C. Dik (1940–1995), whose Functional Grammar expressly strove to achieve ‘psychological adequacy’: Describing the language system, i.e. the system of rules underlying the construction of linguistic expressions, is not the same thing as describing the psychological structures, principles, and strategies which determine the way in which linguistic expressions are perceived, interpreted, processed, stored, retrieved, and produced. A grammar should nonetheless be psychologically adequate in that it should not be incompatible with strongly validated psychological hypotheses about language processing.(Dik 1978: 7)
This article will accordingly consider how various recent developments in the study of language production impinge upon FDG, summarizing and improving upon earlier work. It will begin by introducing the notion of psychological adequacy in Section 2, which contextualizes the brief outline of FDG to be given in Section 3, and then discuss in successive sections how the cognitive notions of incrementality (Section 4), prediction (Section 5), priming (Section 6) and dialogic alignment (Section 7) have had implications for work in FDG. The aim is to . In keeping with a welcome new convention, the speaker will be referred to as ‘she’ and the hearer as ‘he’.
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argue that the entwining of psychological and functional-linguistic work leads to an interpretation of FDG as both dynamic and dialogic (Section 8). 2. Psychological adequacy When he came up with the notion of psychological adequacy, Dik was writing at a time when many linguists favoured the idea that grammatical rules could be similar or even identical to the mental processes of a speaker who is building an utterance. In the seventies and eighties, certainly in the Netherlands where he was a young professor, the mentalist assumptions of Generative Grammar were dominating linguistics. Although opposed to many principles of C homskyan linguistics, he could not ignore the omnipresence of the model he rejected and dedicated the first chapter of Dik (1978) to highlighting differences between the two approaches. While Chomsky (1965: 18–27) distinguished observational, descriptive and explanatory adequacy as levels at which alternative grammars of the same language could be evaluated, it seems that Dik (1978: 6–9) felt compelled to put forward three functional additions. Specifically, he proposed ‘pragmatic adequacy’, which values grammatical description more highly to the extent that it is compatible with the rules governing verbal interaction; ‘typological adequacy’, which requires that the theory should be set up to provide grammars for languages of all types; and ‘psychological adequacy’, defined in the quotation above. Chomsky regarded adequacy as a technical notion permitting the evaluation and comparison of alternative grammars. For Dik, by contrast, adequacy was never such a rigorous concept. It was, however, a way of placing Functional Grammar (FG) in an alternative space by associating it with other disciplines – Grice’s (1975) pragmatics, the typology of Greenberg (1963), and cognitive psychology in general. In stating that psychological adequacy should “not be incompatible with strongly validated psychological hypotheses about language processing”, Dik did not specify which strongly validated hypotheses he was referring to. Throughout the development of FG, none of the various versions of the theory were compared against results from psycholinguistics.3 One reason for this, perhaps, is that in
. Dik (1990: 205) did, however, put forward his own hypotheses, notably that the ‘underlying clause structures’ of FG could in principle be identified with the Lco, or ‘cognitive language’, of the natural language user. The psychological implausibility of this claim was demonstrated by Nuyts (1992).
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psycholinguistics, as in linguistics, there are various approaches and numerous hypotheses and very few conclusions that all researchers in this discipline agree with. Although Dik’s psychological adequacy was an unfulfillable requirement, the awareness of a close relationship between linguistics and psychology never disappeared from the consciousness of FG practitioners and, as we shall see in Section 3, was to prove an important source of inspiration in the genesis of FDG, the successor theory to FG. As far as I can discover, the expression ‘psychological adequacy’ was invented by Simon Dik, but the tag that was most frequently applied in linguistics in general was ‘psychological reality’.4 This expression seems to have first appeared in an article published in French by Sapir (1933) in which he speaks of the impossibility of an indigène (the term is his) being aware of phonetic differences while he could have reliable intuitions about phonemes. Phonemes to Sapir have psychological reality and exist in the language user’s tacit knowledge. In more recent linguistic work psychological reality entails that linguistic theory has as its object the description of the mental reality that underlies a speaker’s behaviour, also known as her ‘competence’. The linguist does not describe languages – an activity which was rejected by generativists as unbecoming of linguists – but unveils knowledge, a position that appears necessarily to involve psychology and cognitive psychology in particular. For Dik (1997: 1), too, the task of the functional grammarian was to describe the knowledge of the NLU, the Natural Language User. He thus did not reject the idea of describing competence but extended the concept by invoking “communicative competence” (1997: 5); for all that, he was as mentalistic as those whom he opposed. In actual practice, neither in the formal nor the functional paradigm did the invocation of psychological reality have much impact. As Black & Chiat (1981: 42) observe, “[t]he notion of psychological reality has never played any role in the motivation of linguistic concepts or in linguistic argumentation”. Psychological reality was widely discussed in the seventies and eighties, notably in a book edited by Halle et al. (1981). Black & Chiat’s (1981: 44) comment about Bresnan’s own contribution to this book is that “psychological reality is no more than a programmatic commitment or a metatheoretical afterthought”.
. As pointed out by a reviewer, the term that is currently preferred is ‘cognitive adequacy’ (coined by Bakker 2005; cf. Mackenzie 2012, Butler & Gonzálvez-García 2014: 136); this term is more specific and focuses on the cognitive processes underlying language production and comprehension.
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The notion of psychological reality, however, does imply that the empirical value of the study of language is boosted by the possibility of checking linguistic hypotheses in the psychology laboratory. Initially, the tests that were carried out did not yield the hoped-for results. The hypothesis of derivational complexity (originating in Miller 1962) entailed the eminently testable idea that the processing of a sentence with a certain number of transformations would take more processing time than one with fewer. At a time when the transformations still played a decisive role in Generative Grammar, it was very seductive for psycholinguists to surmise that there was a direct relationship between derivational complexity (roughly the number of transformations) and processing. There were transformations that complexified sentences, for example those that introduced relative clauses, but also others that streamlined them, like those that eliminated the agent from a passive sentence. So a sentence like I was attacked by a thief on the beach had fewer transformations than the sentence I was attacked on the beach, since the latter involved both passivizing and disposing of the agent while the former only had passivization. Nevertheless, it proved easy to demonstrate that the processing of I was attacked on the beach takes less time than the processing of the longer sentence. The theory of derivational complexity soon faded away. But enough had been done for at least some branches of psycholinguistics to perceive themselves as offering a test bed for linguistic hypotheses, specifically those emerging from Generative Grammar. To this day, articles in psycholinguistics and neurolinguistics tend to formulate their questions in Chomskyan terms (as lamented by Pickering & Garrod 2004: 170) and many psycholinguists came to be dependent on linguistics, or rather, a certain kind of linguistics. In the eighties, the special relationship between generative linguistics and psycholinguistics continued, with Generative Grammar being presented as providing a theory of first and even second language acquisition. There were a few linguists who questioned the assumption of a close relationship between linguistic representations and mental reality but they did not have much impact. Soames (1984: 155), for example, argued that “… the formal structures utilized by optimal linguistic theories are not likely to be isomorphic to the internal representations posited by theories in cognitive psychology”. For him, the interesting question is why psychologically real systems seem to differ so strongly from linguists’ grammars, characterized as these are by the quest for simplicity and generality. Antony (2003) unearths and critiques Soames’s (1984) arguments in a defence of psychological reality: in her opinion, the goal of Generative Grammar is to explain the acquisition of language, an aim that justifies linguistics being seen as a branch of cognitive psychology. However, Devitt, a philosopher, rejects the idea that the grammar of our language is represented
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in the mind (Devitt 2006). Acuña Fariña (2005) demonstrates that the problem is ultimately a very practical one: generative syntactic theory is far from providing psycholinguists with unequivocal analyses (he shows for example that there are seven different theories of apposition in syntax, one of the simplest kinds of structure, he says, in involving “the mere juxtaposition of two NPs”, sycholinguists are also bickering over rivalling theories of lan2005: 18), while p guage processing. For work on psychological reality to succeed, he maintains, linguists and psycholinguists would have to join forces and form a single discipline. Working in isolation on a syntactic problem and then hoping to find empirical evidence in favour of one’s hypotheses has not worked well in the past and probably never will. 3. Functional Discourse Grammar The preceding outline of the role of psychological reality in Generative Grammar may serve to provide a context for a presentation of Functional Discourse Grammar (FDG) and its attitude to psychological adequacy in the face of challenges from developments in the study of language in use. The basic model of FDG is shown in Figure 1. Although the expressions ‘psychological adequacy’ and ‘cognitive adequacy’ are not mentioned in Hengeveld & Mackenzie (2008), the explicit aim of the model is to reflect psycholinguistic evidence in its architecture. For example, in adopting a strictly top-down architecture, beginning with the speaker’s communicative intention in the Conceptual Component and progressing towards the articulation of the actual utterance in the Output Component, the model does appear to mimic the real-time sequence of events in language production by the individual. However, this does not entail that FDG is a model of the speaker; rather, in the analysis of any one unit of discourse, the model shown in Figure 1 is subject to what is called ‘dynamic implementation’. This means that any run through the model involves a series of operations that are sequenced in a way that clarifies the relationships of dependency among the various components. In other words, the trajectories defined by the arrows do not indicate procedures that occur in real time, but according to Hengeveld & Mackenzie (2008: 2) “the sequence of steps that the analyst must take in understanding and laying bare the nature of a particular phenomenon”. The model itself, then, remains static and thus a ‘pattern model’ in the sense of Butler & Gonzálvez García (2014: 136). Although it has never turned into a fully-fledged ‘process model’ (as advocated and sketched out by Bakker & S iewierska 2004), its psychological/cognitive adequacy has been enhanced since the model was initially launched, as will be explained below.
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J. Lachlan Mackenzie
Conceptual Component
Frames
Formulation
Lexemes Interpersonal and
Interpersonal Level
Representational Operators
Representational Level
Templates Grammatical
Morphosyntactic Encoding
Grammatical Component
Morphosyntactic
Morphosyntactic Level
Operators Phonological Encoding Templates Suppletive forms
Contextual Component
Morphemes
Phonological Level
Phonological Operators
Output Component
Articulation
Output
Figure 1. General organization of FDG
The central unit of analysis in FDG is the Discourse Act, located at the Interpersonal Level, and this is the primary motivation for the name of the theory. A Discourse Act may correspond to a clause at the Morphosyntactic Level, but may also be realized as a clausal fragment or as some close combination of clauses; Discourse Acts are best identified in practice as corresponding to the chunks into which conversational speech naturally divides itself prosodically at the Phonological Level. Figure 1 shows the Interpersonal Level to be the initial level within the
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dynamic implementation of the Grammatical Component. Here Discourse Acts may be grouped into Moves, the highest layer of grammatical analysis recognized by FDG, with the left-right sequencing following the dynamic succession of those Acts. A Discourse Act also has internal structure, usually breaking down into four parts, namely an Illocution, the two speech participants, and the Communicated Content. The Communicated Content, in turn, breaks down into a Topic and Comment,5 and each of these consists of one or more Subacts. Subacts are either Referential or Ascriptive. The result is a hierarchical construct with various layers of analysis, in which both the dynamics of speech and the internal make-up of Discourse Acts are demonstrated. Consider the following segment from the Santa Barbara Corpus of Spoken American English (Segment SBC001), in which a transcription technique is applied that reveals the ‘chunking’ of speech:6 (1)
32.59–33.90 33.90–34.22 34.22–35.23 35.23–36.88 36.88–39.30
it takes me longer than most people, cause you know, I’m not as stro=ng and, (H) … and I’m not as good, as like somebody that would do it … all the ti=me.
Here we see five Discourse Acts (symbolized as AI, J, … in (2) below) in sequence, grouped into a Move (M) at the Interpersonal Level. The first Discourse Act (32.59–33.90) has a Declarative Illocution (DECL) with its two participants (PS and PA) and a Communicated Content (CI), which divides into a Topic (TOP) with two Referential Subacts (R), it and me, and a Comment (COMM), containing two Ascriptive Subacts (T) take and longer and the Referential Subact most people. Longer takes the Focus operator within the Comment, reflected phonologically in nuclear stress. In FDG analyses, this organization is normally shown by means of a bracketed representation as in (2a), but a tree diagram can also be used for expository purposes, as in (2b): (2a) (MI: [AI: [(FI: DECL (FI)) (PI)S (PI)A (CI: [(TOPI: [(d+sRI: [–S,–A] (RI)) (d+sRJ: [+S,–A] (RJ))] (TOPI)) (COMMI: [(TI) (Foc TJ) (i–sRK)] ( COMMI))] (CI))] (AI)] (AJ) (AK) (AL) (AM)] (MI))
. The presentation here follows Smit (2010: 85–107); in Hengeveld & Mackenzie (2008), Focus (vs Background), Topic (vs Comment) and Contrast (vs Overlap) are regarded as pragmatic functions. . The transcription of the complete SBC001 segment is available at 〈http://www.linguistics. ucsb.edu/sites/secure.lsit.ucsb.edu.ling.d7/files/sitefiles/research/SBC/SBC001.trn 〉 (Last accessed on 11 June 2015).
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(2b)
(MI) AJ
AI DECL
PS
PA
AK AL AM
CI
TOP R: it
COMM R:me
T:take
FocT:longer
R:most people
The hierarchical structure shown in (2) results from the operation of Formulation (see Figure 1). Whereas (2) reflects the dynamic sequence of Discourse Acts and the pragmatic properties of the first Discourse Act in (1) (chiefly illocution, reference and ascription), there is another level produced by Formulation, the Representational Level, which shows the semantic relations among the various elements. It is there, for example, that the semantic configuration [Action – take – I ndividual – Time] is shown as well as the configuration [Adj-er – than – I ndividual] and also the quantifier most and the Present Tense. For full details of the two Formulation Levels, see Hengeveld & Mackenzie (2008: 46–281). With the exception of the sequencing of Discourse Acts within the Move, the output of Formulation is unordered in time. Linearization of the elements is left to the next operation in dynamic implementation, Encoding, which delivers the Morphosyntactic and Phonological Levels. It will be clear even from this very initial sketch that FDG owes a great debt to psychological work on language production and in particular to the ‘blueprint of the speaker’ presented by Levelt (1989). Likewise, it will be clear that the various components of that blueprint have inspired the major elements of the FDG model, notably a Conceptualizer that generates preverbal messages (cf. FDG’s Conceptual Component), a Formulator that contains a Grammatical Encoder and a Phonological Encoder (cf. FDG’s Grammatical Component with its two operations of Formulation and Encoding) and an Articulator that executes the phonetic plan (cf. FDG’s Output Component with the operation of Articulation). Like Levelt, Hengeveld & Mackenzie (2008), too, focus on the individual and they build their grammar to run in parallel with the processes of language production, not taking language comprehension into account. The interpretation they give to psychological adequacy is that “a model of grammar will be more effective the more its organization resembles language processing in the individual” (2008: 1–2).7
. As conceded by Mackenzie (2012: 423), the relation between Levelt’s lexically driven speaker model and FDG’s grammatically driven pattern model can only be partial; he also
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The openness to impulses from ongoing work in the psychology of language that is apparent in this last quotation has been an inspiration for some adherents of FDG (Bakker & Siewierska 2004; Mackenzie 2010, 2012; Giomi 2014) to consider how FDG, with its commitment to understanding the use of language in communicative situations, can adapt its organization to reflect developments in the study of language production and comprehension without losing its status as a model of grammar. Four ways in which FDG is responding to ongoing work in psycholinguistics will be mentioned in the next sections. 4. Incrementality The basic idea of i ncrementality is very simple: each part of a linguistic unit (except for the absolute first in sequence) is an addition (or increment) with respect to the parts that precede it in time. A clause is a sequence of phrases; an intonational phrase is a series of phonological phrases; and so on. In actual speech production it often occurs (possibly in most utterances) that the speaker utters the first part of a unit without knowing at that moment exactly how things will continue. In FDG terms, while the Grammatical Component is active, the Conceptual Component is racing ahead to decide what will be said next. In psycholinguistics this is not controversial, and many linguists who wish to be more open to the ideas of psycholinguistics have developed more dynamic theories of grammar that will take account of this observation. Mackenzie (2010) presents a conspectus of grammatical approaches in which the dynamics of speech production occupies a central place, for example Kempen & Harbusch’s (2002) Performance Grammar, Kathol’s (2000) Linear Syntax, Cann et al.’s (2005) Dynamic Syntax and William O’Grady’s Emergent Syntax (2005), which each have their own specificities while giving a central place to incrementality. Firbas’s work on Communicative Dynamism shares the preoccupation with the gradual ‘left-to-right’ build-up of the elements of syntax, and the notion of incrementality has been prominent in more recent functional work, too. Butler’s (2007) exploration of incrementalism within the framework of Role and Reference Grammar is explicitly both functional and psycholinguistic in inspiration. Sinclair & Mauranen’s (2006) Linear Unit Grammar starts out from the conviction that “sequencing is critical for determining meaning” (2006: 6) and develops a grammar of English in which the linearity of contributions to conversation is key (see Mauranen, this issue). Their work is in part a development of Brazil’s (1995) Grammar of Speech. That model, too, was conceived as a real-time
admits that “the notion of cognitive adequacy gives us insufficient criteria for determining which psychological notions to import and which can be safely disregarded”.
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grammar that “operates on an essentially increment-by-increment basis” (Brazil 1995: 21). Sinclair & Mauranen adopt this notion, interpreting it primarily with reference to the advance of discourse. Another heir to Brazil’s work is Gerard O’Grady, who develops the earlier syntactic work, integrating it with the study of tone groups and exploring the psychological foundations of his proposals (see also O’Grady 2012, this issue). The integration of incrementality into FDG (Mackenzie 2005) has concentrated on the initial (or in some cases sole) constituent of the expression of the Discourse Act, theorized as occupying the initial position (PI) at the Morphosyntactic Level. Based on the insight from psycholinguistics that easily ‘retrieved’ material is processed first and less easily retrieved material later (Bock 1982), the proposal is that the Conceptual Component passes elements of the conceptual representation on to the Grammatical Component as soon as they come ‘on line’. More specifically, every Discourse Act must contain a Subact with the Focus operator. It is this Focused Subact that justifies the Discourse Act as a whole and should therefore be the first element to be activated. In various instances, if there is a lot of contextual information available to the interlocutors, simply stating the Focus is enough to achieve satisfactory communication, as when a football commentator uses a single chunk simply to identify the player on the ball, as in (3): (3) Shearer.
The result is a Discourse Act whose Communicated Content is a single Subact, much like the holophrases of babies, in FDG representation (A1: … ((C1: (Foc R/T) (C1)) (A1)). More complex Discourse Acts will contain more Subacts with different categories or functions (Topic, Contrast, etc.). Topics do not have the Discourse Act-justifying status of the Focus but are typically highly retrievable and will be rapidly passed on to the Grammatical Component; contrasted elements are different in requiring comparative processing and are likely to be slower in becoming available for expression. As a result, where everything else is equal (as it rarely is), morphosyntactic order will reflect the sequence of Subacts shown in (4):
(4) Focus – Topics – Contrast – Others
In a study of the syntax of football commentary under various degrees of time pressure (Mackenzie 2005), it was found that in highly time-pressured circumstances Focus–Topic Discourse Acts like (5) occurred, in keeping with (4): (5) A little overEAGer Ashley Cole
However, under more normal circumstances, the Representational and Morphosyntactic Levels will also be consulted, imposing ordering rules that reflect semantic or form-based considerations, as in (6):
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(6) Look at Pires running in from DEEP
Here the commentator is under no great time pressure and the Focus information (‘Pires running in from deep’) is placed by the grammar in the final position in keeping with the word-order principles of English morphosyntax. This take on the interaction between information structure and language production (cf. also Wagner 2016) provides a view on the long-standing competition between Givón’s (1989: 235) Task Urgency Principle, which states that the Focus is placed in initial position as a result of attending first to the most urgent task (as in (4)) and majority approaches such as CD, which entail final position for the Focus (as the element contributing most to the ongoing communication). Although English only favours initial position for the Focus under conditions of great communicative urgency, there are also languages in which the most newsworthy element is always placed initially, e.g. Nootka (Fortescue 2004). Certain elements of the incremental interpretation of FDG have found their way into the standard version of the theory (Hengeveld & Mackenzie 2008), for example the goal of accounting for speech acts of all degrees of explicitness, even holophrastic ones. Another is the arrangement, visible in the arrows leading directly from the Interpersonal to the Morphosyntactic and Phonological Components in Figure 1, whereby Interpersonal Level information may have a direct and immediate influence on the constitution of the Encoding levels. For example, in accounting for a Move that consists of several Discourse Acts, for example a Vocative, an Imperative Nuclear Act and a final Reinforcer, as in Harry, get lost, will you? each of the first two Discourse Acts, in accordance with Hengeveld’s (2005: 72–73) Depth-First Principle, is “sent down” for morphosyntactic and phonological encoding before the entire Move is completed.
5. Prediction A corollary of an incrementalist view of language production is that both the speaker who has initiated an utterance and the listener who is hearing it are involved in predicting what is coming up (Auer 2009) in order to determine whether more needs to be said or whether the speaker’s communicative intention is already sufficiently clear. Given the syntactic construction and prosodic contour that are already under way, the speaker is committed to considering certain types of continuation and closure and to excluding others. This anticipatory aspect of speech production was initially examined in Conversation Analysis (for example, Schegloff 1987: 71) under the flag of ‘projectability’, which was seen as a key aspect of ‘managing’ a conversation, both for the speaker of the moment and
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for the listener on the look-out for a transition-relevant place. In recent psycholinguistic and neurolinguistic work on language production and understanding, prediction has come to figure ever more prominently (e.g. Pickering & Garrod 2011); in cognitive science more generally, see Andy Clark’s (2013) view of brains as ‘prediction machines’ and Hohwy’s (2013) study of the mind as constantly minimizing prediction errors. Some studies on the interaction of grammar and conversation analysis (e.g. Tanaka 2000) have found differences in projectability according to the syntactic type of the language being spoken. In English the predicate occurs relatively early in the clause, in any case before its complements, while it occurs at the end of the clause in Japanese, possibly followed by ‘afterthoughts’ of various kinds. Tanaka demonstrates that Japanese listeners who are waiting for a transition place tend to wait for the predicate to come along. If there is an overlap of speakers, this takes place during the production of post-predicate units. Thus, the speaker of Japanese will not be interrupted until she reaches the predicate; the listener adopts an attitude of ‘wait and see’, mitigated by frequent acknowledgment signals (backchannels). At FDG’s Morphosyntactic Level, the basic syntactic and morphological positions for constituents are the absolute initial and the final positions (PI and PF respectively).8 The idea of a starting position that defines following relative positions is not unfamiliar: for example, Wackernagel’s position, occupied by the second constituent, is defined as occurring immediately after the initial position (PI+1 in (7) below).9 A characteristic of the FDG approach to morphosyntax is the recognition (in relevant languages) of a final absolute position that defines previous relative positions, i.e. a penultimate and a pre-penultimate position: (7) PI … PI+1 … PI+2 …………………………………………… PF-2 … PF-1 … PF
This mirror image set-up allows a type of countdown comparable to the attitude of the listener in Japanese and possibly all languages with the verb in final position (PF). Afterthoughts are placed in a further space known as Ppost, just as pre-clausal, ‘orientational’ units occur in Ppre. Another relevant use of PF is in the German finite clause, where with separable prefix verbs such as ablehnen ‘turn down’ the finite verb occurs in P2 and the ‘prefix’ in PF:
. It should be noted that these two positions are not relevant for all languages. Generally speaking, every language has at least one and possibly up to four absolute positions, and different combinations are possible (see Hengeveld & Mackenzie 2008: 341–342). . Where this position itself defines relative positions, it is recognized as an absolute position P2 (Hengeveld & Mackenzie 2008: 340); see (8) for an example.
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(8) Er (PI) lehn-te (P2) meinen Vorschlag (P2+1) ab (PF). 3sm lean-pst my.acc proposal off ‘He turned down my proposal.’
Here the presence of the verb lehnen followed by an NP in the accusative case promotes the hearer’s prediction that there will be a final element ab, thereby creating a transitive verb that satisfies the ongoing grammatical construction.10 This approach aligns well with Firbas’s discussion of comparable separated prefixes (as he calls them) in English, which he argues to have high CD, especially if separated from the verb by an “intervening word or group of words” (Firbas 1959: 88). Firbas does not exemplify this statement directly, but we may understand him as meaning that in (9a) the particle back has less CD than in (9b), where the noun phrase his chair intervenes between push and back (for an FDG treatment of such phrasal verbs, see Keizer 2009): (9) a. Stanley pushed back his chair.(Firbas 1959: 89) b. Stanley pushed his chair back.
6. Priming Let us now turn to priming, a psychological effect related to implicit memory, in which exposure to certain stimuli affects the response to subsequent stimuli. This concept is potentially highly relevant to understanding the relationship between grammar and psychology. The standard FDG architecture (shown in Figure 1 above), much like the majority of grammatical architectures, implies an algorithm in which every utterance is an entirely new creation that emerges from the Conceptual Component as an interlinked structure of concepts. The process of formulation translates this conceptual framework into two representations, a pragmatic one (at the Interpersonal Level) and a semantic one (at the Representational Level). From a purely grammatical point of view, all this is beyond reproach. However, this procedure creates difficulties for anyone trying to share a perspective or even
. Reviewers have rightly pointed out that this process is not purely syntactic: for example, the semantics of the accusative NP is also involved, as in (i): (i) Er lehnte das Fenster an. 3sm lean-pst def.acc window on ‘He left the window ajar.’ Fenster and Tür ‘door’, which collocate strongly with anlehnen ‘leave ajar’, denote first-order entities (x1 in FDG), while Vorschlag ‘proposal’ denotes a third-order entity (p1).
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work practices with psychologists, who have become increasingly impressed by the fact that linguistic utterances involve a high degree of reuse of elements that have already occurred in the interaction in which they are situated. For any utterance, the question arises to what extent it is new and to what extent composed of elements already activated. Many psychologists believe that every utterance originates in a combination of creativity and recycling and that this helps to explain the speed and fluency of dialogue. For the speaker, reuse equals less effort, and for the listener, too, a speaker who reuses known elements is easier to follow. The psycholinguists Ferreira & Bock (2006: 1011) address these very benefits of repetition for fluent communication and conclude that “although linguistic performance is quintessentially creative, it can also be surprisingly recapitulative”. The repetitiveness of conversational discourse is understood by many psycholinguists through the invocation of priming in speech production. Successive studies over the past decades (see Pickering & Ferreira 2008 for an overview) have revealed an unconscious trend to formulate and encode expressions in ways that are similar to previously produced expressions. The previous use is called the prime, and in psycholinguistics there is a now almost venerable tradition of studies on so-called structural priming. This concept has been applied to all aspects of linguistic production from semantic structure and the lexicon to phonology and morphosyntactic form. To mention but one phenomenon that has often been studied in both FG and FDG, alternations between syntactic structures (Mackenzie 2011), a frequently replicated finding is that the choice of a variant is affected by priming effects, all of this in the context of laboratory experimentation, of course. The switch between active and passive, the presence or absence of that in relevant subordinate and relative clauses, the prepositional dative vs. the dative object, for all these cases and many more, it has been found that an experimental subject exposed to a clause in one alternant (e.g. the passive voice) is significantly more likely to use that alternant in describing what is happening in a picture than someone who has not been so exposed. For a functionalist, a significant finding arising from this research tradition is that the power of priming may be sufficient to outweigh the functional determinants of the choice (see in particular Keizer 2014 for a treatment of the active–passive alternation). 7. Dialogical alignment The work on interpersonal or dialogical alignment that has arisen in psycholinguistics develops the work on priming. Pickering & Garrod (2004) created laboratory situations in which two experimental subjects participated in dialogues
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concerned with solving a common problem. They observed in their analysis of the transcriptions that each interlocutor tended to reuse formulations he or she had used in the same dialogue or formulations their partner had used, proving that priming also occurs in dialogue in situations that, while still created under controlled conditions, are closer to real conversation than the responses of individual subjects in laboratories. They identify a process of mutual accommodation in which interlocutors develop a kind of communicative intimacy, reflected in repetitions, parallelisms, shared formulations, coincidences in lexical choices, common morphosyntactic, prosodic or phonological preferences, as well as the phenomena of one partner completing an utterance of the other or of a speaker not completing an utterance because the listener has obviously already understood. There are antecedents to these observations in linguistic and discourseanalytical work, notably in Tannen’s (2006) work on repetition in conversation, first published in 1989, and in Herbert H. Clark’s work on conversational interaction as a ‘joint project’ (Clark 1996). Pickering & Garrod’s observations have also echoed in various areas of cognitive science: Riley et al. (2011) talk of “interpersonal synergies”; H asson et al. (2012), considering mirror neurons, speak of “brain-to-brain coupling”; and so on. A concept it is relevant to add at this point is John Du Bois’s (2014) notion of resonance. Working on the assumption that “the situated use of language is canonically dialogic” (2014: 360), he argues that the recurrence of patterns (he too focuses on morphosyntax, representing the parallels as ‘diagraphs’) generates an added value that he calls resonance. The resonance between two (or more) words or utterances offers affordances, i.e. opportunities for action, one example being their function as a handle for the child to acquire constructions and conversational norms (‘dialogic bootstrapping’, Du Bois 2014: 369). I see a certain similarity between FDG’s interest in parallelisms across representations and Du Bois’s definition of resonance as “the catalytic activation of affinities across r epresentations” (2014: 375, his emphasis).11 Although his work is situated in the American ‘WestCoast’ brand of functionalism, there are clear connections with FDG work on the psychological underpinnings of verbal interaction, as well as with the SFL tradition of work on cohesion (Halliday & Hasan 1976) with, in Du Bois’s words, its “welter of criss-crossing lines” (2014: 375). If we allow this kind of observation to impact our discourse-grammatical work, as I think we must, then this will entail no longer seeing verbal interaction as the mere transfer of information from speaker to hearer, as the FDG model tends
. Although Du Bois does not mention FDG as such, he characterizes himself as doing “discourse-functional grammar” (2014: 399).
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to suggest, but rather as a process of the mutual alignment of the various levels of the grammatical activity of both parties. After all, the speaker who is formulating and encoding a message has just decoded another and therefore is inspired by all possible details of that previous message: its pragmatic structure, as well as its semantic, morphosyntactic, phonological and phonetic make-up. The previous utterance serves as a kind of help from the other party, just as that other party continues to offer support with feedback, backchannels, reactions, eye movements, hand gestures, etc. Of course, there is a creative element in human words, which comes from the irreducibly individual Conceptual Component. But the Contextual Component can serve to model what the interlocutors share; in Hengeveld & Mackenzie (2014) and especially Mackenzie (2014) and Giomi (2014), it has been proposed that the Contextual Component is stratified and that each stratum interacts with corresponding operations carried out by the grammar in the processes of formulation and encoding.12 In order to accommodate the notions invoked here, I have proposed ( Mackenzie 2014) to model the Contextual Component, which in the standard model of FDG flanks the other components (see Figure 1), as being shared by the interactants in a dialogue. In this approach, the Contextual Component is stratified in the same way as the grammar, with interpersonal, representational, morphosyntactic and phonological strata. The analyses at each level are stored (for a while at least) at the appropriate strata of the shared Contextual Component, from where they can influence the formulation and encoding of subsequent utterances. The final form of any discourse act thus flows from both the individual Conceptual Component and the shared Contextual Component, an architecture that captures
. It should be stressed that the view of the Contextual Component sketched here is not uncontroversial among practitioners of FDG (for a rather complete account of the history of the debate, see Butler 2013: 32–35). A major opponent of the view adumbrated here is Connolly (2014), who proposes that the Contextual Component houses not only linguistic information but also the entire range of non-verbal, physical and socio-cultural information that can impinge in any way upon grammatical operations; another is Cornish, who points out that a restricted Contextual Component does not do justice to “the complexity of the contextual factors which impinge on his or her actual utterance acts in some specific context” (2013: 83) and proposes, programmatically, a model of the wider discourse context which fully subsumes FDG. Butler (2013: 36) is sympathetic to Connolly’s and Cornish’s more embracing approaches and calls for the inclusion of “systematic quantitative information” in the Contextual Component that will permit an account of both probabilistically conditioned variation and of the inferences needed for anaphor resolution and other purposes. Hengeveld & Mackenzie (2014) do not deny the cognitive and interactional reality of probabilistic and inferential processes but regard these as general properties of human cognition rather than specifically linguistic.
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the interplay of individual goals and strategies within a dialogue and the mutuality of the dialogic situation. 8. C onclusion The claim embodied in this paper is that FDG, if re-interpreted as a dialogical model, is capable of attaining a greater degree of ‘psychological adequacy’ by accommodating two major lines of thought that are current in various streams of cognitive psychology. One direction of change exploits the notions of incrementality and prediction/projection to model the communicative dynamism of the discourse act as a reflection of the conceptual processes that underlie speech. The other theoretical renewal is the claim that the Contextual Component, rather than being a static repository of background facts, is actively involved in the creation of common ground and shared understandings. In these ways, FDG, without jettisoning its primary principles, can come to model dialoguing interactants rather than an isolated ‘speaker’. Such a change will strengthen connections with the growing movement in discourse analysis and psycholinguistics towards the position that language production and comprehension are essentially collaborative processes. The proposal is that the production of each interactant is subject to priming from their own or from their partner’s earlier Formulation and Encoding choices. The result is a model of FDG which, while retaining all the sophistication of the original model oriented to the individual speaker, is inherently dialogic.
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