Education-Profession: Gaps and Intersections

Education-Profession: Gaps and Intersections. Emphasis in Marketing : The Win-win-win papakonstantinidis model and the High Risk Ethical Priorities (HREP)1

LEONIDAS Words: 9987 < 10.000

Education-Profession: Gaps and Intersections. Emphasis in Marketing: The Win-win-win papakonstantinidis model and the High Risk Ethical Priorities (HREP) 1 Papakonstantinidis LA

Abstract

Given gaps and intersections between education-profession marketing, this article goes on the next step Efforts are focused on "what must be done", what policy must be applied so that gaps and intersections must be eliminated, that means "all about the graduated from any education level could be absorbed by the labor market in a time period Conventional policies have failed and alternative solutions are promoted from the scientific community Among them, there are scientists who propose quite new forms, as the compassion-social entrepreneur In this volume-section a quite radical reversal concept is proposed Instead of “good trade practices” in the frame of a high risk hard competitive market’s environment”, the “High Risk Ethical Priorities” is proposed taking into account market trends, and competition From this point of view, the term of “High Risk Ethical Priorities” (HREP) is introduced (for the first time), by this article Finally, Two criteria, the Chi-square and the NE2 have been used, in order the point of the unique equilibrium (deviation=0) be detected

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Papakonstantinidis LA (2018)The term “High Risk Ethical Priorities (HREP)” is launched into the socio-economic perspective data, by this IGI-GLOBAL volume; it expresses the hopeful expectation of the author on reconstructing a new word, in which “Ethical Priorities” will have the role of the market, with some necessary market constraints-for its operation,. That is quite different from the competitive capitalistic perception (competitive market, under the constraints of a minimum ethical market conditions) In the first case, people act with the “Ethic Rule’s expected payoffs In the second case, payoffs (or incentives for someone to participate in a deal or bargain) are the expected individual profit The “Ethical” side is introduced by the form of “bargaining constraints” (i. e law rules against the violence in bargain and during the bargain) 2

Nash Equilibrium

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Keywords: “win - win- win papakonstantinidis model”, HREP Priorities, Social Welfare, social entrepreneurship, the Impossibility Theorem (Arrow) the Incompleteness Theorem (Gödel) Pareto Efficiency, Nash Equilibrium, the Rawls Theorem on Justice, sensitization, team psychology, The “Principle-Agent Theory”, Egalitarianism, Utilitarianism

Discussion

Starting from the given thesis that gaps and intersections between education and profession marketing exist, then, new policy aspects may be detected, thus deriving incentives of looking for new forms of marketing organization: The shift to the philosophy of modern literature is now visible as the last decade writers propose to return to Moral Values close to Human Being and less close to numbers 3 A scientific dialogue is starting on what entrepreneurship is now define and if “social compassion” organizations could have the same treatment It is obvious that capitalism is impossible to go on with this form In this frame, HREP (High Risk Ethical Priorities) is launched as a new form of a radical perception view of marketing, which resulted from the “win-win-win Papakonstantinidis model” application in socioeconomic forms

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Nash, Jr., John F. 1950a. "The bargaining problem." Econometrica 18:155-162. Nash, Jr., John F. 1950b. "Equilibrium points in n-person games." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences U.S.A. 36:48-49. Nash, Jr., John F. 1951. "Non-cooperative games." Annals of Mathematics 54:289-295. Nash, Jr., John F. 1953. "Two-person cooperative games." Econometrica 21:128-140.

John F. Nash, Jr.(1950) The Bargaining Problem Econometrica Vol. 18, No. 2 (Apr., 1950), pp. 155-162 Published by: The Econometric Society DOI: 10.2307/1907266 (Nash Solution) 3

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"What is a Disregarded Entity – Disregarded Entity Definition". Biztaxlaw.about.com. 13 July 2013. Freer Spreckley (1981). "Social Audit – A Management Tool for Co-operative Working" Beechwood College. "Social Enterprise - Harvard Business School". Hbs.edu. Retrieved 24 May 2013. Nicholls, A. (2006) Social Entrepreneurship: New Models of Sustainable Social Change, Oxford: Oxford University Press. A social enterprise is an organization that applies commercial strategies to maximize improvements in financial, social and environmental well-being—this may include maximizing social impact alongside profits for external shareholders. Social enterprises can be structured as a for-profit or non-profit, and may take the form (depending in which country the entity exists and the legal forms available) of a co-operative, mutual organization, a disregarded entity,a social business, a benefit corporation, a community interest company, a company limited by guarantee or a charity organization.

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Definitions

Definitions 1. Marketing education4 is a degree program option where students learn how to move products from concept to consumer. Learn more about what marketing education entails in this lesson. The discipline of marketing is built upon three areas of interdisciplinary content. These foundations of economics, human resource skills and marketing concepts 2.

Marketing profession: The action or business of promoting and selling products or services, including market research and advertising.5 On the distance between the 2 forms of marketing, the (1) win-win-win papakonstantinidis model and (2) HREP are building on

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3.

The “win-win-win papakonstantinidis model” is - more than a methodological tool for conflict resolution and “measuring” social welfare, based on deviations- a mechanism for a new bargaining ethic, taking into consideration the Community profit6, (the “C’ factor) in terms of grades of freedom, into the bargain and during the bargain, thus strengthening social cohesion, solidarity and respect to other

4.

High Risk Ethical Priorities (HREP) are “payoffs” expected by people who dedicate time money, or even their own lives in implementing of an ethical priority, as for example to save a human life- see at “doctors without borders” who everyday risk their lives, to save another life. As “free will” is the greatest human conquest, these doctors want to be in war zones, it is not

High School Marketing for Teachers: Help & Review / Business Courses Next Lesson What Is Marketing Education? Oxford dictionary

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Papakonstantinidis LA (2002) “the win-win-win model” Euracademy Summer School Visby University SW (Aug 14): The term “Community” is used for different means as village, city, state union of states, common Values, traditions, common History, ..anything that concerns “Social Cohesion”

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imposed

Introduction

Suppose that President Putin (Russia) and President Trump (USA) decide to launch joint oil drilling in the Arctic Ocean (where ,their common borders are ) after long-term negotiations that result in benefits (win-win) and mutual positions for their countries (Russia-US, respectively)- see map Is this agreement Ok from the socioeconomic view? The answer in this “old” question, is NO Any re-active agreement, or disagreement (whatever small or big, on how drive a car or bicycle, from “baby cry towards the UN decision, are based on the Nash “Bargaining Problem” according to which the decision of one is depended on the decision taken by the other part of a win-win negotiation So from the concept of Neumann-Morgenstern (1940) “zero sum two players game”, where the “winner takes it all” ten years later (1950) John Forbs Nash focuses on “shares”, detached from the result (the outcome)

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The win-win agreement [or even disagreement] does not concerns the two Global leaders [or even the Russia-US population, bat [it concerns 7 billion population, the Global population by “di-chain reactions” Starting from this super-simple paradigm, we extended it, as to interpret a number of Different scientific fields, economics, sociology, psychology, history, are included in the re-active behavior and decision making, due to re-active Starting from this simple paradigm, it is understood that any bargain, any re-active behavior, in any bargain between 2 does not concern these but all the population of the planet; according to Lorentz paradigm the butterfly effect7 state In chaos theory, the butterfly effect is the sensitive dependence on initial conditions in which a small change in one state of a deterministic nonlinear system can result in large differences in a later state It is believed that human relations-especially after the New Technologies evolution-have been become very sensitive, as the whether /climate phenomena are

Lorenz Eduard (1963) “Can a Butterfly in Brazil Really Cause a Tornado in Texas?” This concept butterfly effect was initially used in theories about weather prediction but later the term became a popular metaphor in science writing .In chaos theory, the butterfly effect is the sensitive dependence on initial conditions in which a small change in one state of a deterministic nonlinear system can result in large differences in a later. The name, coined by Edward Lorenz for the effect which had been known long before, is derived from the metaphorical example of the details of a hurricane (exact time of formation, exact path taken) being influenced by minor perturbations such as the flapping of the wings of a distant butterfly several weeks earlier. Lorenz discovered the effect when he observed that runs of his weather model with initial condition data that was rounded in a seemingly inconsequential manner would fail to reproduce the results of runs with the unrounded initial condition data. A very small change in initial conditions had created a significantly different outcome 7

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Methodology

The Article deals with the timely Marketing Education and Marketing Profession gaps’ and intersections’ elimination by smart policies, taking into account human needs, -more than a typical entrepreneurship behavior- under the prism of neo-introducing “High Risk Ethical Priorities” (HREP) terminology, and the “win-win-win papakonstantinidis model” It is looking out for coincidences and “distances” between the 2, taking into account the competitiveness in the market An approach, education/profession be given as “cost” on the other has been done Research outcomes are given by the application of “Chi-Square” and the Nash Equilibrium (NE) An ideal condition –the “angels case” is looked to facilitate the “measured deviation” be done In the case of Chi-square and the NE coincidence, in the higher level, then the absolute equilibrium may resulted [sample from population and the absolute cooperation – expected agreement-disagreement payoffs are equal – see the HREP EQUATION, below

HREP EQUATION:

As education and profession marketing’s gaps and intersections are concerned given, the article is focused on the new-introductory terms, i.e i. The win-win-win papakonstantinidis model, and ii. The “High Risk Ethical Priorities

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Analysis i.

The win-win-win papakonstantinidis model

According to fluent literature Nash-Arrow…social problems,(Bargaining/Impossibility Theory/theorem respectively, as poverty, children deaths, due mostly interpreted by the bargaining theory and the Nash bargaining solution, 8 also accepting the Kenneth Arrow Theorem (Social Voting Impossibility, 1950)9 work, intends to prove that marketing in double expression (education and profession) could co-exist with the social behavior What is needed on this point, is the “bridge” to joint rationality10,11 with collective actions directed in serving a common objective, i.e the environmental protection12 or compassion task From this point of view, marketing has an important role to derive justification for this choice, and not to reproduce an individual –rational norm At any case, “Environmental Protection” combined with "social welfare" 13 and social behavior, may be accepted as a "tri-polar" (instead of bipolar) perception of any interaction between people, local communities, organizations, states, including the Community as the intermediate pole In this case, a Community that ensures social cohesion among its population, must be concern as “Intermediate Community” (or the “C” factor, or the third “win”) On this point, an information is needed: The “Intermediate Community” is not simple a third player in a “n-tuples game with more than 2 players14based on re-active behavior”: It is more from them, as Community –the intermediate community-has also the role of agent of the other players, in the frame of an Principal-Agent Theory It has also the role of arbitrator and the role of the Leader in an LMX approach … it operates as a rainbow over separate colors The Intermediate Community 15-, or the "C" factor the community as “rainbow” synthesis/analysis It is the “rainbow concept”16 If it is true, then it will be feasible a social welfare policy in a new world 8

John F. Nash, Jr.(1950) The Bargaining Problem Econometrica Vol. 18, No. 2 (Apr., 1950), pp. 155-162 Published by: The Econometric Society DOI: 10.2307/1907266 9 Arrow, Kenneth J. (1950). "A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare" (Journal of Political Economy. 58 (4): 328–346. doi:10.1086/256963. JSTOR 1828886. 10 The German sociologist Max Weber proposed an interpretation of social action that distinguished between four different idealized types of rationality. The first, which he called Zweckrational or purposive/instrumental rationality, is related to the expectations about the behavior of other human beings or objects in the environment. These expectations serve as means for a particular actor to attain ends, ends which Weber noted were "rationally pursued and calculated. 11 Weber M Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus) tlnsl in Greek AND in Weber's Rationalism and Modern Society, Edited and Translated by Tony Waters and Dagmar Waters, New York: Palgrave Macmillan and 12 13

The article’s questionnaire has been based on marketing that promotes the necessity of environmental protection Papakonstantinidis LA (2010)“Socio-sustainable Development, ION Ed 2010

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Nash J.F (1951) "Non-cooperative Games", Annals of Mathematics (54): 286–95, 1951: game, with more than 2 players Papakonstantinidis LA (2011/10) “The intermediate Community A behavioral / bargaining Approach for conflict resolution at the Local Level/ Bayesian Analysis” Presentation in the World Conference EMPRI/EuroMed (Web Sciences- IF 3) titled “Business Research Challenges in a Turbulence Era” Cyprus –Tel Aviv Universities, ISBN: 978-9963-711-01-7 book of Proceedings, pp – 1374-1387- Blind reviewers evaluation 15

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that will not resemble the current (centralized structure) It also is about the classification of the simplest singular theoretical points on an hypothetic surface C (all bargaining behaviors) that do not depend on the orientation of C in space. This scientific proposal, once recorded as such, classified and analyzed a number of other theories and models, tried to put down a "new" concept of an alternative approach of "socio-economic welfare" for the sole purpose to demonstrate that it is possible a new tripolar concerning17 instead of bipolar crumbling over time, producing increasingly more injustice, inequality, misery, depression This based on: a. The set theory(Cantor18,19 and Zemelo20), Principal –Agent theory21 the Ultimatum theory 22 and the bargaining Nash theory23,24,25,26 b. The incompatibilities of 5 famous theorems ant 3 theories: The win-win-win papakonstantinidis model, consists from discrete and independent “parts” with independent will and way of thinking: These are fundamental requisitions of a SET From this point of view, win-win-win theory may be seen as “agency theory”, in the frame of “SET theory” (Cantor)27 (ZFC)28: The concept here is that the "set theory" deals with sets which informally are collections of objects. Any type of object can be collected into a set From this point of view, the win-win-win perception includes “sets of behaviors” that obey in common rules (axioms) It is an “Agency Theory” (or an application of the agency theory) because the individual must go beyond narrow personal interest and thought about the man who is to him and negotiates with him. This is the core of the suggestion Due to agency theory win-win-win papakonstantinidis model, help the researchers and University students to think twice (a) as the principle and (b) as agent of the whole community so to win So, “agency theory” introduces them to the double thinking leading thus, in limit, to a triple pole win (win-win-win) Furthermore, the "agency theory" produces “behaviors” of a double direction: one for him/her/self and the other for the "principle" The third part of negotiations (even under-informed) can induce the other party to reveal their information. They can

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Papakonstantinidis L.A (2016) the “Rainbow Concept”: “Social Welfare” Part of the Book, Dardanos Ed. Papakonstantinidis L.A (2002) the “win-win-win model” Euracademy Thematic Guide “Rural Development’ vol 1 iss 1 University of Visby, Gotland,SW Aug 14, 2002 18 Cantor, Georg (1874), "Ueber eine Eigenschaft des Inbegriffes aller reellen algebraischen Zahlen" Journal für die Reine und Angewandte Mathematik 77: 258–262, 19 Johnson, Phillip E. (1972),"The Genesis and Development of Set Theory", The Two-Year College Mathematics Journal 3 (1): 55 20 Zermelo, Ernst (1908), "Untersuchungen über die Grundlagen der Mengenlehre I", Mathematische Annalen 65 (2): 261– 281English translation: Heijenoort, Jean van (1967), "Investigations in the foundations of set theory", From Frege to Gödel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 1879-1931, Source Books in the History of the Sciences, Harvard Univ. Press, pp. 199–215 21 Eisenhardt, K.M.. (1989). Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review. The Academy of Management Reivew, 14(1), 57-74. 22 Sanfey, Alan; Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, Cohen (13 June 2003). "The Neural Basis of Economic Decision-Making in the Ultimatum Game" Science 300 (5626): 1755–1758. 23 Nash, John (1950). "The Bargaining Problem" Econometrica 18 (2): 155–162. 24 Nash J.F. (1950) "Equilibrium Points in N-person Games", Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (36): 48–9, 1950, http://www.pnas.org/cgi/reprint/36/1/48, 25 Nash J.F (1950) (36): 48–9, 1950"Equilibrium Points in N-person Games", Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 26 Nash J.F (1951) "Non-cooperative Games", Annals of Mathematics (54): 286–95, 1951 17

27 28

Cantor (1879) "Ueber unendliche, lineare Punktmannichfaltigkeiten (1)" Mathematische Annalen 15 (1): 1–7. Zermelo, Ernst (1908). "Untersuchungen über die Grundlagen der Mengenlehre I", Mathematische Annalen 65 (2): 261–

281, doi:10.1007/bf01449999. English translation: Heijenoort, Jean van (1967), "Investigations in the foundations of set theory", From Frege to Gödel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic

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provide a menu of choices in such a way that the choice depends on the private information of the other party29. It is a “Justice Theory30: "...no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like. I shall even assume that the parties do not know their conceptions of the good or their special psychological propensities. The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance. From this view, Community could be characterized –according to the model- as the right-wing judge It is finally a bargaining theory (or an application of bargaining theory) as it relates to each infinitesimal agreement or disagreement that people have when dealing with each other and produce results fairly, or (most times) unjustly and even inequalities The aim of this theoretical contribution (if it exists) is to highlight the "SENSITIZATION ability" that everyone of us either relates to refugees, or in countries, whether in claiming or even in our daily transactions It is time to stop looking only personal interest or “individual defense” In particular, the proposal deals with the collecting, classifying and comparing the theoretical material from various sources on the functioning of Social Welfare Function (SWF), towards building a strong “body” with logical and coherent arguments, towards the one Triple Pole (A-B-COMMUNITY) Equilibrium (TPE), different from N.E, that leads to the Social Bargaining Solution” (SBS) and coincides with the "optimal" Community Collective Choice (CCC) in order to create a highly versatile tool, “the win-win-win papakonstantinidis model” of well-formed formulas (wffs), Based on this model, in practical level, the ambitious is to create a series of new policies to strengthen social welfare, despite the "impossibility theorem" (K. Arrow 1951) win

win win papakonstantinidis

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29

Stiglitz Joseph E. (1975) The Theory of "Screening," Education, and the Distribution of Income- The American Economic Review Vol. 65, No. 3 (Jun., 1975), pp. 283-300 30 John Rawls (1971)A Theory of Justice Belknap Edition, 1971

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▀ RELATION BETWEEN EDUCATION AND PROFESSION

EDUCATION IN TERMS OF PROFESSION PROFESSION IN TERMS OF EDUCATION

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LABOR DEMAND IN IN TERMS OF LOW LEVEL OF EDUVATION: EMPLOYMENT LABOR SUPPLY IN TERMS OF HIGH EDUCATION’s UNEMPLOYMENT

INTERPRETATION

“Education-profession relation” gives us the opportunity to define each of them, as the cost of another: Now, education has two different distinct costs 1.

The family cost-the parents’ cost for their children studies [rentals, home, food, books, computer clothes..] and

2.

The other cost: the cost of unemployment-at least, during their studies

[The relation education-profession is negative, as the negative slop towards the beginning of the axles in the above graph: The more education, the less profession, The more profession, the less education The adoption of the win-win-win papakonstantinidis model could help to measurement the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) to each of them with the other (in terms of agreement-disagreement deviation)

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High Risk Ethical Priorities

What HREP is? Till now, good trading practices was a presuppose (?) in a hard competitive world What we intend now, is the reverse image: Ethical Priorities, of High Risk, under the condition of a free market

Pre-supposes Priorities (%) The field of action

liberalisms

conservatives

communism

HREP

in a competitive World

85

75

60

5

In a future World less competitive, more respect the other’s personality

15

25

40

95

Papakonstantinidis 2018

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The field of action

100

-

socialist

-

HREP

-

Jobs creation

Labor market/syndicat es

HREP

Communism

In a world

Profit

competitive World

In a future World less competitive, more respect the other’s personality

Conservatism stability

Liberalism

presupposes

l

(%) accepted

40

10

50

-

-

20

80

-

-

100

-

-

Papakonstantinidis 2018

See that old people-conservatives, mostly, invest in the future. In the opposite, young people claim direct profit in their bargain

Definition is approached through the register of its characteristics: Let’s start from a paradigm,

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“Doctors without borders ” activities, especially those in war zones, could be considered as of “High Risk Ethical Priorities” due to their not only saving lives but one more, endangering their own lives These scientists could choice their “profession environment” in a good hospitality, far of the war zones..But they prefer to serve there, putting their lives at risk -endangering their own lives this is the compendium of self-sacrificing and solidarity Saving a life is extreme “Ethical Priority” , but doing it by endangering your own life is the holistic view of the High Risk Ethical Priority (HREP) Now, people from marketing Profession who promote this task , looking for a new doctors on war zones are also HREP, if and only if they have to lose their positions, due to this promotion [i.e for promoting persona non grata according to their Governments, thus endangering to be fired for this]

From the above mentioned, resulted that 1.

HREP are the people’s actions by their own choice and decision, vs the micro-economic rational behavior Except some few cases, HREP overcome rationality and thus cannot be included in economic thought

2.

HREP are included in free will” philosophy, the west type democracies have based on

3.

HREP i included in the “romantic” view of life, meeting self-sacrifice, bravery, value humanity, respect, recognition

4.

HREP may be concerned as the higher level of offering to all people

5.

Finally HREP is “out of market rules” and from this, cannot be measured

▀

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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Ethical Priorities: Aspects on “Moral Philosophy” A brief review to philosophical aspects: Ethical Perception

The “GOOD” coming from GOD Ancient Greek Philosophy focused on the “Society” and the “human being” as a part of the society: They tabled “man” in the Society, not in a separate logic On the opposite, Thomas Hobbes focused on “individual” That was a huge change from the one syllogism to another : Citizens in Greek Athens and Sparta were peer in their class: They have only 3 responsibilities: (i) to vote their Laws in “Ecclesia of Dimos” (ii) to go to war for fighting and (iii) to follow their Philosophical Academy (where they were) One more, in Sparta the healthy young men were separate from their families and involved in society, were educated in the art of war Over than two and half -at least, in Europe- thousand (2500) years (starting from the written history’s period) people have involved in timeless philosophical, focusing in “human happiness” and the social welfare; first of all, there is not a common accepted definition concerned either “social welfare” or “happiness” or even “good Here ”Community as total GOOD” The Greek Ancient Philosopher Socrates (469-399 b.C)31 believed that self-knowledge was sufficient to live a good life. He concerned that “knowledge is equivalent to virtue. People can reach absolute knowledge say, just follow the correct method.. One has to seek knowledge and wisdom before the other private interests. The knowledge sought as a means of moral action. The logic is a prerequisite to live a good life. Our true happiness depends on whether you do what is right. You cannot be happy if you act in contrary to what you believe32”

31

Dorion Louis-André(2013), L'Autre Socrate. Études sur les écrits socratiques de Xénophon, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 2013 May, H. (2000) “On Socrates Wadsworth”/Thomson Learning, p. 20.

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Aristotle (384-322)33 Aristotle’s emphasis was on good reasoning combined with his belief in the scientific method forms the backdrop for most of his work. For example, in his work in ethics and politics, Aristotle identifies the highest good with intellectual virtue; that is, a moral person is one who cultivates certain virtues based on reasoning.

Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics34 The Nicomachean Ethics is widely considered one of the most important historical philosophical works, and had an important impact upon the European Middle Ages 35 Aristotle argues that the correct approach for studying such controversial subjects as Ethics or Politics which involve discussing what is beautiful or just is to start with what would be roughly agreed to be true by people of good upbringing and experience in life, and to work from there to a higher understanding. a contemplation about good living, because it also aims to create good living. It is therefore connected to Aristotle's other practical work, the Politics, which similarly aims at people becoming good. Ethics is about how individuals should best live, while the study of politics is from the perspective of a law-giver, looking at the good of a whole community. Taking this approach, Aristotle begins by saying that the highest good for humans, the highest aim of all human practical thinking, is eudaimonia, a Greek word often translated as well-being or happiness Aristotle in turn argues that happiness is properly understood as an on-going and stable dynamic a way of being in action (energeia) specifically appropriate to the human “soul” (psyxi)at its most "excellent" or virtuous (virtue translates arête in Greek). If there are several virtues then the best and most complete or perfect of them will be the happiest one. An excellent human will be a person good at living life, who does it well and beautifully (kalos). Aristotle says that such a person would also be a serious (spoudaios) human being, in the same sense of "serious" that one contrasts serious harpists with other harpists. He also asserts as part of this starting point that virtue for a human must involve reason in thought and speech (logos) as this is an aspect (an ergon, literally meaning a task or work) of human living. Character here translates ēthos in Greek, related to modern words such as ethics, ethical and ethos Aristotle does not however equate character 33

“Aristotle”(1998) entry in Collins English Dictionary HarperCollins Publishers, 1998

34

Τσάτσος Κωνσταντίνος (1980) Η κοινωνική φιλοσοφία των αρχαίων Ελλήνων, σσ. 176-258, Εστία, 19803η

35

Ross, David (1925). Aristotle The Nicomachean Ethics: Translated with an Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Re-

issued 1980, revised by J. L. Ackrill and J. O. Urmson.

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with habit (ethos in Greek, with a short "e") because real character involves conscious choice, unlike habit. Instead of being habit, character is a hexis like health or knowledge, meaning it is a stable disposition which must be pursued and maintained with some effort. However, good habits are described as a precondition for good character. Starting point for the west Europe philology is divided in two (2) main philosophical currents (although were guided by those bases provided by the classical ancient Greek thought): o o

Classical Utilitarianism36, which started with the slogan “The greatest happiness for the greatest number”37 and Welfare Economics, which is supposed to increase national welfare Example:

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) 38, The pure state of nature or "the natural condition of mankind" was deduced by the 17th century English philosopher in “Leviathan” in his earlier work on the Citizen” Hobbes argued that all humans are by nature equal in faculties of body and mind (i.e., no natural in equalities are so great as to give anyone a "claim" to an exclusive "benefit David Hume (1711-1776)39 Beginning with his “A treatise of Human Nature” (1739), Hume strove to create a total naturalistic “science of man” that examined the psychological basis of human nature In opposition to the rationalists who preceded him, most notably Rene Descartes

he concluded

that desire rather than reason governed human behavior. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)40 Kant argued that our experiences are structured by necessary features of our minds. In his view, the mind shapes and structures experience so that, on an abstract level, all human experience shares certain essential structural features. J. J. Rousseau (1712-1778)41 Rousseau claimed that the state of nature was a primitive condition without law or morality, which human beings left for the benefits and necessity of cooperation. As

36

Bentham, Jeremy (1776).’A Fragment on Government 1st edition(1776- Printed for T. PAYNE, at the Mews-Gate; P. EMILY,)

Retrieved 31 January 2013. 37

John Stuart Mill (1861) Utilitarianism Editor: John M. Robson (1861) Thomas Hobbes (1651) “Leviathan or The Matter, Forme and Power of a Common Wealth Ecclesiastical and Civil” OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS (1651)- new edition by Noel Malcolm Awarded one of the three inaugural British Academy Medals, 2013 38

39

David Hume A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-1740)- The Oxford Philosophical Texts edition (Being an Attempt to introduce

the experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects. (1739–40) Hume intended to see whether the Treatise of Human Nature met with success, and if so to complete it with books devoted to Politics and Criticism. However, it did not meet with success. As Hume himself said, "It fell dead-born from the press, without reaching such distinction as even to excite a murmur 40

among the zealots and so was not completed. Immanuel Kant, 1787(1781 1st edition) Also, “The Critique of Pure Reason Critique of Pure Reason (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant)” (German: Kritik der reinen Vernunft, KrV) first published in 1781, second edition 1787- Editortranslator Paul Guver and Allen W. Wood (1999)

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society developed, division of labor and private property required the human race to adopt institutions of law. In the degenerate phase of society, man is prone to be in frequent competition with his fellow men while also becoming increasingly dependent on them. This double pressure threatens both his survival and his freedom. According to Rousseau, by joining together into civil society through the Social Contract and abandoning their claims of natural right individuals can both preserve themselves and remain free. This is because submission to the authority of the general will of the people as a whole guarantees individuals against being subordinated to the wills of others and also ensures that they obey themselves because they are, collectively, the authors of the law. Classical utilitarianism42: The origins of utilitarianism are often traced as far back as the Greek philosopher Epicurus but, as a specific school of thought, it is generally credited to Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) (Utilitarianism) Utilitarianism retains the Epicurean view that humans naturally seek pleasure and avoid pain,) J.Bentham (1748-1832)43: Utilitarianism theory-cardinal utility function)

became a leading

theorist in Anglo-American philosophy of law Bentham’s utilitarianism is based on a number of assumptions44 like, Each individual knows best what is good for him/her, Each individual should decide him/herself in private matters, The welfare of an individual doesn’t depend on other individual’s welfare…From the other hand, John Stuart Mill45 was better known as the author of Principles of Political Economy (1848)46, a work that tried to show that economics was not the "dismal science" that its radical and literary critics had supposed. Its philosophical interest lay in Mill's reflections on the difference between what economics measured and what human beings really valued John Rawls (A Theory of Justice 1971)47. Rawls belongs to the social contracts tradition. However, Rawls' social contract takes a different view from that of previous thinkers. Specifically, Rawls develops what he claims are principles of justice through the use of an artificial device he calls the Original position in which everyone decides principles of justice from behind a veil of ignorance. This "veil" is one that essentially blinds people to all facts about themselves so they cannot tailor principles to their own advantage:

41

J.J. Rousseau (1762) Du contrat social ou Principes du droit politique 1st edition local/editor: Amsterdam, Holland MetaLibri edition: 2008 October 42 Jeremy Bentham (1st edition :1789,…d. ed 1907 ) An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation- Oxford Clarenton Press 43 Jeremy Bentham (1st edition :1789,…d. ed 1907 ) An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation- Oxford Clarenton Press 44 Kleinewefers Hener(2008) 37-38 Short History of Welfare Economics- Einführung in die Wohlfahrtsökonomie, Verlag W. 45 BLTC http://www.utilitarianism.com/jsmill.htm 46

John Stuart Mill (1848) Principles of Political Economy Economics, Finance and Management Department of the University of

Bristol 47 John Rawls(1971) A Theory of Justice 1971- Harvard University Press 1971 (1st Edition)

18


Capitalism48: The historical context of classical economics was the age of enlightenment the French Revolution (1789-1799) and the Industrial Revolution Classical economics is widely regarded as the first modern school of economic thought It is the idea that free markets can regulate themselves. Its major developers include Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Thomas Malthus and John Stuart Mill Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations49 in 1776 is usually considered to mark the beginning of classical economics. The school was active into the mid 19th century and was followed by neoclassical economics in Britain beginning around 1870. Classical economists attempted and partially succeeded to explain economic growth and development. Wealth of Nations (1776)50

Karl Marx (1818-1883)51 Marx's theories about society, economics and politics—the collective understanding of which is known as “Marxism” hold that human societies progress through class struggle a conflict between an ownership class that controls production and a dispossessed laboring class that provides the labor for production.

Marxism52 "The relations of capital assume their most externalized and most fetish-like form in interest-bearing capital We have here value, without the process that

, money creating more money, self-expanding effectuates these two extremes. In merchant's

capital, , there is at least the general form of the capitalistic movement, although it confines itself solely to the sphere of circulation, so that profit appears merely as profit derived from alienation; but it is at least seen to be the product of a social relation, not the product of a mere thing. (...) This is obliterated in

, the form of interest-bearing capital. (...)

Mahatma Gandhi (1869–1948)53 quotes: “Happiness is when what you think, what you say, and what you do are in harmony.”Quotes: “When it (violence) appears to do good, the good is only temporary; the evil it does is permanent.” "Happiness is when what you think, what you say, and what you do are in harmony." "Hate the sin, love the sinner."

48

Oxford Dictionaries.(2013) "capitalism. An economic e and political system in which a country's trade and industry are controlled by private owners for profit, rather than by the state." Retrieved - 4 January 2013. 49Adam

Smith (1776) An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations- Publisher W. Strahan and T. Cadell, London 50 Adam Smith (1904[1776]). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations- London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., ed. Edwin Cannan, 1904. Fifth edition. 51 Karl Marx (1867–1894).Das Kapital“ Verlag von Otto Meisner publication dates 1867, 1885, 1894 52 (K MARX (1867), Das Kapital” Progress Publishers, Moscow, USSR 53 Random House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary

19


"I believe in equality for everyone, except reporters and photographers." "You must not lose faith in humanity. Humanity is an ocean; if a few drops of the ocean are dirty, the ocean does not become dirty." "Victory attained by violence is tantamount to a defeat, for it is momentary." "An eye for an eye makes the whole world blind." Neoclassical Economics54 Neoclassical economics55 is a term variously used for approaches to economics focusing on the determination of prices, outputs, and income distributions in markets through supply and demand often mediated through a hypothesized maximization of utility by income-constrained individuals and of profits by cost-constrained firms employing Neoclassical economics is conventionally dated from William Stanley Jevons's56 “Theory of Political Economy” (1871), Carl Menger’ s Principles of Economics (1871)57, and Leon Walras’ s “Elements of Pure Economics” (1874 – 1877)58. These three economists have been said to have promulgated the marginal utility revolution or Neoclassical Revolution (…). Marginal utility59 Instead of the price of a good or service reflecting the labor that has produced it, it (the price) reflects the marginal usefulness (utility) of the last purchase. This meant that in equilibrium, people's preferences determined prices, including, indirectly the price of labor (…). Consumers act rationally by seeking to maximize satisfaction of all their preferences. People allocate their spending so that the last unit of a commodity bought creates no more satisfaction than a last unit bought of something else Assumptions (for welfare) 1.

Social Welfare may be the end of the “social welfare process (the ideal case) The utilities of consumers are independent

54 55

56

Antonietta Campus (1987), "marginal economics", The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics v,3, p 323 George Stigler 1941 [1994]). Production and Distribution Theories. New York: Macmillan William Stanley Jevons's 1871. The Theory of Political Economy, Macmillan & Co In James R. Newman, ed., The World of

Mathematics, Vol. 2, Part IV, 1956. 57 Carl Menger [2007(1976)(1871)] - “Principles of Economics” Ludwig von Mises Institute- Auburrn Alabama 58

Éléments d'économie politique pure, ou théorie de la richesse sociale (Elements of Pure Economics, or the theory of social

wealth, transl. W. Jaffé), 1874. (1899, 4th ed.; 1926, rev ed., 1954, Engl. transl.) 59 William Vickrey (1945)Measuring Marginal Utility by Reactions to Risk Econometrica Vol. 13, No. 4 (Oct., 1945), pp. 319-333 Published by: the econometric society

20


2.

. A social welfare function exists…………………………………………….

Acceptance of Valerio Capraro thesis.(Capraro Valerio 2013) “Humans have attitude to cooperation by nature and the same person may act more or less cooperatively depending on the particular payoffs”…………………………. “Utility” may be useful mainly in its “marginal” situation: very small “utils” by which decision taken: Marginal utility is the additional satisfaction a consumer gains from consuming one more unit of a good or service.



The new-classical “Non-Cooperative Games” &its famous “win-win Nash Equilibrium”(NE)60 

The welfare function is a function that ranks social states (alternative complete descriptions of the society) as less desirable, more desirable, or indifferent for every possible pair of social states. Inputs of the function include any variables considered to affect the economic welfare of a society. In using welfare measures of persons in the society as inputs, the social welfare function is individualistic in form. One use of a social welfare function is to represent

60

This work may be “an extension Nash” based on a new “Equilibrium Point” It includes the profit’s side (the “wins) not only between negotiators (A-B) , [the win-win case]but also the “Community’s “win” By the term “Community” or the “C” factor the people values and culture, are considered

21


prospective patterns of collective choice as to alternative social states (Amartya K. Sen, 1970 [retrieve 1984])

RESEARCH ID : Field: Environmental Prtection Sample: 213 high level educated staff with high level hierarchy positions RURAL AREAS in PELOPONNESUS [as categorized by R. 1262/82] –analysis61,62 PERIOD : [ 2017 -01-01 till 2017-12-31 ]

The math of HREP

61

Papakonstantinidis LA (2002) “The Sensitized Local Community” (SLC) DARDANOS/GUTENBERG/TYPOTHITO [six editions FIRST EDITION: EVRYTANIA S.A (1980) , 2nd SELF-EDITION, “To Anapodon”, 1994, 3rd Edition NIKAL-MAREL, 1995,4th edition Dimitropoulos/5-6 Editions DARDANOS/GUTENBERG/TYPOTHITO, 2000-2002 62 Papakonstantinidis LA, Vafeiades G,Kondogeorgis P (1984) Regional Development Incentives in E. E. C Countries (perspectives and changes for the Greek Regional Development Problem ( ATE Ed No 16) – 1984

22


AREA

STATISTIC TIME SAMPLE mmCATEGORIZATION PERIOD education profession post graduated agrobusiness leaders

PELOPONNESUS

STRATIFICATION

RURAL AREA

1-1-2017 TILL

213

107

106

31-122017 1

The sample

Nr

Agribusiness Agribusiness CEO

leaders

1

7

marketing planners

dealers

78

112

Post graduate Students [MBA] 4

Students In marketing schools 11

1a

23


AGES

total

18

25

34

45

77

77+

MALE

10

20

30

55

18

3

136

FEMALE

25

30

17

5

-

-

77 213

EDUCATION63 No Scholl

Primary School

LEVEL

HOUSEHOLD

High

Bachelor

M.Sc

Ph. D

SUM

213

Diploma School

MBA

-

12

94

77

28

2

-

…3

..8

...15

…30

…50..

-

15

42

101

55

-

INCOME/ EUROS/YEAR 000 213

2

63

The ‘GREEK STATISTICAL AYTHORITY”-2013

24


THE QUESTIONAIRE

Disagree Disagree complete mostly ly 1.1

I work in a non well defined MARKETING SPACE [focus on % NATURAL ENVIRONMENT]

1.2

New MARKETING technologies will surely come along to solve environmental problems before they get out of hand

1.3

Some pollution is inevitable if we are going to continue to make improvements in our standard of living: marketing campaign

1.4

If business is forced to spend a lot of money on environmental protection’ MARKETING , it won't be able to invest in research and development to keep us competitive in the international market

1.5

As an MBA student, just don't have the time to worry about how all of my actions affect the environment

.1.6

I think I do my (marketing) work good when I take steps to help the environment by the SENSITIZATION Method 64

1.7

I try to pass the message that I would be embarrassed if people I know caught me not recycling my trash

1.8

A manufacturer that reduces the environmental impact of its production process and products is making a smart business decision: The NEW profile of marketing concerning the environmental protection

1.9

Local governments should provide more incentives for people to recycle: Marketing message , which I focus on

1.10

Marketing Message for environmental Protection: We should wait until the economy gets better before we make the environment a major policy priority

Indiffere nt::Neith er agree Agree non mostly disagree

Agree

Total

completely Agree

indiffere nt

3

64

Papakonstantinidis LA (2002) “The Sensitized Local Community” (SLC) DARDANOS/GUTENBERG/TYPOTHITO [six editions FIRST EDITION: EVRYTANIA S.A (1980) , 2nd SELF-EDITION, “To Anapodon”, 1994, 3rd Edition NIKAL-MAREL, 1995,4th edition DIMITROPOULOS/5-6 EDITIONS DARDANOS/GUTENBERG/TYPOTHITO, 2000-2002

25


METHOD:

The chi-square formula: interdependence between human variables 4

26


Behavioral attitude on environmental protection

Characteristics In Relation With The Environmental Protection

1

I work in a non well defined MARKETING SPACE [focus on NATURAL ENVIRONMENT]

2

New MARKETING technologies will surely come along to solve environmental problems before they get out of hand

3

Some pollution is inevitable if we are going to continue to make improvements in our standard of living: marketing campaign

4

If business is forced to spend a lot of money on environmental protection’ MARKETING , it won't be able to invest in research and development to keep us competitive in the international market

5

As an MBA student, just don't have the time to worry about how all of my actions affect the environment

6

I think I do my (marketing) work good when I take steps to help the environment, by the SENSITIZATION Method 65

7

I try to pass the message that I would be embarrassed if people I know caught me not recycling my trash

8

A manufacturer that reduces the environmental impact of its production process and products is making a smart business decision: The NEW profile of marketing concerning the environmental protection

9

Local governments should provide more incentives for people to recycle: Marketing message , which I focus on

10

Marketing Message for environmental Protection: We should wait until the economy gets better before we make the environment a major policy priority

Papakonstantinidis LA 2017

5

65

Papakonstantinidis LA (2002) “The Sensitized Local Community” (SLC) DARDANOS/GUTENBERG/TYPOTHITO [six editions FIRST EDITION: EVRYTANIA S.A (1980) , 2nd SELF-EDITION, “To Anapodon”, 1994, 3rd Edition NIKAL-MAREL, 1995,4th edition DIMITROPOULOS/5-6 EDITIONS DARDANOS/GUTENBERG/TYPOTHITO, 2000-2002

27


BEHAVIORAL OBSERVED EXPECTED RESIDUAL (OBS- COMPONENT=(OBSATTITUDE frequencies (OBS-EXP) EXP)2 EXP)2/EXP 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.10 TOTAL Papakonstantinidis LA 2017 6

28


BEHAVIOR OBSERVED EXPECTED RESIDUAL (OBS- COMPONENT=(OBSfrequencies (OBS-EXP) EXP)2 EXP)2/EXP 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

29 24 22 19 21 18 19 20 23 18

TOTAL

213

7

29


BEHAVIO R

OBSERVE D

EXPECTED RESIDUA frequencie L (OBS-EXP) s

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

29 24 22 19 21 18 19 20 23 18

21,3 21,3 21,3 21,3 21,3 21,3 21,3 21,3 21,3

TOTAL

213

213

(OBS COMPONENT=(OBS -EXP)2/EXP EXP)2

8

30


BEHAVIO R

OBSERVE D

EXPECTED RESIDUA frequencie L (OBS-EXP) s

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

29 24 22 19 21 18 19 20 23 18

21,3 21,3 21,3 21,3 21,3 21,3 21,3 21,3 21,3 21,3

TOTAL

213

213

(OBS COMPONENT=(OBS -EXP)2/EXP 2 EXP)

7,7 2,7 0,7 -2,3 -0,3 -3,3 -2,3 -1,3 1,7 -3,3

9

31


BEHAVIOR OBSERVED EXPECTED

RESIDUAL (OBS-

frequencies (OBS-

EXP)2

COMPONENT=(OBSEXP)2/EXP

EXP) 1

29

21,3

7,7

59,29

2

24

21,3

2,7

7,29

3

22

21,3

0,7

0,49

4

19

21,3

-2,3

5,29

5

21

21,3

-0,3

0,09

6

18

21,3

-3,3

10,89

7

19

21,3

-2,3

5,29

8

20

21,3

-1,3

1,69

9

23

21,3

1,7

2,89

10

18

21,3

-3,3

10,89

TOTAL

213

213

10

32


BEHAVIO

OBSERVE

EXPECTED

RESIDUA

(OBS-

COMPONENT=(OBS

R

D

frequencie

L

EXP)2

-EXP)2/EXP

s

(OBS-

59,2

2,7835680

EXP) 1

29

21,3

7,7

9 2

24

21,3

2,7

7,29

0,3422535

3

22

21,3

0,7

0,49

0,0230048

4

19

21,3

-2,3

5,29

0,2483568

5

21

21,3

-0,3

0,09

0,0044225

6

18

21,3

-3,3

10,8

0,5112676

9 7

19

21,3

-2,3

5,29

0,2483568

8

20

21,3

-1,3

1,69

0,0793427

9

23

21,3

1,7

2,89

0,1356807

10

18

21,3

-3,3

10,8

0,5112676

9 TOTAL

213

213

11

33


BEHAVIOR OBSERVED EXPECTED

RESIDUAL (OBS-

frequencies (OBS-

EXP)2

COMPONENT=(OBSEXP)2/EXP

EXP) 1

29

21,3

7,7

59,29 2,7835680

2

24

21,3

2,7

7,29

0,3422535

3

22

21,3

0,7

0,49

0,0230048

4

19

21,3

-2,3

5,29

0,2483568

5

21

21,3

-0,3

0,09

0,0044225

6

18

21,3

-3,3

10,89 0,5112676

7

19

21,3

-2,3

5,29

0,2483568

8

20

21,3

-1,3

1,69

0,0793427

9

23

21,3

1,7

2,89

0,1356807

10

18

21,3

-3,3

10,89 0,5112676

TOTAL

213

213

4,9035210

4,9035210

12

34


In GRAPH:

2,7835680 0,3422535 0,0230048 0,2483568 0,0044225 0,5112676 0,2483568 0,0793427 0,1356807 0,5112676

35


36


GOODNES OF FIT TESTS:

Degrees of Freedom are (r-1)(c-1).

CRITICAL VALUE66

For hypothesis tests, a critical value notes the boundary of how extreme a test statistic is needed so that the null hypothesis (H0) be rejected . To determine a critical value, we need to know three things: 67 1.

The number of degrees of freedom

2.

The number and type of tails

3.

The level of significance

i. degrees of freedom 68 Degrees of freedom are the number of values in a study that have the freedom to vary. ii.. The number and type of tails69 In statistical significance testing, a one-tailed test and a two-tailed test are alternative ways of computing the statistical significance of a parameter inferred from a data set, in terms of a test statistic iii level of confidence The final piece of information that is needed to know is the level of confidence or significance. This is a probability

66

Courtney Taylor (2017) “How to Find Critical Values With a Chi-Square Table” Thought co(Updated September 25, 2017 https://www.thoughtco.com/critical-values-with-a-chi-square-table-3126426 67 http://www.statisticshowto.com/probability-and-statistics/find-critical-values/ 68 INVESTOPEDIA 69 http://sphweb.bumc.bu.edu/otlt/MPH-Modules/BS/BS704_HypothesisTest-Means-Proportions/BS704_HypothesisTestMeans-Proportions3.html

37


.

Degrees..of .. freedom....r  1 * c  1 So,

C2 R  10

.......R  1 * C  1  10  1 * 2  1  9 88888888888 According to the above theoretical frame,

H 0 :   0 It is defined

H 0 :   0

 0 , is defined to be a price of 

in which the

H 0 is goodness-of-fit tests)

In this case,

38


 0  0,1356807  4,9035210    DEVIATION ...NON ...IMPORTANT ..SO.. A..NEW ..HYPOTHESIS BE ..SUPPORTED...[.. 0  . .] IN ...THE..OPPOSITE...H O ....IS ...CONSIDERED...TO...BE ...TRUE

888

39


Game Theory and Bargaining Problem70

70

This section is the core of this work

40


Presupposes: To formally define a game, it is needed:



A non-empty and finite set of players.



For each player, a non-empty set of actions.



For each player, a utility function that depicts all possible taps of real player action.

MARKETING-COMMUNITY-LOCAL ACTION specific case 1.

A new marketing “product could be produced the next year, i. e the HREP “product”

2.

Marketing Profession in directed to different kinds of market One from them concerns the promotion of small but wonderful villages which could get profit through the rural tourism initiative

3.

Community development depends mainly on endogenous forces’ participation (public involvement) in the development process (Brugger, 1986). Rural Tourism Plan in Rural Community is the output of public involvement around a Flag Theme (Thirion S- INDE 2000) which motivates its endogenous forces. Policy planning must be structured on the trigonal layout "market-behavior-knowledge" (Fischer, 2006; Papakonstantinidis, 2004).among 3 local power’s poles People-AuthoritiesConsumers (PAC) 71, in the frame of bargaining best response (Spais, Papakonstantinidis and Papakonstantinidis, 200972; Each of them (PAC) is “Buyer” and “Seller” of the same need (tourism) on the others, simultaneously Each side, seeks to maximize its profit (different view)

4. 5.

6.

7.

8.

n   lim i   knowledge  knowledge' s..synthesis  behavior...synthesis  .behavior..change  new..b arg aining ..conditions  i 1  

Each of them make his/her knowlede valuable, based on information aggregated arrount “Flag Theme”thus contributing in his/her place development through the sensitization process (the thrd win’s respect

71

Papakonstantinidis LA(2013) “ Involving communities in rural tourism: Α "win-win-win papakonstantinidis model" methodological approach and the examination of two Women Rural Tourism Cooperatives’ Case Studies” World Conference title “Communities as a part of sustainable rural tourism- success factor or inevitable burden?” 10-11 Sept 2013 KOTA FIN 72 George S Spais, Leonidas Papakonstantinidis, Stavros Papakonstantinidis(2009) An Innovative Bargaining Solution Analysis for Vertical Cooperative Promotion Management Decisions Article • Jan 2009 • Innovative Marketing

41


9. Table 3: Knowledge Creation and Transfer- Types of Behavior Type of Knowledge-1

Type of Knowledge-2

Synthesis

Resulted Behavior

tacit

tacit

Sympathetic

Socialization

tacit

codified

Conceptual

Externalization

codified

tacit

Procedural

Internalization

codified

codified

Systemic

Networking

sympathetic

systemic

Conceptual

Sensitization

systemic

systemic

Procedural

Strategic

Papakonstantinidis, 2003

Since the end of 90s a typical PAC concept was applied based on the S.H.I.E.L.D model (Papakonstantinidis, 1997) which was the forerunner of the “win-win-win papakonstantinidis model in the rural development process thus creating the conditions for “building up” the “Local Standard” for small rural communities Papakonstantinidis, 2015

▀

42


Figure : Flag theme

Flag Theme

Local Skills

Leader skills Priorities

Flag Theme

Active civic participationRoles

Creating Team

Activating Endogenous Potential

psychology

Converging individual winning strategies into a common objective

Papakonstantinidis, 2002

43


The 3 participation forms Voting, bargaining73, cooperating

SOCIAL CHOICE

SOCIAL FUNCTION

SOCIAL WELFARE

Elementary common idea’s acceptance

Sensitization as perquisite of rural tourism rural development

Social choice as perquisite

Voting

Bargaining

Cooperation

individuality

Flag theme

Local development

Environmental protection

1

2

RURAL DEVELOPMENT BY THE SENSITIZATION PROCESS

Papakonstantinidis la, 2002

73

competition

44


CONCLUSIONS

1.

Marketing (education +profession) are included in the HREP toward higher objectives

2.

HREP is a way for activating in a high risk priority without expected in money payoff

3.

The win-win-win papakonstantinidis model is (a) a methodological tool for conflict resolution, especially in the case of decision-making, (b) a “path” to social justice, (c) the basic process for sensitizing local population on the development, around a local “flag theme” (d) a way to “feel free” through involvement in the development process (e) to develop “new” bargaining behavior (f) to convert conflict into cooperation. (g) As the sensitization process tends to infinity, then the limit of PAC relations tend to the absolute collaboration. That’s the end of the real development process

lim P. A.C..r  absolute..collaborat ion

sen

4.

Introducing the “COMMUNITY” as the field of “total good” and as the ultimate player in the bargain and for the bargain, transforms a TWO –players anticipation, in a THREEplayers anticipation, thus proposing a new view in our (capitalist) system

5.

The “win-win-win papakonstantinidis model” is a “tool of consent” useful in socio-economic human relations It is focused on “transferring the “voting perception (Arrow, 1951) from a single individual choice, in the «bargaining multiple decision as “a Moral Aggregation” The suggested "win-win-win papakonstantinidis model”74is built up on these incompatibilities, in particular as regards the pairs" Pareto efficiency – Impossibility Theorem” "

6.

7.

Launching the "win-win-win papakonstantinidis model" help the scientific Community providing it by a NEW methodological tool for measuring the social cost, in terms of deviation from the EQUILIBRIUM POINT, that represents dissatisfaction or satisfaction resulting from the consumption of certain goods taking into account the butterfly effect

Proposal The win-win-win papakonstantinidis model-an overview

74

Papakonstantinidis L.A(2002-August 14) “The win-win-win model” Euracademy Guide The Visby University-Gotland-SW

45


The “win-win-win Equilibrium” From the two graphs above, and the “Pareto Efficiency” conditions is resulted that the “utility functions” follows the law of diminishing marginal returns, The law of diminishing marginal returns, includes the marginal productivity and law of variable proportions (Turgot (1727-1781)

d ( f ( x)) , or.. It is dx f ( x)..is..its ..MARGINAL...UTILITY....FUNCTION If ..u  f ( x)..is..a..utility .. function ,..then..

As..the.." rational ....individual ....objective ....is..to....MAXIMIZE..individual ..... profit then , on..the..MAX ..POINT ..in..his / her ..Utility .. function ,..the..aditional / m arg inal ..quantity ..must..be..zero..or..in..the..neghiborhood ..of ..ZERO

1.

It..is...assumed..that ..the....MAX ..Utility .. function .. for ....all .. people..  MARGINAL..UTILITY  ZERO , If ....U A ,U B ,U c ..are..UTILITY..FUNCTIONS..of ... A,..B,.. AND..C ,..then..the.. product..U A * U B * U C responds.." social ..welfare"..So....if ..the.. product........U A *U B*U c  MAX ..then..MRS  0..that ' s..the..END..of the..development... process..( IDEAL...CASE )..We..can..measure..the..result..in..terms..of ..deviation.. from ideal ..case...The.." win  win  win.. papakons tan tinidis .." EQUILIBRIUM

'Pareto Efficiency' Pareto efficiency, also known as "Pareto optimality," is an economic state where resources are allocated in the most efficient manner, and it is obtained when a distribution strategy exists where one party's situation cannot be improved without making another party's situation worse. Pareto efficiency does not imply equality or fairness.

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PARETO...EFFICIECY MAX ...Utility ...Function : ...MAX ..U ( x1 ,..x 2 ,...x n )

p x i

i

 M ,...xi  0,...xi  {1,..2,..n}

p  price,...xi  quantities ..... pxi  sum..of ..all , , pxi M  FRONTIER...MAX ..sources.. for ..allocation

U i  u i  pi U A  uA  pA U B  uB  pB U C  u C  pC U  pleasant .. exp eriance...according ..to....a..strictly .. personal... positive..list u  individual ....utils ..(not..measuring ) p : probabilit ies , these.. pleasant ... exp eriance ' s..utils ..to..occure..in..the... A.B.C...individual s

47


The bargaining problem is a “share problem, not a binomial

term 75

From this point of view, “payoffs” are the incentives, for which 2 bargainers start negotiations The final [agreement or not agreement] are the outcome

In this proposed method, we recognize that “When two negotiators pushed by expected payoffs

75

In this term, scientists (rontos and alle) have not right, as they try to solve it, by probabilities bargaining problem is a mainly a sharing problem

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U A ,U B ,U C when UA  x UB  y U c  (100  x  y ) U A  U B  U C  U A  U B  U C  MAX  (U A  U B  U C )  0 xy (100  xy ) n  MAX  [ xy (100  x  y ) n ]  0 generally , ( f ( x) * g ( x))  f ( x) * g ( x)  f ( x) * g ( x)

But,

49


U A  U B  U c  U A *U B *U c  max U A *U B *U c   0 ui  f i ( s ) xy (100  x  y ) n  max  [ xy (100  x  y ) n ]  0 [ xy (100  x  y ) n ]  x y (100  x  y ) n  xy (100  x  y ) n  xy [(100  x  y ) n ]  0 xy (100  x  y ) n ]  y (100  x  y ) n  x (100  x  y ) n  nxy (100  x  y ) n 1  0

 f ( x ) * g ( x )  

f ( x ) * g ( x )  f ( x ) * g ( x )

[ xy (100  x  y ) n ]  y (100  x  y ) n 1 (100  x  y )  x (100  x  y ) n 1 (100  x  y )  nxy (100  x  y ) n 1  0 It...must : ..... xy (100  x  y ) n  max  lim [ xy (100  x  y ) n ]  0 x 

sup ...that ..(100  x  y )  0 y (100  x  y )  x (100  x  y )  nxy *1  0 x y x y ( x  y )(100  x  y )  nxy  0    0 (100  x  y )  ( 1)n.....................by.. putting ,.... xy  xy 

 (100  x  y )  ( 1)n  (100  x  y ) 

n



 ( n )

1



but ,.....(100  x  y )  %..Community.." share"..of ...o..budget ,..b  1.......EXPECTED .. payoff ... from.." b  1" 1 %..Community...share  ( n ) (b).........the..( n )...denotes , , the..reduction



result...which ..comes.. from..the..Community.." reaction "..in..any..BARGAIN ,..(by...its ..3rd ...role,....i.e as..an.. Agent ..of ..the..CITIZEN .  .PRINCIPALr elation ,.. Arbitrator , , , and ..as..the.. Indepented ..3rd ..barty )..to..the..total ..budget .." b"...of ..the..BARGAIN then ,...the..i th .. player ; s.best..mixed ...strategy ( probabilit y  ..a..lottery ..over..

50

a..trinomial ...distribution ), is..the..best..strategies .. for..h.imself , as..well , as..the..best...STRATEGIES .. for..the..other .. players , aswell ..as..the..best..strategy ..


notes : A, B.C...do, , , not...cooperate.. forward A, B, C..must..collaborat e..in..and ..during..the..b arg ain..(ins tan t..reflection ..winning ..strategies )

" C"... exp resses...not...only..the..rest..( no..b arg ain.. participan ts ), , but...also..the..total ..community ..the..word cultural ...heritage , world ...cultivatio n...the.." human...being "..." Homo...Sapiens "

From...this .. po int ..of ...view,...Community... participat ion..in..any..b arg ain...between ..TWO( 2)..is..necessary

Also,..COMMUNITY  the.." c".. factor ..MUST ... exp ress..the.." Community..Fear ".. from..the...b arg ain ,..between .. A, B For..this .." Community.. participat ion"..is..captured ..as...(100  x  y ) n , where..n  the.. fear .. factor ..( nonlinear ), while.. the.. A, B..utility .. functions ...must..be..linear

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n 1

  1,. x * %... %  100%  max( quite..unequality ..and ..unjustice ..in..distibutio n...of . A, B, and ..Community )

  2... x * % 

n %  50  50  0 2

  3... x * % 

n %..  33,3333... IDEAL...SITUATION 3

  4  ...... x * %  .

x %  UNSTABLE.(THEOCHARIS  OSCILLATION )...of .. A, B, C.. exp ectations 4

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