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Equality and Diversity: A New Equality Framework for Britain? Judith Squires Department of Politics University of Bristol [email protected]

Abstract This paper offers a survey of the current Government review of Britain’s equality framework, including the proposal to create a new Commission for Equality and Human Rights, and the adoption of gender mainstreaming strategies.

These discourses and

practices issue new theoretical and practical challenges, in that they are required to address an increasingly complex range of inequalities and are required to engage with ‘equality and diversity’. Theorising mainstreaming in the context of diversity represents a significant challenge, and makes the role of inclusive deliberation particularly central. This transforms mainstreaming from a technocratic tool to an institutional manifestation of deliberative democracy. Key words: equality, diversity, mainstreaming, deliberative democracy

Squires

Equality and Diversity Equality and Diversity: A New Equality Framework for Britain?

Introduction This paper explores current developments in equality discourses, policies and institutions in Britain. This entails surveying theoretical debates about equality (focusing in particular on liberal egalitarianism and a politics of recognition) and popular understandings of equality in Britain amongst the general public. It also entails a brief survey of the current Government review of Britain’s equality framework, including the proposal to create a new Commission for Equality and Human Rights, and the current Governmental adoption of gender mainstreaming strategies. I will suggest that these discourses and practices frame equality in terms of formal anti-discrimination policies, whilst positive action strategies are largely rejected. This focus is consonant with a liberal egalitarian approach (and shares its unwillingness to include economic inequality within its purview). However proposed new anti-discrimination institutions issue new theoretical and practical challenges, in that they are required to address an increasingly complex range of inequalities and are required to engage with ‘equality and diversity’.

In addition,

mainstreaming strategies are also potentially significant in relation to newly emerging understandings of equality. Mainstreaming strategies complement anti-discrimination policies. Though they have tended to take a narrow technocratic form to date they could, if augmented by theories of deliberative democracy, enrich current British equality policies. Understanding what mainstreaming might entail in the context of diversity and not just gender represents a significant challenge. Given the plurality of equality agendas held by diverse groups the role of inclusive deliberation should be stressed.

This

transforms mainstreaming from a technocratic tool to an institutional manifestation of deliberative democracy. Meanwhile the practice of mainstreaming offers an important set of resources to deliberative democrats, who have not been sufficiently detailed about the practical and institutional implications of their theory.

Equality in a UK Context A recent survey of how people think and talk about equality, particularly equality between women and men, in Britain today found that most people expressed skepticism

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Equality and Diversity

about the idea of equal outcomes and felt more comfortable with the idea of equal opportunities, or protection from discrimination. The language respondents used was ‘fairness’, ‘tolerance’ and ‘having the same chances in life’. (Howard and Tibballs 2003:7) Respondents were reluctant to think of themselves as experiencing inequality. As Howard and Tibballs note: ‘Women may have less well paid jobs, or do much more domestic work, but people see this as a result of individual choice and natural gender differences, rather than bias in society as a whole.’ (2003:8 emphasis added). There was little support for the idea that women, as a group, are unequal in society today and sex inequality was not seen as a priority issue. The concept of feminism was seen virtually unanimously in negative terms as old-fashioned. However many people (and young women in particular) liked the idea of promoting ‘women’s rights.’ (Howard and Tibballs 2003:7) What is striking here is the extent to which these common ways of understanding equality resonate with a liberal egalitarian agenda. Here too equality is understood as equality of opportunity; experiences of discrimination are only understood to be manifestations of inequality if the circumstances are deemed to be not a product of individual choice; sex inequality is not seen as a priority issue; inequality is considered in relation to individual acts rather than institutional arrangements. The Future Foundation suggests that the public is comprehensively not ‘on board’ with current approaches of equality professionals. (Howard and Tibballs 2003:9) These ‘equality professionals’

- ‘policy makers, academic sociologists, think tanks and

women’s representative groups’ (2003: 42) – operate with an analysis of structural inequality that simply isn’t shared by the British public. In this context The Future Foundation suggest that: ‘A new vision of equality needs to be set out that makes clear the social, organizational and individual benefits of a more equal society…. A new language needs to be developed, based on people’s current understandings and perceptions, to help make the connections between recognition of prejudice and the need for societal change.’ (2003:10) This survey was conducted at a time when the Government was engaged in ‘the most significant review of equality in over a quarter of a century.’ In October 2002 the Government launched ‘The Equality Institutions Review’ and produced various

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consultation documents, including Equality and Diversity: Making it Happen, which explored long-term options for the priorities and role of equality institutions in Great Britain, and invited responses from end-users, businesses, service providers and equality experts. The consultation phase ended in February 2003 and was followed by a Government announcement that it plans to establish a new Commission for Equality and Human Rights. The equality consultation and current plans for a new Commission were in large part instigated in response to directives from Europe.

European Union Article 13

Employment Directive will, for example, extend the grounds for protection against discrimination in employment and training to include sexual orientation and religion by 2003 and age by 2006. The government is required by this EU directive to outlaw discrimination on the grounds of age or sexual orientation in addition to legislating – as it is currently - against religious discrimination. This new directive gives an added impetus to long-standing calls to review the equality legislation in operation in Britain. In addition the EU has recently issued a directive requiring member states to promote equality in relation to sexual orientation, age and religion in addition to race, gender and disability. These directives issued a particular challenge for Britain, with its three separate equality Commissions. As Barbara Roche stated, when announcing the consultation: ‘We cannot have six separate commissions dealing with six separate strands.’ (IPPR May 2002). The leaders of the two oldest commissions – CRE and EOC - both tentatively supported the idea of single Commission. Angela Mason, previously executive director of the gay rights group Stonewall (now Director of the Women and Equality Unit) argued that one equality body would benefit the gay community, which currently does not have its own commission: ‘We will finally have a statutory body that will challenge discrimination against sexual orientation.’ (Pink Paper, issue 738, 24 May 2002) However, concerns were also been expressed. Bert Massie, Chair of the three-year-old Disability Rights Commission feared that unless a Single Equality Act was introduced in advance of a single equality body (SEB), and the policy agenda delivered in advance of the new body, the voice of the disabled would get drowned (Massie 12th September 2002). Similarly the Women’s National Commission argued that ‘a single Equality Act

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must underpin any changes to the equalities commissions.’ (WNC 2002b) They also recommend that any SEB should be set up under statute with guaranteed independence and funding, and a responsibility to report to parliament, no just Ministers. The introduction of a single Equality Act and Equality Body was also advocated by other groups within the UK such as the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (Parekh 2000: 266-7). The creation of such an Act and Commission would, they feel, give the principle of equality a higher profile, give more consistent advice across a range of specific issues, more readily tackle cases of multiple discrimination, and better mirror the equality units that exist in most public bodies and private sector companies (Parekh 2000: 267). However, they are also attuned to the fears that would accompany such a move: specialist knowledge may be dissipated, there may be rivalries between groups within the Commission, the differences between the various kinds of discrimination may be neglected, and the turbulence caused by organizational restructuring may be to the detriment of the equalities agenda (Parekh 2000: 267). Similarly, grassroots women’s groups consulted by the WNC felt that the synergy of a common approach might be very valuable, but all the women consulted – disabled, lesbian, minority ethnic women – felt that gender issues would become marginalised (WMC 2002b). Our current legislative framework for equality represents a complex patchwork of laws, many, though not all, of which fit neatly into an equality of opportunity perspective. The Labour governments of the 1970s introduced a range of equality laws designed to remedy group discrimination (in preparation for joining the European Economic Community): The Equal Pay Act 1970, the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (SDA), the Race Relations Act 1976 and the Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act 1976. Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome (signed by the UK in 1973) also established the principle of equal pay. The Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC) and Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) were established to uphold these laws. The Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and the Equal Pay Act 1970 are the two pieces of domestic legislation introduced to make discrimination between men and women unlawful. In April 2003 the Equal Pay Act was amended to allow for a questionnaire procedure. The introduction of new legislation - The Employment Equality (Sexual

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Orientation) Regulations 2003 and the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003 - implement strands of the European Employment Directive (Council Directive 2000/78/EC). The Employment Directive outlaws discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, religion or belief, disability and age in employment and vocational training. New legislation - The Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003 and the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003 - will come into force in December 2003. Amendments to the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 will come into force in October 2004 and new legislation outlawing discrimination on grounds of age by the end of 2006. The Race Directive outlaws discrimination on grounds of racial or ethnic origin in the areas of employment, vocational training, goods and services, social protection, education and housing. Changes to the Race Relations Act 1976 to implement the Directive come into force in July 2003. The Race Relations Act 1976 makes it unlawful to treat a person less favourably than others on racial grounds. These cover grounds of race, colour, nationality (including citizenship), and national or ethnic origin. It provides protection from race discrimination in the fields of employment, education, training, housing, and the provision of goods, facilities and services. The Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 amended the 1976 Act. It fulfilled recommendation 11 of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry report and went further, prohibiting race discrimination in all public functions, with only a few limited exceptions. The Race Relations Act 1976 (Amendment) Regulations 2003 implement the EC Article 13 Race Directive. The Regulations enhance the Race Relations Act by, for example, amending the definition of indirect discrimination and changing the way in which the burden of proof applies, as well as removing a number of exceptions from the legislation. The first noteworthy feature of these equality laws is their focus on equal treatment, which some critics (employing a difference perspective) have suggested relies on a ‘spurious gender neutrality’ which ‘endorses a male norm’ and restricts the possibilities of challenging structural disadvantage on the grounds that such actions would discriminate against men (Gregory 1999). A second feature has been the way in which Britain has operated a system in which gender and race, represented by the EOC and CRE respectively, operated distinct – possibly competing – agendas, fueling the suggestion that multiculturalism may be ‘bad for women’ (Okin 2000:7-26). With the

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establishment of the Disability Rights Commission in 2000 this fragmentation was further complicated. A third feature has been the piece-meal approach of using European directives to update UK equality laws, which has created a complicated array of equality laws (see Rees 2002, Bagilhole 1997). As Paul Chaney notes, equality is presently addressed by a patchwork of at least thirty Acts of Parliament, thirty-eight Statutory Instruments, eleven Codes of Practice, twelve EC Directives and the devolution statutes of 1998-9 (Chaney 2002:88). Contemporary UK equality law is itself a source of inequality, he concludes: ‘it applies to legislatures and government departments in different ways (e.g. Northern Ireland Act, 1998); privileges some social groupings (e.g. Race Relations Amendment Act, 2000); and affords varying levels of protection between polities (e.g. Scotland Act, 1998).’ (Chaney 2002:88) Teresa Rees concurs arguing that sexual equality legislation in Britain has never worked effectively and is now ‘badly out of date and unmanageable.’ (Rees 2002:61) So too does Julie Mellor, chair of the EOC, who argues that ‘Britain’s equality laws are in a mess. Inconsistent and incomplete, they offer different levels of protection for different groups and none at all for others.’ (The Guardian 16 May 2002) In fact the Government announced, on 29th October 2003, that it would establish a new Commission for Equality and Human Rights (CEHR), but made no mention of a single Equality Act (Hewitt 2003).

Announcing the plans for the new Equality

Commission, Patricia Hewitt (Trade and Industry Secretary and Minister for Women) claimed that the new CEHR would ‘give greater support and more joined-up advice to individuals, businesses and communities to crackdown on discrimination, and promote equality and diversity.’ (DTI press release, 29/10/03, Ref P/2003/537) She continued: ‘tackling discrimination in the 21st century requires a joined-up approach that puts equality in the mainstream of concerns.

As individuals, our identities are diverse,

complex and multi-layered. People don’t see themselves as solely a woman, or black, or gay and neither should our equality organizations.’ Meanwhile Lord Falconer (Secretary of State at the Department for Constitutional Affairs) suggested that ‘Human rights and equality are two sides of a single coin – respect for the dignity and value of each person.’ (DTI press release, 29/10/03, Ref P/2003/537)

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Equality and Diversity The formulation of the Government’s approach to equality here is worth noting.

It fits well with popular perceptions of equality in three respects: it focuses on equality of opportunity rather than equality of outcome; it rejects ‘old-fashioned’ structural accounts of group inequality; it equates equality discourses with human rights discourses. It also fits well with Governmental priorities of modernization and joined-up government (which will be discussed later). This suggests that the proposals for a CEHR have been formulated and articulated effectively in terms of successful ‘frame bridging’ with dominant discourses, both popular and governmental. In the context of this ‘significant review of equality’ by the current Labour Government I want now to turn to the ways in which equality is being conceptualized and institutionalized in contemporary Britain.

Theorizing Equality Debates about equality amongst contemporary political theorists have tended to be confined to discussions between liberal egalitarians. The liberal egalitarian literature is characterized, not by a debate between equality of opportunities and outcomes, but on different sorts of equality of opportunity.

Having distinguished between two

understandings of equality: treating people equally and treating them as equals, liberal egalitarians opt for the latter and then focus debate upon what would count as treating people as equals. A narrow reading of equality of opportunity has been widely criticized in favour of a broader understanding.

The meritocratic system generated by a

commitment to equality of opportunities is widely perceived to be compatible with, and indeed to generate, a society with huge disparities in income and status in which a talented elite dominate whilst the disadvantaged are deemed to have failed as a result of their own personal deficiencies.

John Rawls describes this approach to equality as an

‘equal chance to leave the less fortunate behind in a personal quest for influence and social position.’ (Rawls 1972: 108) Given this many liberal egalitarians base their approach not on talent (which is morally arbitrary with respect to social justice), but on effort and ambition (Dworkin 2000: 199). Even socialist egalitarians such as Gerry Cohen advocate ‘equal access to advantage’ (Cohen 1989: 907). This shift from defining equality of opportunity in terms

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of talent to defining it in terms of effort has been remarkably successful because, critics suggest, it incorporates the key concerns of the anti-egalitarian right: choice and responsibility (Armstrong 2003:415). Equality has become something which one must earn – and whether one does so will depend upon one’s ‘choices’: ‘Equality becomes a discretionary privilege to take a share of the good produced by society, which will be granted only conditionally, if the individual measures up.’ (Armstrong 2003: 415) As Tony Blair says, we must ‘broaden the opportunities for individual to take responsibility for their own development.’ (quoted in Levitas 1997: 121) This liberal egalitarian literature assumes that one can distinguish between talent and ambition and that we can be relatively sure which part of an individual’s life is the result of his or her own choices and which part is not. It also focuses on rewarding desirable characteristics in individuals, rather than focusing on equal institutions. Another common feature within these liberal theories of equality is the absence of theories of inequality: they don’t analyse the origins of the forms of inequality that they want to eradicate.

As Iris Young notes, ‘many discussions of social justice often

presuppose specific institutional structures whose justice they fail to bring under evaluation.’ (1990: 22) Moreover, liberal egalitarians are increasingly likely to advocate the free market as the surest route to egalitarian justice. This means that they maintain a concern with material and financial distributions, rather than distributions of power or status (focusing on distribution rather than recognition), whilst failing to advocate material redistribution.

In place of a convincing explanatory account of inequality,

liberal egalitarianism works with an economic theory of rational individualism. Money is considered to be what we all want, ‘thus facilitating the colonization of all field of human activity by the market.’ (Armstrong 2003: 421) Liberal egalitarianism requires equal treatment under the law and a fair distribution of opportunities. Redistribution, in the form of giving people extra resources, is permitted on grounds of need (such as disability) but not in response to religious belief, or ethnicity, or any other cultural attribute. These principles must be applied universally, without exemption for cultural groups. Brian Barry offers a trenchant defense of this form of liberal egalitarianism with reference to principles of equal treatment. In so doing

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he depicts all those who advocate a ‘politics of recognition’ in addition to a politics of ‘redistribution’ as basically illiberal (Barry 2000). This articulation of liberalism is however increasingly challenged by the perception amongst some political theorists that what it means to treat citizens as equals is not self-evident in a culturally plural society, but has to be worked out through democratic dialogue in which the full range of different points of view are represented. Liberal egalitarians are primarily concerned with equal treatment, where uniform rules create identical choice sets, ensuring that opportunities are equal. Critics, often republican and democratic, question whether it is sufficient that the rules are applied uniformly, without consideration of their formulation. For if some people are structurally marginalized from the rule-formation process the rules that emanate from it are likely to be systematically distorted. The most significant critique of this liberal egalitarianism has come in recent years from advocates of a politics of recognition, who largely adopt an ‘identity politics’ perspective in relation to equality. Our moral salvation, as Taylor argues, comes from recovering authentic moral contact with ourselves (Taylor 1994:29). The discovery of one’s true identity is not, on Taylor’s account, a monological process, it cannot take place in isolation but rather needs to be negotiated with others and therefore depends upon one’s dialogical relation with others.

Recognising the unique identity of everyone

requires not an identical set of rights for all, but public acknowledgement of the particular worth of each. Advocates of a politics of recognition insist that liberal egalitarianism has privatized cultural, religious and other differences, which the state should recognize and take into account in its laws, institutions, practices and policies. Treating citizens as equals does not entail treating them equally: laws may legitimately grant exemptions to some groups and not to others and public policies may focus on those groups whose cultures are under threat (see Kymlicka 1995). Advocates of a politics of recognition argue that a politics of redistribution defines justice too narrowly and fails to focus on the importance of the diversity of ways of thought, of life, tastes and moral perspectives: as Bhikhu Parekh states, ‘non-recognition or mis-recognition of their identity imprisons

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people into a reduced mode of being and gives rise to deep unhappiness and a sense of powerlessness.’ (Parekh 2003:7). Critics of multiculturalism have countered that this politics of recognition results in a ‘rule-and-exemption’ approach that not only diverts attention away from the struggle for economic equality, but also formalizes and freezes identities that are actually subject to constant change and thereby undermines solidarity across groups. As one critic notes a ‘focus on affirming identity produces debilitating political fragmentation, diverts attention from widening material inequality, and leads to a fetishism of identity groups, reinforcing the tendency of such groups to become exclusionary to outsiders and coercive to insiders.’ (Kiss 1999:194)

Liberal egalitarians therefore reject this approach as

undermining liberalism’s core commitment to uniform application of laws as a cornerstone of equal treatment. However, it is worth noting that Barry, a key defender of liberal egalitarianism against the multicultural challenge, suggests that: ‘The alternative [to a rule and exemption approach] is to work out some less restrictive alternative form of the law that would adequately meet the objectives of the original one while offering the members of the religious or cultural minority whatever is most important to them’ (Barry 2000: 39). Meanwhile Parekh, taken by Barry to be one of the main multicultural challengers, argues that principles of distribution can only be arrived at by means of a democratic dialogue: ‘No single language can adequately capture or express all the diverse experiences of and insights into the structures of justice and injustice. Religious communities, cultural and ethnic minorities, women and others should therefore be able to bring to the public agenda their respective views and experiences, which they can best do only if they speak in their own voices. And if these voices are not heard, we need to seek them out and ensure their adequate representation in the deliberative bodies.’ (Parekh 2003:13) Although neither give details as to how this process of formulating less restrictive laws on the basis of deliberative inclusion could be institutionalized, I suggest that their remarks are entirely consistent with the adoption of not only equal treatment but also ‘mainstreaming’ equality approaches to be discussed below. I also want to suggest that an exploration of the ways in which mainstreaming might help formulate less restrictive alternative forms of law is an important and useful task confronting us.

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In other words key advocates of both a liberal egalitarianism and a politics of recognition appear to accept a role for democratic deliberation about the rule formation process. In this their recommendations echo a mainstreaming strategy, which has been developed within gender theory and been widely implemented across European institutions in recent years, but which has not been considered by ‘mainstream’ political theorists. Though the process they recommend is not currently discussed in terms of mainstreaming, I suggest that it might be useful to integrate the gender literature on mainstreaming into these debates.

Equality, Difference and Diversity I want now to turn to debates about equality within gender theory. The concept of ‘gender equality’ has long been controversial, even amongst feminists. In 1985 the Feminist Dictionary carried the following entry: Equality: A principle and a practice which means the insurance of the same opportunities, expectations and support for all. It is a problematic terms since the referent condition is that of the white male. … An insufficient slogan for women. (Kramarae & Treichler 1985:140). Debates about equality within feminist writings have been shaped by a perception, frequently referred to as ‘Wollstonecraft’s dilemma’ (Pateman 1989:196-7), that equality and difference are antagonistic aims. The ensuing debate about equality and difference prefigured the debate between liberal egalitarians and advocates of a politics of recognition in many respects. Where is differs, apart from the obvious focus on gender, is in the current determination to move beyond the apparent opposition between equality and difference. ‘Throughout its history,’ argue Bock and James ‘women’s liberation has been seen sometimes as the right to be equal, sometimes as the right to be different.’ (Bock and James 1992:4) The central tension between these two positions arises from a dispute as to whether a commitment to gender-neutrality can ever be achieved by pursuing a strategy of equality. Some feel that, in the context of a patriarchal society, the pursuit of equality might inevitably result in requiring everyone to assimilate to the dominant

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gender norm of masculinity. Those who believe the former to be possible fall within the ‘equality’ perspective; those who are skeptical adopt a ‘difference’ perspective. Put bluntly, women appear to be faced by a clear choice: in a society where the male is the norm, one can - as a woman – pursue either assimilation or differentiation. One can aim to transcend one’s gendered particularity, or to affirm it: pursue ‘gender-neutrality’ or seek ‘gender-visibility’. Within this debate those who adopt an equality perspective firmly believe that gender ought to be politically irrelevant, or non-pertinent. Given that gender differences are assumed to be perpetuated in the interests of men, the project is to advocate the transcendence of gender differences. The idea that women ‘are different’ has been used to exclude women from valued and fulfilling social engagement.

As Fraser notes,

‘(f)rom the equality perspective, then, gender difference appeared to be inextricable from sexism. The political task was thus clear: the goal of feminism was to throw off the shackles of ‘difference’ and establish equality, bringing men and women under a common measure.’ (Fraser 1997:100) From the equality perspective gender difference is synonymous with inferiority and is to be rejected in the name of a more genuinely inclusive democratic practice (Squires 1999:3). By contrast, difference theorists accept and even celebrate gender differences. Men and women are different they argue, but difference should not be read as inferiority. The nurturing, peace-loving, intuitive and emotional qualities of women are celebrated rather than subordinated. The individualistic, competitive, rational qualities of existing social structures are viewed with suspicion and hostility rather than admiration and longing. The aim is to lessen the power, not to join the ranks, of the male order. The political task here is the reversal of that proposed by the equality theorist. The goal of feminism is to make clear the fundamental difference between men and women and to enable women to gain a positive sense of their common identity as women. Once this is gained, women can then demand that their distinctive voice is heard and perspective valued. The fundamental disagreement between equality and difference theorists centres on the question of impartiality. Equality theorists accept the basic claim that the liberal ideal of equality is itself neutral vis-à-vis gender. If women are in practice not equal with

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men, this is as a result of contingent distortions of the ideal of impartiality.

The

appropriate response to the inequality between the sexes is for women to pursue the ideal of impartiality more rigorously: to hold liberal democracy accountable to its own professed ideals. Difference theorists on the other hand see the ideal as itself partial. Rather than perceiving the liberal commitment to gender-neutrality and equality as an inspiring, if sadly unfulfilled, ideal, difference theorists argue that what appears impartial is actually androcentric or male-defined.

Appeals to gender-neutrality are therefore

complicit with the structures that denigrate the feminine. Where equality theorists appeal to impartiality to mobilise for change, difference theorists emphasise the inevitability of partiality, and politicise – in order to delegitimise – claims to impartiality. The existence of these two distinct strategies within feminism is not new, nor is the ambivalence about their relative merits. As Joan Scott notes: ‘When equality and difference are paired dichotomously’, she argues, ’they structure an impossible choice. If one opts for equality, one is forced to accept the notion that difference is antithetical to it. If one opts for difference, one admits that equality is unattainable.’ (Scott 1997:765) Recognition of the negative effects of this dilemma upon feminist theory and practice has motivated many to attempt to negotiate a path beyond the dichotomy and to map out a third perspective – that of diversity. The diversity perspective is not located on either side of the equality/difference divide, but rather gains its definition from its commitment to deconstructing the division itself. Whereas the difference theorist is concerned to reverse the privileged terms in oppositional pairs, the issue for diversity theorists is, as Elizabeth Grosz suggests, ‘not to privilege one term at the expense of the other, but to explore the cost of their maintenance.’ (Grosz 1994:32) If a difference approach aims to ‘put women in the centre’, this diversity approach in contrast aims to ‘deconstruct centres’.

Both are

transformative projects: both seek to problematise dominant norms. As such both are analytically distinct from an equality approach, which merely seeks to ‘add women’ in to the existing schema; they are transformative rather than integrative. Yet it is the dissimilarity between the difference and diversity forms of gender politics that has increasingly preoccupied gender theorists. The distinction between these two approaches manifests itself in the contrast between the kind of transformation envisaged. ‘In the first

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stance,’ Kathy Ferguson states, ‘men - male power, male identities, masculinity as a set of practices - are problematized; in the second, the gendered world itself becomes a problem.’ (Ferguson 1993:3) This distinction lies between those who would reverse patriarchal gender priorities and those who would explode them. The determination to ‘go beyond’ the equality/difference debate does not therefore signal a simple desire for agreement and synthesis, rather it represents the emergence of a new perspective that takes the deconstruction of binary oppositions to be its central task. Dichotomous thinking itself has been subject to extensive critique (see Flax 1992, Lloyd 1984, Grosz 1994, Green 1995, Prokhovnik 1999). Diversity theorists point to the weaknesses of both the equality perspective, which fails to recognise the socially constructed and patriarchal nature of the criteria of evaluation deemed pertinent to social inclusion, and the difference perspective, which fails to theorise the extent to which ‘maleness’ and ‘femaleness’ are themselves socially constructed and underplays the plurality of other forms of difference. Given this, the diversity perspective aims at what I have called elsewhere a ‘strategy of displacement’ (Squires 1999:3).

Equal Treatment, Positive Action, Gender Mainstreaming Mapping fairly directly onto the theoretical debates about gender equality, it is common to divide political campaigns for gender equality into three distinct phases, which are historically specific and follow in progression. This progression is sometimes located in terms of first, second and third wave feminism. First wave feminism describes the period of campaigning for women’s suffrage at the turn of the century, which drew on the liberal principles of equal rights and treatment before the law. This was followed by a growing demand from the second wave feminists in the 1960’s for positive action and separate women’s provision. It concludes in the 1990’s, with a shift to a gender perspective, which recognises the diversity amongst and between women and men, and involves men in the process of social change. The three theoretical approaches to equality appear to map onto three distinctive equality strategies: equal treatment, positive action and gender mainstreaming. Teresa Rees, for example, suggests that one can identify three phases in the European Commission’s approach to gender equality over the last three decades: equal

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treatment in the 1970s, positive action in the 1980s and gender mainstreaming in the 1990s (Rees 2002:48). These three approaches, which Rees labels ‘tinkering’, ‘tailoring’ and ‘transforming’ respectively, map fairly neatly onto the three perspectives in the equality/difference/diversity debate outlined above. Equal treatment is a ‘legal redress to treat men and women the same’. Positive action recognizes that there are differences between men and women and that measures are required to address disadvantages experienced by women as a consequence of those differences. Mainstreaming ‘ideally should involve identifying how existing systems and structures cause indirect discrimination and altering or redesigning them as appropriate’ (Rees 2002:46-8). Mainstreaming is widely perceived, by ‘gender equality professional’ at least, to be a positive development, representing a form of equality policy that moves beyond, but complements, equal treatment and positive action. It is a product of extensive theorizing and debating amongst gender theorists and professionals, who have been preoccupied with the apparently irreconcilable dichotomy between equality and difference.

Figure 1: Northern European Equality Timeline 1st Wave 1918 onwards

2nd Wave 1960 onwards

3rd Wave 1990 onwards

Equal Treatment Perspective

Women’s Perspective

Gender Perspective

x

Equal rights & opportunities

x

Equality of outcome

x

Equal valuing of difference

x

Legislative response

x

Separate institutional provision

x

Managing diversity

Source: Christine Booth, ‘Gender Mainstreaming in the European Union: Toward a New Conception and Practice of Equal Opportunities? Paper presented at ESRC Gender Mainstreaming Seminar Series, Leeds, 24.10.03

Mainstreaming provides a new and additional tool for promoting equality by focusing attention on gender influences on the operation of apparently gender-neutral policy. It is frequently understood as an attempt at innovation in gender equality policies

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(Verloo 2001:1) and is widely represented as an improvement on previous gender equality strategies, overcoming the limitations of existing policies (Mazey 2000:3). Definitions of gender mainstreaming vary. The United Nations definition is as follows: ‘Mainstreaming a gender perspective is the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women’s as well as men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated.’ (UN 1997) The Council of Europe definition is: ‘Gender mainstreaming is the (re)organization, improvement, development and evaluation of policy processes, so that a gender equality perspective is incorporated in all policies at all levels and at all stages, by the actors normally involved in policy-making.’ (Council of Europe 1998:15) Verloo suggests that gender mainstreaming should be understood as ‘about (re)organizing procedures and routines, about (re)organizing responsibilities and capacities for the incorporation of a gender equality perspective.’ (Verloo 2001:2) The (re)organization could entail using gender expertise in policy-making, using gender impact analyses in the policy-making process, or organizing consultation and participation of relevant groups and organizations in the process. The aim of the mainstreaming strategy is to counteract gender bias within existing systems and structures: it addresses ‘those very institutionalized practices that cause both individual and group disadvantage in the first place.’ (Rees 2000:3) Mainstreaming takes us beyond the classic opposition between equality of opportunity and equality of outcome, as embodied in equal treatment and positive action, by focusing on the structural reproduction of gender inequality and aiming to transform the policy process such that gender bias is eliminated. It also appears to allow for the recognition of cross-cutting diversity in a manner that neither the equal treatment nor positive discrimination models do. For, while some have understood mainstreaming as about gender equality only, its real potential resides in the fact that it could be

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implemented such that it addresses inequalities based on race, religion, disability, sexual orientation and age as well. As Rees argues, limiting mainstreaming to gender equality is conceptually flawed given the diversity among women and men (Rees 2002:54).

This

takes us beyond an equal treatment discourse but also demands that we resist essentialist articulations of gender difference. This equality strategy does not demand that women integrate into male norms, nor does it demand that female norms be adopted. Rather it seeks to transform and de-gender the norms of equivalence themselves. Equal treatment, positive action and gender mainstreaming can be viewed as distinct approaches to equality, but are most commonly viewed by equality professionals as cumulative and complementary rather than competing or incompatible. Rees, for example, clearly states that: ‘mainstreaming is a long-term strategy that needs to be accompanied by the secure underpinning of equal treatment legislation and positive action measures.’ (Rees 1999:166)

Mainstreaming in Practice Mainstreaming represents an important theoretical development within equality debates, but one that has been largely confined to gender equality debates thus far.

Wider

theoretical debates about equality might well be enriched by an engagement with this gender literature. Yet mainstreaming is not only a significant theoretical development. It has also been widely adopted by governmental organizations, from the United Nations and European Council to Whitehall and the newly created Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly. A brief account of the adoption of mainstreaming within Westminster and Whitehall will indicate the extent to which the equality agenda in Britain has already embraced mainstreaming as a central new equality strategy. New Labour has shown itself to be aware of the distinction between equal treatment strategies and gender mainstreaming strategies, and has adopted policies and practices to promote both.

It has not generally engaged with positive action strategies,

though the Labour Party’s commitment to ‘all-women shortlists’ is an interesting exception to this rule (see Squires and Wickham Jones 2002). The Government Women and Equality Unit states that ‘gender mainstreaming will complement gender equality

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policies to form a twin track strategy. Gender equality policies are specifically developed to address a problem. Gender mainstreaming is a strategy for achieving gender equality.’ (Cabinet Office website) In similar vein, the Department of Trade and Industry web site states, ‘It [gender mainstreaming] aims to achieve greater equality between women and men by bringing a gender equality perspective into everyday policy-making (into the mainstream), and by complementing the more traditional approaches of promoting gender equality, such as legislation and positive action’. Whilst New Labour’s approach to equal treatment policies is clearly exemplified in its recent announcement of the new Commission for Equality and Human Rights, its approach to gender mainstreaming is perhaps best exemplified through the work of the Women’s Unit (WU) and then Women and Equality Unit (WEU) (for a more detailed discussion see Squires and Wickham-Jones 2004). The Women’s Unit (WU) was established in June 1997 and was charged with scrutinising legislation to promote sexual equality and with promoting female friendly policies. As Minister for Women, Harriet Harman indicated that the unit would ensure a coordinated approach across departments as she looked ‘over the shoulder of colleagues’ (The Daily Telegraph, 4th June 1997). A WU publication stated, ‘At the centre of its work is the drive to put women’s interests into the mainstream of government policy, including for civil servants through guidance and training. (WU 1998: 25) Emphasising the different roles of the unit, including policy-making and consultation, Harman was quoted: ‘For the first time, women’s issues are put firmly at the heart of government. I will open a new dialogue with women.’ (The Guardian 4th June 1997) Indicating a similarly wideranging role, she soon argued, ‘I will be supported by a dedicated WU which will promote women’s issues across Whitehall and throughout the country.’ (The Guardian 5th June 1997) The Unit’s web site promised to provide ‘a two-way voice between government and the women of the UK’ as well as working ‘closely with No 10, Government Departments and others to bring about measurable improvements to the position of women which benefit society generally.’ It continued, ‘The Unit makes it a priority to listen to what women have to say and to ensure that their views are acted upon.’ Joan Ruddock said later that the Unit ‘was established to focus on delivery for women across all departments.’ (Hansard, 7th March 2000: col. 882)

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Equality and Diversity The WU struggled to establish a clear identity for itself during its first year of

existence. In part this reflected inevitable difficulties in establishing a new unit and get a team of civil servants together. It also was indicative of a (relative) lack of resources and a marginalized location within Whitehall. In June 1998 both Ministers for Women were sacked and Margaret Jay and Tessa Jowell were appointed respectively in place of Harman and Ruddock. At the same time, the WU was moved to the Cabinet Office. In November 1998, New Labour’s commitment to mainstreaming was formalised with the publication of ‘Policy Appraisal for Equal Treatment’ (PAET) guidelines. The guidelines stated, ‘We must understand how policy can have a different impact on different groups in society.’(Cabinet Office, PAET guidelines) The guidelines offered advice to civil servants on how to monitor the impact of policy proposal through the collection of data, consultation, assessment, and, if necessary action. Civil servants should not assume that policy measures were gender neutral: ‘gender impact assessment challenges the assumption that policies and service affect everyone in the same way. It puts people at the heart of policy-making and leads to better government by making gender equality issues visible in the mainstream of society.’ (Cabinet Office, PAET guidelines) The WU would provide advice on the implementation of the guidelines. For the remainder of the first Blair term, the WU undertook a range of activities. Some of these activities had a direct impact on the policy-making process; others were more indirect in orientation. Policy issues that the unit worked on included family friendly employment, the protection and safety of women, and national childcare. The Unit also collected information regarding women’s concerns and publicised government policy measures that had benefited women (see, for example The WU 1998). It undertook research about the issues concerning teenage girls and about the pay gap between women and men. These indirect activities were important: ‘the aim of the WU is to ensure that women’s interests are properly represented as policy is formed. It is therefore essential that we understand more about women’s attitudes and how they differ from men.’ (The WU 1999: 1). Delivering for Women highlighted the unit’s role as a cross-cutting structure designed to mainstream public policy: Jay wrote in the forward, ‘We recognise too that we need to improve the way Government works. One of the main reasons for setting up

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the cross-cutting WU was to ensure that Government policies knit together properly to take account of the interests of women.’ (The WU 1998: 2) The publication noted key areas of the unit’s activities including the pay gap, poverty in old age and teenage girls. In 1999 the Unit carried out a large-scale consultation exercise, Listening to Women: ‘Government has never communicated with women in this way before. We will circulate our findings in the autumn to all parts of the government so that they can use them in their own policy making and will develop women specific guidelines for service providers.’(Prime Minister 1999: 27) This exercise was followed up with further research and the publication that year of a magazine, Voices, aimed at disseminating information to women (‘perceived within government as the most exciting bit of the Unit’s work’, according to one ex-member) (Interview April 2001). In terms of dissemination, the Unit also produced regular reports on the Budget (see, for example, The WU 2000, and The WU 2001). The Unit also organised consultations with women’s groups in civil society, including the Women’s National Commission. However many commentators confidently predicted the demise of the WU before the June 2001 general election: ‘Downing Street has always appeared to be embarrassed by its WU.’ (The Guardian 18th June 2001). Another journalist had concluded earlier, ‘There is a suspicion that No 10 is simply waiting for the Unit to wither away from neglect.’ (The Guardian, 1st June 1999) The Times had called it ‘a clumsy, counterproductive way to fight for equality.’(The Times, 26th August 1998) Speculation also indicated the need for a unit to look at inequalities more generally (The Observer, 17th December 2000). In the event the WU was not abolished; rather it was restructured as the Women and Equality Unit (WEU) – taking responsibility for both gender equality policies and gender mainstreaming. Its remit now includes ‘coordinating policy on women and gender equality issues’ (Cabinet Office 12th July 2001), including sex discrimination act and equal pay. It became sponsor for the Equal Opportunities Commission and the Women’s National Commission and it took on the Kingsmill Review, currently then underway, into women’s employment and pay. The Unit’s new remit, to improve the position of women in ‘measurable’ ways and to promote equality generally regardless of gender or sexual orientation, reflected a

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reorientation of its work towards more measurable outputs and away from information generation that had taken place in November 2000. At the same time as the new structure was unveiled the new Minister for Women in the Cabinet, Patricia Hewitt, appeared more committed to the work of the Unit than her predecessor. The WEU announced five priorities (one of which, domestic violence, was added after the others): reducing the pay gap, work-life balance, women in public life, public services, women’s experiences and perceptions of government initiatives, and domestic violence. In May 2002, the WEU was moved from the Cabinet office to the Department of Trade and Industry.

The Limitations of Mainstreaming One concern about mainstreaming as a gender equality strategy is that it may come to replace rather than complement the other two strategies, legitimating the disappearance of equal treatment legislation and targeted equality policies, and the associated equality units and commissions created to monitor these. At a time when there is little support amongst the British public for the idea that women as a group are unequal, and when gender inequality is not seen as a priority issue, this is a real worry. Indeed there are indications that mainstreaming has come come to replace positive action strategies in Britain, which the Government increasingly represents as an ‘Old Labour’ approach to equality, to be distinguished from its own more ‘modern’ commitment to ‘equality and diversity’.

However, there is no indication that equal treatment policies are being

marginalized, although they are now being framed in terms of equality and diversity. The review of the equality framework in Great Britain was framed in the consultation document as being about ‘what equality institutions can contribute to making equal opportunities and equal treatment a reality for everyone.’ (2002: 2) Under the heading ‘Equality Now’ the Government consultation document states: ‘Through the working of the equality legislation since the 1970s much progress has been made in reducing discrimination against individuals. There is an increasing acceptance of the diversity agenda – organizations are more and more addressing the needs of particular groups, whether as employees customers or otherwise. This is good for business as well as right in its own terms.’ (2002:5) This narrative depicts equality policies in Britain as moving from an equal treatment focus to a diversity focus.

Providing redress for

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individual’s suffering discrimination is no longer sufficient: ‘equality is now everyone’s business. The challenge now is to promote and support equality throughout our society’ (2002: 8). In addition to tackling discrimination the Government indicates that equality institutions should in future also engage in mainstreaming – building issues of equality into policies and practices across a broad front, taking account of all equality strands (2002:8).

In other words the new equality framework in Britain appears to be

characterized by a twin track strategy of a) addressing problems arising from historical inequalities via anti-discrimination legislation, and b) promoting gender equality via mainstreaming strategies.

They key concern here, for those in favour of their

implementation, is that there appears to be no place for positive action programmes. Advocates of a politics of difference are unlikely to find comfort in the New Labour twin track equality strategy. Yet there is another concern about the potential limitations of mainstreaming. Verloo, one of the members of the Council of Europe Expert Group that devised the 1998 definition of mainstreaming, points out that to be transformative gender mainstreaming must be understood and implemented by the regular actors in the policy-making process. It must convince these actors that policy-makers are a part of ‘the problem’ without alienating them from the mainstreaming project. In order to do so, it needs to ‘resonate’ with the existing frames within which regular actors operate: it needs to ‘seduce’ them (Verloo 2001:9). Frame extension and bridging is needed to bring the goal of gender equality into alignment with the existing frames and norms of politicians and civil servants. In the context of contemporary Britain this usually means that gender equality is argued to be better for both women and men, to improve productivity, and to facilitate better, more modern, government. Mainstreaming has been most effective to date where it has been formulated in terms of arguments for modernization, greater economic efficiency and productivity. The WEU tells us on its website, for instance, that: ‘The Government has a vision for a modern Britain. A vision of equality and opportunity for all… Everyone must be able to play their full part in social and economic life. We need to tackle barriers to participation and change culture so that equal opportunities and equal treatment become a priority for all.’ They point out that ‘real, substantive equality’ is good for everyone: individuals,

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businesses and service providers (WEU 2003, emphasis added). Meanwhile the ‘Gender Impact Assessment’ document is framed by a discussion of ‘Inclusive Policy Making’, which is depicted as part of the Government’s programme of public service reform, the ultimate goal of which is to put the consumer first. Here mainstreaming becomes a way of thinking about users as distinct groups with differing needs, characteristics and behaviours, which matters if one is concerned about delivering customer and user satisfaction. The ‘business case’ for mainstreaming is the only case offered for ‘why gender equality’ matters (WEU 2003). Even domestic violence is approached in terms of its economic consequences. As an WEU ‘Interim Findings’ document states: ‘Two women each week are killed by a partner or former partner, a total of over 100 deaths each year. The cost of the domestic homicide of adult women is an estimated £112 million each year…Domestic violence is a complex social problem with devastating consequences. It drains the resources of public and voluntary services and of employers and causes pain and distress to women and their families. The purpose of providing a figure for the ‘cost’ of domestic violence is to more clearly show its importance, by finding a way of translating these hardships into a common unit of account.’ (WEU 2003a) The extent to which gender equality issues have come to be articulated in terms of economic efficiency is clear. In a related manner the Department for Trade and Industry states on its website: ‘Unfair discrimination in employment is wrong. It is bad for the individuals who are denied jobs and access to vocational training, who suffer victimisation or harassment, because of prejudice. It is bad for the businesses which are denying themselves access to the widest pool of talent and not sharing in the benefits such as increased motivation, lower turnover of staff, and access to wider markets - that a diverse workforce and effective equality policies can bring.’ Meanwhile, Barbara Roche (then Junior Minister for Women) told an Institute for Public Policy Research conference that ‘the key to unlocking equality of worth is economic integration.’

She continued: ‘As a government, we have concentrated much of our

energy on engaging people into the economic life of our country.’ Equality and diversity, she claimed, ‘are good for business too.’ (Roche 15th May 2002) A couple of months later she asserted, ‘The benefits of realising this [equality] agenda are enormous, not just for

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individuals but for Britain as a whole. And the business for diversity is becoming harder to resist as a diverse workforce [brought forward by equality] gives employers a competitive edge.’ (Roche 15th July 2002) It is clear from these statements that the equality agenda is increasingly articulated in terms of economic efficiency and productivity. This suggests that frame bridging is indeed happening in terms of the discourse of the mainstreaming institutions. In addition, one can discern frame bridging in terms of the structure and institutional function of the WEU. For mainstreaming has also been most successful where it has been depicted as a part of the Government’s wider commitment to ‘modernization’. Within the New Labour lexicon, as Alan Finlayson has shown, ‘modernization’ ‘is an “up” word, that makes things sound exciting, progressive and positive… (Its) usage helps generate an appearance of structured and unified thinking… It helps to render “natural” and un-contestable that which is not necessarily so.’ (Finlayson: 2003:67) It is used most frequently in relation to public sector reform, ushering in what Stuart Hall has called ‘the new managerialism’ (Hall 2003: 16). As part of its modernising agenda, on its election to office in May 1997, Labour promised to reform the machinery of government. A central feature of this modernisation, the administration argued, was the introduction of ‘joined-up government’. This notion was based on the conclusion that too often policy initiatives were constrained by departmental boundaries. The way that individual departments interpreted responsibilities meant that proposals were not assessed in their full context. Richards and Smith conclude, ‘The notion is that the policy arena has become a more crowded environment with numerous actors competing for political space, so the government’s ability to maintain some semblance of control has been curtailed.’(Richards and Smith 2001:6, 239-50) Whilst problems frequently require more than one department in the design of any solution, the departmental system is ‘administratively and culturally ill-equipped to reconcile conflicting departmental objectives of encourage cross-cutting policy formation.’ (Flinders 2002) As Tony Blair, noted: ‘Government is organised vertically, with departments based on the function they perform … But people’s problems are rarely so neat.’ (Blair, speech ‘Modernising Public Services’, 26th January 1999) He suggested that joined-up government, side-stepping departmental boundaries (and the differing

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norms) would overcome the problem (Taylor 2000: 55-57). One means by which Labour proposed to deliver joined up government was through the establishment of cross-cutting departmental units. Such units would be able to work across departments and to coordinate policy initiatives. A variety of units were established after 1997, including the Women’s Unit. The success of the Unit in its pursuit of mainstreaming is therefore bound up with the success of the broader project of modernizing government. Similarly, the problem of institutional uncertainty surrounding the WEU is indicative of problems encountered by Labour’s attempt to introduce ‘joined up’ government more generally – namely that many officials remain culturally entrenched within their department and resentful of cross-cutting bodies. This implies that the adoption of mainstreaming as a theoretical approach and political strategy has been shaped to some considerable extent by its potential to resonate positively with wider Governmental priorities and discourses in relation to economic productivity and modernization. There is some evidence that advocates of mainstreaming have consciously adopted ‘frame bridging’ as a strategic means of pursuing their broader goals of gender justice. However, the necessity of engaging in this process of ‘frame bridging’ means that there is always a danger of ‘rhetorical entrapment’ (Verloo 2001:10) – the danger that mainstreaming will be reduced to a means of pursuing the goals of economic productivity and government modernization alone.

Indeed some of the

initiatives that Labour have adopted that promote gender equality may have been introduced for motives other than gender justice. As Vicky Randall notes in relation to Labour’s childcare policy: considerations of gender equity played some part in motivating and shaping policy developments, ‘but they are not the driving force.’ (Randall 2000: 193) The danger of rhetorical entrapment is complemented to a correlative danger of depoliticization. Once accepted as a norm that resonates with the dominant policy frame, mainstreaming may be adopted as a technocratic tool in policymaking, depoliticising the issue of gender inequality itself. It is clear, for example, that Gender Impact Assessments have only been introduced where they are not too demanding in terms of costs, time and expertise (Verloo 2001:15). This demand to limit the scope of mainstreaming tools such

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that they fit easily within existing policy processes potentially delimits the transformative potential of mainstreaming itself. So it is worth reflecting on the fact that mainstreaming might be viewed as a positive strategy for two quite distinct reasons. The first, adopted many of the ‘gender equality professionals’, is that it represents a positive development beyond equal treatment approaches, which define equality in such a way that men become the standard against which women are measured. Mainstreaming is therefore understood as a way of overcoming the fact that laws that are intended to eradicate discrimination frequently fail to address its root cause, because they fail to challenge the assumption that men are the norm (Beveridge et al 2000: 387).

The second, more likely to appeal to liberal

egalitarians, policy makers and the public, is that mainstreaming appears more ‘modern’ and in keeping with the norms of neo-liberalism than do positive action strategies. As Beverdige et al suggest, one reason why one might pursue mainstreaming is that in practice the strategy has ‘met with little resistance from those who would find positive discrimination unpalatable.’ (Beverdige et al 2000:391) This presents diversity theorists with a dilemma: how to hold on to the theoretical and practical potential of mainstreaming as a transformative conception of equality when the widespread adoption of mainstreaming strategies appears to be bought at price of rhetorical and institutional entrapment. If mainstreaming is to be transgressive it must be more than a technocratic tool. What is more, there is yet another concern about mainstreaming strategies as conceived to date. Mainstreaming has generally been pursued as a strategy to achieving gender equality. ‘Gender mainstreaming’ has aimed to address the structural inequalities of women and has not paid too much attention to other structural inequalities. Whether one could extend and refine a mainstreaming strategy such that it addresses ethnicity, religion, sexuality, age and disability is as yet unclear. It is the case that the Race Equality Unit, which develops, implements and monitors a race equality strategy, has a ‘Race and Gender Mainstreaming Team’ that aims to ‘mainstream race and gender into employment, policy development and service delivery across the public sector and to develop policy and targets on mainstreaming race in the Home Office and its services.’ (Home Office 2003).

Whilst within the DTI there is an ‘Equality Impact Team, which

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‘informs, encourages and instructs DTI staff in integrating equality into their policies and their services to the public. It is responsible for preparing and monitoring the DTI’s Race Equality Scheme and Northern Ireland Scheme, but equally covers gender and disability issues.’ (WEU, 2003)

In other words Equality Impact Assessments are clearly being

applied across many of the equality strands.

Mainstreaming is therefore already being

used as an equality strategy that engages with diversity. Nonetheless, the technocratic complexities of attempting to conduct impact assessments in relation not only to gender, but also to race, religion, sexuality, disability and age are enormous. The very fact that the bureaucratic co-ordination of all six strands of impact assessment would prove so cumbersome suggests that there may be an institutional, as well as normative, sense to thinking about deliberative democracy as a useful resource when considering mainstreaming in the context of diversity.

Deliberation and Mainstreaming Advocates of deliberative democracy – in a move akin to that made by advocates of mainstreaming - suggest that the idea of democracy revolves around the transformation, rather than simply the aggregation, of preferences. The basic impulse behind deliberative democracy is the notion that people will modify their perceptions of what society should do in the course of discussing this with others. The point of democratic participation is to manufacture, rather than to discover and aggregate, the common good. The ideal is one of democratic decision-making arising from deliberative procedures that are inclusive and rational (Miller 2000:142). A deliberative decision will, says Melissa Williams, have taken all relevant evidence, perspectives and persons into account, and will not favour some over others on morally arbitrary grounds (Williams 2000).

Legitimacy here

requires not only a lack of bias but also inclusivity. This suggests that the commitment to impartiality be retained, but that the process for grounding impartiality is transformed. The project, as articulated by Shane O’Neill, is ‘to conceive of how we might reflect critically, and impartially, on principles of justice without abstracting from concrete needs and interests that are particular to some social group or other.’ (O’Neill 1997:55) His suggestion is that this will only be possible ‘if we can ground impartiality not in a hypothetical contract but rather in a conception of a

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reasonable yet open and unrestricted dialogue in the public domain.’ (O’Neill 1997:56) Similarly Williams argues that ‘one of the central aims of deliberative theory is to redeem the ideal of impartiality by defining political processes in a manner which avoids bias against valid social interests.’ (Williams 2000:126) In other words, we find in the deliberative democracy literature very similar concerns to those within the mainstreaming literature, though the language is different: both focus on the rule-formation process and aim at impartiality through inclusivity. It is for this reason that it makes sense to think about mainstreaming in relation to deliberative democracy. The emphasis that deliberative democrats place on inclusion and dialogue offer rich resources to counter the technocratic tendency in more narrowly bureaucratic articulations of mainstreaming.

Where the technocratic form of mainstreaming

increasingly emphasizes the importance of ‘gender expertise’ and creates an elite body of professional gender experts, a deliberative rendering of mainstreaming would emphasize the importance of dialogue with diverse social groups. This is particularly significant given that the move to consider equality and diversity rather than simply gender equality renders the process of mainstreaming infinitely more complex. Moreover, if theories of deliberation have much to offer theories of mainstreaming, the reverse might also be true. For although deliberative democrats have placed great emphasis on inclusion and deliberative decision-making they have had relatively little to say about the practical institutional arrangements that might facilitate such inclusive deliberation. Indeed, when one does look at the institutional arrangements proposed by deliberative democrats they appear to embody not simply the dialogical conception of impartiality, but rather a two-track model in which the monological and the dialogical have distinct roles, located within clearly demarcated political practices (see Squires 2002: 133-156 for a fuller discussion of this point). For example, Habermas suggests that legitimacy is based on ‘rationally motivated agreement’ that is produced in ‘un-deformed public spheres’ through actual processes of deliberation. The general public sphere is not a mere ‘back room’ of democratic politics, but rather an ‘impulse-generating periphery that surrounds the political centre: in cultivating normative reasons, it affects all parts of the political system without intending to conquer it.’ In other words he draws a clear distinction between ‘un-deformed',

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informal or weak public spheres where public opinion may be formed, and the strong, ‘arranged’, formal sites of institutionalized dialogue, which must be open to influence from the weak public spheres turning influence into a ‘jurisgenerative communicative power’ (Habermas 1996:147). This implies that political decisions in complex and pluralistic societies can be rational and hence legitimate in a deliberative democratic sense – that is rationally authored by the citizens to who they are addressed – if institutionalized decision making procedures follow two tracks. Political decisions must be both open to inputs from an informal, vibrant public sphere (contexts of discovery) and appropriately structured to support the rationality of the relevant types of discourses and to ensure implementation (contexts of justification). This is two-track model in which the informal, public spheres are ‘contexts of discovery’, and the formal, public spheres are ‘contexts of justification’ (see Bohman 1996). This two-track model of deliberative democracy distinguishes between communication oriented toward mutual understanding on the one hand, and instrumental action and politics on the other.

Because it remains largely within the realms of ideal

theory it entails very little institutional design, yet the potential fit with New Labour’s twin track equality strategy is intriguing.

Recall the WEU statement that: ‘gender

mainstreaming will complement gender equality policies to form a twin track strategy’ and the DTI statement that gender mainstreaming aims to achieve greater equality by bringing a gender equality perspective into everyday policy-making, and by complementing the more traditional approaches of promoting gender equality, such as legislation.

Compare this approach to that recommended by Habermas: ‘Discourses

conducted by representatives can meet the condition of equal participation on the part of all members only if they remain porous, sensitive, and receptive to the suggestions, issues and contributions, information and arguments that flow in from a discursively structured public sphere, that is, one that is pluralistic, close to the grass roots, and relatively undisturbed by the effects of power.’ (Habermas 1996:182) I am suggesting here that New Labour has a nascent twin-track strategy to equality policies, and that it is one that potentially shares certain features of a deliberative

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democratic model.

For this potential to be realized a more deliberative and less

technocratic form of mainstreaming would need to be explored.

Inclusive Deliberation and Diversity Mainstreaming The successful pursuit of equality conceived as mainstreaming requires that marginalized groups actively participate within deliberative processes that prefigure and inform policy formation.

As Alexandra Dobrowolsky notes: ‘only through the incorporation of

alternate forms of representation, particularly via social movement organizations, can the old-style, opaque, elitist, individualistic and adversarial political of the present be challenged.’ (Dobrowolsky 2000:250) Yet political opportunity structures are limited and there are practical difficulties in establishing mechanisms for the inclusion of marginalised groups in the decision-making process. Many of the groups that an effective mainstreaming programme would need to engage with are unprepared in their organisational structure, in the skills levels of their leadership, in their communications and research capabilities, and in their resources levels to engage in a mainstreamed policy process. In addition, anti-statist views still predominate amongst women’s groups in England making them culturally hostile to the institutional assimilation that mainstreaming may entail. As the WNC reports, grassroots women’s groups do not feel the EOC or CRE served their needs. Many were indifferent to the consultation on a new Single Equality Body because they did not believe that it would address their concerns, even though one of the Government’s stated aims is to tackle discrimination more effectively (WNC 2002b). Those who suffer from multiple disadvantages clearly need to be brought into the process of developing proposals for change. In the absence of the active participation of these citizens the equality agenda will lack the necessary engagement with the ‘diversity’ that might enrich its formulation. However, the lack of engagement amongst marginalised groups in the consultation about the SEB can be contrasted with the strength of minority claims making in Scotland. In contrast to the rather ambivalent attitude to the prospect of devolution found within Wales, there was an active campaign for constitutional change in Scotland. There was also an active campaign for equal representation in the Scottish Parliament, which created new spaces for the active participation of women in Scottish politics. As Alice Brown

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notes: ‘Women political activists from the political parties, trade unions, local government, the voluntary sector and a broad range of organisations and women’s groups have seized the political opportunity opened up by the constitutional debate in order to make their own proposals for deepening democracy.’ (Brown 2001:213-29) Having campaigned long and hard for democratic inclusion in the new Scottish Parliament, these women’s organisations had high expectations of the Scottish equality agenda, confidence in their ability to affect change, and organisational structures to enable effective consultation. In this context it has perhaps been easier for the Scottish Equality Unit to work closely with various women’s and equality organisations than it has for its equivalent in Whitehall. As Ronnie McDonald suggests: ‘The women’s groups that have campaigned for equality to be a founding principle of the Scottish Parliament will continue to campaign to ensure that the Equality Unit is well resourced and staffed, so that its can play a real role in assisting the creation of an equal Scotland.’ (McDonald 2001: 240) Where women worked pro-actively to shape the constitution, and have a sense of ownership in it as a result, their civil society involvement is bolstered. Post-devolution Scotland therefore offers an important lesson for the development of an effective diversity mainstreaming policy that is deliberative rather than simply technocratic: a vibrant civil society with clear political opportunity structures enables non-governmental organisations to work with Equality Units, thereby strengthening their role and increasing their effectiveness. This contrasted sharply with the Government’s ‘Equality and Diversity’ consultation process, where the capacity of grassroots organisations to engage in the consultation was constrained by tight Government timetables and narrow consultation networks, ensuring that well-funded sectors had a greater say in the process say than did disadvantaged groups that the CEHR is meant to champion. Whilst an Equality Unit within Whitehall is unlikely to perform an important role in filtering deliberation into Governmental decision-making whilst political opportunity structures are weak in practice, it is nonetheless possible that a mainstreaming strategy could draw upon theories of deliberative democracy to enrich current thinking about equality.

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Conclusion This exploration of current equality discourses suggests that the general public hold an understanding of equality that is broadly in keeping with liberal egalitarianism, which is at ease with the notion of equal treatment but not with positive action. The recent Government review of Britain’s equality framework that resulted in the proposal to create a new Commission for Equality and Human Rights is in close alignment with this understanding of equality. Yet one should also note that New Labour has adopted gender mainstreaming strategies, and that whilst equality is still primarily being framed in terms of anti-discrimination legislation, mainstreaming represents a potentially significant development in equality strategies.

There are limitations to the ways in which

mainstreaming has been conceived and implemented to date, but the potential for developing this approach to equality in the context of diversity (rather than simply gender) and in the light of deliberative democracy (rather than technocratic modernization) remains strong.

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