Evaluation of court interpreting.

Evaluation of court interpreting A case study of metadiscourse in interpreter-mediated expert witness examinations Jieun Lee

Ewha Womans University

The present paper examines the metadiscourse of court interpreting, with a focus on the evaluative language used in relation to interpreting of expert witness testimony. The study explores interactional resources such as hedges, boosters, attitude markers, self-mentions and engagement markers, employed by participants in the interpreter-mediated South Korean courtroom examinations of three English-speaking expert witnesses. Extracts analysed for this paper, involving a total of four interpreters, are taken from two court cases (four extracts each from a civil case, featuring experienced conference interpreters, and a criminal case, with unskilled interpreters). In courtroom settings, where the interpretation of expert testimony is frequently contested, this study demonstrates metadiscursive representation of stance management during professional communication, which is closely linked with facework and rapport management. The analysis indicates that hedging is far more frequently used than boosters, and that various attitude markers and engagement markers are used in evaluating interpretations and ensuring their accuracy. Legal professionals and interpreters alike display their evaluative, affective and epistemic orientation in the interdisciplinary professional discourse, and personal interaction, of the courtroom examinations analysed here. Keywords: court interpreting, expert witness, evaluation, metadiscourse, stance

1. Introduction There traditionally tends to be an assumption that service users are by and large not in a position to evaluate the accuracy of interpreting, for the very reason that they understand only one of the languages involved. However, there are nowdays more and more bilingual or multilingual participants in interpreter-mediated Interpreting 17:2 (2015), 167–194. doi 10.1075/intp.17.2.02lee issn 1384–6647 / e-issn 1569–982X © John Benjamins Publishing Company

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communication (see Hlavac 2010; Pym 1999). In the context of courtroom proceedings, they often evaluate interpreting explicitly and clearly: it is common for interpretation of testimony in adversarial courtroom examinations to be challenged by those participating in the proceedings, including other interpreters (see Lee 2013, 2015; Martinsen & Dubslaff 2010). The likelihood of having mistakes corrected in this way may increase psychological pressure on court interpreters, who are already faced with a challenging task. Discourse-based court interpreting studies have drawn attention to the need for court interpreters to deal with such features as professional norms, power dynamics, role distribution and participation framework (e.g. Angermeyer 2009; Hale 2004; Jacobsen 2008; Lee 2009, 2013; Leung & Gibbons 2008). Regarding the subcategories of court interpreting which researchers have focused on, most studies have analysed the examination of lay witnesses. While the examination of expert witnesses and their testimony have been dealt with in monolingual discourse-based studies (e.g. Hobbs 2002; Maley 2000; Matoesian 1999, 2008; Shuy 2006; Stygall 2001; Winiecki 2008), this topic has rarely been investigated in interpreting studies. Expert testimony may not necessarily be more difficult to interpret than lay testimony, but it is generally considered highly technical, thus requiring thorough research and preparation by interpreters (de Jongh 2012: 108). Called by the prosecution, plaintiff or defence in order to clarify points of controversy in criminal or civil cases, expert witnesses nowadays play an increasingly important role in litigation (Miguelez 2001: 5). Unlike lay witnesses, who are called upon to state what they saw and heard with respect to the incident in question, expert witnesses are expected to provide professional opinions and explanations based on their specialist training, qualifications, skills and knowledge (Matoesian 2008: 19). Since it is often used to settle points contested by opposing parties, expert testimony tends to be frequently challenged. The present paper aims to examine the metadiscourse of court interpreting, with specific reference to the evaluative language used in comments on the interpreting of expert witness testimony. Examples of Korean-English interpreting in South Korean courtrooms are examined; the official language, in which evaluation of interpreted expert testimony in the courtroom is expressed, is Korean. When interpretations are challenged, this inevitably draws attention to interpreters, often marking not only a challenge to their professional self-esteem but even possible loss of face (Lee 2013).1 Analysing how interpretation of a courtroom examination 1. Face is concerned with ‘one’s sense of worth, dignity, identity, respect, honour, status, reputation and competence’ (Spencer-Oatey 2008: 14). Goffman (1967: 5) defines face as ‘the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact’.

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is evaluated can thus shed light on the degree of tact and sensitivity shown by different professionals like lawyers and fellow-interpreters. It may also indicate how the participants in the courtroom proceedings engage interactional resources in conveying their criticism of interpreting, and how participants’ professional identities and roles are constructed, negotiated, acknowledged or challenged.2 There has been an upsurge of interest in metadiscourse in a variety of disciplines, including English for Special Purposes, corpus linguistics and genre studies. In interpreting studies, metadiscourse has been examined with a view to exploring issues such as the professional identity and role of interpreters (e.g. Angermeyer 2005; Diriker 2004, 2009; Martinsen & Dubslaff 2010; Monacelli 2009; Pym 1999; Wadensjö 1998). In the present study, focusing on challenges to interpretation of expert testimony affords insight into how negotiation of meaning or understanding is achieved through interaction among courtroom participants. By comparing two cases involving interpreters with different qualifications, the study will also look at how the interpreter’s level of skill affects this interaction during the examination of expert witnesses. Although interpersonal communication involves various semiotic systems such as gesture, body position and gaze, the focus here is only on the linguistic expression of evaluation. 2. Theoretical framework Evaluation is an essential aspect of interpersonal discourse (Mauranen & Bondi 2003; Querol-Julian & Fortanet-Gomez 2012). Hard to pin down (Bondi & Mauranen 2003; Hyland 2005) and highly complex (Luzón 2012), it tends to be understood as a ‘broad cover term for the expression of the speaker or writer’s attitude or stance towards, viewpoint on, or feelings about the entities or propositions that he or she is talking about’ (Thompson & Hunston 2000: 5). Through a variety of lexico-grammatical and rhetorical resources, evaluation expresses the speaker’s opinion, establishes an interpersonal relationship with the hearer, and organises the discourse (Moreno & Suárez 2008: 750, 756). Conceptually, evaluation overlaps to some extent with attitude (Halliday 1994), appraisal (Martin & White 2005), stance (Hyland 1998, 2005), and metadiscourse (Crismore 1989; Crismore et al. 1993; Hyland & Tse 2004). Given the complexity of these concepts and the lack of consensus on their definition, the brief literature review which follows is limited to those aspects of evaluation, stance and metadiscourse relevant to this study. The focus is not so much on distinguishing between these related terms 2. Social identity is not a fixed construct, and different acts and stances are employed to construct and manage different aspects of (inter)subjective identity (McEntnee-Atalianis 2013: 321).

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as on examining how evaluation of interpreted expert testimony is expressed in the metadiscourse used by the various actors in the courtroom. Evaluation is viewed as an attitudinal dimension of linguistic resources which convey the speakers’ judgements, opinions and commitments (Hyland 2005: 176). Stance is a very closely related concept, referring to ‘the speaker’s opinion or attitude towards a proposition that the sentence expresses or the situation that the proposition describes’ (Lyons 1977: 452, cited in Wharton 2012: 262). Defined as ‘the lexical and grammatical expression of attitudes, feelings, judgements, or commitment concerning the propositional content of a message’ (Biber & Finegan 1989: 92), stance emerges from interactions (Kärkkäinen 2006: 700) as the evaluative, affective and epistemic orientation in discourse (Bucholtz & Hall 2005: 59; Englebretson 2007: 17). Epistemic stance, indicating the relative certainty or doubt that speakers have about what they are saying, may be cued by adjectives (e.g. ‘obvious’, ‘dubious’), adverbs (e.g. ‘perhaps’, ‘indeed’) and verbs (e.g. ‘demonstrate’, ‘indicate’), including modals (e.g. ‘might’, ‘should’) (Tracy 2011: 66). Affective stance, indicating a speaker’s assessment of a person, an issue or an event, can be shown in various ways (Tracy 2011: 66). Stance is collaboratively constructed among participants (Englebreston 2007: 6) and is constantly adjusted in interactions (Wharton 2012: 262). Metadiscourse, defined as ‘aspects of textual structure which go beyond the subject matter and signal the presence of the author’ (Hyland 1998: 225), is related to the organisation of discourse and the speaker’s/writer’s stance towards either the message or the reader/hearer. It conveys the speaker’s/writer’s personality, responsibility, credibility, sensitivity towards the listener/reader and evaluation of propositional matter (Hyland 1998: 225). Metadiscourse serves an important function in facilitating communication (Hyland & Tse 2004: 159). It is considered an indispensable tool in interpreting discourse so as to access the propositional content of utterances (Ifantidou 2005: 1325). Various scholars have used different taxonomies of metadiscourse. Luuka (1994) uses three subtypes: textual metadiscourse (text structuring), interpersonal metadiscourse (signaling attitudes towards the content of the text or people involved in the communication situation), and contextual metadiscourse (commenting on the communicative situation or the text as a product). Drawing on Hallidayan macro-functions of language, Vande Kopple (1985) assigns interpersonal and textual functions to metadiscourse. Textual metadiscourse concerns the organisation of discourse, while interpersonal metadiscourse expresses the writer’s stance towards both the content of the text and the potential reader (Vande Kopple 1985). However, the boundary between textual and interpersonal metadiscourse may not be clear-cut (Ifantidou 2005: 1327–1328). These subtypes of metadiscourse,


which help speakers/writers conduct interaction, are referred to by Hyland (2005) as stance and engagement markers respectively. Of particular interest in the present paper is interpersonal metadiscourse, which includes a wide range of linguistic resources such as hedges and boosters, attitude markers, self-mentions and engagement markers. These are used to construct the interpersonal dimension of discourse and facilitate the interaction between the writer/speaker and the reader/audience (Hyland & Tse 2004: 168). Hedges (e.g. ‘might’, ‘perhaps’) indicate the speaker’s decision to withhold complete commitment to a proposition and reluctance to present propositional information categorically (Hyland 2005: 178; Hyland & Tse 2004: 168). Boosters (e.g. ‘clearly’, ‘obviously’) imply certainty and stress the force of propositions (Hyland & Tse 2004: 168). Since attitude concerns our feelings, judgement, appreciation, affect and acknowledgement (Martin & White 2005), attitude markers express forms of appraisal like surprise, obligation, agreement and recognition of importance (Hyland & Tse 2004: 168). A wide array of verbs (e.g. ‘agree’, ‘prefer’), adverbs (e.g. ‘unfortunately’, ‘hopefully’), and adjectives (e.g. ‘appropriate’, ‘logical’, ‘remarkable’) are used as attitude markers (Hyland 2005: 180). Self-mention refers to the use of first person pronouns and possessive adjectives to present propositional, affective and interpersonal information (Hyland 2005: 181). Engagement markers are addressed to the audience, either by selectively focusing their attention or by including them as participants in the text through second person pronouns, imperatives, question forms and asides (Hyland & Tse 2004: 168–170). Speakers thus acknowledge their interlocutors, engaging with them as discourse participants (Hyland 2005: 176). Different degrees and kinds of commitment can be expressed, for both epistemological and social/interpersonal reasons. Epistemological reasons relate to uncertainty regarding the message content, whereas social/interpersonal reasons are linked to speakers’ awareness that there is room for alternative positions or voices (Wharton 2012: 265). Social reasons are strongly linked to relational work (Locher & Watts 2005),3 which has been viewed within the theoretical framework of facework and rapport management.4 Evaluation has the potential to threaten both face and rapport with others (Spencer-Oatey 2008). Participants in the communication therefore need to consider interpersonal dynamics when using evaluative language, particularly in a professional and/or institutional capacity. In this 3. ‘Relational work refers to the “work” individuals invest in negotiating relationships with others’ (Locher & Watts 2005: 10). 4. Facework refers to ‘the actions taken by a person to make whatever he is doing consistent with face’ (Goffman 1967: 12). Rapport refers to ‘people’s subjective perceptions of (dis)harmony, smoothness-turbulence and warmth-antagonism in interpersonal relationship’ (SpencerOatey & Franklin 2009: 102).

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respect, metadiscursive elements in evaluation of courtroom interpreting may reflect concern with the interpreter’s status in the interaction. 3. The study The audio recordings for this study, with a total duration of 14 hours and 30 minutes, were obtained, with the court’s permission, from one civil case and one criminal case in South Korea. Both cases drew media attention in South Korea and, for obvious reasons of data protection, no further details are given here. Three different English-speaking expert witnesses are examined — the first two in the civil case, the third in the criminal case. Features of the recordings are presented in Table 1, below. They were transcribed and analysed by the researcher (see Appendix for transcription conventions). Instances of evaluative language in relation to the interpretations were identified. These were far less frequent in recording 1 (16) than in recordings 2 and 3 (42 and 36 respectively). Accordingly, recordings 2 and 3 were chosen as the sources of the examples presented below. The author was present in the courtroom, as an observer, when recording 3 was made. Table 1. Details of case type and participants in the three recordings Recording no. Case type 1 Civil

2

Civil

3

Criminal

English-speaking expert witnesses Interpreters Plaintiff ’s expert witness Two trained conference (a male economist) interpreters (both female, >10 yrs’ experience) Defendant’s expert witness Two trained conference (a male economist) interpreters (both female, >10 yrs’ experience) Defendant’s expert witness Two untrained interpreters (a male forensic pathologist) (both male)

The court interpreting system in South Korea is in many ways underdeveloped, and the qualifications and role of interpreters have not attracted much attention in legal circles (Lee 2011, 2014). Many interpreters in criminal court proceedings have not received interpreter training, and it is quite rare for support interpreters or ‘check’ interpreters to be engaged in criminal cases. In civil cases, litigation parties may hire skilled interpreters5 and each party’s interpreters will often monitor the other’s. 5. In Korean civil trials, the interpreter’s fees have to be paid by the party requiring the service, whereas in criminal trials, defendants who cannot understand the language of the court may be exempt from the payment of interpreters’ fees.


The civil case examined here was about currency dealing, with frequent mention of the ‘Knock-In Knock-Out’ (‘KIKO’) trading format in the first two extracts discussed below. Table 1 indicates that expert testimony for both the defendant and the plaintiff was given by economists, with each party using experienced conference interpreters (‘INT1’ and ‘INT2’ respectively, in the extracts examined in this article; another interpreter, referred to as ‘INT3’, was with the plaintiff for part of the overall proceedings but does not feature in these extracts and is not mentioned again here). The criminal case was a murder trial, in which the defence used expert testimony to dispute the evidence of death by strangulation presented in the autopsy report. The two interpreters were untrained: one (‘INT4’) was on the local court’s interpreter register; the other (‘INT5’) was a forensic pathologist with no professional interpreting experience, recruited by the court to assist with medical terms. Both cases were tried before a judge, as is the norm in South Korea. The judges often intervened and managed turn-taking when the interpreting was disputed by lawyers, with the judge in the civil case paying closer attention to any issues of this kind.6 It is now increasingly common, in high-stakes litigation, to engage check interpreters for this very purpose. Here, the interpreters in the civil case monitored each other, offering corrections or suggestions. Early in the proceedings, they commented immediately on any perceived interpretation errors; later, they were instructed by the judge to wait until the end of the turn. After the courtroom examination was over, the interpreters in the civil case were asked to check the transcript for the court records; in the criminal case, this was not done. The two interpreters in the criminal case, seated next to each other, often took turns at interpreting, but their limited interpreting skills made it difficult for the court to follow the expert testimony (see Lee 2015). The interpretation of the testimony was more frequently evaluated and corrected by the lawyers than by the interpreters. In the extracts below (1, 2, 7 and 8 from the civil case; 3, 4, 5 and 6 from the criminal case), Korean utterances have been transcribed according to the Yale 6. González et al. (2012: 1108) state that interpreters should request a bench conference if they hear an error in their peers’ interpreting, so that they can inform their peers and give them a chance to have the record corrected. They say that the interpreter who hears the error should not take it upon herself to offer a correction immediately (González et al. 2012: 1108–1109). However, in the recordings examined for this study, interpreters were expected or allowed to make corrections without having to ask for a bench conference (which is, in any case, an extremely rare practice in South Korea) or testifying to comment on the accuracy of their own interpretation and that of other interpreters. There is no established legal procedure for interpreters’ corrections, and the rules governing check interpreters’ conduct are uncertain (Stern & Ballard n.d.).

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Romanisation system. Each transcribed turn in Korean is followed by a bracketed English translation, in italics. English words used by Korean speakers are transcribed in English, with no indication of any phonetic variants introduced by the speaker. 3.1 Hedges and boosters in evaluation Courtroom participants often hedged their comments on interpretations. The most commonly used hedging form was ‘kathta’, equivalent to ‘it seems’ or ‘I think’ (see An 2013; Kim 2011; and, on the usage of ‘I think’ and ‘I guess’, Kärkkäinen 2003, 2007). Its inflected forms, in different contexts, include ‘kathsupnita’, ‘kathunteyyo’, ‘kathkwuyo’ and ‘kathayo’. Since the English back-translation provided in the extracts below has to take differences between Korean and English sentence form into account, ‘kahta’ is mostly translated as ‘it seems’ and placed at the start of the utterance. Extract 1 is an excerpt from the cross-examination of the expert witness for the defence in the civil case. INT2 is interpreting the cross-examination by the counsel for the plaintiff, monitored by the defendant’s interpreter INT1. Extract 1 (Rec. no. 2) 1

WIT: (.) Well (.) if I took your view (..) uh they should never buy a forward contract, or sell a forward contract. 2 INT2: Kulen kwancemilamyen, ilehan cwungsokieptulun celtaylo sentokyeyyakul mayiphakena maytohaysenun antoyl kesipnita. (From that perspective, these small and medium-sized companies should never buy a forward contract or sell it.) 3 WIT: U:h (.) by your own witness’s statement, they should’ve done forwards. They should’ve sold forwards, (.) but in fact forwards expose them to even more risk than the KIKO does. (.) Is that unreasonable? (.) Hardly. 4 INT2: Ku wenlitaylolamyen nonlitaylolamyen, e kiepun incey KIKO taysiney sentokyeyyakul maycesseya hanuntey kukey pihaplicekilkkayo? Kulehci anhsupnita. (According to that principle, according to that logic, uh a company should have bought a forward contract rather than a KIKO. Is that unreasonable? It’s not.) (5 turns omitted) 9 INT1: (..) Cwungkan pwupwuney tayhayse sentokyeyyakkwa kwanlyentoysenun wihemi te manhi toyki ttaymwuney (..) Kulehkey toysen antoyntalanun pwupwuni issessnunteyyo. Ku wihemilanun pwupwuni thongyeki toyci anhun ke kathsupnita. (In the middle part, (he said) because forwards expose them to more risks, they shouldn’t do so. It seems that the risk part was not interpreted.) 10 DC2: Thongyeki ko pwupwuneyse cenpancekulo com calmostoyn kes kathunteyyo. Cikum cungini yaykihan kenun wenkochuk nonlitaylolamyen cwungsokiepun mwe forward-man saya toyntanun yaykiintey forward-lul sassumyen ohilye wihemi te nophacyessul keta kulenikka mali antoynta. Kulen chwicilo ceki


cungenul hayssnunteyyo. Ku pwupwuni thongyeki ceytaylo antoyn kes kathsupnita. (It seems that the overall interpretation of that part went wrong a bit. What the witness said is that by the plaintiff ’s account, small and medium-sized companies should buy forwards only, but it would have only raised the risks even more, so it does not make sense. That’s what he just testified. It seems that that part was not properly interpreted.) 11 J: (..) Ku nonlitaylolamyen kiepun KIKO taysiney sentokyeyyakul maycesseya hanuntey kukey (.) (According to that logic, a company should have bought a forward contract rather than a KIKO, that is-) 12 INT1: XXX 13 DC2: Yey. Sentokyeyyakman mayceya hantanun iyakiintey KIKO kathun kes haci malko. Kulentey KI- sentokyeyyakul maycessumyen ohilye wihemi te nophacyessul keta. Kulehkey cungini yayki haysssupnita. (Yes, that means they should buy only forward contracts, not something like KIKO, but the witness said that a Ki- forward contract would have increased the risk.)

The witness states, in turn 3, that forwards expose small and medium-sized companies to greater risk; this is not fully and accurately interpreted in the following turn by the interpreter (turn 4). After INT2 finishes interpreting, check interpreter INT1 points out that part of the evidence was not interpreted (turn 9). Her evaluation of a fellow professional’s interpreting is marked by hedging, conveyed in the form ‘kathsupnita’ (‘it seems’, underlined in the transcription of turn 9). This stance marker is closely related to INT1’s facework, in the sense that it marks the proposition as a tentatively expressed opinion, not a categorically stated fact. Immediately after INT1’s comment, the non-examining defence counsel (DC2) elaborates on what was omitted in INT2’s interpretation. The lawyer repeatedly uses ‘katha’ (‘it seems’) (see the underlined forms ‘kathunteyyo’ and ‘kathsupnita’, in turn 10). His evaluative language also includes the hedging form ‘com’ (‘a bit’) (see the first underlined ‘com’ in turn 10).7 He then finishes his turn by stating that what the witness said about risk was seemingly not interpreted properly. Overall, both INT1 and the defence counsel express their criticism tentatively. The expert witness’s testimony is obviously not easy to follow for non-economists. The lawyers, the judge and the interpreters show their knowledge and understanding of the financial products at issue in this case. The participants achieve intersubjective understanding of various points in the interpreted evidence, often correcting or confirming their co-participants’ input. Thus, in turn 11, the judge starts by restating what has been said; INT1 appears to confirm this in turn 12, which is not audible. Then, in turn 13, the defence counsel again sums up the point 7. ‘com’ has been studied under the heading of discourse markers in Korean (e.g. Joo 2000; Yu 2008; Ahn 2009). Discourse markers have an emotive and expressive function and do not affect or add anything to the propositional meaning of an utterance (Hölker 1991, cited in Jucker 1993).

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which was missing from the earlier interpretation of the witness’s testimony, but this time makes no explicit reference to the interpretation. He simply states what he understands to have been said by the expert witness, without using any hedges or boosters (‘… the witness said that KI- forward contract would have increased the risk.’). The epistemic phrase ‘the witness said’ clearly indicates his certainty about his assertion. The tension regarding the interpreted testimony and its evaluation escalates when the comment on the risks entailed, which are a critical issue here, is not accurately translated. Extract 2 occurs seven turns after extract 1. INT2 mistranslates by saying that people could lose more money with a KIKO deal than by selling forwards, although the witness said the opposite. In the next utterance, she manages to convey the expert witness’s evidence that KIKO is not an inherently dangerous product (see turn 2). However, as INT2’s interpretation is partly inaccurate, the check interpreter INT1 intervenes by addressing the judge (turn 3). Extract 2 (Rec. no. 2) 1

2

3

4

WIT: The lesson of Long-Term Capital like the lesson for these KIKOs is that if you don’t have the dollars to deliver, you’re speculating. And if you speculate, you’re gonna lose just as much money selling forward as you would, in fact, you’d lose more money selling forward than you will with a KIKO. There is nothing inherently dangerous about the KIKO if you have the dollars. If you don’t have the dollars, it’s like any other instrument. It could be used as a tool of speculation, and a speculator could lose money. INT2: wulika LTCM-kwa kuliko KIKO-eyse etul swu issnun kyohwunun manyakey ku dollar position-i epstamyen kuken thwukiey pwulkwahan kesipnita. kulel kyengwueynun sentokyeyyakul e maytohayssul ttaypota hwelssin te manhun sonsilul ipul swuka isssupnita. KIKO cacheynun manyakey kekiey sangunghanun dollar position-i isstamyen naycaycekulo wihemhaci anhun kyeyyakipnita. Manyakey kuey sangunghanun kulen hyenmwul position-i epstamyen inun thwukiswutanulo pakkey sayongtoyl swu epsko, thwukikkwuntulun tonul ilhkey toypnita. (The lesson we can get from LTCM and KIKOs is that if uh we don’t have dollar position, it is nothing more than speculation. In that case, we could lose a lot more than when we sell forwards. KIKO is not inherently dangerous if (we) have the dollars. If (we) don’t have the dollars, it could be used only as an instrument of speculation. Speculators lose money.) (inaudible noise) INT1: …Phansanim, akkalang kathun pwupwuninteyyo. KIKO pota forward-lul maytohayssul ttay te manhun sonsilul ipul swu isssupnitalanun iyakika myenghwakhakey naoci anhun kes kathsupnita. (Your honour, it’s the same part as before. It seems that the interpretation is not clear about his statement that one could suffer a bigger loss selling forwards than a KIKO.) DC1: cungini myengpaykhi forward ka te wihemhaycinta ilehkey yaykihayssketunyo, hyenmwuli epstamyen, yey. Cikum akka forward pota te wihemhaycil

5

6

7


swu isssupnita. Ilehkey thongyeki ilehkey thongyekhaysssupnita. (The witness clearly said forwards become more dangerous, if one doesn’t have the dollar, yes. It could become more dangerous than forwards. This is- that’s how the interpretation went.) J: Cikum ettehkey chwicilo cosenun cenglitway issnyamyen, dollar position-i epstamyen KIKO kyeyyaki sentokyeyyakul maytohayssul ttay hwelssin te manhun sonsilul ipul swuka isssupnita. Ilehkey cungenhan kesulo cenglitwayissnun= (The gist of the testimony recorded reads as follows. If one has no underlying dollar position, one could suffer even more losses selling a KIKO contract than forwards. His testimony is recorded like this.) DC1: =Kunikka calmos thongyeki toyn kepnita. Cunginun, dollar position-i epstamyen KIKO pota forward-ka te wihemhatako kulehkey cungenhaysssupnita. (That’s why it was misinterpreted. The witness said if one has no underlying dollar position, forwards are more dangerous than a KIKO.) J: Hanpen mwuleposicyo. Dollar position-i epsul ttay enu ccoki wihemhatako malssumhasyessnunci. (Please ask him which he said is dangerous when there is no underlying dollar position.)

INT1 comments on the interpretation, again using the stance marker ‘kathsupnita’ (‘it seems’) (underlined in turn 3). Without stating explicitly that the testimony concerning risks was mistranslated, she says, ‘It seems that the interpretation is not clear about his statement…’. Defence counsel DC1 backs her by pointing out the difference between the testimony and its interpretation (turn 4): this turn is noteworthy, as it contains the sole occurrence within these recordings of the booster ‘myengpaykhi’ (‘clearly’). The expert witness’s statement that KIKO is not inherently dangerous, and that one could lose even more money selling forwards than a KIKO product, is a crucial piece of evidence for the defence. By stressing that the witness stated this, the defence counsel here discredits the interpretation. In turn 5, the judge reads from the court record the part of the interpreted testimony contested by INT1 (turn 5); immediately afterwards (turn 6), the defence counsel again says that the testimony was misinterpreted. His statement on this point is conveyed clearly and factually, with no hedges or boosters. He also repeats this evaluation later in the proceedings (the turn concerned is not shown here). None of the other participants in the exchanges recorded for this study expressed so clear a criticism of the interpreter for having, plainly and simply, ‘misinterpreted’. Extract 3 will show that in the criminal case too, when doubts are raised about the interpreter’s competence, the lawyer’s correction is hedged and there is no threat to the interpreter’s professional face. Regardless of this restraint, and the tension which is an inevitable feature of a criminal case of this kind, the lawyers and check interpreters alike nevertheless pay constant attention to the interpretation of the expert testimony.

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3.2 Self-mentions in evaluation Extract 3 is taken from the examination-in-chief of the expert witness in the criminal case. The interpreter here (INT5) is the forensic pathologist. His interpreting contains frequent fillers and pauses, and he sometimes indicates that he did not understand the witness’s statement. Shortly before this extract, the defence counsel had asked the expert witness to specify when histological examination is done as part of an autopsy. The expert witness here continues his answer to this question. Extract 3 (Rec. no. 3) 1

2

3

4

WIT: Particularly when the diagnosis uh may not be as clear to other people. (..) So we do histology particularly in cases where the diagnosis uh may not be very obvious. So for example if somebody’s shot in the head some people don’t do histology. Some people do. But in cases where there is a allegation of asphyxia, then it’s- most people will go extra step for completeness to provide assurance to the system that they have done a proper examination INT5: E (…) ipwuntulun e: com saini com myenghwakhaci anhun kyengwueynun cocikhakcek kemsalul thongsangcekulo hako ku taumey thukhi iwa kathi cilsiksaka uysimi toyntatunci hokun kulen noncayngi pwuthessnun kyengwueynun hwaksilhakey haki wihayse cocikhak kemsalul hantanun kepnita. (Uh these people uh in cases where signs are not clear, usually carry out histology, and in cases where asphyxia is suspected or when there is debate, they do histology to make sure [of the cause of death].) DC6: (..) Chongul ssokena mwe ilehkey myenghwakhan kyengwueynun hal swuto issko anhal swu issko kuntey isangcilsiksawa kathi kulehkey sainey tayhayse uykyeni ceysitoynun kyengwueynun cwulo hantanun cenun kulehkey alatulesssupnita. (In case of a clear-cut case such as a gunshot, (they) may do so or not do so. but when opinions such as positional asphyxia are presented, they usually do. That’s what I understood.) J: Yey yey ku cengtolo cengli- alkeysssupnita yey yey. (Alright alright. Let’s- yeah yeah.)

Turn 2, like the preceding turns (not shown in this extract), is not an accurate interpretation. After the interpretation, the defence counsel (DC6) states what was left out by the interpreter and suggests the term ‘positional asphyxia’, although the witness actually said asphyxia (turn 3). In offering this interpretation, DC6 finishes his turn by qualifying this statement as his understanding of the expert testimony (hence the underlining of ‘I’, in turn 3). This acknowledgment of subjectivity softens the implied reflection on the interpreter’s professional competence. As would be expected in a formal context like this, DC6 uses the deferential first person form ‘ce’ (‘I’). More fluent in English than his colleague on the defence team, he often intervened to correct interpreting during the courtroom examination.


The presiding judge’s reaction (turn 4) reveals that he does not want the proceedings to be prolonged by controversy over interpretation of specific details. His lack of insistence on precision in the interpreting may be attributed to the perceived competence of the interpreters at work, and possibly also to the judge’s lack of familiarity with the involvement of interpreters in court proceedings. At the same time, the fact that he engaged a doctor for the interpreting team indicates that he was aware of the potential difficulties with interpreting expert testimony. Earlier in the examination-in-chief, this judge requested the examining counsel to skip some questions regarding exhibit photos, saying that it would only be troublesome to translate the resulting exchanges. Extract 4, which comes later in the discussion regarding asphyxiation as the possible cause of death, once more reflects this judge’s attitude on the subject of interpreting. Defence counsels DC5 and DC6 are both involved here, with INT4 interpreting. Struggling with the term ‘positional asphyxia’, he first omits it (turn 2) and then gives the loose equivalent ‘a difficult position’ (turn 4). Extract 4 (Rec. no. 3)

1 2 3 4

WIT: So positional asphyxia is where you collapse unconscious. INT4: Uysik epsi ilehkey nemecintakena, yey. (You fall unconscious, yes.) WIT: In a position, awkward position you can’t breathe. INT4: Koyngcanghi ilehkey himtun caseyeysenun swumul swikika himtupnita. elyewun caseysenun elyewun casey awkward position- awkward position- (In such a very difficult position, you have difficulty with breathing. In a difficult position, difficult position awkward position-) 5 DC6: (.) Isangcaseyey uyhan cilsiksaeysenun kapcaki silsinhakena hanun kyengwuka issta kulen yaykin ke kathunteyyo ceyka pwassul ttaynun. (In positional asphyxia one may collapse suddenly. That seems to be what he’s saying, I think.) 6 DC5: One more time please. 7 INT4: Ceytaylo thongyekhako (..) kunkka cikum ipwuni malssumhasinun ke kutaylo cikum sentence pyello thongyekhako issnuntey kunkka koyngcanghi (..) e caseylul capki himtun elyewun caseyeysen swumswikika himtultako cikum yaykihako isssupnita. (I’m interpreting properly. Uh I’m interpreting exactly what this person’s saying sentence by sentence, uh he’s saying that uh in a very difficult, difficult position, it’s difficult to breathe.) 8 DC5: Yey. (Yes.) 9 J: Nayna ku yaykika ku yayki kathsupnita. (It seems/sounds about the same.) 10 DC5: Sasipphal hang. Penyekuy mwunceyuy- mwuncey ttaymwuney kantanhi sasipchil hang hanaman mwutko namecinun secungulo cenglihakeysssupnita. Sasipchil hang mwutkeysssupnita (omitted). (Question 48. Because- because of translation problems, let me simply ask question 47 only and then submit documentary evidence regarding other questions.)

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Here, defence counsel DC6 intervenes again to offer an alternative translation (turn 5). He uses the epistemic stance marker ‘kathunteyyo’, together with the first person form ‘ce’ (‘I’) (underlined in turn 5), roughly translatable in English as ‘I think’, ‘from my viewpoint’ or ‘in my opinion’. By not seeming to take it for granted that his interpretation must be perceived as the only correct one, he mitigates any threat to the interpreter’s face. In turn 6, defence counsel DC5 asks the interpreter to repeat the interpretation. Instead of seeking clarification or confirmation, INT4 maintains that he is interpreting accurately (turn 7). He is defensive and insists that he is doing his job properly, interpreting sentence by sentence. In the civil case, when their interpretation was disputed during the witness examination, the interpreters readily clarified and corrected their interpretation for the record; when the untrained interpreters in the criminal case were challenged in the same way, they became defensive in attitude (INT4) or simply gave up (INT5). This had obvious repercussions for the quality of interpretation heard by the court. Extract 4 also gives some insight into the presiding judge’s management of interpreting issues. Whereas the civil court judge makes it a priority to resolve any disagreement on such points, the judge in the criminal hearing does not seem particularly sensitive to differences created by nuances of interpretation (see turn 9). In the final turn of extract 4 (turn 10), DC5 says that he will not ask all the questions he has prepared. The reason he gives for this change of plan is the occurrence of translation problem(s), indicating his poor assessment of the interpretation (and perhaps of the judge’s attitude to the problems this creates). 3.3 Attitude markers and engagement markers in evaluation Although attitude markers and engagement markers appear in the extracts above, the discussion so far has focused on hedges, boosters and self-mention. Since both these types of marker may appear in the same turn, they are not dealt with separately here. This can be seen in the discussion of extract 5, again from the criminal case. Here, INT5 is interpreting the witness’s response to the defence counsel’s question on the possibility of positional asphyxia, which is a crucial point in the defence argument. Immediately before this extract, the witness had said that this was not a case of classic positional asphyxia. Extract 5 (Rec. no. 3) 1

WIT: The point though is that she is pregnant (..) and this, uh and her position in the tub, in the bathtub, where her hips are on the edge of the tub and she’s going down. Like this? And her neck is hyper-flexed. That position (.) of her in the tub, in my view, (.) may explain how she has some of the features that she has


on her body (.) some of the bleeding, that position that posture (.) the awkward posture may explain why you have the bleeding in some areas. 2 INT5: Ipwunuy malssumun palkyentoyn caseylo pwassessul ttay e mokilatunci ilen tey sayngkil swu issnun yele kaci chwulhyelina mosuptulul selmyenghal swu isski ttaymwuney i isangcaseyey uyhan cilsiksalul (.) kolyelul hayya hantanun °yaykipnita°. (This person’s saying that the position she was in when she was found can explain various losses of blood and features on uh her neck so he’s saying that positional asphyxia should be considered.) 3 DC5: Yey alkeysssupnita. Osipo hang mwutkeysssupnita (..) myechmyech salyeyeyse pomyen cwukekanun salamuy macimak caseyka= (Yes, understood. Let me ask question 55. Some cases show that the last position of dying people) 4 PRO1: =Camsimanyo. Cikum cungini cikum kulen yaykiyesssupnikka. Nemwu yoyakhasin ke aninkayo? hh (Just a moment. Is that what the witness just said? Isn’t it summarised too much? hh) 5 PRO2: Tasi hanpen XXX. (XX once again.) 6 PRO1: (..)Yey, cikum ku elkwul.. ilehkey momey nan phiey tayhayseto selmyengul hayssnuntey, (Yes, he also explained the face- bleeding on her body,) 7 INT5: Ipwunun kukel kulehkey= (This person thinks) 8 PRO1: =Yey keki= (Yes there) 9 INT5: =Selmyeng hal swu isskeysstalako sayngkakhaki ttaymwuney isangcaseyey uyhan cilsiksauy kanungsengul (that could explain so the possibility of positional asphyxia) 10 PRO1: (..) Ani kunkka elkwuley issnun (..) kukel cenghwakhakey com penyekul thongyekul haycwusicyo. Ceyka- ceyka thongyekhanun key cekcelhaci anhun ke kathayyo. (No um what’s on her face, please translate accurately, interpret please. I, I don’t think it’s appropriate for me to interpret.)

The interpretation in turn 2 involves information loss and distortion of meaning. Details such as the victim’s pregnancy and her position in the bathtub are lost. The interpretation is also closer than the witness’s statement to the defence’s argument that the cause of death was positional asphyxia: while the expert witness uses hedging forms (‘may’ and ‘in my view’, in turn 1), the interpreter replaces these auxiliaries with ‘can’ and then with ‘should’. When the defence counsel proceeds with the next question (turn 3), the prosecutor (PRO1) interrupts to comment on the interpretation: ‘isn’t it summarised too much?’ (turn 4); however, he does not mention details of mistranslation or offer corrections. His utterance may also be seen as a rhetorical question, bringing the interpreter into the discussion. The other prosecutor (PRO2) is also engaged when the interpretation is challenged, and asks the interpreter to repeat it (turn 5). PRO1 goes on to point out an omission regarding the bleeding (turn 6). Such details are obviously important to the prosecutors, if they are to have a chance of impeaching the expert witness’s evidence during the cross-examination.

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INT5 starts to go over the gist of his interpretation (turns 7–9), but is quickly interrupted at the end of this extract by the prosecutor’s request for an accurate interpretation (turn 10). Although the expert witness did not commit himself to the likelihood of positional asphyxia, the interpretation has leaned in this direction and PRO1 is at this point obviously not convinced of its accuracy. Turn 10 contains both engagement markers (use of imperatives, underlined in the transcription, to address the interpreter) and the attitude marker ‘cenghwakhakey com’ (‘accurately please’), implying dissatisfaction with the interpretation. The discourse marker ‘com’, literally ‘a bit’ or ‘a little’, complements the effect created by the speaker’s use of honorifics in mitigating the force of the imperatives — hence the inclusion of ‘please’ in the back-translation. At the same time, ‘com’ can also function as a marker of frustration and protest if accompanied by nonverbal cues, voice tone or stress (Joo 2000). However, the prosecutor is interrupting the examination-inchief and his tone does not convey irritation; he also adds that it is not appropriate for him to interpret (turn 10), indicating his understanding of the demarcation line between the roles of a prosecutor and an interpreter. This also may be seen, albeit probably to a lesser extent, as a mark of respect for the role of the interpreter. In another exchange some thirty minutes later, not transcribed here, the same prosecutor becomes more openly critical of the interpreter’s incompetence when he remarks that the defence counsel is becoming too involved in the interpreting. Extract 6 is taken from the cross-examination in the criminal case. Earlier, the expert witness stated that he performs 100 to 200 autopsies per year. The prosecutor now comes back to this statement as a measure of the expert witness’s credentials. Extract 6 (Rec. no. 3) 1

PRO1: Ilnyeney, yey. Cungini cikcep e sihaynghanun kepnikka animyen peer reviewna ettehkeytunci kwanyehanun kes- kwanyena kamtokhanun ke ta phohamhayse [hanun kenkayo]. (Per year, yes. Do you perform all of them uh yourself or do they include all cases you were involved through peer review or other types of involvement including supervision?) 2 INT4: [You perform] autopsy by yourself or you just supervising other people’s doing. 3 WIT: [Both] 4 INT4: [Both] Twu kaci ta ipnita. (Both of them.) 5 PRO1: Ta phohamhayse (Both included.) 6 INT4: Kwanlikamtokhanun ke hako cikcephanun kehako ta. (Including his supervision and his own, both.) 7 WIT: Forensic pathologists must perform autopsies themselves 8 PRO1: Ta phohamhayse kulen iyakicyo. (Inclusive all, that’s what he’s saying, right?) 9 INT4: Yey yey. (Yes, yes.) Every performance is included between 100 to 200 right? Per year right? 10 WIT: Approximately yeah. 11 INT4: Approximately so.


12 PRO1: E (..) kulem cikcep pwukemhanun kesun myech ken cengtoinci, cikcep pwukemul silsihanun kesun myech ken cengtoincinun cal molusipnikka? (Uh then don’t you know how many cases you perform yourself, how many autopsies you perform yourself?) 13 INT4: Can you remember how many time do you performed the autoposy by yourself (.) per year. 14 WIT: Per year, 15 INT4: Yeah. Ilnyeneycyo? Ilnyeney. (You mean per year, a year?) 16 WIT: 100 to 200 cases per year.= 17 INT5: =for yourself for yourself. 18 WIT: By myself.= 19 INT4: =By yourself. 20 WIT: By myself yes, and then I supervise people doing other cases. 21 INT4: A: (..) cakika cikcep hanun key han paykkeneyse han ipaykkeniko tto nameci kestulun talun kelul ilehkey kwanli kamtokhanun kesto phohamtoyntako cikum kulehkey cinswulhako isssupnita. yaykihako isssupnita. (A:h (..) he’s saying he performs one hundred to two hundred autopsies himself and the rest includes others he’s supervising. That’s what he’s saying.) 22 PRO1: Cinswuli hh tallacinuntey hh (His statement is changing then.) 23 INT 5: (..) okay 24 INT4: (.) they wanna know about how many time you know by yourself performing of autopsy. you said you know (..) you’re doing both you know by yourself and supervising. 25 WIT: right (five turns omitted) 31 PRO1: .hh thongyekul com hh cey- ceytaylo yayki anhasinun ke kathuntey (.) alkeysssupnita. mwe yey (..) cal (.) cal thongyeki antoyn kello ceyka ihayhakeysssupnita. (Interpreting needs- it seems that interpreting is sort of not done pr- properly. Well, yeah.. I will understand that the interpretation was not done well, well.) 32 INT4: XXX 33 J: Ani ani macnun malin ke kathunteyyo mwe (No no I think he’s correct.) 34 INT4: [Ceyka cenghwakhakey] kemsanim [malssumhasinuntaylo hanun keeyyo.] (I’m doing exactly what you/Mr. Prosecutor is saying.) 35 J: [Talun ke mwule]poseyyo. Cakika [sonswu hanun key] paykken nayci ipaykken [toyntanun yaykieyyo] (Ask the next question. He’s saying he’s conducting 100 to 200 autopsies himself.) 36 INT4: [Ipwuni] ciktapul hoyphihanun keeyyo (He’s avoiding answering.)

The question with which PRO1 begins the exchange (turn 1) is not accurately interpreted by INT4 (turn 2), who asks the witness in more general terms whether he performs autopsies himself or supervises autopsies carried out by others. The witness responds by saying that he does both, which is then mistranslated as indicating that the figure of 100–200 autopsies per year includes autopsies done by the witness as well as others supervised by him (turns 3–9). The witness’s utterance in

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turn 7 is not interpreted. When the prosecutor twice seeks to ascertain that both categories of autopsy were included in the figure (turns 5 and 8), the interpreter first answers in the affirmative and then asks for the expert witness’s confirmation (turn 9). However, it is not clear what the interpreter means by ‘every performance’ and he thus fails to ensure that the question is clearly answered. When the witness comments ‘approximately yeah’ and the interpreter merely repeats his words in English (turns 10–11), the prosecutor goes on immediately to ask the witness the leading question don’t you know how many […]autopsies you perform yourself? (turn 12). The interpreter phrases this in Korean as a neutral ‘how many?’ question (turn 13). Having stated that the figure is between 100 and 200 autopsies per year (turns 14–16), the witness specifies that these are cases he performs personally and, in turn 20, adds that he also supervises other cases (turn 20). However, this is erroneously interpreted by INT4 as indicating that the figure of 100 to 200 includes supervision cases (turn 21). When PRO1 remarks that the statement is changing, INT5 seemingly indicates his willingness to help with the interpreting (turns 22–23). A moment later, INT4 tries to seek clarification from the witness (turn 24), but his question is poorly phrased and therefore of little use. Eventually, the prosecutor states that the interpretation has not been adequately provided (turn 31). In doing so, he hedges (see ‘kathuntey’ (‘seems’), in turn 31). Again in turn 31, there are also attitudinal markers such as ‘com’ (‘sort of ’/‘a bit’), indicating the speaker’s frustration, and ‘ceytaylo an’ (‘not properly’). Since the criticism expressed by the prosecutor is face-threatening for the interpreter and affects relations between the two, self-mention strategies are used to put the negative evaluation in perspective as a personal judgement (see ‘ceyka ihayhakeysssupnita’ (‘I will understand’), in turn 31). This leaves scope for ‘dialogic space’ in the construction of meaning (Wharton 2012). The prosecutor’s breathing is accompanied at this point by a short laugh (transcribed as ‘hh’, in turn 31), marking an interactional stance. He also uses a marker of hesitation (‘mwe’ (‘well’), again in turn 31), this form sometimes serving as a filler or delaying device in Korean (Lee 1999). In the face of such criticism, the interpreter reacts strongly to defend the quality of his interpreting (turns 32, 34, 36). Here, the judge is not tolerant of the controversy over the interpreting. However, he seems favourably disposed toward the interpreter whose competence has been challenged. The judge says the interpretation seems correct to him (turn 33) and, without seeking further clarification, simply instructs the cross-examining prosecutor to move on (turn 35). His attitude may reflect his perception of the issue as minor, but also seems to indicate tolerance of inaccurate interpreting. Returning to the civil case, extract 7 is taken from the cross-examination of the expert witness for the defence and thus affords a direct comparison with extract 6. INT1, the check interpreter, intervenes here to offer corrections even when


INT2’s interpretation is reasonably accurate. This extract shows that the judge is handling the issue of interpreting with care, and that the defence team and their interpreter are paying attention to every utterance of the interpreted testimony. Extract 7 (Rec. no. 2) 1

WIT: (..) There’s no obligation on the bank to offer the company a variety of ways to pay. The company uh: apparently wanted a zero-cost contract so it put no money up. The bank offered it to them. The bank isn’t obligated to say to you, (.) you can pay this way or do this or that. The bank offers a contract, the customer is knowing and understanding of what the implications of that are, (.) the term sheet is a full disclosure of those terms. That’s all the com- customer needs to know. 2 INT2: Unhaynguy ipcangeysenun kiepi kokayki piyongul cipwulhanun pangsikul e: ilen key isstalako allyecwul uymwuka epssupnita. Kokayki i zero cost sangphwumul wenhaysski ttaymwuney piyongul e aph taney nayci anhnun kulen sangphwumul nayn kekwuyo, kulayse piyongcipwul pangsiki yele kayka isstalanun kel kocihal uymwuka epssupnita. I kokaykun kyeyyakcokenul pomyense yekieyse casini e pwutamhayya hanun piyongul al swuka issnun kesipnita. (The bank does not have an uh obligation to tell the company the client these are payment methods. Since the client wanted a zero-cost product, they produced a product which does not require money uh up front. That’s why the bank does not have an obligation to inform that there are a variety of ways to pay. The client can know the costs they have to bear by looking at the contract terms.) 3 INT1: [XX] issnunteyyo. (I have XX.) 4 J: (..)[Um] (Um) 5 INT1: Kunkka (..) unhayngi kociuy uymwuka isstanun kesi anila, ku cipwulpangpepey tayhan senthaykul cweya hal uymwuka epstanun e thongyekul- thongyeki macsupnita. (It’s..not that the bank has an obligation to inform, it’s that it doesn’t have an obligation to give choices in terms of methods of payment, uh the interpretation- this interpretation is correct.) 6 J: Kuken macsupnikka? (Is that correct?) 7 INT2: Yey. (Yes.) 8 J: (…) Piyongul nayci- (Pay-) 9 INT1: (…) Kulenikkan ilen pangpepi issko celen pangpepi isstalako allil uymwuka epsnun kesi anikwuyo.= (So it’s not that the bank has no obligation to tell you can pay this way or that way.) 10 J: =Piyongcipwul pangsikey tayhayse senthaykuy kihoylul cwul uymwuka epsta. ilehkey hamyen toypnikka? (Regarding payment method, the bank does not have an obligation to give an opportunity to choose. Will this do?) 11 INT1: (..) Yey. (Yes.) 12 J: Kokaykeykey piyongcipwul pangsikey tayhayse senthaykuy kihoylul cwul uymwunun epsnun kesipnita. ilehkey hamyen toynun kenkayo? ((The bank) does not have an obligation to give an opportunity for its customer to choose a method of payment. Will this do?)

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13 INT1: Sen- (cho-) 14 DC2: (..) Ilen key issko ilen pangsiki issko celen pangsiki ilen kel allyecwul philyoka epstanun kepnita. (It’s that the bank does not need to tell here’s this, this way or that way.) 15 INT1: Kulen kel ceysihal XX (to offer XX) 16 DC2: Ceysihal uymwuka epstanun °kepnita° (It has no obligation to offer) 17 J: Piyongcipwul pangsikey tayhayse ceysi (…) yele piyongcipwul pangsikul ceysihanun tungulo senthaykuy kihoylul cwul uymwunun epsnun kesipnita. ilehkey hamyen toynun kenkayo? (Offer ways to pay- (…) it doesn’t have an obligation to give an opportunity to choose by offering various ways to pay. Will this do?) 18 INT1: Ceysilul hal philyoka epstanun kecyo. Kulenikkan kokayki- unhaynguy ipcangeysenun ilehkey hal swuto issko celehkey hal swuto isskolul ceysihal uymwuka epsko, kokayki e sen:kupswuswulyolul naykoca haci anhasski ttaymwuney kukey kyelkwacekulo zero cost sangphwumi toyn kesiko, (..) kulehki ttaymwuney i pangpepi issta ce pangpepi isstalako hayeya hal philyoka epskwuyo. Tanci incey kyeyyakcokentulul alliko ku kyeyyakcokentulul patassten kiepi e chwungpwunhi kukel alko issko ihayhantamyen kulemyenun kokayki alaya hal motun etten kociuy pwupwuney issesenun chwungpwunhi e (..) [hayya hal XXX] (It means there’s no need to offer. The customer- the bank does not have an obligation to offer you can do this way or that. Since the customer did want to pay prepaid commission, it became a zero cost product at the end, and for that reason, there’s no need to tell there’s this way or that way. The bank gives the terms of the contract and if the company which receives them knows them and if they fully understand them, then when it comes to informing the customer uh what they have to know XXX ) 19 J: [Iken hayseki] ta tulekan kes kathkwuyo. hh hhh thongyekini cikum tule pon kes kacko thongyekul tasi hanpen hay poseyyo. macnunka cikum tapey tayhayse. (.) Cikum thongyekhal swu isssupnikka? Tasi hanpen mwulepositenciyo. (It seems that it includes your interpretation. hh hhh based on what you’ve heard, please interpret his answer again. Can you interpret now? You may ask him again.)

After the witness’s initial turn has been interpreted by INT2 (turns 1–2), INT1 gives an alternative interpretation and, in concluding turn 5 with the comment ‘macsupnita’ (‘[it]is correct’), effectively rejects INT2’s interpretation that the bank has no obligation to ‘tell’ customers about payment methods. (What the witness actually said, in turn 1 is that the bank is not obligated to offer the company different ways of paying and state what they are). After obtaining confirmation from INT2 that INT1’s interpretation is indeed correct (turns 6–7),8 the judge begins to 8. Some time after this case was finalised, the author had the chance to ask INT2 about her experience of the proceedings. She found her first court interpreting experience in such an adversarial atmosphere extremely stressful. She said that the cross-examination lasted nearly seven


reformulate the interpreted testimony but is interrupted by INT1’s renewed rejection of INT2’s wording (turns 8–9). Thus, INT1 twice draws attention plainly and clearly to the inaccuracy of INT2’s interpretation (see turns 5 and 9). When the judge asks for confirmation of the alternative interpretation (turns 10 and 12), defence counsel DC2’s use of the word ‘tell’ in Korean (turn 14) is in line with the wording used earlier by INT2 . However, DC2 then complies with INT1’s insistence on the word ‘ceysi’ (‘offer’) (turns 15–16). Interestingly, when INT1 repeats her interpretation in turn 18, the underlined word ‘koci’ (‘informing’/‘telling’) suggests that INT2’s original choice of wording was not wrong in that particular respect. The judge’s rejection of INT1’s formulation is based on his perception that it includes her own interpretation of the witness’s statement (turn 19). This reflects legal practitioners’ frequent usage of ‘interpretation’ in the sense of intralingual explanation or disambiguation, which they regard as strictly their own domain. The judge then gives INT2 another chance to interpret the witness’s answer. As shown in the extracts presented in this paper, the judge in the civil case frequently sought both parties’ input in officially recording the interpreted expert testimony, and showed concern with the need for impartiality in obtaining the interpreted testimony. He tended to give the active interpreter a chance to provide correct interpretations when the interpretation was challenged. The skilled interpreters in the civil case played important roles in obtaining the expert testimony, demonstrating strong interpreting skills. INT1, in particular, had years of professional experience in the financial sector and worked on this case longer than INT2. This might help explain why her interpreting was challenged less frequently than INT2’s, though the two interpreters’ different roles in the case should also be taken into account (INT2 worked for the plaintiff, INT1 for the defence). INT1’s terminological precision reflects her familiarity with the financial field — for example, her use of the term ‘prepaid commission’ (turn 18) as the equivalent of the witness’s non-technical phrasing ‘it put no money up’ (turn 1). Accuracy in interpreting has obvious implications for high-stakes litigation, and handling of terminology often becomes an extremely delicate and controversial issue (Elias-Bursać 2012; Hepburn 2012).9 The final exchange to be discussed hours without a break; during this time, she became progressively more resigned and tended increasingly not to dispute the objections. 9. In the civil case, during the courtroom examination the participants sometimes had lengthy discussions regarding correct Korean translations of English terms. The judge was obviously aware of the court reporter’s probable difficulties with the record: as a result, the bench occasionally asked the interpreter to slow down and provide translated terms rather than use English words. Since English financial terms are often preserved intentionally in interpreting,

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(extract 8) is taken from the examination-in-chief, again in the civil case. INT1 is interpreting for the expert witness, with INT2 as a check interpreter. The expert witness is disagreeing with the other expert witness’s testimony, given earlier in the case, which he describes here as unreasonable and untenable (see turn 1). Extract 8 (Rec. no. 2) 1

2

3

4 5

WIT: If to the contrary, we take the logical step forward and say that we can’t have any of these of sorts of provisions on a contract, we wind up in the untenable situation saying that the only contracts that are suitable are forward contracts or puts. And that simply isn’t reasonable. INT1: Manyakey cehuyka ilen nonlilul ttalase han tankyey te palcensikhye nakantamyen kulemyenun e malto an toynun kyellonul naylikey toypnita. Cuk, tasi malhayse e kacang cekhaphan kyeyyakilako hanun kesun senmwulhwanman isskena animyen put man issnun kulen kyeyyakman concayhayya toypnita. (If we take go one step further based on this logic, then we will end up drawing a conclusion which does not make any sense. In other words, uh the most suitable contracts are either forward exchange or puts.) INT2: Tongyekini senmwulhwanilako han kesun sentokelaylo pakkweya hapnita. forward ka senmwul XXX (What the interpreter said forward exchange should be replaced with forward contracts. Forwards are XXX.) J: Ku cemey tayhaysenun tonguyhasipnikka? (Do you agree?) INT1: Ney, aniyo. tonguynun hal swu issnunteyyo. cehuyka pepcengeyse kyeysok senmwulhwanilako sayongul hako issese ceyka kulehkey thongyekul haysssupnita. (Yes and no. I can agree, but we have been using forward exchange throughout so I have interpreted that way.)

In the transcription of turn 3, INT2’s recommendation that the translation of forward contracts should be changed is underlined. What INT2 says is that ‘senmwulhwan’ (‘forward exchange’) should be replaced with ‘sentokelay’ (‘forward contract/trading’). The indirect directive ‘-ya hapnita’ (‘should’) is used. When asked her opinion by the judge (turn 4), INT1 says that she agrees but that the rejected term has been used so far (turn 5). By speaking in the first person plural and opting for the pronoun ‘cehuy’ (‘we’), INT1 indicates her solidarity with the defence team. This engagement marker may be regarded as her appeal to shared knowledge, by involving the defence team in the ongoing interaction. By attributing her choice of term to its prior use in the courtroom, she is defending her interpretation. In the subsequent turns, not shown here, the defence counsel says that the terms are used interchangeably; the plaintiff ’s counsel states that the two are different, and that ‘senmwulhwan’ is correct. The two sides finally agree on this judge’s request posed challenges to both the interpreters and the litigation parties; as a result, the lawyers asked that both the original English term and the Korean equivalent be used in the court record.


using the Korean term ‘sendokelay’ in the record, with the English word ‘forward’ in brackets alongside. In this discussion, both interpreters show their knowledge of the subject matter and terminology. 4. Conclusion This paper has examined the evaluation of interpreting in English interpreter-mediated courtroom examination of expert witnesses in South Korea. The analysis shows that various interactional resources, such as hedges, boosters, self-mention, attitude markers and engagement markers, are used by courtroom participants in evaluating the accuracy of interpreted testimony. In expressing their position regarding the interpretation, the participants often use hedging forms and, more rarely, boosters. These features seem to reflect their consciousness of facework and rapport management in a professional setting. In addition, they use a variety of engagement markers such as questions and directives, as well as attitude markers, in their assessment of the interpretation. When they are certain about what they are saying, or when the expert testimony is of particular significance, they are less likely to hedge and may even use booster forms. Nevertheless, negative evaluation of interpreting is often hedged and various interactional resources are deployed for relational work. It is beyond the scope of this study to identify what determines the usage of evaluative language, and to what extent it might be influenced by interpersonal or other factors. The analysis shows that the courtroom participants cooperate with a view to accurate interpretation of the witness’s testimony (see also Lee 2013, 2014; Martinsen & Dubslaff 2010). It also shows that the evaluation of interpreting is part of the process of understanding, challenging, negotiating and interpreting the expert testimony, and setting down the court record. In other words, the metadiscourse contributes to the communicative interactions in the courtroom and the achievement of institutional goals. The study also indicates the courtroom participants’ attitudes to interpreting and the varying levels of competence among the interpreters. While most of the questions concerning interpreting in the criminal case focused on the propositional meaning and substance, evaluation in the civil case was generally concerned with nuances expressed by modality and interpretation of complex concepts. The skilled interpreters’ demonstration of interpreting competence contrasts with the unskilled interpreters’ phonetic/grammatical errors and mistranslations. Similarly, the way they convey their evaluation of interpreting shows different levels of professionalism and awareness of the interpreter’s role in the courtroom setting. Despite occasional lapses in accuracy, the three conference interpreters in

190 Jieun Lee

the civil case seemed able to cope well with evaluation of their interpreting and to resolve any problems of misunderstanding or mistranslation. They played important roles in obtaining the most accurate interpretation of the expert witness’s testimony, through clarification and checking. Whenever the courtroom participants were engaged in metadiscourse on interpretation, the skilled conference interpreters whispered to the expert witnesses so that they could follow the proceedings. However, the two unskilled interpreters in the criminal case were far less efficient in their handling of evaluation and in their interpreting. When discussion focused on their interpreting, they did not convey what was going on to the expert witness, thus isolating him from the courtroom communication in Korean. Given that the evaluative language examined in this paper is Korean, the findings may be specific to English-Korean interpreting, though evaluation of interpreting can obviously occur whenever bilingual participants take part in interpreted interaction. Despite its limitations as a case study, this paper has shed some light on the complex, interactional dimension of interpreting in the courtroom, offering examples of how it is evaluated almost literally in real time during the examination of expert witnesses. It would be interesting to examine metadiscourse in other professional interpreting settings, and also with a view to how this could be covered in training.

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Appendix. Transcription conventions WIT: INT: DC: PRO: J:

Witness Interpreter Defence counsel Prosecutor Judge

194 Jieun Lee (.) (..) (…) XXX , ? . bold [ ] = : : ° ° -

short pause, less than one second pause lasting between one and two seconds long pause, over two seconds inaudible continuing intonation rising intonation falling intonation emphasis overlapping talk latching utterances elongated vowel sounds soft voice truncated word (cf. dashes)

Author’s address Jieun Lee Graduate School of Translation and Interpretation Ewha Womans University 52 Ewhayeodaegil Seodaemungu Seoul 120–750 South Korea [email protected]

About the author Jieun Lee is an Associate Professor at the Graduate School of Translation and Interpretation of Ewha Womans University in Seoul, South Korea. She is currently the head of the Ewha Research Institute for Translation Studies of the University. She received her PhD in Linguistics from Macquarie University in Sydney, and taught there before joining Ewha Womans University in 2010. Her research work has been published in peer-reviewed journals such as Interpreting, Applied Linguistics, Multilingua, Perspectives, Meta, and International Journal of Speech, Language and the Law.

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