treme job demands are likely to cause experienced .... reward fairness were measured by six statements ... created for the assessment of standard and innova-.
'^ Acadaniy of Managemtint lournal 2001. Vol. 44, No. 5, 1039-lOSO.
FAIRNESS PERCEPTIONS AS A MODERATOR IN THE CURVILINEAR RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN JOB DEMANDS, AND JOB PERFORMANCE AND JOB SATISFACTION ONNE JANSSEN University of Groningen Activation theory suggests that intermediate rather than low or high levels of quantitative job demands beneflt job performance and job satisfaction among managers. Using an equity theory framework, I hypothesize that perceptions of effort-reward fairness moderate these inverted U-shaped demand-response relationships. In support of this hypothesis, survey results demonstrate that managers who perceive effortreward fairness perform better and feel more satisfied in response to intermediate levels of job demands than managers who perceive "underreward unfairness." Job demands on management employees typically constitute a broad variety of role obligations. Yukl. Wall, and Lepsinger (1990) identified no fewer than 14 categories of management behaviors: informing, consulting, planning and organizing, problem solving, clarifying, monitoring, motivating, recognizing, supporting, conflict management end team building, networking, delegating, rewarding, and mentoring. All these actions are assumed to be required of managers ranging from first-line supervisors to CEOs, althougb their relative importance differs by organizational level (Hogan, Curpby, & Hogan, 1994). An intriguing question is how the amount of job demands imposed on managers affects their behavioral and affective responses. According to activation theory, tbere will be inverted U-shaped relationships between job demands and both job performance and job satisfaction (Gardner, 1986; Gardner & Gummings, 1988; Scott, 1966). That is, an increase in job demands is assumed to be beneficial for job performance and job satisfaction to, but not beyond, a certain level; after attainment of that optimum level of job demands, job performance and job satisfaction should start to decline. Activation theory has been modified to account for empirical findings that individual differences in extraversion and electrodermal lability moderate the curvilinear effects of job design on physiological, behavioral, and affective responses of job performers (Gardner, 1986; Gardner & Gummings, 1988). Unfortunately, little is known about the job-contextual factors that moderate curvilinear re-
lationships. Recent research has only started exploring how curvilinear relationships between variations in job design and job performer responses are shaped by work context conditions such as pay and supervisory satisfaction (Cbampoux, 1992) and demands-ability fit (Xie & fohns, 1995). Ghampoux (1992) found several different moderating effects, especially of pay satisfaction, at low and high levels of job scope. Examples of these moderating effects are a negative enhancement effect (people doing low-scope jobs provided lower affective responses when pay satisfaction was also low); a compensatory effect (people doing lowscope jobs provided higher affective responses when pay satisfaction was high; and a positive enhancement effect (people doing high-scope jobs provided higher affective responses when pay satisfaction was also high). The context of pay satisfaction had little effect in the middle range of job scope. Xie and Johns (1995) found that a job holder's perceptions of the fit between job demands and his or her ability (demands-ability fit) moderated the U-shaped curvilinear relationship between job scope and stress. That is, people with high-scope jobs who perceived demands-ability fit experienced less exhaustion and anxiety than those perceiving misfit. The purpose of this study was to contribute to the literature on moderating job-contextual influences by examining the effect of perceptions of fairness on curvilinear demand-response relationships. More specifically, taking an equity theory perspective (Adams, 1963, 1965), I propose that the inverted U-shaped relationships between job demands and job performance and job satisfaction are contingent upon perceptions of the ratio between the effort spent and tbe rewards received at work. Managers who perceive job effort and rewards to be
1 would like to thank Jildou Spoelstra and Eduard Buhrer for their assistance in data collection and the editor, Thomas Lee, and three anonymous reviewers for this journal for their helpful comments on drafts. 1039
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fairly balanced (job effort-reward fairness) are argued to perform better and feel more satisfied in response to intermediate levels of job demands than managers who perceive an imbalance [underreward unfairness). Job demands is a multifaceted construct consisting of quantitative and qualitative role obligations. Quantitative job demands refer to the degree to which employees are required to work fast and hard and have much work to do in a short time, or permanently have a great deal of work to do; qualitative job demands refer to having to deal with role ambiguity and/or with conflicting role demands, such as those that have been labeled "person-role conflict," "intrasender conflict," and "intersender conflict" (cf. Ganster & Fusilier, 1989; Karasek, 1979; Katz & Kahn. 1966; Rabinowitz & Stumpf, 1987). Using broad definitions and measurements that mix up quantitative and qualitative aspects may produce unclear theory on the nature and consequences of joh demands or may blur relationships between separate facets of job demands with specific responses. To avoid such conceptual problems, in this study I exclusively concentrated on quantitative job demands, leaving role ambiguity and role conflict out of further consideration.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND Curvilinear Dem and-Response Relationships Activation theory has been used to explain the effects of variations in joh design on physiological, behavioral, and affective responses (Gardner, 1986; Gardner & Cummings, 1988; Scott, 1966). Central to the theory is the concept of activation level, defined as "the degree of neural activity in the reticular activation system, a major part of the central nervous system" (Gardner. 1986: 411). The idea that demand-response relationships are curvilinear borrows from two important propositions about activation level. First, each individual is assumed to have a characteristic level of activation, which is the level of activation that allows the central nervous system to function most efficiently, resulting in enhanced cerebral and behavioral performance and positive affect. As the experienced activation level deviates negatively or positively from the characteristic activation level, central nervous system efficiency is diminished, causing decreases in performance and positive affect (Gardner, 1986; Gardner & Cummings, 1988). Second, job demands "differ in terms of the resulting experienced level of activation of the joh performer" (Gardner & Cummings, 1988; 87). Johs with low demands provide low activation levels.
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and jobs with high demands provide high activation levels. Given that job demands result in different activation levels, the prediction of curvilinear demand-response relationship is straightforward. That is, job performance and job satisfaction are predicted to decline in proportion to the degree to which a job performer's experienced activation level negatively or positively deviates from the characteristic activation level owing to job underload and job overload, respectively (cf. Gardner & Cummings. 1988). As mentioned above, managerial johs constitute a complex set of role obligations with high information-processing requirements. Gardner and Cummings (1988) suggested that the predicted invertedU-shaped demand-performance relationships are more likely to be found for complex johs than for simple or easy johs. The justification for this impact of joh content is that "high and low activation levels impair the ability to process information, by lowering information processing capacity" (Gardner & Cummings. 1988: 89). In the case of simple jobs in which little information needs to be processed, extremes in activation level due to joh underload or overload are not likely to have much impact on performance because Uttle informationprocessing capacity is needed. However, in complex managerial jobs with high informationprocessing requirements, extremes in activation level do cause performance decrements by lowering information-processing capacity when it is especially necessary. Applied to the area of job design, activation theory has been supported by empirical research demonstrating a linear relationship between task difficulty and activation level, and an inverted-Ushaped relationship between activation level and task satisfaction (Baschera & Grandjean, 1979). Moreover, inverted U-shaped relationships have been found between job stimulation and job performance (Gardner, 1986) and between job complexity and affective outcomes (Champoux, 1980, 1992). Following this line of research, the present study applies activation theory to assume inverted-Ushaped relationships of job demands with job performance and job satisfaction among managers. Departing from this assumption, this study examines the possibility that these curvilinear relationships are influenced by perceptions of job effort—reward fairness. Fairness Perceptions as a Moderator of Curvilinear Demand-Response Relationships Equity theory (Adams, 1963, 1965: Mowday, 1991) suggests that perceptions of fairness are a
2001
job-related motivational base that can influence the behavioral and affective responses of job performers. According to equity theory, employees evaluate the exchange relationships with the organizations they are affiliated with in terms of a ratio between effort spent and rewards recieved at work. Job efforts include comprehensive investments, such as intelligence, experience, training, skill, and seniority, and specific work actions needed for task fulfilment. Job rewards, on the other hand, refer to inducements an employee may receive from an organization, including money, desired job-related responsibilities, esteem, status, and social identity (Adams, 1965). Perceived inequity resulting from job effort-reward discrepancies provides an unpleasant emotional state requiring the worker to reduce this tension. To diminish perceived inequity, a worker may actually alter efforts or rewards, may cognitively reframe efforts and rewards, may withdraw from the job, or may change comparison dimensions (Adams, 1965; Dittrich & Carrell, 1979; Mowday, 1991). Inequity can reflect underreward or overreward unfairness. In employee-employer exchange relationships, employees are more likely to perceive underreward unfairness than overreward unfairness. Moreover, the reactions of workers to the former appear to be much more intense than their reactions to the latter (Mowday, 1991). Therefore, this study focuses on equity perceptions regarding the difference between effort-reward fairness and underreward unfairness and does not deal with overreward unfairness. On the basis of activation theory, I argue that intermediate rather than low or high levels of job demands result in higher levels of job performance among managers. However, the extent to which a manager actually performs better in response to intermediate levels of job demands might be regulated by fairness perceptions of the ratio between effort spent and reward received at work. Responding to joh demands with good performance implies job investments such as intelligence, experience, energy, and time expended on appropriate work actions. A manager who judges that effort does pay will be driven to perform well in response to job demands. However, when job efforts are perceived as not being proportional to job rewards, management employees will be inclined to restrict job investments. In such an unfair situation, the performance enhancement effect that occurs in the case of intermediate job demands is expected to be impaired by the tension of restricting job efforts in order to reduce underrewaxd unfairness. In other words, a manager is assumed to have different options for performing her or his side of the exchange process to which the organization contributes re-
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wards. In this exchange process, managers who feel fairly treated are likely to perform better in response to intermediate job demands than managers who are underrewarded hy their organization. Fairness perceptions might also affect the curvilinear demand-satisfaction relationship. Although characteristic activation level differs across individuals, in general, intermediate rather than extreme job demands are likely to cause experienced activation levels that are closer to the characteristic activation levels of job performers, and, therefore, result in higher levels of job satisfaction (cf. Ghampoux, 1992; Gardner & Cummings, 1988). This satisfaction enhancement effect in the case of intermediate joh demands might be moderated by perceptions of effort-reward fairness. Perceptions of a fairly balanced reciprocity of efforts and rewards reinforce a manager's self-regulatory functions, his or her sense of mastery, efficiacy, and esteem, and will therefore serve as a beneficial condition for affective job responses (cf. Siegrist, 1996). As a consequence, the interaction of perceptions of a fair effort-reward ratio with intermediate job demands can be expected to provide high levels of job satisfaction, since managers are pleased to be doing a properly active job for which they are fairly rewarded. This balanced job situation enhances feelings of control over occupational life, producing joh satisfaction (cf. Adams, 1963, 1965; Dittrich & Carrell, 1979; Mowday, 1991; Siegrist, 1996). However, perceptions of underreward unfairness are expected to impair the positive effect of intermediate levels of job demands on job satisfaction. In terms of equity theory, managers will be less satisfied if they perceive their efforts as being disproportionate to their rewards. A context they evaluate negatively in terms of rewards is likely to distract them from the positive qualities of intermediate job demands. The unbalanced effort-reward ratio undermines feelings of control over the job situation, causing a decrease in job dissatisfaction (cf. Siegrist, 1996). In sum, perceptions of fairness conceivably moderate the curvilinear relationships between job demands and job performance and job satisfaction among managers. To test this moderator effect, I formulated the following hypothesis: Hypothesis 1. Fairness perceptions moderate inverted U-shaped demand-response relationships in such a way that managers who perceive effort-reward fairness produce higher levels of job performance and job satisfaction in response to intermediate job demands than managers who perceive underreward unfairness.
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METHODS Sample and Procedures A sample of 134 low-level and midlevel management employees from a Dutch industrial organization in the food sector received a questionnaire through regular mail. This sample of management employees was randomly selected from diverse units representing all functions and departments of the company. Ninety-nine completed questionnaires were returned, representing a response rate of 74 percent. The respondents were all men and had an average age of 45.33 years (s.d. = 7.71) and a mean company tenure of 6.98 years (s.d. = 5.87). Eleven percent of the respondents had at the most a primary education; 46 percent, an initial vocational education; 21 percent, a higher vocational education (at a level equivalent to college); and 22 percent, postgraduate degrees. As Warr (1990) noted, to test theoretical expectations of nonlinear relationships, a wide range of different jobs is needed so that job demands ranging from low to high are included. So, to ensure variety of job demands, I surveyed low- and midlevel management employees from a variety of departments, including purchasing, logistics, order processing, production, maintenance, quality control, research, marketing, engineering, and administration. The respondents provided self-reports of job demands, fairness perceptions, and job satisfaction. Since supervisors play a pivotal part in appraisal and reward systems, a manager's job performance might be best rated by his or her supervisor. Therefore, respondents delivered a second questionnaire for measuring Individual joh performance to their immediate supervisors. The latter filled out the questionnaire and sent it hack to me by regular mail. Supervisor ratings were obtained from 60 of the 99 management employees in the sample. Additionally, respondents provided self-reports for the particular aspect of innovative job performance (see Measures). Exploratory analyses revealed that the group of respondents for whom supervisor ratings were obtained (n = 60) did not significantly differ from the group of respondents without supervisor ratings (n = 39) with respect to age [t = —0.94, n.s.), company tenure [t = 1.45, n.s.), education (t = —0.35, n.s.), job demands [t = -0.83, n.s.), perceived effort-reward fairness [t - -1.38, n.s.), work satisfaction (f = —0.45, n.s.), and supervisory satisfaction (f = -0.23, n.s.). Measures Job demands. Perceived quantitative job demands were assessed by eight items from a Dutch
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scale developed and validated by Van Veldhoven and Meijman (1994). The items were: (l) "Do you have to work fast?" (2) "Do you have too much work to do?" (3) "Do you have to work extra hard to finish a task?" (4) "Do you work under time pressure?" (5) "Can you do your work in comfort?" (6) "Do you have to deal with a backlog at work?" (7) "Do you have problems with the pace of work?" and (8) "Do you have problems with the workload?" Item 5 is reverse-coded. Items were rated on a four-point Likert scale ranging from "never" (1) to "always" (4). The Cronbach's alpha of the summative scale was .79. Fairness perceptions. Perceptions of job effortreward fairness were measured by six statements (cf. VanYperen, 1996), each of which was followed by a seven-point response scale ranging from "totally disagree" (1) to "totally agree" (7). The items were: (l) "I work too hard considering my outcomes"; (2) "I give a great deal of time and attention to the organization, but do not feel appreciated"; (3) "I invest more in my job than I receive in return"; (4) "The rewards 1 receive are not proportional to my investments"; (5) "I put more energy into my job than it is worth"; (6) "I feel unfairly treated in my job." All responses were reverse-coded, so that higher ratings indicated more perceived effortreward fairness. Scale reliability was .90. Job performance. Given the diverse johs represented in the sample, no common objective assessments of job performance were available, or even possible. Therefore, a two-dimensional scale was created for the assessment of standard and innovative job performance. Standard job performance refers to the extent to which a management employee fulfills organizationally prescribed work role expectations (Katz & Kahn, 1966). However, "an organization which depends solely upon its hlueprints of prescribed behavior is a very fragile social system" (Katz, 1964: 132). To cope with global competition and environmental uncertainty, an organization needs managers who exceed their standard work behaviors by generating, promoting, and realizing new ideas for organizational change. Innovative job performance in the workplace is widely claimed to he crucial for the effective functioning of organizations (Kanter, 1988; Katz & Kahn, 1966; Woodman, Sawyer, & Griffin, 1993). Standard job performance was measured by a Dutch translation (Van Yperen & De Jong, 1997) of Podsakoff and MacKenzie's (1989) five-item scale for in-role job performance. Respondents' immediate supervisors indicated the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with the following five statements: (1) "This worker always completes the duties specified in his/her job description," (2) "This
2001
worker fulfills all responsibilities required by his/ her job," (3) "This worker often fails to perform essential duties," (4) "This worker never neglects aspects of the job that he/she is obligated to perform," and (5) "This worker meets all the formal performance requirements of the job." Item 3 is reversed. The response format ranged from "strongly disagree" (1) to "strongly agree" (7). Innovative job performance was assessed by nine items based on Scott and Bruce's (1994) scale for individual innovative behavior in the workplace, which draws on Kanter's (1988) work on the stages of innovation. Three items refer to idea generation ("creating new ideas for improvements," "searching out new working methods, techniques, or instruments," and "generating original solutions to problems"); three items refer to idea promotion ("mobilizing support for innovative ideas," "acquiring approval for innovative ideas," and "making important organizational members enthusiastic for innovative ideas"); and three items refer to idea realization ("transforming innovative ideas into useful applications," "introducing innovative ideas into the work environment in a systemic way," and "evaluating the utility of innovate ideas"). Immediate supervisors rated how often respondents performed the nine innovative work behaviors in the workplace. The response format ranged from "never" (l) to "always" (7). A principal axis factor analysis using oblique rotation of the items revealed the expected twofactor structure, which accounted for 77 percent of the variance. The two factors appropriately represented the standard job performance and innovative job performance items. Primary loadings exceeded .76, and cross-loadings were lower than .11. Adequate reliabilities were achieved for both standard job performance (a = .85, after deletion of item 4) and innovative job performance [a = .96). The management employees were asked to provide self-reports on the nine-item innovative job performance scale in addition to their supervisors' ratings for three reasons. First, the assessment of discretionary innovative performance is much like many forms of subjective performance appraisal, highly susceptible to idiosyncratic interpretations and thus likely to vary across different raters (Organ & Konovsky, 1989). Second, a management employee's cognitive representation and reports of his or her own innovative performance may be more subtle than those of his or her supervisor, since a manager has much more information about the historical, contextual, intentional, and other backgrounds of his or her own work activities (cf. Jones & Nisbett, 1971). Finally, the supervisor measure may miss genuine innovative activities of the man-
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agement employee involved, and may capt\ire only those gestures intended to impress the supervisor (Organ & Konovsky, 1989). So, although the supervisor scores provide a performance assessment that is procedurally independent of the respondents scores on job demands and fairness perceptions, the self-reports might be more subtle than the supervisor scores. The Cronhach's alpha of the selfreport scale of innovative job performance was .92. Below, the self-reports and supervisor scores are labeled "self-rated" and "leader-rated," respectively. Job satisfaction. As a managerial job constitutes sets of work actions, a manager's affective responses to the substance and results of those work activities are assumed to be a critical part of job satisfaction (cf. Smith, Kendall, & Hulin, 1969). Additionally, a manager's Immediate supervisor is likely to be the most important representative of the organization she or he has to deal with concerning a variety of job-related issues, including the determination of job demands (Smith et a l , 1969). Therefore, satisfaction with work and the immediate supervisor were assessed as features of job satisfaction. The question "How satisfied or dissatisfied are your with . . .?" was followed hy four items on work satisfaction ("your work performance," "the quality of your work performance," "the way you perform your work," "the way you carry out your work activities") and three items on supervisory satisfaction ("your collaboration with your supervisor," "the support you get from your supervisor," and "the support you give to your supervisor"). Items were rated from "very dissatisfied" (1) to "very satisfied" (7). A factor analysis using principal components extraction and oblique rotation yielded the expected two-factor solution, accounting for 76 percent of the variance. The two factors constituted the appropriate items, with primary loadings higher than .71 and cross-loadings lower than .20. Reliabilities for work and supervisory satisfaction were .85 and .91, respectively. Covariates. To control for the possibility that sociodemographic differences in the predictor and outcome variables might lead to spurious relationships, age (in years), organization tenure (in years), and education (1 = "primary education," 2 = "initial vocational education," 3 = "higher vocational education," and 4 = "postgraduate degree") were entered as covariates in the analysis. Older managers who have been affiliated with an organization a long time can be plateaued, which could influence the allocation and perceptions of job demands, perceptions of effort-reward fairness, job performance, and job satisfaction. Moreover, level of education can be critical for enhancing job performance, es-
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Academy of Management Journal
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pecially innovative performance Gustafson, 1988).
linear X^Z term was added to test the hypothesis that the curvilinear relationships of job demands with job performance and job satisfaction vary as a function of perceptions of job effort-reward fairness.
(Mumford &
Data Analysis Since the independent variables were continuous, I conducted hierarchical multiple regression analyses to test the hypothesis of quadratic-jobdemands-by-linear-fairness-perceptions interaction effects on the dependent variables of job performance and job satisfaction (cf. Aiken & West, 1991; Cohen & Cohen, 1983). To facilitate testing of quadratic and interaction effects, standardized independent variables were used. To test the hypothesized quadratic-by-linear interaction between job demands (X) and fairness perceptions (ZJ the following equation should be used: Y = b,X + + b^XZ + + + (cf. Aiken & West, 1991). The predictors were entered into the regression equation in six successive steps. In the first step, I entered age, company tenure, and level of education to control for possible confounding effects. In the second and third steps, the linear (X) and quadratic (X^) terms of job demands were successively added to detect linear and quadratic main effects. In the fourth and fifth steps, fairness perceptions as a linear moderator (Z) and the linear interaction between job demands and fairness perceptions (XZ) were entered, respectively. In the sixth and final step, the quadratic-by-
RESULTS
Table 1 presents means, standard deviations, and zero-order Pearson correlations among all variables. Job demands were not linearly related to the measures of job performance and job satisfaction, with the exception of a significantly negative association between job demands and work satisfaction [r = - . 2 1 , p < .05). There were no significant correlations between fairness perceptions and the scales of job performance, but fairness perceptions appeared to be positively related to supervisory satisfaction [r = .20, p < .05). Furthermore, standard job performance correlated only modestly with leader-rated innovative job performance (r .33, p < .01), indicating that these variables reflect different elements of observed job performance. The moderate correlation between leader-rated and self-rated innovative job performance (r = .27, p < .05) is consistent with earlier research findings concerning self-reports and supervisor judgments of employee work behavior (Harris & Schaubroeck, 1988).
TABLE 1 Univariate Statistics and Pearson Correlations among the Variables^ Variables'' Control l.Age 2. Tenure 3. Education Predictor 4. Job demands 5. Fairness perceptions Dependent 6. Standard job performance 7. Leader-rated innovative job performance 8. Self-rated innovative job performance 9. Work satisfaction 10. Supervisory satisfaction
Mean
s.d.
1
45.33 6.98 2.57
7.71 5.87 0.95
.37*** -.13
2.30 4.71
0.43 1.37
-.01
-.09 -.04
.24*
.03
5.55 3.81
0.98 1.39
-.33** -.09
-.33* -.20
-.08 .46***
-.13
3.89
1.08
-.14
-.22*
.34***
5.73 5.49
0.69 1.17
.16
.15
-.04
-.09
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
^,
-.40***
.04
-.11 -
-.28** -.11
.06
.07 .09
.33**
.14
.07
.12
-.21* -.13
-.10 .20*
.05
.35**
.27* -.05
-.02
.14
.13
.39***
^ n - 99. except for standard job performance [n = 60) and leader-rated innovative job performance [n = 59). '' Age and tenure were measured in years; education, with four categories of responses; job demands, on a four-point scalB; and the remaining variables, on seven-point scales. * p < .05 " p < .01 **' p < .001
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Test of the Demand-Fairness Hypothesis I conducted hierarchical multiple regression analyses to test the quadratic-by-linear interaction of job demands and fairness perceptions with the job response variables of job performance and job satisfaction separately dependent (see Table 2). All regressions met the major model assumptions; that is, no serious violations were found in the plots of standardized residuals as compared to the predicted values, in the normal probability plots of standardized residuals, and with regard to the independence of error terms (the Durbin-Watson statistic ranged from 1.77 for job satisfaction to 2.02 for supervisor-rated innovative job performance). Job performance. Entering the control variables of age, company tenure, and education into the regression yielded significant equations for standard job performance (AH^ = .20, p < .01), leader-rated innovative job performance (Ai?^ = .22, p < .01), and self-rated Innovative job performance (Ai?^ = .13, p < .01). Company tenure appeared to be negatively related to standard job performance [b ^ -0.38, p < .05), and education was positively associated with leader-rated innovative job performance [b ~ 0.63, p < .001) and self-rated innovative job performance (5 = 0.33, p < .01). In step 2, the main effect of job demands was entered, which was predictive for none of the measures of job performance. The quadratic term of job demands was entered in step 3. This block was not predictive for standard job performance and selfrated innovative job performance, but it reached significance for leader-rated innovative job performance (A/?^ = .09, p < .05). In steps 4 and 5, fairness perceptions and the demands-fairness interaction were successively entered. These blocks were not predictive. Finally, in step 6, the quadratic-by-linear interaction of job demands and fairness perceptions was entered. This interaction was significant for standard job performance (Ai?^ = .07, p < .05), leader-rated innovative job performance (A/?^ = .09, p < .05), and self-rated innovative job performance [LR^ = .07, p < .01). To further analyze this quadratic-by-linear interaction effect, I tested simple slopes of the regression curves corresponding to all possible combinations of low (one standard deviation below the mean), medium (mean), and high (one standard deviation over the mean) levels of job demands with perceptions of effort-reward fairness and underreward unfairness [cf. Aiken & West, 1991). In the case of effort-reward fairness, the simple slope of the regression curve had a positive value at low levels of job demands for standard job performance [b = 1.09, ( = 2.22, p < .05), leader-rated innovative
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job performance {b = 2.17, t = 3.33, p < .01), and self-rated innovative job performance [b ~ 1.12, t = 3.59, p < .001) and did not significantly differ from zero at medium levels of job demands for standard job performance [b = 0.18, ( = 0.88, n.s.), leaderrated innovative job performance [b = 0.18, t = 0.66, n.s.), and self-rated innovative job performance (b = 0.30, t= 1.75, n.s.). At high levels of job demands, the simple slope had a significantly negative value for leader-rated innovative joh performance {b = -1.82, t = -3.05, p < .01), and a negative but nonsignificant value for standard job performance [b = -0.74, t = -1.64, p = .11) and self-rated innovative job performance (b = -0.52, t = -1.46, p = .14). Additional analyses revealed that for very highly demanding jobs (two standard deviations over the mean), the simple slope of the regression curve had a nearly significant negative value for standard joh performance [b = -1.65, ( = — 1.94, p = .06) and a significant, negative value for self-rated innovative job performance [b = -1.34, t = -2.16, p < .05). In the case of underreward unfairness, the simple slope of the regression line did not significantly differ from zero at low, medium, and high values of job demands for standard job performance, leaderrated innovative job performance, and self-rated innovative job performance. To facilitate interpretation of the quadratic-hy-linear interaction effect, Figiu-e 1 illustrates how the relationships of job demands with the measures of job performance do indeed follow the inverted U-shaped function in the case of effort-reward fairness, whereas this curvilinearity does not emerge for underreward unfairness. These findings provide support for H5'pothesis 1. Job satisfaction. Entering the control variables of age, company tenure, and education into the regression yielded a significant equation for work satisfaction [R^ = .10, F = 3.33, p < .05), whereas this block was not predictive for supervisory satisfaction. Better-educated managers reported themselves to be less satisfied with work (6 = —0.19,p < .05). None of the steps (2-5) in which job demands, quadratic job demands, fairness perceptions, and the interaction between job demands and fairness perceptions were successively entered approached significance. However, adding the quadratic-bylinear interaction of job demands and fairness perceptions was significant for both work satisfaction {^R^ = .12, AF = 14.91, p < .001) and supervisory satisfaction (Afi^ = .09, AF = 10.54, p < .01). In addition, simple slopes of the regression curves were tested corresponding to all possible combinations of low, medium, and high levels of job demands with perceptions of effort-reward fair-
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Oo^llpr
TABLE 2 Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses^ Dependent Variables
n
Standard job performance Step 1: Age Tenure Education Stop 2: Job demands Step 3: Job demands squared Step 4: Fairness perceptions Step 5: Job demands x fairness perceptions Step 6: Job demands squared X fairness perceptions
60
Leader-rated innovative job performance Step 1: Age Tenure Education • Step 2: Job demands Step 3: Job demands squared Step 4: Fairness perceptions Step 5: Job demands x fairness perceptions Step 6: Job demands squared X fairness perceptions
59
Self-rated innovative job performance Step 1: Age , Tenure , Education Step 2: Job demands , Step 3: Job demands squared Step 4: Fairness perceptions Step 5; Job demands x fairness perceptions Step 6: Job demands squared X fairness perceptions
99
Work satisfaction Step 1; Age Tenure Education Step 2: Job demands Step 3: Job demands squared Step 4: Fairness perceptions Step 5: Job demands X fairness perceptions Step 6; Job demands squared X fairness perceptions
99
Supervisory satisfaction Step 1: Age ' Tenure Education Step 2: Job demands . Step 3; Job demands squared Step 4; Fairness perceptions Step 5: Job demands x fairness perceptions Step 6: Job demands squared x fairness perceptions
99
Entry b
Final b
Afl^
Af
B^
Adjusted R'
F
df
-0.21 -0.38* -0.23 0.00 -0.05 0.15 0.05 -0.32*
-0.21 -0.42' -0.28* 0.04 -0.13 0.42* 0.14 -0.32*
' .20 .00 .00 .02 .00 .07
-0.07 0.02 0.63*** 0.04 -0.34* 0.00 0.03 -0.49*
0.00 -0.07 0.54** 0.02 -0.51"* 0.41 0.15 -0.49*
.22 .00 .09 .00 .00 .09
5.08** 0.04 6.65* 0.00 0.02 7.04*
.39
0.29
4.01*'*
8,50
-0,08 -0.07 0.33** 0.08 -0.07 0.06 0.23 -0.27**
-0.01 -0.08 0.27* 0.11 -0.14 0.32* 0.20 -0.27**
.13 .00 .01 .00 .04 .07
4.62*" 0.51 0.77 0.32 3.90 8.42**
.25
0.18
3.72*'*
8,90
0.08 -0.00 -0.19* -0.10 -0.08 -0.10 -0.03 -0.23***
0.10 0.00 -0.16* -0.16' -0.15** 0.09 -0.06 -0.23**"
.10 .02 .02 .02 .00 .12
3.33* 2.31 2.28 2.13 0.16 14.91*"*
.28
0.21
4.34**"
8.90
-0.01 -0.19 -0,20 -0.13 -0,16 0.19 0.01 -0.34*"
0.01 -0.17 -0.20 -0.15 -0.22* 0.49** -0.03 -0.34*"
.03 .01 .03 .03 .00 .09
1.14 1.09 2.90 2.60 0.01 10.54"*
' 4.64*' 0.00 0.23 1.13 0.13 5,41*
•; r
.30
0.19
2,68*
8,51
j
•
.19
0.12
2.72*"
8,90
" Regression coefficients shown are from the equation at tbe step indicated (entry b] and from the final equation (final b). Because of rounding off, fi^ differs .01 from the sum of AJi^ for standard job performance and leader-rated innovative job performance. * p < .05 **p
