Fighting against the tide: the white right and

African Studies

ISSN: 0002-0184 (Print) 1469-2872 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cast20

Fighting against the tide: the white right and desegregation in Johannesburg's inner city Alan Morris To cite this article: Alan Morris (1998) Fighting against the tide: the white right and desegregation in Johannesburg's inner city, African Studies, 57:1, 55-78, DOI: 10.1080/00020189808707885 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00020189808707885

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African Studies, 57, 1, 1998

Fighting against the Tide: The White Right and Desegregation in Johannesburg's Inner City Alan Morris

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University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa Introduction Towards the end of 1977 it became evident that the sanctity of the Group Areas Act (No. 41 of 1950) was under threat. Reports started drifting in of Indian and coloured families risking the .wrath of the authorities and settling in Johannesburg's inner city neighbourhoods — areas reserved for white residence only in terms of the Group Areas Act (Citizen 9/11/77). This study explores the various responses of the two major right-wing parties, the National Party (NP) and, from 1982, the Conservative Party (CP) to the rapid disintegration of de facto segregation in Johannesburg's inner city.1 What is argued is that the respective responses reflected the different approaches of the political parties in question to the increasing unworkability of apartheid. For the CP the undermining of the Group Areas Act was viewed as a phenomenon that had to be countered at all costs as it was an attack on a fundamental component of the apartheid system. The response of the NP took several forms. At first there was a serious attempt to stem the flow but this was soon replaced by more flexible and ad hoc responses. From the early 1980s, for the majority of the NP hierarchy, desegregation in Johannesburg's inner city represented a crisis that had to be managed pragmatically and flexibly as the surrounding context increasingly inhibited the apartheid government's tendency — and capacity — to smash any broaching of the apartheid framework. Although the South African city had been racially compartmentalised throughout most of the twentieth century, the coming into power of the NP in 1948 and the subsequent implementation of apartheid meant that the racist structuring of the city became far more systematic and complete (Davenport 1989; Lemon 1991; Mabin and Smit 1977). A central element in this racist structuring was the Group Areas Act which made it mandatory that every part of the city be reserved for the sole occupation of a particular racial category and that all mixed neighbourhoods be "racially cleansed". In terms of the Population Registration Act (No. 30 of 1950) and a government proclamation in 1959, four primary racial categories were created by the apartheid government — African, coloured (mixed race), Asiatic, and white (Horrell 1971:9-10). Urban neighbourhoods 0002-0184/98/010055-24 © 1998 Carfax Publishing Ltd on behalf of the University of Witwatersrand


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were classified accordingly, and residents had to live in the group area in line with their racial category (Platzsky and Walker 1985; Western 1981). The implementation of the Group Areas Act saw whole neighbourhoods housing tens of thousands of people destroyed and their occupants removed (Lodge 1983; Adams and Suttner 1988; Western 1981). By 1983, 82,859 coloured families, 39,892 Indian families and 2,331 white families had been moved in terms of the Group Areas Act (SAIRR 1985:468). People classified African were less affected by the Group Areas Act as within cities most were already racially segregated in terms of the Urban Areas Act of 1923 and its various amendments. This Act empowered municipalities to establish separate residential areas for African people (Davenport 1991). From 1950 to 1977 deliberate transgressions of the Group Areas Act were negligible.2 From mid-1977, however, the policy of residential segregation began fraying as dozens of coloured and Indian families started moving into the high-rise inner-city neighbourhoods in Johannesburg which, de jure, had been reserved exclusively for white occupation [Citizen 9/11/77, 1/5/78; De Coning et al. 1987; Pickard-Cambridge 1988; Star 29/4/78). Johannesburg was the only South African city to experience significant desegregation al this time. The inner-city neighbourhoods affected (for the purposes of this study constituted by Berea, the Central Business District, Joubert Park and Hillbrow; see Figure 1) comprise an area of about two square kilometres. Almost all of the residential accommodation in these high-density neighbourhoods are high-rise apartments and the area's population in the late 1970s was about 50,000 {Cape Times 18/3/80). From the mid-1980s the influx of coloured and Asian families was joined by a steady inward movement of African residents into Johannesburg's inner city, and by the end of the 1990s racial compartmentalisation and exclusivity in Johannesburg's inner city had effectively collapsed (Crankshaw and White 1995).3 In 1991, when the Group Areas Act was formerly scrapped, white apartmentdwellers constituted less than 20 per cent of Hillbrow's population, one of the primary inner-city neighbourhoods affected by desegregation (Crankshaw and White 1995:130). This paper does not analyse the complex process of desegregation in any detail (Morris 1994; Pickard-Cambridge 1988) but rather focuses on the overlapping theme of the shifting responses of the two main white right-wing parties, the ruling NP and the CP to this ever-increasing integration. How to deal with the undermining of the Group Areas Act in the Johannesburg inner city became a key battleground in white right-wing party politics and reflected the increasing fragmentation of the white power bloc during this period.

Fighting against the Tide 57


Figure 1: Neighbourhoods in the inner city which experienced substantial inward movement of black residents

The Big Stick is Vigorously Waved: 1977-1979 Up to the late 1970s very few Johannesburg landlords had the courage to defy the authorities and let an apartment to anybody classified other than white. Similarly, few people not classified white would have dared approach a Johannesburg inner-city landlord to ask for accommodation. This was mainly due to the determination of the NP government to uphold residential segregation in the city at all costs. For the NP, the Group Areas Act and the resultant residential segregation were presented as central to the success of the apartheid project (Simon 1989; Stadler 1987). The Group Areas Act certainly facilitated racial segregation and oppression. It allowed the government to provide separate and unequal amenities and services such as health and education and helped maintain and strengthen the notion that those whom apartheid had classified as racially distinct could not reside together. The undermining of residential segregation was presented by the NP as a fundamental attack on the whole apartheid edifice (Star 19/5/78). It is noteworthy that, despite this presentation of Group Areas as a cornerstone of apartheid, the initial response of the authorities to the inward movement of coloured and Indian tenants was restrained. Possibly the Johannes-


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burg City Council (JCC), although controlled by the NP, was inclined quietly to allow Indian and coloured individuals and families to move into the inner city as a way of lessening the pressure on the JCC to provide adequate housing in the Group Areas in question.4 However, once the media broke the story and complaints about Group Areas transgressions from right-wing inner-city residents started streaming in, the NP-led central government moved rapidly and forcibly. Marais Steyn, the then Minister of Community Development whose ministry was responsible for the enforcement of the Group Areas Act at the time, soon set the tone. He insisted that the 'illegal' tenants be removed arguing that "overcrowding in the coloured and Indian areas is better than breaking the law". He went on to say, "We are not persecuting these people by forcing them out, we are merely trying to make them comply with the law" (Star 19/5/78). Within days of the newspaper reports, 'illegal' tenants started being harassed, charged and prosecuted for transgressing the Group Areas Act. Eventually, so many cases involving the infringement of the Group Areas Act were set in motion that a special Magistrates Court had to be set aside for them to be heard. By the end of May 1979 it was estimated that in the preceding six months 500 people had been charged with contravening the Group Areas Act in the Johannesburg area (Sunday Express 27/5/79). Police also visited individual landlords and letting agencies and instructed them to give notice to their existing coloured and Indian tenants and not to take in more (Star 19/5/78; Rand Daily Mail 2/2/79). On face value the sentences imposed were lenient, generally fines ranging between R50 and R100. A much more severe aspect of the punishment, however, was that tenants were given two months to vacate their apartments and move on (Rand Daily Mail 2/2/79). This was usually exceptionally difficult as there was little alternative accommodation available. The response of the government was so draconian that in February 1979 about 100 tenants and concerned individuals met and formed The Action Committee to Stop Evictions (Actstop) (Race Relations News Apr. 1979). By August 1979 Actstop had "nearly 300 people or families on its books" (Star 23/8/79). The formation of Actstop changed the balance of power. Whereas previously, 'illegal' tenants had been frightened and isolated, Actstop supported and helped unite threatened tenants, thereby substantially increasing their capacity to contest evictions (Rand Daily Mail 23/8/79). Actstop ensured that all prosecutions and evictions in terms of the Group Areas Act were given substantial media coverage (Morris 1994:830). Despite the publicity and adverse criticism, the government continued to push for prosecutions and evictions.

Explaining the Government's Hard-line Response: 1977-1979 At this time the government was still reeling from the Soweto uprisings of 1976 and was struggling to find a way forward. Within the NP a battle was raging between the more pragmatic verligtes ('enlightened ones') and the hardline



verkramptes ('the cramped or narrow ones')- The verkramptes were determined to maintain white domination and as much Afrikaner influence as possible using "stringent security measures", while the verligtes were more flexible and realised that some reforms were necessary so as to broaden support for the NP (Gilliomie 1992:347). This deeply divisive struggle had a significant impact on the NP at this time. Allistair Sparks argues that it "made for paralysis in government especially during Vorster's later years ..." (Sparks 1990).5 O'Meara comments that John Vorster, the Prime Minister at the time, was "terrified of exacerbating the growing divisions among the faithful" and "seemed incapable of decisive, effective leadership" (O'Meara 1996:195). In this context the bureaucratic apparatuses continued to operate as they always had under apartheid. This involved ensuring that any transgressions of the apartheid laws were severely dealt with: something captured most dramatically in the case of the 'illegal' squatter settlements in Cape Town, where throughout 1977 and 1978 settlements were attacked by the authorities and either entirely or partially destroyed, so as to ensure that influx control was maintained (Cole 1987:21). The coming into power of P.W. Botha in September 1978 was marked by an increasing awareness within the NP that the old tactic of using brute force to enforce compliance was no longer adequate and that there was a need to win greater consent of the governed by granting some reforms (Charney 1983; O'Meara 1996:241). However, Botha's hold on the party in the aftermath of the information scandal and resignation of John Vorster was still tenuous and the reformist mindset was certainly not pervasive within government at this time (O'Meara 1996:241). A strong and perhaps dominant tendency within the NP was still to immediately crush any transgression of apartheid laws by prosecuting the transgressors (Charney 1983:145). Within government circles there was a disavowing of the notion that housing shortages in coloured and Indian Group Areas was an adequate reason for transgressing the Group Areas Act and transgressors had to accept the consequences. This sentiment is captured in the statements of Marais Steyn, the minister responsible for enforcing Group Areas quoted above and the utterances of his colleagues. Referring to the evictions, R.B. Durrant, a NP Member of Parliament, commented that, there was no inhumane implementation of these court orders by the Department (of Community Development). There was in fact consideration for those who had forcibly broken the law. Those eviction orders were not granted against people who had no accommodation either. They were issued against people who had vacated previous accommodation in other areas and who purposely moved into accommodation in classified areas where they had no right to be ... I therefore want to express my thanks to the... Minister for the warning he has issued ... to the owners and landlords who permit this illegal occupation.6

The statement reveals a remarkable lack of empathy and understanding and a conviction that any transgression of apartheid laws be immediately dealt with.

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The Government Retreats Significantly: 1980-1982 The government's onslaught against illegal tenants was tempered significantly towards the end of 1979 when two cases involving the transgression of the Group Areas Act in the inner city were taken on appeal (Dugard 1979; SAIRR 1980:471). While the higher court deliberated, all Group Areas prosecutions were put on hold. When the Supreme Court finally ruled in August 1980 that the prosecutions and evictions were legal, the statements of Minister Steyn once more displayed no empathy for 'illegal' tenants and he reiterated that the NP would retain the area as a white domain: "Indian and coloured people living in white Group Areas should now move out voluntarily rather than face eviction" (Star 2/10/80). Asked where they should go, Steyn responded "they must make a plan. We Afrikaners came here after the Anglo Boer War [in 1902] and we made plans" (ibid.). He went on to say "They did not just come out of the sea like some mystical being. They came from somewhere and must go back there to find homes" (Rand Daily Mail 3/10/80). Action on the ground did not, however, correspond with the fierce rhetoric of the minister. At the beginning of March 1981 charges against 107 people in Johannesburg were withdrawn, and another 56 cases involving the transgression of the Group Areas Act were postponed (Star 4/3/81). All in all, of the 564 Group Areas Act cases that came before the Johannesburg courts in February and March 1981, 286 cases were withdrawn and 233 cases were suspended for six months (Sunday Times 29/3/81). Ultimately, in 1981 only three people were prosecuted in the Johannesburg inner city area for occupying premises in contravention of the provisions of the Group Areas Act.7 There had clearly been a rethink within the NP as to how to proceed: indeed, the evidence suggests that the government actively intervened to forestall further prosecutions in terms of the Group Areas Act. The integration of the Johannesburg inner city was dramatically hastened in December 1982 when, in a landmark supreme court case, State versus Govender, Judge Goldstone concluded that the notion that a person convicted under the Group Areas Act was compelled to vacate his dwelling was unjust and that this practice had to be halted (Star 1/12/82; Pickard-Cambridge 1988:7). The Govender judgment heralded a new era in Johannesburg's inner city. The significance of being convicted under the Group Areas Act had not been limited to the prospects of a fine or imprisonment. A far worse punishment had been the possibility of eviction with no alternative accommodation available. By removing the threat of eviction, the judgment effectively nullified this fear and de facto allowed coloured and Indian tenants to remain in Hillbrow. It also hastened the movement into Hillbrow of many coloured and Indian people who, because of the persistent threat of eviction, had previously been hesitant to settle there. Cas Coovadia, a past chairperson of Actstop, commented:


The judgement spurred people on and gave people more courage to move into inner city areas. I'll say that the Goldstone judgement was a milestone in that it created the opportunities for a lot of people who would not otherwise have moved to come in. It was one of the key factors that led to the breakdown of Group Areas (Interview, June 1995).


The Govender judgment meant that unless draconian new legislation were drawn up the government had no chance of reversing the flow of 'illegal' tenants into the inner city. The question that needs to be posed and answered at this point is why the government did not draft new legislation to help it nullify Judge Goldstone's judgment.

Explaining the Retreat of the NP A range of issues influenced the ruling NP's decision to curtail the prosecution of individuals transgressing the Group Areas Act in Johannesburg's inner city and elsewhere at this time. These are discussed in turn.

1. The Ongoing Political Ascendency of the Verligtes

and

Economic

Crisis

and

the

During the 1970s the policy of racial capitalism began to unravel. Dramatic indications of this were the drop in the economic growth rate, and the mounting political challenge against apartheid. As regards the economy, Saul and Gelb point out: the 'apartheid boom' began to tail off in the early 1970s ... real growth rate which averaged 5,7 percent in the 1960s, was negative in the first half of 1976 and zero in 1977 ...Total investment declined by about 13 percent between 1975 and 1977 as the state was forced to cut back spending on its projects (Saul and Gclb 1981:23).

The government's increasing fiscal predicament had a direct bearing on its capacity to deliver housing to the sections of the population classified as Indian and coloured, and this realisation strengthened the hand of those in government who argued that the inward movement of 'illegal' tenants into Johannesburg's inner city should be allowed to continue as it was playing a useful role both in terms of providing housing and illustrating that the government was capable of responding in a compassionate fashion (Pickard-Cambridge 1988:21). Daryl Swanepoel, an NP member of the Gauteng Provincial Legislature commented "There wasn't the money in place to undertake the large scale construction of housing. Also private rental stock was much more attractive to the state at this stage" (Interview, 16 Aug. 1997). Besides the economic reversal, the formerly unquestioned authority of the government was also being severely challenged. The overt, country-wide antiapartheid resistance that began in June 1976 profoundly altered South Africa's political landscape. Never before had the might of the apartheid government

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been so fundamentally defied. International opposition to apartheid had also started to intensify. In 1981 the Minister of the Interior, Chris Heunis, commented that "the Southern African problem had been internationalised and the opinion of the international community could no longer be disregarded in the context of domestic reforms" (Lipton 1989:355). The economic and political crisis generated turmoil within the ruling NP. This party, which had appeared to be impregnable in the 1960s, became increasingly divided between the more pragmatic verligtes and the more rigid verkramptes. In order to enhance the possibility of stability, renewed economic growth and ultimately the political survival of the NP, the verligtes, in alliance with sections of capital, realised that movement away from the fundamental tenets of apartheid was essential (Gilliomie 1992:353; Stadler 1987:2). Thus, control over the organisation and use of African labour was loosened, as was control over movement and the enforcement of segregation in the social spheres of life, captured by the term 'petty apartheid' (Simon 1989). The verligtes also argued that there was a need for the government to widen its potential support base and to increase parliamentary access beyond the section of the population classified as white (Gilliomie 1992:353). This reasoning was to culminate in the setting up in 1984 of the tricameral parliament, in which those sections of the population classified as coloured and Indian were incorporated into the central parliament by way of separate houses, namely, the House of Representatives and the House of Delegates (see below). There was also growing recognition that the old tactic of massive repression against black opposition was not necessarily in the interests of the government (Saul and Gelb 1981:36).x The unpredictability of the government's response in this period was shaped by the verkrampte presence. Although the verligtes held the levers of power, their ability to reform apartheid was partially hindered by the substantial support base of the verkramptes within the state bureaucracy and the white populace. As the leadership within government and the military tried to satisfy different forces within and outside the NP, the power of the verkrampte bloc reinforced government vacillation and its ad hoc responses to political events. As Saul and Gelb, referring to the 1978 to 1981 period, concluded, "Botha cannot simply ignore the white polity. There is a real fear of splitting the NP irrevocably, and simultaneously a real constraint upon his freedom of manoeuvre ..." (ibid.:38). The fear of the ultra-right was heightened by the success of the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) in the 1981 general election in which the HNP pushed up their tally of the votes considerably, especially in the Transvaal and Orange Free State. The HNP obtained 34,000 votes overall in the 1977 general election and 192,304 votes in the 1981 general election (Van Rooyen 1994:74). It is against this background that the response of the NP to the racial transition in Johannesburg's inner city needs to be viewed. There was the beginning of the 'rolling back' of the old apartheid order as the contradictions generated by racial



capitalism came to the fore. Not only did mass resistance weaken the resolve of the NP but, in addition, the determination of the party to uphold the Group Areas Act in Johannesburg was dissipated by the realisation in the late 1970s that, in relation to the coloured and Indian section of the population, the urban policy of apartheid had become unworkable. This development coincided with a period when the government had lost its ability to act in a definite, conclusive fashion. Caught as it was between fear of a right-wing backlash and local and international condemnation if it acted in a racist fashion, the P.W. Botha administration had become partially immobilised on the^ issue of Group Areas in Johannesburg's inner city. Thus, although in the early stages of its battle against inner-city integration the NP-led government appeared to be operating in a united fashion, dissension within the NP as to how to deal with offenders of the Group Areas Act in the inner city soon emerged and became a key source of tension between the verligte and verkrampte factions of the Party (Rand Daily Mail 14/8/79; Star 10/7/80). The verligtes, in the context of a realisation that the base of the NP had to be extended, tended to be far more pragmatic. They perceived that using brute force against people transgressing the Group Areas Act would probably evoke substantial resistance and possibly destroy the possibility of the avidly sought-after alliance with moderate sections of the coloured and Indian citizenry (see the following section). The verkramptes, bound by old-style apartheid ideology, had no compunction in bringing the full force of the law to bear on offenders. Harsh government action against Group Areas offenders was severely criticised by that part of the Afrikaans press aligned with the verligte section of the NP. They viewed it as damaging to the NP and typical of the short-sighted policy of the verkrampte faction. Towards the end of 1979 The Beeld newspaper made a strong plea to the government to declare a moratorium on the prosecution of coloureds and Indians living in white Group Areas, to act humanely, and to consider what results such actions had on political relations: We want to urge Minister Steyn, as Dr Koomhof did in other circumstances, to institute a moratorium on prosecutions, at least until housing is again available in brown [sic] areas. We ask him to allow families who cannot obtain any legal housing in group areas to live where people are prepared to house them (Rand Daily Mail 14/8/79).

Another government-supporting newspaper, Die Transvaler, expressed similar sentiments. In an editorial it criticised the Minister for threatening to escalate the onslaught against 'illegal' tenants and commented that "although it appreciated the problems of the situation... the fact remained that coloured and Indian people sought refuge in the area because they could not get housing elsewhere" (Star 10/7/80). The editorial suggested "that in the interests of good race relations it would be better to withhold such threats until the necessary balance in the housing situation is achieved" (ibid.).


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But the continuing — although limited — power of the verkramptes within the NP was highlighted in the latter part of 1981 when Mr Pen Kotze, the newly-appointed Minister of Community Development, announced that legislation would be introduced that would greatly facilitate the ability of the authorities to take decisive action against coloured and Indian residents transgressing the Group Areas Act. The amendments were aimed at overcoming "the time-consuming legal proceedings presently hampering the eviction of illegal residents" (Citizen 17/9/81). Kotze went on to say that the Group Areas Act "was the foundation of government policy" and therefore "is a necessary piece of legislation" and that without it "there would be chaos" (Star 17/9/81). The verligte component of the NP was, however, able to block Kotze's proposals and they were never promulgated.

2. The Formation of the Tricameral Parliament A powerful shaper of the government's policy on the Johannesburg inner city was the creation of the 'tricameral' parliament. As mentioned, the verligtes were desperate to extend the support base of the existing power structure and to draw in moderate Indian and coloured leaders. Alan Hendrickse, the leader of the dominant coloured political party of the period, the Labour Party, made it clear that his party's agreement to participate in the new tricameral parliamentary structure would have been jeopardised by too harsh an approach on the part of government towards 'illegal' coloured and Indian tenants. He indicated that "issues arising from the application of the Group Areas Act would be high on the agenda in early meetings between the Party and Government leaders" (Star 20/4/83; Pickard-Cambridge 1988:8). The Labour Party was to "take up a negotiating stance on the issue of suspending all prosecutions and further group area proclamations under the Act" (Pickard-Cambridge 1988:8). The lack of government action on the Group Areas Act became more apparent in the months preceding the first coloured and Indian elections for the tricameral parliament in August 1984. A government spokesperson, when asked about the lack of prosecutions and evictions under the Group Areas Act during this period, stated that the government was not prepared "to take strong action in the current sensitive political climate as it may jeopardise the elections" (SAIRR 1985:481; Sunday Express 15/7/84).

3. The Deepening Housing Crisis in Indian and Coloured Group Areas in the Johannesburg Region The deepening of the housing shortage in Indian and coloured Group Areas served to encourage constant movement into the Johannesburg inner city and the disregarding of prosecutions and threats. Community leaders estimated that at the beginning of 1983 there were more than 10,000 families waiting for houses in Johannesburg's coloured and Indian areas (Star 11/1/83). Towards the end of



1983, Dr Essop Jassat of the Transvaal Indian Congress estimated that "10,000 new homes are required in the Johannesburg area for Indian families" (Star 19/10/83). Thousands of families were reported to be "living in overcrowded houses, backyard rooms, servant quarters, garages and 'Wendy houses'" (Sunday Tribune 20/1/85). The small number of homes being built in Lenasia at this time were being sold in the R50.000 to R90.000 range and few people could afford these prices (ibid.). As regards the provision of homes for the coloured and Indian working class, the government appeared to have absolved itself of all responsibility and handed over the building of housing to private capital. Even the land that the government made available was sold to private companies rather than private individuals (ibid.). These property companies built the homes which were then bought by speculators "to rent to desperate home-seekers at exorbitant rates" (ibid.). Gavin Relly, the then chairperson of the Anglo American Corporation, argued that the shortage of housing and land for coloureds and Indians in the Johannesburg area was so acute that it was equivalent to a form of influx control: "It is impossible for them to migrate to the industrial areas even when they can afford to provide their own housing or when their potential employers would be willing to provide housing for them" (Citizen 13/7/83). In the early 1980s Johannesburg's inner city was often the only alternative for these 'migrants' and a large proportion of the NP hierarchy had come to accept that the inner city was playing a crucial role in alleviating the crisis of coloured and Indian housing (Pickard-Cambridge 1988:18). This acceptance was reinforced by the increasing dominance of a free market ideology and the concomitant belief that the government must cut spending (Charney 1983:149).

4. White Flight, the Perilous Position of Many Landlords and their Desire for 'Illegal' Tenants In the early 1980s for many inner-city landlords accommodating coloured and Indian tenants had become crucial for economic survival. Many white tenants had moved out of the inner city and in 1979 one estate agent estimated that there were 528 vacant bachelor apartments and 224 empty one-bedroomed apartments in Johannesburg's inner city (SAIRR 1979:468). White flight persisted and in late 1984 it was estimated that there were 500 vacant apartments in the Hillbrow and Berea area and more and more landlords were no longer prepared to accept the provisions of the Group Areas Act (Sunday Express 30/9/84). Through the South African Property Association landlords in Johannesburg's inner city constantly lobbied government to ease up on the harassment of illegal tenants (ibid.). Government realised that they would not be able to persuade landlords to stop letting apartments to people of colour.

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The determination of many landlords to risk prosecution rather than have vacant apartments meant that by the end of 1984, in several apartment blocks in Hillbrow, at least 25 per cent of the tenants were coloured, Indian and to a lesser extent, African (Sunday Star 25/11/84).


5. Resistance by Tenants By 1980 the number of 'illegal' tenants in Hillbrow and the Johannesburg inner city had reached a point where many 'illegal' tenants no longer felt cowed by the authorities! The organisation of tenants under the auspices of Actstop meant that every case involving the Group Areas Act in Johannesburg's inner city was likely to be defended in the courts and receive media coverage. More and more NP leaders wished to avoid the inevitable negative publicity such a legal struggle would evoke, and this contributed substantially to their realisation that any endeavour to forcibly remove the thousands of black tenants living in Hillbrow and other inner city neighbourhoods in the early 1980s was no longer feasible. In the early part of 1981 some NP MPs were openly calling for legal recognition of Indian and coloured tenants in Hillbrow (Star 3/7/81; Rand Daily Mail 3/7/81). The willingness of verligte government officials to convert the de facto nature of mixed areas like Hillbrow into a de jure status was illustrated again in early 1982 when Francois Oberholzer, the chairperson of the management committee of the NP-contro!led Johannesburg City Council, revealed that there had been a secret meeting between the council's management committee and senior government representatives where the latter had suggested proclaiming certain parts of Johannesburg's inner city neighbourhoods mixed areas. This proposition was opposed by the management committee who argued that white residents would be forced out of the areas in question and ultimately the proposal was dropped (Rand Daily Mail 11/2/82).

The CP Enters the Hillbrow Fray March 1982 saw a dramatic development in South African politics. The verkrampte wing of the NP left the party and founded the CP. The main reason for the latter's formation was the belief amongst the MPs involved that the NP was abandoning "sacred" apartheid principles (Chamey 1983:145; Gilliomie 1992:353). The planned inclusion of 'coloureds' and Indians in the previously whites-only national legislature structure was viewed as unacceptable (SAIRR 1983:11). The large number of black tenants in Johannesburg's inner city was cited as a key indication of the government's reluctance to impose strict segregation in line with apartheid doctrine (Citizen 4/8/83). The Group Areas Act together with the Separate Amenities Acts were of fundamental importance for the CP as illustrated in the following statement by Andries Treurnicht, the leader of the CP: "Only through the rigid enforcement of separate residential



areas can separate schools, an own community life, own voters rolls and own political representation be guaranteed" (Van Rooyen 1994:67). The formation of the CP was certainly a blow for Johannesburg's 'illegal' inner-city residents as once again there was a powerful, organised force waging battle against them. The tenancy of coloureds and Indians in Johannesburg became a central focus for the CP, and in mid-1983 a petition was organised in Hillbrow by CP members opposing racial integration in the area (ibid.). One of the organisers, J.H. Steenkamp, said that the "petition was aimed at the average [white] man in the street who did not have the resources to flee to expensive suburbs and away from integration" (Star 30/7/83). He went on to say that he did not "hate other races. But [he did] not believe that we can mix different cultures in residential areas. Integration has not worked anywhere in the world. Why should it work in Hillbrow?" (ibid.). In August 1983 the CP called a public meeting to publicise the petition and to oppose calls by some NP officials that the area be opened up to coloured and Indian people (Star 3/8/83). Addressing the meeting, whilst brandishing the petition, apparently signed by 5,000 people, Koos van der Merwe, a CP Member of Parliament, "listed 16 grievances of [white] residents in the area" (Star 4/8/83). He claimed that "coloureds, Indians and blacks are swamping whites in these areas" (Johannesburg inner-city neighbourhoods) and that whites arc afraid to leave their apartments for fear of being attacked; parks arc occupied by unemployed blacks; Indians threaten or bribe landlords to give them accommodation, landlords arc allowing people of other race groups to live in their blocks of flats, to intimidate white protected tenants to vacate,... crime is increasing, people of colour litter the area and urinate in public. The entire situation is forcing whites to leave the area (.Citizen 4/8/83).

He went on to argue that "the NP had gone soft on Group Areas" and that as a result "our [the whites'] traditional way of life is being threatened" (ibid.). Van der Merwe made similar claims at the CP national congress a few days later (Star 10/8/83). Some inner-city residents ardently supported the CP. In April 1983 the principal of the local Joubert Park primary school distributed a letter to each child to give to their parents. In an act reminiscent of the Nazi era the letter "strongly" advised parents to "complain to the police about any non-whites living in Hillbrow and the city centre" and requested parents to "fill in a questionnaire listing any non-white tenants they might be aware of and their addresses" (Star 28/4/83). The.CP project was to create a stereotype of the 'illegal' tenant and the white legal tenant. The way in which Body-Gendrot (Body-Gendrot 1993) depicts the racist stereotyping of immigrants from ex-colonies in France's cities is similar to the CP's depiction of the Johannesburg inner-city scenario. Body-Gendrot

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argues that the stereotyping involves portraying the immigrants/'illegal' tenants as "producing a 'third-worldisation' of the national space as well as a pollution of culture which only spatial segregation can avoid" (ibid.)- The discourse of the CP.clearly linked the disintegration of racial homogeneity to a 'fall in standards' and an expansion of anti-social behaviour. The presence of the CP combined with the ambivalence of the NP, ensured that black tenants continued to be harassed as CP supporters were the primary suppliers of information to the police as regards individual infringements of the Group Areas Act. The Govender judgment of 1982 resulted in a change of strategy by the police (Rand Daily Mail 24/3/83). Aware that harassing individual tenants was fruitless in view of the Govender judgment, the police, according to the chairperson of Actstop at that time, Cas Saloojee, "began to pressurise landlords and caretakers to evict the tenants themselves" as evictions of tenants by the landlord would be far more difficult to fight in a court of law (ibid.). Also, if tenants were turfed out by the landlord, negative publicity would be directed against the individual landlord rather than the police or NP government. The pressure placed on landlords by the police led to inner-city Johannesburg property owners issuing a statement at the beginning of 1983 claiming that "the police are carrying out witch hunts for Asian and coloured people living in white-owned fiats and are forcing the landlords to evict them" (Star 4/3/83). This was denied by the divisional CID chief for the Witwatersrand, Brigadier Tertius Wium, who commented that, "We act only on complaints and then we are duty bound to investigate whether we like it or not. If we find sufficient evidence that the law is being infringed we notify the property owners to rectify the matter" (ibid.). In March 1983 'illegal' residents in three Joubert Park apartment blocks were given notice by the landlords after the latter had been told by the police to instruct their 'illegal' tenants to vacate (ibid.). One of the biggest property owners in South Africa, Anglo American Properties Services (Ampros), also bowed to police pressure when they gave about 35 coloured and Indian families in Highpoint, Hillbrow's biggest apartment block, 24 hours' notice to vacate their apartments. The notice period was later extended. A spokesperson for Ampros claimed that their hands were tied as regards the eviction of non-white tenants from their Highpoint apartments. We have been told by police that non-white tenants are contravening the Group Areas Act and if we do not remove them we will be fined {Rand Daily Mail 16/4/83).

The Highpoint tenants ignored their eviction notices but the renewed state pressure made many 'illegal' tenants feel that although their situation had improved, their tenure in the inner city was still fragile. As one columnist put it, referring specifically to Highpoint:



They live in a twilight world where leaving and entering their homes is a carefully conducted exercise. Behaving like normal tenants with rights is out of the question for the coloured and Indian occupants of Hillbrow's Highpoint building (Sunday Express 24/4/83).

Right up to the mid-1980s, highlighting and fighting the increasing integration of Hillbrow continued to be a pivotal part of the CP's propaganda weaponry. Towards the end of 1984 the party reopened its campaign "to clean up the Hillbrow cesspool" (Rand Daily Mail 24/9/84). The Johannesburg chairperson of the CP, Clive Derby-Lewis, claimed that "if black people were allowed to break the Group Areas Act by living in Hillbrow, they would break other laws as well. The disregard for the law was contributing to the general lawlessness in the area" (ibid.).9 At a public meeting in September 1984, the leader of the CP, Dr Andries Treurnicht, launched a new CP plan as regards 'illegal' residents. He called for people to form "action groups" to help police "clean up Hillbrow" (ibid.; Pickard-Cambridge 1988:9). This was to be combined with continuing pressure on the government to prosecute landlords. At the meeting Treurnicht "accused the government of being too scared to act against coloured and Indian people living in Hillbrow ... for fear of upsetting their new-found partners in government" (Star 25/9/84). He announced that the CP was to consider private prosecutions and that thirty "greater Hillbrow" properties had been earmarked (Sunday Express 30/9/84). The publicity generated by these threats had a slight impact. Some coloured and Indian tenants were evicted and, in a few cases, estate agents and caretakers reverted to allowing only whites to occupy vacant apartments (Star 3/10/84). In other instances, estate agents started to insist that no-one other than the lease-signer could live in the apartment (ibid.). It was also reported that hundreds of 'illegal' tenants received letters from landlords instructing them to vacate their apartments (SAIRR 1985:482). These letters were largely ignored as 'illegal' tenants had nowhere else to go. Overall, the statistics indicate that the CP's campaign to reverse integration in Johannesburg's inner city was a dismal failure. 'Illegal' tenants continued to stream in, few of those already living there were evicted, and by the end of 1984 it was estimated that there were at least 10,000 black residents in Johannesburg's inner-city area (ibid.:481). The CP's initiative had effectively collapsed.

The Response of the NP-led Government to CP Pressure and to its Own Constituency: 1983-1989 Under pressure from the CP, and fearing a backlash from the white electorate, the government continued to give the impression that it was still in favour of separate Group Areas and would enforce the law. Towards the end of 1983 Pen Kotze again warned of 'drastic measures' planned by the government against Indians and coloureds living illegally — that is, in defiance of the Group Areas

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Act — in Johannesburg's 'white' suburbs" {Rand Daily Mail 29/10/83). He claimed that "leftist elements had done everything in their power to thwart government efforts by attempting to delay legal proceedings deliberately and inciting people to break the law" (Star 18/10/83). Kotze was subsequently lavishly praised by Prime Minister Botha for his handling of the Group Areas issue. The latter pronounced that he wanted "to refer with honour to Mr Pen Kotze and what he has done in spite of the attacks on him" (Rand Daily Mail 29/10/83). The NP, contending that separate residential areas were still essential, unveiled a new plan for dealing with increasing integration in Johannesburg's inner city. The plan, announced in a joint statement by a group of eight ministers which included the leaders of the coloured and Indian houses of Parliament, involved the building of 1 100 apartments for Indian families and 500 for coloured families (Citizen 21/11/84; Pickard-Cambridge 1988:21). The total lack of government action to implement this plan gives the impression that it was, from the very beginning, a decoy to deflect the ultra-right. The apartments were to be situated in the coloured group area of Ncwclare and the Indian group area of Burghersdorp. Newclare is about 10 kilometres from the city centre and Burghersdorp about 2 kilometres. The plan involved persuading coloured and Indian families living in Hillbrow and Mayfair to move to government-provided apartments (Rand Daily Mail 22/11/84). The government's statement said that 'illegal' tenants had been consulted and given their consent to the plan: As a result of impending action against their occupation as well as gross exploitation, they requested, and it was agreed, that immediate steps be taken to alleviate the accommodation problem and to avoid prosecution in these cases {Citizen 21/11/84).

Most 'illegal' residents were sceptical of the plan and would not register as they feared they would be forced to move once their names and addresses were known to the authorities. Also coloured families did not want to move out of town to Newclare (Sunday Star 25/11/84). It would seem that a prime aim of the government's announcement was to dissipate the criticisms made by the CP. This became especially urgent in the context of three crucial by-elections around this time in which the CP was once more testing its strength against the NP (Nan Rooyen 1994:124). In the previous five by-elections the CP had contested it had made significant gains and the NP was clearly concerned (ibid.: 122-4). The thrust of the CP's attack on the NP was that the latter had abandoned 'separate development' and the NP was determined to show that it had not (ibid.: 124). The housing proposal under discussion never materialised and it can be concluded that the proposal was either a deliberate ploy right from the beginning to blunt the CP's attack or alternatively the government decided the plan was not feasible for ideological or fiscal reasons. The proposed plan did, however, appear partially to remove the Johannesburg



inner city from the CP's focus, and from the beginning of 1985 the increasing integration of Johannesburg's inner city featured less prominently on the CP's agenda. This is evidenced by fewer public meetings on the issue and the dropping of the CP's plan to institute private prosecutions of landlords transgressing the Group Areas Act in Johannesburg's inner-city neighbourhoods (Star 22/11/84). Harassment of 'illegal' residents and landlords also declined, although there were intermittent actions. For example, towards the end of 1984 "police threatened 23 'illegal' tenants living in Hillbrow with eviction" (Star 18/10/84). However, between November 1983 and July 1984 only one Group Areas case, according to the Witwatersrand Attorney-General, came to court (Sunday Express 15/7/84). In 1985 and 1986 there was not one Group Areas prosecution in Johannesburg's inner city. The Group Areas Act once more became a major issue in the period preceding the general election in May 1987. The large amount of support for the CP, especially in the Transvaal, ensured that the NP would not jettison the Group Areas Act. At the same time the de facto collapse of the Group Areas Act in Johannesburg's inner city ensured a spate of contradictory statements by NP leaders.10 In March 1987 PJ. Badenhorst, the Deputy Minister of Constitutional Development, said that the government would not hesitate to prosecute Group Areas Act offenders in existing "grey areas" like Hillbrow and that "National Party policy is that the different groups must be in different residential areas" (Cape Times 23/3/87). In the same week, Danie van Zyl, the leader of the NP in the Johannesburg City Council, said that nobody would be removed from Hillbrow (Star 1/4/87). In Johannesburg's inner-city neighbourhoods the NP's candidates maintained that they supported the Group Areas Act but that it was not possible to remove black residents from the neighbourhood (Rapport 19/4/87; Star 2/2/87). At the same time Leon de Beer, the NP candidate in Hillbrow, "denied that the government was refusing to prosecute under the Group Areas Act" (Argus 14/4/87). The NP's ambiguity won the day and they took the Hillbrow seat from the Progressive Federal Party (PFP) by 89 votes — the NP polled 3,455 votes, the PFP 3,366 and the CP 1,196 (Star 7/5/87). In 1981 the PFP had won the seat with a majority of 2,959 votes (ibid.). The strong showing by the CP in the 1987 general election — in the Transvaal the CP won 37.3 per cent of the vote and the NP 48.7 percent — put a further brake on any anticipated NP reforms, and this was reinforced by the successes of the CP in the various by-elections held in March 1988 (Van Rooyen 1994:128, 130). The CP won all the three by-elections contested and a specific focus in the CP election campaign "was the 'greying' of suburbs like Hillbrow" (ibid.: 131). In June 1988, in response to the increasing strength of the CP and the impending local elections in October 1988, the NP introduced a new Bill to tighten up the Group Areas Act. The Group Areas Amendment Bill had some draconian provisions. According to the then Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, Chris Heunis, the aim of the amendments to the Group Areas

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Act was "to strengthen the hands of... law enforcement officers, forestall infringements and obviate the development of intolerable situations" (SAIRR 1988:502). The Bill made provision for the "automatic eviction of any illegal occupant on conviction under the Act" (Sunday Star 3/7/88). The Group Areas Amendment Bill was severely criticised but, significantly, only in February 1989, after the local elections, did Heunis announce that the Bill would be dropped. An important additional Bill introduced at the same time was the Free Settlement Bill which created the possibility of certain areas being declared "free settlement" or "open" areas (SAIRR 1988:504). In these areas there would be no racial exclusivity and Group Areas legislation would not apply. The Free Settlement Bill was useful for NP candidates in mixed areas as they could argue that a future option would be to allow areas like Hillbrow to become "grey" areas if residents so desired. It was clear that the CP was going to perform well in the local elections, especially in the Transvaal, and it was important that the NP indicate that they had not given up on the Group Areas Act in Johannesburg's inner city and elsewhere. The statements and advertisements placed by the NP candidates in the Johannesburg inner city wards for the most part endeavoured to avoid the issue. For example, in a full page advertisement entitled "Policy Statement — Greater Hillbrow Residents Do Have Rights" no direct mention is made of the Group Areas Act." Reflecting on the tactics of the NP in Hillbrow in the 1988 local elections, Daryl Swanepoel who was the NP candidate in Hillbrow and chairperson of the greater Hillbrow branch of the National Party between 1987 and 1989, commented, There was a fear of a major swing to the CP. In order to appease people and to illustrate that we were not moving too rapidly we had to strike a balance. Where a community wanted integration we would allow that and if not then we would enforce the Group Areas Act (Interview, 16 August 1997).

In a four-page election flyer he issued, he discussed the Group Areas Act in one paragraph on the last page, and mentioned the Bill on Free Settlement Areas as a possible solution for Hillbrow (Swanepoel 1988). It is noteworthy thai the PFP and NP shared the spoils in Johannesburg's inner city, each winning two wards. The CP fought the October 1988 local elections mainly on the basis of opposing desegregation and reversing it if they gained control of any city council (Van Rooyen 1994:132). Although the CP did not win any seats specifically in Johannesburg's inner city, it did exceptionally well overall in the Transvaal, winning 53 per cent of the local authorities against the NP's 38 per cent (ibid.: 133). In the general elections in September 1989, the NP again reiterated its support for separate residential areas (ibid.: 135). However, the major swing to the CP in



this election appeared to convince the NP that it could no longer hope to recapture those NP supporters that had defected to the CP and that the focus should rather be on accelerating the pace of reform (ibid.: 138); this process must be understood in the broader context of continuing political challenge by both the civic and labour movements, the weakness of the economy and the changing international scenario with the collapse of the Soviet Union (Gilliomie 1992:357-60). The first de jure mixed areas or "free settlement areas" in South Africa were proclaimed in November 1989 (SAIRR 1990:70). Within Johannesburg, the government wanted to declare only Hillbrow a "free settlement area" and leave the rest of the inner city a white group area.12 This was blocked by the Johannesburg City Council on the premise that opening up Hillbrow could accentuate the "problem" as everybody "would stream into one area" {Sunday Star 15/4/90). In the end, no Johannesburg inner-city neighbourhoods were ever declared "free settlement areas".

Conclusion Even after the dramatic reform speech by FW de Klerk on 2 February 1990, Minister Heunis declared that the government was not planning to scrap the Group Areas Act during that parliamentary session as "the government still believed in group rights, including the right to live in one's own community" (SAIRR 1990:63). Not until February 1991 was the Group Areas Act, together with those other cornerstones of apartheid, the Land Acts and the Population Registration Act, officially rescinded. The pattern of urban segregation based on race is of course not unique to South Africa. During the colonial era, in almost all cities in Africa, segregation on the basis of race was the practice. It was viewed as a key feature in the subjugation of local populations and as a necessity for keeping people perceived as inferior at a distance (Abu-Lughod 1980; Davies 1992; Davies and Dewer 1989; Lowder 1986:91; Sidaway 1993; Teedon and Drakakis-Smith 1986). Lloyd describes how the "British developed residential areas well away from the existing [black] centres of population", while in the capital cities of states in French-speaking Africa the settler residential area would usually be in the centre and the residential areas for Africans would be "sited beyond its limits" (Lloyd 1972:113-4). In post-independent Africa, urban segregation on the basis of race has virtually collapsed, but in cities with substantial white settler populations racial compartmentalisation is still fairly extensive. For example, in Harare in 1985, six years after independence, Africans owned only 7,033 dwellings in the historically white suburbs: this amounted to 23 per cent of the total number of homes in these areas but represented only "4.5 per cent of the estimated total number of black households" (Davies 1992:306). The vast majority of black urban residents lived in uniracial, high-density townships. In Windhoek, Namibia's largest

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city, the spatial patterning historically followed the South African apartheid pattern with whites, coloureds and Africans living in separate areas (Simon 1986:291). In a similar vein to the South African and Zimbabwean experience, almost all desegregation in post-independent Namibia has involved the movement of coloureds and Africans into historically white neighbourhoods (ibid.). Racial compartmentalisation in cities elsewhere has also been profound. In the United States, although de jure racial segregation was declared unconstitutional in 1916, the segregation of African-Americans in ghettos was attained mainly through violence and 'restrictive covenants' whereby white property owners in a neighbourhood would sign contractual agreements "stating that they would not permit a black to own, occupy or lease their property" to blacks (Massey and Denton 1993:36). After the Second World War and the subsequent economic boom in the United States, segregation was maintained by suburbanisation (ibid.:45). White urbanites threatened with integration would almost invariably leave for the suburbs (Rose 1969:16). The United States experience of white flight is pertinent to explaining the failure of the white right to maintain the white-only status of Johannesburg's inner-city neighbourhoods. Had 'flight' been less possible — or less affordable — for Johannesburg's white apartmentdwellers, it is probable that their opposition to the influx of black people would have been more sustained. However, once it became evident that the CP had failed to persuade the government to enforce the Group Areas Act rigorously, and that black people were continuing to move into the inner city in ever greater numbers, most white residents took the easier option of leaving the neighbourhoods concerned. A 1996 survey found that in the Hillbrow/Berea/Joubert Park area only 5 per cent of the population was white (Crankshaw 1996). In what had for a short period been South Africa's probably most desegregated neighbourhoods, a new form of racial exclusivity was emerging. The collapse of Johannesburg's inner city as a white residential area and the response of the NP to this phenomenon in many ways epitomised the increasing unworkability of apartheid. To retain exclusively white residential areas in Johannesburg's inner city in the face of a massive and increasing housing shortage in black townships was clearly untenable. The government's fiscal crisis brought on by the lack of economic growth, and partially by the enormous expenditure required to perpetuate apartheid, ensured that it would not be able to provide enough housing in the prescribed Group Areas indefinitely. The endeavour to broaden the support base of apartheid by extending the vote to coloureds and Indians made the sustained prosecution of coloured and Indian Group Areas Act transgressors more and more untenable. The ending of influx control, combined with a severe shortage of accommodation in the township areas and increasing levels of violence in these areas, ensured that thousands of African people would continue to flock to the Johannesburg inner city. The responses of the two key white political parties on the right to the demise of residential racial exclusivity in Johannesburg's inner city reflected their



different approaches to the crisis of apartheid. For the CP the disintegration of residential apartheid was viewed as an affront to white dominance to be countered at all costs. From the early 1980s for the majority of the NP hierarchy it represented a crisis that had to be managed flexibly. This flexibility, however, created the space for further inward movement of black tenants and ultimately made any return to the status quo impossible. At the same time the NP was determined to hang on to the Group Areas Act. Its scrapping was viewed as tantamount to subverting a central component of the apartheid edifice and giving the CP a far too tempting bait with which to entice the white electorate. The fear of the right wing meant that as late as 1988, just prior to the local municipal elections, the NP once more gave the impression that it was determined to shore up the Group Areas Act. It was only in the wake of the decision to unban the African National Congress and other liberation movement organisations and scrap apartheid in its entirety that the NP felt able to part, de facto and de jure, with the whites-only status of Johannesburg's inner city.

Notes 1. The major right-wing political parties arc defined as those major political parties dominated by an explicit policy of racial discrimination. Up until 1982 this would have been the governing National Party and from 1982 onwards the National Party and the Conservative Party. The Hcrsligtc Nationalc Party formed in 1969 was generally loo small to make a significant impact; in the 1981 general election, however, it did relatively well garnering 18 per cent of the vote in the Transvaal, 25.2 per cent in the Orange Free Stale and 14.3 per cent overall. See Van Rooycn 1994:119. 2. There is no mention in the Annual Survey of Race Relations in the years 1961 lo 1976 of any case of an individual moving into a group area that was not in accord with his/her racial classification and being charged wilh transgressing the Group Areas Act. 3. Prior to 1985 African movement into Johannesburg's inner city was fairly restrained. The scrapping of influx control in 1986 and the escalation of political violence in the townships in the context of a massive housing shortage led to a substantial increase in the movement of African people into Johannesburg's inner city from the mid-1980s. 4. The tendency of white local authorities in South Africa not always to be in slcp with central government was fairly common. See Todes and Watson 1985:202. 5. It must be noted that under Vorster the Riekert and Wiehahn Commissions were set in motion in 1977. The commissions, which reported in 1979, resulted in significant reforms in the areas of influx control and more especially in the area of the usage of black labour. The Wiehahn Commission led to the dropping of statutory job reservation and the registration of black trade unions. It can be argued that Vorster set up the commissions to delay making a decision in these vital areas. 6. Hansard, House of Assembly Debates, col. 5 821 (1979), 7 May. 7. Hansard, House of Assembly Debates, cols 136 and 137 (1982), 17 February. 8. Black refers to the racial categories African, coloured and Indian. 9. Derby-Lewis is currently serving a life sentence for the murder of Chris Hani. Hani was • General-Secretary of the South African Communist Party at the time of his assassination. 10. Although the estimates varied, the government claimed that in March 1987 there were 45 000 people living in the Hillbrow area who were not classified white {Financial Mail 27/3/87). 11. Flyer advertisement for National Party. Compiled and issued by Jack Steyn of Pretoria Street, Hillbrow.

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12. City of Johannesburg, Departmental Circular No 96/90. Proposed Free Settlement Area: Hillbrow, 17 July 1990.

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Body-Gendrot, S. 1993. "Migration and the Racialisation of the Postmodern City in France", in Cross, M. and Keith, M. (eds), Racism, the City and the State (London), 77-92. Charney, C. 1983. "Restructuring White Politics; The Transformation of the National Party", in South African Research Services (eds). South African Review One: Same Foundations, New Facades? (Johannesburg), 142-54. Cole, J. 1987. Crossroads (Johannesburg). Crankshaw, O. 1996. Exploding the Myths of Johannesburg's Inner City. Johannesburg: Unpublished, for the Inner City Housing Upgrading Trust. Crankshaw, O. and White, C. 1995. "Racial Desegregation and Inner City Decay in Johannesburg". International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 19(4), 1995, 622-38. Davenport, T.R.H. 1989. South Africa: A Modern History (Cape Town). _____ 1991. "Historical Background of the Apartheid City to 1948", in Swilling, M., Humphries, R. and Shubane, K. (eds). Apartheid City in Transition (Cape Town), 1-19. Davies, R.J. 1992. "Lessons from the Harare, Zimbabwe, Experience", in Smith, D. M. (ed.), The Apartheid City and Beyond: Urbanisation and Social Change in South Africa (London), 303-13. Davies, R.J. and Dewer, N. 1989. "Adaptive or structural transformation? The Case of the Harare, Zimbabwe, Housing System". Social Dynamics 15, 1, 46-60. De Coning, C., Fick, J. and Olivier, N. 1987. "Residential Settlement Patterns: A Pilot Study of Socio-Political Perceptions in Grey Areas in Johannesburg". South Africa International 17, 121-37. Dugard, J. 1979. Memorandum on Possible Legal Defences to Prosecutions under the Group Areas Act (Johannesburg). Gilliomie, H. 1992. "Broedertwis: Intra-Afrikaner Conflicts in the Transition from Apartheid". African Affairs 91, 347. Horrell, M. 1971. Legislation and Race Relations (Johannesburg). Lemon, Anthony (ed.). 1991. Homes Apart: South Africa's Segregated Cities (Cape Town). Lipton, M. 1989. Capitalism and Apartheid: South Africa, 1910-1986 (Cape Town). Lloyd, P.C. 1972. Africa in Social Change (Harmondsworth, Penguin). Lodge, T. 1983. Black Politics in South Africa since 1945 (Johannesburg).


Lowder, S. 1986. Inside Third World Cities (London). Mabin, A. and Smit, D. 1997. "Reconstructing South Africa's Cities? The Making of Urban Planning 1900-2000". Planning Perspectives, 12, 193-223. Massey, D.S. and Denton, N.A. 1993. American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass (Cambridge, Mass.). Morris, A. 1994. "The Desegregation of Hillbrow, Johannesburg, 1978-1982". Urban Studies 31, 6, 821-34.


O'Meara, D. 1996. Forty Lost Years: The Apartheid State and the Politics of the National Party, 1948-1994 (Johannesburg). Pickard-Cambridge, C. 1988. The Greying of Johannesburg (Johannesburg). Platzsky, L. and Walker, C. 1985. The Surplus People: Forced Removals in South Africa (Johannesburg). Rose, H.M. 1969. Social Processes in the City: Race and Urban Residential Choice (Washington). SAIRR. 1980. South African Institute of Race Relations Survey 1979 (Johannesburg). _____

1983. South African Institute of Race Relations Survey 1982 (Johannesburg).

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Saul, J. and Gelb, S. 1981. The Crisis in South Africa: Class Defense, Class Revolution (New York). Sidaway, J.D. 1993. "Urban and Regional Planning in Post-independence Mozambique". International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 17, 2, 241-59. Simon, D. 1986. "Desegregation in Namibia: The Demise of Urban Apartheid?" Geoforum 17, 2, 291. _____ 1989. "Crisis and Change in South Africa: Implications for the Apartheid City". Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 14, 2, 189-206. Sparks, A. 1990. The Mind of South Africa (New York). Stadler, A. 1987. The Political Economy of Modern South Africa (Johannesburg). Swanepoel, D. 1988. "I'm Here to Stay". Election Flyer for 26 Oct. 1988 Local Elections. Teedon, P. and Drakakis-Smith, D. 1986. "Urbanisation and Socialism in Zimbabwe: The Case of Low-cost Urban Housing". Geoforum 17, 2, 309-24. Todes, A. and Watson, V. 1985. "Local Government Reform in South Africa: An Interpretation of Aspects of the State's Current Proposals". South African Geographical Journal 67, 2, 202. Van Rooyen, J. 1994. Hard Right (London). Western, J. 1981. Outcast Cape Town (Minneapolis).

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Newspapers and Periodicals Argus, Cape Town Cape Times, Cape Town Citizen, Johannesburg Financial Mail, Johannesburg Race Relations News, Johannesburg Rand Daily Mail, Johannesburg


Rapport, Johannesburg Star, Johannesburg Sunday Express, Johannesburg Sunday Star, Johannesburg Sunday Times, Johannesburg Sunday Tribune, Durban