convex sets intro- duced by Billera and Bixby is considered. It is shown that for zz ... Also for zz = 3 the maximal ... holds the bundle of commodities ... If not, put 8.
PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN MATHEMATICAL SOCIETY Volume 49, Number 2, June 1975
ON A GAMETHEORETIC NOTION OF COMPLEXITY
FOR COMPACTCONVEX SETS EHUD KALAI AND MEIR SMORODINSKY ABSTRACT.
The
duced by Billera
sets
in R"
of complexity
1. Introduction. model of market valued
notion
zz. Also
Let
defined
An allocation
u.,
x>>0
for every
(2) V¡=lx\= We define
the function
occur
z?z-dimensional
= (uy(x\,
x\,
of zz is a compact
if for some
u.(xy,
the bundle
portion
...,x)),
of R" (see
convex
set
of n traders
on Im, where Received
amount
paper
C C R",
Key words market
*£
[l]).
lm.
by
•",*;)).
A subset
we say that V is
("players")
available
by Billera the set
VCR"
is
ix)\.
p < q if p¿ < 3 there
• • • , zz be zz concave
1 for i= 1,2,-..,
u((x[))
(For
definitions
«,,
on the
convex
that
for zz = 3 the maximal
(of the commodities)
zzz; / = 1, 2, • ■• , n, satisfying (1)
for compact It is shown
The following
games.
functions
of complexity
and Bixby is considered.
m < nin - l).
They
13, 1973 and, in revised
(1970). convex
that for any compact
for some iu,,I u~, • • •, u)n ¿ defined
the coz7z-
form, May 13, 1974
Primary 90A15, 52A20; Secondary sets,
concave
utility
functions,
com-
games. Copyright © 1975. American Mathematical Society
416
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A GAME THEORETIC NOTION OF COMPLEXITY plexity
of V (or C) to be the minimal
plexity
of n (com(zz))
ttz for which
to be the maximal
complexity
this
417
is true,
and the com-
of an attainable
set in
R". It follows is easy
from the work of Billera
to see that
an attainable
set in R3 with complexity
conjectured
that
n and,
that for every
therefore,
paper
2, i.e.
com (zz) = n - 1 for all
In §2 we prove plexity
and Bixby that
com (2) = 1, and in their
com (tí) < 72(72- l).
they gave
an example
It of
2 < com (3) < 6.
One of them
is an attainable
set of com-
72.
n, n > 3, there
com (72) > 72 for n > 3.
3 we show that com(3) = 3. We are grateful
to Nimrod
Megiddo
who made
valuable
comments
about
the problem.
2. Complexity in R". Lemma following
(a)
1. Suppose
V* is an attainable
set
in R",
n > 3, satisfying
the
properties:
the
72+1
points
p* =(a,
a, •••,
a),
P* = (0, 1, 0, -..,
p* = (1, 0, • • •, 0),
0), ....
P* = i0, ■•■, 0, 1)
belong to V* with 0 < a< 1; (b) for each p = iy y, ■■• , y ) £ V*. if for some j, 1 < ;' < 72,y. > a, then y, < a for every k 4 jThen com V* > n. n — Proof.
Assume
that generate
u {x',
V*.
that Let
u = iuy,
■ • • , u ) are the utility
(x) = (x;.) be the allocation
• • ■, x' ) = a for /: = 1, 2, ■• ■, 72. Consider
er in this X. » 1.
allocation, If / 4 0,
We claim
that
(x",I
■ ■• , x"). zzz
assume there
without
Let loss
is an index
functions
for which
of generality 1< i
i.e.
the bundle of the 72th play-
/ be the set of indices J
j,,
on lm
zz(x) = p*,
that
< k, such
i for which
] = \k + 1, • ■ • , m\. that
x\y = 0 for
every /', /' 4 1» n. If not, put 8. = 2. ,} nxi > 0 for 1 < i < k and 8 = min1 3, the allocation
and
we find
1 is arbitrary,
z'j > k, which
2nd and
that there
j, j 4 2,n,
1 to conclude
= 0 for every
x?, = 1 and
x\. = 0 for every
n > 3, this is a contradiction, Remark.
that
to conclude
Observe
from which
m = n - 1 so that
the choice
argument
inductively,
k such
72 to player
> 0 and x\
the above
m > k > n - 1.
that
by a. on B . So
it must be a global
the requirement
x\2 = 0 tot every
are 72- 2 commodities Suppose
and by concavity
72th players
1 and
that
zz is bounded
> 0, for if xjy = 0 then
Continuing
and all between
(b) that
of the claim.
repeat
that
z, 4 i2-
in B
contradicts
x¿.
Next,
1 < i- < k, such
implies
from property
for the point
1 that in the case
p* is the unit matrix
where
up to a renaming
of the commodities. Theorem
1.
The attainable
vex hull of the 72+1
set
V
Pl = iVi,V2,■•■,lA), P2*= (o, 1,0, ...,o), has complexity Proof. to show that
in R",
n > 3, generated
by the con-
points
p* = ii,o,o,.-.,o), ••-,
p* = io,---,o,D
n.
To show that the complexity V
satisfies
condition
of V
is at least
(b) of Lemma
1.
Let
72, it is enough p be a point
in
the convex hull of \p^, ■■• , p*\; then p = £"=0 X¡p*, where X¡> 0 and 2^"=0^/
= 1. Denoting
p = iyy,
• ■• , yn),
we then have
for z 4 ]■>
y. + Jy.j = A„ < 1,' 0 + A. 1 + A. j — J1
which
proves
property
To show that
that generate
(b).
com Vn < n, we exhibit
72 utility
functions
V . Define
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from
/" to R
A GAME THEORETIC NOTION OF COMPLEXITY
zzz.(x,,l
Denote
by V
• • • ,' x zz)'=:—-, \x. + I z
2L
the attainable
the allocation
For every
to player
; the total
show the converse and show that
less ality
assume
player
to player
amount
we start
of x under
p
different
combination
the changes
diagonal linear
player
/, x1. = ß . if i 4 ji x\ = a-
and
a>
is the image of the allocation
1 and
2 the same
consider
and
of the
entries
are zero except
the point
of players
2nd player
arrive
of such
2 iß2 + ßy,
p
obtained
1 and from p
2.
pisa
and
p
convex and making
where
We infer that
0-2 + ß y,
in the same
(or 1st in the case
allocations
ß..
that assigns
as in x, assigns
at allocations
for one row.
of the images
amounts
to player
p . Now starting
and so on, we finally
combination
is
which
the roles
in the bundles
the 3rd player,
• • ■ , y ) which
of gener-
Also
of p
3 V . To x = (xJj
loss
way as p , by interchanging linear
V
assigns
Without
from
ßy).
p = iyy,
;'th
that
allocation
• • • , p*\.
at
of the
Therefore
zz is a point
1 (ctj - ß Jt 0, • • • , 0) and assigns
ß2 + ßy , • • ■ , ß2+
amount
with an arbitrary
hull of ip*,
attained
at the allocation
of all the commodities.
in the convex
the point
/ the total
;', p* is attained
inclusion,
that for every
Consider to every
to each player
player
the image
than a point
for i = 1,
x.; II
IS/i« J
set of zz = (zzj, • • • , zzn). pg is
that assigns
commodity.
min
419
of p ) and
all the off
p is a convex
of the following
form:
xl = y and xí = 0 ií i 4 j fot every j'4 k; x* = 1 and xk = 1 - y for i 4 k (where
k is the row with the off diagonal
of such an allocation,
then
nonzero
p = iy y, ■• ■ , yn),
entries).
where
If p is the image
y. = Y2y ii j 4 k and
yk=V2 +ÍV2- My) = 1 - Viy- So p = yp* + (l - y)p*, and we conclude that p is a convex
3.
linear
Complexity
combination
in R3.
V in R5 can be attained
variable,
utility
of ip*,
In this by three
functions
■■• , p*).
section
we prove
continuous,
that any attainable
concave,
monotone
set
in each
on /^.
Theorem 2. com(3) = 3Proof.
In view of Theorem
Let C be a compact
convex
ity (see [l, p. 262]) that maxíyj: that
miniy,:
conditions iliary
(y,, for the
function
1 we have to show only that
set in R . Assume
com (3) < 3-
loss
of general-
iy y, y 2, y A) £ C tot some y2> y^\ = 1 and
y 2, y A £ C tot some 2nd and
without
3rd players.
y,,
yA = 0. Let
Also assume
V = C — R\.
on / ,
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the same
Consider
the aux-
420
EHUD KALAI AND MEIR SMORODINSKY
gix y, x2) = max\S £ R: ix y + 8, 1 - X. +8, It is easy
to verify
Now we shall
functions
that
g is continuous
define
generate
utility
1 - x2) e V\.
and concave.
functions
on I* and prove
that these
utility
V. UyiXy,
X2,
Xj)
= Xy+
g^,
X^,
uAx - x,,13 xA, 2123 , x , xA - x. 1 + g(l ° zz3(xr Let
V be the attainable
sider any point
x2, x3) = min¡x2,
set of zz = iuy,
y = iy.,
x^.
zz,, zz,).
y 2, y A £ C. Choose
To see that
8Q such that y y + z5Q+ y, + (5n
= 1. It follows that 0 < y. + 8Q < I, i = 1, 2. Consider
.i .. . *
x3 = 0>
x, = y + (5„,
x, = 0,
x, = 1 - y,,
x^ = o,
*2 = y3'
*)->*•
' 2
0'
calculation that
that
Uy, u2, u,
loss
of generality
x3. If z5= g(xj, the
„i -
*2 = 2 -y3'
A straightforward
yj=Xj+z5,y2
..
the allocation
*1 = >1 + S0'
1
To prove
>r, 2
increasing
it can be assumed
1 - xp,
zz.'s for the given
that
'3
zz((xp) = y.
(x7.) = x be any allocation.
ate monotonically
= 1-Xj
3
of zz((x'.)) shows
V C V, let
that
V ^ V, con-
in each
It is easy
variable,
to see
so without
x* = 0, x2 = 0, x^ = 0, and
x^ =
then there is a point (y1? y2, y A £ V such that + S and
allocation
y, = x3.
But these
y¿'s
are the values
of
x.
REFERENCE 1.
Louis
J. Billera
and Robert
E. Bixby,
A characterization
of Pareto
surfaces,
Proc Amer. Math. Soc. 41 (1973), 261-267. DEPARTMENT OF STATISTICS, TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY, TEL AVIV, ISRAEL
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