From public to private global environmental ...

Environment and Planning A 2009, volume 41, pages 2305 ^ 2323

doi:10.1068/a41218

From public to private global environmental governance: lessons from the Montreal Protocol's stalled methyl bromide phase-out Brian J Gareau

Department of Sociology, McGuinn Hall 426, Boston College, 140 Commonwealth Avenue, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467-3807, USA; e-mail: [email protected]

E Melanie DuPuis

Department of Sociology, University of California, Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, CA 95064, USA; e-mail: [email protected] Received 17 July 2008; in revised form 19 November 2008; published online 6 August 2009

Abstract. The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, a multilateral environmental agreement, has successfully eliminated the use of most ozone-depleting chlorofluorocarbons. As a result, a number of observers have pointed to the possibility of transferring successes öand even linking regulationsö between the Montreal Protocol and Kyoto Protocol, the international but stalled climate-change agreement. We argue that there is need for caution on this issue. The Montreal and Kyoto protocols are the outcomes of vastly different political contexts, from public civil society approaches to what we call `the private turn': the current loss of faith in state sovereignty, the rejection of multilateralism, and an embrace of private knowledge about economic damage over public knowledge about the protection of citizens and natural resources. From this broader perspective we show that the differences between the Montreal and Kyoto protocols are therefore more than `command-and-control' versus `market-based' solutions. These differences also reflect an even deeper divide over what `counts' as knowledge in political decision-making processes. We illustrate these points through a case study of the current knowledge controversies around the phase-out of methyl bromide under the Montreal Protocol. We explain how the methyl bromide phase-out has stalled because the phase-out approach is incompatible with the current political regime, thus supporting the argument that neoliberal forms of governance cannot solve global environmental problems. This case, therefore, shows us that the challenges we face are more than atmospheric: to save the Earth we must create new ways to govern ourselves.

Introduction Current crises often prompt a look to past successes as models for a better future. Such is the case with the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (hereafter the Montreal Protocol), a multilateral environmental agreement that has successfully eliminated the use of most chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), a major cause of ozone-layer depletion. As a result, policy makers and commentators have looked to it for guidance on dealing with global climate change (Barrett, 2003; Benedick, 1991; Megie, 2006; Oberthur, 2001; Parson, 2003; Shende and Gorman, 1997). Some observers point to the possibility of transferring successes öand even linking regulationsö between the Montreal Protocol and the Kyoto Protocol, the stalled international climate-change agreement (Andersen et al, 2007; Norman et al, 2008). Given the scientific evidence for a relationship öboth positive and negativeöbetween ozone depletion and climate change, such a linkage makes sense from an ecological viewpoint (eg Chipperfield and Fioletov, 2007; Shindell et al, 1998; van der Leun, 2004). However, such optimism should be tempered with caution. The Montreal and Kyoto protocols are the outcomes of vastly different political contexts. As we will show, nations signed on to the Montreal Protocol in an era characterized by a faith in the idea of `the public' managing public resources through a sovereign state mandated to protect these resources. The state carried out this mandate through the development of public

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B J Gareau, E M DuPuis

knowledge, technocratic expertise, and strong `command-and-control' public intervention, particularly in the regulation of industry. In contrast, the Kyoto Protocol emerged in an era characterized by a `neoliberal' turn to private solutions and a distrust of state management (Bailey, 2007; Castree, 2008a; Goldman, 2005; Harvey, 2005; Liverman, 2004; McCarthy and Prudham, 2004). To understand the importance of what we call `the private turn' in governance, we draw upon current characterizations of neoliberalism and neoliberal global environmental governance (GEG) while broadening this characterization with concepts from the history of political culture and science studies. The private turn describes not only the current loss of faith in state sovereignty and the rejection of multilateralism (Bhaskar et al, 2005; Forman and Segaar, 2006), but also the embrace of private knowledge about economic damage over public knowledge about the protection of citizens and natural resources. From this broader perspective we show that the differences between the Montreal and Kyoto Protocols are more than the gradual dismissal of command-and-control for `market-based' solutions (Bumpus and Liverman, 2008, pages 131 ^ 132). These differences reflect an even deeper divide over what counts as knowledge in political decision-making processes. The turn from public to private governance, we argue, is also a turn from public to private knowledge. To explain this new knowledge regime we draw from the ``new historicism'' (Hacking, 1990), which focuses on the ``network of concepts'' (Somers, 1995) or ``styles of reasoning'' (Hacking, 1992) that characterize a particular era and which `ìntroduce new ways of being a candidate for truth or falsehood'' (Hacking, 1992, page 12). The new historicism provides tools for analyzing long-term changes in the nature of civil society, particularly understanding changes in political metanarratives describing civil society which provides the social site for what `counts' as legitimate knowledge. Drawing upon this framework we show that the Montreal Protocol governance model, based on a previous era of faith in public knowledge, multilateral agreements, and mandated phase-outs, has not functioned well in the neoliberal era. We then argue that any proposals for considering the Montreal Protocol as a model for climate-change solutions must deal with this fundamental change in GEG regime. We will look specifically at the transformation of the Montreal Protocol since its incarnation in 1987, from the multilateralist policies that successfully led to a global ban on CFCs to the more private governance approach to the recent methyl bromide (MeBr) phase-out, another ozone-depleting substance (ODS). We show that the treatment of MeBr itself in the Montreal Protocol is a hybrid between public and private governance approaches. We will argue that the lack of success in the MeBr phase-out is due to this fundamental conceptual disconnect between public and private GEG. The case study provides a substantial warning to those who hope that marketbased or hybrid public ^ private approaches to global governance will solve our climate problems. The case will illustrate how the US and pro-MeBr members of the Montreal Protocol's scientific expert group, the Methyl Bromide Technical Options Committee (MBTOC) defend the continued use of MeBr through arguments reflective of private, market-based perspectives that undermine state authority and public expertise. In contrast, European Union (EU) delegates, delegates from the global South, anti-MeBr MBTOC members, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) continue to draw upon a more public metanarrative that legitimizes scientific expertise and state action in its public governance structures. This conflict, we argue, illustrates how the adoption of market-based or hybrid approaches in a multilateral environmental agreement can significantly hamper global governance solutions to environmental problems.

The Montreal Protocol's stalled methyl bromide phase-out

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From public to private GEG Observers have characterized the history of GEG as the gradual move from commandand-control state regulatory solutions to private, market-based solutions (Bernstein, 2002). For example, the United Nations 1972 Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm took place during an era when public environmental awareness was extremely high, as was public trust in government intervention to regulate industrial pollution despite strong industry opposition (Dunlap and Mertig, 1992; Szasz, 1994). Statements from the Stockholm meeting reflected confidence in and reliance on global scientific expertise and knowledge, and optimism about multilateral governance, describing ``the international expression of the huge surge of environmental concern then occurring at the national level, especially in key industries'' (Speth and Haas, 2006, pages 56 ^ 57). with participants calling upon ``states to cooperate in developing international environmental law'' (page 60). Such regulations were not seen as being necessarily at odds with democracy or political freedoms. Ophuls exemplified this sentiment when, in 1974, he described the times as ``The Politics of Scarcity'' and argued the need for a powerful state to curb environmental crises: ``Man is a passionate being'', he stated, and therefore there must be ``checks on will and appetite, if these checks are not self-imposed, they must be applied externally as fetters by a sovereign power'' (Ophuls, 2004, page 60). This environmental approach typified the public political culture of the welfare state which ``sought to `decommodify' certain aspects of economic and social life, both through the provision of resources and entitlements to certain categories of people and the formulation of `command-and-control regulations' that imposed limits on externality-producing practices by capital'' (Lipschutz, 2005, page 233). Bolstered by a growing scientific knowledge base about pollution and its effects, civil society groups and public scientists pressured governments to place limits on industry, sometimes with significant levels of success (Dunlap and Mertig, 1992). The Stockholm meeting resulted in a surge of international and global environmental treaties, along with the creation of the intergovernmental environmental organization, the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP). This building of international environmental management infrastructure indicated a rise in conviction that strong state intervention, combined with new multilateral environmental agreements and international governance law, could resolve international environmental issues (Hunter et al, 2007, pages 173 ^ 174). After Stockholm, international panels of scientists published all manner of reports on global environmental concerns, strengthening legitimization of the global public science community. Owing to now-famous scientific research reports such as Rowland and Molina's study (1975) and the National Academy of Science's Charney Report (NAS, 1979), climate change and ozone depletion gained increasing attention (Speth and Haas, 2006, page 62). In addition to initiating discussion of global climate and ozone regimes, the reports directed governments to adopt precautionary policies for public protection against other uncertain environmental effects and strong policies to control pollution at the local and the global levels. In 1987 Montreal Protocol signatories were successful in adopting this kind of strong regulatory approach in the CFC phase-out even before the science on CFC ozone depletion was fully conclusive (Bankobeza, 2005, page 36). While industry and the White House originally opposed any regulation on the grounds of scientific uncertainty, public pressure combined with Environmental Protection Agency support and

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NGO promotion of the precautionary approach prevailed (Litfin, 1994). Consistent with strong state sovereignty attitudes about environmental regulation, the CFC phase-out utilized command-and-control measures that motivated industry to rapidly seek ways to incorporate CFC substitutes (Bankobeza, 2005, page 27).(1) In a report celebrating twenty years of the Montreal Protocol, Fest Grabiel (2007) reported delegates' sentiments regarding the Protocol's past and future: ``Participants ... pointed out that the [Montreal] Protocol's straightforward, commandand-control style of regulation ... proved that a `back to basics' approach to regulation can be the most cost-effective and expeditious way to achieve environmental protection'' (page 22). For two decades the impetus to create stronger global governance begun in Stockholm continued to strengthen. Optimism for new international relationships that typified the early 1990s, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, led some to call for ``planetary democracy'' (Held, 1995). Havel (1995) characterized the era as ``part of an endeavour to find a new and genuinely universal articulation of that global human experience'', in which we all may `èngage in a common quest for the general good'' (page 9). Concurrently, scholars in international environmental law called for the centralization of GEG, and for global governing bodies to have increased power over states, just as states had conceded power to the World Trade Organization on issues of international trade (Hunter et al, 2007, pages 234 ^ 244). Global environmental problems required a global environmental institution to which nations would limit their sovereignty (Esty, 1994), thus giving authoritative power to global governance bodies that would ``create a proper international environmental agency within the United Nations system that has real power and authority'' (Palmer, 1992, page 262). The 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio, or the `Rio Summit', has often been acclaimed as the high point of public GEG. With the promotion of the Brundtland Report (WCED, 1987) at Rio, `sustainable development' discourse gained prominence, linking environmental degradation to poverty (Le¨le¨, 1991). In fact, the agreements that emerged from Rio reflected the gradual shift from public to private forms of governance. For example, Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration stressed ``the use of the precautionary approach where there are threats of serious or irreversible environmental damage'' (Hunter et al, 2007, page 199). Yet, unlike the usage of the precautionary principle at the Montreal Protocol, where the risk of chlorine loading to the ozone layer led to a regulated phase-out of CFCs, its usage at Rio was arguably more market oriented. As Bernstein (2002, pages 106 ^ 107) points out, the precautionary principle decided upon at Rio emphasized that costeffective measures should be applied where scientific uncertainty remained, and thus emphasized the role of the market and private industry. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change agreement initiated at Rio also made use of cost-effective precautionary measures due to uncertainty over the consequences of climate change (Speth and Haas, 2006). The environmental management strategy at Rio clearly favored market mechanisms over command-and-control regulation, and questioned `limits to growth' arguments (Meadows, 1972). An influential message coming from business, represented through the Business Council for Sustainable Development, was that (1) While it is possible to trade CFC quotas internationally under the Montreal Protocol, the strategy is seldom employed. Instead, governments and CFC producers negotiated the transition to non-CFC production largely via command-and-control mechanisms not directly tied to market conditions (Parson, 2003).


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``governments concerned with long-term sustainability need not seek to limit growth in economic output as long as they stabilize aggregate natural resource consumption (Goodland and Ledoc, 1987; in Le¨le¨, 1991). At the same time it had become widely accepted that NGOs should play a role in shaping global environmental objectives, generating optimism that sustainable development could be orchestrated to meet the needs of the common people (Conca and Dabelko, 2004). Nevertheless, at Rio, government and GEG, were still seen as being the primary institutions through which sustainability could be orchestrated. Successful international agreements like the Montreal Protocol had proven that GEG could successfully alter production in a sustainable way, sustainable to both industry profits and the global environment. Here, GEG was deemed necessary in order to persuade governments to comply with environmentally friendly goals (Conca, 2006, page 11). The authoritative role of states in global governance at Rio is perhaps best brought home in the influential report of the Earth Summit, Our Common Future (WCED, 1987), where most of the twenty-three principles for environmental protection ``begin with the same phrase: `states shall ...' '' (Conca, 2006, pages 21 ^ 22). At the Rio conference the US played a very different role than at Stockholm or even in the formulation of the Montreal Protocol five years prior. The financial crisis of the late 1980s, the rise of Reaganism, which prompted a Third Way response in opposition, and the emergence of the post-Soviet era, had begun to infiltrate the US position on global environmental politics (Bernstein, 2002). US environmental policy reflected the structural adjustment approaches of international financial institutions such as the World Bank's ``global managerial state of mind'', emphasizing ``the neoliberal question of the freedom and sovereignty of capital '' (Goldman, 2005, page 91, original emphasis). Under this new political regime the US promoted the privatization of state-run institutions, providing markets for phenomena previously protected from market forces through the elimination of command-and-control public regulatory instruments (Castree, 2008b; Harvey, 2005), and the promotion of private stakeholder politics over the usage of society-based measures (DuPuis and Gareau, 2008; Gareau, 2008a). Observers such as Lester Brown of the Worldwatch Institute disparaged this new political turn, arguing that ``the US is no longer capable of leading'' (Brown, 1992, page 13). In fact, the US was playing a leadership role, but one of a different design. The US was applying to environmental issues the same strategies it was applying to global economic issuesöones that emphasized free marketeering and decentralized governance instead of governmental control (Tickell and Peck, 2003, page 167). This new Washington Consensus was `ìncreasingly negative on multilaterialism, environmental regulation, the United Nations, foreign aid, and treaties and similar agreements, and, indeed, government itself '' (Speth and Haas, 2006, page 80, our emphasis). Yet the private turn was more than just a change in politics: it was a change in what knowledge counted as legitimate in formulating solutions to public problems. The influential reader, Economics of the Environment, provides an excellent representation of the transition from public to private knowledge in environmental policy. First published in 1972, the year of the Stockholm Meeting, and published most recently in 2005, this reader has been a major mainstay in environmental economics courses, covering `classic' readings on environmental economics. The first two editions exemplify the era of public environmental knowledge. Coeditor Robert Dorman provides a substantial introduction (in Dorfman and Dorfman, 1972; 1977) focused on the problem of ``common resources'' and the limits of the `ìnvisible hand'' in managing

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resources efficiently, because common goods are ``non-excludable'' public goods. Environmental problems, from this perspective, are public problems concerning the protection of public goodsösuch as the ozone layeröthat require joint action through state intervention, public services, and strong controls over use. The third edition (Dorfman and Dorfman, 1993) represents a transition state between public and private governance and accompanying forms of knowledge. Published a year after Rio, there is no introduction providing an overview of the field. Although Robert Dorfman is still coeditor, his earlier introduction becomes an article representing a single view, that of welfare economics. In this edition, an alternative view, that of èconomic incentives', appears, including the privatization of common property resources, especially the market trading of pollution permits. According to market-based incentive theories, total pollution control expenditures are less costly under a private trading regime. This is true because the cost of controls varies from one emission source to the next. The market enables more cheaply controlled sources to control their emissions and to sell the rights to those whose controls are more costly (Tietenberg, 1993). Nevertheless, Rio-based multilateralism remains very much in evidence in the volume, as reflected in articles showing the benefits of global participation in environmental agreements (Dorfman and Dorfman, 1993). In the latest two editions the new editor is Robert Stavins (2000; 2005), one of the major proponents of market-based environmental policies. Stavins, a Harvard economist, headed `Project 88: Harnessing Market Forces to Protect our Environment', a bipartisan initiative supported by the Environmental Defense Fund, which provided much momentum for the 1990 US Clean Air Act's permit system for sulfur dioxide emissions (Bernstein, 2002, page 81). In these editions welfare economic approaches are significantly underplayed, replaced almost entirely with an economics of private interests. In contrast to the previous volumes' positive take on the mutual benefits of multilateral agreements, the articles in this edition emphasize the trade-offs of global governance. One article states unequivocally that `àny action combating global warming will be, intended or not, a foreign aid program'' (Schelling, 2000, page 510). between developed and underdeveloped countries. Instead of GEG, individual economic development is the ``sound advice'' for environmental improvement in developing countries, because development ``reduc[es] their reliance on agriculture and other such outdoor livelihoods'' (page 510). In fact the economic analysis showing that individual countries can benefit from global cooperation no longer appears in the most recent additions. The 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg exemplifies this disappearance of `the public' from environmental policy (Speth and Haas, 2006), leading business groups to hail ``the call for [business ^ government] partnerships ... and a serious doubt about whether a multilateral system is able to effectively address our sustainable development challenges'' (Stigson, 2004, page 266, our emphasis). Global civil society groups, however, disparaged Johannesburg's clear shift to private governance. Meena Rahman of Friends of the Earth argued that ``there were no reasons to be optimistic [about the World Summit]'', and emphasized that NGOs were ``frustrated by the results''. She added that ``nothing happened since Rio in 1992 because governments embraced a neo-liberal agenda, which represents the interest of big powers'' (World Bank, 2004). To be sure, there are exceptions to this characterization of the historical trajectory of environmental issues from public to private. Even at Johannesburg, environmentalists, the UN, and several delegations hoped for commitments to projects that give governments a leading role in sustainable development and the implementation of


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the Rio Summit's Agenda 21. Yet the principle outcome of Johannesburg reflects a shift in dominant ideology regarding GEG (Speth, 2004). This gradual transition from public to private environmental policy knowledge provided the epistemological basis for the private turn in environmental economic analysis. This is most obvious in the wholesale adoption of market trading instruments as the main policy option under the Kyoto Protocol, which committed countries to a `cap-and-trade' scheme in which private parties bought the rights to emit carbon dioxide from those who had reduced their emissions (Bernstein, 2002). Economists support this idea because, according to neoliberal economic theory, it is deemed the most cost-effective option (Ekins and Barker, 2001). While the goal of cap-and-trade schemes is laudable öcheaper control of emissions öthe wholesale embrace of marketbased solutions over public authority made private interests tantamount over any form of public decision making. In the end, both the US and Australia refused to participate in Kyoto, mostly because of the `cap'öpublic interventionöaspect of the cap-andtrade policies in the treaty. In the latest plan (described in Stavins, 2005), economists propose a trading scheme that proceeds entirely through private economic instruments, abandoning any notion that the public has any sovereignty over private business (cf McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 2005). In the next section we will describe the history of the MeBr phase-out and how the move to private solutions has influenced the control of this ODS in the Montreal Protocol. While MeBr is not subject to a cap-and-trade system, it does differ from the CFC phase-out in relation to a new set of standards for exempting users from the phase-out. The move from èssential' use exemptions based on public health and welfare concerns to `critical' use exemptions (CUEs) based on economic criteria exemplifies the move from public to private governance structures. These changes parallel the move from welfare economics analyses of environmental policies that emphasize the benefits of governmental management of public goods and GEG in favor of economic analyses that emphasize market-based and private governance solutions. The Montreal Protocol: from public to private governance The 1987 Montreal Protocol is widely considered to be the most successful example of GEG in history (Andersen et al, 2007; Benedick, 1991; Litfin, 1994). Despite a lack of scientific consensus regarding the impact of CFCs on the ozone layer, the impact of ozone depletion on the environment and human health, and the fact that ``large uncertainties surrounded estimates of the economic costs of phasedown of ODSs'' (Norman et al, 2008, page 1), ratification of the protocol was widely supported in the industrialized world. It went into force in 1989, ``committing those nations to reduce production of CFCs by 50% of the 1986 baseline values by 1996'' (Canan and Reichman, 2002, page 42). Since its ratification, this global environmental agreement has successfully phased out over 95% of ODSs consumed worldwide (UNEP, 2007a). Problems we see today in the Kyoto Protocol were also evident in the early days of the Montreal Protocol. Industry initially refused to become fully invested, making attempts to question the viability of ozone research and stress the high costs of investing in alternative technologies (Parson, 2003). Additionally, CFC producers argued that alternatives would need to be protected, not transferred to competitors. Unlike Kyoto, however, leadership from the US and the EU, pushed by their environment ministries and civil society groups, and subsequently from corporate and military groups, eventually led to an agreement on the conditions for the transfer of CFCalternative technologies (Andersen et al, 2007). A ``record of effective multilateral funding

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of ODS-reducing investments in developing countries'' (Norman et al, 2008, page 1), from the protocol's Multilateral Fund (MLF) and the Global Environmental Facility, combined with a cohesive, highly respected scientific advisory group that provided technical support on ODSs and alternative technologies, orchestrated (with the UNEP) a successful phase-out of most CFCs and other ODSs in the industrialized world (Canan and Reichman, 2002). In contrast the MeBr phase-out, scheduled from completion in 2005 in the industralized world, has proceeded more slowly than the CFC phase-out. MeBr was added to the Protocol's list of controlled substances in the Copenhagen Amendment to the Protocol in 1992. Primarily used as a soil fumigant in strawberry and tomato production, and for quarantine preshipment of agricultural goods, MeBr use has remained at high levels several years beyond the phase-out date (Norman et al, 2008). To understand the reasons behind the continued use of MeBr beyond the phase-out date, we followed the history of the MeBr phase-out between 2003 and 2008, gathering information from: (1) the rules of protocol themselves; (2) in-depth formal and informal interviews with key nation-state delegates, NGO and industry representatives, and MBTOC members; and (3) field notes taken from direct observation at the Meetings of the Parties (MOP). From 2003 to 2006 the first author of this paper attended each of the annual MOPs, the two Èxtraordinary Meetings', (ExMOP), and annual Òpenended Working Group' (OEWG) meetings, which are designed to prepare for the annual MOPs. Attendance at these meetings provided first-hand information regarding the decision-making process of the Montreal Protocol around the MeBr phase-out. While the Copenhagen Amendment mandated the MeBr phase-out in the industrialized world in 2005, an amendment decision accompanying Article 2H at the 1997 meeting allowed for a new category of exempted use, CUEs, which has significantly slowed the phase-out. In 2003 parties agreed to allow for significant CUEs to the MeBr phase-out mainly for strawberry and tomato production in several industrialized countries. Since then, the vast majority of CUEs have continued to go to US strawberry and tomato growers. By 2005 the US request for CUEs had expanded to over half the exemptions worldwide, almost 10 000 tonnes. By the time of the 2009 exemption requests, the US was awarded 92% of total exemptions (UNEP, 2007b). So, while total use has declined to less than half of the 2005 request, its share of 2009 exemptions shows that the US has gained the majority share of exemptions. The CFC phase-out also contained a clause for exemptions. However, the definition of exemptions under the CFC phase-out was significantly more restrictive and `àdministered sparingly and with discrimination'' (Benedick, 1998, page 239). Despite pressure from US industry lobbyists to push the scientific community to accept broadbased exemptions for air-conditioning refrigeration and other uses, ``the [scientific] panel was unafraid to say no to the US and others'' (page 240) that wanted to minimize exemptions in that case. Instead, the CFC essential use exemption clause included only three uses ``necessary for the health, safety or [are] critical for the functioning of society'' (EPA, 2006). In contrast, determinations of exemptions to the MeBr phase-out found in Decision IX/6öand drafted in accordance with Article 2Hörely on market criteria as interpreted by particular interest groups, including: ``the lack of availability of MeBr for that use [which] would result in a significant market disruption'' and in which there are ``no technically and economically feasible alternatives'' (Decision IX/6, UNEP, 2007a). For MeBr phase-out exemptions the parties focused on the economic impact of the MeBr phase-out on specific interest groups, even on individual users of MeBr, not on the protection of public health or welfare (DuPuis and Gareau, 2008).


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Additionally, a major difference between the MBTOC and the scientific committees formed previously was that MBTOC members included chemical manufacturers and suppliers of MeBr. The first MBTOC cochairperson, Jonathan Banks (1998), notes that this was problematic because it was ``the first time the agricultural sector [and agribusiness] came under the scrutiny of the Montreal Protocol'' (page 168), and `ùnlike other industrial sectors affected by the Montreal Protocol, the MeBr industry produces no alternatives and therefore has no business interest in alternatives'' (page 168). Indeed, the MeBr case soon became a thorn in the side of the protocol due to the inability of the MBTOC to form a consensus on the efficacy of MeBr alternatives, and the growing uncertainty regarding the legitimacy of the MBTOC's scientific advice due to private interest politics. Banks argued that ``carefully orchestrated criticism of MBTOC activities taking place outside the Protocol makes it increasingly challenging for the committee to provide the parties with objective policy-relevant information (page 169)'', and that ``this situation is destabilizing the MBTOC and represents a threat to the total Montreal Protocol process'' (page 169). Additionally, global civil society has had difficulty convincing governments to reduce or withdraw their CUE nominations. Here, the private cost criteria for CUEs have deflected demands from civil society groups and certain nations to meet the terms of the phase-out, as they do not reflect market-based concerns written in Decision IX/6 (Gareau, 2008a, chapter 6). As the scientific and technical experts advising parties on the MeBr issue, the MBTOC, and other technical committees that have worked on the CUE issue, such as the Economics Options Committee and the Agricultural Economics Task Force (AETF), were equally delegitimized in favor of information provided by private lobby groups on costs of compliance (DuPuis and Gareau, 2008). In particular, the US has protected its own economic interests by drawing attention to the unique, local conditions of strawberry production in the US, as presented by strawberry industry experts, while delegitimizing the claims made by the MBTOC (Gareau, 2008a, chapter 3; 2008b). The contention between pro-MeBr and anti-MeBr MBTOC members reflects the rift that exists between other groups, including nation-states, due to their view of the role of the public, the state, and scientific expertise in GEG. The US delegation and pro-MeBr CUE MBTOC members have responded with skepticism to much of the general scientific expertise presented by the parties on behalf of significantly reduced CUEs, instead offering arguments in favor of `local conditions' (Gareau, 2008b) and private costs. The EU delegation, anti-MeBr CUE MBTOC members, and NGOs note the importance of precaution, command-and-control regulations, GEG, and public scientific knowledge. Much of this conflict has occurred in and around MBTOC discussions. The MBTOC rift: public to private knowledge Disagrements about the role of public governance in the Montreal Protocol have centered primarily on the MBTOC. MBTOC contains a mixture of public and private technocratic experts. Interviews with members of the MBTOC illustrate the nature of this conflict. A rift has developed between pro-MeBr MBTOC members who express support for private economic interests and anti-MeBr MBTOC members who express concerns for public health and the global environment. This rift over forms of governance parallels a rift over forms of legitimate knowledge with some MBTOC members accusing others of supporting irrelevant knowledge claims about

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MeBr alternatives based either on political interests or on scientific knowledge that is not transferable to specific locales. Disagreements among MBTOC members have therefore become struggles over public or private GEG and its associated knowledges. For example, at the 2005 25th OEWG the first author of this paper interviewed two MBTOC members, one from Canada, the other from the US. He told the members he was conducting an investigation of the relationship between the science disseminated from MBTOC and how the parties make use of that information. The US MBTOC member asked, ``Do you see any science here?'' His Canadian counterpart exclaimed, `Ì think I take offense to that comment!'' The offender quickly backtracked to correct himself. He meant, he told us, that MBTOC is rife with political activity. MBTOC meetings, he said, can consist of very charged debates in which members make arguments for or against particular critical use nominations based on politics, not science. For her part, the second MBTOC member felt that their science was indeed science at the research stage, but that, as soon as MBTOC discussed research findings as a group, the science became politically charged. In both their opinions the alternatives to MeBr were not adequate, and the MBTOC's decisions did not reflect that `fact' well enough. When Gareau discussed the current problems with the MeBr phase-out, the MBTOC members interviewed often contrasted it to the CFC phase-out. The CFC phase-out, they commented, involved one industry producing a handful of chemicals. They described MeBr as more of an ecological, localized issue. These local conditions, they argued, nullified any attempt to draw on global scientific research or economic analysis to justify the MeBr phase-out. From this perspective, the MeBr case is complex, dynamic, and locally varied: ``You can't just substitute [MeBr] for another [chemical] when the other has a different effect on the whole system'', the US MBTOC member argued. In this interview MBTOC members are referring to the commonly accepted explanation for the success of the CFC phase-out as compared with problems with the MeBr phase-out. In the case of CFCs, a large company, DuPont, had developed a `drop-in' chemical that would substitute for CFCs in many of its industrial applications (see Parson, 2003). However, switching MeBr for an alternative chemical changes the pest management strategy: it changes the ecology of the approach to limit pests and pathogens. According to this narrative, MeBr CUEs were developed to deal with these differences. These differences do, in fact, exist: there is no drop-in MeBr alternative similar to the CFC alternatives. However, the questions remain: at what point does public health and environmental protection trump private interests? How much of the ozone layer should the public sacrifice to defend the personal interests of how many strawberry and tomato producers? At what point do innovative MeBr alternatives become `good enough' to become acceptable substitutes for this substance? Unfortunately, the regulatory mandate behind CUEsöthe primacy of private costs over public interestsömakes those questions unanswerable because it does not allow for the consideration of public knowledge in CUE decision making. Owing to the primacy of private costs means that new MeBr alternatives can only be considered truly feasible if they are cost free. For example, the reception of a 2003 MBTOC report that demonstrated growing and wide-ranging success in the implementation of MeBr alternatives virtually debunked claims of local conditions requiring unique needs. Nevertheless, at the 15th MOP held in Nairobi in 2003, Mark Morai of the California Strawberry Commission argued, ``How can we possibly make decisions in Nairobi or even in a United Nations committee that proposes to address all situations in all farming communities around the world? The answer can only be to trust the system you have devised


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for [CUEs], and let the regulating agency in each country work closely with their farmers to make the necessary progress.'' It is clear here that the US agroindustry lobbyists are calling on the US to reject trust in the global science and knowledge and the global governing system in general and instead to promote the private needs, conditions, and scientific knowledge selected at the local scale. Pro-MeBr MBTOC members discuss the regulatory issue in terms of local ecological conditions of California strawberry production and the need for particular strawberry growers to use MeBr. In other words, the regulatory structure of MeBr CUEs pits private interests over public interests in ways not found in the CFC exemptions. However, EU experts on MeBr alternatives tend to disagree with the argument that alternatives are not feasible. One EU MBTOC member at the 2003 24th OEWG, a consultant with experience in implementing MeBr alternatives in the global South, argued that ``there are alternatives [to MeBr] if you try hard enough to find them.'' One of the problems facing more practical approaches is the need in MBTOC for data from recent findings presented in scientific journals worldwide. Not surprisingly, the most respected reports on MeBr effectiveness come from the US. The consultant argued that the almost exclusive use of US reports slows down the promotion and dissemination of alternatives at the MBTOC discussion table, and thus to the plenary. This MBTOC member has seen success in the implementation of alternatives. For example, the MBTOC had successfully funded MeBr alternatives for cut flowers, which have helped African countries like Uganda and South Africa. The alternatives turned out to be economically viable and yielded a better product. The EU expert noted that civil society pressures also help with the transition to alternatives. Europe has a special label for cut flowers that shows that `no methyl bromide' was used in production. ``This label can now be found in New York!'' he exclaimed. Certain cut flowers companies were able to `link up' with the experts in MeBr-alternative technologies through the Internet, and were thus able to use computers to disseminate the technologies to growers worldwide on the ground. This is ``real globalization'', in the EU MBTOC member's words, where technology is provided instantaneously via the Internet, where soil content analyses are sent to experts in the industrialized world who then analyze the data and send them immediately back to the growers with the necessary combination of chemicals for successful flower cultivation. According to this EU MBTOC member, there is ``no difference'' between this sort of success and what could happen with strawberries were it not for the unwillingness of private parties to participate in global cooperation in research and implementation of alternatives, all stymied by the economic protection provided by the CUE regulations. In fact, the MBTOC had shown that strawberry production projects in the global South revealed virtually no difference between MeBr and MeBr alternatives in strawberry production. Indeed, the MBTOC reported to the parties at the 23rd OEWG that, of the two-hundred-plus projects implemented, ``with two exemptions ... the complete demonstration projects, for all ... locations and all crops or situations tested, identified one or more alternatives comparable to MeBr in their effectiveness in the control of targeted pests and diseases.'' (2) It is clear here that MBTOC members in favor of minimal CUEs draw from a different knowledge base to reason out their position on the MeBr issue. For example, another anti-MeBr MBTOC member noted that civil society plays a role in shaping state and corporate behavior by selecting MeBr-free commodities. This sort of reasoning never arose during the interviews with the US MBTOC members. During the deliberations at plenary, however, the EU delegation noted this (2)

MBTOC presentation at the 2003 23rd OEWG (tape-recorded notes, our emphasis).

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pressure as reason to make proactive decisions to phase out MeBr. The EU reported at the 23rd OEWG the need to pay attention to consumers: ``[T]here is a need to avoid developed country boycotts of MeBr-treated imports. According to previous reports, it is possible that supermarkets and consumers will avoid food imports known to be treated with MeBr. Some large supermarket chains in Europe now require the growers to be certified by specialized agencies that food delivered to the supermarket has been produced without MeBr. Some developing countries with export programs have voluntarily signed into early phase-outs, citing boycotts as one of the main reasons for doing this ... . There is a need to continue this momentum.'' In the EU, civil society has influenced changes in the behavior of private firms (Osterveer, 2008) to the point that EU delegates call attention to that influence at the global scale of governance. Public pressures to thwart ozone depletion have provoked the EU delegation to motivate the global South to take proactive measures to ensure early phase-outsöa public and precautionary approach. In other words, disagreement between MBTOC members about legitimate governance structures has led to a rift about legitimate knowledge. In 2004 the MBTOC presented its updated report on how to handle MeBr CUEs to parties. Owing to their inability to reach consensus on certain CUE requests, the MBTOC devised a third category to accompany `reject' and àccept', titled `noted', which did not commit MBTOC to either a rejection or an acceptance of certain nominations. These noted CUEs came largely from the US. In interviews members expressed strong uncertainties over the meaning of the term noted. One interviewee mentioned that the description of the noted category in plenary made it appear that MBTOC wanted to recommend rejecting these nominations. Two MBTOC members said that they feared that might happen. They argued that MBTOC was leaning toward recommending the noted nominations, but needed more information. But the real issue was that MBTOC could not agree on the critical use nominations from the US. Certain MBTOC members felt that the nominations were not legitimate, and therefore MBTOC was unable to reach consensus prior to the 2004 MOP. Earlier that year the environmental advocacy group, the Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA), proclaimed what was the common opinion of most nations from the global South and the EU. At the 1st ExMOP in 2004, the EIA warned parties of the ramifications for the overly generous granting of CUEs, a reaction due partly to the US's threat to withdraw from the treaty if its CUEs were not accepted: ``This body should not panic here ... . The Montreal Protocol is threatening to abandon the precautionary principle on which it is based. ... a consistent precautionary approach has rightfully made this the most successful environmental agreement in history.''(3) However, arguments about precautions made by the EIA, and similar arguments made by anti-MeBr MBTOC members that supported the EIA's position, were deemed `political' by pro-MeBr MBTOC members, thus demonstrating their skepticism of global scientific knowledge and the ability of GEG to resolve an issue that they believe is rooted in particular conditions and circumstances. For example, two US MBTOC members interviewed in 2005 at the 17th MOP spoke about how the MBTOC is composed of various people with disparate talents, some of which are less valuable, in their opinion, than others. They spoke about the fact that some MBTOC members from the EU had worked on the MLF-funded MeBr-alternative projects and that these members used these projects as evidence to support the rejection of the majority of CUE nominations. The US MBTOC members strongly opposed this position, and their (3)

EIA speaking at the 1st ExMOP to the Montreal Protocol, Montreal, 2004 (tape-recorded notes).


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opposition helped lead to the approval of US CUEs later that year (Gareau, 2008a, chapters 3 and 5). One of the US MBTOC members described the EU MBTOC members as `politically minded', as not understanding the `true' science of MeBr: ``Some [EU MBTOC members] push an agenda, but don't know anything about the science of the alternatives [to MeBr]. They might see the results of MLF projects and say that growers should make the transition [to alternatives], but they don't understand the local situation.'' The local situation refers to the conditions of production that exist in the US, where certain researches point out that the application of alternatives to MeBr would lead to loss of market share for US strawberry growers (see Carter et al, 2005; Gareau, 2008b). Although the registration of alternatives to MeBr might be a real barrier to their application, this was not the condition mentioned by pro-MeBr MBTOC members. The US skepticism about knowledge created in the global scientific realm echoed a similar skepticism over public policy analyses of CUEs using the tools of welfare economics. A study provided by the AETF, designed to inform the MBTOC on how to handle the assessment of private costs in the CUE requests, recommended the rejection of the US's nominations because they cost less than the cost of alternatives elsewhere (DeCanio and Norman, 2005). The US argued against this form of economic analysis on public costs because it did not reflect the CUE language for MeBr in terms of private costs (see DeCanio and Norman, 2005; DuPuis and Gareau, 2008). Additionally, the report noted that past experience with the CFC phase-out demonstrated that the MeBr phase-out would likely be much less costly than some US-based research predicted; economies of scale, learning by doing, and the likely emergence of advanced technologies would lessen the negative economic impact of the MeBr phase-out. However, the continuance of MeBr CUEs would serve not only to dampen research on MeBr alternatives (DeCanio and Norman, 2005; Norman, 2005; Norman et al, 2008) but also to set a standard in which any private costs created a need for exemptions. Since most regulatory interventions involve some private costs, the refusal to consider the public and environmental impacts of continued MeBr use in CUE discussions crippled the ability to justify any restrictions on continued use of MeBr. As DeCanio noted during his presentation of the AETF report at the 2003 23rd OEWG, the ``liberal granting of CUEs will have the effect of protecting MeBr suppliers and customers.'' However, according to these two US-based members of MBTOC, the application of global studies to the case of US growers was inappropriate: ``The [AETF] study was a mistake because it didn't take into account the local costs to growers; it only looked at the cost-benefit of spending on alternatives projects versus strawberry transition costs.'' For these MBTOC members, such a study bears no resemblance to the economic reality facing US growers. The costs and results of scientific projects in the global South and Europe were inconsequential to the local context of US growers. The factors that were relevant were the costs of labor and other local production costs, which are lower in other countries, ``so any lowering of yields can push out US growers. In the view of the Bush Administration, there can be no loss of competition to other growers, so yields cannot go down with the alternatives'', one member stated. Paradoxically, another issue that supports the market-based argument is that the US is subject to stringent environmental regulations. The MBTOC members spoke at length about the local problems with MeBr alternatives. Although considering the local environmental effects of alternatives is not in the purview of MBTOC, it is an issue that shapes the US position and that of (some) US-based MBTOC members. 1,3-Dichloropropene (trade name Telone II), for example, a registered alternative to MeBr patented by The Dow Chemical Company, contaminates local water sources, and its use is

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restricted in California townships due to air quality concerns (Carpenter et al, 2001). The MBTOC members relayed how Telone contaminated drinking water on Prince Edward Island, Canada, leading to the need for an emergency CUE to allow Canada to replace Telone with MeBr. The two MBTOC members think that their own scientific community and the parties to the protocol might be too concerned with phasing out every aspect of MeBr without thinking about the local impact of alternatives. With MeBr being the pesticide with the least harmful local effects, these MBTOC members believe it will also be hard to convince some MBTOC members of the feasibility of alternatives. It seems clear that these pro-MeBr MBTOC members make decisions and hold opinions reflective of the private, local interests of the strawberry industry. With county limits on MeBr alternatives in California (the country's largest strawberry producer), with alternatives producing locally based negative consequences, and with the potential loss of market share to competitors, these MeBr experts are unable to support a complete MeBr phase-out. Additionally, they mimic the ideologies of neoliberalism and skepticism of command-and-control regulation. Pro-MeBr MBTOC members pointed to the need for fair market conditions, and the need to draw from local private knowledge over public forms of knowledge that measure the `cost' impacts on public goods like the atmosphere or any scientific research about the feasibility of alternatives that is not specific to a particular locality. These experts sometimes have direct contact with growers in California, and they utilize certain data presented in specific scientific journals on the efficacy of alternatives to MeBr. For example, studies funded by the California Strawberry Commission are used to argue that, without MeBr, California will lose market share to imports from China (Carter et al, 2005). The comments made by the MBTOC members above indicate that a rift between public and private forms of governance is carried out in the arena of private versus public forms of knowledge. The pro-MeBr MBTOC members characterize scientific knowledge claims drawn from the global knowledge base as `political', while their own science reflects the realistic, `true' situation of private actors. To make their scientific claims they refer to projects funded by industry institutions, such as the California Strawberry Commission, to support their support of MeBr CUEs. Other MBTOC members, civil society groups, and delegations in opposition to large CUES criticize the private forms of scientific knowledge used to justify MeBr CUEs and argue for the legitimate consideration of knowledge created by more public, global economic and scientific analyses. The EU delegation and several anti-MeBr MBTOC members call attention to the Montreal Protocol's MLF-funded projects, whose results worldwide indicate that alternatives to MeBr are feasible, and the shift to MeBr-free production needs to be enforced as a result, despite any marginal market impact on specific growers and localities. Additionally, MBTOC members against CUEs draw from an alternative conceptualization of the MeBr issue, one that stresses the need for public protection and faith in GEG. While the opinions of the MBTOC members seem intimately tied to their political affiliations, more importantly the rift plays out in the styles of knowledge that characterize GEG politics today öthe privatization and localization of GEG. The CUE regulations give primacy to private over public governance and styles of knowledge, thereby stifling CUE opposition. There is significant pressure on the MBTOC from the US to provide recommendations that fit the political ideals that they now support: market-based (neoliberal) logic, skepticism of global knowledge, and lenient regulatory parameters informed by a localized and privatized approach to science [for a full account of these pressures, see Gareau (2008a)]. Such pressures appear to be increasingly frustrating for MBTOC members that support the results of global projects to eliminate MeBr and precautionary measures to limit ozone depletion.


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Conclusion Over the last thirty years GEG has increasingly converged with neoliberal economic norms. Since the 1972 Stockholm meeting, the primacy of governmental regulation of industry, command-and-control policies, confidence in and reliance on global scientific expertise and knowledge, precautionary principle solutions, and optimism about multilateral governance has been gradually supplanted by privatized governance and market-based strategies to resolve global environmental problems. The 1992 Rio Earth Summit exemplified the emergence of market-based approaches, the use of private and/or local knowledge, and the questioning of the precautionary principle. By the 2002 Johannesburg meeting, `the public' had been all but replaced by neoliberal strategies of environmental policy, accompanied by a private turn in environmental economics as a form of knowledge. Based largely on US support, private forms of environmental knowledge now supercede public governance as the dominant paradigm. While the 1987 Montreal Protocol had showed signs of being subject to industry pressures to forestall any restrictions on production, global public concerns over ozone depletion prevailed even before reaching scientific consensus on the anthropogenic effects of CFCs on the ozone layer. However, the MeBr case is distinct from other ODS phase-outs, where exemptions to the MeBr phase-out are based upon the projected economic impact of the alternatives to particular private actors as determined by those same actors, and the usage of private knowledge over that of global public knowledge. Pro-MeBr participants in CUE policy are correct in stating that MeBr is more difficult to replace by drop-in alternative chemicals than was the case for CFCs. However, the overall delegitimation of public knowledge means that there is no legitimate way to ask the question: which alternatives are feasible enough? This shift marks a departure from the public welfare regulatory structure from which the protocol obtained its early success. The inability to present analysis based on the costs to public global human and environmental health severely hobbles any further reductions in MeBr use and in general shows the inability of neoliberal governance to solve global environmental problems. The Kyoto Protocol, on the other hand, represents ``the most ambitious attempt to date to implement market and other economic mechanisms at the global level'' (Bernstein, 2002, page 118). On the basis of this study, however, the reliance on market-based approaches to Kyoto should give pause to policy makers and scholars alike. The MeBr case reveals how market-based approaches erase public environmental concerns in a global environmental treaty that succeeded due to the principles of global public cooperation. The MeBr case provides evidence of the harm that market-based approaches can cause when employed as the only legitimate form of governance, weakening levels of cooperation among nation-states, delegitimizing and fragmenting global scientific knowledge, and forestalling protection of the global environment. Particularly problematic is the current discussion of linking the Montreal and Kyoto protocols, which, whilst responding to recent assessments of the climate ^ ozone interface (IPCC, 2005), could serve to draw attention away from the deep-rooted problems that neoliberalization has caused both climate and recent ozone politics. Undermining the Kyoto Protocol by reorganizing the Montreal Protocol could move attention away from the negative impacts of market-based mechanisms of carbon reduction, such as the newly created markets of carbon offsets through the Kyoto Protocol Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects. Carbon trading has complicated implications for development in the global South, and for governments, firms, and environmental strategies in the North. In some cases, CDM projects have raised concerns about the potentially negative impacts that climate politics can have on

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existing development and environmental management strategies in the global South (Bumpus and Liverman, 2008). Similarly, the MeBr phase-out has raised concerns about the impact that the US's MeBr phase-out exemptions could have on terms of trade with countries in the South that, through Montreal Protocol support, have successfully phased out MeBr (Gareau, 2008a, chapter 4). Finally, given that the MeBr case is bogged down in politics and rifts in scientific knowledge, some analysts have proposed to circumvent this problem by accelerating the phase-out of other ODSs with higher global warming potential and that are less controversial than MeBr (Norman et al, 2008). While this may be the most efficient solution in economic terms, it is not the most practical. Countries in the global South and in the EU have made great efforts to reduce their dependency on MeBr, and they will not easily shift policies in order to yield to an intractable US. What is more, quarantine preshipment use of MeBr is not yet monitored by the Montreal Protocol, and this use is increasing, making resolution of the MeBr phase-out extremely important. What these issues largely reflect is not only the broader implications of the neoliberalization of environmental governance, but also the ability of the USöor other `veto states'öto exercise a disproportionate degree of influence in global governance. Much of the success of the CFC case was due to environmental ministries, scientists, civil society groups, and other forms of public pressure acting first, and forcing the White House to react. Can a new US administration redeem the idea of `the public' and can civil society learn a new form of politics in a `Fourth Way'? The MeBr case shows us that the challenges we face are more than atmospheric: to save the Earth we must create new ways to govern, and to know, ourselves. Acknowledgements. Special thanks to the four reviewers, and to Wally Goldfrank, Ronnie Lipschutz, Ben Crow, and Max Boykoff, who all provided excellent comments and suggestions for revisions on this paper. We also wish to thank the UCSC STEPS Institute for Innovation in Environmental Research, the UCSC Center for Agroecology and Sustainable Food Systems, the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, the UC Pacific Rim Research Program, and the UCSC Department of Sociology for their funding support. The usual disclaimers apply. References Andersen S O, Sarma K M, Taddonio K N, 2007 Technology Transfer for the Ozone Layer: Lessons for Climate Change (Earthscan, Sterling, VA) Bailey I, 2007, ``Neoliberalism, climate governance and the scalar politics of EU emissions trading'' Area 39 431 ^ 442 Bankobeza G M, 2005 Ozone Protection: The International Legal Regime (Eleven, Utrecht) Banks J, 1998, ``Methyl bromide technical options committee'', in Protecting the Ozone Layer: Lessons, Models and Prospects Eds P G LePretre, J D Reid, J E T Morehouse (Kluwer, Boston, MA) pp 167 ^ 172 Barrett S, 2003 Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-making (Oxford University Press, Oxford) Benedick R E, 1991, ``The diplomacy of climate change: lessons from the Montreal Ozone Protocol'' Energy Policy 19 94 ^ 97 Benedick R E, 1998 Ozone Diplomacy: New Directions in Safeguarding the Planet enlarged edition (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA) Bernstein S, 2002 The Compromise of Liberal Environmentalism (Columbia University Press, New York) Bhaskar C U, Santhanam K, Sinah U K, Meenai T, 2005 United Nations: Multilateralism and International Security (Shipra Publications, Delhi) Brown L, 1992, ``Time is running out on the planet'' Earth Summit Times 2 June, page 13 Bumpus A, Liverman D, 2008, `Àccumulation by decarbonization and the governance of carbon offsets'' Economic Geography 84 127 ^ 155 Canan P, Reichman N, 2002 Ozone Connections: Expert Networks in Global Environmental Governance (Greenleaf, Sheffield) Carpenter J, Lynch L, Trout T, 2001, ``Township limits on 1,3-D will impact adjustment to methyl bromide phase-out'' California Agriculture 55 12 ^ 18


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