Hegemony or survival - IngentaConnect

Hegemony or Survival South Africa’s Soft Power and the Challenge of Xenophobia Oluwaseun Tella

Faculty Member, College of Humanities, School of Social Science, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa

Olusola Ogunnubi

Postdoctoral Research fellow, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Zululand, South Africa

Abstract The literature on South African politics makes widespread reference to the culture of xenophobia. There is also a small but growing body of literature on South Africa’s soft power currencies. However, no study has attempted to comprehensively examine the nexus between South Africa’s soft power and its culture of xenophobia. Thus, the major question this study seeks to address is: what impact does South Africa’s prevailing culture of xenophobia have on its soft power and, ultimately, its regional hegemonic credentials? This article explores this lacuna through the lenses of hegemonic stability and scapegoating theories. The study used both primary sources (interviews and focus group discussions) and secondary sources to solicit dependable data on the subject matter. It found that South Africa’s pervasive xenophobic posture has the tendency to erode the efficacy of its rising soft power as well as to constrain its capacity to play a hegemonic role within Africa. South Africa has the potential to achieve regional hegemony in Africa, but in order to do so it must address phenomena such as xenophobia, which imposes severe limitations on its credibility and legitimacy. The article concludes that consciously framed policies as well as constructive and positive media reporting are required to mitigate the possibly devastating effects of xenophobia on South Africa’s soft power within its region and globally. Keywords: hegemony, regional hegemony, foreigners, soft power, South Africa, xenophobia

© Africa Institute of South Africa

Africa Insight   Vol 44(3) – December 2014

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Hegemony or survival | Oluwaseun Tella and Olusola Ogunnubi

Introduction The moral imperative to redeem South Africa’s regional position and international image after the damage it suffered during the apartheid era provided a platform for the country to exhibit its soft power resources in pursuit of its interests in Africa and the global arena. Soft power resources based on the power of attraction, rather than the traditional hard power currencies of economic and military capabilities, have been significant in South Africa’s successful attempt to elevate its capacity and, by implication, its international profile in pursuit of regional hegemony.1 Armed with this historic awareness, South Africa has portrayed itself as a regional and middle power and effectively exercised leadership roles on behalf of the continent.2 Its membership of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) and the Group of 20 (G20) provides a geographical representation of Africa in these institutions. Since the end of apartheid and the dawn of democratic rule in 1994, South Africa has become a nesting place for African immigrants that include not only skilled professionals and international students, but also economic migrants and refugees trying to escape from conflict areas within the continent.3 This growing influx of African immigrants into South Africa has changed the perceptions of South Africans towards the rest of Africa, with derogatory terms such as ‘Makwerekwere’ being used to refer to black African immigrants. The general perception is that this category of foreigners consists of ‘castaways’ – poor people who have nothing good to offer South Africa.4 South Africa hosts a large chunk of over 14 million immigrants originating from sub-Saharan Africa.5 The sources of South Africa’s soft power include, among others, the influence of charismatic leaders like Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki; the country’s peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts in Africa; its progressive constitution (which emphasises democracy and human rights); and the hosting of major international events.6 While soft power serves as a pull factor that enhances South Africa’s capacity to promote its interests in African countries, it also attracts those citizens of these countries in search of either greener pastures or enrolment in South African educational institutions. However, since 1994 there have been endless reports of South Africans’ intolerance and antagonism towards foreigners, particularly those from other African countries. The January 2015 looting of shops owned by foreign nationals in Soweto as well as more recent incidents of this nature are a clear reminder that xenophobia is still rife within the South African society.7 These xenophobic attacks are a stark reminder of the reality of the country’s increasing intolerance towards foreign nationals residing in the country. While the South African Police Service (SAPS) is keen to dismiss such incidents as mere criminal acts and not xenophobic attacks, the fact remains that it is foreign nationals who are being specifically targeted. The pervasive nature of xenophobia8 in South Africa cannot be overemphasised. Some government officials, the media and the general public implicitly and explicitly show xenophobic attitudes to African foreigners. This motivates the need for a fundamental inquiry – worthy of academic exercise – into the impact of xenophobia on South Africa’s image as a rainbow nation and a bastion of human rights. Using a purposive sampling method, this article draws insights from a survey administered to both South Africans and African immigrants. Dependable data was obtained through personal in-depth interviews as well as one focus group discussion in Pietermaritzburg.9 These survey instruments provided useful assessments regarding the perceptions that South Africans

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have of African immigrants as well as the possible implications this has for the country’s image, and hence its soft power, in general. This is nuanced with selected theoretical frameworks that offer pragmatic analyses of the connections between xenophobia, soft power and hegemony with reference to South Africa. The article consists of five main sections. First, we provide the theoretical foundations that support the arguments presented in the article. The second section provides a brief overview of the concept of soft power by identifying the basic elements and manifestations of the concept while further drawing inferences from soft power features as manifested in relation to South Africa. Next, we consider the extent of xenophobia in South Africa, particularly in the post-apartheid dispensation. Fourth, we critically examine how xenophobia imposes additional costs on South Africa’s soft power strategies. The final section summarises, draws conclusions and advances suggestions regarding how South Africa can maximise the gains of its soft power attributes by addressing its xenophobic tendencies.

Theoretical frameworks Hegemonic stability theory One of the most celebrated works on hegemony is Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci’s series titled Prison Notebooks.10 Gramsci observes that ‘the concept of hegemony […] means political leadership based on the consent of the led, a consent which is secured by the diffusion and popularization of the worldview of the ruling class’.11 Therefore, as Gramsci contends, ‘hegemony implies the ability of the hegemon to let subordinates believe that power rests upon the consensus of the majority’12. A hegemon can be endorsed (similar to Gramsci’s consent) because it offers certain goods and services that benefit less powerful states.13 On the other hand, Nye viewed hegemony as being able to dictate, or at least dominate, the rules and arrangements in terms of which international politics and economics are conducted.14 Spurred by their military and economic superiority, hegemons are in most cases able to control natural resources, markets and capital and have the technological advantage as well as prestige and moral supremacy. However, the predominance of power does not necessarily imply simultaneous superiority (or control) with respect to both military and nonmilitary resources.15 Therefore, to suggest that a preponderant power must necessarily be animated with moral credentials is a stretch of the imagination, since this only occurs when the hegemon’s control is based on authority or influence rather than fear. This is often represented as the nonmaterial bases (ideology and norm) referred to as ideational value by some scholars.16 As Gilpin argues, the hegemon is thus strategically positioned to promote and inspire sets of principles, ideas and values that authenticate its status as a dominant power.17 The theory of hegemonic stability was originally formulated by Charles Kindleberger, who applied this term to the rise and fall of America’s influence in international affairs.18 He argued that since states are rational egoists seeking to maximise their own interests and welfare as defined in material terms, there is a need for a single leader to provide the public good of international stability. In essence, international economic stability is only possible where there is a clearly identified preponderant power or state in terms of material capabilities; by implication, the stability of the



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international system rests on a single dominant state that is able to articulate and enforce the rules of interaction among the most important members of the system. While hegemonic stability theory was originally conceived to explain global great-power behaviour and may not explicitly capture regional power relations, this study extrapolates and applies its basic assumptions in its analysis of hegemonic order in Africa. This theory is evaluated in terms of its coherence and consistency, parsimony and explanatory power to capture South Africa’s regional power realities in the African region. In recent times, South Africa has been referred to and celebrated as Africa’s hegemon,19 particularly since the end of decades of apartheid rule, and many scholars have suggested that it might hold the key to unlocking Africa’s economic wealth and political recovery.20 There is no doubt that Africa needs a regional hegemon capable of addressing the endemic political, economic and security issues bedevilling the continent.21 This would restore international respect for the continent. In line with the argument that African states must take responsibility for their own development, regional hegemonic powers have the potential to promote hegemonic order and hence stability within the region where they are located. It is generally understood that a regional hegemon or power is not necessarily defined by its potential for hard and soft power but, more importantly, by its capacity and effectiveness in mobilising these power coefficients either for its own material benefit (the national interest) or for the general advantage of the whole (Africa) in the provision of public goods both in the short and long terms. The leadership role that regional powers play is therefore connected to their superior military and/or economic capabilities as well as their ideational strength vis-à-vis other states within the region. As Flemes and Wojczewski assert, ‘[b]oth material and ideational resources have to be taken into account in order to assess whether the regional power possesses the necessary resources to make a difference in regional and international bargains’.22 Scholars have described South Africa’s roles in Africa at various times as that of hegemon, leader, pivot and behemoth.23 South Africa undoubtedly enjoys international recognition as a regional leader. It shares this recognition with Nigeria, the country that overtook South Africa overnight as the largest economy in Africa. Both countries thus have to shoulder with the responsibility of helping Africa ‘to chart its own alternative developmental course’.24 By extrapolating the prescriptions of hegemonic stability theory at the regional level of analysis, with particular application to South Africa, the theory offers useful insights not only into the hard power capabilities of South Africa but, more importantly, about the depth of its ideational resources – required to attain international legitimacy and acceptance of its regional hegemonic status. The theory further helps to map the contexts of the conditions under which regional hegemonic status is established and to see whether South Africa fulfils the requirements espoused by the theory. In other words, what moral credentials or ideational value does South Africa possess to be recognised as a regional hegemonic power? And do incidents such as xenophobia invoke limitations on South Africa’s hegemonic claim?

Scapegoat theory The historical heritage of the scapegoat theory can be traced to Freud’s ego-defensive mechanism, which he labelled displacement. Displacement refers to an individual’s tendency to shift their

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aggression to another target when the original target is inaccessible or threatening. For instance, a child beaten by their parent may transfer the aggression to their younger siblings. Hanson contends that ‘scapegoat creation is a direct implication of this mechanism; the person or group shouldered with blame is weaker or less threatening than the actual cause’.25 In other words, the scapegoat theory emphasises that a vulnerable target group is usually blamed by a wider and more powerful group for societal misfortune or challenges. The theory posits that in the event of economic and political instability, high perceptions of threats and ultimately aggression would follow.26 The victims of the aggression are often minority or vulnerable groups who may not be responsible for the predicament. Gibson and Howard assert that ‘[f]inding a scapegoat when times go bad is often a task of utmost importance, for political leaders and ordinary citizens alike’.27 The Jews are perhaps one of the groups most often used as a scapegoat. Not only were they blamed for the economic difficulties in Germany in the 1930s, triggering the holocaust perpetrated by Adolf Hitler; but, as Gibson and Howard argue, the Jews have been blamed for Russian crises since time immemorial.28 During the apartheid regime, the majority of South Africans blamed their economic deprivation and misfortune on the apartheid administration and consequently directed their aggression at white minority rule. The end of apartheid and the dawn of democracy promised better conditions, more rights and generally improved welfare for the black South African population and citizens had high hopes and expectations. However, two decades into democracy, the black majority’s aspirations and expectations have not yet been fulfilled; hence the need to find an outlet for their aggression. Vulnerable black African foreigners have thus become easy targets. Black Africans are seen to be invading South Africa and this explains why terms such as ‘flood’ and ‘descend’ are being employed as buzzwords by the South African media to describe the migration of African foreigners into South Africa.29 Black African foreigners are seen as enterprising and are often willing to accept lower wages than local people from employers of labour. This is perceived to diminish the job opportunities available for local people. Black South Africans blame foreigners for their misfortunes and economic hardship, including unemployment, limited infrastructure and the spread of diseases such as HIV and tuberculosis. This aggression reached a peak with the 2008 xenophobic violence in the country and has since continued to flare up sporadically.

Making sense of the ‘second face of power’ In the past two decades, international relations scholars have advanced and developed the concept of a new dimension of power that is uniquely different from the traditional conception of (hard) power, consisting as it does of military capability and economic strength. This new type of power, popularly referred to as ‘soft power’, was defined by US political scientist Joseph Nye as the ‘ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payment’.30 Nye drew the attention of states, scholars and foreign policy practitioners away from the traditional elements of power – which emphasised military might, economic strength and population figures – to more subtle elements of power in the international system. As Nye suggests, modern-day states want other states to not only fear them but to love them as well. Soft power is a means of power that utilises



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strategies such as diplomacy, culture and history. It refers to anything essentially antonymous to hard power. Nye suggests that the pivotal goal of soft power is the ability to shape others’ preferences.31 It is a state’s capacity to influence others through persuasion and attraction instead of through coercion; or ‘the ability to entice and attract’ others without having to deploy hard power threats because ‘if I can get you to want to do what I want, then I do not have to force you to do what you do not want to do’.32 States mobilise this non-physical, abstract, subjective and often intangible type of power in three dimensions, identified by Nye as culture (in places where it is attractive to others), political values (when they live up to global expectations) and foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)33 (see Table 1). Table 1: Dimensions of soft power Attractive culture Popular culture in literature, art, music, entertainment, education, tourism and hospitality, media, indigenous products, etc.; hosting media-attracting events; global sports competitions; iconic universities; religious preference; education, etc.

Political values (ideology) Liberal democratic ideals; international global reputation, constitutionalism; political goodwill and international status of political leaders; transition process and national struggle history; domestic policies; constitutionally enshrined values of human rights, equality of all people, etc.

Foreign policies (diplomacy) Immigration; peace diplomacy (peace keeping and peace making); environmental technology; influx of multinational corporations; poverty alleviation; bilateral and multilateral treaties; rule-based multilateralism; good neighbourliness; norm entrepreneur; provision of public goods; post-conflict reconstruction; foreign aid; debt relief; amnesty, etc. Source: Ogunnubi (2013)

Since Nye, several other scholars have advanced their own explanations of soft power. For example, Gill and Huang describe it as a ‘directing, attracting and imitating force derived mainly from intangible resources such as national cohesion, culture, ideology and influence on international institutions’.34 Soft power is accordingly deployed when nations are inspired by certain values and the civilisation of another nation to the point that they are driven to imbibe such standards.35 Power therefore lies in the capacity to influence a state’s behaviour in a way that it would otherwise not have acted in order to obtain an intended outcome. By implication, powerful states can affect the behaviour of others by either coercion (with threats) and inducement (with payments) or by attraction and co-option (with attraction of ideas).36 Soft power hinges on a state’s capacity to shape the preferences of others and in simple terms involves getting others to willingly choose your own preference through co-option rather than coercion.37 It therefore requires that the state is able to determine and shape actors’ agendas and preferences with the ultimate objective of making others realise the advantages of cooperation as opposed to confrontation, thus reducing the need to mobilise hard power and avoiding the cost of such mobilisation.38 Culture in this sense consists of the values, norms and practices that give meaning to a society through its literature, art, music, entertainment, tourism and hospitality, popular media,

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indigenous products, etc. These represent the accomplishments, values and standards of a people as they ‘symbolize a greater society built on personal freedom’.39 On the other hand, political values are values and ideals such as respect for fundamental human rights, freedom of the press and popular participation in government. These have the capacity to inspire confidence and attract others.40 Thirdly, well-designed foreign policies are also an important aspect of a country’s soft power as it is able to use its foreign policy to set international moral standards for all to emulate. Honghua argues that five fundamental elements constitute soft power: culture, ideas, a development model, international institutions and an international image.41 Soft power may therefore include: thoughts, ideas and principles, that may be advocated by the state, and that may also be accepted and identified by people [or] institutions, especially those that are engaged in the building of international regimes, but not confined to that because domestic institutions could be relevant as well [and] strategies and policies, that are apparently established and implemented by the state.42

Chiroro, again, classifies soft power in terms of international sources (foreign policy and actions) and domestic sources (domestic policies and actions).43 The 2012 rapid-growth markets (RGM) soft power index proposes 13 variables that quantitatively measure a nation’s soft power capabilities, organised into three major categories.44 These are global integrity (freedom index, voter turnout, rule of law and CO2 emissions); global integration (immigration, tourism, English fluency and university ranking) and global image (Time 100, media exports, most admired companies, Olympics and language enrolments). While global image is measured as a country’s global popularity and admiration with particular reference to its culture, global integrity is calculated based on how much a country adheres to international ethics and moral codes. Global integration gauges the interconnectivity of a country with the rest of the world.45 To project these forms of power, states can use a number of ‘attraction’ tools – what Nye termed ‘assets that produce such attraction’ – as a means to achieve certain strategic external objectives.46 In essence, soft (or ideational) power is centrerd on ‘resources such as the culture of a nation; its norms and values; and its foreign policy, which reflects these’.47 These resources may include movies, consumer products, the educational system, humanitarian aid, development assistance and bilateral or multi-lateral relations, as well as public diplomacy programmes such as broadcasting, cultural exports and exchange programmes.48 States thus need to creatively find a means of converting these soft power resources into political advantage and influence. According to Chiroro, ‘[a] positive image in world affairs that endears a nation to other nations generates respect and admiration, which in turn renders nations that have soft power more endearing to the eyes of other nations’.49 In the following section, we apply the basic manifestations of soft power to the realities of South Africa.

South Africa’s soft power characteristics While the analysis of and debate on South Africa’s power focus almost entirely on economic and military aspects, a reasonable account of the country’s power portfolio would be incomplete



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without an estimation of its soft power capabilities. This is because one of the major requirements for regional power status is the location, presence and deployment of a state’s sources of soft power. This may vary from culture, political ideology and diplomacy to sporting achievements, foreign policy, tourism, media, language, etc. An account of South Africa’s soft power status is therefore necessary, notwithstanding the fact that hardly any literature exists on the country’s soft power assortment. That there is little discussion on South Africa’s soft power potential does not imply that it does not exist. In investigating the abovementioned soft power context as it may apply in South Africa, one pertinent question that may be asked is whether this country indeed possesses any meaningful soft power attributes or capacity that it could wield on an international scale to attract certain strategic gains. While it is possible to infer that South Africa indeed has incredible soft power potential, it may prove difficult to locate the effective, calculated and empirically measurable translation of this potential into actual influence or strategic advantage for the country. But interestingly, South Africa’s soft power potential may be far greater than its hard power assets. Indeed, South Africa’s soft power has grown remarkably as measured by Pretoria’s official diplomatic calculations and strategy. It is therefore imperative for the country to begin to deliberately find the means to enhance and optimise its soft power profile, particularly within the continent, in order to maximise its comparative advantage and advance its global reputation while equally attracting the necessary accruable benefits. South Africa is therefore capable of achieving more and gaining more influence through mobilising soft power, which in any case is often less expensive and controversial than fronting its external strategy. South Africa was ranked seventh in the 2005 to 2010 soft power index of the economies of the top 20 EM/RGMs and has been the only African country to feature on the list since 2005 (see Table 2 below). Table 2: Emerging Markets Soft Power Index Rank

Country

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

1

China

31,1

32,2

32,2

32,2

33,7

30,7

2

India

22,6

21,5

21,9

26,7

22,6

20,4

3

Russia

22,9

18,4

22,9

21,0

23,5

18,0

4

Brazil

5,9

6,0

9,3

12,7

9,7

13,8

5

Turkey

10,3

12,5

11,4

14,4

10,3

12,9

6

Mexico

10,0

11,8

11,8

17,1

19,3

11,5

7

South Africa

13,0

10,0

8,5

12,6

11,8

10,3

8

Hungary

12,2

11,1

7,4

9,2

9,2

10,0

9

Czech Republic

8,5

9,2

9,2

9,2

10,7

9,6

10

Slovakia

7,0

7,4

6,6

6,6

7,0

9,2

Source: RGM Soft Power Index (2012)

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Similarly, as Table 3 shows, South Africa is ranked fourteenth in the 2012 RGM global soft power index.50 Table 3: RGM Global Soft Power Index Rank 1

Country US

2005 84,0

2006

2007

2008

85,5

86,3

88,1

2009 87,0

2010 87,0

2

France

49,7

48,4

50,3

49,6

49,6

49,5

2

Germany

44,0

46,6

46,6

45,8

44,0

43,2

4

UK

46,0

45,9

46,3

46,0

46,7

43,0

5

Canada

36,0

39,4

38,6

36,8

35,3

39,0

6

Italy

33,0

34,6

33,9

34,6

34,2

32,0

7

Japan

36,9

36,5

35,5

34,7

32,5

31,8

8

China

31,1

32,2

32,2

32,2

33,7

30,7

9

India

22,6

21,5

21,9

26,7

22,6

20,4

10

Russia

22,9

18,4

22,9

21,0

23,5

18,0

11

Brazil

5,9

6,0

9,3

12,7

9,7

13,8

12

Turkey

10,3

12,5

11,4

14,4

10,3

12,9

13

Mexico

10,0

11,8

11,8

17,1

19,3

11,5

14

South Africa

13,0

10,0

8,5

12,6

11,8

10,3

Source: RGM Soft Power Index (2012)

In terms of our account, South Africa’s soft power potential would include its media exports, political freedom, its constitutionally enshrined rule of law and Bill of Rights, its vast array of iconic powers and political goodwill, multinational companies, prestigious universities, cultural exports, sporting attractions, and hospitality, among many others. Significantly, the RGM report notes, ‘Nelson Mandela’s iconic influence has contributed to South Africa’s soft power’.51 Without mincing any words, South Africa can clearly be seen as a soft power state with the soft power attributes to avoid the use of coercion and force in ensuring that the attractiveness of its own ideas and preferences is reflected in the choices of other states, particularly within Africa. It can do this ‘by taking cognizance of its racial past; the richness of its diverse culture; the contradictions in socio-economic development; the fight against poverty and inequalities; and adherence to constitutionalism and the rule of law in setting the agenda and ensuring that the multilateral system can implement policies that are people-centred’.52 According to Chiroro, South Africa can confidently assert its geopolitical influence by exercising its ‘values, culture, policies and institutions and use these effectively in attracting other nations to want what South Africa desires for its people; this is the ultimate display of soft power’.53 In this way, it is able to gain acceptance and voluntary compliance without any force being needed. If South Africa is unable to augment its soft power in the coming years, its influence in Africa will



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undoubtedly dwindle. This is particularly true given its declining economy and the inexperience of its military force in peace missions.

Xenophobia in South Africa It is common knowledge that South Africans enjoy one of the most progressive constitutions in the world. The constitution guarantees the rights of both citizen and non-citizen residents in the country. It forbids discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion or linguistic background. Ironically though, many South Africans are intolerant of foreigners, especially black African foreigners. The intensity of this intolerance has led many scholars to assert that South Africa has a culture of xenophobia. These antagonistic attitudes are not limited to the country’s citizens; some government officials, various government departments, a number of politicians and the press have perpetuated xenophobic behaviour. Sharing her personal experience, a British scholar (an employee of one of the top universities in South Africa) asserted that the presence of xenophobia in South Africa is not limited to uneducated communities; it exists within both educated and uneducated communities. It particularly emerges when there is competition for limited resources. The same dynamics come into play, whether among informal traders or university staff.54 Noting the ubiquitous nature of South Africa’s xenophobia, Human Rights Watch observes: In general, South Africa’s public culture has become increasingly xenophobic, and politicians often make unsubstantiated and inflammatory statements that the ‘deluge’ of migrants is responsible for the current crime wave, rising unemployment, or even the spread of diseases. As the unfounded perception that migrants are responsible for a variety of social ills grows, migrants have increasingly become the target of abuse at the hands of South African citizens as well as members of the police, the army, and the Department of Home Affairs.55

The leadership of the African National Congress (ANC) had hoped to show gratitude to African countries for their contributions to ending the apartheid regime, as is evident in post-apartheid South Africa’s progressive constitution, which recognises the rights of immigrants and refugees in accordance with international standards. However, the ANC did not foresee a burgeoning migration from other African countries into the newly democratic South Africa.56 Crush observes that since the dawn of democracy, successive South African governments have been hostile to foreigners, ostensibly to counteract the threat to the limited jobs available to citizens, which foreigners compete for.57 Legal immigration has plummeted and it is a herculean task to obtain a temporary residence permit. Anti-immigration sentiments are rife, even among top government officials. Only a few government officials are sympathetic to the plight of foreigners. Some politicians even make public derogatory statements about immigrants. For instance, former Home Affairs Minister Mangosuthu Buthelezi once stated that ‘all Nigerian immigrants are criminals and drug traffickers’.58 Undoubtedly, the South African government is frustrated by its inability to make inroads into socio-economic problems such as income inequality, relative and absolute poverty, and, most importantly, rising unemployment, particularly among its black citizens. This has created an

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environment where foreigners are seen as a threat to those competing for limited resources such as employment, housing and other social welfare. In a country where nearly half of the citizens live below the poverty line, it could be said that such frustration fits the context.59 Officials from the Department of Home Affairs also exhibit a high degree of xenophobia. These officials are so powerful that even those in the lower ranks can determine the fate of foreigners by, for instance, deliberately delaying the movement of files or carelessly misplacing the documents of foreigners.60 Crush observes that, over a period of five years, foreigners won almost all cases against the Department of Foreign Affairs and judges have often rebuked the Department for not observing due process and the rule of law in the conduct of their duties towards foreigners.61 A white British scholar asserted that over the years the Department of Home Affairs has treated her differently from black African foreigners; the latter are subjected to unnecessary delays and do not dare complain because they fear their files may ‘go missing’. In other words, even though all immigrants in South Africa legally have the same rights, in reality black African foreigners have fewer rights.62 A Congolese doctor who was frustrated at the Department of Home Affairs’ treatment of his visa renewal lamented: ‘This is why doctors are leaving here for Australia, Canada and the United States. Sometime soon you will not find foreign doctors here because of your harsh treatment of foreigners’.63 It is worth noting that South Africa relies heavily on the expertise of foreign doctors, as there are not enough qualified doctors to serve the country’s needs. The SAPS has shown reluctance to rescue and assist foreigners when they are attacked by criminals; instead, they raid and beat the foreigners.64 Neocosmos observes that there is substantial evidence that official agents of social control such as the police, immigration officials and other officers of government play active roles in instigating xenophobic violence by motivating locals to ‘uproot or round up illegal immigrants’.65 The actions of these agents play a significant role in the construction and propagation of a deviant label for African immigrants. What this means is that in the South African context, black African immigrants are socially constructed as deviants by the official agents of social control. The South African media also plays a significant role in imposing negative stereotypes on foreigners, thus endorsing xenophobia among the Rainbow Nation. The most common stereotypes used to portray foreigners are those of criminals and illegals that steal jobs.66 These stereotypes are partly a consequence of South Africans’ frustration with the country’s high rate of unemployment. Foreigners therefore become scapegoats for South Africans’ misfortune. Media reports have suggested that the country’s unemployment problems can only be mitigated by stricter migration policies, coupled with the abolition of work permits and the withdrawal of those already issued.67 When a non-South African is convicted, the media hastens to mention the nationality of the individual, such as ‘Nigerian drug lord’ or ‘Somalian drug mule’.68 The government and the media play a pivotal role in shaping public opinion. It is clear that the South African government and media have painted a negative image of foreigners in the minds of the public.69 It is therefore not surprising that South African citizens exhibit highly xenophobic tendencies. They generally believe that too many foreigners, particularly black foreigners, are allowed entry into the country and that they steal jobs and are criminals and drug dealers. ‘Foreigners are stealing our jobs’ is a common statement among poor, black South Africans. They often call black foreigners ‘Makwerekwere’. While the literal meaning of the word relates to the incomprehensible languages spoken by black foreigners, it has metamorphosed into a derogatory word to describe



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black foreigners. It is also a common experience for foreigners who speak English to Zulu-speaking South Africans, particularly those who are poor, to be told: ‘I do not understand English; if you cannot speak Zulu, you should go back to your own country’. In one incident, a Congolese man was attacked. He cried for help, but no one came to his rescue. After the criminal had left, he was told by passers-by: ‘Because you are crying in English, we didn’t help you. If you are crying in Zulu, we will help you’. When he reported the incident to the police, he was told, ‘You are not our brother, we can’t help you’.70 In a similar vein, a Congolese interviewee remarked: At first, when you meet a South African black man, after the greeting when we start talking the first question they will ask you is, ‘Where are you from?’ The second one, ‘Why did you come here?’ The third one, ‘When are you going back to your place?’ You know, in my country I’ve studied with a lot of foreigners from all over, but we never ask them those questions. They’re stupid, insulting questions.71

The most common conceptualisation of xenophobia is dislike or fear of foreigners. However, South Africans’ antagonism towards foreigners goes beyond mere fear or dislike, and occasionally engenders violent attacks. An example is the May 2008 xenophobic violence, which began in Johannesburg and then spread like wildfire to other cities like Pretoria and Cape Town. Both foreigners and South Africans lost their lives. Valuable properties were destroyed. One would have expected the South African government to take bold and decisive action to prevent the escalation of the violence, but it did not show much political will to arrest the situation. Instead, government action was ‘disorganized and lacking in leadership’.72 Similarly, the 2015 xenophobic violence started in Durban and spread into other cities such as Pietermaritzburg and Johannesburg. This also caused the loss of lives (both foreigners and South Africans) and the destruction of properties, mainly foreign-owned shops. However, the South African government appears to have acted decisively to put an end to the violence. This is perhaps a direct result of the global condemnation of the attacks and the perceived attendant diplomatic hostility that other countries might show towards South Africa.

South Africa’s soft power and the contradiction of Xenophobia As explained earlier, a major source of South Africa’s soft power is its political values, which include, among others, its liberal democracy, human rights culture and progressive constitution. However, the country’s xenophobic culture and the sometimes attendant violence has tarnished its global image as a champion of democracy and human rights and has consequently reduced the efficacy of its soft power currencies in Africa. Jaynes succinctly expressed the mood of the nation after the 2008 xenophobic violence thus: In its wake, some have called it the death of the Rainbow Nation; others have more cautiously suggested that this is a timely reprimand to a nation that has strayed from its accomplishments of the early nineties. Most do, however, agree that it has shattered any pretence, which many South Africans have still harboured, about our exceptionality as a moral beacon of the world.73

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The Citizenship Rights in Africa Initiative (CRAI) concludes that, while a large number of African asylum seekers still regard South Africa as a preferred country of destination, few have any sense of belonging to the Rainbow Nation and these people are therefore seeking repatriation to another country.74 This suggests that Pretoria’s power of attraction (soft power) has been dented by xenophobia. Undoubtedly, the attitude of South Africa’s state officials as well as the conduct of its people towards immigrants from other African countries in particular, as well as towards those from other developing states, such as Bangladesh and Pakistan, have significantly tarnished the positive image that the country has built for itself over the years.75 According to a university academic, the general feeling among foreigners is fear – fear of not knowing whether you will be attacked by virtue of being a foreigner the following day; fear that you will be treated as though you were not a human being but a virus that must be avoided at all costs. The other feeling, particularly among West, Central and East African foreigners, is that of betrayal. During the struggle against apartheid, many South Africans sought refuge in countries like Malawi, Uganda and Zimbabwe. Many other countries contributed in one way or another to the struggle. Now that the struggle is over, they feel that they are not appreciated.76 Against this background, foreigners are beginning to think of leaving South Africa and they usually have a sense of temporariness while living in the country.77 The hostile environment has also engendered ‘a sense of nationhood’ among foreigners. Some foreign nationals, especially Nigerians and Congolese, have forged a solid social cohesion in response to antagonism on the part of the locals and are thus unwilling to assimilate South African cultural values.78 It is clear, for instance, that Zulu-speaking people stick together and foreigners stick together. While they sometimes interact, the former resent the latter, because they feel that they are taking their jobs.79 Some foreigners find it difficult to associate with South Africans because they perceive them as belonging to close social groups that are not easy to penetrate and therefore do not get along with them.80 This incessant hostility has caused foreigners to conclude that black South Africans are inferior to them.81 It is common for foreigners to label South African men as lazy, adulterous, violent and drunkards.82 A South African doctoral student recounts how the way South Africans relate with other black Africans does not make her feel proud of being a South African, because South Africa is also an African country. She further asserts that there is an element of jealousy because foreign nationals are perceived to do better in academics and jobs. Therefore, South Africans look for a weak spot – which is foreign nationality. South Africa has ‘a culture of give me, I deserve it without working for it’.83 Similarly, an Indian South African builder stated that whereas the black foreigners are diligent, Zulu men are very lazy. He added that local workers sometimes tell foreigners not to work so hard. In his opinion, Zulu men are generally lazy and, if they are not supervised, they take long breaks. Asked whether he would prefer to recruit foreigners rather than black South Africans, his response was ‘definitely’. These kinds of attitudes not only reinforce xenophobia among black South Africans but strengthen the assumption that black South Africans are generally lazy and expect virtually everything from the government. While this assumption appears contestable, it is worth noting that South Africa is a welfare state and many black South Africans rely heavily on social grants. As outlined by Nye, a nation’s culture is another major source of soft power.84 The intolerant culture in South Africa has impacted on its identity at the global level; this was evident in the



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enormous difficulties South Africa encountered in its attempts to have Dr Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma elected as the Chairperson of the African Union Commission.85 It is difficult to establish a direct link between the election and xenophobia, particularly because what apparently played out was power politics among the SADC countries, who wanted the position filled by Zuma, and the West African countries, who wanted the incumbent, Jean Ping, to remain in the position. However, the impact of South Africa’s xenophobic culture cannot be completely disregarded. For example, Nigeria, which overtly opposed South Africa’s candidacy, had experienced what it regarded as xenophobic attitudes a couple of months before the election, when South Africa deported 125 Nigerians ostensibly over their possession of fake travel documents (Yellow Fever cards). In his attempt to justify the implementation of the e-Toll system on some roads in Gauteng at an ANC Forum held at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg on 21 October 2013, the following statement was made by South African President Jacob Zuma: ‘We cannot think like Africans in Africa. This is Johannesburg. It is not some national road in Malawi’.86 This arrogant display of exceptionalism by South Africa in relation to its position on the African continent appears to be popular among South Africans. Thus, one could argue that President Zuma was merely expressing many South Africans’ perceptions of other African countries. Such comments do not portray South Africa in a positive light among other African countries. This should be of particular concern to a country that is seeking a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council and is counting on support from other African countries. A continental power that lays claim to regional hegemony ought to be tolerant and friendly towards foreigners within the continent, but unfortunately this is not the case with South Africa.87 It is therefore clear that xenophobia has eroded South Africa’s soft power efficacy to a considerable extent, as illustrated by the downward trend in its ranking in the various surveys that measure states’ soft power. For instance, Table 1 reveals that in the RGM soft power index, South Africa’s score plummeted from 13,0 to 10,3 between 2005 and 2010. Similarly, in the Country Brand Index prepared by Future Brand (2013), South Africa ranked thirty-first, thirty-fifth and forty-third in 2010, 2011 and 2012 respectively.88 Mauritius, a small country with no significant power in the African region in comparison to South Africa, was ranked twenty-first, twenty-second and twentieth in 2010, 2011 and 2012 respectively. These are clear indications of contradictions in terms of South Africa’s soft power as a result of the increasing culture of xenophobia, among other factors. Paradoxically, while South Africa claims that its future is inextricably tied to that of the rest of the African continent and that it has a major role to play in the stability and development of the continent, it seems to allow sporadic incidences of xenophobia to tarnish and call into question South Africa’s ‘African-ness’, reinforced by negative perceptions and stereotyping by South Africans of Africans in general.89 As le Pere pointed out, South Africa’s noble goals in Africa and further afield as well as the celebratory legacy of its transition have been severely compromised and undermined by the treatment of the many foreigners, migrants, and refugees from Africa and other developing countries such as Pakistan and Bangladesh who have come to the country in search of a better life and improved economic prospects.90

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Arguably, the negative treatment of African immigrants, such as demonstrated during the recent looting of shops owned by foreigners in Soweto and through the official and unofficial actions of state officials and, of course, a good number of South African citizens, has the tendency to wither South Africa’s soft power credentials in ways that dent its progress as an international norm entrepreneur. It is such incidents that cast doubt upon South Africa’s international acceptance and regional recognition, as well as its moral authority to act the part of an African regional hegemon. As noted by gender and culture analyst Gasa, South Africa generally needs to reconsider the way it thinks about poor people and find ways to convincingly deal with issues regarding foreign nationals.91 She admits that the direct and indirect actions of state and non-state agencies contribute to a psyche that enables people to create a scenario of intolerance towards foreigners. According to her, South Africa must demonstrate a willingness to initiate a conversation on the issue of xenophobia if it wants to see an attrition of xenophobic incidences in the country. Many people feel that the country has always been unable to deal with discrimination on the grounds of race, class, ethnicity and xenophobia, but because xenophobia involves the negative treatment of foreigners, it attracts more international attention. The manner in which a state interacts with others is an indication of how it views the world.92 And for South Africa, clearly, this has a significant implication for its leadership credentials in Africa, as was evident from the Libyan crisis. While the leadership and citizens of South Africa wanted diplomatic intervention by South Africa, there was a contradictory mood in other countries that may be interpreted to have stemmed from the perception of South Africa as a state that has shown an incapacity to find solutions to its own internal problems of violence, including xenophobia.93 At the launch of the Human Rights Watch’s 2014 World Report in Johannesburg, its Southern Africa director, Tiseke Kasambala, argued that ‘South Africa remains a beacon of hope on the continent, but its human rights legacy is gradually being eroded’.94

Conclusion This article has argued that, while soft power assets present a significant platform for South Africa to advance a hegemonic claim in Africa and while the country shows evidence of soft power attributes, the potential offered by this subtle element of power is eroded by xenophobic attacks targeted specifically at Africans from other countries. We have demonstrated that xenophobia is undoubtedly a pervasive phenomenon in South Africa, with citizens, the media, the police, various government agencies and, notably, politicians – consciously or unconsciously – displaying xenophobic attitudes targeted at African foreigners. While it can be argued that xenophobia is part of a much more complicated problem of discrimination that pervades the country, it receives more international attention because the aggression is directed at foreigners. Clearly, the long-term effect of this reality might be the significant erosion of South Africa’s soft power efficacy in Africa. There is no gainsaying the fact that South Africa’s leadership position in Africa might become devoid of legitimacy – and ultimately regional acceptance – if South Africans continue to express xenophobic attitudes towards African migrants.95



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Against this background, the article draws a connection between South Africa’s hegemonic posture in Africa, the sources of its soft power and the contradictions espoused by its xenophobic culture. The arguments and evidence presented specifically highlight how South Africa’s culture of xenophobia96 has affected its soft power status and consequently its regional hegemonic prospects. South Africa’s poor tolerance for foreign nationals, especially those from Africa, dents its chances of regional acceptance and puts a question mark over its legitimacy and recognition by its African neighbours to act the part of a regional hegemon. The article finds that xenophobia in South Africa is a push factor characterised by an inherent tendency to repel foreigners, consequently eroding the efficacy of its soft power currencies on the continent. Xenophobia in South Africa could be avoided if the government were to implement proactive and constructive policies to address xenophobia, including educating its citizens on the importance of tolerating foreigners and punishing those found guilty of xenophobic violence. Leadership at all levels in South Africa, including the government and traditional leaders, must also exercise the political will to address the socio-economic conditions of the dominant black population in order to tame the intolerance that accompanies their struggle for survival. Suggesting ways to combat the widespread culture of xenophobia in South Africa, Bongani notes that ‘the study of Pan-Africanism should be compulsory in all South African institutions of higher learning. South Africans should be integrated to the rest of Africa, socially as well as ideologically. The lack of interest (or ignorance) in African affairs is worrisome and is the main reason behind xenophobia’.97

His suggestion, if implemented, could no doubt play a huge role in addressing the divergent polarities of a Janus-faced South African democratic society. The media also has an important role to play as it has the capacity to set the agenda, reinforce existing opinions and frame citizens’ mindsets. The media can play the important role of disseminating constructive information about foreigners that projects the meaningful contribution they make to South African society. Among other factors, widespread corruption within the South African Department of Home Affairs has contributed much to the frustration of foreigners who are denied employment, housing and other social amenities. This has resulted in a high crime rate among the foreigners in their quest for survival in South Africa.98 Accordingly, the Department has a significant role to play in ameliorating South Africa’s level of tolerance towards foreigners. Mainly, we argue that the effective utilisation of South Africa’s soft power currencies as a medium of leverage to influence decisions of regional consequence in Africa will depend largely on its ability to tackle the xenophobic trends that continue to recur since the start of the post-apartheid era. This would enable South Africa to effectively mobilise its culture, values and foreign policy to attract other African countries in support of its interests in world politics and enhance its capacity to lay claim to sub-regional, if not regional, hegemony. A hegemon promotes values and ideas that legitimise its position and status in the international system – not a culture of xenophobia.

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Notes and References 1

Smith, K., 2012. Soft Power: The essence of South Africa’s foreign policy. In: Landsberg, C. and Van Wyk, J. (eds), South African foreign policy review. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa; Ogunnubi O. and Uzodike O., 2015. South Africa’s foreign policy and the strategy of soft power. South African Journal of International Affairs, 22(1), pp.23–41.

2

Sidiropoulos, E., 2008. South African foreign policy in the post-Mbeki period. Sou h African Journal of Interna ional Affairs, 15(2), pp.107–120.

3

Smith, 2012; Isike, C. and Isike, E., 2012. A Socio-cultural analysis of African immigration to South Africa. Alternation, 19(1), pp 93–116.

4

Gqola, P., 2008. Brutal inheritances: Echoes, negrophobia and masculinist violence. In: Shireen, H., T. Kupe, and & Worby, E. (eds), Go home or die here: Violence, xenophobia and he reinvention of difference in Sou h Africa. Johannesburg: Wits University Press; Matsinhe, D., 2011. Africa’s fear of itself: The ideology of makwerekwere in South Africa. Third World Quarterly, 32(2), pp.295–313.

5

According to Stats SA, an estimated 998 000 African migrants are expected to enter South Africa between 2011 and 2015. Available at http //www. sanews.gov.za/south-africa/inflow-migrants-pushes-population-53-million-%E2%80%93-stats-sa [Accessed 8 May 2015].

6

Smith, 2012.

7

Although some parts of the South African media as well as government agencies are quick to dismiss these attacks as mere opportunistic criminal acts, the fact remains that the incidents have all the trappings of xenophobia underlined by specific and targeted attacks and looting on foreign shop owners.

8

In this paper we conceptualise xenophobia as any form of hatred or fear of foreigners.

9

The focus group consists of third-year undergraduate students of Political Science at the University KwaZulu-Natal, (UKZN) Pietermaritzburg campus, South Africa.

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67 Ibid. 68 British scholar, 2015. 69 Morris, A , 2008. Our fellow Africans make our lives hell: the lives of Congolese and Nigerians living in Johannesburg. E hnic and Racial Studies, 21(6), pp.1116–1136. 70 Harris, B., 2002. Xenophobia: A new pathology for a new South Africa?. In: Hook, D. and Eagle, G. (eds), Psychopathology and social prejudice. Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press. 71 Morris, 2008. 72 Citizenship Rights in Africa Initiative (CRA ), 2009. Tolerating intolerance: Xenophobic violence in Sou h Africa. Place: Available at http //citizenshiprightsinafrica.org/docs/CRAISAReportFINAL.pdf [Accessed 6 September 2014]. 73 Jaynes, N , 2008. The state of nation b uilding in South Africa in light of the recent xenophobic attacks. Perspec ives: Poli ical analysis and commentary from Southern Africa, 3(8), p.12. 74 CRAI, 2009. 75 Le Pere, 2014. 76 Anonymous South African scholar (‘SA scholar’), 2014. Personal communications. 28 February 2014. The scholar further argued that, while this is a legitimate concern, it does not consider the fact that most South Africans do not know what happened in the past. It also does not take into account that South Africa was isolated from the rest of the world for a long time and it is thus difficult to integrate people into the world. 77 Harris, 2002. 78 Harris, 2002; Isike and Isike, 2012. 79 Anonymous Indian South African builder (‘Builder’), 2014. Personal communications. 17 January 2014. 80 Anonymous Canadian scholar in a South African University (‘Canadian scholar’), 2015. Personal communications. 6 January 2015. 81 Morris, 2008. 82 Morris, 2008. 83 Anonymous Zulu-speaking South African student (‘Zulu student’), 2014. Personal communications. 24 February 2014. 84 Nye, 2004. 85 South African and foreign students, 2014. Focus group discussion. 24 February 2014. 86 Patel, K., 2013. Zuma at ANC Manifesto forum: the courts have spoken on eTolls, people must obey. Daily Maverick [online], 22 October 2013. Available at http://www.dailymaverick.co za/article/2013-10-22-zuma-at-anc-manifesto-forum-the-courts-have-spoken-on-etolls-people-mustobey/#.VTinnULnD2k [Accessed 5 September 2014]. 87 Anonymous employee of a research institute in South Africa. Personal communications. 13 January 2015. 88 FutureBrand, 2013. Country Brand Index 2012–13. London: FutureBrand. Available at http://www.futurebrand.com/images/uploads/studies/cbi/ CBI_2012-Final.pdf [Accessed 6 September 2014]. 89 Hamill, J., 2014. Closing the door: South Africa’s draconian immigration reforms. World Politics Review, 7 October 2014. Available at http //www. worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/14145/closing-the-door-south-africa-s-draconian-immigration-reforms [Accessed 6 September 2014]. 90 Le Pere, 2014. 91 Interview, Nombuso Gasa, researcher, analyst and freelance writer on gender, political and cultural issues. Interview by Enca News, 23 January 2015. 92 South African scholar, 2014. 93 British scholar, 2015. 94 Evans, S., 2014. Lethal force: SA warned on human rights. Mail & Guardian, 21 January 2014. Available at http://mg.co.za/article/201401-21-lethal-force-sa-warned-on-human-rights [Accessed 9 September 2014]. 95 Le Pere, 2014. 96 In 1998, Human Rights Watch argued that South Africa has a xenophobic public culture owing to the pervasiveness of South Africa’s intolerance towards foreigners. Thus, xenophobia is seen as a legitimate attitude towards foreigners, and this is reinforced by public officials and the media. 97 Bongani Khanyile. Lawyer and Pan-Africanist. Personal communication. 11 January 2015. 98 Le Pere, 2014.



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