Housing for the Urban Poor?

NOTES

Housing for the Urban Poor? Changes in Credit-linked Subsidy Amitabh Kundu, Arjun Kumar

Recent modifications in the credit linked subsidy scheme—an important vertical under the Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana (Urban)—have raised the income limits for eligibility of loans, increased the amount of subsidised loans, relaxed norms with regard to built-up area, and importantly, have included the middle-income group, diluting its core agenda of being “pro-poor.” While this would boost the housing sector, there is risk that subsidies will be cornered by real estate developers, private builders, and the urban middle class. The planners must view this development with concern.

Amitabh Kundu ([email protected]) is visiting professor and Arjun Kumar ([email protected]) is visiting fellow with the Institute for Human Development, New Delhi. Economic & Political Weekly

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A

t the joint session of Parliament on 9 June 2014, the President of India proclaimed the intention of the newly elected National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government of providing every family “a pucca house with water connection, toilet facilities, 24 × 7 electricity supply and access.” In pursuit of this, the union government has launched a comprehensive mission, Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana-Housing for All (Urban) (PMAY-HFA[U]), under which houses are to be provided to all eligible families/ beneficiaries1 by 2022 in a phased manner, wherein the union government would assist the implementing agencies through states and union territories. The total housing shortage to be addressed is 20 million (18 million slum households and 2 million non-slum urban poor, households). Four programme verticals are envisaged under the mission to address the housing requirements of the urban poor, including slum dwellers, where an eligible beneficiary can take advantage of only one of the following: (i) slum rehabilitation of slum dwellers with the participation of private developers using land as a resource; (ii) promotion of affordable housing for the weaker section through credit-linked subsidies; (iii) affordable housing2 in partnership with public and private sectors; and (iv) subsidy for beneficiary-led individual house construction or enhancement. As of January 2017, 3,888 cities (including 468 Class-I cities) have been selected under the mission in 34 states/union territories. Until 8 December 2016, 2,596 project proposals in 1,700 cities with a project cost of `690.8 billion (with central assistance component of `188.5 billion) for the 1.28 million houses involved3 have been considered for financing. 4 Cities from the most urbanised states, especially in western and southern vol lII no 52

India, accounted for a large proportion of these houses. The number of houses sanctioned under the scheme has been phenomenal, and it is expected that soon it will cross the mark of 2 million houses involving an investment of around `1 trillion, including central assistance of around `0.3 trillion. As of 20 March 2017, around 82,000 houses have been constructed under the mission, and of these, 62,000 houses have been occupied, implying the slow pace of implementation. However, information on the physical and financial progress under the mission for each of the programme verticals and by other details, such as income class categories, is not available for greater scrutiny. This is a serious handicap in making an appropriate evaluation of the performance under the mission. Credit-linked Subsidy Scheme Among the four verticals, the credit linked subsidy scheme (CLSS) has some important features that make it stand out, thereby necessitating an in-depth analysis. First, whereas the other three verticals are centrally sponsored schemes (CSS) implemented by state government agencies and urban local bodies (ULBs)/authorities, and so on, the CLSS is a central sector scheme implemented through primary lending institutions (PLIs).5 Creditlinked subsidy is credited upfront by PLIs to the loan account of the beneficiary. Second, the central assistance provided per household is the highest under the CLSS (`2.2 lakh) as compared with other verticals (`1 lakh for “in situ” slum redevelopment and `1.5 lakh for the remaining two). Third, the scheme is demand driven with maximum scope for the household to choose the design and structure of the house. A beneficiary can apply for a housing loan directly or through the ULBs or local agencies identified by the state/ULBs, for facilitating the applications from intended beneficiaries. The role of the state governments/ULBs is limited to being a facilitator, verifying sanctioning of land and other documents. 105

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Genesis and Evolution The CLSS is designed to expand and augment institutional credit through interest rate subvention to back up the demand of the economically weaker section (EWS) and low-income group (LIG) for acquisition and construction of a new house or incremental housing, including extension, expansion, and repair. EWS households (annual household income up to `3 lakh) and LIG households (annual household Income between `3 lakh and `6 lakh) seeking housing loans from banks, housing finance companies (HFCs), and other such institutions would be eligible for an interest subsidy at the rate of 6.5% for the maximum tenure period of 15 years. The net present value (NPV) of the interest subsidy would be calculated at a discount rate of 9%. While the CLSS stipulates loan amounts up to `6 lakh, it does not constrain the beneficiary from taking loans above `6 lakh, as long as the person pays the market rate for the additional amount. Interest subsidy is to be credited upfront to the loan account of beneficiaries by the lending institutions, resulting in a reduced effective housing loan and equated monthly instalment (EMI). To avail this subsidy, the upper limit for the carpet area of houses being constructed or enhanced under this vertical of the mission is 30 square metres (sq m) and 60 sq m for EWS and LIG, respectively, to avail of this subsidy. Again, this is not binding as concerned agencies in different states have allowed construction of houses covering larger areas. A beneficiary can, at his/her discretion, build a house of a larger area, but interest subvention would be limited to the first `6 lakh only. The Housing and Urban Development Corporation (HUDCO) and National Housing Bank (NHB) have been identified as the central nodal agencies (CNAs) to channelise this subsidy to the lending institutions and for monitoring the progress under this component. The Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation (MoHUPA) is expected to notify other institutions as CNAs in the future. The genesis of the CLSS can immediately be traced to the Rajiv Rinn Yojana (RRY), launched in 2013 as a central sector 106

scheme linked to the Rajiv Awas Yojana (RAY) with the identical goal of interest subvention for small loans given to poor families for building “affordable housing.” The RRY, in turn, is an offshoot of the Interest Subsidy Scheme for Housing the Urban Poor (ISHUP) launched in 2009 as a CSS and piloted in the Eleventh Five Year Plan period with enhanced scope and coverage. The objective of the ISHUP was to create an enabling and a supportive environment for expanding credit flow to the housing sector and increasing home ownership as envisaged in the National Urban Housing and Habitat Policy (NUHHP), 2007. The MoHUPA (2015: 24) stated that the ISHUP had a less than optimal performance due to lukewarm responses from banks/HFCs. Important reasons mentioned for the slow off-take during the pilot phase were: (i) limited bank response due to issues associated with lending to the informal sectors; (ii) not covering expansion/alteration but only new constructions; (iii) ceiling of `1 lakh on loan amount being insufficient; (iv) demandoriented nature of the scheme instead of being target-oriented; (v) low targets responsible for inadequate enthusiasm among key players including banks, state governments, and beneficiaries. Table 1 highlights some of the important features of the ISHUP, RRY, and CLSS. There has been a rise in the ceiling for the loan amount and interest rate subsidy in the CLSS as compared to the RRY. It is surprising that the income limit for the households belonging to EWS and LIG categories have been enhanced without

providing any rationale. The income limits in RRY in 2013 were fixed roughly at `1 lakh for EWS, and `2 lakh for LIG, more than double the limits set under the ISHUP in 2009. Strangely, the CLSS in 2015 set the income limits three times the figures set under the RRY. The sharp rise in the income limit under the CLSS for the EWS and LIG families evidently involves greater risk of mistargeting of the subsidised funds to the middle- and upper-middle-income households, leading to a dilution of the core pro-poor agenda, and the focus on housing for all. Physical and Financial Progress The HUDCO had been designated as a CNA for the ISHUP, to disburse subsidy to PLIs, which had till 31 December 2014 processed claims and released a subsidy of `1,002 lakh to 5,317 beneficiaries. The RRY was effective from 1 October 2013 to 16 April 2015. The budget outlay (plan) for the RRY in 2015–16 was `4.5 billion (target of 0.26 million beneficiaries to be covered under the scheme for the 12th plan period). Under the RRY, subsidy claims amounting to `6.86 lakh only were disbursed to 229 beneficiaries through four PLIs,6 suggesting a meagre performance. The budget outlay (plan) for CLSS in 2016–17 was `4.75 billion. Recently, there has been some momentum in the CLSS as the NHB released subsidy claims of `1.2 billion pertaining to 7,062 households to 57 PLIs till June 2016. Under the PMAY-HFA(U) CLSS components, so far only about 20,000 beneficiaries have availed this scheme (Dashi 2017).

Table 1: Comparison of Features of ISHUP, RRY, and CLSS ISHUP 2009

Launch Year

Loan amount admissible (maximum limit for subsidised loan in ` ) Interest subsidy (per annum) Tenure (years) Income limit for households (average annual income in `) —EWS —LIG Size of house/dwelling unit (carpet area in sq m) —EWS —LIG Physical progress (beneficiaries) Financial claims disbursement ( ` in lakh)

1,00,000 5% 15–20

RRY 2013

CLSS 2015

5,00,000 5% 15–20

6,00,000 6.5% maximum 15

up to 39,600 up to 1,00,000 up to 3,00,000 39,600–87,600 1,00,000–2,00,000 3,00,000–6,00,000 (maximum size in either case is 60) at least 25 minimum 21 up to 30 at least 40 minimum 28 up to 60 5,317 229 20,000 (so far) 1,001.99 6.86 –

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The dismal performance of the earlier schemes is suggestive of the fact that they suffer critical structural problems. The poor and LIG households are facing serious difficulties in availing the benefits, especially on the account of nonaffordability of the loans, procedures and documentation. Instead of addressing these difficulties, the government has opened the door to the middle class in a bid to increase off-take under the mission and to meet the stipulated targets. Misplaced Priorities? On 31 December 2016, the Prime Minister announced an interest rate subvention of 4% and 3% for loans up to `9 lakh and `12 lakh, respectively, under the CLSS, post demonetisation. To take this further, the cabinet approved the introduction of a new CLSS for the middleincome group (MIG). The maximum tenure of loans under the CLSS for the EWS/LIG (renamed and recategorised) and for the MIG have now been placed at 20 years.7 The MoHUPA has released the operational guidelines for the CLSS for MIG, which will be effective from January 2017. The CLSS for the MIG is further categorised into two: MIG–I (annual household income between `6 lakh and `12 lakh), and MIG–II (annual household income between `12 lakh and `18 lakh) (for details, see Table 2). The interest subsidy amount for the subsidised loan amounts of `6 lakh (at 6.5% interest rate subvention), `9 lakh (at 4%) and `12 lakh (at 3%) for a period of 20 years work out to be `2.67 lakh, `2.35 lakh and `2.30 lakh, respectively. This would reduce the EMI for EWS/LIG,

MIG–I and MIG–II beneficiaries to `2,579, `2,268, and `2,221, respectively. The total budget estimate allocation of the PMAY-HFA(U) was `50.75 billion in 2016–17, which has been increased to `60.43 billion in 2017–18. Almost the entire increase in the budget estimate allocation of `10 billion (`1,000 crore) is proposed for the CLSS for the MIG. Upon the recent progress under the CLSS delivered by the NHB, the government announced that the NHB would refinance individual housing loans of about `200 billion in 2017–18. The reaffirmation by the finance minister that affordable housing is to be given infrastructure status will enable these projects to avail the associated benefits such as lower borrowing rates, tax concessions, and increased flow of foreign and private capital. There were also announcements pertaining to affordable housing, such as profit-linked income tax deduction, relaxations on tax for vacant/unsold units for one year, counting of the carpet area instead of the built-up area of 30 sqm and 60 sqm, among others. Furthermore, the restriction of 30 sqm would now apply only in the case of housing within the municipal limits of four metropolitan cities, while for the rest of the country, including in the peripheral areas of metros, the EWS housing limit will be 60 sqm. It is not a mere coincidence that these announcements have been made when there is a fall in the prices of housing (also circle rates in various cities) and land prices, along with the interest rates for housing loans from the banks. These trends have become even stronger after demonetisation. A host of other measures

Table 2: Comparison of Key Features of ISHUP, RRY, CLSS, CLSS for EWS/LIG and CLSS for MIG ISHUP 2009

Launch Year

Loan amount admissible (maximum limit for subsidised loan in ` lakh) Interest subsidy (per annum) Tenure (years) Income limit for households (average annual income in ` lakh) —EWS —LIG Size of house/dwelling unit (carpet area in sqm) — EWS —LIG Economic & Political Weekly

EPW

RRY 2013

CLSS 2015

CLSS for EWS/LIG Effective 2017

CLSS for MIG January 2017

1

5

6

6

5%

5%

6.5%

6.5%

15–20

15–20

max 15

max 20

MIG-I: 9 MIG-II: 12 MIG-I: 4% MIG-II: 3% max 20

up to 0.4 0.4–0.87

up to 1 1–2

up to 3 3–6

up to 3 3–6

MIG-I: 6–12 MIG-II: 12–18

at least 25 at least 40

min 21 min 28

up to 30 up to 60

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up to 30 MIG-I: up to 90 up to 60 MIG-II: up to 110

such as the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA), real estate investment trusts (REITs), the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Amendment Act, 2016, higher tax breaks on home loans, the goods and services tax (GST), land-related reforms, optimisation of development control rules, rationalisation of the stamp duty and registration charges, streamlining of operational procedures, digitalisation, etc, have been launched that would facilitate middleclass housing. The MoHUPA is reaching out to all the developers’ bodies, banks, HFCs and other concerned stakeholders to increase private sector participation, which is abysmally low under the old stipulations of the PMAY-HFA(U). The union cabinet in November 2017 approved the increase in the carpet area of houses eligible for interest subsidy under the CLSS for the MIG to further enhance the scope, coverage, and outreach of the scheme.8 The stated and anticipated impact for these changes are: first, the increase of the carpet area to 120 sqm and 150 sqm for MIG-I and MIG-II respectively is seen as reasonable and would cater to the market generally scouted by the MIG belonging to the two income categories specified in the scheme; second, the increase in carpet area would enable the MIG category of individuals to have a wider choice in developers’ projects; and third, the increased carpet area will also give a boost to the sale of ready built flats in the affordable housing segment. As per October 2017 reports in the CLSS, `1,292 crore has been released by the NHB and HUDCO in 64,752 home loan accounts since its inception. The break-ups for the EWS, LIG, and MIG categories, unfortunately, are not in public domain. The new measures will be effective in spurring housing and construction activities, providing relief to real estate developers and bringing windfall gains to the urban middle class. Understandably, these would attract private and foreign investments in the housing sector, which will have a positive multiplier effect on gross domestic product and the labour market. What, however, is a matter of serious concern is that this will pivot 107

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away from the core pro-poor character of the PMAY-HFA(U). An Appraisal The focus of the present housing strategy is on adequacy (all-weather dwelling unit of reasonable size with basic civic amenities, infrastructure and services, conforming to the National Building Code and other relevant Bureau of Indian Standards codes, planned development), formalisation (through engagement of banks, ULBs and state governments, requirement of land title related documents), financial viability (provisioning of central assistance and subsidised bank loans), private sector participation (permitting builders to get extra incentives such as flood space index or FSI). With these, the strategy has become more formalised with a focus on legal tenure and housing being treated as a marketable commodity. Openness with regard to beneficiaries by increasing the built-up area and income ceiling, as also by allowing self-certification or affidavit as proof of income, linked to the Aadhaar and Jan Dhan Yojana, have further facilitated this process. This must be seen as a clear departure from the earlier strategy of sites and services that focused on the people, processes, and incremental housing linked with their economic affordability and opportunity, which involved providing basic shelter and a small loan in a manner that the poor could incrementally construct their houses, with a built-in mechanism for self-targeting. The focus, now, is on building formal houses with the engagement of public agencies at the city/town and state level through substantial central funding or highly subsidised loans. The loan amount can also be used for purchasing an already constructed house which will be a relief for the builders with massive unsold housing stock. As per Census 2011, the number of vacant census houses was 11 million, which had grown at a whopping rate of 72% between 2001 and 2011. The rise in vacant housing in the recent past is an outcome of speculative investment by builders, most of which are financed through the formal system. One wonders why the state, instead of trying to bring 108

down the unrealistically high prices in the housing market through stringent incentives and taxation policies, and encouraging massive production of 30 sqm units, should facilitate private builders to sell off their vacant houses through state subsidy. The poor, who can afford to pay the EMI for a loan up to a maximum limit of `2 lakh only, even when it is made interest free, have thus disappeared from availing this housing strategy altogether. The government must strictly adhere to tighter restrictions with regard to income ceiling and, more importantly, the permitted built-up area for self-targeting. If the scheme is opened up for upperincome categories by relaxing various criteria as discussed, and the doors are opened for the entry of the middle and upper-middle class, much of the subsidies are likely to be cornered by them. The allocated funds under the mission may, thus, be spent without the benefits reaching the targeted population. The openness in the CLSS can be gauged from the fact that the restriction on the built-up area or annual income is

only notional. While violation of these norms, like obtaining a larger loan or building a bigger house, would not entitle the beneficiary to a larger subsidy, it would also not invite any penal provision. Many of the state governments and ULBs have submitted to the pressures to increase the carpet/built-up area under each category, and relaxed the limit on carpet area. The self-certification or affidavit as proof of income cannot be a deterrent despite the use of the Aadhaar. Misreporting of income is clearly manifest in the tax compliance data, mentioned by the finance minister time and again. All that has been done so far is to incentivise evaders to comply by lowering the tax rate. Chances of missing the targeted beneficiaries (exclusions of both intended beneficiaries and inclusion of non-intended beneficiaries) have thus gone up enormously. Demand–Supply Mismatch Several experiences of the residential housing industry illustrate the demand and supply mismatch and market distortions. The urban housing industry

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(catering mostly to the upper-middle class and upper class), in the ownership and rental market, has mostly become the destination of speculative investment resulting in rocketing prices, and high inventories of vacant and unoccupied houses. In turn, the private housing industry also suffers from informality, trust deficit, stringent regulations, and bureaucratic controls. The fall out of this can be seen as delays in projects, contestations between builders/developers and consumers/end-users, quality issues, delay in obtaining sanctions and approvals, rising costs of construction, among others. Similarly, public housing programmes and projects suffer from various systemic failures, such as inadequate supply, high gestation period, severe issues pertaining to the identification of intended beneficiaries, location and design of the projects, maintenances, high vacancy and non-utilisation rates, post-occupancy issues, etc. Housing Prices There has been a sharp rise in housing prices over the past one and a half decades except for 2015 and 2016, as suggested by the NHB Residex and the quarterly house price index (HPI) released by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). The concerned ministries, as well as the RBI, in different platforms and policy documents, have voiced the need for an intervention to combat the speculative forces and bring housing within the affordability limits of the poor and LIG households. The Technical Group on Urban Housing Shortage, 2012–17 (TG-12) had noted that the households from EWS and LIG account for 56.18% and 39.44%, respectively, of the total estimated urban housing shortage of 18.8 million. Households with income up to `5,000 per month are placed in the EWS category, while those with income between `5,000 and `10,000 per month constitute the LIG category. Using consumption expenditure data from the National Sample Survey Office’s (NSSO) 66th round (2009–10), one would hold that the EWS category comprises one-third of households in urban areas, and this, combined with LIG category, accounts for almost 80% of the households. Economic & Political Weekly

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As a well-accepted practice, the housing loan is generally around four times the annual income of the household for a longer tenure (around 15–20 years), considering the fact that not more than 25%–30% of the annual income can be paid towards payment of EMI. Poor households, mostly engaged in the informal sector can under no circumstances incur expenditure higher than this. This, of course, is not the case with high-income households. A loan amount of `3 lakh– `6 lakh at the subsidised interest rate sanctioned for a period of 15 years would still mean an EMI between `4,000 and `6,000 per month. Thus, repayment of the loan amount with interest, amounting to more than 50% of their earnings, would be a major issue for the poor and LIG households, given their pattern of earning and expenditure. In fact, EMI even at zero rate of interest would be out of the capacity for poor families when the loan amount is higher than `3 lakh. For the homeless, daily wage earners, migrant workers, and marginalised families, repayment of such loans would be formidable. EMI amounts of more than around `1,500 at current prices are not affordable for the poor if the expenditure pattern as reported in the NSSO is taken into consideration. The EMI amount must be worked out considering regional, city size class, and other such factors, based on empirical evidence and studies on the average earning and expenditure at the field level. Also, the poor and LIG households face problems pertaining to documentations, such as ownership of land, duration of stay, etc, other eligibility criteria, and stringent processes (that also lead to unscrupulous practices), besides the capacity of loan repayment. In-depth research is required to probe into questions as to why there are not many takers under the CLSS among the poor. For lowering the loan amount and the EMI, it would be important to bring down the cost of house construction through appropriate research on housing design, land use, technology, building materials, other supply side factors, and environmental sustainability. Regulatory and executive measures are needed to control the prices of the houses, meant for vol lII no 52

the poor and LIG households, and to bring the massive stock of vacant houses through strong disincentives into the market so that the current supply constraint is reduced. According to the TG-12, 80% of the housing shortage is on account of congestion, that is, households that have a large number of persons per room or wherein a married couple shares a room with an adult, followed by 12%, 5% and 3% on account of households living in obsolete houses, non-serviceable kutcha house, and the homeless, respectively. In order to tackle the problem of congestion, the focus must be on enhancement of dwelling units and incremental housing for creating extra space or additional rooms through support from public agencies. In situations where there is no space for constructing an extra room, a mechanism can be developed through which the household can buy a new house or shift to another area, using the value of the old house, government subsidy, and a small loan that it can repay. This can be done through a public–private partnership model with the engagement of civil society organisations, when necessary. In this context, it would be worthwhile to analyse the fourth vertical of the PMAY-HFA(U)—the beneficiary-led individual house construction or enhancement— under which an eligible family belonging to the EWS category can get central assistance of `1.5 lakh. This too is partly a demand side intervention that focuses on incremental housing for the poor families. It, however, has its own limitations. Besides the residual nature of this fourth vertical, and the key requirement of a household to possess a formal land title, there are several provisions that would make its implementation difficult, particularly when it is designed to cover the poor. The processes of beneficiary selection, possession of formal land documents, fitting into the framework of a city-level plan, the housing-for-all plan of action and its priorities, approval of various agencies at the city and state level, and scrutiny through Socio-Economic and Caste Census (SECC) data (not yet publicly released) for ensuring beneficiary’s eligibility are likely to and could be used for denying permission to households to stay 109

NOTES

or build their houses in central and elite areas, and hence, for “sanitising” the cities. The households away from places of business and livelihoods with a low value of land are likely to be preferred under this vertical, while those occupying lands around commercial places or high-income neighbourhoods would be evicted. Also, there is no provision for poor families living in rented houses to benefit from this vertical as they can show no land title. Summing Up The PMAY-HFA(U)—the housing strategy envisaged for the urban poor to access ownership housing—has been formalised through changes in its various provisions and designs. The emphasis has been on land title, state agencies, and formalised procedures, where housing is being treated as “marketable commodity” with a massive subsidy component. This shift has the propensity to strengthen the exclusionary model of urbanisation, which would make it increasingly difficult for the poor and LIG households, the homeless, slum dwellers, and distress migrants to access shelter and live in the cities. With state and local agencies, along with formal private agencies being assigned a greater role to play, the individual self-help model becomes less

significant in scope. The sharp rise in income limits that defines the EWS and LIG categories, and simultaneous inclusion of the MIG categories under the CLSS dilutes the core “pro-poor” and “housing for all” agenda of the government. While it cannot be doubted that the housing sector, which had hitherto suffered from demand deficit, would be boosted, the PMAY-HFA(U) turns out to be a programme that would cater to the interests of the real estate and builders’ lobby as well as the interests of the urban middle class. It is thus understood that the changes in the stipulations made through the recent announcements of the Prime Minister, the Union Budget 2017–18, and administrative orders, that opened a new window for MIG housing, have come up due to the lukewarm response from the EWS and LIG households, and the meagre off-take of loans under the scheme. The government has now decided to ensure that loans are given and repayments are guaranteed by raising the amount of subsidised loan amount per household, relaxing the norms and conditionalities, explicitly or implicitly, with regard to built-up area, income ceiling, etc. This has increased the chances of appropriation of subsidies offered through the CLSS by the middle class, while keeping the poor away from

its stated benefits. It comes as a natural corollary to the urban poor and lowerincome families’ incapacities to repay loans, and their failure to meet the documentation and other formal requirements and procedures. Notes 1

2

3 4 5

6 7 8

A beneficiary family will comprise husband, wife, unmarried sons and/or unmarried daughters. The beneficiary family should not own a pucca house in the name of any member of the family in any part of India to be eligible to receive central assistance under the mission. Affordable Housing Project: Housing projects where 35% of the houses are constructed for the economically weaker section (EWS) category. These include the subsumed projects under the Rajiv Awas Yojana. http://mhupa.gov.in/writereaddata/PMAY_ Progress.pdf. Scheduled commercial banks, housing finance companies, regional rural banks (RRBs), state cooperative banks, urban cooperative banks or any other institutions as may be identified by the ministry. A total of 201 such PLIs have signed memorandums of understanding (MoUs) with central nodal agencies (CNAs) as on 31 December 2016, http://www.mhupa.gov.in/writereaddata/PLI31082016.pdf. http://164.100.47.190/loksabhaquestions/annex/8/AU617.pdf. http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease. aspx?relid=157827. http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease. aspx?relid=173565.

References Dashi, Dipak K (2017): “Middle-class too Will Benefit from PM’s Housing Sop,” Times of India, 5 January. MoHUPA (2015): “Annual Report 2014–15,” Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation, Government of India.

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The Bolsheviks Come to Power in Petrograd: Centennial Reflections

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The Bolshevik Heritage

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Revolutionary Democracy in 1917 and the Bolsheviks

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