How young people engage in their futures

“How young people engage in their futures" - operationalising Agency for a qualitative research project on youth transitions Stephan Dahmen1

Paper to be presented at the annual HDCA conference 2011, Den Haag, The Netherlands, September 5-8th, 2011 Young researcher meets Senior Session

Draft paper, please do not cite without the permission of the author Comments are welcome ([email protected])

Abstract: This paper investigates the heuristic added value of the concept of Agency and develops a conceptual model that is amenable for a qualitative application of the capability approach to the field of socio-vocational integration of young disadvantaged school leavers in transition from school to work. It is argued that the capability approach with it`s mainly normative orientation and it`s predominantly quantitative operationalization requires a reformulation and reconceptualization in order to account for the processual and interactive dimension of Agency, especially in qualitative research designs. It is then argued that existing concepts applied in biographical and socialization research can bring some major contributions for a conceptual furthering of the C.A., particularly for the use and analysis of narratives in a capability perspective. In following Arjun Appadurai`s reading of the C.A. as an invitation to “widen our conception of how human beings engage their own futures” (Appadurai 2004), this contribution aims at presenting a analytical framework for the investigation of how young disadvantaged people develop future projects and subjectively viable life-plans in the light of a more and more restrictive labour market, often without possessing the necessary resources for doing so. This contribution is structured as follows: After a short display of the central role of “Agency” in the theorethical architecture of the capability approach, recent discussions which critically assess the concept of Agency of the capability approach are depicted. These accounts, albeit mostly well-disposed to the C.A. in general, point towards the conceptual underdeterminedness of the C.A. when it comes to account for the role of “culture” and language, (Deneulin 2006, Jackson 2005 ) the neglect of the processual and interactive dimension of Agency, (Zimmerman 2005) as well as the “individualist” conception of the person (Dean 2009). Based on these objections, it is called for a sociological respecification of the concept of Agency as it is used in the capability approach. In drawing on a a project in which the capability approach is used for the analysis of transitions from school to work of school leavers participating in two “transition mesures” aiming at professional integration, possible conceptual links between the concept of agency – as depicted in the capability

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Early-stage researcher (ITN Marie-Curie EduWel “Education as Welfare” at Center for the Study of Capabilities in Social and Health Services (CESCAP) University of applied sciences Western Switzerland, EESP, Vaud.

approach and biographical research are investigated. The contribution closes with a first insight in preliminary findings and develop some routes for further inquiry.

Operationalizing the capability Approach: recent discussions and critiques With the multiplication of research projects which apply the capability approach for their analytical purposes, the discussion on the operationalization, the strenghts and weaknesses, necessary complementations and supplements especially for the field of educational research has become apparent. Some argue that the C.A. has to be seen first and foremost as a “normative framework”, which, informed by a rigourous examination of different theories of Justice proposes a certain evaluative space (capabilities – in despite of ressources, rights and entitlements) that has to be taken into consideration. This perspective would transport as an implicit idea that the capability approach would leave the decision for a certain methodology open. While the capability approach does not impose certain methodological framework, I suggest that research done under the “umbrella” of capability-informed analyses could profit from a deeper investigation in key concepts of the capability approach – which beyond their “normative” value, may contain a important heuristic potential when used in Research. While it is clear that the capability approach – understood as a normative framework – cannot be made responsible for not providing adequate methodologies or routes of inquiry that can be applied straightforwardly into empirical research, it is of crucial importance to look for adequate methodologies to implement the C.A. for empirical research.While the capability approach, initially developed in the context of develloppement studies has generated many works based on quanitative methodology mainly in economics, it stays undertheorized in qualitative research. In referring to my Dissertation research project on Transitions from school to work in a biographical perspective, i will try to propose one way of doing so. One of the most elaborated discussions on the capability aproach in relation to more analytical concerns is Benedicte Zimmerman`s discussion of possible sociological operationalization of Agency for qualitative analysis from a ethnomethodological and pragmatist perspective. Her main argument can be summarized as follows: In order that the capability approach may be “more than a normative horizon for sociologists” (ibid 2005: 464) it requires a theorethical and methodological completion. According to Zimmerman, the capability approach, in conceptualizing freedom predominantly as a value, proposes to develop analytical tools deriving from the concept of Agency, which in Sen`s writings“ remains sociologically unspecified and suffers from weakness and inconsistency”, As “it is not able to consider the required “skills and supports that are required to make (such) decisions” (Zimmerman, 2005, 474). In Zimmermans Terms, the C.A. is thus not able take fully into account the “interactive dimension” of Agency, which mainly relates to the role of environment and experience an their role in shaping actions, preferences and aspirations. This critique also refers to the conception of “preferences” and ”aspirations” which, in Sen`s theory are mainly “taken for granted” as individual dispositions which need no further investigation. A similar concern is issued towards Sen`s concept of personhood. Allbeit reclaiming taking into account of interindividual differences and being sensitive for the constitutive plurality of human beings Sen mainly refers to a “generalized human”, and moves between the “generic human being” and the singular person. Zimmerman claims that Sen, on going only down the half way down the road of “grounding” the subject of Justice claims in singular and situated persons, he is not taking into account sufficiently the social situatedness and the role of individual predispositions and environemental differences which enable or restrain individuals to make

decisions2. It seems obvious that Sen, being concerned with issues of “Justice” conceives persons mainly as “subjects of Justice”, which are qua their affiliation to a political community, bearer of rights, entitlements and justice claims, while putting less attention to the fact that individuals are also “Social Actors”, which embedded in social relations, structures of meaning and webs of recognition, cannot realistically be tought as being “independent” of the surrounding structures. Implicitely referring to the conception of personhood inherent (or absent) in the capability approach, Sen, “objectively distances(d) (the individuals, t.A.) from the relations of power within which her identity and her life chances must be constituted » and would not account for the fact that «human beings cannot be free from their dependency upon other human beings » (Dean 2009 : 2). This critique is not new in relation to liberal theories of justice, and has been termed quite convincingly the « sociological objection » by Michael Sandel, referring to the fact that liberal approaches would « misunderstand the fundamentally « social » nature of man, the fact that we are conditioned beings « all the way down.» (Sandel 1982 :11). A similar objection towards the capability approach issued by these authors is referring to the conception of rationality: Sen – despite rejecting a “rational choice” conception of actors, thus opening “choice” for actions which are not based on utility maximization and calculation, leaves open the “nature of the decision” (Zimmerman 2005)This characterization may be due to the fact that social factors, past or present connections to significant others, seem to be left aside in a language of “choice”, “preferences” and that the concept of preferences doesn`t allow to conceptualize how these preferences, concerns and wishes are formed and constituted in an active contention with social norms and the cultural world. In leaving the question of “preferences” purely on the individual level, this concept would fail to do justice to the social character of these wishes and desires (see also Deneulin Mc Gregor 2010, Appadurai 2004). They would argue that qua their social embeddedness, human beings cannot be conceived as independent chooser of values that guide their commitments, but that these values are always “social” respectively refer to a “common good” the individual does thus not “choose” it`s preferences independently, but orient themselves to commonly valued goods. In the eyes of these authors, Sen seems thus to provide a very “minimalist” conception of how people choose, act and feel and how they develop aspirations, preferences and projects. These critiques state that Sen stays underdetermined in the sense that albeit respecifying the R.C.-Model to other, non utilitarist actions and motives but leaves the choosing subject, his preferences and wants as a “Black-Box”. Not further specifying the modalities and rationalities in which real empirical individuals choose and act.

Sen`sconceptionofAgency But can this critique legitimately be pointed towards the capability approach? As Christman argues, “normative political theories, in particular conceptions of justice, always presuppose or assert a conception of the person taken to be the subject of those principles." (Christman 2009: 4). The capability approach`s concept of Agency, defined as “what a person is free to do and achieve in pursuit of whatever goals or values he or she regards as important.” (Sen 1985: 2

As Ziegler 2011 states, the the just distribution of Life-chances is not only bound to the means provided by institutions for a hypothetical realisation of different life-perspectives, rather this comes to the fore only trough taking into account biographies and life-conduct of concrete, empirical individuals. This speaks in favour of taking into account (self)- int erpretations, motives, aspirations, but also emotional, practical, and cognitive competences as relevant aspects of the IBJJ. (vulnerabilities, with bodies, emotions etc…. ). The capability approach is thus well-disposed to not only account for “generic” individuals disposing of certain rights and ressources promarily adressed as memebers of a political community but is bothered with “concrete” empirical individuals, which trough their interindividual differences in conversion factors, their different dispositions, specific environemental factors and vulnerabilities which are taken into account by the capability approach. One can thus merely talk about a “individualist” conception of the person in the capability appproach as a wide range of informations are deemed relevant for judgements in justice and the asessment of the Well-being of persons.

203), is a central concept in the theorethical architecture of the C.A.. Sen`s formulations on the social prerequirements for “Agency freedom” in the Sense of the C.A. show quite good inhowfar the C.A. is a normative-political philosophical approach, conceptualizing freedom mainly in substantive, nominalistic terms rather than an analytical one, which looks at practices, actionorientations and agentic capacities of social actors. Sen mainly considers the preconditions for “Agency-freedom” in terms of political and economic guarantees, entitlements and opportunities, (Sen 2000) thus rather in terms of « formal requirements » than in terms of a consideration of how people are able to « act » and to develop autonomous Life-plans. Despite the obvious importance of these preconditions in terms of basic guarantees and democratic institutions, “Just procedures, institutions and distributed resources are always necessary but often insufficient to enhance social justice and human well-being“ (Andresen/Otto 2009: 120). Sen`s ambitious formulation does thus does not explicitely conceptualize more profoundly the properties of the „Actor“ aspect of the Individuals subject of justice claims stated by Sen. The capacity to act on behalf of one`s own value commitments, to “be an agent who brings about change” (Sen 2001) respectively who “chooses” reflexively between different options of his opportunity set on behalf of what he “has reason to value” is quite straightforwardly assumed. Nevertheless, Sen seems to draw a quite exact image of his concept of persons, allowing to asess more extensively how Sen conceives “Agency” and and choice processes in relation to social structures. A first dimension is clearly Sen`s conception “reflexive actor” who –different to the conceptualization of action in rational choice theory, does not act on behalf on a “utility maximization principle” e.g. on the expected outcomes of a choice but on the good reasons he has to conduct a certain action. “Rationality of choice”, in Sen`s view, “is primarily a matter of basing our choices - explicitely or by implication - on reasoning that we can reflectively sustain if we subject them to critical reasoning (….) people are, by and large, able to reason and scrutinize their own decisions and those of others" (Amartya Sen 2010: 180-178).Sen`s “reflexive actor” is able to deliberate, to assess and to think about the “good reasons” he has to choose and to conduct as certain action. While stressing the voluntarist dimension and the intentionality of actions as well as the ability to act and choose on the basis of “good reasons actors can sustain after critical reflection”, Sen seems to be sensible for the influence for societal influences as well on the preferences and aspirations as well on the processes of choice. His concept of “good reasons” and his stress on the need to understand “how people read the world in which they live” (Sen 2010) seems to point to the necessity to adopt a situated view on individual choice processes and to suggest a view that is responsive to the above-cited critiques. I argue that Sen`s conception of “social Actors” as well as his conception of rationality suggests awareness for the role of societal relations, the interactions between persons and their environnement as well as the situatedness and embeddedness of these choice processes, while not spelling out more specifically how these relations can be further conceptualized and devellopped3. While being potentially awarefor the “deep an pervasive influence of society on our thinking and doing” (Sen 2010) he does not provide a more profound analysis of the processes interfering a this point. One should thus consider to include more extensively conceptualizations of agency and autonomy from other disciplinary contexts which can shed more light on these prerequirements and the processes that allow autonomous choices. While Sen mainly seems to highlight the material and institutional preconditions that are necessary for autonomous choices, he fails to take into account the 3

Amartya Sen, especially in his newest book „the idea of Justice“ has much more to offer regarding the issue of rationality and human Agency, which cannot be accounted for here because of the restricted Space. Among others, his reference to Herbert Simons Model of “bounded rationality” (Simon 1954, Sen 2010:176), his stress that human beings have to be conceived as “social creatures with different types of societal interactions” (Sen: 2010: 247), his precaution to depict behaviour as “irrational” as this judgement may be based on “failing to see the underlying reasons behind” (Sen 2010: 178), the stress on the positionality of Justice claims – an epistemological argument which points to the fact that human experience is highly influenced by the social context an individual is living in, from which the claim to understand “how people read the world in which they live” (Sen 2010: 168) is deduced and last but not least, the concept of “situated evaluation” (- are just some relevant issues.

individual preconditions. This requires to specify the conception of the Subject that is at the foundation of these choice and decision processes. The Key formulation “What people have reason to value”, clearly presupposes a “self” who has the capacity for self-reflection, to think about ones desires, wishes and Aspirations and who is able to asess one`s own life-design4. While one can conceive the human agent as having the capacity for self-evaluation, reflexivity and intentionality, it may seem short-sighted to see these properties as innate, taken for granted capacities of actors, respectively to conceive human agency as a presuppositionless achievement.

AnactiontheorethicinterpretationoftheC.A.? One could argue that Sen – trough his wide interest in questions of rationality, his consideration of theories of action as well as his toughts on the “situatedness” of rationality and decision making is “setting the stage” for a deeper investigation of these issues. Furthermore, Sen seems to – mainly in his critical accounts he gives of “Rational choice Theory” and his critiques of “Human-capital approaches” propose more or less explicitely – a analytical stance (the concept of “good reasons”) that is quite elaborate in relation to the analysis of biographical orientation processes. In fact, for analysing educational decisionmaking, the opposed anthroplogical postulates/theorethical universes and concepts of instrumental rationality (as used in H.C. and R.C. approaches) as well as more deterministic conceptions of action (as used in more sociological approaches e.g. in Pierre Bourdieus concept of “habitus”) lead to the same difficulties. Ultilitarianism is postulated a posteriori, don`t taking into account that people could act on behalf of other reasons than utility maximization, while in more deterministic concepts “action” is deduced from statistical regularities of choices and behaviours. An individual “chooses” a certain educational pathway or Job, either because it is in it`s instrumental interest or because it has been “programmed” (trough socialisatory context and conditions) to do so. While the first perspective provides a widely voluntarist conception of action, disregarding the social embeddedness of vocational orientation processes and conceiving “Agency” in a very calculative, instrumental and abstract manner, the latter may provide a a predominantly deterministic way of conceptualising Agency. While it is clear that “decision-making” in relation to education has some habitualised, non reflexive aspects, and is bound to actors dispositions and socialisatory experiences, it may, in the same vein – contain elements of a calculating rationality, insofar human beings -when engaging in their future, expect, calculate investments, attach probabilities to possible future trajectories and courses of action. It is thus at this intersection, in which socially embedded individuals choose, do and act, and gain a “relative autonomy” in relation to (incoporated and institutionalized) social structures. As an Answer to these reductions, it seems reasonable to choose a model of subjective rationality and to think about action and Agency in terms of “good reasons5” (Sen 2010) actors can sustain when acting and doing important decision in their lives. Rationality of choice can thus be conjugated along the lines of multiple, subjectively viable “reasons” actors reflexively can sustain (and have access to) which lie at the basis of their actions respectively are brought forward by the actors as “justifications”, for their actions and choices. This has important methodological implications: When talking about “good reasons” we are not accessing human behaviour in terms of “causes”, but looking at human beings as being responsive and gaining the capacity for intentional, agentic action trough enculturation in the “space of reasons” (McDowell 1994). In 4

This is also highlighted by the high importance that is given to “self-reflection” or “reflexivity” in theories of Autonomy. The demand to understand and shape one`s own life i.e. one`s own identity against the Background of the respective social environment requires the capacitiy for self-reflection and for assessing one`s own life design (Bothfeld 2008: 6, Burchardt 2010: 11).

this perspective, it is “our responsiveness to reasons, (…) what makes us become a rational agent in selfconscious control of our thoughts and actions”. (Bakehurst 2004). “Reasons” understood in this sense are part of the universe of meaning and culture, requiring thus interpretative methods in order to look on how people make sense of, draw on different “good reasons” for acting and choosing in a certain way. aplying the (famous, but problematic) distinction fron philosophy of social sciences – it requires rather methods promoting “understanding” (verstehen) than “explanation” (erklären), as the researcher has to reconstruct and intersubjectively understand the “good reasons” of actors, in ther light of their subjective relevancies, wishes and Aspirations in order to Answer this question. Or more concretely, subjects are able to to extract from the given "arrangements of meaning" certain Aspects from which emerge .certain, subjectively reasonable premises of action which then - are transposed into action.” (Holzkamp 1995: 838). Insofar the ability to act intentionaly is bound to already established instituionalized meanings and significations on which draw on for devellopping good reasons, we have to take into account that these “good reasons” are socially mediated” (Christmann 2009). For Taylor (as for others conceiving human beings as “language animals”, this process of self-interpretation (one could say –“reflexivity” or “practical reason” ) is only possible from the Background of a symbolic and semantic field of language (Taylor uses the term “horizons of significance” (Taylor 1984), as a means to asess one`s own life-plan, wishes, desires and devellop future projections and possible futures which are at the basis of devellopping an idea of “what we have reason to value. Insofar the develloppement of what one has reason to value happens only trough and within language, preferences, aspirations and “good reasons” (Sen) are “socially mediated” (Christmann 2009): “When an individual reflects on her personal characteristics, actions, memories, and the like, she must use concepts gleaned from the language(s) she speaks and the subtleties of meaning provided by the social world within which that language is developed”.(ibid.: 84). In Appadurais words – and albeit he refers to Aspirations: “Aspirations are never simply individual (as the language of wants and choices inclines us to think). They are always formed in interaction and in the thick of social life”. (Appadurai 2004). Preferences, in Sen`s Framework treated as a-priori-features of individuals, not being subject to further inquiry are therefore deeply social insofar they are always mediated, transposed an devellopped in a social frame. This aspect has also been devellopped by Severine Deneulin and Allister Mc Gregor in a recent article on the socio-theorethical foundations of the capability approach: They argue that the C.A.`s potential “is diminished by its insufficient treatment of the social construction of meaning. Social meanings enable people to make value judgements about what they will do and be, and also to evaluate how satisfied they are about what they are able to achieve. From this viewpoint, a person’s state of wellbeing must be understood as being socially and psychologically co-constituted in specific social and cultural contexts. (Deneulin and McGregor 2010: 501). For the application of the capability approach to my research project, I will retain three points that seem particularly important. 1.) The scope of interest being “Agency freedom” as “what a person is free to do and achieve in pursuit of whatever goals or values he or she regards as important”, (Sen 2000) not only the political and economic formal requirements should be considered. Insofar Aspirations and preferences are not a a-priori-feature of individuals, but are “formed in the thick interaction with social life” (Appadurai 2004), the processes of preference formation, respectively the preconditions which allow a autonomous formulation of self-determined life-plans have to be considered as well. Inequalities in the space a capabilities are thus not only due to the unequal distribution of material ressources, but are also rooted in the “asymetrical distribution of cultural and psychological life-chances” (Honneth 2007:93). This refers to the unavoidable

“evaluative character” of the symbolic-semantic field in which aspirations are devellopped, and of the concepts, languages and meanings individuals glean on when individuals develop self-interpretations, future projects and mobilize ressources for own projects. Analysing Agency thus requires not only to look at the “formal requirements” described by Sen, but has to include an analysis of the different ways people “reflect upon, make sense of, and utilize the human and nonhuman resources and sociocultural schemas available to them” (Grundmann/ Dravenau: 2009: 94). 2.) Closely related to the previous issue, a closer investigation of the “interactive and processual dimension” (Zimmerman 2005) of Agency. Insofar the key formulation of the capability approach “ what people have reason to value6” requires a “Self” who is able to deliberate, to act more or less intentionally on behalf of own value commitments and who is able to provide justifications for acts, choices and decisions, a more profound investigation in the these processes of “practical reasoning” are required. Practial reasoning, as the “ability to engage in critial reflection and the planning of one`s life” (Nussbaum 2000) entails thus processes of reflexive deliberation on one owns life, on the ability to consider more or less good reasons and to reflect about one owns life and life-situation in the in the light of one owns values, wishes wants and beliefs. Furthermore, the ability to act intentionally and in a planning manner, is always related – at least in a modicum to a dyachronous, futureoriented perspective. As Macintyre writes, in order to be a practical reasoner, “I have to be able to imagine different possible futures for me, to imagine myself moving forward from the starting point of the present in different directions, be able to envisage both nearer and more distant futures and to attach probalities, even if only in a rough and ready way, to the future results of acting in one way rather than another“ (MacIntyre 1999:74). In order to catch this projective, temporal dimension, “biographical methods” seem most appropriate. 3.) As a third point, Agency –or the action-theorethic premises of action that are implicit in the capability approach may be biased in the sense that they presuppose that all actions, decisions and choices we take are taken after reflexive deliberation. This is obviously not true, as many of the decisions we take are rather following a “logic of practice” without the existence of conscious calculation (Bourdieu 1998). Furthermore, a conscious-calculative and “planning” attitude towards ones life, as is depicted in the notion of “choice Biography” (Beck 1992) may not be the prevailing mode of “engagement with one`s future” respectively may inscribe young people in a way that depicts them as being the authors of their lives, which potentially disrespects the constraining forces many young people are confronted with. Even if modern societies increasingly demand that people actively shape their own biography, the objective conditions to do so seem to be increasingly absent (Bauman, 2000; Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1991). This calls thus to find a balanced approach which considers at the same time the reflexive, considered and deliberative aspects of decisions and actions as well as the non-reflexive, habitualized and on-the-spot decisions.

The period between compulsory education and vocational-training comprises important “decisions” and orientation- processes which have a high impact on the further life-course, and lead to a confrontation of own inclinations, vocational aspirations with a highly structured and for some, very restrcited opportunity space. One can describe this period as a important “biographical turning point” in which the own life-course could potentially take different directions, different pathways and directions. From the subjective side, this period is

charaterized by a process of connecting the “biographical with the structural” (Dubar/Demaziere 1994) insofar as young people develop have to develop as subjectively (and structurally) viable life-plans, thus have to balance own hopes, aspirations and wishes connected to their adult life and their profession with what is structurally possible and available. In a biographical perspective, the vocational orientation processes of young people facing a restricted range of opportunities can thus be described – in a processual dimensionas a (more or less) reflexive reformulation of life-plans, the projective develloppement of plans pointed towards towards the future on the basis of perceived opportunities and possibilities young people are confronted with. In this process, own aspirations, expectations and life-projects are constantly confronted with with selection criteria and accessible joboffers, but also have to be reformulated, aligned and balanced with expectations from parents, teachers and peers in an act of “reality check” (Heinz 1995: 130). I use the term “biographical orientations patterns” respectively “biographical strategies” in order to highlight that these processes not necessarily have the character of voluntarist “decisions” in which young people follow a fully rational process of weighting different options, attaching probabilities and calculating the relative effort they are willing to put in each of this option, but mainly – as a narrative imagination of different possible future selves which is informed by the past (insofar as the young people base their decisions on past experiences e.g. in school, with employers, their internships, but also more habitualized and socialized values that are transmitted trough socialization) by the present situation (insofar as different “key ecologies” of youth life, different social and institutional settings impact on their ability to devellop future projections and to give coherence of the different demands and injunction that they are deemed to follow) and oriented to the future (as the engagegement in actions pointed towards the future – a constitutive aspect of Agency requires at least a “blurry” idea of possible future selves that can provide “good reasons” for and engagament in a certain pathway). The term of “biographical strategies” and “biographical orientation processes” highlights the need to understand the engagement in one`s future as embedded in his socially mediated and meaningfull involvement in his every-day Life-world. Remember that “biography” does not refer to the “real” life-course, in terms of factual transitions, dates and life-course markers, but to the entity of of subjective representations trough which individuals continually construct as well for themseves as for others the mental and verbal form and meaning of their existence. Biography, Agency and “practical reason” Human Agency has thus to be reconstructed as constituted trough meaningfull experiences and to the ways human beings “make sense” and “build coherence” to their lived experience and develop future action plans from the background of these supports. This perspective is informed by the concept of biographical research, as it conceives “narratives” and language as the main medium trough which individuals “structure their experience”, (see e.g. Brunner 1984). The concept of “Biographicity” (Alheit/Dausien 2000, Marotzki 2007) defined as a continual re-interpretation of new lived experience from the background of their biographical stock of knowledge trying to bring it in accordance with what they have experienced untill now. As Marotzki states Biographicity points towards the process of a retrospective reflection in which trough biographical Work, we try to link different (sometimes contradictory) experiences and events in order to yarn a consistent thread towards our life” (Marotzki 2007: 179). According to Alheit and Dausien (2000), it is via this active process of continual reinterpretation trough which we are able to perceive our Life as “mouldable” (ibid), respectively try to give direction to our lifes. Processes of biographisation – as conceived by this strand of biographical research are thus a main medium trough which individuals practice reflexivity, think about their life and develop future plans of action. I argue that these descriptions of “biographisation” are particularly close to the notion of “practical reason”, as for example described in Martha Nussbaums

second “architectonic capabilities”. The ability ability to “engage in critical reflection about the planning of one's own life” (Nussbaum 2000), can be conceived as a narratively embedded process in which actors develop, drawing from their experiences, selfinterpretations that allow them to engage in a critical reflection of their lives and develop action plans towards the future. Nevertheless, while biographisation seems mainly pointed towards the past, the aspect of practical reason highlights also the future-oriented aspects of these reasoning processes: As Macintyre writes, in order to be a practical reasoner, “I have to be able to imagine different possible futures for me, to imagine myself moving forward from the starting point of the present in different directions, be able to envisage both nearer and more distant futures and to attach probalities, even if only in a rough and ready way, to the future results of acting in one way rather than another“(MacIntyre 1999:74). Biographical orientation processes thus contain a projective element which is constituive for this future oriented aspects of practical reasoning. This projective element, as “the imaginative generation by actors of possible future trajectories of action, in which received structures of thought and action may be creatively reconfigured in relation to actors'hopes, fears, and desires for the future”.(Emirbayer and Mische 1998: 963) Seems to catch quite well the future oriented Aspect of biographically embedded decision and orientation processes – also contained in the “planning” aspect of the Nussbaum-citation. In referring to a more theorethical description this comes close to what Margaret Archer has described as “reflexivity”: “people deliberate about their objective circumstances in relation to their subjective concern. They consult their projects to see whether they can realize them, including adapting them, adjusting them, abandoning them or enlarging them in the deliberative process”. (Archer 2007: 21). For Archer, reflexivity is inseparable and constitutive of Human Agency, in the sense that engaging in biographical decisions and planning is inextricably linked with a projective anticipation of possible future doings and beings. This conception of rationality seems, in my opinion quite close to the weak rationality principle that Sen sets as central concept against concepts of “instrumental rationality: “ Rationality of choice, in this view, is primarily a matter of basing our choices - explicitely or by implication - on reasoning that we can reflectively sustain if we subject them to critical reasoning (…..) people are, by and large, able to reason and scrutinize their own decisions and those of others" (Amartya Sen 2010: 180-178).Sen`s “reflexive actor” is able to deliberate, to assess and to think about the “good reasons” he has to choose and to conduct as certain action, thus to refer to the “space of reasons” elaborated above. Nevertheless as a corrective to the “reflexive” aspects of decision-making, one has to take into account that “choice” is often not something that occurs after reasoned deliberation: “most choices we make are made in urgent and contingent encounters in which we have to made on-the-spot decisions as our own and others needs, expectations, phantasies and feelings press in on us” (Hoggett 2001: 40). Often, (what also becomes clear in some of the narratives of theyoung people) choices are not perceived as such, respectively, a situation, period or decision is not perveiced as a a situation with a certain discretionary space. This calls to take into account the “situative factors” that impinge in a speficic socio-temporal biographical situation (Leu Krappmann: 1999) in which choices are made and decisions (more or less reflexively) taken. Another concept that can shed more light on the processes taking place in the period of transition from school to work is the concept of “Life-planning” (Oechsle and Geissler 1996, 1999). The term “planning” should thereby not suggest that young people engage predominantly in an active and rational planning attitude towards their futures, but points to the fact that biographical orientation processes can be conceived as “an element of every-day Life-practice itself” (Oechsle and Geissler:1996: 4). While it refers – on the one side- to the past and the devolution of the previous Biography, trough which certain spaces of action and opportunities are constituted it refers on the other side towards the future, insofar as different action alternatives are considered and pondered, decisions are prepared and future demands

and injunctions are anticipated. Most importantly, the possibility for Life-planning is only given in the case the “present” can be transgressed, “if tomorrow is not only the prolonged present” (Oechsle/Geissler 1996). Nevertheless, the space in which these processes of planning, of weighting of different alternatives takes place is the “present” the everyday life, insofar as “past” self and “future self are linked, where past achievements and actual decisions are linked with future Aspirations, and in which different action possibilities are devellopped from past experiences. The biographical orientation processes are “socially situated” Insofar as decisions are inevitably bound to a spacio-temporal and a socially determined “scope of the subjectively possible and imaginable” of the individual. It is in this space of the biographically impregnated, concrete spatio-temporal situation, in which individuals try to deal with different societal injunctions and demands and try to balance these injonctions with their own projects and values, thus with what they have “reason to value”, in which they develop further projects and in which they decide to engage in different projects and opportunities. This process “depends decisively (…) on the possibility to develop a stable balance between actual and future action-projects”(Lange 2001: 134).The ressources necessary for this are distributed unequally insofar this possibility decisively depends on the material, social and cultural resources a person has at its disposition. Many studies on “precarity” and poverty have shown, that people living in precarious life—situations have to bring up most of their time and energy for the coping with everyday adversities and injunctions, thus inhibiting more future-oriented planning activities. As Bourdieu states, “below a certain level of economic security (…) Actors are no more able to conduct those actions that implicate a appropriation of future (2000: 20). The organization of everyday-life and the organization of ones future life are interdependent, so that e.g. the sychnchronous organization of everyday activities and the hardships of coping with everyday life may strongly impact on the ability to the planning of one`s Life and on the develloppement of a perspective in which individuals may develop a sense of agentic capacity and autonomy in the sense of a proactive anticipation of future states of being and doing that one deems valuable (e.g. Dörre 2008). In terms of the capability approach, one should thus consider to investigate these preconditions in terms of “basic security” are necessary in order that young people can exert practical reason. It is important to note that the capacity to “engage in one`s future”, the required competencies are highly vulnerable to external contingencies. These processes of “engagement with one`s own future” can be described as “self-projects” (Bühler-Niederberger 2010). This term is mainly used to designate that the transition from school to work is not only charaterized by a process of “career-planning”, restricted to choosing a educational or vocational pathway but entail important processes of identityformation. Allbeit work may have predominantly a purely instrumental value for some, young people interviewed orient themselves not only to the material-reproductional aspects of work (e.g. the expected salary etc.) but also take into consideration their subjective inclinations, wishes and aspirations, which point towars the “intrinsic” value of work young people ascribe to certain professional activities. Similarly to Robeyns (2006) distinction between the “instrumental” and the “intrinsic” value of Education, work thus has not only a value that can be attributed to on the one side to the monetary outcomes of a certain professional activity, but point to the other side, to a the non-material aspects of Work7. Insofar this description holds, vocational choice processes and orientation processes are always “biographised” insofar they relate to the individuals values inclinations and wishes, formed trough previous 7

For example, work is not only a mean for material subsitence, but allows recognition for productive contributions trough participating “in a system of cooperative production” (Anderson, 1999: 318). Thus “the nature of the work that we are allowed or required to do has considerable ethical significance” (Sayer, 2005: 118). Sen describes abundantly the noninstrumental value of work, e.g.: “paid work matters for quality of life partly because it provides identity to people and opportunities to socialise with others” (Stiglitz, Sen & Fitoussi, 2009 : 49, Sen 1997).

experience and oriented towards future possible selves. In order to highlight the processual dimension of these biographical orientation patterns, Bühler Niederberger (2010) coined the term “working out” between own aspirations and the socially structured space of available opportunities. “Working out” refers to the processes which occur when young people – starting from their subjective assessment of the opportunity structure, assess what is possible for them, reflect on possible bareers they are confronted with and develop different Aspirations which guide their plans and actions. It may also entail processes of adaptation towards educational pathways that seem easier to achieve, in order to reduce the risk of failure (and to avoid later disappointment) respectively based on anticipated obstacles and hindrances that “real” or “imagined” – impact on the biographical orientations and strategies young people adopt in transition from school to work. A model highlighting to a similar point that has found to be has been developed by Andreas Witzel (1996, 1999). Witzel analyses biographical orientation processes in terms of “Bilancations”, Aspirations” and “Realisations”. In his model of analysis, Aspirations point towards the identified reasons for action, respectively the justifications young people depict for engaging in a certain pathway. According to Witzel, Aspirations can thus be conceptualized as “good reasons” to engage in a certain pathway, and which can be identified in Interviews as motives, interests, inclinations but also more concrete plans and projects. As already described above, “Actors foresight vocational and educational opportunities in order to explore different action alternatives” (Witzel 1999: 17). “Realisations” are defined as statements which point towards concrete action plans in order to realize the Aspirations. These also often incorporate identified barriers that have to be overcome, opportunities and possibilities that have to be grasped. “Bilancations” refer to individual and subjective appraisals of the outcomes of different decisions, experiences and life-phases. “Bilancations” are thus retrospective and narrative processes of “making sense” of and “giving coherence” to past experiences. This processing and integration of past experiences into the current ”self” is important as young people may draw on these retrospective reflexive processes of bilancation of past experience when planning future actions, devellopping future Aspirations or reframe own concerns in the light of their lived experience.

biographicalstrategiesandbiographicaldecisionmakingprocesses– Afirstinsightinapreliminaryanalysis The following extracts are based on a first set of 5 interviews that have been conducted with young people without upper secondary education in search for an apprenticeship and who are enrolled either in a "transition measure" financed by the public employment service or by a "coaching"-sheme put in place for school leavers who coudn`t find an apprenticeship/ respectively have been monitored to be "at risk". It is planned to conduct follow-up interviews with a selected number of young people in order to allow a certain tracking over time and to develop a dyachronic perspective on the transitions of the young people. The interviews have been conducted in the framework of a dissertation-project on educational and welfare policies for vulnerable Youth. Beyond these interviews with young people several Interviews with frontline agents in charge of the young people as well with managers and policy-makers have been conducted which will not be subject of this paper. The methodology adopted followed the concept of “problem-centered interview” (Witzel 1999) thus combining narrative sections with more theorethically informed questionnements on specific topics in order to favour a case-comparative stance and to have a more profound information on specific topics. This preliminary analysis is based on a case-wise analysis of biographical patterns that seemed to be reccurent in the narratives of each young people where analysed. Allbeit it is planned to adopt a sequential analysis, this preliminary analysis draws on a preliminary, theory-based coding-procedure in order to plausibilise some of the theorethical statements made.

For this first, preliminary analysis, special attention was drawn on the following focal points. Based on the theorethical premises, it seemed important to take particular notice on: x

x

x

x x x

The narrative imagination of future projects, and how they differ according to their breadth, their reach, their depth, their “fixedness”/”openness “ resp. their degree of specificity and complexity (see e.g. Mische 2009). This includes also perceived bareers, “subjunctivisations” (Brunner 1986) or hypothethical resolution of conflicts and narratively enacted “maps of action” (Ricoeur 1991). In relation to the professional and vocational projects, on the “experiential and relational supports” (Castel 2003/ Vuille 2007) young people draw on when devellopping “imagined futures” (Ball 1999). This points to the identification of the role of different “Key ecologies” (Lange 2008) and their role in biographical orientation processes. This refers also to the “justifications” in terms of “good reasons” they draw on when devellopping possible futures and which are forwarded in order to plausibilise or make accountable certain actions and choices. Caroline Harts Study on decision-making in higher education (2010) describes these “justifications” as “socio-cultural registers of meaning and action” (ibid.) on which young people draw on when accounting for their decisions and actions. The individuals acquaintance with the time-perspective, in a more general sense, their “temporal horizons” and in a more specific perspective, trough analysing more profoundly “temporal markers” in narratives (Zimmerman 2005, Schütze 1982). In the role of “Agentivity” and causality in narratives, e.g. the ways in how certain actions, situations are described (even counterfactually) in a way that places the young people in an active, agentic role. Alike, sections of narratives which point to the experience of “powerlessness”, respectively to situations that are narrated as “incurred”. This should rise attention to situations that young people depict as being exposed to forces beyond their control, respectively in which they perceived their life as under the control of external forces.

The role of experiential and relational supports for the develloppement of vocational futures When “engaging in their futures”, young people draw – in different manners on their repertoire of experiences they have at their disposition. The biographical orientation processes which involve the develloppement of different “imagined futures” (Ball 1999). In relation to the theorethical respecifications of the concepts of “preferences” and “Aspirations” that have been claimed above, one can argue that these do not devellop in a neutral space, but relate in very direct manner to different past experiences, which serve as a “wellspring” of future actions, plans and vocational orientations (see e.g. Lahire 2010). One can claim that young people confronted with the task to “narrate” them projectively into the world of work, draw on a repertoire of different past experiences they have made in different fields of their everyday life. They “build” future imaginations from the ressources, experiences and information at hand, while taking into consideration the spaces of possibilities that they think they are able to achieve. The ability to formulate future projects to develop narrations which point to more or less viable professional futures is in a strong dependance of their “relational supports” (Castel 2001) they have at their disposition. The extracts below show different ways in which young people relate to past experience respectively to different experiential and relational supports when explaining why they are aspiring to a certain Job or profession. In different manners, they draw on past experiences in different social fields when asessing if they will “fit” into a certain profession, respectively if different professional activities will allow them to develop what they “have reason to value”. It is clear that these different hopes

and expectations tied to professional futures are always preliminary and highly fallible, sometimes idealizing, sometimes depicting very selectively different aspects of professions. Nevertheless, they seem to be highly relevant when contextualising them, e.g. when taking into account the experiences of young people as a whole. Sam`s narrative, highlighting the relations at the workplace, the “sincerity” of colleagues and the sometimes”rude” straightforwardness that he knows from his fathers accounts can only be understood in the light of his past job-related experiences, in which he suffered from the disrespect his colleagues where showing to him. The other young person, highlighting the fact that her future profession “has to have something to do with the medical sector”, and has to allow her to do something where she “has to think” is more comprehensible when taking into account that she experienced several setbacks while attempting to access “medical” professions, leaving her with less valued professional options in the eyes of their parents who are seeing the carreer of their daughter as a familial social ascension project. (M, 17) Because mechanics is a world where people are straightforward,they yell at each other.. you know, that`s how you do it, that`s how it works.. yesyes. That`s it it doesn`t bother me doesn`t bother because I.. myself i can do that.. that`s all in the way because that`s a world where they don`thide you anything, you see? You think on something.. you say it.. (F22) So that is stays in the medical field.. because at the Gymnasium, I really liked Biology, I really liked the human body and how it works and everything.. so one needs to work for living, that`s clear,but if it is the only thing.. if it`s all I do and I have nothing else I won`t I cant you see? medical assistant that`s quite regular hours and at the same time it^s in the medical field. For me there has to be same medical in it, some Biology, something where I can think, at least a minimum…but I also want time for my family and friends These first accounts depict quite clearly (at least in my eyes) that Aspirations already take into account the “institutionally possible” and are devellopped always in relation to possible subjective attachments and engagements to different institutions. One can use Howard Beckers concept of « institutional careers” (Becker 1985) to describe how the young people struggle to connect the “biographical and the structural” (Dubar 1994) respectively to find a place in society in which their subjective inclinations can find realization. In fact, the normal development of people in our society (and probably in any society) can be seen as a series of “progressively increasing commitments to conventional norms and institutions” (Becker 1966: 27). That means that the young people are in a certain way all allong their transition to work and adulthood, “constructing” their aspirations in relation to the institutions through which they transit (school, vocational education, the world of work). It is only at the interior of these relations to central social institutions (which are strongly linked to different life course phases), in which the realisation of their subjective expectations, their wishes and Aspirations can take place, and which provide certain socially recognised, accepted and viable pathways. We can observe, in the narratives of young people – a quite fragile relationship to these social institutions, Some express serious concerns to find a Job they “like”, others have given up any hope for a Job which serves as more than pure as more breadwinning activity. All of the young people, nevertheless, “narrate” their possible pathways to work, their imagined futures by accounting for the space of instituionally possibilities, thus take into account what trajectories are (more or less) foreseen and possible for themselves. Balancing own wishes and aspirations with options and opportunities A reccurrent theme is the role and interplay of different injunctions that play a role in

devellopping a professional project and an engagement with a possible professional future. This comes close to bringing together different “logics of action” (Dubet 1994) closely tied to the different social contexts and affiliations that a young person are endowed in. Biographical orientation processes ( and thus educational and vocational choice processes) are thus strongly linked to these attachements young people sustain with these different “key-ecologies” (Lange 2008) of youth life. This becomes particularly clear in the narrative of Catherine. The reduction of possible choices due to her advanced age interferes with, at the one side the demands “ to do something” that are pointed to her from her parents, on the other side Catherine seems to be particularly concerned to find a Job which valorises her in the eyes of her friends. Thirdly she seems particularly concerned “to find something” that she likes. Catherine is be caught between this contradictory logics of action which seem to make her balance between insecure professional perspectives, and which, allbeit she disposes of relatively high school grades – are nevertheless not given. While she maintains her wish “find something” into the medical field, she is more and more confronted to pressures from her counsellors who tell her that she will have to develop a “Plan B”, and experiences that employers are reluctant to offer an apprenticeship place to a person that is a few years older than her competitors. So in this moment, now(.) so. I come back to it, because I say to myself that commercial employee(..) I know I have the capacities to do it but do I also like the Job that`s another thing you know because among the people who give me advice there are some who tell me do this or that at least you have work but at the same time do I have to force myself to do some work I don`t like basically that`s the main point.. so in the moment the tell me I have to develop a plan B, a plan B but the problem is all the plan B`s I don’t`like these professions there…

Restricted choices In some cases, biographical orientations and Aspirations are not oriented towards a long-term goal of a specific job, but to a rather pragmatic overcoming of the transition period itself (see Golisch 2002) up to the point that they doesn t tend to fixed aspirations but rather to the pragmatic adaption of decisions to engage in a certain profession– they “(are forced to) “take what they get” (see Fobe/Minx 1996 or Heinz 2009). This cases are often characterized by a proccess in which earlier Job aspirations have been “cooled out” trough experiences of failure, and often professional projects have been scaled down several times after experiencing that due to insufficient school grades, other individual preconditions or simply a very restricted range of apprenticeship places in certain economic sectors, a cherished vocational pathway is not attainable. In these cases, “intentionality of choices” is progressively replaced by « practical choices » (Zunigo 2010: 14). These biographical orientation processes can be read as a strategy to manage restricted opportunities and follow a “sense of necessity” (Bourdieu 1998) – the imperative to find simply “something” takes overhand on the wish to something that one “likes”. It is not that these young people are not able to express what they have reason to value respectively do not dispose of Job-related Aspirations – rather, they often depict work as something important in their lives and express rather clear (and often not unattainable) projects. But troughout the narratives, a certain disconnection of their Identity from Work becomes obvious. While others stress the aspect of self-realization trough work and often connect certain aspects of their valued professions they are aspiring to with earlier hobbies or competencies - with things “they always liked”, or they “know quite good”, the group here at stake stress the need that they “take what they get”. Jes, that`s it basically… i don`t have the choice and i have to tell you… the least annoying …you see? I would prefer a work which I like…but, if there is none, there is none…it is not

that hard, ill do with it… but I don`t have to tell to myself… (4sec) anyway… i don`t know something i like would be great… In some cases of this group, the decision to engage in a certain apprenticeship was depicted as being coined to a high extent by the recomendations from school and carreer couselling. Allbeit – in retrospective- the choosen profession was often not corresponding their expectation, they where engaging in a certain vocational training because “at school they said i had the ability to do this apprenticeship” or because the “ability test I have undergone pointed to these careers”. These processes can be described as a form of delegated decisionmaking (Burchardt 2010) It is nevertheless not clear if these patterns, in which the reasons to engage in a certain pathway are delegated to institutions point to lacking information about alternative pathways or if they are a sign of an orientation towards those pathways in which the highest probabilities to achieve an apprenticeship persist. Nonetheless, these cases are particularly interesting as these young people depict themselves as quite uninvolved in the decision of a future pathway. A further interpretation – in terms of a biographical strategy could be that ceeding the responsibility for choices to counselling institutions and “interest tests” is a way of conveying the pressure to succeed from oneself, may it be in a retrospective, rationalizing manner. Hmm and then (..) after that (..) I have searched afterwards (..) I have made logistician, logistician I found an apprenticeship directly but seriously this job didn`t please me at all., you know I made logistician because you see, at school, they told me I have the right grades for this Job you see, it was sure that I was going to achieve the apprenticeship with this these grades, you see and then I said to myself, I will rather go.. in the direction first pass an apprenticeship and then do perhaps something else, you know and then so, yes, I found.. Last Year I had a apprenticeship but then I did a bit stupid (.) a little(…) at the (xxx) I did some foolish things and then I dropped out. Afterwards, I made a Test, here psychotechnical test. And it sorted out all the professions that i mentally think i will be able to do.. and then there is Gardener who got out(…) there is cook… and then aah artist professions. And that. Yes i like that Another possible explanation of this phenomenon could be the fact that young people – at least at the moment they where taking these decisions – did not dispose in “a sufficient way those situative action- and interpretation competencies for short-termed processes of analysis, reflection and choice that are oriented towards a longer-termed lifecourse and biography”, a observation Fritz Schütze made already 30 Years ago (Schütze 1982:290). In a certain way it seems quite demanding to take a decision which has a huge impact on the further Life-course and which implies a long-term commitment. Furthermore, one can ask the question if the temporal rationalities of Youth-life itself (time perspectives necessarily foccussed on the short –term overcoming of present sintuations and every-daylife problems) impede considerably the ability to take such important decisions. In a more abstract sense one could talk of an “autonomy gap” (Anderson 2005), of social policies, insofar as there is a considerable gap between the real decision making capacities and skills to make responsible and autonomous decisions that individuals actually dispose of and the amount of these competencies and properties, that is required and presupposed by the policies in question. Insofar policies, at least implicitely, “necessarily rest upon assumptions about the motivations that people have and the capacities they possess”. (Deacon 2004: 448), and the hypothesis proves right that the policies are based on a biased view of the young peoples abilities (in the terms described above) this could lead to a systematic effect in terms of unequal outcomes.

Dealing with instituional demands and Injunctions The transition policies and vocational guidance schemes in question have undergone, with the rise of the “active state” a considerable semantic swap. Under the influence of the discourse of the activating state, policies are undergoing a triple trend towards Individualisation, responsibilization and territorialisation. Allbeit these develloppements have been most influential in Labour-marekt and Welfare policies (see Barbier 2006) the leitmotifs, in terms of a accentuation of individual responsibility, the stress on the adaptability of individuals to labour market demands and the conditionalisaton of help behavioral requirements has spread out to other policy fields. It is primarily the individual who is responsible for his own life and his own insertion on the labour market, having to find biographical solutions to social problems (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002). In the schemes under consideration, a high stress on the young peoples responsibility to actively engage in the autonomous formulation of a “individual professional project” seem to prevail. Some of these young people are described by the representatives of the institutions as lacking autonomy and initiative, thus not engaging sufficiently in writing applications or having a “consumption attitude” towards the Institutions supposed to “integrate” them in the world of work. This ascribed lack of motivation, not corresponding to the institutional demands and often being constant concern of negotiation between the young persons and the institutional representatives, is experienced quite differently by the young people. These go from active refutation to interiorisation of the norms and demands promoted by the transition scheme young people are attending: .. Yes, I think that.. the counsellor did not explain very well what the goal of the (name of the institution) was. Because the way she said it, i had the impression .. like she was doing as if it would be my fault that I didn`t find, you know. And then in this moment, she told me motivational Semester it is like saying that i am not motivated to find and if I would need to get motivated, while I only need to find my way… (female, 18) Others seem not to refute the ascription of lacking of motivation. This is reflected in this extract, where a young man describes what happened in his last session with his personal advisor: Yes, and then she was a little unsetlled, today because you know, i have no internship and for 2 months now, and i do nothing, you see.. so today she was a bit nervous, a bit unsettled…I Understand very well, I was just waiting for the right moment I was not ( I did not say to her) listen, I am not in a hurry, no.. I was waiting for her to tell me and then today, she told me today, and now I have to get motivated, I will do it, find a internship.. The ascription of lacking “Motivation”, not being sufficiently engaged in the develloppement of their professional future is important as it entails the implicit ascription of responsibility for their own situation: “ If you are not motivated, it is clear that you don`t find an apprenticeship”. Allbeit the structural lack of apprenticeship places makes it hard (for some) to access the labour-market, the institutional interpretation pattern “codes” these situations as a lack of motivation of the young persons. At least in a semantic manner, structural inequalities are translated into categories of individual responsibility.Duvoux coined the Term “biographical injunction” or “injunction to Autonomy” (2008),which consists in asking people to develop their professional project without providing them with the necessary ressources to do so. Insofar this interpretation pattern conceives the young people as principally able to act autonomously, to actively engage searching an apprenticeship and to “choose” a professional pathway (note that real “choice” does in many cases not exist) but lacking the motivation of doing so, it perpetuates potentially a “blame the victim” attitude. In cases in which this “ascription” is internalized by the person, it can have detrimental effects on the self worth of

the person. As I am responsible for my professional future, and I potentially dispose of the agentic capacities to do so, failure can only attributed to the individual who consequently judges itself not “good enough” or not “competitive” enough. Or as Dubet puts it “asking the most destitute to make a project is transforming their fate into choice” (Dubet 1994). Engagement and disenagement in transition to work Scope and specificity of imagined futures,temporal horizons and descriptions of agentivity differ highly across the different narratives. While some seem to have a quite clear image of future professional activities, depict possible valued states of being and doing, and devellop sometimes quite determinate ideas of their future professional identities others seem to be very hesitant. It is important not to ascribe a high level of Agency to the first one`s and a small level of Agency to the second one`s: Often those with determinate projects and predominantly future-oriented orientations seem to have restrained their horizons of possibilities already to a considerable extent and interiorised the institutional ascriptions, while those who are reluctant to “engage in their future” are also those who often voice their concerns and depict a certain “sense of entitlement” towards the institution. They describe more often feelings of Injustice and seem to be more realistic about their future options, but also more “empowered” to express voice. Agency has thus not to be equalized with a pronounced future orientation. Nevertheless, some of the patterns above clearly related to important differences in experiencing one`s life as being under influence of external forces. The subjective (feeling) – and the objective ability to exert a certain control over one`s life course as well as the ability to find a job one has reason remains an important dimension of inequality.What is striking troughout most of the cases, is the strong link between the objective factors that restrict access to different vocational opportunities (e.g. school grades, advanced age), the prevalence of experiences of drop-out and failure and the “diffusity” of imagined futures and the length of temporal horizons. It seems that, in a situation of biographical insecurity, an adaptive attitude in the sense to not “choose” in order to stay open to the circumstances and that may (or may not) offer certain opportunities prevails. The avoidance of too “concrete” future imaginations, to develop plans and projects may seem to be a important strategy to deal with biographical insecurity. The sometimes depicted inutility to think about one`s future, a centring on present activities, a more or less drawn-out “wait and see” attitude, and often a readiness to “take what they get” (in terms of apprenticeships), may be absolutetly coherent with a youth specific acquaintance with time and future. Nevertheless, as the decisions taken under these conditions are merely qualifiable as “autonomous decisions” – which furthermore can have a high impact of later life-course impact and may translate directly into low job-satisfaction, this seems to be a important aspect for further inquiry. Faced with a very restricted range of opportunities and having experienced a range of setbacks in attempting to access the world of work the “disengagement” with one`s own future seems to be a viable strategy in order to avoid a possible anticipated failure, respectively in order to maintain an identity that remains stable in the face of biographical uncertainty.As Pierre Bourdieu writes, „the inexorably repeated experience of failure, first in school, then in the labour-market prevents or discourages any reasonable hope for the future (…) this temporal experience, characteristic of a subproletariat fated by lack of power over the present to give up on the future or to constantly switch aspirations, is rooted in an absolute uncertainty about the future”. (Bourdieu: 1999: 185). It may sound tragic, but confronted with lacking reliable expectations about the future, it seems to be a viable strategy “not to expect too much” from the future: Reduced expectations “may play an essential role in maintaining the mental stability of individuals” Kay et.al (2002: 1300). The motivational ressources necessary to engage in a certain school pathway or an apprenticeship are quite extensive. As Roger Gould states, an apprenticeship requires a four

year “commitment that is made to a future self” (Gould 2003). The “wellsprings of action” (Lahire 2010) from which young people draw when engaging in a apprenticeship, and which sustains the ability to conduct all the smaller (getting up in the morning) an the bigger (planning a carreer) actions necessary to access and maintain an employment depend on “good reasons” young people have to engage in such. “Drop-out” of apprenticeships (or of school-based programmes), experienced by most of the sample interviewed by now can thus be interpreted as difficulties – in terms of Dubar/Demaziere, to” connect the biographical and the structural” - to find viable connections between the subjective inclinations, wishes and Aspirations and the opportunity structure. The develloppement of a (provisional) viable “future self” from which the necessary motivation to engage in one`s vocational future can be derived is inhibited by a highly structured opportunity space, leaving only a few occupational options often with a low social status open to them. Understood like this, one can read processes of “disengagement”, of “drop-out” or of hostility towards the world of work or education as a viable “biographical strategy” – the young people have “good reasons” not to engage in a vocational pathway which threatens their self-image, or to reject to develop a “future (occupational) self” that neither they, neither others would have reason to value. Those narratives which refer to a certain refusal, which contain sometimes diffuse and contradictory indications towards different possible aprenticeships, often rather done in order to comply to the institutional demands than in a veritable commitment to find an apprenticeship seem thus to come close to a strategy Francois Dubet termed “not to play the game anymore” (Dubet 2004: 628). Confronted with repeated failure and rejection, the disengagement from those “games” which threaten the own feeling of dignity, making it more and more difficult to maintain apositive self-image, seems to be a viable option. Conclusion: This contribution aimed at developing a analytical framework based on the Capability approach in order to assess biographical orientation patterns of low-educated school leavers in transition from School to Work. Drawing on these first results, one can preliminary retain three main Arguments. Firstly, the “preconditions” for Agency freedom cannot be reduced to the the provision of the “formal requirements” (political and economic guarantees, entitlements and opportunities- Sen 2000), but have to be enhanced. While a wide range of quality options (in terms of acces to apprenticeships) clearly is relevant for Agency freedom, focussing solely on this point may prove wrong when one considers that the ability to take informed decisions about one`s own futures, to develop autonomous life plans and to engage in the planning of one`s own life (all implicitely incorporated in a more or less obvious way in the formulation “have reason to value”) requires furthermore a basic level of biographical and material security, a freedom from external and internal pressure and constraints and last but not least, adequate socio-cultural means for expression and voice. In a more general sense one could talk about “autonomy-related competences” (Anderson/Honneth 2005). Taken it this way, the process of “practical reasoning” that this contribution has been trying to connect with concepts used in biographical research, (e.g. the notion of “biographical reflexivity”) is highly vulnerable to external constraints that should be included in the “informational basis of Judgements in Justice”, or more precisely taken into consideration when asessing if – and in what situations - people can and should be made responsible for their choices. Secondly, the idea of a autonomous and free individual seems to have become a powerful cultural model imposed to everybody. In the case of school leavers with low vocational and educational prospects, this discourse may inscribe the young people as being able to compose their life “a la carte”, as “being the author of their lives”, while this is obviously not the case. These discourses are themselves a source of human suffering, confronting individuals with a norm they value themselves but are not able to conform to. Further investigation should thus not only investigate the conditions that are necessary in order that vulnerable, socially situated

and socially embedded individuals can exert “Agency”, but expand the analysis to relations of domination and power which sytematically deprives persons from thinking of themselves as valuable persons. Consequently, this has to lead to an acknowledgement of the boundaries of Human Agency. Thirdly, and in a more analytic manner, this article argued for more intensive utilization of qualitative, interpretative methods in capability research. While this claim may sound unnecessary in front of the wide range of contributions at this conference which are based on qualitative methods, the need to recognise that the analysis of “how people read the world in which they live” (Sen 2010) and the acknowledgement that human beings gain Autonomy and Agency only by means of “culturally mediated self-interpretations” (Taylor 1984), which allow them to deliberate about what “they have reason to value” and to develop aspirations, wishes, wants and preferences makes it necessary to stress this point again.

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