Casualty and Tank Loss Rates in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War .... 144 ... Table C: US Army Casualties in Wars of the 19th and 20th ...... was not until the beginning of the 17th Century that guns finally displaced ..... Lower. Period. Battles. Successful. Stronger. Casualty Rate. 1600-1-699. 47. 77 ...... By contrast, the antitank rocket.
0AD-A278 728 Historical Evaluation & Research Organization HANDBOOK ON GROUND. FORCES ATTRITION IN MODERN WARFARE SEPTEMBER 1986
.
DTIC Trevor N. John R. C.
ELECTE
0 d
Dupuy
Brinkerhoff
APR 2 81994
Curtiss Johnson
Peter J.
Clark
A Division of:
DATA MEMORY SYSTEMS, INC. 10332 Democracy Lane Fairfax, VA 22030
(703) 591-3674
Thi, docu• e•e hs
p!. rove tor public releclwe a:-d zo1(,; its
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Ronald F. Bellamy 056-30-3794
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037:
Handbook on
GROUND
-
FORCES ATTRITION
IN MODERN WARFARE
Accesion
STrevor
N.
John R.. C.
*
NTIS DTIC
CRA&I IA-
Brinkerhoff
Curtiss Johnson
Peter J.
i
Dupuy
o
By O -rib.it o-
Clark
September 19R6
Prepared by:
*
The Historical
Evaluation and Fe.earch Organization
A Division of Data Memory Systems.. Inc. 10392 Democracy Lcne *
Fairfax, Tel,:
Virginia (703)
22030
591-36"74
The contents of this handbook reflect the views and findings of the Historical Evaluation and Research Organization not to be ccnstrued as an official
United States Government
position unless so designated by authorized documents.
*e
and are
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION CHAPTER
1:
........................................... FUNDAMENTALS
Significance Kinds Causes
of
OF ATTRITION
Attrition
of Attrition
1
.............................
7
....................................
7
........................................
of Attrition
The Attrition Cycle Personnel
..........
9
..........................................
..........................................
Loss Categories
10
....................................
12
The Personnel Attrition Process ..............................
15
Theater Evacuation
18
Policy
..................................
Personnel strength Terminology ...............................
20
Materiel
25
Attrition
Concepts
..................................
The Materiel Attrition Process Kinds of Attrition
Rates
...............................
31
.....................................
33
Sources of Strength and Attrition Data ........................
36
Understanding
41
CHAPTER 2: 1600:
Attrition
.....................................
PERSONNEL ATTRITION: The Benchmark Year
HISTORICAL PATTERNS AND TRENDS
....................................
Lethality versus Casualties
...
43 43
.................................
44
Effect of Dispersion on Casualty Rates ........................
48
Effect of the Conoidal Bullet on Casualty Rates
..............
55
Effect of Posture and Success on Casualty Rates
..............
57
The Concept of Relative Combat Effectiveness ..................
63
Maijor Historical Patterns and Trends ..........................
65
CHAPTER
4
3:
PERSONNEL
ATTRITION:
TWENTIETH
CENTURY
RATES ..........
67
Impact of Sustained Combat on Casualties .......................
67
Relative Combat Effectiveness and Casualty Rates ...............
71
Relationship of Casualty
74
Range
CHAPTER 4:
of
Twentieth
Rates to Force Size
Century Casualty
PERSONNEL ATTRITION:
Rates
of
Improved Medical
Disease and Non-Battle
Causes of Casualties
....................
76
TWENTIETH CENTURY RELATIONSHIPS
Relationship of Killed to Wounded in 'mpact
..............
Care
Injuries
Battle ....................
..............................
84
..............................
90 93
..............................
96
Casualties by Rank ........................................... CHAPTER 5:
PERSONNEL ATTRITION:
99
MINOR CONFLICTS SINCE 1945
......
103
Classification of Post-1945 Conflicts ..........................
104
The 73-Engagement
106
Data Base ..................................
Analysis of Engagement Data ...................................
108
Casualties by Circumstances of Combat (Rates and Wounded to Killed Ratio) ........................
12
Composite Terrain and Weather Casualty Rate Matrix ........... Comparision with World War II
CHAPTER 6:
MATERIEL ATTRITION
118
Casualty Rates .................120
Summary of Casualty Experience
SIntroduction
79 79
.........................................
Casualties by Branch of Service
..
for Minor Conflicts
...........
....................................
124
to Materiel Attrition ........................... Tank Losses and Crew Casualties
124
..............................
127
Tank Losses and Casualties in Battalion-Sized Maneuver Units ...... .................................... US Armored Division Casualty and Tank Loss Rates British Casualty and rank Loss Rates in
123
129 .............
Operation "Goodwood"
132 . 134
Soviet Casualty and Tank Loss Rates Evaluation of World War II Casualty
..........................
136
Tank Loss EXperience ..............
and Tank Loss Rates
in
the 1973
Arab-Israeli
139 War
Artillery Loss Rates in World War II ....................... Artillery Loss Rates in
the 1973 Arab-Israeli
Helicopter Loss Rates
in Vietnam
Other
......................
CHAPTER SELECT,
Materiel
Losses
7: ATTRITION
VERITIES
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
APPENDICES ..
War ............
.............................
....
144
....
145 153 155
.
..........
................................... ....................................
......................................................
157
161 171 183
Appendix 1:
THE HIERARCHY OF COMBAT ...........................
Appendix 2;
EXAMPLE OF ATTRITION RESEARCH....................87
Appendix 3:
THE PROCESS OF HISTORICAL CRITICISM .............
191
Appendix 4:
ASSESSING RELATIVE COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS VALUE . ........................................
195
73-ENGAGEMENT
199
Appendix 5: TABLES
............................................................
S!
POST-1945 CONFLICT DATA BASE .......
183
203
9
9
ATTRITION
DATA
TABLES
Page
Table'A:
Table B: Table C: Table D: Table E:
Theater Annual World War
F:
Table G:
9.
Rates: US Wars, II .......................
in Battles Daily Casualty Rates Selected Engagements (1861-1982) ............................. US Army Casualties in Wars of the 19th and Centuries .......................................... US
Army World War I Overseas Strengths Casualties by Branch and Rank .......................
US Army World War I Battle Deaths by Branch Raick
Table
and Daily Casualty I, and World War
203
or 204 20th 205 and
206
and
...............................
207
US Army World War II Overseas Casaalties by Branch and
Strengths and Rank .......................
Hist3rical
Battles,
Data
from
595 Land
1600-19733
208 ........
209
IN' RODUCTION purpose of this Handbook on Ground Forces Attrition
The ModErn
ics
Warfare
provide
to
military
with
analysts
in some
background information that will help them understand and analyze current future
outcomes of
operations and project the possible
combat
basis for this treatment of
The
combat.
attrition
in
modern warfare is historical analysis of combat. The
in this handbook has been
information
drawn
a series of different studies and reports prepared
from
Evaluation
Historical
and Research organization
by and
the by
II.-
p
there has
Unfortunately,
organizations and individuals.
other
(HERO)
together
not yet been a systematic and comprehensive study of attrition in warfare,~ and
mocdern
the
data
had
to
be
few studies that have been done,
relatively
other than the study of attrition.
from
gleaned often for
Additional study may modify some factors and
combat as a whole.
givc greater credibility to the findings, are likely to remain valid.
relai.ionship~s is
general
of this important phenomenon and how it relates to
understanding
handbook
purposes
Nevertheless, there has been
sufficient historical. analysis of attrition to provide a
will
the
the
best
compilation of
At
but the any
historical
general
rate, analyses
this on
attrition experi~ence available at the present time. Because analy~ud,
of
most
way in which the data
the of
it
pertains to US Ar',iy
was
collected
experience
and
and is
I
presented according
to US Army doctrine and
otherwise indicated
in
can
is
intent
The
general
provide
to
be
can
which
data
experiential
instances,
several
of
understanding
for example,
a of
explanation
combat
allow
to
This
processes. use of
not designed to
attrition
explained
information,
tions and War,
in
Fali 1986, which is
but
the concept of
are
invited
obtain some of the other HERO publications and reports,
publication
enough
or other aspects of modern combat
or elucidated by the QJM
larly A Theaorj of Combat,
full
the
provides
handbook
complete information on the QJM,
Relative Combat Effectiveness, are
the
fully
understood
This handbook is
*
important to an
complete explanation of the QJM or to cover
readers desiring
which
is
or
The concept
(QJM).
combat attritLon but can be
only in the context of the QJMo provide
concepts
the handbook refers to
of Relative Combat Effectiveness,
improved
with
applied
from the Quantified Judgment Model
findings
and
policies,
terms,
to specific situations.
understanding by military analysts In
9
or ideological biases.
differences
range
cultural
emphases may be placed on treatment because of
varying
9
although
armies,
all
to be the same for
tends
example,
for
The categorization of kinds of casualties,
some local variation. ;for
they
that
allowing
modern armies,
applied universally to all
be
HERO has
these concepts and definitions of ter:ms so
broadened
this
in
the terms and concepts
the text,
based on contemporary US Army doctrine.
are
handbook
Unless
terminology.
particu-
a book. by Trevor N. Dupuy scheduled or his earlier book
Numbers,
for
Predic-
currently available from HERO Books.
2
to
9
Although the authors of this handbook believe that there has been
insufficient analytical
more
historical analysis has been performed on personnel
tion
than on materiel attrition,
this
handbook.
synthesis
of
Obviously,
Chapter existing
more
attention paid to
and that fact
data
needs to be done on
tion has been established,
it
better treatment of materiel
much attri-
reflected
is
into
the
coherent
materiel
Since the linkage between personnel attrition
is
is
6 on materiel attrition historical
work
attrition,
in
first form.
attrition.
and materiel attri-
should be possible to provide much attrition
than is
now available.
Two omissions in
this handbook should be noted briefly.
One
that the Lanchester
Equations or Laws are not discussed.
The
other
is
that there is
no discussion of the impact of
attrition
on combat effectiveness. The
Lanchester
attrition;
Equations provide an analytical
treatment of
they are not historically based and do not necessarily
relate well to historical
experience.
The Lanchester
and
are
extensively
their
contribution
publications covered
This
analysis
the
earlier,
military
in and
operations
presents the results of
the
two
they
are
research historical
and does not touch on the relationship
of
Efforts
to
lessons to theoretical
results.
experience are underway
and
to bear fruit.
other issue which is
impact of attrition
evident
in
mentioned
the theory to the historical
are beginning The
Dupuy
hindbook
of attrition
historical
relate
the
T.N.
extensively
literature.
these
by
covered
Equations
not addressed
in
this handbook
on combat effectiveness.
that reduced strength
It
is
impairs combat effectiveness,
3
is
selfbut
the extent and nature Some
early
work
effectiveness
Dorothy this
in
historical
unit
World War
II
of
strength
was done
in
that.
There is,
to either
that there
is
a
the 1950s,
for example,
support or refute
"breakpoint"
loses cohesion and becomes
in
is
losses
Little systematic work has been
analysis
assumption
loss of effectiveness
on the effect
Clark.*
matter after
of this
on
combat
notably by
performed
on
no comprehensive the
strength
completely
not clear.
widespread
below which
ineffective.
a
More
work needs to be done on this point. The Soviet
Soviet
system is
attrition
there is
sufficient
comparable
system
in
do
certain
but
the Soviet experience
to attrition
is
and
similar to those
The Soviet armed forces,
the of
Soviet other
like the United States
place stress on prompt and effective medical treatment Reports that the Soviets are callous and
however,
validity.
that all armies,
It
must be
including the Soviets,
times adopted tactics which produced greater
casualties. World
In general,
lives carelessly have little
nized,
on
information to draw general conclusions about process.
reacting
of casualties. fice
Information
to that of other modern armies,
modern armies. Army,
per sýe.
experience has not been available readily,
the Soviet attrition is
not addressed
War I,
The French Army,
for example,
sacrirecoghave at
than normal
at the outbreak
used tactics which produced huge casualties
of
among
• Dorothy K. Clark, Casualties as a Measure of the Loss of Combat Effectiveness of an Infantry Battalion . Technical Memorandum 6RO-T-289. (Chevy Chase, Md.; Operations Research Office of the Johns Hopkins University, 1954).
4
their
own
commanders This that
troops until
handbook
the available
lems.
have It
additional
inevitable
reactions
of
troops
and
forced modifications.
been compiled will
the
is
a unique product.
historical
is
the
time
serve also as a useful
work
is
basis
performed and understanding
improved.
5
for
have
As such,
analysts dealing with current military
will
is
first
facts dealing witb attrition
into a single comprehensive document.
value for
modern warfare
It
prob-
updatinq
of attrition
it
as in
Chapter 1 FUNDAMENTALS OF ATTRITION
The
purpose
significance,
of this chapter is
and
-erminology
to introduce
the
of attrition so that
concept, the
later
chapters will be easier to understand. Attrition weapons,
and
is
a
reduction
equipment
in
the
in a military
number unit,
of
personnel,
organization,
or
force. Significance of Attrition Others of
the
things being equal,
numbers of
leadership,
morale,
outcome,
the
weapons
also
like,
troops
and
tactics,
numbers
of
victory in battle is weapons and
on
chance do
to
each side.
While
influence
battle
troops and the numbers and
influence battle outcome.
therefore,
a function
have
as
Each
numerous
a
types
commander
force
as
of
would
possible
throughout the battle. Force strength force.
Change
between
in
attrition
augmentation, attrition,
is
the number of personnel and weapons in
force strength is and
augmentation.
force strength is
force
a function of
strength is
reduced.
If If
increased.
a
the
balance
attrition
exceeds
augmentation exceeds If
attrition
equals
augmentation, force strength is maintained at a constant level. It is necessary, therefore, for commanders to attempt
to
minimize attrition in order to maximize force strength. It
is
accurately
useful
also
to
be
able
to
forecast
attrition
in order to provide for the proper numbers and
types
of augmentation in Augmentation
has tts.ee components,
replacements;
and
bring
up
units
mobilization.
the planning process.
reinforcements. from
follows:
Fillers are individuals who to
wartime
strength of a unit.
replace
entire
force.
Reinforcements
units
It
are additional
strength
of
a
individuals or units over The commander
or reinforcements
and units from his higher commander
reserve.
The application of additional
impottaot
most
losses to
he
has will
tools available to any
or can commit his
force is
com.andcr
to
one of the influence
battle outcome. Attrition duty.
0 is
the difference between losses and returns
to
Returns to duty are personnel who have been counted as
loss and then report back to their units. a
component
of attrition
They
important
instead of as a kind of
in maintaining
force
augmentation.
strength.
The
to duty is commander
normally has some control over returns to duty by the actions takes
to assure medical care for his people and maintenance
his damaged equipment. depend
on
higher
A combat commander,
level organizations
a
are included as
The number and proportion of losses which are returned very
however,
he for
usually must
to provide most
of
this
medical and maintenance support. The losses
*
except to the extent that he can obtain more personnel,
equipment, own
upon
also possible to
to maintain the original
influence over the'replacements
receive,
strength
is
above the original strength of a force.
little
fillers;
Replacements are individuals who offset
maintain the original
and
peacetime
as
primary factor in
attrition
is
losses.
caused by enemy action can be influenced by
8
The number a
of
commander
only
partially.
He can minimize his losses
good
strategy,
and good
leadership,
and
troops also have a great
of
losses
too.
extraordinary
Combat
circumstances,
by clever
tactics,
but the opposing commander
influence over the amount and implies
losses,
and
losses will occur
in
kind
except
for
battle.
Kinds of Attrition
are
There
9
two
of
basic kinds
and
personnel
aWtrition:
materiel. Personnel attrition
0
ture,
injury,
or
results illness
of
from the killing,
wounding,
military personnel
or
cap-
civilian
employees. Materiel attrition
results
destruction of weapons,
from
equipment,
the
separate treat
and materiel,
topics.
the
This is
have ma-y similarities
but they commonly are treated
because
it
is
perceived as proper
killing and wounding of people
as being an
different matter than the loss of equipment. we
In
shall follow the convention by treating the
while
pointing
out
the
or
and supplies.
The causes and treatment of attrition for both personnel
disabling
similarities
and
this two
as to
entirely handbook,
separately,
relationships
when
appropriate. Causes of Attrition
*
Attrition has three major causes:
enemy action;
accidents;
and illness or wearout. Enemyaction
*
equipment
0o.
P
causes attrition
with bullets or fragments
9
mostly by hitting people
and
(both large and small)
from
artillery
or
mortar shells,
addition,
it
is
aerial
bombs,
will be possible in
with war
also
Most attrition
usually is
tempo
wartime is
people
Accidents
occur
in
attrition
there are more accidents
tense,
is
an
modern
cause
carelessness and violations of good
increased,
are
in
The proximate
armed
forces
because people are using dangerous weapons
During
or germs.
action.
cause attrition.
safety practices.
time
In
the future to damage people and equipment
occurs because of enemy
accidents or
toxic chemicals,
laser beams and particle beams.
Accidents
missiles.
possible to damage both people and equipment by
bringing them into contact with fire, It
or
matters have and safety
important
and
because
in
are
the
relaxed.
considLdtioii
in
health peace-
equipment. operating
to be accomplished
rules
of
urgently, Accidental
maintaining
the
strength of a force. Illness or wearout causes attrition equipment wears out. on people.
important
This cause of attrition
For personnel,
cause of attrition
until
cause
when peop)e get sick and
disease was
about
of
impacts
the single most
80 years ago.
personnel
It
attrition,
is
still
primarily important a very
particularly
in
environments which are inherently hostile to humans. The Attrition-Cycle Attrition
is
a process which occurs
in
a
cyclic
manner.
Since commanders are concerned with replacement of losses as well as for
obtaining additional force strength, treatment
intermediate
of
points
personnel in
and
it
repair
Is usual to of
the replacement stream.
10 10I
provide
equipment As
shown
at in
0
Figure
principles of this attrition
the general
1,
both to personnel
cycle
apply
and materiel. Figure 1 The Attrition Cycle Materiel
Personnel No recovery
Salvage for parts
Combat Zone:
Immediate treatment & return to unit, or evacuation
Repair & return to unit, or evacuation
Theater Zone:
Treatment & return to replacement pipeline, or evacuation
Repair and return to depot stocks, or evacuation
Treatment & return to ZI duty, or discharge from the service.
Repair and return to ZI stocks
Complete Loss: Partial Loss:
Support
Zone of the Interior (ZI) :
key distinction among the levels at which
The declared
for
fit
serviceable
is
unit
suffering
duty
from
duty
or a piece
of
equipment
the combat zone will
almost
equipment probably some in
returning
the theater.
'the Zone of the Interior
soon,
if
ever,
(ZI)
serve
or will with
Personnel or equipment treated will not return
and then as a new replacement.
ii
to
certainly
to duty from the Theater Support Zone
not return to their original unit but will
other unit in
original
Personnel
return to their original unit and rather quickly.
is
declared
Personnel and equipment returning
the loss. in
is
to the
the speed and certainty of return
treatment
the person
to combat
duty
Personnel Loss Categories There
are
two basic categories of
Battle Casualties and
(2)
Battle Casualties and
type
of
strength,
morale,
they
number, lead
losses:
Injuries
are caused by enemy action.
friendly force strength,
and luck.
rate,
Disease and Non-Battle
battle casualties is
factors of the combat,
personnel
a
function
environmental
and the human factors,
Commanders can influence
(DNBI).
The
of
(1)
number
enemy
force
and operational
such as leadership, to some degree
the
and kinds of battle casualties by the way in which
their
units.
There
are
three
kinds
of
battle
are
killed
casualties: Killed in
Action (KIA).
Personnel
who
outright or die of wounds on the battlefield before receiving any medical recover,
treatment
are listed as KIA.
identify,
record,
deceased remains.
This work is
registration system, function,
require
effort
provide proper burial
to
in
to the
the responsibility of the graves
but many other personnel will assist in
particularly
forces place great
and
KIA
the recovery phase.
Most
this
fighting
importance on the proper and respectful treat-
ment of their own dead.
This is
true of the United States Ar-med
Forces. Wounded in enter WIA
the
(WIA).
Personnel who are wounded and
into the medical- system while still even
thereafter. part
Action
though they may have died of wounds
(DOW)
some
time
WIA personnel require a great deal of effort on the
of the military medical system. prompt
alive are classified as
and effective
First, early and effective
Great stress
treatment of wounds for
is
placed on
two
reasons.
treatment provides a greater number of
19
returns *
to duty.
wounds
helps
enter
combat.
Second,
1. 2. 3. 4.
in Action
separated
CMIA.
Some
become
prisoners of war (POW),
under
good for
of
unit
Personnel
(CMIA).
from their units during combat are these personnel
who
listed
are captured by the
as
enemy
at least temporarily.
and
Some
of
Some of the CMIA are still
friendly control but are not with the unit responsible for
duty.
for them;
but,
other
in
fact,
system.
killed or dies of wounds under circumstances unknown
to
members of his unit. recovered and placed
Sometimes
into the
wounded
medical
CMIA
treatment
There are five possible dispositions for CMIA: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
*
Return to Duty Dead Wounded Prisoner of War Missing
Non-Battle Casualties injuries (DNBI) illness,
their a
are
are dead.
from
to
This situation occurs when
surviving
personnel
these MIA personnel often are returned
CMIA are neither captured nor separated
Some
person is
9
to
Return to Duty Died of Wounds Transfer to another medical facility Discharge from the armed forces
become
accounting
*
troops
WIA:
these POW escape and return to duty.
*
of
There are four possible dispositions
Captured-missing
*
treatment
Most fighting forces place great stress on
9
*
in
morale and increases the willingness of
treatment of the WIA. *
obvious excellence
.
are
called
Disease
The three major categories
and injuries.
13
and
Non-Battle
are disease,
mental
is
Disease parasites,
or
debilitated, past
other
illness
organisms.
Patients
severely debilitated,
viruses,
bacteria,
by
caused
may
be
mildly
or killed by disease.
disease has been a major factor in maintenance of
and health of armies,
strength
but modern medical systems have
disease to a relatively minor factor,
In the
relegated
at least for modern armies.
Mental Illness is a form of disease caused by emotional or
psychological
stresses of from
traumas.
The
reaction of
3mbat can cause mental illness.
"shellshock" in World War I,
effects remain largely the same.
considered
in Vietnam,
inability
causes
Mental illness usually is of
mental toughness,
factors in current non-conventional warfare, illness is
World
but the
conviction
and may be considered an extreme form of these general
Menta'
seldom fatal initially,
problems.
are important
such as insurgency.
but it
can lead to the
of the victim to continue performing effectively
combat unit or in
the
The name has varied
to be related to poor morale and lack
Mental illness and its opposite,
to
to "battle fatigue" in
War II, to "Vietnam stress syndrome" and
soldiers
in
a
the theater of operations.
Injuries are caused by accidents.
In
general,
these
have the same effects as WIA and are treated much the same. people die of their injuries.
Some
The injured are treated and either
returned
to duty in
Interior
for further treatment and then either returned to
the theater or returned to the Zone
there or discharged from the service.
14
of
the duty
The Personnel Attrition Process A
generalized,
for personnel are
is
schematic diagram of the attrition
shown in Figure 2.
the Combat Zone,
the Interior.
For the United States,
the Zone of the Interior is of
The three areas of interest
the Theater Support Zone,
the Continental United States,
process
and the Zone of
the Zone of the Interior is
or CONUS.
For the Soviec'Union,
the Soviet Union itself.
The Theater
Operations may be divided into several geographical areas
commands,
depending
on
the circumstances.
Only
one
Theater
Support Zone is shown in this diagram for simplicity's sake. Combat rear
Zone
is generally considered to be forward of the
boundary,
cir
but
this
also
will
vary
or
The corps
according
to
These three basic zones will exist in all wartime
situations,
but
there
will be as many variations as there
are
wars.
The
three
differently. or
basic
categories of
casualties
Personnel who are killed in action,
are
processed
die of wounds,
die trom injuries or disease are collected at various
graves
registration points for identification and subsequent burial in a temporary or permanent cemetery. Personnel
formerly
in
the CMIA category
designated collection points for processing. condition, returned have
they
placed in
units
collected
and
action or,
if
from
their
directly. either
accidentally
Those
the case is
serious, - 5
at
the medical treatment system
units
returned
gathered
Depending on their
to duty in the replacement system.
strayed
original
are
are
who
to their held
Many of those return
to
desert
or
AWOL
units
for
in
go
who their
disciplinary
a confinement
or
facility
are
awaiting
Those cunvic"ted of crimes arb sent tc,
trial.
miliItary
prisons. Figure 2
0• PERSONNEL ATTRITION PROCESS UNIT
KIA
-
WACMIA
COMBAT
ZONEI
1 22
PTURAECO
PTO ORIWART MEDICA-ISN
UNITI
SUPOR
---------
S; I.
------------------------......... EVACUATE1
CAVES
ON I E I OIT
,,--V -
...................... OLLEC.ION POINT
,/
Dow
AID ATo
THEATER
TTHEATER
AEPLACEMENT,0
"I'sPITAt..
THEATER
CAPP
CENTER
SUPPORT ZONE
.VACUATETO V I•IUTA~qlACIITAY
ZONE
RTO ZI
OF THE INTERIOR
OOq, HOSPITAL
--
OVEARP.AS AIPLACE14EN CN
2
PAUTARY
MILITARY C'IiTIRYPRISON
VIFOMI
I'
0
The require
most
complicated process involves those personnel
medical
injured,
treatment.
and sick,
These are the wounded
who
in
action,
all indicated in the diagram as WIA.
Initial
treatment
is
station.
A decision is made at each treatment facility to treat
and
return
capable, forward' be
likely
to
to be at a
battalion
duty or evacuate the patient
medical
facility.
medical
battalion
battalion;
to
regimental
or regimental
aid
stations;
division
forward
surgical
hospital;
hospital.
Personnel treated
and
facilities
in the Combat Zone generally return directly to
original unit when they have been declared fit
unlikely
to
release. often for
be
Patients
at
medical their
for duty.
moved to a theater level hospital,
returned
one
in reality there woulO
evacuation
Once the patient is
more
only
hospital;
field
aid
another,
While the diagram shows
medical unit in the Combat Zone,
several:
or
directly to his
original
released from theater level
he is
unit
upon
hospitals
more
are reassigned to the theater personnel replacement system further
reassignment to units needing
certain
skills
and
the Zone
of
grades. Once the unit
the patient is evacuated to a hospital in
Interior (ZI), are
released
even from
Sometimes replacement
they
the chances of his returning to his original
less than from
a
theater
hospital.
ZI hospitals often are reassigned reassigned back
are
pipeline.
Sometimes
into
the
to
Patients ZI
oversea
units. theater
they are discharged from
the
service or placed on limited duty. The tendency,
therefore,
is
to treat people as near to the
original combat unit as possible in order to maximize the
number
of
returns to duty and to help preserve
injured,
wounded,
the
having
cohesion by
or sick perscn rejoin the original unit. Theater Evacuation9jj•
One
particularly
attrition
is
important consideration with
respect
to
the policy set for evacuation of patients or damaged
equipment items from the theater of operations to the zone of the Interior.
While this
is
important
for materiel,
it
is
especially
important for personnel. The the
personnel
theater evacuation policy is
a statement
maximum number of days that a patient will be treated
medical facility in
wounded,
sick,
or injured is
to
a theater of operations medical
of
the number of days of treatment required to cure the
so
he
policy,
the
treatm.ent. is
facility an estimate
or she can return to duty. for
the patient is patient
If
will
the projected
If
the projected
less than the be
retained
a
the
admitted is
made
patient
length
theater in
of
evacuation theater
length of treatment for
greater than theater evacuation policy,
given
in
the theater of operations.
When a patient who is
treatment
of
for
the patient
the patient will
be
enough treatment to stablize his or her condition and then
transported
to the ZI
for additional
treatment
until
returned
to
duty.
The
consequences of the evacuation policy are
tant.
The
policy,
the higher
the
Z1,
the
theater,
fewer
the fewer and
the
theater
treatment days
the proportion
very
allowed
of patients who will
imporby
the
be sent
to
the medical resources which will be needed
in
the
be
fewer
recovered
patients
who
will
to duty in
returned evacuation
policy,
evacuated,
the
theater, in
officers as
in
So,
practice,
is
the
for
continuous
the
than on number
regardless of projected
ZI
Improved
methods
times of theater evacuation
rather
hospitals
wounded soldiers
do
this.
In
From
in
the theater
for
basis
of
treatment. hospital All
treatment.
to shorten
Helicopters
have made
the it
than going through unit aid stations
or
even
to move wounded soldiers
have made
possible to evacuate
it
travel
than
and the ease of moving to airfield
make
Vietnam US wounded personnel
or Japan for relatively
policy.
base
jet
from field
directly
this
to
from battlefield
directly
as
treatment.
of
from the theater more easily
of
times
short
strength
of days of
length
policies.
Jet aircraft
hospitals.
field
to
directly
before
than
want
the
evacuation have tended
of
they
on
the
personnel
might be sent to a special
for example,
malaria patients might be retained
easier
often set
short in
and
own
their
the
to duty
the patients
tension regarding
is
policy
in
prefer a
generally
patients
the
patients
returned
Troop commanders
the ZI.
categories of disease rather
in
of patients
authorities
of
required
long evacuation policy because
a
there
All burn wounds,
resources
in
the days
proportion
they want to treat
many recovered
possible. In
the number
policy because
prefer
retain
the medical
Medical
hospitals
the
smaller
greater
theater.
evacuation better
the
and the greater
the
The greater
the theater.
hospitals
to hospitals
minor wounds or
the viewpoint of attrition,
19
The
before.
patient
the
very convenient
it
were often in
to
evacuated
the United
States
injuries. the key point is
that
the
probability
evacuated and
of this
the combat units
respect,
useful
in
the
and experience
is
particu-
casualties. policy can be
the theater evacuation
strength
the
turnover
forces,
which suffer most of
evidence of
estimating
increases personnel
level of the theater
to
return
the soldier
if
significantly
This
from the theater.
lowers the experience
larly In
reduced
is
of operations
theater
injured soldier will
that a wounded or
levels
for
these
forces. Personnel Because attrition it
is
useful
measure
personnel
Strength authorizations difference personnel are
numbers,
the
niumber
a military
between (spaces)
skills,
fill
each
unit,
is
very
and its
authorized
seldom achieved
important.
and
strength,
that
schematic diagram of a military
unit.
20
with
incorrectly. or
personnel
or
The
authorizations
for
that
to
or
bil-
describe
the unit
the
should
system tries
space with the right kind of Thus,
and
force.
The personnel
practice.
all
Authorizations,
grades of personnel mission.
and
personnel
by higher headquarters
in
in
terms,
organization, (faces)
of terms to describe the situation a
are many
of either
personnel
established
to accomplish
is
There
but often used interchangeably
is in
a change
the terminology used to describe
strength.
have
this
a process causing
to understand
precise meanings,
lets,
is
Strength Terminology
person,
there are
does occur.
to but
a variety
Figure
3 is
6
Figure 3
MILIIARY UNIT STRENGTH TERMS Authorizations (spaces)
Personnel (faces)
Wartime StrengthAssg
Strength
UNIT
Peacetime Strength
r(eSt
SPresent
rngth
for Duty
Strength
Wartime Strength terms
as
"full
strength"
are
full
in
authorized Manpower
In
peacetime
area
strength,"
and
terms referring to
many units
in
such
"authorized
the
with personnel-
with
number
of
All
units have
designed
to operate
most armed
forces
are
than wartime strength as an economy measure. authorizations can include military personnel and civi-
and
The
US
Army has
civilian personnel;
service support units.
guides
along
less
personnel.
military
nel
allowed to fill
"TOE*
wartime strength at which the unit is
combat.
lian
strength,"
authorization
spaces a unit is a
and Peacetime Strength,
nothing about
filling
to fill
all
which
include
both
most of these units are
rear
Authorization
to the number of personnel
systems fail
units
in
terms are
not
good
a unit because most person-
of the authorized
spaces,
to
say
them with proper grades and skills.
*This refers to the Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE), which is the document used in the US Army to establish authorizations for numbered units intended to fight as part of the Army-in-the-field. The US Army also has Table of Distribution and Allowance (TDA) documents for stationary support units.
There are Assigned on
Strength of a
the personnel
unit.
Some
duty;
personnel
some are at
is
are sick in away
on
some have
indicator
of
Present actually
or
fighting
is
the basis of
ready
strength
as
for estimates
personnel system
is
that
on
hospital,
in
missing.
There are
to take and
get
is
to
on
temporary for
some have been
Other Still
strength
fight
or work.
personnel others are
is
not
This,
as combat power This
of attrition.
for
leave,
a
good
is
who
are
concerned
and
0
the "effective
is
These seem
from one
is
to expand
the fact
so that
that
there will
unit
the people
in
prisons,
soldiers
area units,
are
in
or
the
simply
these non-available for the unit
are authorized
be enough people
rear
who
include
another,
the authorization
to get the necessary work done.
This method
headquarters,
22
any
that
These
to
to manage
duty
administrative
are
to arrive.
schools,
two basic ways
way
of
large numbers of personnel
duty.
and
0
of course,
basic characteristic
are
camps or
into account sick,
A
but never moving
training
One
0
the
with
the number of personnel
faK
there
or coming
personnel
personnel.
unit.
physically
and
quarters.
Assigned
Personnel.
simply are not available going
the
the unit.
Non-Available
always
their
shown
strength.
with the unit
strength"
in
for Duty Strength
the important
the unit
on the books;
or on pass.
is
left
but have not yet joined.
the hospital
leave
to
are assigned but are away
school;
to the unit
as belonging
of the people are actually
new assignment but are still
assigned
strength.
the number of personnel
the unit
all
that
of personnel
unit
records of
does not mean
This
a
two basic descriptors
leave
present is
used for
civilian
for for
personnel. for
these non-available The
units. for
(
The other method
patients, be
personnel, students,
established
individuals
0
operate in
has
are
the combat theater
to
is
strength and
reported each day. often reported
times shortened
shows
an account would
set of
designed
authorized
terminology for
method
of
in
figures
are properly
referred
strength."
In
to as "end-month
military
they
month or
jargon this
strength of
a unit or a several
force
in
differont
the relationship
a battle
and are
year.
strength" is
some-
or engagement
descriptors. of some of
PERSONNEL STRENGTH IN A BATTLE
END
STRENGTH
STRENGTH
AVERAGE STRENGTH
Figurp 4
these terms.
Figure 4
0
The
to "end strength."
a schematic of
0START
A
time.
are reported,
day of a particular
to
strength
measurement.
point
for
strengths.
present for duty strength ace measured
be described using
0
accounts prisoners,
that the units
for a particular
as of the last
strengths
not assigned to
These authorizations
are at their
When strength
"end-fiscal year
may
mobilization
the time and
valid
authorizations
trainees,
In
Another
do with
assigned
The
transients,
designed to assure
figure
or
individuals
also for replacements,
strength
These
as
separate
uses separate individuals
and holdees.
Kinds of Strength. data
to create
personnel
US Armed Forces
military
is
The
average strength
is
the area
under
the
curve.
possible to compute a strength descriptor which is the start the
start
strength and end strength,
average
strength only
to finish.
strengths, average
which
It
is
is
the average of
but this will be the same as
strength
function
is
linear
from
possible also to calculate average daily
provides
strength.
literature
is
if
It
a more disaggregated
Another measure
sometimes
descriptor
found
total strength on the battlefield,
in
than
historical
which would be
the cumulative sum of the strengths of all units which arrived on the
battlefield,
various which
whether
they left
strength descriptors is
definitions
being of
is
used and what personnel
or
stayed.
valid provided it
means.
strength
terms
Each
of
the
the analyst knows
Figure
5
for
battle
a
provides or
engagment. Figure 5 Personnel Start Strength:
Strength Terms
strength engagement
first
on the day before a battle or or at
the bcginning
of the
day of a battle.
End Strength:
strength at the end of the last day of a battle or on the day after the battle.
Daily Strength:
start day.
Average Daily Strengt .'iT
one half the sum of start strengths for a particular day.
Total Strength:
the cumulative number of personnel the battle from start point to point.
Average Strength:
the sum of the daily strengths divided by the number of days in the battle.
or
24
end strength
on a
particular
and
end in end
_
Materiel Attrition Concepts
to those for personnel.
similar
There is,
generally
are
basic concepts of materiel attrition
The
one
however,
basic
difference. is
difference
The
but materiel comes in
some flexibility for application,
with
models
that personnel come in two basic
a
bewildering variety of makes and models and years of manufacture,
can
be used only for the purposes for which it cannot shoot a projectile,
bulldozer
is
A
designed.
move
cannot
and a cannon
While personnel do come with varying degrees of training
earth. and
A piece of equipment
with no flexibility of application.
often
they
experience,
can be retrained and can be applied to
The signi-
fairly wide range of jobs (with obvious limitations). of this is
ficance
a
provide
that the materiel supply system must
an exact or nearly exact replacement for the lost item. The meaning of the word "exact" applies in particular make
and model of the item being replaced.
combat support equipment are ,cry many repair parts, keep
an
different
guns.
operating
in
models
of
but there are obvious demands
with
artillery battery could not fire efficiently
howitzer;
operations.
requirement
would not do to replace a 130mm howitzer with a 75mm
It
as well.
and often special tools to
There are obvious limits to the
for exact replacement of materiel,
and
Modern weapons
complicateo and require a great
trained mechanics,
operational.
to the
It
would be possible to have
the same company, It
certainly is
but it
different
would complicate
tanks combat
possible to have different makes and
trucks in a transport company,
25
but it
does
make
iL
harder to maintain and repair the trucks because of the necessity for multiple sets of parts and tools. The for
complications
of make and model are particularly
support equipment,
such as generators and air
These relatively small items are prevalent in can occur
in a multitude of sizes,
manufacture. Engineer era,
As a result,
equipment
other
and years of
they are very difficult
to maintain.
During the Korean
that it
armies. is
One group was deployed to the Pacific;
group to Europe. maintenance.
and
it
any modern army and
models,
also complicated.
compressors.
War
the US Army had two different groups of makes and models for
engineer equipment.
is
is
makes,
acute
This was done to simplify parts
is
supply
The significance of make and model preference
complicates resupply.
It
the
This is
less true of unso
true of
most
jt4ueriLla
modern but
fore,
0
always a consideration. There are three kinds of materiel:
consumables;
equipment;
and repair parts. Consumables are consumed tion,
food,
water,
do requite care in to
POL,
in
use.
and numerous sundry items.
storage,
needs
awhile.
However,
to
be
usable shape.
use.
rotated and turned over
consumables
generally are not repairable
0
Consumables
and they do require some maintenance
keep them in good shape for eventual
example,
These include ammuni-
which
Ammunition, every
are damaged or
once
by new scocks.
26
therefore,
in
destroyed
and cannot readily be put back
Losses of consumables,
for
into
must be replaced
0
Equipment the
military
weapons;
force to operate.
combat vehicles;
computers; helmets,
consists of the major end items which
furniture; boots,
These include
aircraft;
helicopters;
tentage;
and
and uniforms.
often can be repaired,
therefore,
and it
has
equipment end items.
a
personal
generally is is
equipment
This system often is
S
such
as
faster and cheaper to Every modern repair
elaborate and
of damaged equipment.
and Oil the .. y
IL
of
includes
Even unsophisticated
fDrces
The primary
the treatment of materiel attrition it ...
enj
items,
system for maintenance and
make some provision for repair during
trucks; radios;
to replace it.
large numbers of trained personnel.
emphasis
following:
Equipment which has been damaged
repair damaged equipment than it army,
the
allow
will be
on
emaintenance
Wi ht
system mitigates losses due to enemy action or to accident. Repair parts
are
nance and repair system. correct There
part -is
is
some
requirement
an essential
Unless
available,
relief
to
parts
process.
It
to
order
be
usually
is
is
of
the correct part -the end
of parts
mainte-
be
repaired.
from
this
demanding
the
field,
but manu-
and
a demanding
itself
easier
in
the
and only the
item cannot
obtained
through manufacture
facturing
element
to provide the
difficult
correct part.
The Equipment Maintenance System consists basically of main
unit maintenance;
elements:
depot maintenance;
and Zi depot or
will
variations
be
account
numerous
for
elements occur
local in
field factory
within
this
maintenance;
conditions and traditions,
every systern.
Z7
theater
maintenance. basic
but
four
There
framework
these
to
four
is
the basic element
even
in
units without a formal
system,
maintenance
of
sists it
adjusting
the item,
cleaning
oil,
has sufficient
tor
or crew of
by the operator
performed
maintenance exists
fuel, in
military
forces,
only of cleaning and oiling
off
of
ammunition. and demanding,
complicated Some maintenance
section,
relatively
or
filters.
The opetator
this
work
is
Both normal enemy
being forms
wear
units
have
assist
skilled
of unit maintenance
most battle
mechanics
maintenance
field
perform
perform
the
6imple
or
fuel when
rather
to
cope
with
than damage
caused
by
Although the capabilities
of
the
damage
repair
than
requires the found
in
they
are
services
specialized
units.
in
is
close proximity
performed to
by maintenance
the combat units.
the third echelon of maintenance,
replacement
some
the mechanic
are designed
and special equipment
Field Maintenance the
ow:n
and
fan belts
operators and the unit mechanics are often greater
of
quite
performed.
and tear on equipment
to be,
sand
their
mechanics
such as
or crew normally
action or by accidents.
designed
is
which consists of making
adjustments and replacing some parts,
con-
it
on a tank.
These personnel
echelon of maintenance,
if
even
a track
of a few
tools.
Opera-
supplies.
maintenance
larger
consisting
uncomplicated
second
operator
such as changing
battalion-sized
that
and washing mud or
a rifle
Some
is
con-
certain
and making
it,
required
sists
This
the equipment.
and other
all
maintenance
echelon of maintenance
The first
section or trained mechanics.
equipment
of any
Unit maintenance
of major assemblies ot
which
the equipment.
200
is
units
in
These units repair
and
Field mainte-
is
nance
It
equipment operational.
Sometimes
is
possible
ael y
The "maintenance
damage is
At in
the
stocks
are
in
imirredi-
item
Needless exhausted
to say,
in
quickly,
combat the maintesince
they
are
peacetime losses.
field maintenance unit a piece of equipment can
It
It
can be repaired
float
can be repaired and put into maintenance
be deemed unrepairable and scrapped.
It
be
and returned
to replace an item which previously was sent to the unit.
It
can
can be sent to a higher
level maintenance unit for repairs which exceed the capability the
at
important equipment items while the
any of four directions.
the unit.
is
it
this case.
float" stocks are designed to keep the units
basically designed to cope with
to
In
in
hLeldA for th~is -Pur-POseC b-y the maintcnancc unit.
being repaired.
float
nance
item at the
that the equipment will be
unit indicates
authorized strength
their
is
returned
will be
sometimes to issue the unit a replacement
fromi stOCIKS
"is
repaired.
shop for an extended period of time.
the
the equipment
inspection of an equipment
the initial
maintenance
field
but it
company,
to the maintenance
to the original unit when it
sent
That is,
goes into field maintenance.
transferred
unit
at least temporarily,
that the unit loses the piece of equipment, when it
the
From
unit and field maintenance
difference between
the
viewpoint
keep
that repair of damage
starts.
action and from accidents
enemy
from
at this level
is
to
feats
performing extraordinary
of
capable
of
field maintenance unit. Depot maintenance
maintenance.
Depots
is
are found
29
the in
highest level the theater
of
military
of operations and
in
of operations
the theater
in
Depots
the Zi.
but both have the capability
the ZI,
capability than do those in
turning out what is
to rebuild a damaged piece of equipment,
in
includes
The depot maintenance capability
new item.
a
effect
less
have
may
subassemblies.
replacement of major assemblies and the repair of
Field maintenance can replace a vehicle engine; depot maintenance rebuild the engine.
can
depots
are the most sophisticated
in
The major difference between
far as the losing unit is of
equipment.
The
at
The skills and tools and facilities
field
concerned,
unit
is
the military
forces.
and depot maintenance,
is
the identity of the piece
quite likely to get
its
original
equipment
back from field maintenance,
or at least one like
from
float.
item
the
maintenance broken,
supply
Once
level,
and
the equipment
however,
the
system.
Commanders
in
enters
(or
rebuilt)
level
sometimes in
the
maintenance
in
depot
unit
is
repair
or
field maintenance unit,
because normally this reduces the time required piece of equipment to replace the damaged
it
item from the
combat prefer to have
maintenance work done by their supporting
Depot
the
connection with the
the unit must draw a new
as
to get a
working
item.
the Zone of
the
Interior
is
carried out by the factories which built the equipment first
place.
This is
often referred
to as
overhaul
or
rebuild. Recovery. maintenance
ment.
While
battlefield have
to
be
system
some
An
important
is recovery
damaged
element
of damaged
in
own power,
hauled off by a recovery
30
equipment
and destroyed
equipment can be
or leave under its
the
some
vehicle.
carried
equip-
off
critical This
the items
recovery
0
process is
important to the success ot the maintenance
critically The
effort.
effective
Army has been particularly
Israeli
in
pulling damaged tanks oft the battlefield to nearby field maintenance units where they are repaired on the spot. it
not recovered, and
prevented
into enemy hands or otherwise be lost
may fall
from being repaired.
it
Thus,
is
important
to
immobile damaged equipment to the
for prompt movement of
provide
the item is
If
shops. The Materiel Attrition Process
is
Process
shown
in
This is
Figure 6.
--
interior
is
difference
destroyed
or
armed
forces
battlefield
in
is
to
system.
and move it
subsequent
aud
destroyed
and
theater
combat,
general flow of sick
the utility
wounded
and
equipment
of
it
is
customary in
destroyed
which
is
parts
well-organized from
equipment
the
where the best use
to salvage facilities Parts are sent to
maintenance
the
and the unusable portions are scrapped.
Another difference is fuhction.
support,
Figure 2.
to the flow of
even
recover
made of the equipment.
facilities,
the
damaged beyond repair as a source of repair
the maintenance
for
similar
to
similar
There are some relatively minor differences.
personnel. One
The
apply.
equipment
damaged
is
still
--
zones
basic
three
very
process in
diagram for the personnel attrition The
Attrition
schematic diagram of the Materiel
A generalized,
Battlefield movement
obvious.
Battlefield
destroyed
equipment
the emphasis on recovery as a separate recovery
within
the
recovery is
not so
of
treatment
medical of damaged obvious
personnel
wounded
and
and,
system
arid is
particularly,
usually
requires
Figure
6
MATERIEL ATTRITION PROCESS
EVACUATE
S CfL -1TRYE
DAAG
MAINTENHA :rE
\
--
O V R AMGE
II
EVACUATE
•
COMBAT ZONE
SALVAGE
MAINTENANC•E
SUPPORT
ll....
i
l
..
ZONE
.
..
___
To Z ,
OFTHEAE SUPPRORT
l.l.... .. .
SAVG
EVACUAT
SZONE
........
STOCKS
.. tl
..... i
.
l..
t
•.I... ----
---...
-----------
SCRAP
ZI
OEZP 0T
SZI
STOCKS
LL
_0
Si
separate identification as a service support sub-system. The
final
evacuation
difference
policy.
evacuated
from
ment
in
the application of the
extent to which damaged
the Theater of Operations
circumstantial. problem,
The
is
Movemants
is
not so easy.
equipment
to the
ZI
is
of patients to the ZI is
particularly with modern aircraft. Some high value,
theater is
highly
a tractable
Movement of equip-
low bulk items such
as
electronic devices or radios,
can be evacuated easily,
often by
air.
such as trucks and tanks,
are less
Bulky and heavy items,
easy
to
evacuate,
despite the possible availability
of
empty
ships or railway cars which otherwise would be travelling Some
items might be evacuated;
%.LleaterL
zon
supportU
available
1' tLJjja L
0.
transportation
maintenance evacuation materiel
i
facilities
1.LL.
I LI±L
the
is
an
effectiveness
or
integral
absence A
element
important
of the process
in '0Ln
%A~jn
locations.
process and can be an
the
W. Li L
existence
particular
however,
attrition
establishing
and
in
system,
others might be retained
empty.
in
a
the -L
of
theater of
factor
the in
particular
war. Kinds of Attrition Rates Attrition can be understood best by referring to rates. actual number of casu not
event,
does
combat
events.
attrition
ti.es,
permit
The
while important for a single com-at among
aggregation or comparison
Accordingly,
it
is
necessary
to
calculate In
rates when performing analyses of attrition.
many
this
handbook we use the term "casualty rate" when referring to losses of
personnel
materiel. 0
and
"loss
rate"
when
referring
to
losses
of
and it
There are several different kinds of casualty rates, is
important
to
know
which kind of rate is
particular analysis or study.
being
used
in
a
Comparing data with two different
kinds of rates can give misleading results. rates
three important dimensions of attrition
The
duration for which the rate is
calculated,
the
are
•
the size of the unit,
and the level of combat. A
rate is
time period,
the number of casualties or losses divided by the
or duration,-for which the rate is
The most common attrition monthly rate is wars.
rate is
used.
the daily rate.
The annual rate is
Daily rates cannot be compared Attrition
strength
rates
of
Sometimes
a
the
found in
or force which is
rates
lost
per
are stated as a number
per time period.
rates are stated in
to
large
specify battalion It
is
each or
of
the
period.
casualties
or rate
In this handbook,
inversely
It
oicganizational
is
0
As will be proportional
necessary
level,
which the rate has been
permissible to compare rates only
if
such
to as
•
calculated.
they are for the
same
general size of units. Level of combat is
0
Small units have high casualty rates,
instance the
division for
time
also important.
units have low casualty rates.
in
of
terms of percentages.
the casualty rate is
the size of the unit.
and
summaries
The most common form of
The size of the unit involved is demonstrated later,
the
to annual rates.
is percentage of the strength per time period. attrition
Sometimes
usually are expressed as a proportion of
unit
losses per 1,800
being calculated.
• particularly
important.
Figure 7
shows
of
Hierarchy of Combat and some of the characteristics
the
each
level. Figure 7 Hierarchy of Combat Level of Combat
Duration
Units Involved
Common Thread
War
Months-Years
National Forces
National Goals
Campaign
Months
Army Groups or Field Armies
Strategic Objectives
Battle
1-3 Weeks
Field Armies or Army Corps
Operational Mission
Engagement
1-5 Days
DivisionsCompanies
Tactical Mission
Action
1-24 Hours
BattalionsSquads
Local Objective
Duel
Minutes
r
%J rndvu]T
level
The
difference is
The
rate.
for
is
unit
not in combat and has no
battle
casualties.
engagement casualty rate for a division therefore,
entire
higher campaign
engagements, is The
the
in
The units
an
there are periods when
however,
During a campaign,
engagement.
much
which
will be committed to combat during almost all of that
engagement
be
attrition
each
due to the proportion of time in
are committed tc combat at each level.
units
the
of combat must be specified
I
1ne
Objective
Mobile Fighting Machines
than the rate for that same of
consisting
and time spent in
key to understanding
several
reserve.
is
likely
to
over
an
division
numerous
battles,
The Hlierarchy of Combat
these different
levels
of
combat.
definitions of the levels of the Hierarchy of Combat are
Appendix 1.
The
in
Data
Sources of Sttength and Attrition
Strength and attrition data (casualties and materiel losses) are
obtained from historical records of combat.
kinds of historical records:
There are
primary and secondary.
P,:imary sources are words of witnesses or first an event. because time,
two
recorders of
Primary sources are preferred for historical research the recorder or witness was close to the event in space,
or both.
Primary sources include contemporary accounts and
official records. Secondary sources
are
derived
from one
sources or from other secondary sources. errors of aggregation, the.
--
or
more
primary
They are susceptible to
0
simplification and misinterpretation when Secondary
d--v
sources are
used
when
primary
sources are not available or are too costly to use. Both
primary and secondary sources must be approached
with
skepticism until checked for validity and reliability. Official Records.
Because
military organization,
of
the complexities of
the staffs of military units are required
to produce and maintain a documentary record. most detailed and contemporaneous In many instances, available,
however,
These provide the
record of unit experiences. the official records may not be
or they may be incomplete
if
available.
records have been destroyed due to the vagaries of Army
modern
Sometimes the war.
German
archives of World War I and earlier years were destroyed by
Ailied
air
records records. destroyed
bombardment
during World
War
destroyed
inadvertently
by
are
Some to
US
Army
obtain
II. the
holders
records from World War
warehouse
space
for
Sometimes
II
other
of
have
the the be, n
purposes.
0
Sometimes
security example,
the
records
exist
or political
classification
does not have access
War II.
Nevertheless,
but are not available
records
reports,
journals,
compiled
chronologically
usual
over
four major staff
to
the and
by the various one day,
researcher
and
include
operatio.nal summaries staff
but some
longer time periods. sections:
for
researchers.
diaries,
reporting period is
activities
records exist
a great many official
files,
US,
of
Soviet records of World
to official
available
The
problems.
are available to determined historical Official
because
sections. reports
The
summarize
Reports are produced by the
personnel;
intelligence;
operations;
and logistics. Personnel
reports
compiling
strength
personnel
daily
Figure 8.
and
will
usually be the
personnel
summary will
casualty
include
most
helpful
data.
the information
A
for
typical
shown
in
Figure 8 Personnel Reports
Data Found in
"o Strength of the organization Authorized
0
Assigned Present for Duty
"o Casualties Total Total Battle Casualties Killed
in Action
Wounded in
(KIA)
Action
(WIA) in Action
Captured/Missinq
(CMIA)
Total DNBI
"o Replacements and hospital returnees of logistics sections provide similar data
reports
The
on
materiel holdings and losses. Personnel
correlated
operations tactical will which and
logistics
of numerical data.
tabulations unless
and
with
sections,
in
usually
which
provide
specific
A typical
of
the
details
of
the
operations
narrative form the circumstantial
reports
environmental the information
circumstances in
were
incurred.
the
report
context
30
in
personnel
Operational
covered will include some or all
Figure 9
of
reports
the casualties and materiel losses shown in logistics
consist
They do not make too much sense
the relevant periodic
activities of the units.
provide
reports
and of
0
Figure 9 Operations Reports
Data Found in
Location of own front line Location of own troops Information on adjacent units and supporting Information on weather
troops
conditions and visibility the
reporting
Information on.the enemy's dispositions and of his intentions
estiimates
Brief
descriptions period
Inf.ormation
of
in
operations
on the combat efficiency of the command
Descriptions of the results of operations addition to supplying
In
operations reports often provide data on strengths
of operations, and
are
records
of
is
This
casualties.
records
information about the circumstances
is
data
generally
conceded it
individually.
A
is
brief
is
that
units
for
records
in
Appendix
the more recent
the
it
data,
but each case must
explanation
passes
be
tests of historical
of the method of historical
Appendix 3.
2.
of historical It
the
is more
approached
would be a grievous error to assume that
reliable until
.presented in
the
a perplexing problem for the analyst.
likely to be, It
presented
Estimating the reliability
Data Reliability. attrition
is
other
with
An example of the use of official
to compile strength and casualty data
data
the case
the British Army and Empire/Commonwealth
World Wars I and II.
reliable
as is
or fragmentary,
missing
when
particularly
important,
any
criticism.
criticism
is
Inaccurate
and
unreliable data may be encountered
record of any historical period. to separate
The task
Century attrition
data is
but there are still
difficult
fact from propaganda.
to
separate
avoid giving accurate casualty data.
from the enemy to fool hirt. understate
US part of the war Even
Vietnam War,
Nations
it tend
In some cases,
to obtain.
Shelby Stanton,
to
the
losses official
The US has good records on the
in Vietnam but no data from the North
the US data is
is
they want to keep good news
Most reports overstate enemy
friendly losses.
records are difficult
limitations.
They want to keep bad news
the enemy or their own people;
Mrese.
is
much more reliable thian
that for earlier eras,
and
of the researcher
the
the wheat from the chaff.
Twentieth
from
in
suspect.
Vietna-
A notcd historian of
the
makes the following observation.*
The entire process of accumulating valid (enemy) casualty data was also shrouded (sic) by the shameful gamesmanship practised by certain reporting elements under pressure to "produce results." Despite a
reasonably
these difficulties accurate
military operations. military
operations
the
in
way
reported
which
it
is
possible to piece
record of strengths The key is
and
together
casualties
a thorough understanding
in
of the
themselves coupled with an understanding of strengths and
in military organizations.
casualties
are
Some important
managed points
and on
*Shelby L. Stanton, The Rise and Fall of an American Army: US Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965-1973 (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1985), P. xvi.
re~liability Figure
of
strength
and casualty data
are
summarized
in
10.
Figure 10 Reliability
of Strength and Casualty Data
o Demonstrably produced in all o Demonstrably in all historic
unreliable data historic eras
reliable eras
has
data has been
o Data from earlier eras generally, less.reliable
is
been
produced
less abundant and,
o Modern data (20th Century) may be misleading and incomplete but can be tested for reliability by persons familiar with the context and the subject The *
successful
adjudged
reliable
analyses,
and establish
military
analyst will make use of
sources
as
trends,
event,
the event
took place.
and
the particular
the general
loss
remainder of this
dimension
of
"15"attrition" treats chapter attrition
that
concept
of
of losses
attrition
is
and
the
interested
analyst
with
usage
of
the
is
In
introduced a broader definition
planning and programming, military
Attrition
term as synonymous with losses.
we have deliberately
of the
context within which
historical
to mean the balance
broader
ranges of variation
book deals almost entirely
attrition.
many
comparative
circumstances
historical
Understanding The
employ
baseline numbers and
based upon historical conflict
possible,
as
in
41
used
and returns in
personnel
to duty.
resource management.
primarily
in
the
the term this of The
management, Moreover, numerical
strength of the military forces, only
one
dimension of strength;
Accordingly,
we
have
not just the losses. gains are
gone to some length
equally to provide
Losses are important. a
basic
understanding of the fundamentals of strength maintenance. The following chapters are designed to provide a good understanding of losses in
military combat.
paid to personnel casualties. and
analysis
effort
That is
coverage
is
where most of the research
has been applied.
tentative hypotheses on materiel the
Most of the attention
0
Soma
basic
data
and
losses are provided to round out
of attrition.
0 42I
0
Chapter 2 PERSONNEL ATTRITION: 1600, The
year 1600
is
HISTORICAL PATTERNS AND TRENDS The Benchmark
Year
a very logical starting point for a survey
of the historical patterns and trends that form the background of personnel attrition first
in
Although gunpowder weapons
modern combat.
appeared on European battlefields
in
the 14th
Century,
it
was not until the beginning
of the 17th Century that guns finally
displaced
halberds,
spears,
swords,
as the principal determinants There
is
data
on
often earlier was
no
though less
point i)r
strengths and losses of
not very reliable, in
history,
crossover
and
important,
the survey.
military
when data
trends
combining at that time to complete
However,
is The
The year
miraculously
to reliable.
from medieval
battle
even for many 20th Century wars.
questionable were
reason for
Quantitative
forces in
the less reliable the data. point
bows and arrows
of battle outcomes.
another related,
choosing 1600 as a starting
pikes,
1.600
changed
from
other cultural and societal
to early modern history,
the
transition
with all that implies with
respect to historical and scientific rigor. This will explain why two of the most reliable of the sional
Years'
general
War,
surveys
of battle
data begin with
early in the 17th Century:
A '
the
occaThirty
Gaston Bodart's Kriegs-
Lexikon,*
and
appendix
Theodore Ayrault Dodge's "Modern Casualties,"
in his four-volume work,
an
Napoleon."*
Having made the case for beginning this survey of historical patterns
and
interesting
trends
with the year
that history
from ancient military
is
reflected in
Some Ancient Battles,"
military
percentage
All
nevertheless
to
logical
the extent
that
"Casualties
in
his Caesar.***
forces
to
exposed
hostile
firepower,
the
per day of combat has declined steadily, over four centuries,
despite
tremendous
the lethality of weapons.
in
weaponF
have
This is
people.
which
is
Dodge's compilation,
Casualties
of those hit
lethality. kill
in
history,
L__ethalityversus
albeit a bit unevenly, increases
it
to note that these patterns and trends were
extrapolations
In
1600,
at
least
one
of men have endeavored
is to
weapons
their
realizing:
or
ultimate lethality potential
than a sword,
is in
possible,
impose their
using their
opponents or by
if
to
a review of the manner
other groups of men by
Lethality
characteristic:
the ability to injure and,
The history of warfare
groups
common
wills
upon
more effectively
at least
in
than
approaching,
the
of their weapons.
a comparative thing.
Nothing
is
more
the hands of someone who can wield it,
lethal
to kill
a
*Gaston Bodart, Militaer-historisches Kriegs-Lexikon. (Leipzig and Vienna: C.W. Stern_,=T8) .
"**T.A.
Dodge,
Napoleon.
4 vols.
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1904). ***T.A.
Dodge,
Caesar.
2 vols.
44
(Boston:
Houghton Mifflin,
1892).
single
opponent
sword's lethality the
physical
values
is
within reach of
limited
limitations
factors
of the sword with
or the tank, kill
by the
the
sword.
factors of time,
of the man
to these and other
lethality
that
who is
it
the lethality
using is
it.
feasible of
range, By
shorter periods oý
and
assigning
to compare
the hydrogen
or any other actual or hypothetical weapon. more people in
the
But
time have
the bomb,
Weapons greater
lethality.
Figure 11 shows the calculated theoretical
index
values of representative weapons over the course
(TLI)
lethality of
history.*
*The theoretical
lethality
index
(TLI)
is
a measure of the
potential number of casualties a weapon can cause per hour based on its own characteristics if employed against an assumed homogeneous, uniformly distributed target array of personnel with a density of one per square meter. TLI is based on the following factors: rate of fire; reliability; accuracy; casualty effect; range; and mobility. For additional information on the TLI see T.N. Dupuy, Numbers, Predictions, and War (Fairfax, Va: HERO Books, 1984).
Figure ii Selected Theoretical Lethality Indices
(TLI)
Weapons
TLI Values
Hand-to-Hand
23
.........................................
Javelin ........
.............................................
19
Ordinary Bow ......................................... Longbow ..............................................
21 36
Crossbow .............................................
33
Arquebus
10
.............................................
17th Century Musket ............................................ 18th Century Flintlock ......................................... Early 19th Century Rifle ................................... Mid-19th Century Rifle ......................................
.
153 495 3,463
Late 19th Century Rifle ............................... Springfield Model 1903 Rifle ..................... WW I Machinegun ......................................
WW II Machinegun ..................................... 16th Century 12-pdr Cannon ........................... 17th Century 12-pdr Cannon ................................. Gribeauval 12-pdr Cannon ............................. French 75 mm Gun .....................................
155
4,973 43 224 940 386,530 ...
mm GPF ........................................
105 mm Howitzer 155 mm "Long
912,42-0
657,215
......................................
Tom........
.
1,180,681
............
.....
WW I Tank ............................................ WW II Medium Tank ....................................
Wý I Fighter-bomber
......
34,636 935,458
......................
31,909
WW II Fiahter-bomber ................................. V-2 Ballistic Missile ................................ 20 KT Nuclear Airburst ............................... One Megaton Nuclear Airburst ..........................
Figure lethality period quite
is
over history.
flat.
Since
It
lethality
of of
the
particularly
and
1,245,789 3,338,370 49,086,000 695,385,000
a semilogarithmic plot of is
weapons
has
trends
not surprising
called the "Age of Muscle,"
however,
Because
12
19 43 .36 102
of
mid-19th
increased
steadily
this great and steady increase in
weapons over the past 400 years --
46
lethality
gunpowder
the
since
weapon
that through
the increase in
introduction
in
is
weapons,
Century, and
the
the
sharply.
the lethality
particularly as the trend
of has
Figure 12
50M
0#
INCREASE OF WEAPON LETHALITY OVER HISTORY Age of Technological Innovation
/
I,
IOM
I-k.L I" , I C/U
1000K C'
-
X/ /'X
1lOOK
ozlt
//j/
1000
C
.:-
500
Age of Muscle Gow N IIU L A D.-"
500 100
MISSILE WEAPONS " .. o-=r,,-
--7 ---------------
--------
I 20U-- -------------------------400 300 200 100) (1000 BC AD
I
I
1100
1200
•7•° 1
.. rC')" 1300 1400
1500
1600
--
T • 1700
!
'4,
1800
!
l
1900
2000
become
pronounced
logical
terms
in
to assume that
of
killed
logical,
an
inflicted
in battle
assumption
centuries.
Casualty
significant
Figure
rates
fighting to
weapons
in
in
13 shows
in
have be
increased
superficially
have
First,
the
gone
daily
in
because
battle
of
the two
their methods
weapons.
Second,
own troops
These two combined,
employment of troops
these
producing more weapons
men have altered
trends have been reflected
tactics for the
down
effects on thliti
hostile hands.
average
over
the
in combat from 1600 to
order to exploit the new
limit
offsetting,
by these weapons
might
responses to man's success
and more lethal weapons.
sought
be
become rather steadily less deadly
casualty rates for winners and losers
of
would
would
it
would be wrong!
has
present.
--
the fact that weapons have become more lethal,
battlefield four
wounded
Such
but it
Despite
the damage
and
commensurately.
same
the past century-and-a-half
in
.f
the
they ncw
and to some extent
the development of new
in battle.
Regardless
of
the weapons,
tactics have the purpose of getting troops and their
weapons
positions from which they can inflict
in
harm on the enemy, them,
the
greatest
or to where the enemy can do the least harm to
or some combination of both of these purposes. Effect of Dispersion on Casualty Rates The
principal
an increase combat
reason
in weapons
for a decrease
lethality has
troops on the battlefield.
occurred lethality
for
the most part in
of new weapons.
in
casualties despite
been greater dispersion This greater
response
to
the
dispersion
has
increase
in
As weapons lethality increased,
48
of
tac-
Cl)
a, c
:A
:-),L'. C .-trd tlhir
is
Love.*" ca.tLfu)
s--.-.9times del ber:atQ is
assumed that
figures are based thie
'aale
:& ""
Beebe and DeBak,.,
archives,
from the official
figuries are accurate. official
the ,;:-,,
For wars before World War
the light of the reliability
Siesearch
-nd
compilation of
based almost entirely upon data In
which
it.
Centu) i•s,"
Army Casualties in Wars of the 19th and 20th
"US
which
figures in
Army Almanac,
DeBakey, 1952),
their. upon the and
the
Battle Casuatties
p.•4.
**Albert G. Love, War Casualties (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Medical Field Service •C-hoo--MTT,7 Ucebe and DeBakey, 01).cjt.
with some minor modifications based upon Beebe and
World Almanac DeBakey.
The Korean War figures
presented
in
Reister;
as
Neel,
from
comes
the Vietnam War data Thayer.*
particularly,
and,
Stanton,
data
are based upon official
Figure 26 Wounded to Killed Ratios
in
US Wars Ratio of Surviving Wounded to Battle Deaths
Patio of Wounded to Killed Mexican War Civil War Spenish-American War Phil. ippine Insurrection World War" I ;-:oJL%
A.
W/0
I
WarL
World War II World War II
w/o USAAF
2.12 2.38 3.94 2.72 4.10
4.20
1
3.57 4.25
2.41 2.77
i
Korean War
4.02
3.56
Vieti am War
4.45
4116
F:gure numhbur. and
~
Gas
3.72 4.55 5.88 3.81 5.96
shows the ratios of the numbers wounded
26
in
killed
American wars of the 19th and 20th
Lhe ratio of the survivii•
wounded to total
battle
to
the
cer;turies deaths,
Ir
which
includes thoa,=. who wert killed outtight and those who died
later
becaus'.
of wounds
*Army Alnman Relste--,-titF-'•T•A•-.•-ualtier
i•i
%;I an6
battlie.
since
World Almanac --
ca-
consistent
Frank
(1985);
tatistics:
medical
US
A.
ArT
The Suryeon D.C.: (Washington, in .xeerience Kedical Support of the US Army in c,--T-TpreiT Department of the Army, D.C.: Vietnam, 1965-1970, (tjaohiniiton, of Battle (Washington, Order Vietnam Stantcu. L. Shelby 1973); Thayer, War Without C. Thomas and li4); US News Books, D.C.: Wstviow Press, 1985). Fronts (Colorado SprinG , Col.: ti,e Koreaii Wac •T,
Ii
rela-
ratios do not reveal any significant trends in
These
between wounded and killed in
tionship5
and
history,
of
course
fairly steady over the
been
possibly
until
battles
the relationship appears
Otherwise,
in World War II.
beginning have
war
first
the
1819,
1846-1848.
the Mexican War,
is
on this list
to
before
the US Army do not exist
for
records
certainly for most of the past two centuries. every Lethal weapons have killed one man in battle for about four men wounded. those who are hit in
Of
die
when those who
three men survive for every one who dies,
mately
has
survivors
considered.
eventually are
Is
wouo
of
appproxi-
battle by lethal weapons
evacuation
recent wars due to modern
increased in
of
propoLtion
The
9
and medical techniques. raw
The
figures by
sources
to
use
official
figures for
the
Spanish-
and War.
It
of 10% to 20%.
possible
is
arrive at very different There
are two
in
corded
at the aid stations.
who were evacuated
sets of numbers
The other set ivr'udeti only for
from the aid stations
The lower figure
wounded
for
is
used in
sets of data are shown in
treatmunt
in
re-
One svt includes all who were
the vietnam War.
action
Two
action
reason to believe that the killed i i
perhaps
American
smaller.
For
reliable.
entirely
not
for the union Army 4n the Civil War may be low, factor
a
is
there
instance,
data is
statistical
those 30%
and
is
Us
expur-
this haridbook.
Figuru 26 for thu
ience in both world War I and World Wai
II.
Thib
is
because there
0m
9
were
special circumtstances
relating to the statistics
which need
to be noted. The
9
data for World War I shows a ratio of
killed of 5.96, other wars.,
total
Thi.:3
However,
killed
in
is
action,
died of
the
gas-relateJ and
fragqmfnts
because slightly
more than
ot 72,773 casualties,
lass
juries
killed
wounded
wý,ich is significantly higher than in
casualties,
gas.
9
raw
than
2% of
arid less
their
to
most of the
one-third of the
%4ere caused by poison
the total
gas
were
casualties
than 2% of the survivors of gas
gas-related
injuries.
If
in-
we deduct all
of
casualties from the World War I statistics,
wounded come
ratios for those hit by
the
bullets
or
shell
much closer to the values experienced
in
other
modern combat. In
World War
II
the overall
of wounded to killed. the
casu:J.ilty
small
Thus,
killed
than
is
figures
of
the
aircraft crews
USAAF
ratio of
the rest of thtc
USAAF figures are strippý:d out of the totals, casualties,
for World War
I
are rely close
Army.
of
Only
Forces.
survived after
had a much lower
was the case for
show a low ratio
L-•cause a substantial portion
figures are for the US Army Air
proportion
down.
This
US Army
being
a
shot
wounded When
to the
the US Army ground
to thu: normal
ground
comibat pattern.
Itie Sspec%, be
data
from
the Spat i h--..,
r i ca n
both because widc:!y diffeziLvg
found alid because
the size oi
War
i3
paLticularly
"official" statistics
the sample is
sirall compared
can to
th9 Civil War and the World Wby.s.
i
I
Records for both the Korean War substantial Only," were
numbers or CRO.
returned
omitted
of cases
to duty
discussed
casualty
to
the
number of personnel
still
status and
this
rates
for
who were treated,
These CRO cases
shown here
between
"Carded
include
arnd non-battle
been
There may
and the correla-
injury
rates
problem missing
not complete. and those still
in
for
the Vietnam War was
action,
for whom data
to
the is
be
Those known to have died while in
then di 1 ed of wounds.
This assumption
casualties
are
US
Army figures.
Including
for our 20th Century wars,
difference.
Air
Force
MIA
wounded
tends to degrade
effects of modern evacuation and treatment with respect to These
large
confusing
missing are shown as having been
the
however,
Marine
the
DOWs. Corps
would make little
figures would be less consistent
for the
reason discussed above.
Impact ot Improved Medical Care Survivability on the battlefield has increased significantly as a result of medicine in the
the past century.
percentage
dealths
the tremendous
improvemenis
to battle deaths
that have been made
in
Figure 27 shows for Am'erican wais
uf survivors of hits, (11T A and bOW),
the ratio
non--battle
and the tatio of
Lromn disease to deaths trouii injuries.
84
of
84I
9
but who
have
for those wars.
CRO phenomenon
Record
later.
Adding
and
immediately.
from the statistics
between
individuals
These are individuals
be some relationship tion
of
and the Vietnam War
dJeaths
9
Figure 27 US Casualty Ratios Influenced by Medical
Progress
Ratio of Non-battle to battle deaths
Survivors as percent of hits
Ratio of deaths from disease to deaths from injuries
MeKican War Civil War
69 70
7.30 2.27
27.80 21.29
Spanish-American War*# Philippine Insurrection* World War I@
80 73
13.34 3.15
16.65 4.59
74
1.43
11.64
World War Ii (ground forces only)* Korean War
(w/o gas casualties)
73 78
0.36 0.13
e.28 0.23
Vietnam War
'76
0.24
0.24
*Ratios
influenced
by tropical
climate
#Malaria epidemic @Influenza epidemic three
Al).
improvements in
of the ratios shown in Fig3ure 27
in military merd•,.ii~e
survivability
indicate
that
ha*,_ caused a 6zý.xnotic increase
on the
Tattiefi-10. Ihe percentage of persorincl
who get hit and survive has .
ed since the Mexicýan War,
the significa:nce of
is ex;,,ained
evident
that the proportion cf.
has decreased Whi .1 figures
t;
interpi.uv
Lu
and
69
te
KuLuarl
ut
It
toul casualties cause,
the trend to 2ncrea.i;'2(d survivability .'J l.
in
the
to mean d
first
co I un,•1
that thu utft1.;
evacuation
burviv4.n(n
0? pu: •:ent, a rid
below.
is
also
Ly diseasei
significantly.
battluLit
chan•.:es
this irc.•:.
and
is
ot
o:1L
i
e
r.-lativie'
VietctLowu, w ..
t•rl! ¢haeV:.i wv.iLt
76 t. II '1L)
-IK
4M
>
U-
0 wa
Z
I .
to
0
wounded survived in
the Mexican War;
of them survived in
the Korean and Vietnam Wars.
The clear
effects
from
deaths
improvements
the decrease in
in
three-quarters
modern medicine
the ratios of non-battle
are to
the
Vietnam War,
of
exception
Insurrection, The
the
also shown
Spanish-American
these
in
Figure
War
27.
the
and
battle
Spanish-American
War
anomaly is
War
With
the
Philippine
ratios decrease steadily until the explained
S
also
and disease deaths to injury deaths from the Mexican
through
War.
of
approximately
Vietnam by
4
The
malaria epidemic which nearly destroyed the US Army expeditionary force
in
Cuba.
The
Philippine
Insurrection
understood also as an indication of a higher and
infection
in the tropics than in
figure
may
be
incidence of disease
temperate
climates.
This
explanation may account also for the very slight increase in
the
ratio of non-battle to battle dead between the Korean and Vietnam War. Another medicine in shows
example
of
the effect of
the past century
is
to be found in
the relationship of disease and wounds
1854 and 1918.
The relative
not exactly comparable,
this is
standards
Figure
29,
of
which
in six wars between
importance of disease as a cause of
casualties has declined significantly.
ratios
improving
Although the ratios
the same trend
m
are
illustrated by the
of non-battle to battle deaths shown for American wars
in
Figure 27.
0k
Figure 29 Ratio of Sick
*
to Wounded
in
European Wars* Sick to Wounded
Ratio
Crimean War (1854-56) French Army
9.06 7.90
British Army Italizi
Campaign
(1859)
French Army
6.59
Austro-Prussian War
(1866)
Prussian-Army
*
4.67
Franco-prussian War
(1.870-71)
German Army
S
Russo-Japanese Russian World War
SRussian
I
4.82
War
(1904-05)
Army
2.37
(1914-18)
Army French Army
1.32 1.25
German Army
0.92
*Source: Great Soviet Encyclopedia (Moscow,
Medical impact *
1928),
p.
286.
studies of our three most recent wars testify to the
of improved medical care and evacuation and explain
apparent anomalies. ot the US Army in for Vietnam was
The following quotation from Medical
Vietnam
explains
why the survivability
lower than for the Korean War.
The hospital mortality rate ( for wounded between Januar 1965 and December 1970) was 2.6 percent for Vietnam] cum[,ared to 4.5 percent in World War II arnd 2.5 percent in Korea. The very slight increase in hospital
some
Suppora ratio
* mortality in Vietnam over that in Korea was a which result of rapid helicopter evacuation brought into the hospital mortally wounded slower means of with earlier, patients who, route and would have died en evacuation, would have been recorded as KIA (killed in those action). Assuming that most of patients who died within the first 24 hours the rate in hospitals belong in this class, would be much closer to 1 percent.*
was
9
9
This also is
almost certainly the principal reason why there
a
lower proportion of survivors in World
slightly
War
I1
9
compared to World War I. Finally, returns
to
there duty
casualties
is
from
(battle
a general rule of thumb for casualties.
casualty,
For
disease,
each
or
between the 6th and 20th days after admission,
of
the
Interior,
or
situation to situation, evacuation policy.
It
discharge. depending does,
personnel will
be
five per day
and 25 will never
evacuation to the Zone
This will in
100
injury) 75
returned to duty at the end of 20 days at a rate of
be returned to duty as a result of death,
estimating
vary
widely
from
large part upon the theater
however,
provide an initial
basis
for analysis of personnel attrition. Disease and Non-Battle Four force:
injuries
considerations affect the disease (1)
the season of the year
tropical climate;
(3)
in
rates of a
temperate
military
climates;
quality of medical care; and (4)
(2)
incidence
of battle casualties. In
northern and northwestern
*Neel,
op.
Europe and the northern United
cit.
QU
the hospital admission rate for disease is
States, twice
as
high in
and January)
as in
early winter summer
approximately
(about 0.30% per day in
(about 0.15% per day in June,
This seasonal variation almost disappears
August).
in
December July,
and
subtropi-
cal and tropical regions. In the
tropical climates,
year
temperate
is
approximately 1.35
climates.
In
admission rate per d:y in average rate in
however,
the disease rate throughout times
the
other words,
if
average
the
a temperate climate
is
rate
average
for
disease
about 0.22t,
the
a trorical climate will be about 0.30% per day.
The effect of high quality, disease death rates is
shown in
sophisticated medical care upon Figure 27.
While admissiorns
to
hospitals are not greatly affectcd by the quality of medical care (with
the exception of the effect of malarial suppressants
as quinine and atabrine upon malaria admissicins
in
the
such
tropics),
the length of hospital stay and the number of deaths from illness are reduceC sharply when quality medical care
is
applied.
Regardless of the other effects upon disease rates discussed above,
there
is
a
clear and
consistent
disease rates and battle casualty rates
in
correlation the combat
following quotation from Beebe and DeBakey is
between
zone.
relevant:
It is of the nature of man to react with his entire i .riq to strong stimuli. If men arc placed , , combat situationi their attrition is no- well estimated by adding a casualty rate to their previous rates of nonbattle causes. Life under combat conditions will interfere with preventive measures otherwise considered rcutine and effective, will transform anxiety ilito somatic symptons, particularly those referrable to the gastrointestinal and cardiovascular systems, and may bring new risks of disease and non-bottle injury.
The
I
a
Thdt ronbattle attrition is well estiblished,
depeuds upon combat but the numerical
relationship is not on, which speýcified for all places and for all Environmental circumstances and the
U
can be t;.mes. previous
experience of the troops shape the relationship in myriad ways. The most uniform and strongest of these relationships is the correlation between wounding and psychiatric breakdown in combat troops....* As
noted
in
the above quotation from B3eebe
there
is
alsc a noticeable rise in
posed.
to
disease) when a unit is
Otherwise, injurics
tnere and
is
either
suffering.
Some
rules
estimating
disease
of
or
battle
in
l.Id$
thumb have been
casualties.
casualties.
In
the
the hospital admis-
been quite constant,
developed
injury rates in a combat
rules are based mainly on US
are applicable generally to all 1.
op-
about
with deaths about 0.001% per day.
disease and non-battle these
battle
(as
no apparent relationship between non-battle
sio-n rate for non-•-•attle injurTes 0.03% per day,
DeBakey,
non-battle injuries
American wars of the 19th and 20th centuries,
I
and
The daily non-battle
for
estimating
theater.
While
experience,
they
modern armies. loss rate for a unit not in
combat
temperate climate.s will be as follows: January February March April
0.30% 0.27% 0.24% 0.21%
2.
daily
combat in
The
May June July August
0.16% 0.15% 0.15% 0.18%
September October November December
0.21% 0.24% 0.27% 0.30%
non-battle casualty rate for a unit not
itl
a tropical climate will be 0.30%.
p • Op.±ct., pp.
27-28.
3. rate
For a unit in
for
a
combat,
unit not in
the daily
non-battle
combat will be increased by
casualty an
amount
equal to 20% of the projected battle casualty rate. Causes of Casualties There over
have
the
last
150 years.
Prior
nearly half of all casua',i2
Century, Then,
been major changes
in
the causes of
eC Lhe
middle
casualties
of
the
19th
were caused by artillery.
for the three major wars of the mid-]9th Century (American
Civil War,
Austro-PrussiAn War,
and Franco-Prussian War)
lery caused barely ten percent of the casualties, small
arms
musket)
artil-
while infantry
(alnost entirely the conoidal bullet of
the
rifled
inflicted nearly ninety percent of the losses.
By the early 20th Century, lethality
of
small
hcweveri the relauionrhip of the
arms and artillery in terms
of
casualties
caused had more than returned to the pre-Civil War situation. fact,
as shown in Figures 30 and 31,
In
artillery and mortar shell
fragments caused nearly seven out of ten WIA and DOW in World War I.
The
ability range
increased effectiveness of artillery was because of the of
and
the artillery to fire effectively observation by hostile infantrymen
fire techniques.
---
while using
out
of
indirect
0
Figure
Causes of Wounded in
30
Action for (US only)
20th Century Wars
Percent of WIA caused by
World War I World War I w/o gas World War 1I Korean War Vietnam War
Mines & Booby Traps
Small Arms
Shell Fragments
19 28 32 33 51
46
-
68
3 4
53 59 36
Toxic Gas
Other
-
3 4 12
-
4
-
2
32 -
ii
Figu:e 31 Causes of Died of Wounds in (US only)
20th Century Wars
Percent of DOW causedd_ Small Arms World War 1 World War I w/o gas World War Ii Korean War Vietnam War
If by were
Mines & Booby Traps
Shell Fragments
18 20 20 2'7 16
71 78 62 61 65
-
4 4 15
ments were approximately as shown in US wars of the 20th Centur
8 4
-
of those killed in
(for which data is
of those hit by artillery
2 2 14
-
not
approximately the same as for those dying of
the percentages
Other
9 -
-
we assume that the proportions
different causative agents
Toxic Gas
or mortar
action
available)
wounds,
then
shell
frag-
Figure 32 for the four major
Swa9ntury:
94
•
Figure
32
Proportion of Battle Casualti.es Caused by Artillery or Mortar Shell Fragments, WoLld War I World War II Korean W,* Vietnam War
50% 55% 59% 40%
The reaston way the proportion of artillery much
higher for Worid War I was the reliance of the
upon
artillery
that
conflict.
in
until
maneuver
the
and
artillery all
near the end cE the war employment of weaponb
of the toxic gas used in
most
shells,
combatants
dealing with the trench warfare stalemate
The inability of either side to
breakthroughs
since
casualties was so
it
achieve
greatly
other
major
inhibited
than
the war was
of
artillei-y. by
projecteJ
could be considered that the proportion of
casualties caused by artillery
in World War I
was
actually
between 75% and 79%. How
do we explain the lower proportion of casualties
by artillery
in
World wars,
I and II
between
sophisticated with
the Vietnam War?
Wars
fought
and the Korean War
traditional
were
keyed to those weapons.
very different sort of war.
conventional
armed forces with
weapons available at that time and
doctrines
causj.ed
in
the
atLost
accordance
The Vietnam Way was
a
The guerrilla nature of the
actual
combat engagements unquestionably has been overemphasized,
since
much
South.
of
the fighting was between the conventional
US and
Vietnamese armies on one side and the conventional North mese Army on the other. front line,
Unlike other wars,
and the manner in
however,
which the conventional
Vietna-
there was no forces were
employed
was
involving
such
that there were
divisions and larger
no
large
formation
organizations.
Most combat
gagements were between companies and platoons. full
battalions and brigades
ally against each other,, and
(or regiments)
The engagements
without the lengthy artillery
20th
were
employed conventionwere relatively brief
preparations typical
of
other
linear
tac-
The Americans and South Vietnamese were supported more-or-
less
traditionally
North
by a substantial amount
of
artillery.
The
Vietnamese had a mUch lower proportion of
artillery,
al-
though their mortar support was ample. conditions the
en-
Only seldom
Century conventional conflicts which involved
tics.
battles,
The fact that under
even as much as 40% of the casualties
American troocs came from hostile artillery
somewhaI
sulprisnilg.
•asualties
The
proportion
caased by US artillery
inflicted and
of
these upon
mortars
North
is
Vietnamese
was undoubtedly much higher.
Casualties by Branch of Service Figute combat the
33
will
COvers:aa simiiar
of casualties
arms and the non-combat services in
2Zth Century. t
statistics
detail
among
the
the major US wars
of
A moce detailed breakdown of the World War be
Strengths
Army Worcld War. II Rank.
shows the distribution
found
and
in
Table D,
Castalties by
"US
Army
Branch
on World War 11 will be found in
World
and
War
Flank,"
Table
E,
I I
and "US
Overseas Strengths and Casual,.es by Branch and
"
t
EN\cupting the Vietnam War. The batt:le casualtie3, of Vietnam WNar have not yet been analyzed by arm/branch.
9C
the
.0
Figuyec 33 Percentage of Casualties bv Bhanch for American Wars of the 20;th Century World
Woz:.d
War
War
83.8 2.5 6.9* 2.4
-
1.9
A
1.5 2.0
2.9 .. 2
3.0 1.4
Air Defenre
Medical Other
Korea
I1
b..3 3.5 1361 3.6
87.9 0.2 4.3 3.2
Infantry Armor Artillery Engineer
and Air Defenrse were combined in
*Artillery War.
Korean
the
highest
the
evident that the Infantry has suffered
is
It
I
proportion of casualtie.s by far.
be misleadinr
may
wars
low proportion
relatively
The
World War I,
unl.ess the reasons
in
the European
and of casualties,
iheater in
armor
in
Asiatic theaters. in
the closing months of the
operations against the Japanese in
the
was considerably war use
There was relatively little
than this average might suggest. of
small
and only a
In World War II
proportion of the ALE was *rithe Tank Corps.
higher
In
explained.
are
tank warfare •;s just beginning,
proportion of Armor troops,
both
of Armor casualties in
the Pacific
and
The small proportion of deployed Armor forces
the Korean and Vietnam wars is
reflected
also in
the
casualty
stat:iistics for those wars. A better perspective on the extent to which Armor casualties be expected
could the
fact that
aver-age
in
a future war in
Europe can be obtained from
Armor branch personnel made up only 1.4%
strength
deployed overseas
97
in
World War
II.
of
the
However,
the percentage of deployed Armor personnel, in
one year was 17.6%,
deployed
who were
second only to the Infantry,
strength becoming cas.oalties
in
a
casualties
with 26.4% of
year.
0
Figure 34
Hypothetical Force and Casualty Relations by Branch 1980r and 1990s Percent of Theater Strength
P,°rcent of Branch Casualties
Percent of Casualties
15 10 8 10 12 10 35
26.0 18.0 5.0 2.0 1.0 2.5 0.5
55.0 27.0 6.5 3.5 2.0 3.5 2.5
Infantry Armor Artillery Engineer Air Defense Medical Dept. Other Figure
principal
34 shows the possible general
branches
1980s or 1990s. of
theater
in
allocation of
a hypoLhetical war
in
Europe in
(instead of about 22% as in
Armor troops making up about 10% of the total and approximate Engineers, It
is
forces by
the
This shows Infantry troops comprising only
forces
World
0
War
late 15% Ii),
(instead of 1.4%),
allocations of the remaining 75% among Artillery,
Air Defense,
Medical Department,
and other branches.
assumed that each branch will suffer approximately the same
proportion
of
casualties as it
did for World War II.
basis the two direct fire combat arms have about 82% of the total casualties, they
had in
troops
would
World War II.
But in
(Infantry
On
and Armor)
this would
about the same as the 84%
this hypothetical
incur about one-third of the total
war
Armor
Infantry-Armor
cas'ialties. The direct of
fire
combat arms comprise
the forces deployed
in
a combat
only about
theater,
one-quarter
but they incur over
0
80% of the casualties.
The non-combat
support and service
(with
the notable exception of the Medical Department)
about
one-third of the forces deployed
they
incur
only slightly more than 2% of
between these groups than
in
is
the Artillery,
10% of the deployed forces and
arms
comprise
a combat theater, the
but
casualties.
In
comprising somewhat
less
incurring
somewhat more than
5% of the casualties. Casualties by Rank Figure 35 provides data on officer
casualties
in
relation to
enlisted casualtias for American wars of the 20th Century. Figure 35 Relationnhip of off-ic'er-En!isted Casualties American 20th Century Wars Percent Officer
Percent Enlisted Men
6.6 10.4 6.1 5.0 10.9
93.4 89.6 93.9 95.0 89.1
World War I World War II (All Army) World War II (Less USAAF) Korean War Vietnam War (Killed Only) Casualties their War I, by
for officers are almost directly proportional
relative strengths where officer
in
the theater of operations.
leadership was
In World
exercised most conspicuously
leading troops into costly assaults
against
fortifications,
officer casualties were substantially higher proportionately enlisted casualties, II
particularly
in
the Infantry.
officer and enlisted casualty rates
branches were almost identical,
to
in
than
In World War
the Infantry and Armor
except among lieutenants,
where
the
officer
enlisted
casualty
casualty rate.
consistently wars.
rate was
considerably
higher
than
The loss rate for Artillery officers is
higher than that of Artiillery enlisted men in
This is
which
who
to hostile aimed fire.
The breakdown of officer casualty rates by rank is 36,
both
because of the exposure of forward observers,
usually are lieutenants,
Figure
the
is based on Beebe and DeBakey.*
shown
This
in
0
shows
clearly the high proportion of losses among lieutenants. Figure 36 Relative Battle Casualty Rates for Officers by Rank, World War II Percentage of Rate for all
Officers
General or Field Grade Captain First Lieutenant
35% 53% 105%
Warrant Officer The discussed been
in
this chapter and the preceeding chapter
these
or
these
the
20th
large
areas.
such
and they did include rebellions,
forms
of
However,
guerrilla
the casualty experience
combat has been
lost
in
the
large "regular" armies.
cite,
p.
46.
In order
to provide some
from
overall
data which has empLasized primarily combat between
SS
in
wars did include smaller military operations,
lesser
•*Op.
all
major
and insurgencies.
casualty
have
The
as raids and rescues, warfare,
In
been
major wars have included large forces engaged
less continuous combat over
conventional
0
for casualties which have
based on data from major conventional wars.
Century more
rates and relationships
8%
two
understanding
p
of
these
lesser
casualty experience wars since 1945.
forms for
of conflict,
the
selected engagements
next
chapter
treats
from less than major
Chapter PERSONNEL ATTRITION: There
5
MINOR CONFLICTS
been no major wars
have
since 1945,
been a large number of lesser conflicts. conflicts were significant regional wars, the
Arab-Israeli
stages, 1945
nuclear
less
discourages
wars lesser
than
deterrence,
instability.
major
inverventions,
in
its
later
a large number of these post-
wars have
conflicts,
flourished
rivalry,
US and the USSR from direct
Although this mutual deterrence
forms
and,
such
as
because
of
or insurgencies.**
superpower
between nuclear powers, of
warfare.
encouraged wars of national
it In
and
Third
World
discourages
this
climate,
the
by taking advantage of poverty and discontent
developed
nations. in
problems coupled
with
some of these nations has brought
large number of insurgencies,
and major
appears to have encouraged
influence
authoritarianism
forces
confrontation
rebellions,
and minor
the
USSR
liberation designed to spread
Economic
have
lesser
The existence of relatively balanced nuclear the
war.
major
there
such as the Korean War,
have been relatively minor
rescues,
These
However,
but
A few of these
the Iran-Iraq War,
the Vietnam War.
conflicts
raids,
Wars,
SINCE 1945*
has
Soviet in
less
political about
a
hostilities.
*This chapter is based on HERO Report No. 118, Casualty Estimates for Contingencies (Fairfax, Va.: HERO, 1986). ** HERO has tentatively identified 300 post-1945 conflicts. This list is being refined, and the number of conflicts will change as a result of this process. A complete list of these conflicts with some descriptive information about each conflict will be published by HERO in 1986.
los]
These minor conflicts are likely to continue future.
It
attrition
is
important,
experience
in
therefore,
to occur
to understand
in the
how
minor conflicts compares with the
and relationships experienced
the rates
in major conventional warfare,
such
as World War II.
Classification of Post-1945 Conflicts In
order
to establish a basis for research
into
casualty
0 experience sample
of
in
these minor conflicts since 1945,
48 post-1945 conflicts and classified them into
groups.
This
conflicts
by
was
accomplished
intensity
and
by
duration.
plotting The
conflicts ranged from one day to over 25 years. were
HERO examined
assigned
the
48
duration The
to one of four intensity categories as
a
four sample
of
the
operations shown
in
Figure 37. Figure 37 Combat Intensity Levels Combat Intensity Level 1:
Absence of combat but occasional inadvertent violence.
Combat Intensity Level 2:
Sporadic and intermittent combat involving small numbers of combatants.
Combat Intensity Level 3:
Frequent combat involving groups of combatants with relatively few pauses periods of intense combat.
large and
0 Combat Intensity Level 4:
Continuous combat involving large groups of combatants with relatively few pauses without some combat activity.
The plot revealed some definite groupings which were helpful
104
in understanding the nature of post-1945 warfare. schematic of plotted points.
Figure 38 is a
Four groups emerge clearly.
Figure 38
OURATION4NTENSrTY PLOT OF CONFUCT SAMPLE Wars 3
Ex lended Insurgencies
Minor Hostilities
Can" I
1 ,__-
Peacekeeping Operations
Duration
There violence
was a distinct group of operations without or
combat
peacekeeping not
been
and with various
durations.
operations and shows of force in
intended
but
in
which
violence
These
which may
sustained were
-zorrdat
have
had
occurred
inadvertently. There
a
was
significant
group
of
conflicts
which
had
involved sustained combat short of conventional war and which had long durations five
years
(all had lasted over one year and many had or
more).
These
were
insurgencies
successful enough to last beyond the initial called extended There
was
stages.
lasted
which
were
They
were
insurgencies. a
small group of
intenpity operations.
fairly
These were wars,
Israeli wars and one India-Pakistan War.
short
duration,
high
such as two of the Arab-
Finally,
there
was
a
group of
operations
clustered
intensity levels 2 and 3 and of relatively short duration. were
a
raids; brief
conglomerate
group of different
interventions;
rescue missions;
(mostly failed) was
operations
these
participants,
insurgencies. that
and duration.
they
types
of
at
These
operations:
abortive rebellions,
and
The major characteristic constrained
were
of
scope,
in
They often led to decisive results.
These were called minor hostilities. The 73-Engagement Data Base The guide sample
classification scheme for minor conflicts was used as a
to perform detailed research on of
engagements
81 engagements were
omitted
was
casualty
researched.
from the final
experience.
Subsequently, sample
for
A six
analysis
because insufficient casualty data was available to permit a full anal.,sis.
Two
other
engagements
were
omitted
because
involved mass capitulations and biased the CMIA data. sample used for analysis has the composition shown in Figure
they
The final Figure 39.
39
Composition of 73-Engagement Data Base Engagements Small Wars
Extended Insurgencies
Minor Hostilities
rotal
31
27
81
-3
0
-6
81-Engagement Data Base Poor Casualty Data
from;
-3
Mass Capitulations
0
0
-2
-2
73-Engagement Data Base
20
28
25
73
106
'a
The 73-Engagerent Data Base was compiled on
in
engaged the
the US or
its
allies
and New Zealand forces to
conflicts
which the US itself
identification
of
casualty
in
Europe in
The intent was
included.
might
of the kind
become
engagement was selected as the unit of
combat
permit
in
not
did
involving Australian
analyze engagements which were representative
minor The
which
The US experience
although engagements in.Vietnam were
forces
armed
Conflicts
were also excluded.
was excluded,
Vietnam
were excluded.
insights
collected only for
Conflicts
forces.
Western-type
Northeast Asia
and
Casualty data was
minor conflicts.
"modern"
include
modern
suffered by sophisticated,
casualties
to provide
experience
of
involved.
analysis
during
to
actual
combat. The
73-Engagement
information *
in
Data
Base
on the eight variable
provides
factors
reasonably
affecting
good
combat shown
Figure 40. Figure 40
Circumstantial Variables for Casualty Rate Analysis Terrain Weather Surprise Posture Air Superiority Insertion Means Opposition to Insertion Organizational Type The
73-Engagement
information differentiate
0.
on
Data
casualties
among KIA,
by
WIA,
Base
does
kind.
It
and CMIA,
provide .is
accurate
possible
and the sum of
to these
three, is
Total Battle Casualties (TBC).
no distinction between KIA and died of wounds (DOW),
KIA figures include DOW. however,
provide
(combat vs. From
is
and the
The 73-Engagement Data Base does
useful information on grade,
branch,
an analytical viewpoint,
or role
It
is
the 73-Engagement Data
engagements
(8,000 plus) estimated to have occurred in conflicts since
be better if
particularly
However, enough
the
an underlying normal distribution,
a larger sample were available.
is widely dispersed,
base
1945.
the sample size does meet the minimum size to assume,
statistical analysis,
not
base
neither random nor representative.
small compared to the total number of combat
While
not,
support) of the casualties.
has some imperfections. it
Except for US data there
it
for would
The casualty
and the means of the various sub-samples are
useful
to describe the
casualty
experience.
73-Engagement Data Base appears to be
homogeneous
to warrant using it
as a whole,
and it
is
the only
currently available for analysis of casualty experience A complete list
post-1945 minor conflicts. Data Base is
data
data in
of the 73-Engagement
in Appendix 5. Analysis of Engagement Data
The mean daily casualty rates for TBC,
KIA,
WIA,
and CMIA
for the 73 engagements are shown in Figure 41. 4
Figure 41 Casualty
Rates
from the 73-Engagement Mean
Mean Rates
TBC 6
Data Base
Daily CasualtyRate KIA
WIA T T.-I
-
%
CMIA "
I
In
0
the sample,
and 8% were CMIA.
22% of the casualties were KIA; 70% were WIA; The ratio of WIA to KIA is
3.76.
Casualty Rates versus Unit Strength The spect
data on Total Battle Casualties was analyzed
to
strength,
both
strength and duration.
the findings are shown in
With
with
respect
to
reunit
Figure 42.
Figure 42 Total Battle Casualty Rates by Unit Strength Unit Class
SStrength
ih~n
i••
Number of Engagements N
•~
301-600 601-1,000 1,001-2,500 over 2,500 The
casualty rates in
Mean Daily Casualty Rate %
14
5.0
15 13 17 14
3.2 2.3 1.3 1.2
the 73-Engagement Data Base show
the
same relationship between strength and size as has been experienced in the
more extended combat in major wars.
higher
the
casualty rate.
The smaller
This relation
the unit,
obviously
goes
beyond the geometry of exposure to the phenomenon which has
been
described
above
explanation,
the
as
"friction in combat."
effect is
Regardless
real and occurs cornsistently
of
the
in
all
combat. Casualtý
Rate versus Duration
Figure
43
shows
the
relationship
between
total
casualties for various classes of engagement duration.
battle
Figure 43 Total
Ratios by Engagement
Casualty
Battle
Number of
Mean Daily
Engagements N%
Duration Class (Days) 1 2
Duration
Casualty Rate
37 13
3.8 2.3
3-5 6 - 10
8 8
1.3 0.8
Over 10
7
0.1
0 An
interesting
terion
is
ments.
The original
of
one
day for
screen
day,
the
shows
is
all
for
achieved if
lasting
a part
for
is
from one day
the daily
difference
short
duration of
casualty rate
the 73-engagement
engage-
of a day.
to a half
cri-
a duration
For each
are somewhat different. reassigned
different
of duration for
used to permit an engagement
is
a
the sample was to assign
engagements
to one day,
the
reclassification
rule
results
duration
two days
is
applied to assignment
finer
whose
variation
If a
a
half
engagement day or
doubles.
from
Figure
sample
when
this
44
S
accomplished. Figure
44
Total Battle Casualcy Rates by Alternative Duration Classes Number of Engagements
Duration Class (days) 1/2 1
2
N
Mean Daily Casualty Rate
%
36
7.1
8
4.3
6
3.1
5 10
8 8
1.3 0.8
Over 10
7
0.1
36 -
0
0
.S
For *
both of these data sets,
ship between duration
and casualty rates.
ment the lower the rate. engagements
longer
This effect
than five-days
been classified as engagements five days or less, day
engagement
means
there is
is
a definite relation-
The longer the engagemost pronounced
(which probably
in any case).
are higher for a one-
engagement.
also that tates are higher on the first
engagement
than
on
should not have
For an engagement of
the casualty rates still
than for a five-day
subsequent days
for the
Whether
this
day of a multi-day
cannot
be
inferred
with
confidence from this data sample. The value of placing a finer screen to develop the tive
duration array is
questionable.
War
The basic reports are daily reports;
operate
on a daily basis;
very
care the
rates
that same day.
are concerned,
it
the
participants'
Commanders ment in
it
Data
in
to be provided
in
minutes
planners'
or
over hours.
engage-
of medical
any case.
Action
on CMIA from the 73-Engagement Data Base is such
whether
was all
advance and must estimate the number of "days"
Captured/Missing
data is
levels below divisions.
9:
a f-w
if
the
and staffs cannot forecast the length of the
support and replacements
because
viewpoint in
a
As far as medical
From
even
days.
lasting
does not matter
were for a half day or a day.
viewpoint that engagement lasted a day, from
term.; of
short engagements which were classified as
or replacements
daily
support activities
and planners think in
half day were all concluded in
*
functions on a
basis.
The
alterna-
not normally available in
much
important detail
at
The overall CMIA proportion of the total
casualties
is
engagements. pattern
and CMIA were reported
in
of influence by any circumstantial
Two
73
variable.
No
CMIA
for 64 of these engagements.
engagments
which were omitted from
Base do show large numbers of CMIA.
Invasion
of Goa
1961.
the Goa invasion,
In
only 9 of the
These nine engagements do not display any definite
were reported
Data
2.7%,
in
the
73-Engagement
These were the Indian
1961 and the Bay of Pigs Invasion,
also
in
1,189 CMIA were reported out of total
battle
casualties of 1,303;
this CMIA figure includes
also.
At
the CMIA were 4,801 of 4,888
battle
casualties,
the Day of Pigs,
all. out of a strength of 7,195.
the
WIA total
In both of
these cases the CMIA figures resulted from a massive capitulation of one side. Overall, factor
in
CMIA does not appear
these kinds of engagements.
CMIA are not reported, cated
to be a major or a consistent
or it
This may be partly because
might be because the less sophisti-
force either does not take or does not keep
major reason, these
however,
prisoners.
may be that the modern forces engaged
A in
relatively short combat operations consist of well trained
professionals
who
do not operate in
such a way as
to
incur
a
large number of prisoners or MIA.
Casualties by Circumstances of Combat in
order
to
provide casualty rates for
combat circumstances, ing
to
types
of
engagement
sets
of
the 73 engagements were classified accord-
the eight circumstantial
Total Battle Casualty
various
(TBC)
variables shown in
rates were calculated
within each
S119
category.
Figure
40.
for each of the
The
results
are
0
0i presented *
in
Figure 45.
Three numbers
are given in
the sophisticated
forces
of engagements
in
a particular class;
casualty rate;
and the ratio of wounded to killed.
0
0I 0,.
in
Figure
each engagement category:
45 for
the number
the mean daily total battle
Figure 45 Casualty Data by Circumstantial Variables
Terrain Type Flat Rolling Rugged Urban
Number of Engagements 17 16 21 19
Weather Type Cold Temperate Hot
6 23 44
3.0 3.6 2.0
3.54 3.66 3.99
Surprise Surprising No Surprise
20 43
1.5 2.1
2.87 4.25
Being Surprised
10
6.6
3.10
Posture Attack Defend
60 13
2.4 3.3
3.84 3.55
47 26
2.5 2.8
3.82 3.64
51 9
2.2 2.3
3.81 2.30
Air Landing
4
0.6
3.00
Helicopter
4
7.7
Ship
2
*
Unknown
3
7.1
1.47 0 6.50
Mean Daily TBC Rate % 3.8 2.1 2.0 2.5
Wounded to Killed Ratio 3.44 3.41 3.94 4.09
S
Air Superiority
Superiority No Superiority Insertion
Means
overland Parachute
O2position to InitialEntr
__
_
_
opposed Unopposed Unknown
58 12 3
2.7 0.8 7.1
3.84 1.74 6.50
Organizational Type Foot Foot, Motor-Mech Motor-Mech w/armor Airborne Special Operations
4 5 37 24 3
5.4 1.9 2.4 2.4 2.6
3.76 3.53 3.87 3.32 1.50
S
*Less than 0.5%
114
14|.,
Daily Engagement
Total Battle Casualty
the mean when related
rates
do vary
to the eight circumstantial
from
factors.
The
mean
TBC daily engagement casualty rate for the entire sample is
2.6%
per
day.
considered the
Casualty
rates below 1.8% or
to vary significantly
sample
shows
the
above
from the mean.
following
with
3.4%
On this
respect
to
are
basis,
engagement
casualty rates: o casualty higher
Terrain
rates. than
ualty rate is
The
the
concealment.
exercises a slight but clear effect rate for flat
mean,
The
terrain
presumably due to
sample, Although
hot weather
this
is
is
the sample mean,
reducing
consistent with experience
the number
in
Surprise
in
the
cold weather
is
has
a great effect
military
This operation
surprised. rates
When
weans
take
due
on
casualty
thaIL
factor affecting casualty ratcs in o
t.EIV
the
significantly
precaution
the one side achieves surprise, iUWeL
IIUiILI.
in
too
rates. casualty
higher
this
its
than
kind
against
of
being casualty
SuLprise is
a
major
this kind of operation.
Posture has an effect on casualty rates.
casualty rate for forces
is
from this.
that forces entering on
must
.LYnificaIHTly
are
is
wars.
higher than
of cold weather engagements
the side being surprised
mean.
the cas-
major
When one side achieves surprise on the other side, for
and
than the mean for the entire
small to permit drawing a definite conclusion
rate
cover
The mean casualty rate for
lower
the mean for engagements
o
of
large but not necessarily significant.
in
and
the
significantly
lack
effect of rugged terrain in
o Weather has some effect. engagements
is
on
defense is
higher
The mean
than the mean
rate
for forces were ground
in
the attack.
ambushes,
and
forces in
casualty
rates.
the
in
only three of
air
attacks
on
which the British
British
had very
high
the 13 defensive engagements had
cas!lalty rates have been higher
casualty .rates.
defender's
13 defensive engagements
one enduring feature of historical combat
defender's
attacker's
of the
two were Argentine
the Falklands
rates below 0.5%. that
Three
tendency
This
data
than
suggests
to have higher casualty rates
the
that is
is
the
true
of
these minor conflict engagements as well. Air Superiority
0
was not a factor
in
sophisticated
force
casualties whether the sophisticated force had it
There
were
no
sophisticated effective
engagements force
in
this sample
in
had air superiority,
which
or
not.
the
less
and so the impact
air attack on sophisticated force casualty
rates
of has
not been measured. o some
Means of Initial
significant
helicopter rates, deal.
leads
but by
in
casualty
rates.
Entry
to significantly higher than average
Mayaguez
Incident
in
which
from a single helicopter
demonstrates Although
differences
the mean of this small sample is
the
casualties
Entry into the engagement does show
significantly
the sample
lower is
crash.
it
is
were
great
numerous
Entry by air
than average
very small,
casualty
influenced a
there
landing
casualty
apparent
by
rates.
that entry by
ship was a particularly safe method. o
unopposed entering
Ojposition
entry in
to entry
is
also
a
factor.
Achieving
led to significantly lower casualty rates
the face of active opposition.
116
This is
related
than to
0
the desirability of achieving o
surprise.
Organization Type
on casualty rates.
does not appear to have an impact
The mean rate of all groups are close to the
sample mean rate except for organizations were
predominant.
elements
in
which foot
Eight of the nine engagements
participated
took place
in
1945 and 1946
and Greece,
and these had high daily casualty
units
used
were
assaults
and
contingency their of
special qualifications.
armor,
are
rates.
Airborne
9
parachute
be
used
in
status as well
Most units involved
motorized or mechanized
foot
Indochina
Airborne units may
operations because of their elite
which
in
iii 24 engagements which involved
3 air landings.
operation
in
elements
in
infantry
as
this kind with
some
and the results of this analysis suggest that having some
form of vehicular mobility is
desirable.
The Wounded to Killed Ratio Another
statistic
action to killed in
of interest is action.
are
in
wounded
in
The wounded to killed ratio for the
entire sample of 73 engagements is experience
the ratio of
combat engagements
3.76.
This is
consistent with
in major wars since 1840.
There
some variations with respect to the circumstances of
combat
which are worthy of note. ratio
is
The variation
in
the wounded to killed
considered significant for values above 4.50 and
below
3.00. o
Terrain,
Weather,
Posture,
and Air Superiority
do
II
not have significant impact on the wounded to killed ratio. O killed
Surprise
ratio.
When
does
have an impact on
forces
achieve
the
surprise
wounded they
have
to a
significantly o
lower wounded to killed ratio than otherwise. Insertion Means
does
show some
variation
in
the
wounded to killed ratio.
Both parachute assault and
helicopter
entry
lower than average wounded
to
show
ratios;
significantly
killed
this means that a much higher proportion of casualties
these kinds of entries are killed outright than is Opposition to Insertion
o
wounded to killed ratio.
0
usual.
does have an impact on
When entry is
in
unopposed,
the
the wounded
0 to killed ratio is The
wounded
circumstances Under
significantly lower than the overall ratio.
most
of
to'killed ratio is
affected much less
by
the combat than is
the casualty
itself.
conditions,
it
can be expected
rate
that three
to
the
0
four
wounded will occur for each KIA. Composite Terrain & Weather Casualty Rate Matrix The
tendencies of casualty rates to vary according
various more
circumstantial
than
one
factor
factors are different are
combined.
if
0 to
the effects
Unfortunately,
the
the of 73
engagement data base does not provide a large enough sample to be able
to do this for all of the eight factors evaluated.
possible,
however,
It
is
to combine two factors to produce a composite
matrix. Terrain and weather are two impoxtant factors interpretation matrix
combines
of this kind of combat. two
of the
in planning or
The terrain and weather
environmental
factors
which
determined
primarily by the location of the engagement.
actual
projected
or
predicted very well,
engagement the terrain and weather
are
For an can
be
and so can the average casualty rates to be
1i18
expected
(provideo
the engagement
sample is
a good predictor).
Figure 46 shows the firmat of the terrain and weather matrix aihd
the
engagements in too
few
of engagements
number
in
not very large,
each cell is
'ihe
cell.
each
of
number
have
and some cells
about
engagements upon which to base valid conclusions
future rates ut.der similar circumstances. Figure 46 Cell Sizes for Terrain & Weather Composite Cesualty Rate Matrix WEATHER
The
Cold
Tezm ftate
Hot
TERRAIN
Flat Rolling
13 12
4 1
0 3
Urban
11
8
0
mean
daily
total
rates
casualty
battle
combination of terrain and weather are shown in
each
for
Figure 47.
Figure 47 Mean TBC Rates for Terrain and Weather Composite Matrix (% per day) WEATHER
Hot
TERRAIN
9.6
2ý5
mean rate fcr engagements in
distorted by a single engagment the
7.4 3.3 3.0 2.5
2.6 1.6
Flat Rolling Rugged urban The
Temperate
casualty
rate
was
(3.9)
3.6 2.4 -
the Plat-Temperate
(the Mý_a.u~e__7
23.5% per
Cold
day.
cell
incident)
in
omitting
this
is
which ou~e
engagement
produces
a mean rate for the cell of 1.9% per
Neither
value
because
of the small number of engayements available
is
probably representative
of
this
day.
combination to
0
compute
the values. Values
of
the mean TBC rate for other cells
clgse to the total mean rate of 2.6%, and
Rolling-Hot
consistent with
with
personal
results in these
except for the
survival and operating
in
a
that
the
hot climate
action,
itself
cells
is
preoccupation
hostile
tends to
be
Rugged-Hot
The low rates for these two
evidence from other combat
to
environment
lower than average casualty rates for both sides.
cases
aggressive
cells.
appear
mitigate
In
against
and the impact of the rugged terrain
lowers
the casualty rates further. This matrix, very
helpful
hos'ilities data
in
and others like it
for other variables,
planning or interpreting
engagements
or from certain stages of extended from the 73-Engagement Data Base is
validity
of
confidence
the
that
method the
but
from
0
minor
insurgencies.
The
sufficient to prove the
insufficient
rates experienced
can be
are
to
provide
representative
high of
future engacjei.ents. Comparison With World War II In
order
Casualty Rates
to compare casuol.ty rates for
Data Base with c.sualty rate!. trom World War
the
73-Engagement
I1, two
conditions
must be fulfilled: 1.
The
comparison
approximate size.
must
This is
be made for units
of
the
same
because casualty rates vary according
to the strength of the unit.
120
O
The
2.
engagements rather US
than for months or years of
daily casualty rate for all
was
about
0.05% per day.
were not in
combat.
includes only days
in
experience.
The
ground forces during World War This is
engagement casualty rates because it units
for
must be made with casualty rates
comparision
much
lower
than
II
typical
includes many days
in
which
The engagement casualty rate,
which
which the units were
in
active combat,
was
about 1.0% per day for divisions. Figure 48 shows daily engagement casualty rates Engagement II,
Data
for
the
73-
Dase compared with average rates for World
War
arranged by approximate
unit size. Figure 48
Comparison of WWII Unit Size
and Minor Conflict Casualty Rates World War Percent
Company Battalion Brigade Division
The difference
Minor Contingencies Percent
1I
5.0 2.3 1.3 -
8.0 2.9 i.0
in
rates appears at the battalion and brigade
level wiere the two samples overlap. it
appears
that
contingencies are experienced
in
daily
engagement
from one-third
On the basis of this casualty
rates
for
to one-half the equivalent
sustained combat in
World War
II.
data minor rates
This may US
result may b• due to several conditions.
One
be that the casualty data for the minor contingencies and
similarly modern,
sophisticated
forces
of the opposing forces.
that
higher
combat effectiveness
their
In
for less
On this basis,
the Combat Effectiveness Value of the sophisticated exceed
is
fighting
sophisticated forces from less developed nations.
forces shoulId
general,
with
forces
have fewer casualties than forces of
inferior opponents. Another
these
kinds
artillery War
reason
Ii.
related factor of
is
operations
that the sophisticated forces
usually did not face
combat,
kind
of
fire that was common during sustained combat in
World
Most
minor
of
the
weapons on
both
contingency engagements were small arms, mortars.
the
in
Artillery and
its
is
sides
in
the
with some tanks and some
F major cause of casualties
absence
would tend to lower
modern
in
battle
casualty
r ates. Still
another
casualty
rates
for
possible minor
explanation conflicts
operations are short and decisive, combat
of
is
the
that
much
many
of
lower these
without the kind of sustained
that existed during the more or less continuous campaigns
and battles of World War II. Whatever the explanation, that
daily
the evidence of this compavis-)m
engagement casualty rates for minor
coni licts
is
have
been much smaller that they were during Wor'Ld War IT. There
were
no other significant
differences
between
casualty
rates
War II.
The manner ir,which the eight cizcumstantial
for tle mirnor contingencies
affect the rates Lppears to be quite similar,
1990
and those for
the World
variables
and the wounded to
killed uatio is
about the same for both sets of data.
Summaryof CasualtyExperience The
analysis
post-1945
the 73 engagements taken
from
conflicts
indicates that casualties and casualty rates from combat are very simi.at to those from combat
of
kind
of
for Minor Conflicts
this
in
major
a
minor
The major lessons are as follows:
wars.
A
--
company
or battalion-sized
can expect to have an total battle casualty
conflict
are possible,
engagement
Casualty rates larger than
of 3.5% per day or less.
rate
unit irivolved in
this
but they will be due to catastrophic events rather
that "normal"
conflict.
F.etween three and four personnel will be wounded for each
--
person kil] el. Lowez
--
climales,
average
rugged terrain,
Achieving
--
being
than
surprised
experienced
in
hot
or both.
surprise will
rates will be
wiil reduce casualty rates by
increase casualty rates by
a
half;
factor
of
three. -an
Higher
initial
than average casualty rates can be expected
insertion
by helicopter
or
parachute
assault
when is
opposed. Captuted
--
factor
in
and missing in
action personnel are not a major
this !dind of operation provided unit discipline is
good
and mass capitulation does not occur. . -- Estimation of expected ca~ualty rateýs during pianning
for
minor
the
conflicts
expected
can be facilitated by taking into
environmental and operational
and the relative combat effectiveness
factors
account
of the
of Lhe two sides.
operation
Chapter 6 MATERIF.L ATTRITION Materiel il
attrition
has beccme a majcr factor in Be:ýfore the middle of the
the last 150 years.
non-personnel attritio.rj in
com'bat only
19th
Centur-y
combat was significant only for horses
and
artillery
due
to overrun and abandonment to tha enemy rather than destruc-
tion
by
guns,
hostile
operations was
not
fire.
Supply was as
from
say
that losses of
in animal-drawn
animals,
to
his
weapons,
was less before the Industrial
Revolution than after.
steam
of the Industrial
energy
Century. Crimean conflict attribute
to
the first
majoz
but
rzilroads and steamboats
in
which Northern
the
early
the impact
was
:.uper ior ity factc.i
profound.
war
9
technologicO]
in in
both
rail
19th
impact on the first
and
major
historians steamboat
the Confederacy's defeat.
whose effects are discussed
124
the
in
Many
The next important contribution of techio'.ogy the conoidal bullet,
otheL
s).gnificar.ce
Awl-rican Civil War was the
resources as a fundamental
This i.sý
R:-volution wsas the application of
The tew steam engine technology had some War,
or
to Materiel Attrition
a military standpoint,
contribution
but t~ir
0
but it
person
arid
Tney were,
From
military
wagons.
materiel were not important.
introduction
was
bas been since,
what the soldier carried on
on beasts of burden and
to
important
before the 2eth Century as it
provided
packed
and the va.t majority of gun attrition
to warfare was
in Chapter
2.
•
This
was
automobile,
followed
thirty
years
later
technology
static
týernch
introduction
was not exploited warfare
of
rudimtentary
sufficiently
of i4orld War I,
potential
to tow
attillery.
a&.so resalted
A
bined
these new developments
into blitzkvieg,
model
for the conduct of conrentional war by all
and
opposinYg
increasing
prefnrence
weapons
it
tank,
artillery,
later
and enhanced of
the
the Germans comwhich became major
and
became inportan•
to
equipment,
many
to targeting his personne?.
therefore,
the
the
the
powerts.
importanceý of these materiel means
supporting war,
force's
--
the
saw
from the develcpment
A genezration
waging
prevent
greatly
internal combustion engine.
the
Although
that conflict
trucks and tractors
self-propel!ed
the
to
many waapons based on this engine
the comb:,,t aircraft,
With
by
propelled by an Internal combustion engine.
this
logistics
about
meteriel attrition
in
target
of the
cases
in
In modern ground wa.:fare,.
has become aJ.moýt as
important
as
personnel attrition. Desp it•a
th(2
increasing
.electronic equipment, war,
the ve
experience This is .,,nd
of
has
in
th4n of
not bvcause of lack of deta. of
-nateriel
to include
the items damaged
It
materiel
materiel attrition
destructior:
to
and other
wx;apons,
extract,
or destroyed. organize,
of th-
historical
pE.rsonrel
attrition.
Considerable data on d.-mage
items is
t\ie actions
vehicles,
the conduct of modeLn
has beer, less systematic analyvis
supDly recurds,
made
of
importa-ice
in
unit
records
taken to rel-air
Huwever:,
little
patterns
losses in the American wats of the 20th C(-tui:y from
125
oL
in
repla(-.
effort has been
and analyze tiiis wealth
been possible to ascertain general
and
ir
of
data.
mrnteriel
fracmentary
reports
Even though these patterns
and data compilations. are
relationships
documentary evidence
less well-defined and less
substantiated
than are personnel attrition
patterns,
provide valuable insights on materiel attrition One
insight is
important
are high,
other
items
so too are
losses of
losses
in
guns,
tanks,
In general,
of materiel.
they
combat are
When personnel casualties
related to personnel casualties. battle
by
modern combat.
in
that materiel
and
these
are
trucks,
in and
proportional
relationships. Data II
this handbook has been taken mostly from World
in
and the 1973 Arab-Israeli
Helicopter
!oss data
artillery,
chapter
helicopters,
deals with tank losses,
information
and other equipment. as this is
losses
to personnel casualties
proceeding
from
battalion/regiment, formations
the
The treatment of
of tank
at various levels of aggregation,
individual
to
tank,
and,
to the armored division,
involved in
Most of the
losses and the relationship
losses discusses tank
tank
on
the area of materiel
that has been emphasized the most.
attrition
losses.
from the Vietnam War.
rest of this chapter presents attrition
The tanks,
is
War for tank and artillery
War
large engagements
and
the
armored
finally,
operations.
to The
treatment comprehends World War II
chronological
and geographical
(US,
and Germans on the Western Front; German and Soviet
British,
experience on War.
The artillery
the
Eastern
and the
1973
loss section relates artillery
to personnel casualties the
Front)
in
a manner similar
tank loss relationship.
Helicopter
Arab-Israeli weapon losses
to that used to develop
losses are addressed as
well
as the scarce data permits.
made
on
other
than tanks and artillery,
Finally,
a brief comment
the relatively unexplored area of
losses
of
is
materiel
and helicopters.
Tank Losses and Crew Casualties Analysis of ties
is
based on data from
combat
*
the relationship of
operations
provided
on
898
1944
by
cause
distinguish whether
incidence losses
by
of
enemy action.
Army
and
101
the tanks
light)
is
burned
shown in
by crew position,
or
for
Data
is
rendered
The data show the tank losses
tank crew casualties
cause of loss,
First
casual-
through April 1945.
(797 medium
inoperable and
losses to crew
field reports of the US
from June
tanks
tank
by
not.
The
relation to
tank
and
according
to
whether the tanks lost burned or not. Figure 49 Tank Losses and Crew Casualties by Cause (First US Army, June 1944 April 1945)
Cause of Trank Loss
Mine Antitank Rocket Gunfire Unknown
Crew Casualties
Crew Casualties Per Tank Loss
171 119 502 106
73 190 579 36
0.43 1.60 1.15 0.34
898
878
0.9820
Tank Losses
Crew Casualties as % of Total Crew 9% 33% 24% 7%
Figure 49 shows tank losses and crew casualties by cause t-nk
loss.
each
tank lost.
and
crews
There was almost one casualty
(on
the average)
The largest cause of casualties to both
was gunfire,
causing 56% of tank losses and
of for
tanks 66%
of
personnel
casualties.
There
is
some evidence
caused about 50% of these gunfire losses, 30%,
and antitank guns about 20%.
damaged
or
destroyed by mines,
artillery
tank guns caused about
Although 20% of the tanks were only about 9% of the
casualties were from that cause. (bazooka)
that
By contrast,
personnel
the antitank rocket
caused about 13% of the tank losses and about
the personnel casualties,
0
21%
of
making an average of 1.60 casualties in
each tank damaged by that weapon. Figure
50
position.
shows
the distribution of
casualties
by
crew
The casualties were distributed evenly among the crew
members.
Figure 50 Tank Crew Casualties by Crew Position (US First Army, June 1944 - April 1945) Crew Position
Casualties
Percentage of Casualties
196 184 173 179 146
22 21 20 20 17
Commander Gunner Driver Bow Gunner Cannoneer*
*This number is reduced because the 101 light tanks in the sample did not have a cannoneer. Figure casualties Over
in
60% of
the casualties in
51
tanks
casualty
shows an interesting
relation between
tanks that burned and those in the tanks were in
that did not.
that were hit
In
rpte was significantly
tanks
tanks that did
did not burn.
tanks thdt burned,
personnel
About
and the other
that burned, higher than
in
however, tanks
that
not. halt
half were the crew did not
burn.
128
1
Figure
51
Impact of Tank Burning on Crew Casualties Tank Loss Type
Tank Losses
Total Crew
Crew Casualties
Casualties as % of Crew
Crew Casualties Per Loss
Burned
346
1,695
444
26
1.28
Not Burned
552
2,694
434
16
0.78
4'73n
878
TOTAL
--
F
Tank Losses and Casualties in The tank
relationship described in
losses
relationship entire
between
tank losses and armored units is
The statistic
is
an
obvious
personnel
point.
tank
units during a period other
armored
sample
regiments
sample is
is in
this
in
relationship when
both
based on the experience of four
from late July 1944 until
based on the experience a three-day engagement in
ratio of tank loss rate to casualty rate is these units.
The
There are two samples used to illustrate
this
The
one.
casualties
the ratio of tank losses to personnel casualties,
One
between
not so obvious but still
used to demonstrate
are expressed as rates.
Units
the previous section
and tank crew casualties
battalion-sized
very real. is
Battalion-Sized Maneuver
The data is
shown in
of July
computed
May
four
US
1945. British
1944. for each
The of
Figures 52 and 53.
I1
"
12
Figure 52 Battalion Tank Loss and Personr Armored (US 6th Armored Division, July 194 Personnel Casualties
•ualty May 1945)
Rates
Tanks
Casualty Rate
Losses
Loss Rate
Ratio of Tank Loss Rate toCasualty Rate
15th Tank Battalion*
411
55%
129
256%
4.65
68th Tank Battalion*
297
40%
101
202%
5.05
69th Tank Battalion*
422
56%
91
182%
3.25
86th Car. Rcn. Sq. (Mecz)**
426
45%
20
118%
2.62
*Based on the TO&E strength of "751 personnel strength of 50 medium tanks. **Based on TO&E strength of 949 personnel
and
an
average
and 17 light tanks.
4
0
130
Figure 53 British Armored Regiment Tank Loss and Personnel Cas.ialty Rates (Operation Goodwood, 18-20 July 1944)
*
Personnel Casualties 2d
Casualty Rate
8th Hussars 2d Welsh Guards 148th RAC *-7
Lossep
50
7.55%
37
1
0.14%
2
2.73%
19.84
13
1.86%
15
22.06%
11.86
6
0.91%
1
1.43%
1.57
0
inference
rates
to casualty rates
some consistency,
S
6.10.
The
mean,
However, *O
of
for
armored
units
the ratio of tank
for these eight data
points
the ratios
all
fall
show
reasonably close to the
the 8th Hussars which had only one
research
confid-ice
personnel
is
necessary to establish to
a
higher
the validity and relevance of this
ratio.
this step does provide a transition to the next level of
the analysis, tark
However,
to permit an
three days of fighting.
Additional degree
6.81
with a mean of 6.96 and a standard deviation of
values of
except
casualty in *
insufficient
that the population of battalion-sized
would exhibit the same relationship. loss
51.39'
1
This sample of only eight units is
S
Ratio of Tank Loss Rate to Casualty Rate
Loss Rate
Norfolk
Yeomanry
S
Tanks
losses
which is and
to examine the same relationship
personnel
casualties
divisions.
131.•
fcr
entire
between armored
UA Armored Division Casalty and Tank Loss Rates Relating armored division casualty rates to tank loss provides since
an indication of combined arms losses in
armored
components. World War II, with
an
were
Europe
were light,
tanks
authorized.
Other US arme•ed
As
a
al.l tank units,
shows in
casualty
combat in Us
tank
divisions
result of the
light losses
the armored divisions,
were rarel.y up to strength.
Figure
and 54
and tank lvs6 data for two light armored di.visions
Europe in
November and December
intantry divisions in World War II
battalions.
1944, diM
in turn to the infantry battaiions.
an infantry division,
tactically fur
not have
A non-divisional tank battalion was
attached
and
its tank
normally were
These tanks
weie
%as a vwny bigh ratio of infantry personnel
in
mass,
&nd
to tanks°
The
to personnel casualty rates in
iaf.intry divisions was* about half that cxperionced
divisionb.
132
organic
platoons
infantry support rather thau
ratio of tank loss rates 11
and
Northwest
initial
heevy
to
tWere
in
in
heavy,
add 232 medium
attached
used
divisions
with 10,P00 men and 168 medium and 77
suffered iuring the Normandy invasion, indeed
infantry
Only the 2d and 3d were
authorized strength of 14,500 men,
about 131 light tanks.
and
two types of US armored
heavy and light.
0
armored combat,
divisions contain sizable artillery There
rates
in
World War armored
0
Figure 54 Armored Division Casualties and Tank Lozses (US AMnoxed Divisions, Nov-Dec 1944) Ratio
Average
6th Armored Div. (28 days) S
.4th
986
Armored Div. 1,416 (30 d&ys)
combat
0.32%
108
1L64%
5.12
0.46%
173
2.64%
5.35
No-rember to 7 D•ecember
IC
attackinr
in
November
and
Lorraine.
1944,
attacked
was engaged in
hi,3hest
percent personnei
10 not
division until
the
period.
over the entire
casualties for z single
day
was
with a high single-day
The daily
to 28 November was 0.45%.
four day,_i of
the
The average
for
loss rate exceeded 3% on each of the first
attack,
was
The average daily loss rate for the 19 days
of the attack from 10 November
this
A part of the
of
pe'riodt of intensive combat both casualty and tank
l.i.4% on 15 November.
tank
(although
combat contitiously
'loss rates were higher than the average Ihe
division
whern the
again on 4 December and contiriued in action
During
7th.
for a 28-day period
The division launched an attack on
intensively) untW. 29 November.
always
is
UL 6th Armored Division data
The
Loss Rate to Casualty Rate
Tank Loss Rate
Daily Tank Personnel Casualty Losses Casualties Rate
DiviScn and Time Period
of Tank
Daily
Ave-age
rate of 4.83%.
saine attack period was 2.15% per day,
for a ratio of
tank
lons rate to casualty rate of 4.78. The days in
4th Armored Division data is
based on experience
combat from 8 November to 7 Decembier 1944.
of .2 to 18 November,
during which the division was
133
In
for 30
the week
involved
in
particularly heavy fighting,
the casualty rate was 0.84% per day,
and the tank lots rate vzs 4.29% per day. alties
per
tank
los-,
and
There were 9.31 casu-
the ratio of
per5onnel casualty rates during
tank
si.milar for these two US armored divisions.
were
fighting
same
to
casualty rates are
very
the
rate
that week was 5.11 to 1.
The ratio of tank less rates to personnel
iu
]oss
weather
coi, tvibutes
to
the similarity of the
consistency
of
the
results suggests
and
The divisions
terrain,
and
results. a
this ,
definite
tha %ven
relations.hip
between personnel casual.t.ies and tank losses. British Caualt_2)and Tank Lois Rates in
July
in
Operation Goodwood
1944 the British I and VIII and Cariadian
I
parLicipated
iii a p
"Goodwood."
Tank and perso:4 nel losses for three days of
fighting, British data
18-20
July 1944,
operations
for
average The
these daily
tic.unly inte-tnve
three days is strength
d.-nant.d
operati.n.. ..
are shown in Figure 55,
research report.*
in
the
tank
figure
personnel
and
or
5.28%
of
casualty rate
the average daily stLength.
This
75,969.
casualties,
equae:es
of 1.76% per day during th2 engagement,
the
tanks.
total combined arms average dai y strength was
the three days of the operation there were 4,011
loss
using in
In
severe
based on a
Personnel and
shown in
Corps
to
which
a
is
a
very high rate for a force of over 75,000 men. During the operation 470 tanks or 34% of the start were
listed as out of actioninot
screncith,
including 25 tanks lost by
Canadian 2d Armored Brigade on 21 July). *Military Operational Research Unit,
Ot these,
Report Number 23.
133
the
{26.9%)
0
Figure 55 British Casualties and Tank Losses (Operation Goodwood, 1-20 Jolly 1944) Average
Ratio
Daily Casualty Rate
' Tank Rate to Casualty Rate
201
0.70%
10.41
24.13%
764
2.48%
9.73
143
15.73%
287
0.98%
16.05
32
4.85%
59
.72%
C .74
47
7.76%
66
1.07%
7.25
9.48%
6
0.30%
1.60
13.59%
1,383
1.76%
7.772
could not.
Since at
Average
Organizar.ion
Tank Losses
Daily Tank Loss Rate
7th Armored Division
63
7.29%
Armored llth Division
207
Guards Armored Division 27th Armored Brigade 2d
Canadian Armored Bde.
148th RAC
Bn.,
493
Total could
be
least
160
course start
personnel Casualties
repaired
in
24
hours;
316
of the operation, strength
it is
esatimated
for the three days,
1,209 tanks.
losses
were 40.78% of average strength,
which
or 13.59%
ratio of tank loss rate to casualty rate 7.s
losses
for
Using this strenath figure,
was
Figure 54.
and
total tank
doily.
becomes
higher than the ratios for the U! 6th and 4th
Divisions in
the
that the average daily
correcting
gains,
overall
during
replacement tanks were reported received
The 7.72,
Armored
armored divisions in approximately took
two
nersonnel casualties wa- so much lower for theý
to
loss
1944,
November-December
There are two
US
was ifor the
than it
four armored divisions of the British
4.n Operation "(;oodwood."
part
tank
an immediate quesrion as to why the ratio of
Is
There
force
that for
reasons
this.
three times as high for thie British at "Goodwood"
nearly 16
the tank to personnel ratio was
and most important,
First,
tanits
to 1,000 personnel)
-
Lorraine
(about
6
tanks
as i. was for the US XII Corps 1,000
pez
indications
that in
armor
rates to casualties
tanks
loss in
There
a typical combined arms force the increases as the
are
ratio
of
proportion
of
the
bad
(rain and snow) of
weather
the
what they would have been har the
the operation taken place in
British offensiv'e.
decline moae in
Lorraina rates from
lowered both personnel and armored attrition
Campaign
did
personnel).
ion
the force incre7ses.
Second,
as
(about
Loss rates for tanks
bad weather than casualty rates,
July,
tend
to
so the ratio of
tank loss rates to casualty rates would be less in bad weather. Scviet Casualty Data
on
World War II
tank
tank
casualties and tank losses of the Soviet is
hard to obtain fromi open sources.
date has been compiled for nine
sufficient ten
and Tank Loss Fates
and
personncI casualties.
Figure 56.
136
in
Nevertheless,
campaigns
armies to give a reasonably accurate pictiire
losses
Army
The data is
involvinq~j of shown
both in
Soviet tank armies in tank
and
tanmcs. a
mechanized corps,
II
were composed entirely of
and so had a
large
proportion
of
They had only about 48,000 men but had 550-750 tanks,
for
ratio
corps,
Woild War
of about 14 tanks per 1,000 with
11,000
troops.
mun and 250 tanks,
The
Soviet
was comparable
to a
tank U$
armozed division of 10,809 men and 263 tanks^ Althougha Soviet stat-istics on tank losses ordinarily losses resulting include campaigns
only
from non-combat causes,
those
were
duration trom two
whic.h
resulted
on the Eastern Front to 29 days.
the losses in
from
enemy
in 1943-45
include
Figure 56
action. and
ranged
The in
1"igure 56 Zoviet Tank Loss and Casualty Rates (World War II)
Campaign
Number Tank of Combat Days Lol.ses
Army
Average Doily Tank Loss Rate
Average Daily Casualty Rate
Ratio of Tank Loss Rate to Casualty Rate
Oboy;'n 1943
IT & 6G
11
761
18.75
3.03
6.07
2
380
29.23
3.65
8.01
292
8.73
1.24
7.04
Pzokhorovka
1943
Steppe
Orel 1943
2 2I
Orel 1943
4T
10
520
7.07
2.11
3.35
Belgornd 1943
IT
29
577
3.54
0.86
4.12
26T
16
213
1.59
0.45
3.53
36T
19
394
2.25
0.40
4.89
56T
25
195
1.34
0.70
1.91
16T
8
87
1.85
1.55
1.19
Vist Qa1 a
1944 Vistula 194.' E.
Prussia 1944
Pomerania 1945 In
the first
three of these nine operations,
the tank loss rate to the personnel casualty rate is and 8,01.
the ratio
of
between 6.07
These ratios are typical of armor-heavy combined arms
operations,
in
which
the emphasis of one or both sides
is
on
armored action.
A combined arms force seems to reach a critical
point
armor-heavy when the ratio of
of
being
tanks
to
1,(300
personnel exceeds a value of 6.00. The the
ratio
middle
of tank loss rate to personnel casualty rate
four operations in
Figure 56 are
138
between
3.35
in and
.0
4.89.
Although extct strength figures
for the Soviet armies are
not readily available for some of these operations, the
ratio
6.00. were
of tanks to 1,000 personnel was
In any event, more
armored that
in
probably
operations.
infantry operations than
than
of the war on the Eastern Front.
these
they
were
the
fact
This was at least partly due to
German armor strength had declined greatly in
few
less
at the levels of aggregation shown,
armor-supported
relatively
most cases
later
stages
The result was that there were
clashes o.f Soviet and German armor
in
which
the
loss rates were high on both sides. The ratios of tank loss rates to personnel casualty rates in the
final
two
respectively.
campaigns
This is
listed
are
only
1.91
and
1.19,
because the Russian forces were tightýn.g a
victorious action against a retreating German Army,
and tank-to-
tank engagements were not common. Evaluation of World War 11 Tank Loss ExýerLence The HERO data base does not have sufficient data to permit a def is
4
nitive evaluation of World War due
in
part
to the difference
II tank loss experience. between
tank operations
Western Front and those on the Eastern Front. large the
(corps level or higher) Western
were fought could
not
comparable
divisions,
compile to
the
data relatively
Front. for
Without Soviet abundant
some of which HERO has compiled.
operations
further
tank data
the
There was only one
armor or armor-heavy operation
Front comparable to the many such on the Eastern
on
This
research,
corps for
on that HERO
operations US
armored
Nevertheless,
Eastern
Front
armored
conflict
both fronts.
the
there
is
sufficient
data compiled
and Western Front operations experience (This similarity
followed is
that
patterns
for some confidence
relatively unreliable Eastern Front data.)
selected
both
to demonstrate
very similar
a basis
from
Figure 57
data on six Eastern Front operations and three
on in
shows Western
Front operations involving armored conflict. Figure
57
Selected Data on World War II
Eastern Front
Average Personnel Strength
Average Tank S
Tank Operations
Tanks per 1,000 Troops
Ratio of Tank Loss Rate to Casualty Rate
Soviets Kursk-Oboyan Kursk-Prokhorovka Belgorod A
89,O00 78,000 981,000
36h 65( 2,296
4 8 2
6.87 8.01 4.87
belgorod B Belgorod C Korsun
70,000 70,000 255,000
562 500 431
R
2
4.12 4.84 3.20
Germans Kursk-Oboyan Kursk-Prokhorovka Belgorod A Belgorod B Belgorod C Korsun
58,000 82,000 280,000 24,000 1.5,000 85,000
476 505 600 150 130 229
8 6 2 6 9 3
6.26 6.39 3.99 1.49 3.99 1.24
Goodwood Arracourt
75,000 4,900
1,209 122
16 25
7.72 8.39
L3rraine-Saar
32,000
272
9
3.64
Germans Goodwood Arracourt Lorraine-Saar
58,000 7,500 17,000
528 126 120
9 17 7
4.36 6.62 4.32
Western Front Allies
140
14I
:
Two battle
of the Eastern Front operations (or campaign),
which the
immediately Oboyan
and
armor-heavy, tanks
and three
combined
the emphasis --
at
German
Soviet armor
First to
sectors
infantry
6 per
first
two
of the in
1,000
initiative
The Belgorod campaign, armor-supported
The
arms operations
on each side exceeded
of
the
are from the Belgorod
followed Kursk. Prokhorovka
ate part
--
operations
Kursk
battle
in were
which the proportion personnel,
hand,
even
Tank Army (Belgorod B),
campaign
and
in
of
which
was on armored action.
on the other offensive,
Kursk
was essentially
on the
an
front
where the
of
the
proportion
1,000 personnel also exceeded the apparently
of
critical
figure of 6. The
three tank operations on the Western Front in 1944
representative of three distinct types. British
Operation "Goodwood,"
operation
between
The first
of these,
was the only major
Front
large armor-heavy forces comparable to
those
The second,
Arracourt,
results
were
typical
of clashes between small armored forces on
third,
somewhat
more one-sided
shows
comparison a
reported
most
others, all
was
fronts.
infantry operations.
of US and Soviet tank losses in World War
significant difference only
in scale.
The
US
and the US Third Army reported a loss of
its average tank strength in a period of nine
months.
the
Soviet First Guards Tank Army lost 1,040 tanks,
its
562
tank
First
II Army
1,878 tanks lost for ten months of operations
Northwest Europe, of
than
while the
an eight-day segment of the Lorraine-Sarre Campaign,
was typical of armor-supported A
the
Western
fought on the Eastern Front.
The
are
starting strength,
in
the 29 days
in 102% Yet,
or 185% of
the
of
1943
Voronezh
Army
in
Group
operation
that
supported by about 1,70G additiona]. tanks in
those same 29 days.
comparision
tanks --
900,000
men
lost only about
900
some
--
While this was a high loss rate in it
with the experience of the First US Army,
only about one-third
rate
the remainder of the Soviet
However,
Belgorod operation alone.
was
-a
that of the Soviet First Tank Army
in
into consideration the difference
in
that operatiov. taking
Nevertheless, overall
scale,
operations, forces
the
Figure
57
demonstrates
that
in
experience of US and British
attrition
on the Western Front was generally similar
pattern to that of Soviet armored Moreover,
the
comparable
data
in
armored
nature
forces on the Eastern Front.
of Figure 57 suggests that there is
distinct pattern with respect to the ratio of the tank loss to the casualty rate.
and
This pattern is
shown
in
a
tate
Figure 58.
1
0
0
142
CD
cc
0
u0
Z0
0-0
II
(n
LU
< L0q/)
-I
O(JL 0
r-D
cc0
0~
0 CC.A LL.
-J
I-j
The ratio of the tank loss rate to the casualty rate appears to
be
a function of the density or proportion of tanks
force.
in
the
A force can be considered armor-heavy when the proportion
of tanks exceeds 6 per 1,000 troops. engage in
battle,
When two armor-heavy
whether for a long or short period,
the ratio
of the tank loss rates to the casualty rates will be in of 5.00 to 8.00, of course,
each event is more,
with an average value of about 6.00.
exceptions,
as there always are in
sui generis,
forces
the range There are,
combat data,
but the pattern is
clear.
where
Further-
this ratio of tank loss rates to casualty rates appears to
remain
relatively constant as the proportion of tanks
above
6
per
1,000
troops.
On the
decreases,
apparently in more-or-less
propoiAion
of
appears force
tanks
further is
loser.
other
hand,
increases that
linear fashion,
dcclines below 6
per
1
ratio
when
the
troops.
-00
that the range of the ratio for an
It
armor-heavy
between 5 and 7 for a winner and between 6 and 8 for
a
This relationship provides a valuable tool for modelling
and predicting tank losses relative topersonnel casualties. Casualty and Tank Loss Rates Since
neither
published
statistics
necessary
to
both degree after
sides
side on
the
the 1973 1973
the combat
in
order
to estimate
considerable
research,
Arab-Israeli
in and
it
War
War
has
has
been
interview participants
strengths
The data
Arab-Israeli
experience,
search many sources and
of confidence.
considered
in
in
and losses
Figure 59 has been the
overall
9
9
on with
any
compiled
figures
are
to be reasonably accurate.
1 144
Figure 59 1973 Arab-Israeli
Selected Data on Tank Operations: Average Personnel Strength
Average Tank Strength
War
Ratio of Tank Loss Rate to Casualty Rate
Tanks per 1,000 Troops
Sinai Front Israelis
17,000
306
18
5.42
Egyptians
34,000
316
9
7.21
Golan Front Israelis Syrians
12,500 17,000
183 248
15 15
5.26 7.71
The
HERO
data
on
tank engagements
combat
days,
the
16 on the Sinai
organized by combat engagements, 24
in
and 14 on the Golan Front,
Front,
these
ments,
most of which were fought by a division-sized
side,
against
Data for
other. has
a
been
entire
estimated
(not shown in
the
basis
of
engage-
on
the
Figure 59) for
by allocation from the statistics on
campaign,
days.
force on one
force the size of a brigade or larger individual engagements
is
covering
covering 20
armored and infantry units were involved in
Both
War
1973
considerable
the
detailed
information about each engagement. The ratios of tank loss rates to personnel casualty rates in the
1973
Soviet, The,
War are quite consistent with those and
Germans units shown in
winners had ratios of about 5,
about 7.
This is
of
US,
British,
Figure 57 for World War
II.
and the losers had ratios of
further evidence of the general relationship of
tank loss rates and casualty rates shown in Figure 58. Artillery Loss Rates Loss
rates
of
artillery
in World War II
weapons 1 4R
generally
are
low
in
comparison to personnel and tank loss rates.
Figure 60 shows the
experience of the US Army and German Army in 1943 World War II. shown in
Another indication of low artillery
Figure 61,
Army divisions in rates
and 1944 during
which summarizes three theaters in
loss rates
the experience of eight
World War II.
The gun
is US
loss
are so low they are expressed as monthly rather than daily
rates. Figure 60
Selected World War II Average Daily Personnel Casualty
Average Artillery Pieces
Rate
Committed
Artillery Loss Data
Artillery
Daily Artillery Loss
Ratio of Artillery Loss Rate to Casualty
Losses
Rate
Rate
US ARMY US First
ArnL
(8/44-2/45)
0.20
677
(12/44)
58
0.56
0.037
583
0.185
37
0.576
1.030
0.25
664
25
0.041
0.164
(9/43-9/44) (1/44-3/44)
0.08 0.16
452 346
62 23
0.038 0.098
0.475 0.613
(5/44-6/44)
0.25
410
11
0.049
0.175
0.28
243
11
0.049
0.175
0.42 0.30 0.14
7,086 6,976 6,820
1,217 369 299
0.554 0.176 0.146
1.320 0.587 1.081
0.16
423
16
0.].26
0.788
US Third Army
(10/44-].2/44) US Fifth Army
US Tenth Army (4/44-6/44) GERMAN ARMY Wehrmacht (Aug 1944) (Sept 1944) (Avg 1944) Fourth Army (Nov 1943)
0
World War
In
*
II
the US Army lost
few
they lost neither artillery pieces nor
Consequently,
statistical
correlations
personnel
gun
crew war.
entire
the
between crew and artillery A large proportion of artillery
losses are not possible.
piece
for
pieces
the
serving
while
personnel
of
Several divisons
enemy action which damaged an artillery piece. that
number
as a result
&rtilety crew members were killed or wounded
reported
artillery
insignificant
and a statistically
pieces to enemy action, of
relatively
losses are among forward observer and liaison reonul
with maneuver units.
0O
Figure 61 US Gun Losses in World War
Number of Combat Gun Battalions Days Losses
Theater
Towed Weapons North Africa
Italy Europe
II
Average Monthly % Cause of Loss Air Loss Enemy Rate % Artillery Attack Other
7
273
11
10.1%
54
36
10
16 8
:40 355
26 4
3.1% 2.8%
65 67
27 23
8 10
7 6 4
7.1% 1.8% 1.4%
43 50 55
43 17 18
14 33 27
Self-Propelled Weajons
North Africa--Italy Europe The
165 553 461
3 ii
experience
considerably,
of
ranging
individual
US
divisions
from those which had no artillery
during the entire war to those which suffered considerable in
sirAgle
battles
December 1944. rates
from
such
as the German
Ardennes
To derive approximate divisional these
army
statistics,
consideLations must be recognized:
the 1)
varied losses losses
offensive
in
combat intensity following
two
the strength-size factor;
and
2)
varying lcevels of commitment of combat and comkat support
elements,
depending upon the intensity of combat.
The
strength-size
loss rates as it army
casualty
component because
is
not as important for
for casualty rates.
rates
are
about
fewer
of the personnel
assumed
that
a division.
most
organizations,
in
available
of
the
those
intensive c omhat;.
a field army are
field of
its
This is exposed
On the other hand,
it
artillery,
of
even
can
World War II
experience shown in
It
The
can be •een
from in
"average"
combat,
and under
artillery
i5ss
casualty rates.
mean artillery
Figure 60 that under
artillery,
conditions
rates were substantially lower than The ratio of artillery
situations
the
of
"average" environmental con.ditions, field
army
loss rates to field army with a mean of 0.599.
one side had overwhelming air superiority in
climate
for
of
F'igure 60 i5 0.172% per day.
casualty rates ranges from 0.164 to 1.320, Where
loss rate
be
loss
of field arm;nes will be only slightly lower than those divisions.
to
large
will be committed to crmbat, so that artillety
constituent
and
artillery
In general.,
one-fourth
divisions while engaged in
hostile fire than in
rates
factor is
where air could
be
effective
terrain against
the rate for the side with air superiority was reduced
by about one-half
to one-third.
This
of the US First Army from 8/44 to 2/45,
is
shown by the experience
of the US Third Army,
and
S
of the US Tenth Army from 4/44 to 6/44. In more
intensive combat artillery
than personnel
loss rates.
of the US First Army in
12/44,
loss rates tended to iucrease This
is
shown by the experience
of the US Fifth Army from 1/44 to
*0
the German Fourth Army.
and of
3/44,
In
periods
of
6/44 and the Wehrmacht.: during Causes of Artillery Losses
unit3
artillery
fire
casualties.
in
September
North Africa,
accounted
personnel
artillezy
losses.
Army from 5/44 to
by cause and
for one-third
Aftica, in
for US
Europe.
to one-1,alf of largest
field Hostile
artillery
cause of artillery
The high losses due to tank attack in
the
initiative
daycs
1944,
Italy,
Air attack wan the second
casualties.
North
of the US Fifth
62 shows personnel casualties
artillery
reflect
long
than did
rate
This ir shown by the experience
Pigure
and
weather
at a greater
rose
casualties
warm
North
far greater fluidity of tthe combat environment as
wE-l
as the ruuchi
that theater.
dcgrcc
high&r
of
Most of the casualties
occurred at such a distance from the front lines
artillery
and air attack must be assumed to be the Data
fo,
units
self-propelled artillery
consistent with the data for the towed artillery
I4 149i
most is
units.
in
German
listed
"urunknowi
cause.
Africa
as that
likely
generally
Figure 62 Artillery Personnel Casudlties by Cause Type of Artillery
Theater
Combat Days
Attilie~rj
% by Cause Air Atck Other*
Unknown
North Africa
Towed Self-Propelled
273 1E5
37 6
13 23
43** 6
7 66***
Towed Self-Propelled
176 5F3
44 50
20 9
11 8
25 33
355
14
30
4b1
40
9
Italy
Europe Towed
Self--Propelled *Incjudes **Inclu.:es "•'*"IncludeG ****Ini.ludes
27****
8
29
43
mortars, tanks, small arms, machine guns, and mines. 23% from tanks. 140 personnel missing in action after being overrun. 20% from mortars.
Gun Crow Casualties and Gun Losses The losses,
data which
in Figure 63 is based on a data sample of 63
gun
excludes catastrophic gun losses. Figure 63 Gun Losses and Crew Casualties (11 US Army Divisions, 1942-1944) Total Gun Losses
Type of Artillery
Light & Medium Towed Self-Propelled
The pieces
average
number
45 18
Artillery Crew Casualties
184 32
of crew personnel
4.09 1.78
harmed
when
towed
were destroyed or damaged by enemy attack was over double
the average for the self-propelled battalions. average
Crew Casualties Per Guiu Loss
number
although 13 guns
For towed guns the
of crew casualties per gun loss was
about
four,
(29% of the sample) were destroyed or damaged by
hostile
attack
propelled
without any
resulting
casualties.
guns there was an average of
for each gun loss,
For
self-
less than two casualties
including five gun losses in which no casualties
occurred. The
lower
average of the self-propelled battalions may
attributed in part to the protection afforded by the armor of
the self-propelled pieces.
It
is
be
plate
possible also that some of
the self-propelled gun losses resulted from damage to the vehicle itself
rather than to the gun compartment where the crew
Despite
the lower casualty rates related to gun losses in
propelled artillery units, in
self-propelled
units.
rides.
One
reason
self-
the overall personnel casualty
units were
greater than the rates
for this is
rates
in
towed
that self-propelled units
were
almost all light artillery in the direct support role for armored units and
deployed closer to the front lines than was usual
units with towed weapons. tion
of
action
Another reason is
that a high propor-
the engagements in which self-propelled units were
for
in mobile operations in which battalion
were
in
personnel
not protected by the aricior of the weapons were not so well dug-in as was normal for personnel operating towed weapons. Catastrejhic Gun Losses
Whenever artillery loss rates exceed 0.1r% per day, assumed
that
and overrun.
it
may be
these are catastrophic losses due to close
combat
The French lost all,
and the British most,
guns as a result of the 1940 German offensive. case
in
of their
Probably the worst
recorded history occurred during Operation "BARBAROSSA"
when the Russian Army lost 16,179 guns and mortars.
US
catastrophic 64.
Figure
catastrophic were
gun losses in World War II
Several
engagements
by the German Ardennes offensive
Catastrophic Allies
In
Some US units of
gun losses did not occur in the armies of
the
from
on
resulted
in
and
the
gun loss.
the summer of 1943
Allied forces in Italy,
constantly
shown
1944
experienced a 100% catastrophic
because
Tunisia
losses by American artille:y units.
surprised
Western
in
are
offensive.
France,
until
December
1944,
and Germany were almost
Local
small-scale
German
counterattacks never penetrated into the artillery position areas behind
the
catastrophic
front
lines.
For
the
Axis
armies,
however,
gun losses became more and more common beginning in
0
May 1944. Until
the German Ardennes counteroffensive in December 1944
most of the US artillery units that were involved in close combat in
Europe
sions. front during
were the self-propelled battalions of
armored
divi-
These came under attack in fluid situations in which was
ill-defined.
The majority of such actions
the Normandy breakout and the subsequent
pursuit
the
occurred
S
across
France to the German border.
S
S
S
Figure 64 US Catastrophic
5Gun Losses in World War II Gun
Theater
Da~.c
North Africa 27th Armored FA Bn
%
Loss
Gun
Loss
Cause
6 Dec 42
5
28
Tank overrun
91st Armored FA Bn 14 Feb 43 5th FA Bn 23 Mar 43
10 4
56 33
Tank overrun Tank/Inf overrun
Tank/Inf overrun Surrender (?) Abandoned in retreat Abandoned in
Ardennes 589 FA Bn 590 FA Bn 924 FA Bn
16-24 Dec 44 21 Dec 44 17-18 Dec 44
12 12 3
100 100 25
371 FA Bn
17-18 Dec 44
7
58
retreat Catastrophic posture suing
gun
losses are directly correlated
and relative success of armies. the
losses,
offensive although
will not an
suffer
occasional
Successtui major
with
armies pur-
catastrophic
isolated
the
lower
gun
echelon
catastrophic gun loss may occur. Artillery Loss rates in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War Based upon the overall statistical comparison,
the artillery
loss
rates of both Israelis and Arabs,
were
about five times higher than the average rates of artillery
losses rates
in World War II. were
artillery
also loss
as shown in
Both Arab and Israeli
two to three times higher than
Figure
artillery World
rates for relatively short periods of
War
65,
loss II
intensive
combat. T-he follows:
principal reasons for the higher Israeli
losses are
as
in
weapons
self-propelled
Israeli
of
vulnerability
Higher
1.
of
comparison to towed artillery by a factor
about
3.0. 2.
vulnerability of all
Greater
artillery
in
weapons
a
desert environment by a factor of about 1.5.
Israeli deployment of artillery,
3.
range artillery,
particularly long-
0
much closer to the front than standard doctrine increasing artillery losses by a factor of about
in World War II, 1.2.
Figure 65 Relation of Artillery Loss Rates to Casualty Rates: 1973 Arab-Israeli War Ratio of
Average Daily Personnel Casualty Rate
Engagement Analysis
Average Artillery Strength
Artillery Loss Rate to Casualty Rate
Average Daily Artillery Loss Rate
Artillery Losses
Sinai Front 1.46 2.05
144 484
30 140
0.87 1.21
0.596 0.590
Israelis
1.34
72
15
0.91
0.679
Syrians
2.59
362
75
0.91
0.1351
Israelis Egyptians Golan Front
losses
reasons for the higher Arab
principal
The
as
are
tollows: 1.
Less
flexibility
and
mobility
when
under
fire,
increasing losses by a factor of about 2.0. 2.
Greater
vulnerability of all
weapons
artillery
in
a
desert environment by factor of about 1.5. 3.
Substantial
Israeli air
superiority,
I
ý
particularly
A
0
to ard
the
end of the war,
increasing artillery
losses
by
a
factor estimated to be 1.4. This analysis Israeli
1. about
leads to the following two conclusions: to be
loss rates would be expected
artillery
five times greater than US and German loss rates in
War II,
from the product of
the three
factors
World
(3.0 x 1.5 x 1.2 =
-. 4). 2. about War
Arab
artillery
loss rates would be expected to
four times greater than US and German loss rates in from the product of the three factors
II,
be
World
(2.0 x 1.5
xl.4=
4.2). These findings are consistent with the data in Helicopter Loss Rates Helicopters War,
is
even
--
the available data on Vietnam
is
form.
experience
of the United States with helicopters
was
States
in
Furthermore,
it
a relatively benign
enjoyed air supremacy,
in
1965-1970.
very general,
must be recognized
air
Korean
Significant
Vietnam,
aggregated
War
the
and the Vietnam War.
available for only one of these
However,
Vietnam
have been used extensively only in
the 1973 Arab-Israeli War,
data
in
Figure 65.
in
that
the
environment.
Vietnam
The
and the enemy was limited
the
United in
the
quantity and quality of ground air defense weapons. Despite these limitations regarding helicopter useful
attrition
insights.
helicopter
experience Figure
in
the data,
Vietnam does
analysis of US provide
66 shows the relationship
loss rates with annual personnel
of
some annual
casualty rates.
mean ratio of helicoptý.z loss rates to casualty rates is 4.0.
The
If
U for 1970
the very high ratio
Helicopter 1968,
that
helicopters otherwise
excluded,
the mean ratio
loss rates increased substantially
when ground
suggests
is
to
commanders
have
been
reduced
due
to decline.
relied
provide the mobility and to
This
increasingly
firepower the
3.4.
for the Army after
force strength was beginning
operational
is
that
decline
on
would
in
ground
personnel strength. Figure 66 Helicopter. Loss Rates in
Year
Vietnam
Annual Theater
Annual Theater
Casualty
Helicopter
Rate
Loss Rates - %
-
USA
USMC
Ratio of Total Helicopter Loss Rates
TOTAL
1965
1.52
5.5
5.2
5.4
3.6
1966
3.52
11.2
28.4
13.3
3.8
1967
6.11
14.7
29.4
16.2
2.7
1968
8.58
27.0
32.8
28.0
3.3
1969
7.84
26.8
32.5
27.5
3.5
1970
4.61
33.0
36.0
33.3
7.2
While Vietnam
the
does
helicopters, Marine
Corps
data for not
helicopter
distinguish
strengths
between
is
losses and
between US Army and
than the Army in
It
it
is
Vietnam,
assumed
US
higher
a difference between the Army helicopter
rates and Marine Corps loss rates.
in
attack
Since the Marine Corps had a
proportion of attack helicopters may be why there
and
non-attack
the data does differentiate experience.
to
Casualty Rates
this loss
that combat
loss rates for the two services were roughly comparable,
then the
o0
higher the
loss
rate for the Marine helicopters would suggest
loss rates for attack helicopters alone
were
that
substantially
higher than the overall rates shown. The
data
in
vulnerability
of
Figure the
66
demonstrates
helicopter,
even
the
under
substantial
the
relatively
This could raise questions as
"benign" conditions already noted.
to the kinds of helicopter loss rates that might be suffered in a less benign environment, hand,
World
suggests
War
that
threshhold,
made
when
the
inconsistent
II
such as
Central Europe.
experience
with
combat
the aircraft, loss rate
level
of
air activity
On the other
aircraft
exceeds
drops.
losses
a
certain
This
is
not
with the fact that neither Arabs nor Israelis
extensive
combat
administrative use --
use
of
helicopters
in their conflicts,
--
as
have
opposed
to
which may be due to the
highly lethal air defense environment in the Arab-Israeli wars. Other Materiel Losses The
data presented above on tank and artillery
suggests
that
there
is a close correlation
loss
between
personnel
casualty rates and the loss rates for weapons and other items.
A
increase prolonged
previous HERO study
in
the
loss
campaigns,
considerable
rates
materiel
also suggests that there is of
particularly
movement.*
rates
some
materiel
campaignr
items
during
which there
is
The relationship of this phenomenon
to
non-battle wearout and breakdown rates is
not clear and
requires
further research and analysis.
*HERO
Report 14,
an
"Wartime Replacement Requirements,"
1966.
Figure
67
weapons
and
compared
to
These
presents
equipment
a summary of loss rates items,
including tanks
and
selected artillery,
a standard personnel casualty rate of 1%
factors are based on analyses similar
herein.
for
Additional work
is
to
needed to treat
per
those
day.
presented
helicopter
losses in
a similar manner. Figure 67 Daily Loss Rates of Selected Materiel Items Normalized to a Personnel Casualty Rate of 1% Daily Loss Rate Tanks Artillery Trucks p Small Arms Mortars Machine Guns Radios
6.00** 0.25 0.50 0.79 i.00 1.25 1.00
**Use this factor if the proporation of tanks per 1,000 troops is 6 or greater. If the proportion is less than 6, the tank loss rate factor will be the same as the number of tanks per 1,000 troops. The casualty
implications rates
relationships materiel
materiel
loss
rates
between are
If
based
interaction
personnul
profound.
The
provide the military analyst a method of estimating
casualties
relationship made
the relationships
losses when personnel casualties are
personnel known.
and
of
can be estimated
if
neither casualties nor materiel will on
still
known.
materiel
of
personnel
losses
losses are known,
allow estimates of materiel
estimates
or,
losses
the are the
losses to be
based
on
the
of the circumstances of combat as explained
in
the
1.58
previous
chapters.
attrition
is
personnel
attrition,
between different
historical
as advanced as
not
casualty of
additional progress in
of
analysis
this area.
a
solid
of
relationships rates
for
foundation
for
rates and materiel loss
materiel provide
materiel
analysis
historical
the
the identification of rough
personnel types
While
Chapter 7 ATTRITION
Based set
of
tion The
upon observed
hypotheses
has been first
have
with
patterns to
formulated.
verities
These
do
significance
attrition
of
respect
two verities
great
VERITIES
for
the
strength is attacker
place
are
the
with
been
average modern
initiativt
dd
of his choosing and in can
battlefield
mass
his
materiel
attriVerities."
attrition
understanding
which have
and
modern combat. a
'"Attrition
directly
but
attrition.
formulated
and analyses battle,
the
about double the defender's.
has the
attacker
in
personnel
not deal
basis of historical observations 1. In
attrition
The
by
HERO
28
on
the
are as follows. attacker's
This
is
numerical
because
the
can initiate•o•ibat at a time anu-d the manner of
forces
at
to gain the advantage
in
his
critical
choosing. points
The
on
strength which he
the
believes
necessary to assure the success of the attack. A
battle
believes it
usually
does not take
has some chance for success.
would avoid taking the initiative. avoid
battle by withdrawal,
reinforce
the
each
Otherwise,
The defender,
if
battle
occurs without the tacit
successful
defense.
he could not
(for
to
One circumstance
in
agreement or acceptance
when the attacker achieves surprise.
surprise by a defender
side
the attacker
prospective battle area sufficiently
for
is
unless
would make every possible effort
chance
defender,
place
instance,
by ambush)
to
have
a
which
a
of
the
Alternatively, may result ih
battle taking place before the prospective attacker
is
a
ready.
m
Most
military
attacker
men are aware of the rule
can count on success
superiority,
while
inferiority
is
surprise
can
force
strength
more
in
a
he has a
defender
can
than one-to-two.
count on
the effects
by a
factor
numerical if
his
multiplying 1.5 and
an attacker
an
the side achieving
of surprise
2.5
expecting
would be willing to attack with
that
success
But
ranging between
Thus,
thumb
three-to-one
expect
not less
some cases).
surprise
if
of
less
its
(or
to
even
achieve
than a three-to-one
suiperiority. Another
factor
which
can
influence an
attacker
battle with less than a three-to-one superiority is the
superior
instances than
in
quality
of his troops.
which the Ge-mans attacked
of
Israeli attacks
great numerical 2.
In the
successful
in
true
World War Ii and for
the Arab-Israeli
average modern battle,
than the defender.
also of World War
attacker
for
in
many
with less
the
similar
wars
without
superiority.
was successful
makes historical
the attacker
In
1973 the attacker was successful
It
in
seek
confidence
This accounts
the desirable numerical superiority,
instances
to
595 battles
in
is
more
between
361 battles,
and
in
about 75% of the engagements
sense that
the Arab-Israeli
most wars
1600
or 61%.
II
wars
are won
by
in
often and
This is which
the
studied.
the side that
has been on the offensive longer and more successfully. 3.
Attrition
r:ates
of winners
losers.
The attrition
rates
forces
are
invariably
vnsuccessful
almost opponents.
-re
lower
than
(not absolute numbers)
This is
162
lower
than
of successful
rates
generally true
those of
of
their
regardless
of
9
which is
attacKer
4.
is
defender.
Small force casualty rates are higher than those of large
forces.
Writing
torian
nearly 100 years ago,
American military
his-
Theodore Ayrault Dodge noted that this phenomenon was
evident
in
Century. lent
and which
the battles of antiquity as in Tt is
smaller
than larger forces.
larger
forces
personnel
the
19th
also true today that under comparable or equiva-
circamstances
rates
the wars of
as
usually
strength
smaller forces
and
forces always have This is
have
exposed in
a
higher
casualty
due in part to the fact that
smaller
proportion
directly to hostile
of
fire
their
than
do
part due to the effect of "friction" upon
larger forces. 5.
More effective forces
inflict
than less effective opponents. influenced leadership,
by
the
Relative
interaction
morale,
casualties5t
training,
of
many
combat effectiveness variables,
and experience.
results of higher relative combat effectiveness inflict
casualties
a hiyher rate
such
casualties.
as
One of the major is
the ability to
on the less effective opponent at
rate than the opponent can inflict
is
a
higher
This relationship
seems to be proportional to the ratio of toe combat effectiveness values of the two sides. 6.
There is
no direct relationship between force
attrition
rates.
weather,
terrain,
effectiveness.
Attrition rates depend on many factors, tactical
Accordingly,
posture,
a point where no clear
relationship
and
exists.
such as
relative
the influence of personnel
ratios or force strength ratios on attrition
which
ratios and
rates is
combat strength
reduced
Combat power
to
ratios
take into account the circumstances of combat do influence
attrition
rates as one of several
7.
In
the average
modern
interacting
battle,
attacker and defender are similar. the
the numerical
This
losses of
seems to be true
combat effectiveness of the opponents does not differ
edly for
factors.
and the battle outcome is the defender.
not an
For many reasons,
overwhelming
when mark-
catastrophe
comparisons of numbers arc
less useful than comparison of rates. 8.
Loss rates for defenders vary inversely with
fortifications. and
The outcome of a battle depends
tue casualties
strength of
on many factors,
and casualty rates for both sides
depend
more than the strength of the defensive fortifications. to
the
extent
that history permits
evident
that if
other conditions remain unchanged,
such
in a hasty defense, attackers.
and they will inflict
The converse
is
However,
comparisons,
prepared positions will suffer fewer casualties
it
defenders
than if
on
is in
they were
more casualties on the
true also.
Loss rates of attackers
vary directly with the strength of the defender's fortifications. 9.
Loss rates ot a surprising
a surprised force. forces
of
greater
This is
the surpriseýr,
force are lower than
because the organized and determined fully prepared
ior battle
confidence by the knowledge that thq opponent
unawares,
perform
more effectively at the moment
The fcrces being surprised, unprepared,
and
those of
on the other hand,
p.)ssibly demoralized,
of
and is
given caught
surprise.
are disorganized,
and are
less
effective
attacker
loss
rates are
until, they recover from being surprised. le.
in
the average
modern battle,
somewhat lower than defender
lozs rates.
This
is
becauise winners
have
casualty rates than losers,
lower
often
than defenders.
This is
and attackers win
alEo because
Also,
defender,
but
the attacker
the
numerical
achieve
since attackers have the
surprise much more often than defenders, initiative.
attackers
mort
usually more numerous than the
is
losses of both sides
are
usually
for both sides
decline
similar. 11. In
in
effectively
is
time
More
L. of
In
inclement
spent surviving
difficult
ar%.
-.
terrain, This,
to move,
Difficult
as they do in
weather.
good
in
than
or remaining comfortable
casualty rates for both sides de-
is a reflection of theffetines
to,
employing weapons.
used
weather
to bear on the opponent.
bringing fire 12.
as
because soldiers do not use their weapons
This is
markedly.
casualty rates
weather,
bad
In
rugged terrain more effort has to
terrain
weapons.
for firing
and less effort i3 available also slows up resupply of
be
ammunition,
which
causes lower firing rates for both sides. 13.
The
casualty-inflicting
after each successive day in phenomenon factor.
The
unit is after
is
in
not clear, reduction
combat,
but
combat.
The
in
casualties measured. 14.
incurred
force declines
reason
although fatigue is
for
this
unquestionably
capability occurs steadily while is
capability
recovered
short periods of rest out of combat.
casualty-inflicting
is
capability of a
capability
is
one way
in
fairly
a the
rapidly
The degradation
of
which the effect
of
on unit effectiveness can be determined
arid
More research needs to be done on this phenomenon. Casualty rates are lower at night than in
another
example
of
casualty
rates
being
daytime. related
This to
9
opportunities
to
employ weapons effectively.
There
less capability to acquire targets and bring tire
is
simply
to bear on them
9
at night than in daylight. 15. This
Casualty
rates
are higher
in
summer
than
in
applies primarily to temperate climates where the
tion
between
summer
and
winter
is
by
distinc-
substantial
differences
in
available in
summer for effective employment of weapons seems
be
only
the hours of daylight.
marked
winter.
slightly
offset.
by the
The increased
inhibiting
daylight
effects
of
to more
luxuriant foliage. 16.
The faster the front line moves,
rates for both sides.
is
in
Combat in
which
world Wars
i
9
is AIid
that troops advancing rapidly have less time to use their
weapons is
the casualty
The reason for this phenomenon,
validated by historical experience II,
the lower
rapid,
itself,
When the rate of advance
than troops advancing slowly. more of the soldier's time is
and
less
targets.
At
targets
during
time
the
is
spent on
available to bring
same time,
it
rapid movement,
is
the
movement
fire to
bear
to
more difficult
so the defenders are
on
acquire hit
less
often. 17, phenomenon, fact
that
CasualtyTrates decline durin which needs further attackers
are very
than using their weapons, defenders
to fire
at
the actual crossing
is
is
Tiiver This
appa-ently due to the
largely occupied with matters other
and the number of
generally
site.
study,
crossings.
smaller
exposed
than usual,
targets except
for at
6
18.
An
"all--out" effort by one
both sides. attack
This
is
a outrance,
costs."
This
in
or
verity
fact,
a defender holding a
19.
position
simply a result of the
is
losses,
or
that
force
a
his
casu-
Combat
environmental,
power
operational,
which comprise the circumstances
engagement.
all
intensively and be more exposed.
consideration of the
factors
battle
fact
but will
alties at a greater rate than the opponent.
human
"at
A force with greater overall combat power inflicts
includes
an
losses to accomplish his mission
incur those higher
opponent also to fight more *
for
true whether it be the attacker making
commander willing to take higher will,
side raises loss rates
of a
and
particular
A numerically inferior force
in
well-
prepared defenses with hiqhlv mobile reserves and good morale and
*
leadership could stronger
have greater combat power
attacker.
than
This can be true even if
higher combat effectiveness.
It
is
a
numerically
the attacker has a
the aggregate of the various
factors which determines the ability to inflict
casualties on the
I,
opponent. The breakout of personnel casualties
20. warfare is
consistent.
immediately. About
20th Century
About 20% of battle casualties are killed
This corresponds
to a wounded-to-killed
ratio of 4.
65% of battle casualties survive their wounds,
minimal has
in
care.
increased
The proportion of seriously wounded who over the past century from less than 5%
than 10% due to improvements 21.
even
Materiel
People are hit in
artillery
weapons are hit.
survive to
more
in medical evacuation and treatment.
loss rate
lates,
with
are rela
ersonnel casualt
most cases vhen tanks, Thus,
vehicles,
and
personnel casualties are caused
4 by the same impacts which destroy or damage materiel.
that
there
are relationships between personnel
casualties
materizl losses which can be used to estimate the the former. depend
This means
latter,
and given
These relationships vary from item to item, and they
on battlefield density and distribution of the
equipment
4
and its relative vulnerability to damage from hostile fire. 22.
Tank loss rates are five to seven times higher than per-
sonnel casualtY rates. in
This applies to combined arms engagements
which armored forces make up a substantial proportion of
0
the
fighting strength on one or both sides. 23.
Attacker tank
ender tank
loss rates.
loss rates are generally higher Thi3 is
rates on the op~osing sides. about the
to personnel casualty
the attacker's tank loss rate ib
tank loss rate will probably be closer
(or even less) 24.
Artillery
tenth personnel phenomenon It
If
relation
seven times that of the attacking personnel casualty rate, defender's
times
in
than def-
the defende.••s
to
0
five
casualty rate.
materiel loss rates are generally about one-
casualty rates.
This
which applies to artillery
does not include catastrophic
is
an
pieces hit
observed by enemy
losses of artillery
fire.
pieces
due
to overrun or surrender.
25.
Self-propelled
artillery
times greater than for towed j of,
factezs:
ammunition
larger in
the
uns.
exposed
loss rates
are about three
This is due to a combination
target;
self-propelled guns;
presence and
of
fuel
vulnerability
and of
engines to damage.
168
10
26.
Average World War II
division engagement
were one to three percent a day. Europe sive
casualty rates
Successful divisions
in
Western
lost about one to two percent casualties a day in
inten-
combat;
losing divisions lost about two to three percent .a
day. 27.
Attrition rates in
to World War II. and the greater casualty war
rates
1973 October War were comparable
spite of the increased
and
Western Europe;
lethality
of weapons
sophistication of military technology, and tank loss rates for engagements
seem to have been approximately
personnel
II
In
the
tanks
in
personnel in
the same as those
intensive battles of World
the
1973
for
both
War
II
in
they were slightly less than comparable World War
loss rates on the Eastern Front. 28.
Casualty
rates
in
minor hostilities
about half those experienced
in
due primarily to the absence
of sustained artillery
World War II.
of these kinds of combat engagements.
after 1945 This fire
may in
are be many
ANNOTATED
SELECT,
This
bibliography
BIBLIOGRAPHY
provides
an
annotated
listing
of
significant secondary works containing attrition data or analysis of casualty and materiel loss data of historical wars, and
battles.
It
and describes important works and is
to be all-encompassing.
intended
and
importance
are
lists
methodological
usefulness,
contribution,
either as data
is
statistics is
a
attrition
in two parts.
that is,
books and
and analysis of military
specific sources
experience
in
specific
or works modern
Part
reporting wars
or
Part other
attrition
of two or more wars or historical periods.
listing of
as
or
source
or both.
a listing of general sources,
literature that provide data
not
inclusion
Major criteria for
The organization of the bibliography is One
campaigns,
Two
military historical
periods. Part One:
General Sources
Armed Forces Information School. The Army Almanac. D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950.
Washington,
an official fact book and reference source of data This is concerning the US Army and, to a limited extent, other services of tte US armed forces, that contains detailed statistical information on US Army personnel strengths and casualties in 20th century wars through World War II. A useful summary table gives US Army troops and casualties in principal wars from the American Revolution to World War II, inclusive. The volume consulted was published in 1950; other volumes appear to have been published on a regular basis up to 1959, at least.
17
Berndt, Otto. Die Zahl im Kriege: Statistische Daten aus der rneuern Krieqsgeschichte in graphischer Darstellung. Vienna: Freytag & Berndt, 1897. This is a data base of strength, casualty, and duration data covering major European wars, campaigns, and battles from 1740 to 1895. Much data is presented, mostly in graphical form, using tables and diagrams accompanied by figures. The statistical coverage of wars and campaigns is limited. However, strength, casualty, and duration data is given for approximately 100 land battles, large cavalry engagements, naval engagements, and sieges. The data base is supplemented by some useful analyses of strength and casualty data. This is an impressive effort, though much smaller and less useful in many respects than the data base compiled by Bodart (q.v.) a few years afterward. Bodart, Gaston. Militaer-historisches Leipzig: C.W. Stern, 1908.
Krie~s-Lexikon.
Vienna and
This is a large data base and statistical analysis of land battles and sieges and naval battles during the period 161819095. The coverage is extensive, comprehending some 1,000 examples, but the primary emphasis is on the battles and sieges of the great powers in the period indicated. The data reporting varies in detail, reflecting the strengths and weaknesses of the source material, which includes primary and secondary references. The author's bibliography of sources, organized chronologically by war or conflict, is given in pages 16-31 of the work. The entries for individual land battles and sieges and naval battles generally report the following data: Name Date(s) Geographical l.ocation National or other identification of opposing sides Commanders Strengths
Personnel casualties Materiel losses Most entries include a brief statement identifying the vica number on a and, for battles only, tor, if applicable, categorical rank of scale of 1 to 6 indicating the relative the battle based on the total of personnel casualties incurred by both sides.
1
172
land battles and sieges the strength data for each For gives:
side
Number of men Number of cavalrymen guns Number of artillery The loss data for each side gives: Total personnel casualties the term for (this is the author's losses" "Bloody action) in wounded and action total of killed in Number captured and missing guns lost Number of artillery Number of flags, standards, and kettledrums lost For naval battles the strength data for each side includes: of of of of of
Number Number Number Number Number
men ships' guns line of battle or capital ships frigates smaller ships
The loss data for each 5idt
iInU'u;5
Number of men (total and killed or captured) Number of ships' guns Number of ships (by category) of
loss data for sieges and storms
Strength
and
places is
reported
like that
for
fortified
but usually
land battles,
in
was it All data is reported to the extent form. summary the author or applicable to a particular by discoverable of the data reported for A unique attribute or siege. battle all by name and grade of or siege is the listing each battle or mortally wounded during the course killed general officers of the event. The
final
section
of
the work
is
devoted
to
an
extensive
1618analysis of conflict and the trends in warfare during in large part on the data base of engagements. based 1905, most The Kriegs-Lexicon remains to this day the greatest, a related data, and ambitious -data base of engagements compiler. its of monument to the industry
David. Eggenberger, Y. Crowell, 1967. The
author's
provide
the
A Dictionarv of Battles.
preface states that:
essential
details
However, re:orded history." approached. noL even met,
of all
New York: Thomas
"This book attempts the major
battles
to in
this ambitious objective is not 1,560 for provided, What is
engagements and battles from Megiddo (1479 B.C.) to Vietnam in the mid-1960s, are brief narrative summaries, accompanied generally by data on personnel strengths and casualties of the opposing sides. But many entries either do not provide strength and casualty data or provide incomplete data. The main problem with the work is that its coverage is uneven: it is fairly complete and accurate for European and American history (despite some major errors and omissions) but poQor for the rest
of
the world before
the 20th Century.
Analysis of Factors Historical Evaluation Research Organization. A Data and Wars: That Have Influenced Outcomes of Battles Base ot Battles and Engagements. Report No. 95. 6 vols. Dunn Loring, Va.: HERO, 1984. This report presents data on 601 major battles of mod'ern history from 1600 to. 1973 in a combination of matrice.s and narratives. The matrices comprise seven tables, which show all of the significant statistical data available on the battles, including attrition data, and show how major factors of combat influenced the outcomes of the battles. In addition, the background, course, and outcome of each battle is concisely described in a narrative, which summarizes principal sources consulted for research. The data base of battles developed for thib it is the HERO Land Warfare Data Base; called corrected, refined, updated, and enhanced, as new data becomes available. HERO has just completed effort to refine and enhance selected aspects of base under contract to the US Army's Concepts Agency.
sLudy is routinely or better a major the data Analysis
0 Artillery A
Dunn Loring,
Survivability
Va.: HERO,
in
Modern War.
Report No.
55.
1976.
For a very limited exploratory study a historical data base of artillery gun losses in modern war was compiled from primary sources, including unit operational records. The emphasis is on gun loss patterns in World War II (US and German experience), but data was also developed for Korea and the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, primarily for comparative purposes. The analysis permitted development of some tentative planning factors for artillery gun loss rates in differing intensities of combat.
7
0
Analysis of Wartime Rlacement Re uirements: Experience for Selected Ma)or Items of Combat Equipment. Report No. 14. 2 vols. Washington, D.C.: HERO, 1966. __Historical
This report examines and analyzes historical data on materiel losses in combat operations in World War I, World War II, and the Korean War. The report is based largely on primary military records and emphasizes the materiel attrition experience of selected units fighting in North Africa, Italy, Northwest Europe, and the Pacific in World War II. T4e research produced tabulated data on losses for units in various combat postures, and under various other conditioning factors. The analysis provides a basis for predicting equipment losses for selected major items of materiel in future warfare. Voevodsky, John. ý_anititative Behavior of Warring Nations. Systems Analysis Divislion Staff Study. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 1968. This study is an investigation of the quantitative relationships between populations, army strengths in battle zones, casualties, and fatalities. It is based on historical data or
IajoL
US
waLs
ffoLll
the CiVil
Wa
to
the
Vietn5a
WaK,
through 1968, and statistics of the military effort of Great Britain and France against Germany in World War I and vice versa. The author attempted to apply the quantitative patterns of repetitive behavior he discerned in the historical data to predict future trends of the then ongoing US experience in Vietnam. The analysis is vitiated by frequent misunderstandings and misinterpretations of the data, and the projections have been refuted by experience data for Vietnam since the date of publication. Wright, Quincy. Press, 1965.
A Study of War.
Chicago:
University of Chicago
First published in 1942, this is a classic study and analysis of war phenomena throughout history. The author compiled a massive data base touching a variety of aspects of warfare and analyzed it using techniques of the social and behavioral sciences. The work considers -quantitative trends in warfare and includes a broad discussion of war casualties. The 1965 2d edition includes the author's commentary on war since 1942.
Part Two:
Specific Sources
Beebe, Gilbert W., and Michael E. De Bakey. Battle Casualties: Incidence, Mortality, and Logistic Consideration. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1952.
0
This book is the seminal source on the casualty experience of US Army ground forces in World War II. The authors compiled the data base for their analysis from a variety of sources, including the operational records of tactical units and their medical staffs and from official records and reports of the The analysis is most complete and US Army Medical Service. .inc]nPzs concepts and considerations of the incidence, of battle mortality, evacuation, and hospitalization casualties. The emphasis is on World War II, but the authors include data and discussion of historical trends in personnel attrition, particularly in chapter II, "Incidence of Hits and Wounds." Clark, Dorothy Kneeland. Casualties as a Measure of the Loss of Combat Effectiveness of an infantry Battalion. Technical Memorandum ORO-T-289. Chevy Chase, Md.: Operations Research Office of the Johns Hopkins
University,
1954.
A pioneering study of the battalion breakpoint concept, babe6 upon actual combat data. The analysis is based on a sample population of 44 US infantry battalions involved in seven engagements in the European Theater of Operations during World War Il. The author concludes that: "The statement that a unit can be considered no longer combat effective when it has suffered a specific casualty percentage is a gross oversimplification not supported by combat data." Gilchrist, H.L. A Comparative Study of World War Casualties from Gas and Other Weapons. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1928. This is a text prepared by the Chief, Medical Division, US Army Chemical Warfare Service, for use in the curriculum of it provides a the Chemical Warfare School, Edgewood Arsenal. useful discussion and analysis of World War I casualties, accompanied by tables arid charts. The emphasis is on gas indicates, the analysis casualties, but, as the title compares gas casualties with those caused by other agents, in the World War and in other wars. An analysis of the datA given in the work was performed subsequently by Dorothy Clark, who questioned the figures on the proportion of gunshot-wounded soldiers who died, finding them much higher than those of other sources.
1 -+
76
Great Britain. -War Office. Statistics of the Milita~y Effort of the British Empire DuriTng the Gret ar (ndon: His This is the official compilation of statistical. dat~a relative to the military effort of Great Britain and the British Empire during World War I. it includes much data on personnel and material strengths, personnel casualties, material losses, allocations of munitions, etc., presented generally in tabular fo0rm. The datcý is organized usually Uy war theater, campaign, and time period, rarr-iy by battle. There are summary reports of Allied and enemy strengths and casualties. Other data [Presented includes various wa r chrono log ies, statements on prisoners captured from the Pienemy, and a table showing the leunyt~h, in ol~les, of the line held by British forces in France and Zlanders at various times during the war. .Little attempt is made to &nalyze the dcta pre!ýented. haldenwang, A. von. Statistik und vetl'13t.e. Vol. XX of Wuerttembergs Hea-r ,m we!Lkrita. Stuttgart, 1936, As the titi.e indicates, this is a narrow statistical and narratie su rnmmary of the military efifort of one German state, that is Wutrttemberq in southwest Germany, in World War I. Discussion and tables give details of mobilization ind organization and provide data on personnel strengths d casualties by arm of serviceŽ for war years (that 1.-" y(ýars beg inri ng or 1 August of ona, yea: and ending on 31 July of the next--the war havin~g begun for Germany on 1 August 191-4) and tor the period -igust 1918 to the Armistice. S omi.ie conr'.deration is gi* to raatt*.rs of logistics and the war econiomy. ,ical Evaluation and Research Organization (HE2OC) Casualty %,.mtsfor Continoencies (CEC). Report. No. 118. .rfaxVa.: HERO, 1986.
This report examines the L~ttle casualty experience otT troops of the US and US a 11i~ar in 73 selected combat engagements that occurr-ed in conflicts since the en'd of World War 11. The tese~irch performed for the repocrt permnitted the formulation of some important generai~zations about the classification rnd complex naturc cf conflict zince 1945. The z.nalysis cr the data base ot 713 engagements resuit~d in the de-elopm'Žlnt rf tabulations showing aver:age battl.e casualty rates by casualty catr~gory and according to a variet~y of circum.,ýi.antiaI (operational and environimental) factors. 'These tablet; prov'ide usef ul insights for planners and moelIr s.
177
of Surve ._Historical Sized Units in Modern Combat. Va.: HERO, 1982.
Casualties Report No.
in 97.
Different Dunn Loring,
Personnel attrition data in four engagements of US troops in the European Theater of Operations in Wocld War II was collected and analyzed at the level of division, regiment, and battalion and recorded in tabular form showing the strength, both by diy and as an average for the period concerned, and casualties by category, both numerically and as percents of the daily strength, by day and as averages for the period. Total or cumulative casualties by category during the period of are also shown. The report includes detailed narratives the combat experience of the divisions and sub-units in each engagement, their casualty experience, and 30 tables.
-
Physical Damage and Casualties in Conventional rport No. 93.Dunn Loring, Va.: HERO, 1982.
Battle.
The report assesses physical damage and military and civilian casualties in three battles in northern Europe in World War II. It includes narratives of the battles and presents tabular data on physical damage done during the course of each battle, the strengths and losses of the opposing forces in each, and civilian casualties incident to each. Additionally, an was made to relate ammunition ei:penditures (artillery shells and air-delivered bombs) to the level of damage assessed for each battle terrain area selected for damage evaluation. Besides the three case studies the report includes a brief chapter describing physical damage and civilian casualties in metropolitan France generally, and particulariy in the departments of the Manche and Calvados (in Normandy) .
Historical Division, Headquarters, united States Arm%, Europe. Guide to Foreiqn Military Studies, 1945-54. Karlsruhe, Germany, 1954. This is a descriptive catalog and index of manuscripts prepared by former high-ranking officers of the German Armed Studies Forces during 1945-1954 under the Foreign Military The originat USAFEUR. Program of the Historical Division, mission of the program was to obtain informati' " about enemy operations in the European Theater for use in The preparation the official history of the 115 Army in World War II. The of proqram's mission was lat. r changfed to emphasize operational studies and analyses of German nilitary experience in a variety of areas. Thus, th3 man~scripts produced include operatiinal summaries and analy:.ies, unit histories, lessons learned type reports, and monographs or, German experience in a diversity of areas, including organization, administratiu.:9 and tactics. Because of the widespr-ad destructior, of Gonrmi-:n Worlrlud War II ope::ational records, many of the monog. a-Jhb have
I
I
value for tbe attrition resea.cbher. Some of them deal analyses of casualty expe.rienccŽ, and one, MS t P-Oil, cribes the German syrtem of reporting casualties. Livermore, Thomas L. Nu•.ibers & Losses ica: 18ý-65. Eloomfngton, Ind.:
with de~o
in the Civil War in Amerindiana unTli-ers-ity PressF
This is a compilation of data relative to personnel strenqths: and caaualties in the American Civil War that was first
published in 1900 and is considered a classic among works of its kind. The author was a Union army veteran w0-) rose thcough the ranks trom private to colonel and who, sub*.-equent to the war, was a lawyer and businessman. The data was culled from the 129-volume Officiel Records of the War of the Rebel1Lion L'nd from rel1L.bTh-e.5ndary sourcer. 7 -Y. hTTYFalf T of the work is devvted. to the presentatict and explicatio:i of data descriptiuL of the total number ot personnel who served in the opposing armies, total casualties, and a comparison of personnel casualties in similar battles. The second half of the work presev:s personnel stten.th and cesualty data for specific battles. Two tables summarize the battle data. Love, Albert G. War Casualties. 24, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.193ý1 .
The Army Medical F-%ulietin, No. Mi1.di;cl Fi:.J.I $;\Cel choo,,
The purpose of this work was to estimate, based on exper.ercce data, the requirements for medical servsices for f.ront: A.7Ht casualties in a future war. It provides Stzrtisti"A o. the incidence an(. treatment of battle and. nonbattle cais'j.'Lties based wair.ly on the experien.crJ of US forces is Wo'cId W..1. Because of the book's f;'ocus on the treatment of wotrveed, 'o because world W.- I szaiw the widespread employment of .:h::,;cc: weapons, the author !'kaws ;3 useful diffHLenti ztion bz'-.,en,, gas..woun6ed and gunf re-wounedo Li nce the data basa I y;rounde&: mainly in US experience, which occur.:ed lar'jely i•, rthe la.st year oI the war, z" gqas casualti Ies aiL predomina:B.Lly from rtistdrd. Nedl,
Majo:. (k'neral Spurei.ri. Sin Vi eu•ara ,
,1'his
if5-19l.
Meu.icc
Washington,
Li-,,,cirt oV D. C.:
the U.S.
Department of
A:"2ny the
is a monograph in the O ice of the Ci.ie: ot 1, ilitr. Iistory's Vietnam Stud ic.s series. It: disrc'.u:l•s tbh euperIe nce o0 the UcAP ts e 4':t••cf Uepartmint in Vie I uam for. the years 1965-1970. Tho':,;gh cnc,:'erned p. imari y wi tc: the spu!cifics of medica.l or.,eretions in the tel itivivey ,rlque envi;:on,'nnt a'd d circuts..ac•ces of tlhv Vientnam War, It- &,rov.6es also an intcr.est'C 1. :outiparati, stntisi:3tical aniL,';•.1 i of quality' of car,! 0t tho ¾u'0;,3!Cd in World W4ar '1, 1 lort:a, aud VAetnam, toc2finirij •i•
49,
survival statistics and patient care indices. Insights int:a the implications of the Vietnam War casualty experienc. )for other modern conflicts are given in discussions of wound causative agents, the nature of wounds and the mechanics of wounds caused by modern weapons, and medical advances. Peckham, Howard H., ed. The Toll of... Indepeudence: Engagements & Battle Casualties of the American Revolution. Chicago: Un-iversity of Chicago Press, 1974. This book lists 1,331 land, and 218 naval enyag-nments and actions of the Ameri.canRevolotiona.y War and American and hritish battle casualties by category in each. Each engagement is briefly described, and the strencths of the cpposing forces, where known, are given. T'his is o very careful compilation, assembled using pri.mazy and secondary sources by ; research team guided by the director of the Williar, L. C].ementi.. Library at the University of Michigan. The introdvction contains a useful description of the methodolcgy e.ployed in the effort to amass the data and analyze it for reliaý)il ity.
Reizter. r,
arnk A. Battle Casualties arid Medical Statistics: D . C,..h ,0 t:0,Ii rr). the Korean War. $urgeon Geneai., 1.973.
U.S.
r' enc
_
This is a vz.ry sicnificant compiUz'tiori and anal-'sis of data xe\at:ive to the casualty expc-zience of the US Army in the Kctean War, . E:ke the work of )ýe'be and De Mzk..y '0
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TABLE
E:
US ARMY WORLD WAR I BATTLE DEATHS BY BRANCH AND RANK*
Officer
Enlisted
Total
2,822
42,429
45,251
11
49
60
Artillery
142
1,729
1,871
Engineers
86
1,228
1,314
Med.
Dept.
47
363
410
Air
Service
130
172
302
65
1,112
1,177
3,303
47,082
50,385
(6.56%)
(93.44%)
Infantry Tank Corps
Others Total
*Based on Leonard
(100%)
P. Ayres, The War With Germany: Summary, Government Printing Office, Washington, =21,-and Army Almanac, p. 666.
A Statistical D.C.
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