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Casualty and Tank Loss Rates in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War .... 144 ... Table C: US Army Casualties in Wars of the 19th and 20th ...... was not until the beginning of the 17th Century that guns finally displaced ..... Lower. Period. Battles. Successful. Stronger. Casualty Rate. 1600-1-699. 47. 77 ...... By contrast, the antitank rocket.
0AD-A278 728 Historical Evaluation & Research Organization HANDBOOK ON GROUND. FORCES ATTRITION IN MODERN WARFARE SEPTEMBER 1986

.

DTIC Trevor N. John R. C.

ELECTE

0 d

Dupuy

Brinkerhoff

APR 2 81994

Curtiss Johnson

Peter J.

Clark

A Division of:

DATA MEMORY SYSTEMS, INC. 10332 Democracy Lane Fairfax, VA 22030

(703) 591-3674

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037:

Handbook on

GROUND

-

FORCES ATTRITION

IN MODERN WARFARE

Accesion

STrevor

N.

John R.. C.

*

NTIS DTIC

CRA&I IA-

Brinkerhoff

Curtiss Johnson

Peter J.

i

Dupuy

o

By O -rib.it o-

Clark

September 19R6

Prepared by:

*

The Historical

Evaluation and Fe.earch Organization

A Division of Data Memory Systems.. Inc. 10392 Democracy Lcne *

Fairfax, Tel,:

Virginia (703)

22030

591-36"74

The contents of this handbook reflect the views and findings of the Historical Evaluation and Research Organization not to be ccnstrued as an official

United States Government

position unless so designated by authorized documents.

*e

and are

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION CHAPTER

1:

........................................... FUNDAMENTALS

Significance Kinds Causes

of

OF ATTRITION

Attrition

of Attrition

1

.............................

7

....................................

7

........................................

of Attrition

The Attrition Cycle Personnel

..........

9

..........................................

..........................................

Loss Categories

10

....................................

12

The Personnel Attrition Process ..............................

15

Theater Evacuation

18

Policy

..................................

Personnel strength Terminology ...............................

20

Materiel

25

Attrition

Concepts

..................................

The Materiel Attrition Process Kinds of Attrition

Rates

...............................

31

.....................................

33

Sources of Strength and Attrition Data ........................

36

Understanding

41

CHAPTER 2: 1600:

Attrition

.....................................

PERSONNEL ATTRITION: The Benchmark Year

HISTORICAL PATTERNS AND TRENDS

....................................

Lethality versus Casualties

...

43 43

.................................

44

Effect of Dispersion on Casualty Rates ........................

48

Effect of the Conoidal Bullet on Casualty Rates

..............

55

Effect of Posture and Success on Casualty Rates

..............

57

The Concept of Relative Combat Effectiveness ..................

63

Maijor Historical Patterns and Trends ..........................

65

CHAPTER

4

3:

PERSONNEL

ATTRITION:

TWENTIETH

CENTURY

RATES ..........

67

Impact of Sustained Combat on Casualties .......................

67

Relative Combat Effectiveness and Casualty Rates ...............

71

Relationship of Casualty

74

Range

CHAPTER 4:

of

Twentieth

Rates to Force Size

Century Casualty

PERSONNEL ATTRITION:

Rates

of

Improved Medical

Disease and Non-Battle

Causes of Casualties

....................

76

TWENTIETH CENTURY RELATIONSHIPS

Relationship of Killed to Wounded in 'mpact

..............

Care

Injuries

Battle ....................

..............................

84

..............................

90 93

..............................

96

Casualties by Rank ........................................... CHAPTER 5:

PERSONNEL ATTRITION:

99

MINOR CONFLICTS SINCE 1945

......

103

Classification of Post-1945 Conflicts ..........................

104

The 73-Engagement

106

Data Base ..................................

Analysis of Engagement Data ...................................

108

Casualties by Circumstances of Combat (Rates and Wounded to Killed Ratio) ........................

12

Composite Terrain and Weather Casualty Rate Matrix ........... Comparision with World War II

CHAPTER 6:

MATERIEL ATTRITION

118

Casualty Rates .................120

Summary of Casualty Experience

SIntroduction

79 79

.........................................

Casualties by Branch of Service

..

for Minor Conflicts

...........

....................................

124

to Materiel Attrition ........................... Tank Losses and Crew Casualties

124

..............................

127

Tank Losses and Casualties in Battalion-Sized Maneuver Units ...... .................................... US Armored Division Casualty and Tank Loss Rates British Casualty and rank Loss Rates in

123

129 .............

Operation "Goodwood"

132 . 134

Soviet Casualty and Tank Loss Rates Evaluation of World War II Casualty

..........................

136

Tank Loss EXperience ..............

and Tank Loss Rates

in

the 1973

Arab-Israeli

139 War

Artillery Loss Rates in World War II ....................... Artillery Loss Rates in

the 1973 Arab-Israeli

Helicopter Loss Rates

in Vietnam

Other

......................

CHAPTER SELECT,

Materiel

Losses

7: ATTRITION

VERITIES

ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

APPENDICES ..

War ............

.............................

....

144

....

145 153 155

.

..........

................................... ....................................

......................................................

157

161 171 183

Appendix 1:

THE HIERARCHY OF COMBAT ...........................

Appendix 2;

EXAMPLE OF ATTRITION RESEARCH....................87

Appendix 3:

THE PROCESS OF HISTORICAL CRITICISM .............

191

Appendix 4:

ASSESSING RELATIVE COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS VALUE . ........................................

195

73-ENGAGEMENT

199

Appendix 5: TABLES

............................................................

S!

POST-1945 CONFLICT DATA BASE .......

183

203

9

9

ATTRITION

DATA

TABLES

Page

Table'A:

Table B: Table C: Table D: Table E:

Theater Annual World War

F:

Table G:

9.

Rates: US Wars, II .......................

in Battles Daily Casualty Rates Selected Engagements (1861-1982) ............................. US Army Casualties in Wars of the 19th and Centuries .......................................... US

Army World War I Overseas Strengths Casualties by Branch and Rank .......................

US Army World War I Battle Deaths by Branch Raick

Table

and Daily Casualty I, and World War

203

or 204 20th 205 and

206

and

...............................

207

US Army World War II Overseas Casaalties by Branch and

Strengths and Rank .......................

Hist3rical

Battles,

Data

from

595 Land

1600-19733

208 ........

209

IN' RODUCTION purpose of this Handbook on Ground Forces Attrition

The ModErn

ics

Warfare

provide

to

military

with

analysts

in some

background information that will help them understand and analyze current future

outcomes of

operations and project the possible

combat

basis for this treatment of

The

combat.

attrition

in

modern warfare is historical analysis of combat. The

in this handbook has been

information

drawn

a series of different studies and reports prepared

from

Evaluation

Historical

and Research organization

by and

the by

II.-

p

there has

Unfortunately,

organizations and individuals.

other

(HERO)

together

not yet been a systematic and comprehensive study of attrition in warfare,~ and

mocdern

the

data

had

to

be

few studies that have been done,

relatively

other than the study of attrition.

from

gleaned often for

Additional study may modify some factors and

combat as a whole.

givc greater credibility to the findings, are likely to remain valid.

relai.ionship~s is

general

of this important phenomenon and how it relates to

understanding

handbook

purposes

Nevertheless, there has been

sufficient historical. analysis of attrition to provide a

will

the

the

best

compilation of

At

but the any

historical

general

rate, analyses

this on

attrition experi~ence available at the present time. Because analy~ud,

of

most

way in which the data

the of

it

pertains to US Ar',iy

was

collected

experience

and

and is

I

presented according

to US Army doctrine and

otherwise indicated

in

can

is

intent

The

general

provide

to

be

can

which

data

experiential

instances,

several

of

understanding

for example,

a of

explanation

combat

allow

to

This

processes. use of

not designed to

attrition

explained

information,

tions and War,

in

Fali 1986, which is

but

the concept of

are

invited

obtain some of the other HERO publications and reports,

publication

enough

or other aspects of modern combat

or elucidated by the QJM

larly A Theaorj of Combat,

full

the

provides

handbook

complete information on the QJM,

Relative Combat Effectiveness, are

the

fully

understood

This handbook is

*

important to an

complete explanation of the QJM or to cover

readers desiring

which

is

or

The concept

(QJM).

combat attritLon but can be

only in the context of the QJMo provide

concepts

the handbook refers to

of Relative Combat Effectiveness,

improved

with

applied

from the Quantified Judgment Model

findings

and

policies,

terms,

to specific situations.

understanding by military analysts In

9

or ideological biases.

differences

range

cultural

emphases may be placed on treatment because of

varying

9

although

armies,

all

to be the same for

tends

example,

for

The categorization of kinds of casualties,

some local variation. ;for

they

that

allowing

modern armies,

applied universally to all

be

HERO has

these concepts and definitions of ter:ms so

broadened

this

in

the terms and concepts

the text,

based on contemporary US Army doctrine.

are

handbook

Unless

terminology.

particu-

a book. by Trevor N. Dupuy scheduled or his earlier book

Numbers,

for

Predic-

currently available from HERO Books.

2

to

9

Although the authors of this handbook believe that there has been

insufficient analytical

more

historical analysis has been performed on personnel

tion

than on materiel attrition,

this

handbook.

synthesis

of

Obviously,

Chapter existing

more

attention paid to

and that fact

data

needs to be done on

tion has been established,

it

better treatment of materiel

much attri-

reflected

is

into

the

coherent

materiel

Since the linkage between personnel attrition

is

is

6 on materiel attrition historical

work

attrition,

in

first form.

attrition.

and materiel attri-

should be possible to provide much attrition

than is

now available.

Two omissions in

this handbook should be noted briefly.

One

that the Lanchester

Equations or Laws are not discussed.

The

other

is

that there is

no discussion of the impact of

attrition

on combat effectiveness. The

Lanchester

attrition;

Equations provide an analytical

treatment of

they are not historically based and do not necessarily

relate well to historical

experience.

The Lanchester

and

are

extensively

their

contribution

publications covered

This

analysis

the

earlier,

military

in and

operations

presents the results of

the

two

they

are

research historical

and does not touch on the relationship

of

Efforts

to

lessons to theoretical

results.

experience are underway

and

to bear fruit.

other issue which is

impact of attrition

evident

in

mentioned

the theory to the historical

are beginning The

Dupuy

hindbook

of attrition

historical

relate

the

T.N.

extensively

literature.

these

by

covered

Equations

not addressed

in

this handbook

on combat effectiveness.

that reduced strength

It

is

impairs combat effectiveness,

3

is

selfbut

the extent and nature Some

early

work

effectiveness

Dorothy this

in

historical

unit

World War

II

of

strength

was done

in

that.

There is,

to either

that there

is

a

the 1950s,

for example,

support or refute

"breakpoint"

loses cohesion and becomes

in

is

losses

Little systematic work has been

analysis

assumption

loss of effectiveness

on the effect

Clark.*

matter after

of this

on

combat

notably by

performed

on

no comprehensive the

strength

completely

not clear.

widespread

below which

ineffective.

a

More

work needs to be done on this point. The Soviet

Soviet

system is

attrition

there is

sufficient

comparable

system

in

do

certain

but

the Soviet experience

to attrition

is

and

similar to those

The Soviet armed forces,

the of

Soviet other

like the United States

place stress on prompt and effective medical treatment Reports that the Soviets are callous and

however,

validity.

that all armies,

It

must be

including the Soviets,

times adopted tactics which produced greater

casualties. World

In general,

lives carelessly have little

nized,

on

information to draw general conclusions about process.

reacting

of casualties. fice

Information

to that of other modern armies,

modern armies. Army,

per sýe.

experience has not been available readily,

the Soviet attrition is

not addressed

War I,

The French Army,

for example,

sacrirecoghave at

than normal

at the outbreak

used tactics which produced huge casualties

of

among

• Dorothy K. Clark, Casualties as a Measure of the Loss of Combat Effectiveness of an Infantry Battalion . Technical Memorandum 6RO-T-289. (Chevy Chase, Md.; Operations Research Office of the Johns Hopkins University, 1954).

4

their

own

commanders This that

troops until

handbook

the available

lems.

have It

additional

inevitable

reactions

of

troops

and

forced modifications.

been compiled will

the

is

a unique product.

historical

is

the

time

serve also as a useful

work

is

basis

performed and understanding

improved.

5

for

have

As such,

analysts dealing with current military

will

is

first

facts dealing witb attrition

into a single comprehensive document.

value for

modern warfare

It

prob-

updatinq

of attrition

it

as in

Chapter 1 FUNDAMENTALS OF ATTRITION

The

purpose

significance,

of this chapter is

and

-erminology

to introduce

the

of attrition so that

concept, the

later

chapters will be easier to understand. Attrition weapons,

and

is

a

reduction

equipment

in

the

in a military

number unit,

of

personnel,

organization,

or

force. Significance of Attrition Others of

the

things being equal,

numbers of

leadership,

morale,

outcome,

the

weapons

also

like,

troops

and

tactics,

numbers

of

victory in battle is weapons and

on

chance do

to

each side.

While

influence

battle

troops and the numbers and

influence battle outcome.

therefore,

a function

have

as

Each

numerous

a

types

commander

force

as

of

would

possible

throughout the battle. Force strength force.

Change

between

in

attrition

augmentation, attrition,

is

the number of personnel and weapons in

force strength is and

augmentation.

force strength is

force

a function of

strength is

reduced.

If If

increased.

a

the

balance

attrition

exceeds

augmentation exceeds If

attrition

equals

augmentation, force strength is maintained at a constant level. It is necessary, therefore, for commanders to attempt

to

minimize attrition in order to maximize force strength. It

is

accurately

useful

also

to

be

able

to

forecast

attrition

in order to provide for the proper numbers and

types

of augmentation in Augmentation

has tts.ee components,

replacements;

and

bring

up

units

mobilization.

the planning process.

reinforcements. from

follows:

Fillers are individuals who to

wartime

strength of a unit.

replace

entire

force.

Reinforcements

units

It

are additional

strength

of

a

individuals or units over The commander

or reinforcements

and units from his higher commander

reserve.

The application of additional

impottaot

most

losses to

he

has will

tools available to any

or can commit his

force is

com.andcr

to

one of the influence

battle outcome. Attrition duty.

0 is

the difference between losses and returns

to

Returns to duty are personnel who have been counted as

loss and then report back to their units. a

component

of attrition

They

important

instead of as a kind of

in maintaining

force

augmentation.

strength.

The

to duty is commander

normally has some control over returns to duty by the actions takes

to assure medical care for his people and maintenance

his damaged equipment. depend

on

higher

A combat commander,

level organizations

a

are included as

The number and proportion of losses which are returned very

however,

he for

usually must

to provide most

of

this

medical and maintenance support. The losses

*

except to the extent that he can obtain more personnel,

equipment, own

upon

also possible to

to maintain the original

influence over the'replacements

receive,

strength

is

above the original strength of a force.

little

fillers;

Replacements are individuals who offset

maintain the original

and

peacetime

as

primary factor in

attrition

is

losses.

caused by enemy action can be influenced by

8

The number a

of

commander

only

partially.

He can minimize his losses

good

strategy,

and good

leadership,

and

troops also have a great

of

losses

too.

extraordinary

Combat

circumstances,

by clever

tactics,

but the opposing commander

influence over the amount and implies

losses,

and

losses will occur

in

kind

except

for

battle.

Kinds of Attrition

are

There

9

two

of

basic kinds

and

personnel

aWtrition:

materiel. Personnel attrition

0

ture,

injury,

or

results illness

of

from the killing,

wounding,

military personnel

or

cap-

civilian

employees. Materiel attrition

results

destruction of weapons,

from

equipment,

the

separate treat

and materiel,

topics.

the

This is

have ma-y similarities

but they commonly are treated

because

it

is

perceived as proper

killing and wounding of people

as being an

different matter than the loss of equipment. we

In

shall follow the convention by treating the

while

pointing

out

the

or

and supplies.

The causes and treatment of attrition for both personnel

disabling

similarities

and

this two

as to

entirely handbook,

separately,

relationships

when

appropriate. Causes of Attrition

*

Attrition has three major causes:

enemy action;

accidents;

and illness or wearout. Enemyaction

*

equipment

0o.

P

causes attrition

with bullets or fragments

9

mostly by hitting people

and

(both large and small)

from

artillery

or

mortar shells,

addition,

it

is

aerial

bombs,

will be possible in

with war

also

Most attrition

usually is

tempo

wartime is

people

Accidents

occur

in

attrition

there are more accidents

tense,

is

an

modern

cause

carelessness and violations of good

increased,

are

in

The proximate

armed

forces

because people are using dangerous weapons

During

or germs.

action.

cause attrition.

safety practices.

time

In

the future to damage people and equipment

occurs because of enemy

accidents or

toxic chemicals,

laser beams and particle beams.

Accidents

missiles.

possible to damage both people and equipment by

bringing them into contact with fire, It

or

matters have and safety

important

and

because

in

are

the

relaxed.

considLdtioii

in

health peace-

equipment. operating

to be accomplished

rules

of

urgently, Accidental

maintaining

the

strength of a force. Illness or wearout causes attrition equipment wears out. on people.

important

This cause of attrition

For personnel,

cause of attrition

until

cause

when peop)e get sick and

disease was

about

of

impacts

the single most

80 years ago.

personnel

It

attrition,

is

still

primarily important a very

particularly

in

environments which are inherently hostile to humans. The Attrition-Cycle Attrition

is

a process which occurs

in

a

cyclic

manner.

Since commanders are concerned with replacement of losses as well as for

obtaining additional force strength, treatment

intermediate

of

points

personnel in

and

it

repair

Is usual to of

the replacement stream.

10 10I

provide

equipment As

shown

at in

0

Figure

principles of this attrition

the general

1,

both to personnel

cycle

apply

and materiel. Figure 1 The Attrition Cycle Materiel

Personnel No recovery

Salvage for parts

Combat Zone:

Immediate treatment & return to unit, or evacuation

Repair & return to unit, or evacuation

Theater Zone:

Treatment & return to replacement pipeline, or evacuation

Repair and return to depot stocks, or evacuation

Treatment & return to ZI duty, or discharge from the service.

Repair and return to ZI stocks

Complete Loss: Partial Loss:

Support

Zone of the Interior (ZI) :

key distinction among the levels at which

The declared

for

fit

serviceable

is

unit

suffering

duty

from

duty

or a piece

of

equipment

the combat zone will

almost

equipment probably some in

returning

the theater.

'the Zone of the Interior

soon,

if

ever,

(ZI)

serve

or will with

Personnel or equipment treated will not return

and then as a new replacement.

ii

to

certainly

to duty from the Theater Support Zone

not return to their original unit but will

other unit in

original

Personnel

return to their original unit and rather quickly.

is

declared

Personnel and equipment returning

the loss. in

is

to the

the speed and certainty of return

treatment

the person

to combat

duty

Personnel Loss Categories There

are

two basic categories of

Battle Casualties and

(2)

Battle Casualties and

type

of

strength,

morale,

they

number, lead

losses:

Injuries

are caused by enemy action.

friendly force strength,

and luck.

rate,

Disease and Non-Battle

battle casualties is

factors of the combat,

personnel

a

function

environmental

and the human factors,

Commanders can influence

(DNBI).

The

of

(1)

number

enemy

force

and operational

such as leadership, to some degree

the

and kinds of battle casualties by the way in which

their

units.

There

are

three

kinds

of

battle

are

killed

casualties: Killed in

Action (KIA).

Personnel

who

outright or die of wounds on the battlefield before receiving any medical recover,

treatment

are listed as KIA.

identify,

record,

deceased remains.

This work is

registration system, function,

require

effort

provide proper burial

to

in

to the

the responsibility of the graves

but many other personnel will assist in

particularly

forces place great

and

KIA

the recovery phase.

Most

this

fighting

importance on the proper and respectful treat-

ment of their own dead.

This is

true of the United States Ar-med

Forces. Wounded in enter WIA

the

(WIA).

Personnel who are wounded and

into the medical- system while still even

thereafter. part

Action

though they may have died of wounds

(DOW)

some

time

WIA personnel require a great deal of effort on the

of the military medical system. prompt

alive are classified as

and effective

First, early and effective

Great stress

treatment of wounds for

is

placed on

two

reasons.

treatment provides a greater number of

19

returns *

to duty.

wounds

helps

enter

combat.

Second,

1. 2. 3. 4.

in Action

separated

CMIA.

Some

become

prisoners of war (POW),

under

good for

of

unit

Personnel

(CMIA).

from their units during combat are these personnel

who

listed

are captured by the

as

enemy

at least temporarily.

and

Some

of

Some of the CMIA are still

friendly control but are not with the unit responsible for

duty.

for them;

but,

other

in

fact,

system.

killed or dies of wounds under circumstances unknown

to

members of his unit. recovered and placed

Sometimes

into the

wounded

medical

CMIA

treatment

There are five possible dispositions for CMIA: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

*

Return to Duty Dead Wounded Prisoner of War Missing

Non-Battle Casualties injuries (DNBI) illness,

their a

are

are dead.

from

to

This situation occurs when

surviving

personnel

these MIA personnel often are returned

CMIA are neither captured nor separated

Some

person is

9

to

Return to Duty Died of Wounds Transfer to another medical facility Discharge from the armed forces

become

accounting

*

troops

WIA:

these POW escape and return to duty.

*

of

There are four possible dispositions

Captured-missing

*

treatment

Most fighting forces place great stress on

9

*

in

morale and increases the willingness of

treatment of the WIA. *

obvious excellence

.

are

called

Disease

The three major categories

and injuries.

13

and

Non-Battle

are disease,

mental

is

Disease parasites,

or

debilitated, past

other

illness

organisms.

Patients

severely debilitated,

viruses,

bacteria,

by

caused

may

be

mildly

or killed by disease.

disease has been a major factor in maintenance of

and health of armies,

strength

but modern medical systems have

disease to a relatively minor factor,

In the

relegated

at least for modern armies.

Mental Illness is a form of disease caused by emotional or

psychological

stresses of from

traumas.

The

reaction of

3mbat can cause mental illness.

"shellshock" in World War I,

effects remain largely the same.

considered

in Vietnam,

inability

causes

Mental illness usually is of

mental toughness,

factors in current non-conventional warfare, illness is

World

but the

conviction

and may be considered an extreme form of these general

Menta'

seldom fatal initially,

problems.

are important

such as insurgency.

but it

can lead to the

of the victim to continue performing effectively

combat unit or in

the

The name has varied

to be related to poor morale and lack

Mental illness and its opposite,

to

to "battle fatigue" in

War II, to "Vietnam stress syndrome" and

soldiers

in

a

the theater of operations.

Injuries are caused by accidents.

In

general,

these

have the same effects as WIA and are treated much the same. people die of their injuries.

Some

The injured are treated and either

returned

to duty in

Interior

for further treatment and then either returned to

the theater or returned to the Zone

there or discharged from the service.

14

of

the duty

The Personnel Attrition Process A

generalized,

for personnel are

is

schematic diagram of the attrition

shown in Figure 2.

the Combat Zone,

the Interior.

For the United States,

the Zone of the Interior is of

The three areas of interest

the Theater Support Zone,

the Continental United States,

process

and the Zone of

the Zone of the Interior is

or CONUS.

For the Soviec'Union,

the Soviet Union itself.

The Theater

Operations may be divided into several geographical areas

commands,

depending

on

the circumstances.

Only

one

Theater

Support Zone is shown in this diagram for simplicity's sake. Combat rear

Zone

is generally considered to be forward of the

boundary,

cir

but

this

also

will

vary

or

The corps

according

to

These three basic zones will exist in all wartime

situations,

but

there

will be as many variations as there

are

wars.

The

three

differently. or

basic

categories of

casualties

Personnel who are killed in action,

are

processed

die of wounds,

die trom injuries or disease are collected at various

graves

registration points for identification and subsequent burial in a temporary or permanent cemetery. Personnel

formerly

in

the CMIA category

designated collection points for processing. condition, returned have

they

placed in

units

collected

and

action or,

if

from

their

directly. either

accidentally

Those

the case is

serious, - 5

at

the medical treatment system

units

returned

gathered

Depending on their

to duty in the replacement system.

strayed

original

are

are

who

to their held

Many of those return

to

desert

or

AWOL

units

for

in

go

who their

disciplinary

a confinement

or

facility

are

awaiting

Those cunvic"ted of crimes arb sent tc,

trial.

miliItary

prisons. Figure 2

0• PERSONNEL ATTRITION PROCESS UNIT

KIA

-

WACMIA

COMBAT

ZONEI

1 22

PTURAECO

PTO ORIWART MEDICA-ISN

UNITI

SUPOR

---------

S; I.

------------------------......... EVACUATE1

CAVES

ON I E I OIT

,,--V -

...................... OLLEC.ION POINT

,/

Dow

AID ATo

THEATER

TTHEATER

AEPLACEMENT,0

"I'sPITAt..

THEATER

CAPP

CENTER

SUPPORT ZONE

.VACUATETO V I•IUTA~qlACIITAY

ZONE

RTO ZI

OF THE INTERIOR

OOq, HOSPITAL

--

OVEARP.AS AIPLACE14EN CN

2

PAUTARY

MILITARY C'IiTIRYPRISON

VIFOMI

I'

0

The require

most

complicated process involves those personnel

medical

injured,

treatment.

and sick,

These are the wounded

who

in

action,

all indicated in the diagram as WIA.

Initial

treatment

is

station.

A decision is made at each treatment facility to treat

and

return

capable, forward' be

likely

to

to be at a

battalion

duty or evacuate the patient

medical

facility.

medical

battalion

battalion;

to

regimental

or regimental

aid

stations;

division

forward

surgical

hospital;

hospital.

Personnel treated

and

facilities

in the Combat Zone generally return directly to

original unit when they have been declared fit

unlikely

to

release. often for

be

Patients

at

medical their

for duty.

moved to a theater level hospital,

returned

one

in reality there woulO

evacuation

Once the patient is

more

only

hospital;

field

aid

another,

While the diagram shows

medical unit in the Combat Zone,

several:

or

directly to his

original

released from theater level

he is

unit

upon

hospitals

more

are reassigned to the theater personnel replacement system further

reassignment to units needing

certain

skills

and

the Zone

of

grades. Once the unit

the patient is evacuated to a hospital in

Interior (ZI), are

released

even from

Sometimes replacement

they

the chances of his returning to his original

less than from

a

theater

hospital.

ZI hospitals often are reassigned reassigned back

are

pipeline.

Sometimes

into

the

to

Patients ZI

oversea

units. theater

they are discharged from

the

service or placed on limited duty. The tendency,

therefore,

is

to treat people as near to the

original combat unit as possible in order to maximize the

number

of

returns to duty and to help preserve

injured,

wounded,

the

having

cohesion by

or sick perscn rejoin the original unit. Theater Evacuation9jj•

One

particularly

attrition

is

important consideration with

respect

to

the policy set for evacuation of patients or damaged

equipment items from the theater of operations to the zone of the Interior.

While this

is

important

for materiel,

it

is

especially

important for personnel. The the

personnel

theater evacuation policy is

a statement

maximum number of days that a patient will be treated

medical facility in

wounded,

sick,

or injured is

to

a theater of operations medical

of

the number of days of treatment required to cure the

so

he

policy,

the

treatm.ent. is

facility an estimate

or she can return to duty. for

the patient is patient

If

will

the projected

If

the projected

less than the be

retained

a

the

admitted is

made

patient

length

theater in

of

evacuation theater

length of treatment for

greater than theater evacuation policy,

given

in

the theater of operations.

When a patient who is

treatment

of

for

the patient

the patient will

be

enough treatment to stablize his or her condition and then

transported

to the ZI

for additional

treatment

until

returned

to

duty.

The

consequences of the evacuation policy are

tant.

The

policy,

the higher

the

Z1,

the

theater,

fewer

the fewer and

the

theater

treatment days

the proportion

very

allowed

of patients who will

imporby

the

be sent

to

the medical resources which will be needed

in

the

be

fewer

recovered

patients

who

will

to duty in

returned evacuation

policy,

evacuated,

the

theater, in

officers as

in

So,

practice,

is

the

for

continuous

the

than on number

regardless of projected

ZI

Improved

methods

times of theater evacuation

rather

hospitals

wounded soldiers

do

this.

In

From

in

the theater

for

basis

of

treatment. hospital All

treatment.

to shorten

Helicopters

have made

the it

than going through unit aid stations

or

even

to move wounded soldiers

have made

possible to evacuate

it

travel

than

and the ease of moving to airfield

make

Vietnam US wounded personnel

or Japan for relatively

policy.

base

jet

from field

directly

this

to

from battlefield

directly

as

treatment.

of

from the theater more easily

of

times

short

strength

of days of

length

policies.

Jet aircraft

hospitals.

field

to

directly

before

than

want

the

evacuation have tended

of

they

on

the

personnel

might be sent to a special

for example,

malaria patients might be retained

easier

often set

short in

and

own

their

the

to duty

the patients

tension regarding

is

policy

in

prefer a

generally

patients

the

patients

returned

Troop commanders

the ZI.

categories of disease rather

in

of patients

authorities

of

required

long evacuation policy because

a

there

All burn wounds,

resources

in

the days

proportion

they want to treat

many recovered

possible. In

the number

policy because

prefer

retain

the medical

Medical

hospitals

the

smaller

greater

theater.

evacuation better

the

and the greater

the

The greater

the theater.

hospitals

to hospitals

minor wounds or

the viewpoint of attrition,

19

The

before.

patient

the

very convenient

it

were often in

to

evacuated

the United

States

injuries. the key point is

that

the

probability

evacuated and

of this

the combat units

respect,

useful

in

the

and experience

is

particu-

casualties. policy can be

the theater evacuation

strength

the

turnover

forces,

which suffer most of

evidence of

estimating

increases personnel

level of the theater

to

return

the soldier

if

significantly

This

from the theater.

lowers the experience

larly In

reduced

is

of operations

theater

injured soldier will

that a wounded or

levels

for

these

forces. Personnel Because attrition it

is

useful

measure

personnel

Strength authorizations difference personnel are

numbers,

the

niumber

a military

between (spaces)

skills,

fill

each

unit,

is

very

and its

authorized

seldom achieved

important.

and

strength,

that

schematic diagram of a military

unit.

20

with

incorrectly. or

personnel

or

The

authorizations

for

that

to

or

bil-

describe

the unit

the

should

system tries

space with the right kind of Thus,

and

force.

The personnel

practice.

all

Authorizations,

grades of personnel mission.

and

personnel

by higher headquarters

in

in

terms,

organization, (faces)

of terms to describe the situation a

are many

of either

personnel

established

to accomplish

is

There

but often used interchangeably

is in

a change

the terminology used to describe

strength.

have

this

a process causing

to understand

precise meanings,

lets,

is

Strength Terminology

person,

there are

does occur.

to but

a variety

Figure

3 is

6

Figure 3

MILIIARY UNIT STRENGTH TERMS Authorizations (spaces)

Personnel (faces)

Wartime StrengthAssg

Strength

UNIT

Peacetime Strength

r(eSt

SPresent

rngth

for Duty

Strength

Wartime Strength terms

as

"full

strength"

are

full

in

authorized Manpower

In

peacetime

area

strength,"

and

terms referring to

many units

in

such

"authorized

the

with personnel-

with

number

of

All

units have

designed

to operate

most armed

forces

are

than wartime strength as an economy measure. authorizations can include military personnel and civi-

and

The

US

Army has

civilian personnel;

service support units.

guides

along

less

personnel.

military

nel

allowed to fill

"TOE*

wartime strength at which the unit is

combat.

lian

strength,"

authorization

spaces a unit is a

and Peacetime Strength,

nothing about

filling

to fill

all

which

include

both

most of these units are

rear

Authorization

to the number of personnel

systems fail

units

in

terms are

not

good

a unit because most person-

of the authorized

spaces,

to

say

them with proper grades and skills.

*This refers to the Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE), which is the document used in the US Army to establish authorizations for numbered units intended to fight as part of the Army-in-the-field. The US Army also has Table of Distribution and Allowance (TDA) documents for stationary support units.

There are Assigned on

Strength of a

the personnel

unit.

Some

duty;

personnel

some are at

is

are sick in away

on

some have

indicator

of

Present actually

or

fighting

is

the basis of

ready

strength

as

for estimates

personnel system

is

that

on

hospital,

in

missing.

There are

to take and

get

is

to

on

temporary for

some have been

Other Still

strength

fight

or work.

personnel others are

is

not

This,

as combat power This

of attrition.

for

leave,

a

good

is

who

are

concerned

and

0

the "effective

is

These seem

from one

is

to expand

the fact

so that

that

there will

unit

the people

in

prisons,

soldiers

area units,

are

in

or

the

simply

these non-available for the unit

are authorized

be enough people

rear

who

include

another,

the authorization

to get the necessary work done.

This method

headquarters,

22

any

that

These

to

to manage

duty

administrative

are

to arrive.

schools,

two basic ways

way

of

large numbers of personnel

duty.

and

0

of course,

basic characteristic

are

camps or

into account sick,

A

but never moving

training

One

0

the

with

the number of personnel

faK

there

or coming

personnel

personnel.

unit.

physically

and

quarters.

Assigned

Personnel.

simply are not available going

the

the unit.

Non-Available

always

their

shown

strength.

with the unit

strength"

in

for Duty Strength

the important

the unit

on the books;

or on pass.

is

left

but have not yet joined.

the hospital

leave

to

are assigned but are away

school;

to the unit

as belonging

of the people are actually

new assignment but are still

assigned

strength.

the number of personnel

the unit

all

that

of personnel

unit

records of

does not mean

This

a

two basic descriptors

leave

present is

used for

civilian

for for

personnel. for

these non-available The

units. for

(

The other method

patients, be

personnel, students,

established

individuals

0

operate in

has

are

the combat theater

to

is

strength and

reported each day. often reported

times shortened

shows

an account would

set of

designed

authorized

terminology for

method

of

in

figures

are properly

referred

strength."

In

to as "end-month

military

they

month or

jargon this

strength of

a unit or a several

force

in

differont

the relationship

a battle

and are

year.

strength" is

some-

or engagement

descriptors. of some of

PERSONNEL STRENGTH IN A BATTLE

END

STRENGTH

STRENGTH

AVERAGE STRENGTH

Figurp 4

these terms.

Figure 4

0

The

to "end strength."

a schematic of

0START

A

time.

are reported,

day of a particular

to

strength

measurement.

point

for

strengths.

present for duty strength ace measured

be described using

0

accounts prisoners,

that the units

for a particular

as of the last

strengths

not assigned to

These authorizations

are at their

When strength

"end-fiscal year

may

mobilization

the time and

valid

authorizations

trainees,

In

Another

do with

assigned

The

transients,

designed to assure

figure

or

individuals

also for replacements,

strength

These

as

separate

uses separate individuals

and holdees.

Kinds of Strength. data

to create

personnel

US Armed Forces

military

is

The

average strength

is

the area

under

the

curve.

possible to compute a strength descriptor which is the start the

start

strength and end strength,

average

strength only

to finish.

strengths, average

which

It

is

is

the average of

but this will be the same as

strength

function

is

linear

from

possible also to calculate average daily

provides

strength.

literature

is

if

It

a more disaggregated

Another measure

sometimes

descriptor

found

total strength on the battlefield,

in

than

historical

which would be

the cumulative sum of the strengths of all units which arrived on the

battlefield,

various which

whether

they left

strength descriptors is

definitions

being of

is

used and what personnel

or

stayed.

valid provided it

means.

strength

terms

Each

of

the

the analyst knows

Figure

5

for

battle

a

provides or

engagment. Figure 5 Personnel Start Strength:

Strength Terms

strength engagement

first

on the day before a battle or or at

the bcginning

of the

day of a battle.

End Strength:

strength at the end of the last day of a battle or on the day after the battle.

Daily Strength:

start day.

Average Daily Strengt .'iT

one half the sum of start strengths for a particular day.

Total Strength:

the cumulative number of personnel the battle from start point to point.

Average Strength:

the sum of the daily strengths divided by the number of days in the battle.

or

24

end strength

on a

particular

and

end in end

_

Materiel Attrition Concepts

to those for personnel.

similar

There is,

generally

are

basic concepts of materiel attrition

The

one

however,

basic

difference. is

difference

The

but materiel comes in

some flexibility for application,

with

models

that personnel come in two basic

a

bewildering variety of makes and models and years of manufacture,

can

be used only for the purposes for which it cannot shoot a projectile,

bulldozer

is

A

designed.

move

cannot

and a cannon

While personnel do come with varying degrees of training

earth. and

A piece of equipment

with no flexibility of application.

often

they

experience,

can be retrained and can be applied to

The signi-

fairly wide range of jobs (with obvious limitations). of this is

ficance

a

provide

that the materiel supply system must

an exact or nearly exact replacement for the lost item. The meaning of the word "exact" applies in particular make

and model of the item being replaced.

combat support equipment are ,cry many repair parts, keep

an

different

guns.

operating

in

models

of

but there are obvious demands

with

artillery battery could not fire efficiently

howitzer;

operations.

requirement

would not do to replace a 130mm howitzer with a 75mm

It

as well.

and often special tools to

There are obvious limits to the

for exact replacement of materiel,

and

Modern weapons

complicateo and require a great

trained mechanics,

operational.

to the

It

would be possible to have

the same company, It

certainly is

but it

different

would complicate

tanks combat

possible to have different makes and

trucks in a transport company,

25

but it

does

make

iL

harder to maintain and repair the trucks because of the necessity for multiple sets of parts and tools. The for

complications

of make and model are particularly

support equipment,

such as generators and air

These relatively small items are prevalent in can occur

in a multitude of sizes,

manufacture. Engineer era,

As a result,

equipment

other

and years of

they are very difficult

to maintain.

During the Korean

that it

armies. is

One group was deployed to the Pacific;

group to Europe. maintenance.

and

it

any modern army and

models,

also complicated.

compressors.

War

the US Army had two different groups of makes and models for

engineer equipment.

is

is

makes,

acute

This was done to simplify parts

is

supply

The significance of make and model preference

complicates resupply.

It

the

This is

less true of unso

true of

most

jt4ueriLla

modern but

fore,

0

always a consideration. There are three kinds of materiel:

consumables;

equipment;

and repair parts. Consumables are consumed tion,

food,

water,

do requite care in to

POL,

in

use.

and numerous sundry items.

storage,

needs

awhile.

However,

to

be

usable shape.

use.

rotated and turned over

consumables

generally are not repairable

0

Consumables

and they do require some maintenance

keep them in good shape for eventual

example,

These include ammuni-

which

Ammunition, every

are damaged or

once

by new scocks.

26

therefore,

in

destroyed

and cannot readily be put back

Losses of consumables,

for

into

must be replaced

0

Equipment the

military

weapons;

force to operate.

combat vehicles;

computers; helmets,

consists of the major end items which

furniture; boots,

These include

aircraft;

helicopters;

tentage;

and

and uniforms.

often can be repaired,

therefore,

and it

has

equipment end items.

a

personal

generally is is

equipment

This system often is

S

such

as

faster and cheaper to Every modern repair

elaborate and

of damaged equipment.

and Oil the .. y

IL

of

includes

Even unsophisticated

fDrces

The primary

the treatment of materiel attrition it ...

enj

items,

system for maintenance and

make some provision for repair during

trucks; radios;

to replace it.

large numbers of trained personnel.

emphasis

following:

Equipment which has been damaged

repair damaged equipment than it army,

the

allow

will be

on

emaintenance

Wi ht

system mitigates losses due to enemy action or to accident. Repair parts

are

nance and repair system. correct There

part -is

is

some

requirement

an essential

Unless

available,

relief

to

parts

process.

It

to

order

be

usually

is

is

of

the correct part -the end

of parts

mainte-

be

repaired.

from

this

demanding

the

field,

but manu-

and

a demanding

itself

easier

in

the

and only the

item cannot

obtained

through manufacture

facturing

element

to provide the

difficult

correct part.

The Equipment Maintenance System consists basically of main

unit maintenance;

elements:

depot maintenance;

and Zi depot or

will

variations

be

account

numerous

for

elements occur

local in

field factory

within

this

maintenance;

conditions and traditions,

every systern.

Z7

theater

maintenance. basic

but

four

There

framework

these

to

four

is

the basic element

even

in

units without a formal

system,

maintenance

of

sists it

adjusting

the item,

cleaning

oil,

has sufficient

tor

or crew of

by the operator

performed

maintenance exists

fuel, in

military

forces,

only of cleaning and oiling

off

of

ammunition. and demanding,

complicated Some maintenance

section,

relatively

or

filters.

The opetator

this

work

is

Both normal enemy

being forms

wear

units

have

assist

skilled

of unit maintenance

most battle

mechanics

maintenance

field

perform

perform

the

6imple

or

fuel when

rather

to

cope

with

than damage

caused

by

Although the capabilities

of

the

damage

repair

than

requires the found

in

they

are

services

specialized

units.

in

is

close proximity

performed to

by maintenance

the combat units.

the third echelon of maintenance,

replacement

some

the mechanic

are designed

and special equipment

Field Maintenance the

ow:n

and

fan belts

operators and the unit mechanics are often greater

of

quite

performed.

and tear on equipment

to be,

sand

their

mechanics

such as

or crew normally

action or by accidents.

designed

is

which consists of making

adjustments and replacing some parts,

con-

it

on a tank.

These personnel

echelon of maintenance,

if

even

a track

of a few

tools.

Opera-

supplies.

maintenance

larger

consisting

uncomplicated

second

operator

such as changing

battalion-sized

that

and washing mud or

a rifle

Some

is

con-

certain

and making

it,

required

sists

This

the equipment.

and other

all

maintenance

echelon of maintenance

The first

section or trained mechanics.

equipment

of any

Unit maintenance

of major assemblies ot

which

the equipment.

200

is

units

in

These units repair

and

Field mainte-

is

nance

It

equipment operational.

Sometimes

is

possible

ael y

The "maintenance

damage is

At in

the

stocks

are

in

imirredi-

item

Needless exhausted

to say,

in

quickly,

combat the maintesince

they

are

peacetime losses.

field maintenance unit a piece of equipment can

It

It

can be repaired

float

can be repaired and put into maintenance

be deemed unrepairable and scrapped.

It

be

and returned

to replace an item which previously was sent to the unit.

It

can

can be sent to a higher

level maintenance unit for repairs which exceed the capability the

at

important equipment items while the

any of four directions.

the unit.

is

it

this case.

float" stocks are designed to keep the units

basically designed to cope with

to

In

in

hLeldA for th~is -Pur-POseC b-y the maintcnancc unit.

being repaired.

float

nance

item at the

that the equipment will be

unit indicates

authorized strength

their

is

returned

will be

sometimes to issue the unit a replacement

fromi stOCIKS

"is

repaired.

shop for an extended period of time.

the

the equipment

inspection of an equipment

the initial

maintenance

field

but it

company,

to the maintenance

to the original unit when it

sent

That is,

goes into field maintenance.

transferred

unit

at least temporarily,

that the unit loses the piece of equipment, when it

the

From

unit and field maintenance

difference between

the

viewpoint

keep

that repair of damage

starts.

action and from accidents

enemy

from

at this level

is

to

feats

performing extraordinary

of

capable

of

field maintenance unit. Depot maintenance

maintenance.

Depots

is

are found

29

the in

highest level the theater

of

military

of operations and

in

of operations

the theater

in

Depots

the Zi.

but both have the capability

the ZI,

capability than do those in

turning out what is

to rebuild a damaged piece of equipment,

in

includes

The depot maintenance capability

new item.

a

effect

less

have

may

subassemblies.

replacement of major assemblies and the repair of

Field maintenance can replace a vehicle engine; depot maintenance rebuild the engine.

can

depots

are the most sophisticated

in

The major difference between

far as the losing unit is of

equipment.

The

at

The skills and tools and facilities

field

concerned,

unit

is

the military

forces.

and depot maintenance,

is

the identity of the piece

quite likely to get

its

original

equipment

back from field maintenance,

or at least one like

from

float.

item

the

maintenance broken,

supply

Once

level,

and

the equipment

however,

the

system.

Commanders

in

enters

(or

rebuilt)

level

sometimes in

the

maintenance

in

depot

unit

is

repair

or

field maintenance unit,

because normally this reduces the time required piece of equipment to replace the damaged

it

item from the

combat prefer to have

maintenance work done by their supporting

Depot

the

connection with the

the unit must draw a new

as

to get a

working

item.

the Zone of

the

Interior

is

carried out by the factories which built the equipment first

place.

This is

often referred

to as

overhaul

or

rebuild. Recovery. maintenance

ment.

While

battlefield have

to

be

system

some

An

important

is recovery

damaged

element

of damaged

in

own power,

hauled off by a recovery

30

equipment

and destroyed

equipment can be

or leave under its

the

some

vehicle.

carried

equip-

off

critical This

the items

recovery

0

process is

important to the success ot the maintenance

critically The

effort.

effective

Army has been particularly

Israeli

in

pulling damaged tanks oft the battlefield to nearby field maintenance units where they are repaired on the spot. it

not recovered, and

prevented

into enemy hands or otherwise be lost

may fall

from being repaired.

it

Thus,

is

important

to

immobile damaged equipment to the

for prompt movement of

provide

the item is

If

shops. The Materiel Attrition Process

is

Process

shown

in

This is

Figure 6.

--

interior

is

difference

destroyed

or

armed

forces

battlefield

in

is

to

system.

and move it

subsequent

aud

destroyed

and

theater

combat,

general flow of sick

the utility

wounded

and

equipment

of

it

is

customary in

destroyed

which

is

parts

well-organized from

equipment

the

where the best use

to salvage facilities Parts are sent to

maintenance

the

and the unusable portions are scrapped.

Another difference is fuhction.

support,

Figure 2.

to the flow of

even

recover

made of the equipment.

facilities,

the

damaged beyond repair as a source of repair

the maintenance

for

similar

to

similar

There are some relatively minor differences.

personnel. One

The

apply.

equipment

damaged

is

still

--

zones

basic

three

very

process in

diagram for the personnel attrition The

Attrition

schematic diagram of the Materiel

A generalized,

Battlefield movement

obvious.

Battlefield

destroyed

equipment

the emphasis on recovery as a separate recovery

within

the

recovery is

not so

of

treatment

medical of damaged obvious

personnel

wounded

and

and,

system

arid is

particularly,

usually

requires

Figure

6

MATERIEL ATTRITION PROCESS

EVACUATE

S CfL -1TRYE

DAAG

MAINTENHA :rE

\

--

O V R AMGE

II

EVACUATE



COMBAT ZONE

SALVAGE

MAINTENANC•E

SUPPORT

ll....

i

l

..

ZONE

.

..

___

To Z ,

OFTHEAE SUPPRORT

l.l.... .. .

SAVG

EVACUAT

SZONE

........

STOCKS

.. tl

..... i

.

l..

t

•.I... ----

---...

-----------

SCRAP

ZI

OEZP 0T

SZI

STOCKS

LL

_0

Si

separate identification as a service support sub-system. The

final

evacuation

difference

policy.

evacuated

from

ment

in

the application of the

extent to which damaged

the Theater of Operations

circumstantial. problem,

The

is

Movemants

is

not so easy.

equipment

to the

ZI

is

of patients to the ZI is

particularly with modern aircraft. Some high value,

theater is

highly

a tractable

Movement of equip-

low bulk items such

as

electronic devices or radios,

can be evacuated easily,

often by

air.

such as trucks and tanks,

are less

Bulky and heavy items,

easy

to

evacuate,

despite the possible availability

of

empty

ships or railway cars which otherwise would be travelling Some

items might be evacuated;

%.LleaterL

zon

supportU

available

1' tLJjja L

0.

transportation

maintenance evacuation materiel

i

facilities

1.LL.

I LI±L

the

is

an

effectiveness

or

integral

absence A

element

important

of the process

in '0Ln

%A~jn

locations.

process and can be an

the

W. Li L

existence

particular

however,

attrition

establishing

and

in

system,

others might be retained

empty.

in

a

the -L

of

theater of

factor

the in

particular

war. Kinds of Attrition Rates Attrition can be understood best by referring to rates. actual number of casu not

event,

does

combat

events.

attrition

ti.es,

permit

The

while important for a single com-at among

aggregation or comparison

Accordingly,

it

is

necessary

to

calculate In

rates when performing analyses of attrition.

many

this

handbook we use the term "casualty rate" when referring to losses of

personnel

materiel. 0

and

"loss

rate"

when

referring

to

losses

of

and it

There are several different kinds of casualty rates, is

important

to

know

which kind of rate is

particular analysis or study.

being

used

in

a

Comparing data with two different

kinds of rates can give misleading results. rates

three important dimensions of attrition

The

duration for which the rate is

calculated,

the

are



the size of the unit,

and the level of combat. A

rate is

time period,

the number of casualties or losses divided by the

or duration,-for which the rate is

The most common attrition monthly rate is wars.

rate is

used.

the daily rate.

The annual rate is

Daily rates cannot be compared Attrition

strength

rates

of

Sometimes

a

the

found in

or force which is

rates

lost

per

are stated as a number

per time period.

rates are stated in

to

large

specify battalion It

is

each or

of

the

period.

casualties

or rate

In this handbook,

inversely

It

oicganizational

is

0

As will be proportional

necessary

level,

which the rate has been

permissible to compare rates only

if

such

to as



calculated.

they are for the

same

general size of units. Level of combat is

0

Small units have high casualty rates,

instance the

division for

time

also important.

units have low casualty rates.

in

of

terms of percentages.

the casualty rate is

the size of the unit.

and

summaries

The most common form of

The size of the unit involved is demonstrated later,

the

to annual rates.

is percentage of the strength per time period. attrition

Sometimes

usually are expressed as a proportion of

unit

losses per 1,800

being calculated.

• particularly

important.

Figure 7

shows

of

Hierarchy of Combat and some of the characteristics

the

each

level. Figure 7 Hierarchy of Combat Level of Combat

Duration

Units Involved

Common Thread

War

Months-Years

National Forces

National Goals

Campaign

Months

Army Groups or Field Armies

Strategic Objectives

Battle

1-3 Weeks

Field Armies or Army Corps

Operational Mission

Engagement

1-5 Days

DivisionsCompanies

Tactical Mission

Action

1-24 Hours

BattalionsSquads

Local Objective

Duel

Minutes

r

%J rndvu]T

level

The

difference is

The

rate.

for

is

unit

not in combat and has no

battle

casualties.

engagement casualty rate for a division therefore,

entire

higher campaign

engagements, is The

the

in

The units

an

there are periods when

however,

During a campaign,

engagement.

much

which

will be committed to combat during almost all of that

engagement

be

attrition

each

due to the proportion of time in

are committed tc combat at each level.

units

the

of combat must be specified

I

1ne

Objective

Mobile Fighting Machines

than the rate for that same of

consisting

and time spent in

key to understanding

several

reserve.

is

likely

to

over

an

division

numerous

battles,

The Hlierarchy of Combat

these different

levels

of

combat.

definitions of the levels of the Hierarchy of Combat are

Appendix 1.

The

in

Data

Sources of Sttength and Attrition

Strength and attrition data (casualties and materiel losses) are

obtained from historical records of combat.

kinds of historical records:

There are

primary and secondary.

P,:imary sources are words of witnesses or first an event. because time,

two

recorders of

Primary sources are preferred for historical research the recorder or witness was close to the event in space,

or both.

Primary sources include contemporary accounts and

official records. Secondary sources

are

derived

from one

sources or from other secondary sources. errors of aggregation, the.

--

or

more

primary

They are susceptible to

0

simplification and misinterpretation when Secondary

d--v

sources are

used

when

primary

sources are not available or are too costly to use. Both

primary and secondary sources must be approached

with

skepticism until checked for validity and reliability. Official Records.

Because

military organization,

of

the complexities of

the staffs of military units are required

to produce and maintain a documentary record. most detailed and contemporaneous In many instances, available,

however,

These provide the

record of unit experiences. the official records may not be

or they may be incomplete

if

available.

records have been destroyed due to the vagaries of Army

modern

Sometimes the war.

German

archives of World War I and earlier years were destroyed by

Ailied

air

records records. destroyed

bombardment

during World

War

destroyed

inadvertently

by

are

Some to

US

Army

obtain

II. the

holders

records from World War

warehouse

space

for

Sometimes

II

other

of

have

the the be, n

purposes.

0

Sometimes

security example,

the

records

exist

or political

classification

does not have access

War II.

Nevertheless,

but are not available

records

reports,

journals,

compiled

chronologically

usual

over

four major staff

to

the and

by the various one day,

researcher

and

include

operatio.nal summaries staff

but some

longer time periods. sections:

for

researchers.

diaries,

reporting period is

activities

records exist

a great many official

files,

US,

of

Soviet records of World

to official

available

The

problems.

are available to determined historical Official

because

sections. reports

The

summarize

Reports are produced by the

personnel;

intelligence;

operations;

and logistics. Personnel

reports

compiling

strength

personnel

daily

Figure 8.

and

will

usually be the

personnel

summary will

casualty

include

most

helpful

data.

the information

A

for

typical

shown

in

Figure 8 Personnel Reports

Data Found in

"o Strength of the organization Authorized

0

Assigned Present for Duty

"o Casualties Total Total Battle Casualties Killed

in Action

Wounded in

(KIA)

Action

(WIA) in Action

Captured/Missinq

(CMIA)

Total DNBI

"o Replacements and hospital returnees of logistics sections provide similar data

reports

The

on

materiel holdings and losses. Personnel

correlated

operations tactical will which and

logistics

of numerical data.

tabulations unless

and

with

sections,

in

usually

which

provide

specific

A typical

of

the

details

of

the

operations

narrative form the circumstantial

reports

environmental the information

circumstances in

were

incurred.

the

report

context

30

in

personnel

Operational

covered will include some or all

Figure 9

of

reports

the casualties and materiel losses shown in logistics

consist

They do not make too much sense

the relevant periodic

activities of the units.

provide

reports

and of

0

Figure 9 Operations Reports

Data Found in

Location of own front line Location of own troops Information on adjacent units and supporting Information on weather

troops

conditions and visibility the

reporting

Information on.the enemy's dispositions and of his intentions

estiimates

Brief

descriptions period

Inf.ormation

of

in

operations

on the combat efficiency of the command

Descriptions of the results of operations addition to supplying

In

operations reports often provide data on strengths

of operations, and

are

records

of

is

This

casualties.

records

information about the circumstances

is

data

generally

conceded it

individually.

A

is

brief

is

that

units

for

records

in

Appendix

the more recent

the

it

data,

but each case must

explanation

passes

be

tests of historical

of the method of historical

Appendix 3.

2.

of historical It

the

is more

approached

would be a grievous error to assume that

reliable until

.presented in

the

a perplexing problem for the analyst.

likely to be, It

presented

Estimating the reliability

Data Reliability. attrition

is

other

with

An example of the use of official

to compile strength and casualty data

data

the case

the British Army and Empire/Commonwealth

World Wars I and II.

reliable

as is

or fragmentary,

missing

when

particularly

important,

any

criticism.

criticism

is

Inaccurate

and

unreliable data may be encountered

record of any historical period. to separate

The task

Century attrition

data is

but there are still

difficult

fact from propaganda.

to

separate

avoid giving accurate casualty data.

from the enemy to fool hirt. understate

US part of the war Even

Vietnam War,

Nations

it tend

In some cases,

to obtain.

Shelby Stanton,

to

the

losses official

The US has good records on the

in Vietnam but no data from the North

the US data is

is

they want to keep good news

Most reports overstate enemy

friendly losses.

records are difficult

limitations.

They want to keep bad news

the enemy or their own people;

Mrese.

is

much more reliable thian

that for earlier eras,

and

of the researcher

the

the wheat from the chaff.

Twentieth

from

in

suspect.

Vietna-

A notcd historian of

the

makes the following observation.*

The entire process of accumulating valid (enemy) casualty data was also shrouded (sic) by the shameful gamesmanship practised by certain reporting elements under pressure to "produce results." Despite a

reasonably

these difficulties accurate

military operations. military

operations

the

in

way

reported

which

it

is

possible to piece

record of strengths The key is

and

together

casualties

a thorough understanding

in

of the

themselves coupled with an understanding of strengths and

in military organizations.

casualties

are

Some important

managed points

and on

*Shelby L. Stanton, The Rise and Fall of an American Army: US Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965-1973 (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1985), P. xvi.

re~liability Figure

of

strength

and casualty data

are

summarized

in

10.

Figure 10 Reliability

of Strength and Casualty Data

o Demonstrably produced in all o Demonstrably in all historic

unreliable data historic eras

reliable eras

has

data has been

o Data from earlier eras generally, less.reliable

is

been

produced

less abundant and,

o Modern data (20th Century) may be misleading and incomplete but can be tested for reliability by persons familiar with the context and the subject The *

successful

adjudged

reliable

analyses,

and establish

military

analyst will make use of

sources

as

trends,

event,

the event

took place.

and

the particular

the general

loss

remainder of this

dimension

of

"15"attrition" treats chapter attrition

that

concept

of

of losses

attrition

is

and

the

interested

analyst

with

usage

of

the

is

In

introduced a broader definition

planning and programming, military

Attrition

term as synonymous with losses.

we have deliberately

of the

context within which

historical

to mean the balance

broader

ranges of variation

book deals almost entirely

attrition.

many

comparative

circumstances

historical

Understanding The

employ

baseline numbers and

based upon historical conflict

possible,

as

in

41

used

and returns in

personnel

to duty.

resource management.

primarily

in

the

the term this of The

management, Moreover, numerical

strength of the military forces, only

one

dimension of strength;

Accordingly,

we

have

not just the losses. gains are

gone to some length

equally to provide

Losses are important. a

basic

understanding of the fundamentals of strength maintenance. The following chapters are designed to provide a good understanding of losses in

military combat.

paid to personnel casualties. and

analysis

effort

That is

coverage

is

where most of the research

has been applied.

tentative hypotheses on materiel the

Most of the attention

0

Soma

basic

data

and

losses are provided to round out

of attrition.

0 42I

0

Chapter 2 PERSONNEL ATTRITION: 1600, The

year 1600

is

HISTORICAL PATTERNS AND TRENDS The Benchmark

Year

a very logical starting point for a survey

of the historical patterns and trends that form the background of personnel attrition first

in

Although gunpowder weapons

modern combat.

appeared on European battlefields

in

the 14th

Century,

it

was not until the beginning

of the 17th Century that guns finally

displaced

halberds,

spears,

swords,

as the principal determinants There

is

data

on

often earlier was

no

though less

point i)r

strengths and losses of

not very reliable, in

history,

crossover

and

important,

the survey.

military

when data

trends

combining at that time to complete

However,

is The

The year

miraculously

to reliable.

from medieval

battle

even for many 20th Century wars.

questionable were

reason for

Quantitative

forces in

the less reliable the data. point

bows and arrows

of battle outcomes.

another related,

choosing 1600 as a starting

pikes,

1.600

changed

from

other cultural and societal

to early modern history,

the

transition

with all that implies with

respect to historical and scientific rigor. This will explain why two of the most reliable of the sional

Years'

general

War,

surveys

of battle

data begin with

early in the 17th Century:

A '

the

occaThirty

Gaston Bodart's Kriegs-

Lexikon,*

and

appendix

Theodore Ayrault Dodge's "Modern Casualties,"

in his four-volume work,

an

Napoleon."*

Having made the case for beginning this survey of historical patterns

and

interesting

trends

with the year

that history

from ancient military

is

reflected in

Some Ancient Battles,"

military

percentage

All

nevertheless

to

logical

the extent

that

"Casualties

in

his Caesar.***

forces

to

exposed

hostile

firepower,

the

per day of combat has declined steadily, over four centuries,

despite

tremendous

the lethality of weapons.

in

weaponF

have

This is

people.

which

is

Dodge's compilation,

Casualties

of those hit

lethality. kill

in

history,

L__ethalityversus

albeit a bit unevenly, increases

it

to note that these patterns and trends were

extrapolations

In

1600,

at

least

one

of men have endeavored

is to

weapons

their

realizing:

or

ultimate lethality potential

than a sword,

is in

possible,

impose their

using their

opponents or by

if

to

a review of the manner

other groups of men by

Lethality

characteristic:

the ability to injure and,

The history of warfare

groups

common

wills

upon

more effectively

at least

in

than

approaching,

the

of their weapons.

a comparative thing.

Nothing

is

more

the hands of someone who can wield it,

lethal

to kill

a

*Gaston Bodart, Militaer-historisches Kriegs-Lexikon. (Leipzig and Vienna: C.W. Stern_,=T8) .

"**T.A.

Dodge,

Napoleon.

4 vols.

(Boston: Houghton Mifflin,

1904). ***T.A.

Dodge,

Caesar.

2 vols.

44

(Boston:

Houghton Mifflin,

1892).

single

opponent

sword's lethality the

physical

values

is

within reach of

limited

limitations

factors

of the sword with

or the tank, kill

by the

the

sword.

factors of time,

of the man

to these and other

lethality

that

who is

it

the lethality

using is

it.

feasible of

range, By

shorter periods oý

and

assigning

to compare

the hydrogen

or any other actual or hypothetical weapon. more people in

the

But

time have

the bomb,

Weapons greater

lethality.

Figure 11 shows the calculated theoretical

index

values of representative weapons over the course

(TLI)

lethality of

history.*

*The theoretical

lethality

index

(TLI)

is

a measure of the

potential number of casualties a weapon can cause per hour based on its own characteristics if employed against an assumed homogeneous, uniformly distributed target array of personnel with a density of one per square meter. TLI is based on the following factors: rate of fire; reliability; accuracy; casualty effect; range; and mobility. For additional information on the TLI see T.N. Dupuy, Numbers, Predictions, and War (Fairfax, Va: HERO Books, 1984).

Figure ii Selected Theoretical Lethality Indices

(TLI)

Weapons

TLI Values

Hand-to-Hand

23

.........................................

Javelin ........

.............................................

19

Ordinary Bow ......................................... Longbow ..............................................

21 36

Crossbow .............................................

33

Arquebus

10

.............................................

17th Century Musket ............................................ 18th Century Flintlock ......................................... Early 19th Century Rifle ................................... Mid-19th Century Rifle ......................................

.

153 495 3,463

Late 19th Century Rifle ............................... Springfield Model 1903 Rifle ..................... WW I Machinegun ......................................

WW II Machinegun ..................................... 16th Century 12-pdr Cannon ........................... 17th Century 12-pdr Cannon ................................. Gribeauval 12-pdr Cannon ............................. French 75 mm Gun .....................................

155

4,973 43 224 940 386,530 ...

mm GPF ........................................

105 mm Howitzer 155 mm "Long

912,42-0

657,215

......................................

Tom........

.

1,180,681

............

.....

WW I Tank ............................................ WW II Medium Tank ....................................

Wý I Fighter-bomber

......

34,636 935,458

......................

31,909

WW II Fiahter-bomber ................................. V-2 Ballistic Missile ................................ 20 KT Nuclear Airburst ............................... One Megaton Nuclear Airburst ..........................

Figure lethality period quite

is

over history.

flat.

Since

It

lethality

of of

the

particularly

and

1,245,789 3,338,370 49,086,000 695,385,000

a semilogarithmic plot of is

weapons

has

trends

not surprising

called the "Age of Muscle,"

however,

Because

12

19 43 .36 102

of

mid-19th

increased

steadily

this great and steady increase in

weapons over the past 400 years --

46

lethality

gunpowder

the

since

weapon

that through

the increase in

introduction

in

is

weapons,

Century, and

the

the

sharply.

the lethality

particularly as the trend

of has

Figure 12

50M

0#

INCREASE OF WEAPON LETHALITY OVER HISTORY Age of Technological Innovation

/

I,

IOM

I-k.L I" , I C/U

1000K C'

-

X/ /'X

1lOOK

ozlt

//j/

1000

C

.:-

500

Age of Muscle Gow N IIU L A D.-"

500 100

MISSILE WEAPONS " .. o-=r,,-

--7 ---------------

--------

I 20U-- -------------------------400 300 200 100) (1000 BC AD

I

I

1100

1200

•7•° 1

.. rC')" 1300 1400

1500

1600

--

T • 1700

!

'4,

1800

!

l

1900

2000

become

pronounced

logical

terms

in

to assume that

of

killed

logical,

an

inflicted

in battle

assumption

centuries.

Casualty

significant

Figure

rates

fighting to

weapons

in

in

13 shows

in

have be

increased

superficially

have

First,

the

gone

daily

in

because

battle

of

the two

their methods

weapons.

Second,

own troops

These two combined,

employment of troops

these

producing more weapons

men have altered

trends have been reflected

tactics for the

down

effects on thliti

hostile hands.

average

over

the

in combat from 1600 to

order to exploit the new

limit

offsetting,

by these weapons

might

responses to man's success

and more lethal weapons.

sought

be

become rather steadily less deadly

casualty rates for winners and losers

of

would

would

it

would be wrong!

has

present.

--

the fact that weapons have become more lethal,

battlefield four

wounded

Such

but it

Despite

the damage

and

commensurately.

same

the past century-and-a-half

in

.f

the

they ncw

and to some extent

the development of new

in battle.

Regardless

of

the weapons,

tactics have the purpose of getting troops and their

weapons

positions from which they can inflict

in

harm on the enemy, them,

the

greatest

or to where the enemy can do the least harm to

or some combination of both of these purposes. Effect of Dispersion on Casualty Rates The

principal

an increase combat

reason

in weapons

for a decrease

lethality has

troops on the battlefield.

occurred lethality

for

the most part in

of new weapons.

in

casualties despite

been greater dispersion This greater

response

to

the

dispersion

has

increase

in

As weapons lethality increased,

48

of

tac-

Cl)

a, c

:A

:-),L'. C .-trd tlhir

is

Love.*" ca.tLfu)

s--.-.9times del ber:atQ is

assumed that

figures are based thie

'aale

:& ""

Beebe and DeBak,.,

archives,

from the official

figuries are accurate. official

the ,;:-,,

For wars before World War

the light of the reliability

Siesearch

-nd

compilation of

based almost entirely upon data In

which

it.

Centu) i•s,"

Army Casualties in Wars of the 19th and 20th

"US

which

figures in

Army Almanac,

DeBakey, 1952),

their. upon the and

the

Battle Casuatties

p.•4.

**Albert G. Love, War Casualties (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Medical Field Service •C-hoo--MTT,7 Ucebe and DeBakey, 01).cjt.

with some minor modifications based upon Beebe and

World Almanac DeBakey.

The Korean War figures

presented

in

Reister;

as

Neel,

from

comes

the Vietnam War data Thayer.*

particularly,

and,

Stanton,

data

are based upon official

Figure 26 Wounded to Killed Ratios

in

US Wars Ratio of Surviving Wounded to Battle Deaths

Patio of Wounded to Killed Mexican War Civil War Spenish-American War Phil. ippine Insurrection World War" I ;-:oJL%

A.

W/0

I

WarL

World War II World War II

w/o USAAF

2.12 2.38 3.94 2.72 4.10

4.20

1

3.57 4.25

2.41 2.77

i

Korean War

4.02

3.56

Vieti am War

4.45

4116

F:gure numhbur. and

~

Gas

3.72 4.55 5.88 3.81 5.96

shows the ratios of the numbers wounded

26

in

killed

American wars of the 19th and 20th

Lhe ratio of the survivii•

wounded to total

battle

to

the

cer;turies deaths,

Ir

which

includes thoa,=. who wert killed outtight and those who died

later

becaus'.

of wounds

*Army Alnman Relste--,-titF-'•T•A•-.•-ualtier

i•i

%;I an6

battlie.

since

World Almanac --

ca-

consistent

Frank

(1985);

tatistics:

medical

US

A.

ArT

The Suryeon D.C.: (Washington, in .xeerience Kedical Support of the US Army in c,--T-TpreiT Department of the Army, D.C.: Vietnam, 1965-1970, (tjaohiniiton, of Battle (Washington, Order Vietnam Stantcu. L. Shelby 1973); Thayer, War Without C. Thomas and li4); US News Books, D.C.: Wstviow Press, 1985). Fronts (Colorado SprinG , Col.: ti,e Koreaii Wac •T,

Ii

rela-

ratios do not reveal any significant trends in

These

between wounded and killed in

tionship5

and

history,

of

course

fairly steady over the

been

possibly

until

battles

the relationship appears

Otherwise,

in World War II.

beginning have

war

first

the

1819,

1846-1848.

the Mexican War,

is

on this list

to

before

the US Army do not exist

for

records

certainly for most of the past two centuries. every Lethal weapons have killed one man in battle for about four men wounded. those who are hit in

Of

die

when those who

three men survive for every one who dies,

mately

has

survivors

considered.

eventually are

Is

wouo

of

appproxi-

battle by lethal weapons

evacuation

recent wars due to modern

increased in

of

propoLtion

The

9

and medical techniques. raw

The

figures by

sources

to

use

official

figures for

the

Spanish-

and War.

It

of 10% to 20%.

possible

is

arrive at very different There

are two

in

corded

at the aid stations.

who were evacuated

sets of numbers

The other set ivr'udeti only for

from the aid stations

The lower figure

wounded

for

is

used in

sets of data are shown in

treatmunt

in

re-

One svt includes all who were

the vietnam War.

action

Two

action

reason to believe that the killed i i

perhaps

American

smaller.

For

reliable.

entirely

not

for the union Army 4n the Civil War may be low, factor

a

is

there

instance,

data is

statistical

those 30%

and

is

Us

expur-

this haridbook.

Figuru 26 for thu

ience in both world War I and World Wai

II.

Thib

is

because there

0m

9

were

special circumtstances

relating to the statistics

which need

to be noted. The

9

data for World War I shows a ratio of

killed of 5.96, other wars.,

total

Thi.:3

However,

killed

in

is

action,

died of

the

gas-relateJ and

fragqmfnts

because slightly

more than

ot 72,773 casualties,

lass

juries

killed

wounded

wý,ich is significantly higher than in

casualties,

gas.

9

raw

than

2% of

arid less

their

to

most of the

one-third of the

%4ere caused by poison

the total

gas

were

casualties

than 2% of the survivors of gas

gas-related

injuries.

If

in-

we deduct all

of

casualties from the World War I statistics,

wounded come

ratios for those hit by

the

bullets

or

shell

much closer to the values experienced

in

other

modern combat. In

World War

II

the overall

of wounded to killed. the

casu:J.ilty

small

Thus,

killed

than

is

figures

of

the

aircraft crews

USAAF

ratio of

the rest of thtc

USAAF figures are strippý:d out of the totals, casualties,

for World War

I

are rely close

Army.

of

Only

Forces.

survived after

had a much lower

was the case for

show a low ratio

L-•cause a substantial portion

figures are for the US Army Air

proportion

down.

This

US Army

being

a

shot

wounded When

to the

the US Army ground

to thu: normal

ground

comibat pattern.

Itie Sspec%, be

data

from

the Spat i h--..,

r i ca n

both because widc:!y diffeziLvg

found alid because

the size oi

War

i3

paLticularly

"official" statistics

the sample is

sirall compared

can to

th9 Civil War and the World Wby.s.

i

I

Records for both the Korean War substantial Only," were

numbers or CRO.

returned

omitted

of cases

to duty

discussed

casualty

to

the

number of personnel

still

status and

this

rates

for

who were treated,

These CRO cases

shown here

between

"Carded

include

arnd non-battle

been

There may

and the correla-

injury

rates

problem missing

not complete. and those still

in

for

the Vietnam War was

action,

for whom data

to

the is

be

Those known to have died while in

then di 1 ed of wounds.

This assumption

casualties

are

US

Army figures.

Including

for our 20th Century wars,

difference.

Air

Force

MIA

wounded

tends to degrade

effects of modern evacuation and treatment with respect to These

large

confusing

missing are shown as having been

the

however,

Marine

the

DOWs. Corps

would make little

figures would be less consistent

for the

reason discussed above.

Impact ot Improved Medical Care Survivability on the battlefield has increased significantly as a result of medicine in the

the past century.

percentage

dealths

the tremendous

improvemenis

to battle deaths

that have been made

in

Figure 27 shows for Am'erican wais

uf survivors of hits, (11T A and bOW),

the ratio

non--battle

and the tatio of

Lromn disease to deaths trouii injuries.

84

of

84I

9

but who

have

for those wars.

CRO phenomenon

Record

later.

Adding

and

immediately.

from the statistics

between

individuals

These are individuals

be some relationship tion

of

and the Vietnam War

dJeaths

9

Figure 27 US Casualty Ratios Influenced by Medical

Progress

Ratio of Non-battle to battle deaths

Survivors as percent of hits

Ratio of deaths from disease to deaths from injuries

MeKican War Civil War

69 70

7.30 2.27

27.80 21.29

Spanish-American War*# Philippine Insurrection* World War I@

80 73

13.34 3.15

16.65 4.59

74

1.43

11.64

World War Ii (ground forces only)* Korean War

(w/o gas casualties)

73 78

0.36 0.13

e.28 0.23

Vietnam War

'76

0.24

0.24

*Ratios

influenced

by tropical

climate

#Malaria epidemic @Influenza epidemic three

Al).

improvements in

of the ratios shown in Fig3ure 27

in military merd•,.ii~e

survivability

indicate

that

ha*,_ caused a 6zý.xnotic increase

on the

Tattiefi-10. Ihe percentage of persorincl

who get hit and survive has .

ed since the Mexicýan War,

the significa:nce of

is ex;,,ained

evident

that the proportion cf.

has decreased Whi .1 figures

t;

interpi.uv

Lu

and

69

te

KuLuarl

ut

It

toul casualties cause,

the trend to 2ncrea.i;'2(d survivability .'J l.

in

the

to mean d

first

co I un,•1

that thu utft1.;

evacuation

burviv4.n(n

0? pu: •:ent, a rid

below.

is

also

Ly diseasei

significantly.

battluLit

chan•.:es

this irc.•:.

and

is

ot

o:1L

i

e

r.-lativie'

VietctLowu, w ..

t•rl! ¢haeV:.i wv.iLt

76 t. II '1L)

-IK

4M

>

U-

0 wa

Z

I .

to

0

wounded survived in

the Mexican War;

of them survived in

the Korean and Vietnam Wars.

The clear

effects

from

deaths

improvements

the decrease in

in

three-quarters

modern medicine

the ratios of non-battle

are to

the

Vietnam War,

of

exception

Insurrection, The

the

also shown

Spanish-American

these

in

Figure

War

27.

the

and

battle

Spanish-American

War

anomaly is

War

With

the

Philippine

ratios decrease steadily until the explained

S

also

and disease deaths to injury deaths from the Mexican

through

War.

of

approximately

Vietnam by

4

The

malaria epidemic which nearly destroyed the US Army expeditionary force

in

Cuba.

The

Philippine

Insurrection

understood also as an indication of a higher and

infection

in the tropics than in

figure

may

be

incidence of disease

temperate

climates.

This

explanation may account also for the very slight increase in

the

ratio of non-battle to battle dead between the Korean and Vietnam War. Another medicine in shows

example

of

the effect of

the past century

is

to be found in

the relationship of disease and wounds

1854 and 1918.

The relative

not exactly comparable,

this is

standards

Figure

29,

of

which

in six wars between

importance of disease as a cause of

casualties has declined significantly.

ratios

improving

Although the ratios

the same trend

m

are

illustrated by the

of non-battle to battle deaths shown for American wars

in

Figure 27.

0k

Figure 29 Ratio of Sick

*

to Wounded

in

European Wars* Sick to Wounded

Ratio

Crimean War (1854-56) French Army

9.06 7.90

British Army Italizi

Campaign

(1859)

French Army

6.59

Austro-Prussian War

(1866)

Prussian-Army

*

4.67

Franco-prussian War

(1.870-71)

German Army

S

Russo-Japanese Russian World War

SRussian

I

4.82

War

(1904-05)

Army

2.37

(1914-18)

Army French Army

1.32 1.25

German Army

0.92

*Source: Great Soviet Encyclopedia (Moscow,

Medical impact *

1928),

p.

286.

studies of our three most recent wars testify to the

of improved medical care and evacuation and explain

apparent anomalies. ot the US Army in for Vietnam was

The following quotation from Medical

Vietnam

explains

why the survivability

lower than for the Korean War.

The hospital mortality rate ( for wounded between Januar 1965 and December 1970) was 2.6 percent for Vietnam] cum[,ared to 4.5 percent in World War II arnd 2.5 percent in Korea. The very slight increase in hospital

some

Suppora ratio

* mortality in Vietnam over that in Korea was a which result of rapid helicopter evacuation brought into the hospital mortally wounded slower means of with earlier, patients who, route and would have died en evacuation, would have been recorded as KIA (killed in those action). Assuming that most of patients who died within the first 24 hours the rate in hospitals belong in this class, would be much closer to 1 percent.*

was

9

9

This also is

almost certainly the principal reason why there

a

lower proportion of survivors in World

slightly

War

I1

9

compared to World War I. Finally, returns

to

there duty

casualties

is

from

(battle

a general rule of thumb for casualties.

casualty,

For

disease,

each

or

between the 6th and 20th days after admission,

of

the

Interior,

or

situation to situation, evacuation policy.

It

discharge. depending does,

personnel will

be

five per day

and 25 will never

evacuation to the Zone

This will in

100

injury) 75

returned to duty at the end of 20 days at a rate of

be returned to duty as a result of death,

estimating

vary

widely

from

large part upon the theater

however,

provide an initial

basis

for analysis of personnel attrition. Disease and Non-Battle Four force:

injuries

considerations affect the disease (1)

the season of the year

tropical climate;

(3)

in

rates of a

temperate

military

climates;

quality of medical care; and (4)

(2)

incidence

of battle casualties. In

northern and northwestern

*Neel,

op.

Europe and the northern United

cit.

QU

the hospital admission rate for disease is

States, twice

as

high in

and January)

as in

early winter summer

approximately

(about 0.30% per day in

(about 0.15% per day in June,

This seasonal variation almost disappears

August).

in

December July,

and

subtropi-

cal and tropical regions. In the

tropical climates,

year

temperate

is

approximately 1.35

climates.

In

admission rate per d:y in average rate in

however,

the disease rate throughout times

the

other words,

if

average

the

a temperate climate

is

rate

average

for

disease

about 0.22t,

the

a trorical climate will be about 0.30% per day.

The effect of high quality, disease death rates is

shown in

sophisticated medical care upon Figure 27.

While admissiorns

to

hospitals are not greatly affectcd by the quality of medical care (with

the exception of the effect of malarial suppressants

as quinine and atabrine upon malaria admissicins

in

the

such

tropics),

the length of hospital stay and the number of deaths from illness are reduceC sharply when quality medical care

is

applied.

Regardless of the other effects upon disease rates discussed above,

there

is

a

clear and

consistent

disease rates and battle casualty rates

in

correlation the combat

following quotation from Beebe and DeBakey is

between

zone.

relevant:

It is of the nature of man to react with his entire i .riq to strong stimuli. If men arc placed , , combat situationi their attrition is no- well estimated by adding a casualty rate to their previous rates of nonbattle causes. Life under combat conditions will interfere with preventive measures otherwise considered rcutine and effective, will transform anxiety ilito somatic symptons, particularly those referrable to the gastrointestinal and cardiovascular systems, and may bring new risks of disease and non-bottle injury.

The

I

a

Thdt ronbattle attrition is well estiblished,

depeuds upon combat but the numerical

relationship is not on, which speýcified for all places and for all Environmental circumstances and the

U

can be t;.mes. previous

experience of the troops shape the relationship in myriad ways. The most uniform and strongest of these relationships is the correlation between wounding and psychiatric breakdown in combat troops....* As

noted

in

the above quotation from B3eebe

there

is

alsc a noticeable rise in

posed.

to

disease) when a unit is

Otherwise, injurics

tnere and

is

either

suffering.

Some

rules

estimating

disease

of

or

battle

in

l.Id$

thumb have been

casualties.

casualties.

In

the

the hospital admis-

been quite constant,

developed

injury rates in a combat

rules are based mainly on US

are applicable generally to all 1.

op-

about

with deaths about 0.001% per day.

disease and non-battle these

battle

(as

no apparent relationship between non-battle

sio-n rate for non-•-•attle injurTes 0.03% per day,

DeBakey,

non-battle injuries

American wars of the 19th and 20th centuries,

I

and

The daily non-battle

for

estimating

theater.

While

experience,

they

modern armies. loss rate for a unit not in

combat

temperate climate.s will be as follows: January February March April

0.30% 0.27% 0.24% 0.21%

2.

daily

combat in

The

May June July August

0.16% 0.15% 0.15% 0.18%

September October November December

0.21% 0.24% 0.27% 0.30%

non-battle casualty rate for a unit not

itl

a tropical climate will be 0.30%.

p • Op.±ct., pp.

27-28.

3. rate

For a unit in

for

a

combat,

unit not in

the daily

non-battle

combat will be increased by

casualty an

amount

equal to 20% of the projected battle casualty rate. Causes of Casualties There over

have

the

last

150 years.

Prior

nearly half of all casua',i2

Century, Then,

been major changes

in

the causes of

eC Lhe

middle

casualties

of

the

19th

were caused by artillery.

for the three major wars of the mid-]9th Century (American

Civil War,

Austro-PrussiAn War,

and Franco-Prussian War)

lery caused barely ten percent of the casualties, small

arms

musket)

artil-

while infantry

(alnost entirely the conoidal bullet of

the

rifled

inflicted nearly ninety percent of the losses.

By the early 20th Century, lethality

of

small

hcweveri the relauionrhip of the

arms and artillery in terms

of

casualties

caused had more than returned to the pre-Civil War situation. fact,

as shown in Figures 30 and 31,

In

artillery and mortar shell

fragments caused nearly seven out of ten WIA and DOW in World War I.

The

ability range

increased effectiveness of artillery was because of the of

and

the artillery to fire effectively observation by hostile infantrymen

fire techniques.

---

while using

out

of

indirect

0

Figure

Causes of Wounded in

30

Action for (US only)

20th Century Wars

Percent of WIA caused by

World War I World War I w/o gas World War 1I Korean War Vietnam War

Mines & Booby Traps

Small Arms

Shell Fragments

19 28 32 33 51

46

-

68

3 4

53 59 36

Toxic Gas

Other

-

3 4 12

-

4

-

2

32 -

ii

Figu:e 31 Causes of Died of Wounds in (US only)

20th Century Wars

Percent of DOW causedd_ Small Arms World War 1 World War I w/o gas World War Ii Korean War Vietnam War

If by were

Mines & Booby Traps

Shell Fragments

18 20 20 2'7 16

71 78 62 61 65

-

4 4 15

ments were approximately as shown in US wars of the 20th Centur

8 4

-

of those killed in

(for which data is

of those hit by artillery

2 2 14

-

not

approximately the same as for those dying of

the percentages

Other

9 -

-

we assume that the proportions

different causative agents

Toxic Gas

or mortar

action

available)

wounds,

then

shell

frag-

Figure 32 for the four major

Swa9ntury:

94



Figure

32

Proportion of Battle Casualti.es Caused by Artillery or Mortar Shell Fragments, WoLld War I World War II Korean W,* Vietnam War

50% 55% 59% 40%

The reaston way the proportion of artillery much

higher for Worid War I was the reliance of the

upon

artillery

that

conflict.

in

until

maneuver

the

and

artillery all

near the end cE the war employment of weaponb

of the toxic gas used in

most

shells,

combatants

dealing with the trench warfare stalemate

The inability of either side to

breakthroughs

since

casualties was so

it

achieve

greatly

other

major

inhibited

than

the war was

of

artillei-y. by

projecteJ

could be considered that the proportion of

casualties caused by artillery

in World War I

was

actually

between 75% and 79%. How

do we explain the lower proportion of casualties

by artillery

in

World wars,

I and II

between

sophisticated with

the Vietnam War?

Wars

fought

and the Korean War

traditional

were

keyed to those weapons.

very different sort of war.

conventional

armed forces with

weapons available at that time and

doctrines

causj.ed

in

the

atLost

accordance

The Vietnam Way was

a

The guerrilla nature of the

actual

combat engagements unquestionably has been overemphasized,

since

much

South.

of

the fighting was between the conventional

US and

Vietnamese armies on one side and the conventional North mese Army on the other. front line,

Unlike other wars,

and the manner in

however,

which the conventional

Vietna-

there was no forces were

employed

was

involving

such

that there were

divisions and larger

no

large

formation

organizations.

Most combat

gagements were between companies and platoons. full

battalions and brigades

ally against each other,, and

(or regiments)

The engagements

without the lengthy artillery

20th

were

employed conventionwere relatively brief

preparations typical

of

other

linear

tac-

The Americans and South Vietnamese were supported more-or-

less

traditionally

North

by a substantial amount

of

artillery.

The

Vietnamese had a mUch lower proportion of

artillery,

al-

though their mortar support was ample. conditions the

en-

Only seldom

Century conventional conflicts which involved

tics.

battles,

The fact that under

even as much as 40% of the casualties

American troocs came from hostile artillery

somewhaI

sulprisnilg.

•asualties

The

proportion

caased by US artillery

inflicted and

of

these upon

mortars

North

is

Vietnamese

was undoubtedly much higher.

Casualties by Branch of Service Figute combat the

33

will

COvers:aa simiiar

of casualties

arms and the non-combat services in

2Zth Century. t

statistics

detail

among

the

the major US wars

of

A moce detailed breakdown of the World War be

Strengths

Army Worcld War. II Rank.

shows the distribution

found

and

in

Table D,

Castalties by

"US

Army

Branch

on World War 11 will be found in

World

and

War

Flank,"

Table

E,

I I

and "US

Overseas Strengths and Casual,.es by Branch and

"

t

EN\cupting the Vietnam War. The batt:le casualtie3, of Vietnam WNar have not yet been analyzed by arm/branch.

9C

the

.0

Figuyec 33 Percentage of Casualties bv Bhanch for American Wars of the 20;th Century World

Woz:.d

War

War

83.8 2.5 6.9* 2.4

-

1.9

A

1.5 2.0

2.9 .. 2

3.0 1.4

Air Defenre

Medical Other

Korea

I1

b..3 3.5 1361 3.6

87.9 0.2 4.3 3.2

Infantry Armor Artillery Engineer

and Air Defenrse were combined in

*Artillery War.

Korean

the

highest

the

evident that the Infantry has suffered

is

It

I

proportion of casualtie.s by far.

be misleadinr

may

wars

low proportion

relatively

The

World War I,

unl.ess the reasons

in

the European

and of casualties,

iheater in

armor

in

Asiatic theaters. in

the closing months of the

operations against the Japanese in

the

was considerably war use

There was relatively little

than this average might suggest. of

small

and only a

In World War II

proportion of the ALE was *rithe Tank Corps.

higher

In

explained.

are

tank warfare •;s just beginning,

proportion of Armor troops,

both

of Armor casualties in

the Pacific

and

The small proportion of deployed Armor forces

the Korean and Vietnam wars is

reflected

also in

the

casualty

stat:iistics for those wars. A better perspective on the extent to which Armor casualties be expected

could the

fact that

aver-age

in

a future war in

Europe can be obtained from

Armor branch personnel made up only 1.4%

strength

deployed overseas

97

in

World War

II.

of

the

However,

the percentage of deployed Armor personnel, in

one year was 17.6%,

deployed

who were

second only to the Infantry,

strength becoming cas.oalties

in

a

casualties

with 26.4% of

year.

0

Figure 34

Hypothetical Force and Casualty Relations by Branch 1980r and 1990s Percent of Theater Strength

P,°rcent of Branch Casualties

Percent of Casualties

15 10 8 10 12 10 35

26.0 18.0 5.0 2.0 1.0 2.5 0.5

55.0 27.0 6.5 3.5 2.0 3.5 2.5

Infantry Armor Artillery Engineer Air Defense Medical Dept. Other Figure

principal

34 shows the possible general

branches

1980s or 1990s. of

theater

in

allocation of

a hypoLhetical war

in

Europe in

(instead of about 22% as in

Armor troops making up about 10% of the total and approximate Engineers, It

is

forces by

the

This shows Infantry troops comprising only

forces

World

0

War

late 15% Ii),

(instead of 1.4%),

allocations of the remaining 75% among Artillery,

Air Defense,

Medical Department,

and other branches.

assumed that each branch will suffer approximately the same

proportion

of

casualties as it

did for World War II.

basis the two direct fire combat arms have about 82% of the total casualties, they

had in

troops

would

World War II.

But in

(Infantry

On

and Armor)

this would

about the same as the 84%

this hypothetical

incur about one-third of the total

war

Armor

Infantry-Armor

cas'ialties. The direct of

fire

combat arms comprise

the forces deployed

in

a combat

only about

theater,

one-quarter

but they incur over

0

80% of the casualties.

The non-combat

support and service

(with

the notable exception of the Medical Department)

about

one-third of the forces deployed

they

incur

only slightly more than 2% of

between these groups than

in

is

the Artillery,

10% of the deployed forces and

arms

comprise

a combat theater, the

but

casualties.

In

comprising somewhat

less

incurring

somewhat more than

5% of the casualties. Casualties by Rank Figure 35 provides data on officer

casualties

in

relation to

enlisted casualtias for American wars of the 20th Century. Figure 35 Relationnhip of off-ic'er-En!isted Casualties American 20th Century Wars Percent Officer

Percent Enlisted Men

6.6 10.4 6.1 5.0 10.9

93.4 89.6 93.9 95.0 89.1

World War I World War II (All Army) World War II (Less USAAF) Korean War Vietnam War (Killed Only) Casualties their War I, by

for officers are almost directly proportional

relative strengths where officer

in

the theater of operations.

leadership was

In World

exercised most conspicuously

leading troops into costly assaults

against

fortifications,

officer casualties were substantially higher proportionately enlisted casualties, II

particularly

in

the Infantry.

officer and enlisted casualty rates

branches were almost identical,

to

in

than

In World War

the Infantry and Armor

except among lieutenants,

where

the

officer

enlisted

casualty

casualty rate.

consistently wars.

rate was

considerably

higher

than

The loss rate for Artillery officers is

higher than that of Artiillery enlisted men in

This is

which

who

to hostile aimed fire.

The breakdown of officer casualty rates by rank is 36,

both

because of the exposure of forward observers,

usually are lieutenants,

Figure

the

is based on Beebe and DeBakey.*

shown

This

in

0

shows

clearly the high proportion of losses among lieutenants. Figure 36 Relative Battle Casualty Rates for Officers by Rank, World War II Percentage of Rate for all

Officers

General or Field Grade Captain First Lieutenant

35% 53% 105%

Warrant Officer The discussed been

in

this chapter and the preceeding chapter

these

or

these

the

20th

large

areas.

such

and they did include rebellions,

forms

of

However,

guerrilla

the casualty experience

combat has been

lost

in

the

large "regular" armies.

cite,

p.

46.

In order

to provide some

from

overall

data which has empLasized primarily combat between

SS

in

wars did include smaller military operations,

lesser

•*Op.

all

major

and insurgencies.

casualty

have

The

as raids and rescues, warfare,

In

been

major wars have included large forces engaged

less continuous combat over

conventional

0

for casualties which have

based on data from major conventional wars.

Century more

rates and relationships

8%

two

understanding

p

of

these

lesser

casualty experience wars since 1945.

forms for

of conflict,

the

selected engagements

next

chapter

treats

from less than major

Chapter PERSONNEL ATTRITION: There

5

MINOR CONFLICTS

been no major wars

have

since 1945,

been a large number of lesser conflicts. conflicts were significant regional wars, the

Arab-Israeli

stages, 1945

nuclear

less

discourages

wars lesser

than

deterrence,

instability.

major

inverventions,

in

its

later

a large number of these post-

wars have

conflicts,

flourished

rivalry,

US and the USSR from direct

Although this mutual deterrence

forms

and,

such

as

because

of

or insurgencies.**

superpower

between nuclear powers, of

warfare.

encouraged wars of national

it In

and

Third

World

discourages

this

climate,

the

by taking advantage of poverty and discontent

developed

nations. in

problems coupled

with

some of these nations has brought

large number of insurgencies,

and major

appears to have encouraged

influence

authoritarianism

forces

confrontation

rebellions,

and minor

the

USSR

liberation designed to spread

Economic

have

lesser

The existence of relatively balanced nuclear the

war.

major

there

such as the Korean War,

have been relatively minor

rescues,

These

However,

but

A few of these

the Iran-Iraq War,

the Vietnam War.

conflicts

raids,

Wars,

SINCE 1945*

has

Soviet in

less

political about

a

hostilities.

*This chapter is based on HERO Report No. 118, Casualty Estimates for Contingencies (Fairfax, Va.: HERO, 1986). ** HERO has tentatively identified 300 post-1945 conflicts. This list is being refined, and the number of conflicts will change as a result of this process. A complete list of these conflicts with some descriptive information about each conflict will be published by HERO in 1986.

los]

These minor conflicts are likely to continue future.

It

attrition

is

important,

experience

in

therefore,

to occur

to understand

in the

how

minor conflicts compares with the

and relationships experienced

the rates

in major conventional warfare,

such

as World War II.

Classification of Post-1945 Conflicts In

order

to establish a basis for research

into

casualty

0 experience sample

of

in

these minor conflicts since 1945,

48 post-1945 conflicts and classified them into

groups.

This

conflicts

by

was

accomplished

intensity

and

by

duration.

plotting The

conflicts ranged from one day to over 25 years. were

HERO examined

assigned

the

48

duration The

to one of four intensity categories as

a

four sample

of

the

operations shown

in

Figure 37. Figure 37 Combat Intensity Levels Combat Intensity Level 1:

Absence of combat but occasional inadvertent violence.

Combat Intensity Level 2:

Sporadic and intermittent combat involving small numbers of combatants.

Combat Intensity Level 3:

Frequent combat involving groups of combatants with relatively few pauses periods of intense combat.

large and

0 Combat Intensity Level 4:

Continuous combat involving large groups of combatants with relatively few pauses without some combat activity.

The plot revealed some definite groupings which were helpful

104

in understanding the nature of post-1945 warfare. schematic of plotted points.

Figure 38 is a

Four groups emerge clearly.

Figure 38

OURATION4NTENSrTY PLOT OF CONFUCT SAMPLE Wars 3

Ex lended Insurgencies

Minor Hostilities

Can" I

1 ,__-

Peacekeeping Operations

Duration

There violence

was a distinct group of operations without or

combat

peacekeeping not

been

and with various

durations.

operations and shows of force in

intended

but

in

which

violence

These

which may

sustained were

-zorrdat

have

had

occurred

inadvertently. There

a

was

significant

group

of

conflicts

which

had

involved sustained combat short of conventional war and which had long durations five

years

(all had lasted over one year and many had or

more).

These

were

insurgencies

successful enough to last beyond the initial called extended There

was

stages.

lasted

which

were

They

were

insurgencies. a

small group of

intenpity operations.

fairly

These were wars,

Israeli wars and one India-Pakistan War.

short

duration,

high

such as two of the Arab-

Finally,

there

was

a

group of

operations

clustered

intensity levels 2 and 3 and of relatively short duration. were

a

raids; brief

conglomerate

group of different

interventions;

rescue missions;

(mostly failed) was

operations

these

participants,

insurgencies. that

and duration.

they

types

of

at

These

operations:

abortive rebellions,

and

The major characteristic constrained

were

of

scope,

in

They often led to decisive results.

These were called minor hostilities. The 73-Engagement Data Base The guide sample

classification scheme for minor conflicts was used as a

to perform detailed research on of

engagements

81 engagements were

omitted

was

casualty

researched.

from the final

experience.

Subsequently, sample

for

A six

analysis

because insufficient casualty data was available to permit a full anal.,sis.

Two

other

engagements

were

omitted

because

involved mass capitulations and biased the CMIA data. sample used for analysis has the composition shown in Figure

they

The final Figure 39.

39

Composition of 73-Engagement Data Base Engagements Small Wars

Extended Insurgencies

Minor Hostilities

rotal

31

27

81

-3

0

-6

81-Engagement Data Base Poor Casualty Data

from;

-3

Mass Capitulations

0

0

-2

-2

73-Engagement Data Base

20

28

25

73

106

'a

The 73-Engagerent Data Base was compiled on

in

engaged the

the US or

its

allies

and New Zealand forces to

conflicts

which the US itself

identification

of

casualty

in

Europe in

The intent was

included.

might

of the kind

become

engagement was selected as the unit of

combat

permit

in

not

did

involving Australian

analyze engagements which were representative

minor The

which

The US experience

although engagements in.Vietnam were

forces

armed

Conflicts

were also excluded.

was excluded,

Vietnam

were excluded.

insights

collected only for

Conflicts

forces.

Western-type

Northeast Asia

and

Casualty data was

minor conflicts.

"modern"

include

modern

suffered by sophisticated,

casualties

to provide

experience

of

involved.

analysis

during

to

actual

combat. The

73-Engagement

information *

in

Data

Base

on the eight variable

provides

factors

reasonably

affecting

good

combat shown

Figure 40. Figure 40

Circumstantial Variables for Casualty Rate Analysis Terrain Weather Surprise Posture Air Superiority Insertion Means Opposition to Insertion Organizational Type The

73-Engagement

information differentiate

0.

on

Data

casualties

among KIA,

by

WIA,

Base

does

kind.

It

and CMIA,

provide .is

accurate

possible

and the sum of

to these

three, is

Total Battle Casualties (TBC).

no distinction between KIA and died of wounds (DOW),

KIA figures include DOW. however,

provide

(combat vs. From

is

and the

The 73-Engagement Data Base does

useful information on grade,

branch,

an analytical viewpoint,

or role

It

is

the 73-Engagement Data

engagements

(8,000 plus) estimated to have occurred in conflicts since

be better if

particularly

However, enough

the

an underlying normal distribution,

a larger sample were available.

is widely dispersed,

base

1945.

the sample size does meet the minimum size to assume,

statistical analysis,

not

base

neither random nor representative.

small compared to the total number of combat

While

not,

support) of the casualties.

has some imperfections. it

Except for US data there

it

for would

The casualty

and the means of the various sub-samples are

useful

to describe the

casualty

experience.

73-Engagement Data Base appears to be

homogeneous

to warrant using it

as a whole,

and it

is

the only

currently available for analysis of casualty experience A complete list

post-1945 minor conflicts. Data Base is

data

data in

of the 73-Engagement

in Appendix 5. Analysis of Engagement Data

The mean daily casualty rates for TBC,

KIA,

WIA,

and CMIA

for the 73 engagements are shown in Figure 41. 4

Figure 41 Casualty

Rates

from the 73-Engagement Mean

Mean Rates

TBC 6

Data Base

Daily CasualtyRate KIA

WIA T T.-I

-

%

CMIA "

I

In

0

the sample,

and 8% were CMIA.

22% of the casualties were KIA; 70% were WIA; The ratio of WIA to KIA is

3.76.

Casualty Rates versus Unit Strength The spect

data on Total Battle Casualties was analyzed

to

strength,

both

strength and duration.

the findings are shown in

With

with

respect

to

reunit

Figure 42.

Figure 42 Total Battle Casualty Rates by Unit Strength Unit Class

SStrength

ih~n

i••

Number of Engagements N

•~

301-600 601-1,000 1,001-2,500 over 2,500 The

casualty rates in

Mean Daily Casualty Rate %

14

5.0

15 13 17 14

3.2 2.3 1.3 1.2

the 73-Engagement Data Base show

the

same relationship between strength and size as has been experienced in the

more extended combat in major wars.

higher

the

casualty rate.

The smaller

This relation

the unit,

obviously

goes

beyond the geometry of exposure to the phenomenon which has

been

described

above

explanation,

the

as

"friction in combat."

effect is

Regardless

real and occurs cornsistently

of

the

in

all

combat. Casualtý

Rate versus Duration

Figure

43

shows

the

relationship

between

total

casualties for various classes of engagement duration.

battle

Figure 43 Total

Ratios by Engagement

Casualty

Battle

Number of

Mean Daily

Engagements N%

Duration Class (Days) 1 2

Duration

Casualty Rate

37 13

3.8 2.3

3-5 6 - 10

8 8

1.3 0.8

Over 10

7

0.1

0 An

interesting

terion

is

ments.

The original

of

one

day for

screen

day,

the

shows

is

all

for

achieved if

lasting

a part

for

is

from one day

the daily

difference

short

duration of

casualty rate

the 73-engagement

engage-

of a day.

to a half

cri-

a duration

For each

are somewhat different. reassigned

different

of duration for

used to permit an engagement

is

a

the sample was to assign

engagements

to one day,

the

reclassification

rule

results

duration

two days

is

applied to assignment

finer

whose

variation

If a

a

half

engagement day or

doubles.

from

Figure

sample

when

this

44

S

accomplished. Figure

44

Total Battle Casualcy Rates by Alternative Duration Classes Number of Engagements

Duration Class (days) 1/2 1

2

N

Mean Daily Casualty Rate

%

36

7.1

8

4.3

6

3.1

5 10

8 8

1.3 0.8

Over 10

7

0.1

36 -

0

0

.S

For *

both of these data sets,

ship between duration

and casualty rates.

ment the lower the rate. engagements

longer

This effect

than five-days

been classified as engagements five days or less, day

engagement

means

there is

is

a definite relation-

The longer the engagemost pronounced

(which probably

in any case).

are higher for a one-

engagement.

also that tates are higher on the first

engagement

than

on

should not have

For an engagement of

the casualty rates still

than for a five-day

subsequent days

for the

Whether

this

day of a multi-day

cannot

be

inferred

with

confidence from this data sample. The value of placing a finer screen to develop the tive

duration array is

questionable.

War

The basic reports are daily reports;

operate

on a daily basis;

very

care the

rates

that same day.

are concerned,

it

the

participants'

Commanders ment in

it

Data

in

to be provided

in

minutes

planners'

or

over hours.

engage-

of medical

any case.

Action

on CMIA from the 73-Engagement Data Base is such

whether

was all

advance and must estimate the number of "days"

Captured/Missing

data is

levels below divisions.

9:

a f-w

if

the

and staffs cannot forecast the length of the

support and replacements

because

viewpoint in

a

As far as medical

From

even

days.

lasting

does not matter

were for a half day or a day.

viewpoint that engagement lasted a day, from

term.; of

short engagements which were classified as

or replacements

daily

support activities

and planners think in

half day were all concluded in

*

functions on a

basis.

The

alterna-

not normally available in

much

important detail

at

The overall CMIA proportion of the total

casualties

is

engagements. pattern

and CMIA were reported

in

of influence by any circumstantial

Two

73

variable.

No

CMIA

for 64 of these engagements.

engagments

which were omitted from

Base do show large numbers of CMIA.

Invasion

of Goa

1961.

the Goa invasion,

In

only 9 of the

These nine engagements do not display any definite

were reported

Data

2.7%,

in

the

73-Engagement

These were the Indian

1961 and the Bay of Pigs Invasion,

also

in

1,189 CMIA were reported out of total

battle

casualties of 1,303;

this CMIA figure includes

also.

At

the CMIA were 4,801 of 4,888

battle

casualties,

the Day of Pigs,

all. out of a strength of 7,195.

the

WIA total

In both of

these cases the CMIA figures resulted from a massive capitulation of one side. Overall, factor

in

CMIA does not appear

these kinds of engagements.

CMIA are not reported, cated

to be a major or a consistent

or it

This may be partly because

might be because the less sophisti-

force either does not take or does not keep

major reason, these

however,

prisoners.

may be that the modern forces engaged

A in

relatively short combat operations consist of well trained

professionals

who

do not operate in

such a way as

to

incur

a

large number of prisoners or MIA.

Casualties by Circumstances of Combat in

order

to

provide casualty rates for

combat circumstances, ing

to

types

of

engagement

sets

of

the 73 engagements were classified accord-

the eight circumstantial

Total Battle Casualty

various

(TBC)

variables shown in

rates were calculated

within each

S119

category.

Figure

40.

for each of the

The

results

are

0

0i presented *

in

Figure 45.

Three numbers

are given in

the sophisticated

forces

of engagements

in

a particular class;

casualty rate;

and the ratio of wounded to killed.

0

0I 0,.

in

Figure

each engagement category:

45 for

the number

the mean daily total battle

Figure 45 Casualty Data by Circumstantial Variables

Terrain Type Flat Rolling Rugged Urban

Number of Engagements 17 16 21 19

Weather Type Cold Temperate Hot

6 23 44

3.0 3.6 2.0

3.54 3.66 3.99

Surprise Surprising No Surprise

20 43

1.5 2.1

2.87 4.25

Being Surprised

10

6.6

3.10

Posture Attack Defend

60 13

2.4 3.3

3.84 3.55

47 26

2.5 2.8

3.82 3.64

51 9

2.2 2.3

3.81 2.30

Air Landing

4

0.6

3.00

Helicopter

4

7.7

Ship

2

*

Unknown

3

7.1

1.47 0 6.50

Mean Daily TBC Rate % 3.8 2.1 2.0 2.5

Wounded to Killed Ratio 3.44 3.41 3.94 4.09

S

Air Superiority

Superiority No Superiority Insertion

Means

overland Parachute

O2position to InitialEntr

__

_

_

opposed Unopposed Unknown

58 12 3

2.7 0.8 7.1

3.84 1.74 6.50

Organizational Type Foot Foot, Motor-Mech Motor-Mech w/armor Airborne Special Operations

4 5 37 24 3

5.4 1.9 2.4 2.4 2.6

3.76 3.53 3.87 3.32 1.50

S

*Less than 0.5%

114

14|.,

Daily Engagement

Total Battle Casualty

the mean when related

rates

do vary

to the eight circumstantial

from

factors.

The

mean

TBC daily engagement casualty rate for the entire sample is

2.6%

per

day.

considered the

Casualty

rates below 1.8% or

to vary significantly

sample

shows

the

above

from the mean.

following

with

3.4%

On this

respect

to

are

basis,

engagement

casualty rates: o casualty higher

Terrain

rates. than

ualty rate is

The

the

concealment.

exercises a slight but clear effect rate for flat

mean,

The

terrain

presumably due to

sample, Although

hot weather

this

is

is

the sample mean,

reducing

consistent with experience

the number

in

Surprise

in

the

cold weather

is

has

a great effect

military

This operation

surprised. rates

When

weans

take

due

on

casualty

thaIL

factor affecting casualty ratcs in o

t.EIV

the

significantly

precaution

the one side achieves surprise, iUWeL

IIUiILI.

in

too

rates. casualty

higher

this

its

than

kind

against

of

being casualty

SuLprise is

a

major

this kind of operation.

Posture has an effect on casualty rates.

casualty rate for forces

is

from this.

that forces entering on

must

.LYnificaIHTly

are

is

wars.

higher than

of cold weather engagements

the side being surprised

mean.

the cas-

major

When one side achieves surprise on the other side, for

and

than the mean for the entire

small to permit drawing a definite conclusion

rate

cover

The mean casualty rate for

lower

the mean for engagements

o

of

large but not necessarily significant.

in

and

the

significantly

lack

effect of rugged terrain in

o Weather has some effect. engagements

is

on

defense is

higher

The mean

than the mean

rate

for forces were ground

in

the attack.

ambushes,

and

forces in

casualty

rates.

the

in

only three of

air

attacks

on

which the British

British

had very

high

the 13 defensive engagements had

cas!lalty rates have been higher

casualty .rates.

defender's

13 defensive engagements

one enduring feature of historical combat

defender's

attacker's

of the

two were Argentine

the Falklands

rates below 0.5%. that

Three

tendency

This

data

than

suggests

to have higher casualty rates

the

that is

is

the

true

of

these minor conflict engagements as well. Air Superiority

0

was not a factor

in

sophisticated

force

casualties whether the sophisticated force had it

There

were

no

sophisticated effective

engagements force

in

this sample

in

had air superiority,

which

or

not.

the

less

and so the impact

air attack on sophisticated force casualty

rates

of has

not been measured. o some

Means of Initial

significant

helicopter rates, deal.

leads

but by

in

casualty

rates.

Entry

to significantly higher than average

Mayaguez

Incident

in

which

from a single helicopter

demonstrates Although

differences

the mean of this small sample is

the

casualties

Entry into the engagement does show

significantly

the sample

lower is

crash.

it

is

were

great

numerous

Entry by air

than average

very small,

casualty

influenced a

there

landing

casualty

apparent

by

rates.

that entry by

ship was a particularly safe method. o

unopposed entering

Ojposition

entry in

to entry

is

also

a

factor.

Achieving

led to significantly lower casualty rates

the face of active opposition.

116

This is

related

than to

0

the desirability of achieving o

surprise.

Organization Type

on casualty rates.

does not appear to have an impact

The mean rate of all groups are close to the

sample mean rate except for organizations were

predominant.

elements

in

which foot

Eight of the nine engagements

participated

took place

in

1945 and 1946

and Greece,

and these had high daily casualty

units

used

were

assaults

and

contingency their of

special qualifications.

armor,

are

rates.

Airborne

9

parachute

be

used

in

status as well

Most units involved

motorized or mechanized

foot

Indochina

Airborne units may

operations because of their elite

which

in

iii 24 engagements which involved

3 air landings.

operation

in

elements

in

infantry

as

this kind with

some

and the results of this analysis suggest that having some

form of vehicular mobility is

desirable.

The Wounded to Killed Ratio Another

statistic

action to killed in

of interest is action.

are

in

wounded

in

The wounded to killed ratio for the

entire sample of 73 engagements is experience

the ratio of

combat engagements

3.76.

This is

consistent with

in major wars since 1840.

There

some variations with respect to the circumstances of

combat

which are worthy of note. ratio

is

The variation

in

the wounded to killed

considered significant for values above 4.50 and

below

3.00. o

Terrain,

Weather,

Posture,

and Air Superiority

do

II

not have significant impact on the wounded to killed ratio. O killed

Surprise

ratio.

When

does

have an impact on

forces

achieve

the

surprise

wounded they

have

to a

significantly o

lower wounded to killed ratio than otherwise. Insertion Means

does

show some

variation

in

the

wounded to killed ratio.

Both parachute assault and

helicopter

entry

lower than average wounded

to

show

ratios;

significantly

killed

this means that a much higher proportion of casualties

these kinds of entries are killed outright than is Opposition to Insertion

o

wounded to killed ratio.

0

usual.

does have an impact on

When entry is

in

unopposed,

the

the wounded

0 to killed ratio is The

wounded

circumstances Under

significantly lower than the overall ratio.

most

of

to'killed ratio is

affected much less

by

the combat than is

the casualty

itself.

conditions,

it

can be expected

rate

that three

to

the

0

four

wounded will occur for each KIA. Composite Terrain & Weather Casualty Rate Matrix The

tendencies of casualty rates to vary according

various more

circumstantial

than

one

factor

factors are different are

combined.

if

0 to

the effects

Unfortunately,

the

the of 73

engagement data base does not provide a large enough sample to be able

to do this for all of the eight factors evaluated.

possible,

however,

It

is

to combine two factors to produce a composite

matrix. Terrain and weather are two impoxtant factors interpretation matrix

combines

of this kind of combat. two

of the

in planning or

The terrain and weather

environmental

factors

which

determined

primarily by the location of the engagement.

actual

projected

or

predicted very well,

engagement the terrain and weather

are

For an can

be

and so can the average casualty rates to be

1i18

expected

(provideo

the engagement

sample is

a good predictor).

Figure 46 shows the firmat of the terrain and weather matrix aihd

the

engagements in too

few

of engagements

number

in

not very large,

each cell is

'ihe

cell.

each

of

number

have

and some cells

about

engagements upon which to base valid conclusions

future rates ut.der similar circumstances. Figure 46 Cell Sizes for Terrain & Weather Composite Cesualty Rate Matrix WEATHER

The

Cold

Tezm ftate

Hot

TERRAIN

Flat Rolling

13 12

4 1

0 3

Urban

11

8

0

mean

daily

total

rates

casualty

battle

combination of terrain and weather are shown in

each

for

Figure 47.

Figure 47 Mean TBC Rates for Terrain and Weather Composite Matrix (% per day) WEATHER

Hot

TERRAIN

9.6

2ý5

mean rate fcr engagements in

distorted by a single engagment the

7.4 3.3 3.0 2.5

2.6 1.6

Flat Rolling Rugged urban The

Temperate

casualty

rate

was

(3.9)

3.6 2.4 -

the Plat-Temperate

(the Mý_a.u~e__7

23.5% per

Cold

day.

cell

incident)

in

omitting

this

is

which ou~e

engagement

produces

a mean rate for the cell of 1.9% per

Neither

value

because

of the small number of engayements available

is

probably representative

of

this

day.

combination to

0

compute

the values. Values

of

the mean TBC rate for other cells

clgse to the total mean rate of 2.6%, and

Rolling-Hot

consistent with

with

personal

results in these

except for the

survival and operating

in

a

that

the

hot climate

action,

itself

cells

is

preoccupation

hostile

tends to

be

Rugged-Hot

The low rates for these two

evidence from other combat

to

environment

lower than average casualty rates for both sides.

cases

aggressive

cells.

appear

mitigate

In

against

and the impact of the rugged terrain

lowers

the casualty rates further. This matrix, very

helpful

hos'ilities data

in

and others like it

for other variables,

planning or interpreting

engagements

or from certain stages of extended from the 73-Engagement Data Base is

validity

of

confidence

the

that

method the

but

from

0

minor

insurgencies.

The

sufficient to prove the

insufficient

rates experienced

can be

are

to

provide

representative

high of

future engacjei.ents. Comparison With World War II In

order

Casualty Rates

to compare casuol.ty rates for

Data Base with c.sualty rate!. trom World War

the

73-Engagement

I1, two

conditions

must be fulfilled: 1.

The

comparison

approximate size.

must

This is

be made for units

of

the

same

because casualty rates vary according

to the strength of the unit.

120

O

The

2.

engagements rather US

than for months or years of

daily casualty rate for all

was

about

0.05% per day.

were not in

combat.

includes only days

in

experience.

The

ground forces during World War This is

engagement casualty rates because it units

for

must be made with casualty rates

comparision

much

lower

than

II

typical

includes many days

in

which

The engagement casualty rate,

which

which the units were

in

active combat,

was

about 1.0% per day for divisions. Figure 48 shows daily engagement casualty rates Engagement II,

Data

for

the

73-

Dase compared with average rates for World

War

arranged by approximate

unit size. Figure 48

Comparison of WWII Unit Size

and Minor Conflict Casualty Rates World War Percent

Company Battalion Brigade Division

The difference

Minor Contingencies Percent

1I

5.0 2.3 1.3 -

8.0 2.9 i.0

in

rates appears at the battalion and brigade

level wiere the two samples overlap. it

appears

that

contingencies are experienced

in

daily

engagement

from one-third

On the basis of this casualty

rates

for

to one-half the equivalent

sustained combat in

World War

II.

data minor rates

This may US

result may b• due to several conditions.

One

be that the casualty data for the minor contingencies and

similarly modern,

sophisticated

forces

of the opposing forces.

that

higher

combat effectiveness

their

In

for less

On this basis,

the Combat Effectiveness Value of the sophisticated exceed

is

fighting

sophisticated forces from less developed nations.

forces shoulId

general,

with

forces

have fewer casualties than forces of

inferior opponents. Another

these

kinds

artillery War

reason

Ii.

related factor of

is

operations

that the sophisticated forces

usually did not face

combat,

kind

of

fire that was common during sustained combat in

World

Most

minor

of

the

weapons on

both

contingency engagements were small arms, mortars.

the

in

Artillery and

its

is

sides

in

the

with some tanks and some

F major cause of casualties

absence

would tend to lower

modern

in

battle

casualty

r ates. Still

another

casualty

rates

for

possible minor

explanation conflicts

operations are short and decisive, combat

of

is

the

that

much

many

of

lower these

without the kind of sustained

that existed during the more or less continuous campaigns

and battles of World War II. Whatever the explanation, that

daily

the evidence of this compavis-)m

engagement casualty rates for minor

coni licts

is

have

been much smaller that they were during Wor'Ld War IT. There

were

no other significant

differences

between

casualty

rates

War II.

The manner ir,which the eight cizcumstantial

for tle mirnor contingencies

affect the rates Lppears to be quite similar,

1990

and those for

the World

variables

and the wounded to

killed uatio is

about the same for both sets of data.

Summaryof CasualtyExperience The

analysis

post-1945

the 73 engagements taken

from

conflicts

indicates that casualties and casualty rates from combat are very simi.at to those from combat

of

kind

of

for Minor Conflicts

this

in

major

a

minor

The major lessons are as follows:

wars.

A

--

company

or battalion-sized

can expect to have an total battle casualty

conflict

are possible,

engagement

Casualty rates larger than

of 3.5% per day or less.

rate

unit irivolved in

this

but they will be due to catastrophic events rather

that "normal"

conflict.

F.etween three and four personnel will be wounded for each

--

person kil] el. Lowez

--

climales,

average

rugged terrain,

Achieving

--

being

than

surprised

experienced

in

hot

or both.

surprise will

rates will be

wiil reduce casualty rates by

increase casualty rates by

a

half;

factor

of

three. -an

Higher

initial

than average casualty rates can be expected

insertion

by helicopter

or

parachute

assault

when is

opposed. Captuted

--

factor

in

and missing in

action personnel are not a major

this !dind of operation provided unit discipline is

good

and mass capitulation does not occur. . -- Estimation of expected ca~ualty rateýs during pianning

for

minor

the

conflicts

expected

can be facilitated by taking into

environmental and operational

and the relative combat effectiveness

factors

account

of the

of Lhe two sides.

operation

Chapter 6 MATERIF.L ATTRITION Materiel il

attrition

has beccme a majcr factor in Be:ýfore the middle of the

the last 150 years.

non-personnel attritio.rj in

com'bat only

19th

Centur-y

combat was significant only for horses

and

artillery

due

to overrun and abandonment to tha enemy rather than destruc-

tion

by

guns,

hostile

operations was

not

fire.

Supply was as

from

say

that losses of

in animal-drawn

animals,

to

his

weapons,

was less before the Industrial

Revolution than after.

steam

of the Industrial

energy

Century. Crimean conflict attribute

to

the first

majoz

but

rzilroads and steamboats

in

which Northern

the

early

the impact

was

:.uper ior ity factc.i

profound.

war

9

technologicO]

in in

both

rail

19th

impact on the first

and

major

historians steamboat

the Confederacy's defeat.

whose effects are discussed

124

the

in

Many

The next important contribution of techio'.ogy the conoidal bullet,

otheL

s).gnificar.ce

Awl-rican Civil War was the

resources as a fundamental

This i.sý

R:-volution wsas the application of

The tew steam engine technology had some War,

or

to Materiel Attrition

a military standpoint,

contribution

but t~ir

0

but it

person

arid

Tney were,

From

military

wagons.

materiel were not important.

introduction

was

bas been since,

what the soldier carried on

on beasts of burden and

to

important

before the 2eth Century as it

provided

packed

and the va.t majority of gun attrition

to warfare was

in Chapter

2.



This

was

automobile,

followed

thirty

years

later

technology

static

týernch

introduction

was not exploited warfare

of

rudimtentary

sufficiently

of i4orld War I,

potential

to tow

attillery.

a&.so resalted

A

bined

these new developments

into blitzkvieg,

model

for the conduct of conrentional war by all

and

opposinYg

increasing

prefnrence

weapons

it

tank,

artillery,

later

and enhanced of

the

the Germans comwhich became major

and

became inportan•

to

equipment,

many

to targeting his personne?.

therefore,

the

the

the

powerts.

importanceý of these materiel means

supporting war,

force's

--

the

saw

from the develcpment

A genezration

waging

prevent

greatly

internal combustion engine.

the

Although

that conflict

trucks and tractors

self-propel!ed

the

to

many waapons based on this engine

the comb:,,t aircraft,

With

by

propelled by an Internal combustion engine.

this

logistics

about

meteriel attrition

in

target

of the

cases

in

In modern ground wa.:fare,.

has become aJ.moýt as

important

as

personnel attrition. Desp it•a

th(2

increasing

.electronic equipment, war,

the ve

experience This is .,,nd

of

has

in

th4n of

not bvcause of lack of deta. of

-nateriel

to include

the items damaged

It

materiel

materiel attrition

destructior:

to

and other

wx;apons,

extract,

or destroyed. organize,

of th-

historical

pE.rsonrel

attrition.

Considerable data on d.-mage

items is

t\ie actions

vehicles,

the conduct of modeLn

has beer, less systematic analyvis

supDly recurds,

made

of

importa-ice

in

unit

records

taken to rel-air

Huwever:,

little

patterns

losses in the American wats of the 20th C(-tui:y from

125

oL

in

repla(-.

effort has been

and analyze tiiis wealth

been possible to ascertain general

and

ir

of

data.

mrnteriel

fracmentary

reports

Even though these patterns

and data compilations. are

relationships

documentary evidence

less well-defined and less

substantiated

than are personnel attrition

patterns,

provide valuable insights on materiel attrition One

insight is

important

are high,

other

items

so too are

losses of

losses

in

guns,

tanks,

In general,

of materiel.

they

combat are

When personnel casualties

related to personnel casualties. battle

by

modern combat.

in

that materiel

and

these

are

trucks,

in and

proportional

relationships. Data II

this handbook has been taken mostly from World

in

and the 1973 Arab-Israeli

Helicopter

!oss data

artillery,

chapter

helicopters,

deals with tank losses,

information

and other equipment. as this is

losses

to personnel casualties

proceeding

from

battalion/regiment, formations

the

The treatment of

of tank

at various levels of aggregation,

individual

to

tank,

and,

to the armored division,

involved in

Most of the

losses and the relationship

losses discusses tank

tank

on

the area of materiel

that has been emphasized the most.

attrition

losses.

from the Vietnam War.

rest of this chapter presents attrition

The tanks,

is

War for tank and artillery

War

large engagements

and

the

armored

finally,

operations.

to The

treatment comprehends World War II

chronological

and geographical

(US,

and Germans on the Western Front; German and Soviet

British,

experience on War.

The artillery

the

Eastern

and the

1973

loss section relates artillery

to personnel casualties the

Front)

in

a manner similar

tank loss relationship.

Helicopter

Arab-Israeli weapon losses

to that used to develop

losses are addressed as

well

as the scarce data permits.

made

on

other

than tanks and artillery,

Finally,

a brief comment

the relatively unexplored area of

losses

of

is

materiel

and helicopters.

Tank Losses and Crew Casualties Analysis of ties

is

based on data from

combat

*

the relationship of

operations

provided

on

898

1944

by

cause

distinguish whether

incidence losses

by

of

enemy action.

Army

and

101

the tanks

light)

is

burned

shown in

by crew position,

or

for

Data

is

rendered

The data show the tank losses

tank crew casualties

cause of loss,

First

casual-

through April 1945.

(797 medium

inoperable and

losses to crew

field reports of the US

from June

tanks

tank

by

not.

The

relation to

tank

and

according

to

whether the tanks lost burned or not. Figure 49 Tank Losses and Crew Casualties by Cause (First US Army, June 1944 April 1945)

Cause of Trank Loss

Mine Antitank Rocket Gunfire Unknown

Crew Casualties

Crew Casualties Per Tank Loss

171 119 502 106

73 190 579 36

0.43 1.60 1.15 0.34

898

878

0.9820

Tank Losses

Crew Casualties as % of Total Crew 9% 33% 24% 7%

Figure 49 shows tank losses and crew casualties by cause t-nk

loss.

each

tank lost.

and

crews

There was almost one casualty

(on

the average)

The largest cause of casualties to both

was gunfire,

causing 56% of tank losses and

of for

tanks 66%

of

personnel

casualties.

There

is

some evidence

caused about 50% of these gunfire losses, 30%,

and antitank guns about 20%.

damaged

or

destroyed by mines,

artillery

tank guns caused about

Although 20% of the tanks were only about 9% of the

casualties were from that cause. (bazooka)

that

By contrast,

personnel

the antitank rocket

caused about 13% of the tank losses and about

the personnel casualties,

0

21%

of

making an average of 1.60 casualties in

each tank damaged by that weapon. Figure

50

position.

shows

the distribution of

casualties

by

crew

The casualties were distributed evenly among the crew

members.

Figure 50 Tank Crew Casualties by Crew Position (US First Army, June 1944 - April 1945) Crew Position

Casualties

Percentage of Casualties

196 184 173 179 146

22 21 20 20 17

Commander Gunner Driver Bow Gunner Cannoneer*

*This number is reduced because the 101 light tanks in the sample did not have a cannoneer. Figure casualties Over

in

60% of

the casualties in

51

tanks

casualty

shows an interesting

relation between

tanks that burned and those in the tanks were in

that did not.

that were hit

In

rpte was significantly

tanks

tanks that did

did not burn.

tanks thdt burned,

personnel

About

and the other

that burned, higher than

in

however, tanks

that

not. halt

half were the crew did not

burn.

128

1

Figure

51

Impact of Tank Burning on Crew Casualties Tank Loss Type

Tank Losses

Total Crew

Crew Casualties

Casualties as % of Crew

Crew Casualties Per Loss

Burned

346

1,695

444

26

1.28

Not Burned

552

2,694

434

16

0.78

4'73n

878

TOTAL

--

F

Tank Losses and Casualties in The tank

relationship described in

losses

relationship entire

between

tank losses and armored units is

The statistic

is

an

obvious

personnel

point.

tank

units during a period other

armored

sample

regiments

sample is

is in

this

in

relationship when

both

based on the experience of four

from late July 1944 until

based on the experience a three-day engagement in

ratio of tank loss rate to casualty rate is these units.

The

There are two samples used to illustrate

this

The

one.

casualties

the ratio of tank losses to personnel casualties,

One

between

not so obvious but still

used to demonstrate

are expressed as rates.

Units

the previous section

and tank crew casualties

battalion-sized

very real. is

Battalion-Sized Maneuver

The data is

shown in

of July

computed

May

four

US

1945. British

1944. for each

The of

Figures 52 and 53.

I1

"

12

Figure 52 Battalion Tank Loss and Personr Armored (US 6th Armored Division, July 194 Personnel Casualties

•ualty May 1945)

Rates

Tanks

Casualty Rate

Losses

Loss Rate

Ratio of Tank Loss Rate toCasualty Rate

15th Tank Battalion*

411

55%

129

256%

4.65

68th Tank Battalion*

297

40%

101

202%

5.05

69th Tank Battalion*

422

56%

91

182%

3.25

86th Car. Rcn. Sq. (Mecz)**

426

45%

20

118%

2.62

*Based on the TO&E strength of "751 personnel strength of 50 medium tanks. **Based on TO&E strength of 949 personnel

and

an

average

and 17 light tanks.

4

0

130

Figure 53 British Armored Regiment Tank Loss and Personnel Cas.ialty Rates (Operation Goodwood, 18-20 July 1944)

*

Personnel Casualties 2d

Casualty Rate

8th Hussars 2d Welsh Guards 148th RAC *-7

Lossep

50

7.55%

37

1

0.14%

2

2.73%

19.84

13

1.86%

15

22.06%

11.86

6

0.91%

1

1.43%

1.57

0

inference

rates

to casualty rates

some consistency,

S

6.10.

The

mean,

However, *O

of

for

armored

units

the ratio of tank

for these eight data

points

the ratios

all

fall

show

reasonably close to the

the 8th Hussars which had only one

research

confid-ice

personnel

is

necessary to establish to

a

higher

the validity and relevance of this

ratio.

this step does provide a transition to the next level of

the analysis, tark

However,

to permit an

three days of fighting.

Additional degree

6.81

with a mean of 6.96 and a standard deviation of

values of

except

casualty in *

insufficient

that the population of battalion-sized

would exhibit the same relationship. loss

51.39'

1

This sample of only eight units is

S

Ratio of Tank Loss Rate to Casualty Rate

Loss Rate

Norfolk

Yeomanry

S

Tanks

losses

which is and

to examine the same relationship

personnel

casualties

divisions.

131.•

fcr

entire

between armored

UA Armored Division Casalty and Tank Loss Rates Relating armored division casualty rates to tank loss provides since

an indication of combined arms losses in

armored

components. World War II, with

an

were

Europe

were light,

tanks

authorized.

Other US arme•ed

As

a

al.l tank units,

shows in

casualty

combat in Us

tank

divisions

result of the

light losses

the armored divisions,

were rarel.y up to strength.

Figure

and 54

and tank lvs6 data for two light armored di.visions

Europe in

November and December

intantry divisions in World War II

battalions.

1944, diM

in turn to the infantry battaiions.

an infantry division,

tactically fur

not have

A non-divisional tank battalion was

attached

and

its tank

normally were

These tanks

weie

%as a vwny bigh ratio of infantry personnel

in

mass,

&nd

to tanks°

The

to personnel casualty rates in

iaf.intry divisions was* about half that cxperionced

divisionb.

132

organic

platoons

infantry support rather thau

ratio of tank loss rates 11

and

Northwest

initial

heevy

to

tWere

in

in

heavy,

add 232 medium

attached

used

divisions

with 10,P00 men and 168 medium and 77

suffered iuring the Normandy invasion, indeed

infantry

Only the 2d and 3d were

authorized strength of 14,500 men,

about 131 light tanks.

and

two types of US armored

heavy and light.

0

armored combat,

divisions contain sizable artillery There

rates

in

World War armored

0

Figure 54 Armored Division Casualties and Tank Lozses (US AMnoxed Divisions, Nov-Dec 1944) Ratio

Average

6th Armored Div. (28 days) S

.4th

986

Armored Div. 1,416 (30 d&ys)

combat

0.32%

108

1L64%

5.12

0.46%

173

2.64%

5.35

No-rember to 7 D•ecember

IC

attackinr

in

November

and

Lorraine.

1944,

attacked

was engaged in

hi,3hest

percent personnei

10 not

division until

the

period.

over the entire

casualties for z single

day

was

with a high single-day

The daily

to 28 November was 0.45%.

four day,_i of

the

The average

for

loss rate exceeded 3% on each of the first

attack,

was

The average daily loss rate for the 19 days

of the attack from 10 November

this

A part of the

of

pe'riodt of intensive combat both casualty and tank

l.i.4% on 15 November.

tank

(although

combat contitiously

'loss rates were higher than the average Ihe

division

whern the

again on 4 December and contiriued in action

During

7th.

for a 28-day period

The division launched an attack on

intensively) untW. 29 November.

always

is

UL 6th Armored Division data

The

Loss Rate to Casualty Rate

Tank Loss Rate

Daily Tank Personnel Casualty Losses Casualties Rate

DiviScn and Time Period

of Tank

Daily

Ave-age

rate of 4.83%.

saine attack period was 2.15% per day,

for a ratio of

tank

lons rate to casualty rate of 4.78. The days in

4th Armored Division data is

based on experience

combat from 8 November to 7 Decembier 1944.

of .2 to 18 November,

during which the division was

133

In

for 30

the week

involved

in

particularly heavy fighting,

the casualty rate was 0.84% per day,

and the tank lots rate vzs 4.29% per day. alties

per

tank

los-,

and

There were 9.31 casu-

the ratio of

per5onnel casualty rates during

tank

si.milar for these two US armored divisions.

were

fighting

same

to

casualty rates are

very

the

rate

that week was 5.11 to 1.

The ratio of tank less rates to personnel

iu

]oss

weather

coi, tvibutes

to

the similarity of the

consistency

of

the

results suggests

and

The divisions

terrain,

and

results. a

this ,

definite

tha %ven

relations.hip

between personnel casual.t.ies and tank losses. British Caualt_2)and Tank Lois Rates in

July

in

Operation Goodwood

1944 the British I and VIII and Cariadian

I

parLicipated

iii a p

"Goodwood."

Tank and perso:4 nel losses for three days of

fighting, British data

18-20

July 1944,

operations

for

average The

these daily

tic.unly inte-tnve

three days is strength

d.-nant.d

operati.n.. ..

are shown in Figure 55,

research report.*

in

the

tank

figure

personnel

and

or

5.28%

of

casualty rate

the average daily stLength.

This

75,969.

casualties,

equae:es

of 1.76% per day during th2 engagement,

the

tanks.

total combined arms average dai y strength was

the three days of the operation there were 4,011

loss

using in

In

severe

based on a

Personnel and

shown in

Corps

to

which

a

is

a

very high rate for a force of over 75,000 men. During the operation 470 tanks or 34% of the start were

listed as out of actioninot

screncith,

including 25 tanks lost by

Canadian 2d Armored Brigade on 21 July). *Military Operational Research Unit,

Ot these,

Report Number 23.

133

the

{26.9%)

0

Figure 55 British Casualties and Tank Losses (Operation Goodwood, 1-20 Jolly 1944) Average

Ratio

Daily Casualty Rate

' Tank Rate to Casualty Rate

201

0.70%

10.41

24.13%

764

2.48%

9.73

143

15.73%

287

0.98%

16.05

32

4.85%

59

.72%

C .74

47

7.76%

66

1.07%

7.25

9.48%

6

0.30%

1.60

13.59%

1,383

1.76%

7.772

could not.

Since at

Average

Organizar.ion

Tank Losses

Daily Tank Loss Rate

7th Armored Division

63

7.29%

Armored llth Division

207

Guards Armored Division 27th Armored Brigade 2d

Canadian Armored Bde.

148th RAC

Bn.,

493

Total could

be

least

160

course start

personnel Casualties

repaired

in

24

hours;

316

of the operation, strength

it is

esatimated

for the three days,

1,209 tanks.

losses

were 40.78% of average strength,

which

or 13.59%

ratio of tank loss rate to casualty rate 7.s

losses

for

Using this strenath figure,

was

Figure 54.

and

total tank

doily.

becomes

higher than the ratios for the U! 6th and 4th

Divisions in

the

that the average daily

correcting

gains,

overall

during

replacement tanks were reported received

The 7.72,

Armored

armored divisions in approximately took

two

nersonnel casualties wa- so much lower for theý

to

loss

1944,

November-December

There are two

US

was ifor the

than it

four armored divisions of the British

4.n Operation "(;oodwood."

part

tank

an immediate quesrion as to why the ratio of

Is

There

force

that for

reasons

this.

three times as high for thie British at "Goodwood"

nearly 16

the tank to personnel ratio was

and most important,

First,

tanits

to 1,000 personnel)

-

Lorraine

(about

6

tanks

as i. was for the US XII Corps 1,000

pez

indications

that in

armor

rates to casualties

tanks

loss in

There

a typical combined arms force the increases as the

are

ratio

of

proportion

of

the

bad

(rain and snow) of

weather

the

what they would have been har the

the operation taken place in

British offensiv'e.

decline moae in

Lorraina rates from

lowered both personnel and armored attrition

Campaign

did

personnel).

ion

the force incre7ses.

Second,

as

(about

Loss rates for tanks

bad weather than casualty rates,

July,

tend

to

so the ratio of

tank loss rates to casualty rates would be less in bad weather. Scviet Casualty Data

on

World War II

tank

tank

casualties and tank losses of the Soviet is

hard to obtain fromi open sources.

date has been compiled for nine

sufficient ten

and Tank Loss Fates

and

personncI casualties.

Figure 56.

136

in

Nevertheless,

campaigns

armies to give a reasonably accurate pictiire

losses

Army

The data is

involvinq~j of shown

both in

Soviet tank armies in tank

and

tanmcs. a

mechanized corps,

II

were composed entirely of

and so had a

large

proportion

of

They had only about 48,000 men but had 550-750 tanks,

for

ratio

corps,

Woild War

of about 14 tanks per 1,000 with

11,000

troops.

mun and 250 tanks,

The

Soviet

was comparable

to a

tank U$

armozed division of 10,809 men and 263 tanks^ Althougha Soviet stat-istics on tank losses ordinarily losses resulting include campaigns

only

from non-combat causes,

those

were

duration trom two

whic.h

resulted

on the Eastern Front to 29 days.

the losses in

from

enemy

in 1943-45

include

Figure 56

action. and

ranged

The in

1"igure 56 Zoviet Tank Loss and Casualty Rates (World War II)

Campaign

Number Tank of Combat Days Lol.ses

Army

Average Doily Tank Loss Rate

Average Daily Casualty Rate

Ratio of Tank Loss Rate to Casualty Rate

Oboy;'n 1943

IT & 6G

11

761

18.75

3.03

6.07

2

380

29.23

3.65

8.01

292

8.73

1.24

7.04

Pzokhorovka

1943

Steppe

Orel 1943

2 2I

Orel 1943

4T

10

520

7.07

2.11

3.35

Belgornd 1943

IT

29

577

3.54

0.86

4.12

26T

16

213

1.59

0.45

3.53

36T

19

394

2.25

0.40

4.89

56T

25

195

1.34

0.70

1.91

16T

8

87

1.85

1.55

1.19

Vist Qa1 a

1944 Vistula 194.' E.

Prussia 1944

Pomerania 1945 In

the first

three of these nine operations,

the tank loss rate to the personnel casualty rate is and 8,01.

the ratio

of

between 6.07

These ratios are typical of armor-heavy combined arms

operations,

in

which

the emphasis of one or both sides

is

on

armored action.

A combined arms force seems to reach a critical

point

armor-heavy when the ratio of

of

being

tanks

to

1,(300

personnel exceeds a value of 6.00. The the

ratio

middle

of tank loss rate to personnel casualty rate

four operations in

Figure 56 are

138

between

3.35

in and

.0

4.89.

Although extct strength figures

for the Soviet armies are

not readily available for some of these operations, the

ratio

6.00. were

of tanks to 1,000 personnel was

In any event, more

armored that

in

probably

operations.

infantry operations than

than

of the war on the Eastern Front.

these

they

were

the

fact

This was at least partly due to

German armor strength had declined greatly in

few

less

at the levels of aggregation shown,

armor-supported

relatively

most cases

later

stages

The result was that there were

clashes o.f Soviet and German armor

in

which

the

loss rates were high on both sides. The ratios of tank loss rates to personnel casualty rates in the

final

two

respectively.

campaigns

This is

listed

are

only

1.91

and

1.19,

because the Russian forces were tightýn.g a

victorious action against a retreating German Army,

and tank-to-

tank engagements were not common. Evaluation of World War 11 Tank Loss ExýerLence The HERO data base does not have sufficient data to permit a def is

4

nitive evaluation of World War due

in

part

to the difference

II tank loss experience. between

tank operations

Western Front and those on the Eastern Front. large the

(corps level or higher) Western

were fought could

not

comparable

divisions,

compile to

the

data relatively

Front. for

Without Soviet abundant

some of which HERO has compiled.

operations

further

tank data

the

There was only one

armor or armor-heavy operation

Front comparable to the many such on the Eastern

on

This

research,

corps for

on that HERO

operations US

armored

Nevertheless,

Eastern

Front

armored

conflict

both fronts.

the

there

is

sufficient

data compiled

and Western Front operations experience (This similarity

followed is

that

patterns

for some confidence

relatively unreliable Eastern Front data.)

selected

both

to demonstrate

very similar

a basis

from

Figure 57

data on six Eastern Front operations and three

on in

shows Western

Front operations involving armored conflict. Figure

57

Selected Data on World War II

Eastern Front

Average Personnel Strength

Average Tank S

Tank Operations

Tanks per 1,000 Troops

Ratio of Tank Loss Rate to Casualty Rate

Soviets Kursk-Oboyan Kursk-Prokhorovka Belgorod A

89,O00 78,000 981,000

36h 65( 2,296

4 8 2

6.87 8.01 4.87

belgorod B Belgorod C Korsun

70,000 70,000 255,000

562 500 431

R

2

4.12 4.84 3.20

Germans Kursk-Oboyan Kursk-Prokhorovka Belgorod A Belgorod B Belgorod C Korsun

58,000 82,000 280,000 24,000 1.5,000 85,000

476 505 600 150 130 229

8 6 2 6 9 3

6.26 6.39 3.99 1.49 3.99 1.24

Goodwood Arracourt

75,000 4,900

1,209 122

16 25

7.72 8.39

L3rraine-Saar

32,000

272

9

3.64

Germans Goodwood Arracourt Lorraine-Saar

58,000 7,500 17,000

528 126 120

9 17 7

4.36 6.62 4.32

Western Front Allies

140

14I

:

Two battle

of the Eastern Front operations (or campaign),

which the

immediately Oboyan

and

armor-heavy, tanks

and three

combined

the emphasis --

at

German

Soviet armor

First to

sectors

infantry

6 per

first

two

of the in

1,000

initiative

The Belgorod campaign, armor-supported

The

arms operations

on each side exceeded

of

the

are from the Belgorod

followed Kursk. Prokhorovka

ate part

--

operations

Kursk

battle

in were

which the proportion personnel,

hand,

even

Tank Army (Belgorod B),

campaign

and

in

of

which

was on armored action.

on the other offensive,

Kursk

was essentially

on the

an

front

where the

of

the

proportion

1,000 personnel also exceeded the apparently

of

critical

figure of 6. The

three tank operations on the Western Front in 1944

representative of three distinct types. British

Operation "Goodwood,"

operation

between

The first

of these,

was the only major

Front

large armor-heavy forces comparable to

those

The second,

Arracourt,

results

were

typical

of clashes between small armored forces on

third,

somewhat

more one-sided

shows

comparison a

reported

most

others, all

was

fronts.

infantry operations.

of US and Soviet tank losses in World War

significant difference only

in scale.

The

US

and the US Third Army reported a loss of

its average tank strength in a period of nine

months.

the

Soviet First Guards Tank Army lost 1,040 tanks,

its

562

tank

First

II Army

1,878 tanks lost for ten months of operations

Northwest Europe, of

than

while the

an eight-day segment of the Lorraine-Sarre Campaign,

was typical of armor-supported A

the

Western

fought on the Eastern Front.

The

are

starting strength,

in

the 29 days

in 102% Yet,

or 185% of

the

of

1943

Voronezh

Army

in

Group

operation

that

supported by about 1,70G additiona]. tanks in

those same 29 days.

comparision

tanks --

900,000

men

lost only about

900

some

--

While this was a high loss rate in it

with the experience of the First US Army,

only about one-third

rate

the remainder of the Soviet

However,

Belgorod operation alone.

was

-a

that of the Soviet First Tank Army

in

into consideration the difference

in

that operatiov. taking

Nevertheless, overall

scale,

operations, forces

the

Figure

57

demonstrates

that

in

experience of US and British

attrition

on the Western Front was generally similar

pattern to that of Soviet armored Moreover,

the

comparable

data

in

armored

nature

forces on the Eastern Front.

of Figure 57 suggests that there is

distinct pattern with respect to the ratio of the tank loss to the casualty rate.

and

This pattern is

shown

in

a

tate

Figure 58.

1

0

0

142

CD

cc

0

u0

Z0

0-0

II

(n

LU

< L0q/)

-I

O(JL 0

r-D

cc0

0~

0 CC.A LL.

-J

I-j

The ratio of the tank loss rate to the casualty rate appears to

be

a function of the density or proportion of tanks

force.

in

the

A force can be considered armor-heavy when the proportion

of tanks exceeds 6 per 1,000 troops. engage in

battle,

When two armor-heavy

whether for a long or short period,

the ratio

of the tank loss rates to the casualty rates will be in of 5.00 to 8.00, of course,

each event is more,

with an average value of about 6.00.

exceptions,

as there always are in

sui generis,

forces

the range There are,

combat data,

but the pattern is

clear.

where

Further-

this ratio of tank loss rates to casualty rates appears to

remain

relatively constant as the proportion of tanks

above

6

per

1,000

troops.

On the

decreases,

apparently in more-or-less

propoiAion

of

appears force

tanks

further is

loser.

other

hand,

increases that

linear fashion,

dcclines below 6

per

1

ratio

when

the

troops.

-00

that the range of the ratio for an

It

armor-heavy

between 5 and 7 for a winner and between 6 and 8 for

a

This relationship provides a valuable tool for modelling

and predicting tank losses relative topersonnel casualties. Casualty and Tank Loss Rates Since

neither

published

statistics

necessary

to

both degree after

sides

side on

the

the 1973 1973

the combat

in

order

to estimate

considerable

research,

Arab-Israeli

in and

it

War

War

has

has

been

interview participants

strengths

The data

Arab-Israeli

experience,

search many sources and

of confidence.

considered

in

in

and losses

Figure 59 has been the

overall

9

9

on with

any

compiled

figures

are

to be reasonably accurate.

1 144

Figure 59 1973 Arab-Israeli

Selected Data on Tank Operations: Average Personnel Strength

Average Tank Strength

War

Ratio of Tank Loss Rate to Casualty Rate

Tanks per 1,000 Troops

Sinai Front Israelis

17,000

306

18

5.42

Egyptians

34,000

316

9

7.21

Golan Front Israelis Syrians

12,500 17,000

183 248

15 15

5.26 7.71

The

HERO

data

on

tank engagements

combat

days,

the

16 on the Sinai

organized by combat engagements, 24

in

and 14 on the Golan Front,

Front,

these

ments,

most of which were fought by a division-sized

side,

against

Data for

other. has

a

been

entire

estimated

(not shown in

the

basis

of

engage-

on

the

Figure 59) for

by allocation from the statistics on

campaign,

days.

force on one

force the size of a brigade or larger individual engagements

is

covering

covering 20

armored and infantry units were involved in

Both

War

1973

considerable

the

detailed

information about each engagement. The ratios of tank loss rates to personnel casualty rates in the

1973

Soviet, The,

War are quite consistent with those and

Germans units shown in

winners had ratios of about 5,

about 7.

This is

of

US,

British,

Figure 57 for World War

II.

and the losers had ratios of

further evidence of the general relationship of

tank loss rates and casualty rates shown in Figure 58. Artillery Loss Rates Loss

rates

of

artillery

in World War II

weapons 1 4R

generally

are

low

in

comparison to personnel and tank loss rates.

Figure 60 shows the

experience of the US Army and German Army in 1943 World War II. shown in

Another indication of low artillery

Figure 61,

Army divisions in rates

and 1944 during

which summarizes three theaters in

loss rates

the experience of eight

World War II.

The gun

is US

loss

are so low they are expressed as monthly rather than daily

rates. Figure 60

Selected World War II Average Daily Personnel Casualty

Average Artillery Pieces

Rate

Committed

Artillery Loss Data

Artillery

Daily Artillery Loss

Ratio of Artillery Loss Rate to Casualty

Losses

Rate

Rate

US ARMY US First

ArnL

(8/44-2/45)

0.20

677

(12/44)

58

0.56

0.037

583

0.185

37

0.576

1.030

0.25

664

25

0.041

0.164

(9/43-9/44) (1/44-3/44)

0.08 0.16

452 346

62 23

0.038 0.098

0.475 0.613

(5/44-6/44)

0.25

410

11

0.049

0.175

0.28

243

11

0.049

0.175

0.42 0.30 0.14

7,086 6,976 6,820

1,217 369 299

0.554 0.176 0.146

1.320 0.587 1.081

0.16

423

16

0.].26

0.788

US Third Army

(10/44-].2/44) US Fifth Army

US Tenth Army (4/44-6/44) GERMAN ARMY Wehrmacht (Aug 1944) (Sept 1944) (Avg 1944) Fourth Army (Nov 1943)

0

World War

In

*

II

the US Army lost

few

they lost neither artillery pieces nor

Consequently,

statistical

correlations

personnel

gun

crew war.

entire

the

between crew and artillery A large proportion of artillery

losses are not possible.

piece

for

pieces

the

serving

while

personnel

of

Several divisons

enemy action which damaged an artillery piece. that

number

as a result

&rtilety crew members were killed or wounded

reported

artillery

insignificant

and a statistically

pieces to enemy action, of

relatively

losses are among forward observer and liaison reonul

with maneuver units.

0O

Figure 61 US Gun Losses in World War

Number of Combat Gun Battalions Days Losses

Theater

Towed Weapons North Africa

Italy Europe

II

Average Monthly % Cause of Loss Air Loss Enemy Rate % Artillery Attack Other

7

273

11

10.1%

54

36

10

16 8

:40 355

26 4

3.1% 2.8%

65 67

27 23

8 10

7 6 4

7.1% 1.8% 1.4%

43 50 55

43 17 18

14 33 27

Self-Propelled Weajons

North Africa--Italy Europe The

165 553 461

3 ii

experience

considerably,

of

ranging

individual

US

divisions

from those which had no artillery

during the entire war to those which suffered considerable in

sirAgle

battles

December 1944. rates

from

such

as the German

Ardennes

To derive approximate divisional these

army

statistics,

consideLations must be recognized:

the 1)

varied losses losses

offensive

in

combat intensity following

two

the strength-size factor;

and

2)

varying lcevels of commitment of combat and comkat support

elements,

depending upon the intensity of combat.

The

strength-size

loss rates as it army

casualty

component because

is

not as important for

for casualty rates.

rates

are

about

fewer

of the personnel

assumed

that

a division.

most

organizations,

in

available

of

the

those

intensive c omhat;.

a field army are

field of

its

This is exposed

On the other hand,

it

artillery,

of

even

can

World War II

experience shown in

It

The

can be •een

from in

"average"

combat,

and under

artillery

i5ss

casualty rates.

mean artillery

Figure 60 that under

artillery,

conditions

rates were substantially lower than The ratio of artillery

situations

the

of

"average" environmental con.ditions, field

army

loss rates to field army with a mean of 0.599.

one side had overwhelming air superiority in

climate

for

of

F'igure 60 i5 0.172% per day.

casualty rates ranges from 0.164 to 1.320, Where

loss rate

be

loss

of field arm;nes will be only slightly lower than those divisions.

to

large

will be committed to crmbat, so that artillety

constituent

and

artillery

In general.,

one-fourth

divisions while engaged in

hostile fire than in

rates

factor is

where air could

be

effective

terrain against

the rate for the side with air superiority was reduced

by about one-half

to one-third.

This

of the US First Army from 8/44 to 2/45,

is

shown by the experience

of the US Third Army,

and

S

of the US Tenth Army from 4/44 to 6/44. In more

intensive combat artillery

than personnel

loss rates.

of the US First Army in

12/44,

loss rates tended to iucrease This

is

shown by the experience

of the US Fifth Army from 1/44 to

*0

the German Fourth Army.

and of

3/44,

In

periods

of

6/44 and the Wehrmacht.: during Causes of Artillery Losses

unit3

artillery

fire

casualties.

in

September

North Africa,

accounted

personnel

artillezy

losses.

Army from 5/44 to

by cause and

for one-third

Aftica, in

for US

Europe.

to one-1,alf of largest

field Hostile

artillery

cause of artillery

The high losses due to tank attack in

the

initiative

daycs

1944,

Italy,

Air attack wan the second

casualties.

North

of the US Fifth

62 shows personnel casualties

artillery

reflect

long

than did

rate

This ir shown by the experience

Pigure

and

weather

at a greater

rose

casualties

warm

North

far greater fluidity of tthe combat environment as

wE-l

as the ruuchi

that theater.

dcgrcc

high&r

of

Most of the casualties

occurred at such a distance from the front lines

artillery

and air attack must be assumed to be the Data

fo,

units

self-propelled artillery

consistent with the data for the towed artillery

I4 149i

most is

units.

in

German

listed

"urunknowi

cause.

Africa

as that

likely

generally

Figure 62 Artillery Personnel Casudlties by Cause Type of Artillery

Theater

Combat Days

Attilie~rj

% by Cause Air Atck Other*

Unknown

North Africa

Towed Self-Propelled

273 1E5

37 6

13 23

43** 6

7 66***

Towed Self-Propelled

176 5F3

44 50

20 9

11 8

25 33

355

14

30

4b1

40

9

Italy

Europe Towed

Self--Propelled *Incjudes **Inclu.:es "•'*"IncludeG ****Ini.ludes

27****

8

29

43

mortars, tanks, small arms, machine guns, and mines. 23% from tanks. 140 personnel missing in action after being overrun. 20% from mortars.

Gun Crow Casualties and Gun Losses The losses,

data which

in Figure 63 is based on a data sample of 63

gun

excludes catastrophic gun losses. Figure 63 Gun Losses and Crew Casualties (11 US Army Divisions, 1942-1944) Total Gun Losses

Type of Artillery

Light & Medium Towed Self-Propelled

The pieces

average

number

45 18

Artillery Crew Casualties

184 32

of crew personnel

4.09 1.78

harmed

when

towed

were destroyed or damaged by enemy attack was over double

the average for the self-propelled battalions. average

Crew Casualties Per Guiu Loss

number

although 13 guns

For towed guns the

of crew casualties per gun loss was

about

four,

(29% of the sample) were destroyed or damaged by

hostile

attack

propelled

without any

resulting

casualties.

guns there was an average of

for each gun loss,

For

self-

less than two casualties

including five gun losses in which no casualties

occurred. The

lower

average of the self-propelled battalions may

attributed in part to the protection afforded by the armor of

the self-propelled pieces.

It

is

be

plate

possible also that some of

the self-propelled gun losses resulted from damage to the vehicle itself

rather than to the gun compartment where the crew

Despite

the lower casualty rates related to gun losses in

propelled artillery units, in

self-propelled

units.

rides.

One

reason

self-

the overall personnel casualty

units were

greater than the rates

for this is

rates

in

towed

that self-propelled units

were

almost all light artillery in the direct support role for armored units and

deployed closer to the front lines than was usual

units with towed weapons. tion

of

action

Another reason is

that a high propor-

the engagements in which self-propelled units were

for

in mobile operations in which battalion

were

in

personnel

not protected by the aricior of the weapons were not so well dug-in as was normal for personnel operating towed weapons. Catastrejhic Gun Losses

Whenever artillery loss rates exceed 0.1r% per day, assumed

that

and overrun.

it

may be

these are catastrophic losses due to close

combat

The French lost all,

and the British most,

guns as a result of the 1940 German offensive. case

in

of their

Probably the worst

recorded history occurred during Operation "BARBAROSSA"

when the Russian Army lost 16,179 guns and mortars.

US

catastrophic 64.

Figure

catastrophic were

gun losses in World War II

Several

engagements

by the German Ardennes offensive

Catastrophic Allies

In

Some US units of

gun losses did not occur in the armies of

the

from

on

resulted

in

and

the

gun loss.

the summer of 1943

Allied forces in Italy,

constantly

shown

1944

experienced a 100% catastrophic

because

Tunisia

losses by American artille:y units.

surprised

Western

in

are

offensive.

France,

until

December

1944,

and Germany were almost

Local

small-scale

German

counterattacks never penetrated into the artillery position areas behind

the

catastrophic

front

lines.

For

the

Axis

armies,

however,

gun losses became more and more common beginning in

0

May 1944. Until

the German Ardennes counteroffensive in December 1944

most of the US artillery units that were involved in close combat in

Europe

sions. front during

were the self-propelled battalions of

armored

divi-

These came under attack in fluid situations in which was

ill-defined.

The majority of such actions

the Normandy breakout and the subsequent

pursuit

the

occurred

S

across

France to the German border.

S

S

S

Figure 64 US Catastrophic

5Gun Losses in World War II Gun

Theater

Da~.c

North Africa 27th Armored FA Bn

%

Loss

Gun

Loss

Cause

6 Dec 42

5

28

Tank overrun

91st Armored FA Bn 14 Feb 43 5th FA Bn 23 Mar 43

10 4

56 33

Tank overrun Tank/Inf overrun

Tank/Inf overrun Surrender (?) Abandoned in retreat Abandoned in

Ardennes 589 FA Bn 590 FA Bn 924 FA Bn

16-24 Dec 44 21 Dec 44 17-18 Dec 44

12 12 3

100 100 25

371 FA Bn

17-18 Dec 44

7

58

retreat Catastrophic posture suing

gun

losses are directly correlated

and relative success of armies. the

losses,

offensive although

will not an

suffer

occasional

Successtui major

with

armies pur-

catastrophic

isolated

the

lower

gun

echelon

catastrophic gun loss may occur. Artillery Loss rates in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War Based upon the overall statistical comparison,

the artillery

loss

rates of both Israelis and Arabs,

were

about five times higher than the average rates of artillery

losses rates

in World War II. were

artillery

also loss

as shown in

Both Arab and Israeli

two to three times higher than

Figure

artillery World

rates for relatively short periods of

War

65,

loss II

intensive

combat. T-he follows:

principal reasons for the higher Israeli

losses are

as

in

weapons

self-propelled

Israeli

of

vulnerability

Higher

1.

of

comparison to towed artillery by a factor

about

3.0. 2.

vulnerability of all

Greater

artillery

in

weapons

a

desert environment by a factor of about 1.5.

Israeli deployment of artillery,

3.

range artillery,

particularly long-

0

much closer to the front than standard doctrine increasing artillery losses by a factor of about

in World War II, 1.2.

Figure 65 Relation of Artillery Loss Rates to Casualty Rates: 1973 Arab-Israeli War Ratio of

Average Daily Personnel Casualty Rate

Engagement Analysis

Average Artillery Strength

Artillery Loss Rate to Casualty Rate

Average Daily Artillery Loss Rate

Artillery Losses

Sinai Front 1.46 2.05

144 484

30 140

0.87 1.21

0.596 0.590

Israelis

1.34

72

15

0.91

0.679

Syrians

2.59

362

75

0.91

0.1351

Israelis Egyptians Golan Front

losses

reasons for the higher Arab

principal

The

as

are

tollows: 1.

Less

flexibility

and

mobility

when

under

fire,

increasing losses by a factor of about 2.0. 2.

Greater

vulnerability of all

weapons

artillery

in

a

desert environment by factor of about 1.5. 3.

Substantial

Israeli air

superiority,

I

ý

particularly

A

0

to ard

the

end of the war,

increasing artillery

losses

by

a

factor estimated to be 1.4. This analysis Israeli

1. about

leads to the following two conclusions: to be

loss rates would be expected

artillery

five times greater than US and German loss rates in

War II,

from the product of

the three

factors

World

(3.0 x 1.5 x 1.2 =

-. 4). 2. about War

Arab

artillery

loss rates would be expected to

four times greater than US and German loss rates in from the product of the three factors

II,

be

World

(2.0 x 1.5

xl.4=

4.2). These findings are consistent with the data in Helicopter Loss Rates Helicopters War,

is

even

--

the available data on Vietnam

is

form.

experience

of the United States with helicopters

was

States

in

Furthermore,

it

a relatively benign

enjoyed air supremacy,

in

1965-1970.

very general,

must be recognized

air

Korean

Significant

Vietnam,

aggregated

War

the

and the Vietnam War.

available for only one of these

However,

Vietnam

have been used extensively only in

the 1973 Arab-Israeli War,

data

in

Figure 65.

in

that

the

environment.

Vietnam

The

and the enemy was limited

the

United in

the

quantity and quality of ground air defense weapons. Despite these limitations regarding helicopter useful

attrition

insights.

helicopter

experience Figure

in

the data,

Vietnam does

analysis of US provide

66 shows the relationship

loss rates with annual personnel

of

some annual

casualty rates.

mean ratio of helicoptý.z loss rates to casualty rates is 4.0.

The

If

U for 1970

the very high ratio

Helicopter 1968,

that

helicopters otherwise

excluded,

the mean ratio

loss rates increased substantially

when ground

suggests

is

to

commanders

have

been

reduced

due

to decline.

relied

provide the mobility and to

This

increasingly

firepower the

3.4.

for the Army after

force strength was beginning

operational

is

that

decline

on

would

in

ground

personnel strength. Figure 66 Helicopter. Loss Rates in

Year

Vietnam

Annual Theater

Annual Theater

Casualty

Helicopter

Rate

Loss Rates - %

-

USA

USMC

Ratio of Total Helicopter Loss Rates

TOTAL

1965

1.52

5.5

5.2

5.4

3.6

1966

3.52

11.2

28.4

13.3

3.8

1967

6.11

14.7

29.4

16.2

2.7

1968

8.58

27.0

32.8

28.0

3.3

1969

7.84

26.8

32.5

27.5

3.5

1970

4.61

33.0

36.0

33.3

7.2

While Vietnam

the

does

helicopters, Marine

Corps

data for not

helicopter

distinguish

strengths

between

is

losses and

between US Army and

than the Army in

It

it

is

Vietnam,

assumed

US

higher

a difference between the Army helicopter

rates and Marine Corps loss rates.

in

attack

Since the Marine Corps had a

proportion of attack helicopters may be why there

and

non-attack

the data does differentiate experience.

to

Casualty Rates

this loss

that combat

loss rates for the two services were roughly comparable,

then the

o0

higher the

loss

rate for the Marine helicopters would suggest

loss rates for attack helicopters alone

were

that

substantially

higher than the overall rates shown. The

data

in

vulnerability

of

Figure the

66

demonstrates

helicopter,

even

the

under

substantial

the

relatively

This could raise questions as

"benign" conditions already noted.

to the kinds of helicopter loss rates that might be suffered in a less benign environment, hand,

World

suggests

War

that

threshhold,

made

when

the

inconsistent

II

such as

Central Europe.

experience

with

combat

the aircraft, loss rate

level

of

air activity

On the other

aircraft

exceeds

drops.

losses

a

certain

This

is

not

with the fact that neither Arabs nor Israelis

extensive

combat

administrative use --

use

of

helicopters

in their conflicts,

--

as

have

opposed

to

which may be due to the

highly lethal air defense environment in the Arab-Israeli wars. Other Materiel Losses The

data presented above on tank and artillery

suggests

that

there

is a close correlation

loss

between

personnel

casualty rates and the loss rates for weapons and other items.

A

increase prolonged

previous HERO study

in

the

loss

campaigns,

considerable

rates

materiel

also suggests that there is of

particularly

movement.*

rates

some

materiel

campaignr

items

during

which there

is

The relationship of this phenomenon

to

non-battle wearout and breakdown rates is

not clear and

requires

further research and analysis.

*HERO

Report 14,

an

"Wartime Replacement Requirements,"

1966.

Figure

67

weapons

and

compared

to

These

presents

equipment

a summary of loss rates items,

including tanks

and

selected artillery,

a standard personnel casualty rate of 1%

factors are based on analyses similar

herein.

for

Additional work

is

to

needed to treat

per

those

day.

presented

helicopter

losses in

a similar manner. Figure 67 Daily Loss Rates of Selected Materiel Items Normalized to a Personnel Casualty Rate of 1% Daily Loss Rate Tanks Artillery Trucks p Small Arms Mortars Machine Guns Radios

6.00** 0.25 0.50 0.79 i.00 1.25 1.00

**Use this factor if the proporation of tanks per 1,000 troops is 6 or greater. If the proportion is less than 6, the tank loss rate factor will be the same as the number of tanks per 1,000 troops. The casualty

implications rates

relationships materiel

materiel

loss

rates

between are

If

based

interaction

personnul

profound.

The

provide the military analyst a method of estimating

casualties

relationship made

the relationships

losses when personnel casualties are

personnel known.

and

of

can be estimated

if

neither casualties nor materiel will on

still

known.

materiel

of

personnel

losses

losses are known,

allow estimates of materiel

estimates

or,

losses

the are the

losses to be

based

on

the

of the circumstances of combat as explained

in

the

1.58

previous

chapters.

attrition

is

personnel

attrition,

between different

historical

as advanced as

not

casualty of

additional progress in

of

analysis

this area.

a

solid

of

relationships rates

for

foundation

for

rates and materiel loss

materiel provide

materiel

analysis

historical

the

the identification of rough

personnel types

While

Chapter 7 ATTRITION

Based set

of

tion The

upon observed

hypotheses

has been first

have

with

patterns to

formulated.

verities

These

do

significance

attrition

of

respect

two verities

great

VERITIES

for

the

strength is attacker

place

are

the

with

been

average modern

initiativt

dd

of his choosing and in can

battlefield

mass

his

materiel

attriVerities."

attrition

understanding

which have

and

modern combat. a

'"Attrition

directly

but

attrition.

formulated

and analyses battle,

the

about double the defender's.

has the

attacker

in

personnel

not deal

basis of historical observations 1. In

attrition

The

by

HERO

28

on

the

are as follows. attacker's

This

is

numerical

because

the

can initiate•o•ibat at a time anu-d the manner of

forces

at

to gain the advantage

in

his

critical

choosing. points

The

on

strength which he

the

believes

necessary to assure the success of the attack. A

battle

believes it

usually

does not take

has some chance for success.

would avoid taking the initiative. avoid

battle by withdrawal,

reinforce

the

each

Otherwise,

The defender,

if

battle

occurs without the tacit

successful

defense.

he could not

(for

to

One circumstance

in

agreement or acceptance

when the attacker achieves surprise.

surprise by a defender

side

the attacker

prospective battle area sufficiently

for

is

unless

would make every possible effort

chance

defender,

place

instance,

by ambush)

to

have

a

which

a

of

the

Alternatively, may result ih

battle taking place before the prospective attacker

is

a

ready.

m

Most

military

attacker

men are aware of the rule

can count on success

superiority,

while

inferiority

is

surprise

can

force

strength

more

in

a

he has a

defender

can

than one-to-two.

count on

the effects

by a

factor

numerical if

his

multiplying 1.5 and

an attacker

an

the side achieving

of surprise

2.5

expecting

would be willing to attack with

that

success

But

ranging between

Thus,

thumb

three-to-one

expect

not less

some cases).

surprise

if

of

less

its

(or

to

even

achieve

than a three-to-one

suiperiority. Another

factor

which

can

influence an

attacker

battle with less than a three-to-one superiority is the

superior

instances than

in

quality

of his troops.

which the Ge-mans attacked

of

Israeli attacks

great numerical 2.

In the

successful

in

true

World War Ii and for

the Arab-Israeli

average modern battle,

than the defender.

also of World War

attacker

for

in

many

with less

the

similar

wars

without

superiority.

was successful

makes historical

the attacker

In

1973 the attacker was successful

It

in

seek

confidence

This accounts

the desirable numerical superiority,

instances

to

595 battles

in

is

more

between

361 battles,

and

in

about 75% of the engagements

sense that

the Arab-Israeli

most wars

1600

or 61%.

II

wars

are won

by

in

often and

This is which

the

studied.

the side that

has been on the offensive longer and more successfully. 3.

Attrition

r:ates

of winners

losers.

The attrition

rates

forces

are

invariably

vnsuccessful

almost opponents.

-re

lower

than

(not absolute numbers)

This is

162

lower

than

of successful

rates

generally true

those of

of

their

regardless

of

9

which is

attacKer

4.

is

defender.

Small force casualty rates are higher than those of large

forces.

Writing

torian

nearly 100 years ago,

American military

his-

Theodore Ayrault Dodge noted that this phenomenon was

evident

in

Century. lent

and which

the battles of antiquity as in Tt is

smaller

than larger forces.

larger

forces

personnel

the

19th

also true today that under comparable or equiva-

circamstances

rates

the wars of

as

usually

strength

smaller forces

and

forces always have This is

have

exposed in

a

higher

casualty

due in part to the fact that

smaller

proportion

directly to hostile

of

fire

their

than

do

part due to the effect of "friction" upon

larger forces. 5.

More effective forces

inflict

than less effective opponents. influenced leadership,

by

the

Relative

interaction

morale,

casualties5t

training,

of

many

combat effectiveness variables,

and experience.

results of higher relative combat effectiveness inflict

casualties

a hiyher rate

such

casualties.

as

One of the major is

the ability to

on the less effective opponent at

rate than the opponent can inflict

is

a

higher

This relationship

seems to be proportional to the ratio of toe combat effectiveness values of the two sides. 6.

There is

no direct relationship between force

attrition

rates.

weather,

terrain,

effectiveness.

Attrition rates depend on many factors, tactical

Accordingly,

posture,

a point where no clear

relationship

and

exists.

such as

relative

the influence of personnel

ratios or force strength ratios on attrition

which

ratios and

rates is

combat strength

reduced

Combat power

to

ratios

take into account the circumstances of combat do influence

attrition

rates as one of several

7.

In

the average

modern

interacting

battle,

attacker and defender are similar. the

the numerical

This

losses of

seems to be true

combat effectiveness of the opponents does not differ

edly for

factors.

and the battle outcome is the defender.

not an

For many reasons,

overwhelming

when mark-

catastrophe

comparisons of numbers arc

less useful than comparison of rates. 8.

Loss rates for defenders vary inversely with

fortifications. and

The outcome of a battle depends

tue casualties

strength of

on many factors,

and casualty rates for both sides

depend

more than the strength of the defensive fortifications. to

the

extent

that history permits

evident

that if

other conditions remain unchanged,

such

in a hasty defense, attackers.

and they will inflict

The converse

is

However,

comparisons,

prepared positions will suffer fewer casualties

it

defenders

than if

on

is in

they were

more casualties on the

true also.

Loss rates of attackers

vary directly with the strength of the defender's fortifications. 9.

Loss rates ot a surprising

a surprised force. forces

of

greater

This is

the surpriseýr,

force are lower than

because the organized and determined fully prepared

ior battle

confidence by the knowledge that thq opponent

unawares,

perform

more effectively at the moment

The fcrces being surprised, unprepared,

and

those of

on the other hand,

p.)ssibly demoralized,

of

and is

given caught

surprise.

are disorganized,

and are

less

effective

attacker

loss

rates are

until, they recover from being surprised. le.

in

the average

modern battle,

somewhat lower than defender

lozs rates.

This

is

becauise winners

have

casualty rates than losers,

lower

often

than defenders.

This is

and attackers win

alEo because

Also,

defender,

but

the attacker

the

numerical

achieve

since attackers have the

surprise much more often than defenders, initiative.

attackers

mort

usually more numerous than the

is

losses of both sides

are

usually

for both sides

decline

similar. 11. In

in

effectively

is

time

More

L. of

In

inclement

spent surviving

difficult

ar%.

-.

terrain, This,

to move,

Difficult

as they do in

weather.

good

in

than

or remaining comfortable

casualty rates for both sides de-

is a reflection of theffetines

to,

employing weapons.

used

weather

to bear on the opponent.

bringing fire 12.

as

because soldiers do not use their weapons

This is

markedly.

casualty rates

weather,

bad

In

rugged terrain more effort has to

terrain

weapons.

for firing

and less effort i3 available also slows up resupply of

be

ammunition,

which

causes lower firing rates for both sides. 13.

The

casualty-inflicting

after each successive day in phenomenon factor.

The

unit is after

is

in

not clear, reduction

combat,

but

combat.

The

in

casualties measured. 14.

incurred

force declines

reason

although fatigue is

for

this

unquestionably

capability occurs steadily while is

capability

recovered

short periods of rest out of combat.

casualty-inflicting

is

capability of a

capability

is

one way

in

fairly

a the

rapidly

The degradation

of

which the effect

of

on unit effectiveness can be determined

arid

More research needs to be done on this phenomenon. Casualty rates are lower at night than in

another

example

of

casualty

rates

being

daytime. related

This to

9

opportunities

to

employ weapons effectively.

There

less capability to acquire targets and bring tire

is

simply

to bear on them

9

at night than in daylight. 15. This

Casualty

rates

are higher

in

summer

than

in

applies primarily to temperate climates where the

tion

between

summer

and

winter

is

by

distinc-

substantial

differences

in

available in

summer for effective employment of weapons seems

be

only

the hours of daylight.

marked

winter.

slightly

offset.

by the

The increased

inhibiting

daylight

effects

of

to more

luxuriant foliage. 16.

The faster the front line moves,

rates for both sides.

is

in

Combat in

which

world Wars

i

9

is AIid

that troops advancing rapidly have less time to use their

weapons is

the casualty

The reason for this phenomenon,

validated by historical experience II,

the lower

rapid,

itself,

When the rate of advance

than troops advancing slowly. more of the soldier's time is

and

less

targets.

At

targets

during

time

the

is

spent on

available to bring

same time,

it

rapid movement,

is

the

movement

fire to

bear

to

more difficult

so the defenders are

on

acquire hit

less

often. 17, phenomenon, fact

that

CasualtyTrates decline durin which needs further attackers

are very

than using their weapons, defenders

to fire

at

the actual crossing

is

is

Tiiver This

appa-ently due to the

largely occupied with matters other

and the number of

generally

site.

study,

crossings.

smaller

exposed

than usual,

targets except

for at

6

18.

An

"all--out" effort by one

both sides. attack

This

is

a outrance,

costs."

This

in

or

verity

fact,

a defender holding a

19.

position

simply a result of the

is

losses,

or

that

force

a

his

casu-

Combat

environmental,

power

operational,

which comprise the circumstances

engagement.

all

intensively and be more exposed.

consideration of the

factors

battle

fact

but will

alties at a greater rate than the opponent.

human

"at

A force with greater overall combat power inflicts

includes

an

losses to accomplish his mission

incur those higher

opponent also to fight more *

for

true whether it be the attacker making

commander willing to take higher will,

side raises loss rates

of a

and

particular

A numerically inferior force

in

well-

prepared defenses with hiqhlv mobile reserves and good morale and

*

leadership could stronger

have greater combat power

attacker.

than

This can be true even if

higher combat effectiveness.

It

is

a

numerically

the attacker has a

the aggregate of the various

factors which determines the ability to inflict

casualties on the

I,

opponent. The breakout of personnel casualties

20. warfare is

consistent.

immediately. About

20th Century

About 20% of battle casualties are killed

This corresponds

to a wounded-to-killed

ratio of 4.

65% of battle casualties survive their wounds,

minimal has

in

care.

increased

The proportion of seriously wounded who over the past century from less than 5%

than 10% due to improvements 21.

even

Materiel

People are hit in

artillery

weapons are hit.

survive to

more

in medical evacuation and treatment.

loss rate

lates,

with

are rela

ersonnel casualt

most cases vhen tanks, Thus,

vehicles,

and

personnel casualties are caused

4 by the same impacts which destroy or damage materiel.

that

there

are relationships between personnel

casualties

materizl losses which can be used to estimate the the former. depend

This means

latter,

and given

These relationships vary from item to item, and they

on battlefield density and distribution of the

equipment

4

and its relative vulnerability to damage from hostile fire. 22.

Tank loss rates are five to seven times higher than per-

sonnel casualtY rates. in

This applies to combined arms engagements

which armored forces make up a substantial proportion of

0

the

fighting strength on one or both sides. 23.

Attacker tank

ender tank

loss rates.

loss rates are generally higher Thi3 is

rates on the op~osing sides. about the

to personnel casualty

the attacker's tank loss rate ib

tank loss rate will probably be closer

(or even less) 24.

Artillery

tenth personnel phenomenon It

If

relation

seven times that of the attacking personnel casualty rate, defender's

times

in

than def-

the defende.••s

to

0

five

casualty rate.

materiel loss rates are generally about one-

casualty rates.

This

which applies to artillery

does not include catastrophic

is

an

pieces hit

observed by enemy

losses of artillery

fire.

pieces

due

to overrun or surrender.

25.

Self-propelled

artillery

times greater than for towed j of,

factezs:

ammunition

larger in

the

uns.

exposed

loss rates

are about three

This is due to a combination

target;

self-propelled guns;

presence and

of

fuel

vulnerability

and of

engines to damage.

168

10

26.

Average World War II

division engagement

were one to three percent a day. Europe sive

casualty rates

Successful divisions

in

Western

lost about one to two percent casualties a day in

inten-

combat;

losing divisions lost about two to three percent .a

day. 27.

Attrition rates in

to World War II. and the greater casualty war

rates

1973 October War were comparable

spite of the increased

and

Western Europe;

lethality

of weapons

sophistication of military technology, and tank loss rates for engagements

seem to have been approximately

personnel

II

In

the

tanks

in

personnel in

the same as those

intensive battles of World

the

1973

for

both

War

II

in

they were slightly less than comparable World War

loss rates on the Eastern Front. 28.

Casualty

rates

in

minor hostilities

about half those experienced

in

due primarily to the absence

of sustained artillery

World War II.

of these kinds of combat engagements.

after 1945 This fire

may in

are be many

ANNOTATED

SELECT,

This

bibliography

BIBLIOGRAPHY

provides

an

annotated

listing

of

significant secondary works containing attrition data or analysis of casualty and materiel loss data of historical wars, and

battles.

It

and describes important works and is

to be all-encompassing.

intended

and

importance

are

lists

methodological

usefulness,

contribution,

either as data

is

statistics is

a

attrition

in two parts.

that is,

books and

and analysis of military

specific sources

experience

in

specific

or works modern

Part

reporting wars

or

Part other

attrition

of two or more wars or historical periods.

listing of

as

or

source

or both.

a listing of general sources,

literature that provide data

not

inclusion

Major criteria for

The organization of the bibliography is One

campaigns,

Two

military historical

periods. Part One:

General Sources

Armed Forces Information School. The Army Almanac. D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950.

Washington,

an official fact book and reference source of data This is concerning the US Army and, to a limited extent, other services of tte US armed forces, that contains detailed statistical information on US Army personnel strengths and casualties in 20th century wars through World War II. A useful summary table gives US Army troops and casualties in principal wars from the American Revolution to World War II, inclusive. The volume consulted was published in 1950; other volumes appear to have been published on a regular basis up to 1959, at least.

17

Berndt, Otto. Die Zahl im Kriege: Statistische Daten aus der rneuern Krieqsgeschichte in graphischer Darstellung. Vienna: Freytag & Berndt, 1897. This is a data base of strength, casualty, and duration data covering major European wars, campaigns, and battles from 1740 to 1895. Much data is presented, mostly in graphical form, using tables and diagrams accompanied by figures. The statistical coverage of wars and campaigns is limited. However, strength, casualty, and duration data is given for approximately 100 land battles, large cavalry engagements, naval engagements, and sieges. The data base is supplemented by some useful analyses of strength and casualty data. This is an impressive effort, though much smaller and less useful in many respects than the data base compiled by Bodart (q.v.) a few years afterward. Bodart, Gaston. Militaer-historisches Leipzig: C.W. Stern, 1908.

Krie~s-Lexikon.

Vienna and

This is a large data base and statistical analysis of land battles and sieges and naval battles during the period 161819095. The coverage is extensive, comprehending some 1,000 examples, but the primary emphasis is on the battles and sieges of the great powers in the period indicated. The data reporting varies in detail, reflecting the strengths and weaknesses of the source material, which includes primary and secondary references. The author's bibliography of sources, organized chronologically by war or conflict, is given in pages 16-31 of the work. The entries for individual land battles and sieges and naval battles generally report the following data: Name Date(s) Geographical l.ocation National or other identification of opposing sides Commanders Strengths

Personnel casualties Materiel losses Most entries include a brief statement identifying the vica number on a and, for battles only, tor, if applicable, categorical rank of scale of 1 to 6 indicating the relative the battle based on the total of personnel casualties incurred by both sides.

1

172

land battles and sieges the strength data for each For gives:

side

Number of men Number of cavalrymen guns Number of artillery The loss data for each side gives: Total personnel casualties the term for (this is the author's losses" "Bloody action) in wounded and action total of killed in Number captured and missing guns lost Number of artillery Number of flags, standards, and kettledrums lost For naval battles the strength data for each side includes: of of of of of

Number Number Number Number Number

men ships' guns line of battle or capital ships frigates smaller ships

The loss data for each 5idt

iInU'u;5

Number of men (total and killed or captured) Number of ships' guns Number of ships (by category) of

loss data for sieges and storms

Strength

and

places is

reported

like that

for

fortified

but usually

land battles,

in

was it All data is reported to the extent form. summary the author or applicable to a particular by discoverable of the data reported for A unique attribute or siege. battle all by name and grade of or siege is the listing each battle or mortally wounded during the course killed general officers of the event. The

final

section

of

the work

is

devoted

to

an

extensive

1618analysis of conflict and the trends in warfare during in large part on the data base of engagements. based 1905, most The Kriegs-Lexicon remains to this day the greatest, a related data, and ambitious -data base of engagements compiler. its of monument to the industry

David. Eggenberger, Y. Crowell, 1967. The

author's

provide

the

A Dictionarv of Battles.

preface states that:

essential

details

However, re:orded history." approached. noL even met,

of all

New York: Thomas

"This book attempts the major

battles

to in

this ambitious objective is not 1,560 for provided, What is

engagements and battles from Megiddo (1479 B.C.) to Vietnam in the mid-1960s, are brief narrative summaries, accompanied generally by data on personnel strengths and casualties of the opposing sides. But many entries either do not provide strength and casualty data or provide incomplete data. The main problem with the work is that its coverage is uneven: it is fairly complete and accurate for European and American history (despite some major errors and omissions) but poQor for the rest

of

the world before

the 20th Century.

Analysis of Factors Historical Evaluation Research Organization. A Data and Wars: That Have Influenced Outcomes of Battles Base ot Battles and Engagements. Report No. 95. 6 vols. Dunn Loring, Va.: HERO, 1984. This report presents data on 601 major battles of mod'ern history from 1600 to. 1973 in a combination of matrice.s and narratives. The matrices comprise seven tables, which show all of the significant statistical data available on the battles, including attrition data, and show how major factors of combat influenced the outcomes of the battles. In addition, the background, course, and outcome of each battle is concisely described in a narrative, which summarizes principal sources consulted for research. The data base of battles developed for thib it is the HERO Land Warfare Data Base; called corrected, refined, updated, and enhanced, as new data becomes available. HERO has just completed effort to refine and enhance selected aspects of base under contract to the US Army's Concepts Agency.

sLudy is routinely or better a major the data Analysis

0 Artillery A

Dunn Loring,

Survivability

Va.: HERO,

in

Modern War.

Report No.

55.

1976.

For a very limited exploratory study a historical data base of artillery gun losses in modern war was compiled from primary sources, including unit operational records. The emphasis is on gun loss patterns in World War II (US and German experience), but data was also developed for Korea and the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, primarily for comparative purposes. The analysis permitted development of some tentative planning factors for artillery gun loss rates in differing intensities of combat.

7

0

Analysis of Wartime Rlacement Re uirements: Experience for Selected Ma)or Items of Combat Equipment. Report No. 14. 2 vols. Washington, D.C.: HERO, 1966. __Historical

This report examines and analyzes historical data on materiel losses in combat operations in World War I, World War II, and the Korean War. The report is based largely on primary military records and emphasizes the materiel attrition experience of selected units fighting in North Africa, Italy, Northwest Europe, and the Pacific in World War II. T4e research produced tabulated data on losses for units in various combat postures, and under various other conditioning factors. The analysis provides a basis for predicting equipment losses for selected major items of materiel in future warfare. Voevodsky, John. ý_anititative Behavior of Warring Nations. Systems Analysis Divislion Staff Study. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 1968. This study is an investigation of the quantitative relationships between populations, army strengths in battle zones, casualties, and fatalities. It is based on historical data or

IajoL

US

waLs

ffoLll

the CiVil

Wa

to

the

Vietn5a

WaK,

through 1968, and statistics of the military effort of Great Britain and France against Germany in World War I and vice versa. The author attempted to apply the quantitative patterns of repetitive behavior he discerned in the historical data to predict future trends of the then ongoing US experience in Vietnam. The analysis is vitiated by frequent misunderstandings and misinterpretations of the data, and the projections have been refuted by experience data for Vietnam since the date of publication. Wright, Quincy. Press, 1965.

A Study of War.

Chicago:

University of Chicago

First published in 1942, this is a classic study and analysis of war phenomena throughout history. The author compiled a massive data base touching a variety of aspects of warfare and analyzed it using techniques of the social and behavioral sciences. The work considers -quantitative trends in warfare and includes a broad discussion of war casualties. The 1965 2d edition includes the author's commentary on war since 1942.

Part Two:

Specific Sources

Beebe, Gilbert W., and Michael E. De Bakey. Battle Casualties: Incidence, Mortality, and Logistic Consideration. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1952.

0

This book is the seminal source on the casualty experience of US Army ground forces in World War II. The authors compiled the data base for their analysis from a variety of sources, including the operational records of tactical units and their medical staffs and from official records and reports of the The analysis is most complete and US Army Medical Service. .inc]nPzs concepts and considerations of the incidence, of battle mortality, evacuation, and hospitalization casualties. The emphasis is on World War II, but the authors include data and discussion of historical trends in personnel attrition, particularly in chapter II, "Incidence of Hits and Wounds." Clark, Dorothy Kneeland. Casualties as a Measure of the Loss of Combat Effectiveness of an infantry Battalion. Technical Memorandum ORO-T-289. Chevy Chase, Md.: Operations Research Office of the Johns Hopkins

University,

1954.

A pioneering study of the battalion breakpoint concept, babe6 upon actual combat data. The analysis is based on a sample population of 44 US infantry battalions involved in seven engagements in the European Theater of Operations during World War Il. The author concludes that: "The statement that a unit can be considered no longer combat effective when it has suffered a specific casualty percentage is a gross oversimplification not supported by combat data." Gilchrist, H.L. A Comparative Study of World War Casualties from Gas and Other Weapons. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1928. This is a text prepared by the Chief, Medical Division, US Army Chemical Warfare Service, for use in the curriculum of it provides a the Chemical Warfare School, Edgewood Arsenal. useful discussion and analysis of World War I casualties, accompanied by tables arid charts. The emphasis is on gas indicates, the analysis casualties, but, as the title compares gas casualties with those caused by other agents, in the World War and in other wars. An analysis of the datA given in the work was performed subsequently by Dorothy Clark, who questioned the figures on the proportion of gunshot-wounded soldiers who died, finding them much higher than those of other sources.

1 -+

76

Great Britain. -War Office. Statistics of the Milita~y Effort of the British Empire DuriTng the Gret ar (ndon: His This is the official compilation of statistical. dat~a relative to the military effort of Great Britain and the British Empire during World War I. it includes much data on personnel and material strengths, personnel casualties, material losses, allocations of munitions, etc., presented generally in tabular fo0rm. The datcý is organized usually Uy war theater, campaign, and time period, rarr-iy by battle. There are summary reports of Allied and enemy strengths and casualties. Other data [Presented includes various wa r chrono log ies, statements on prisoners captured from the Pienemy, and a table showing the leunyt~h, in ol~les, of the line held by British forces in France and Zlanders at various times during the war. .Little attempt is made to &nalyze the dcta pre!ýented. haldenwang, A. von. Statistik und vetl'13t.e. Vol. XX of Wuerttembergs Hea-r ,m we!Lkrita. Stuttgart, 1936, As the titi.e indicates, this is a narrow statistical and narratie su rnmmary of the military efifort of one German state, that is Wutrttemberq in southwest Germany, in World War I. Discussion and tables give details of mobilization ind organization and provide data on personnel strengths d casualties by arm of serviceŽ for war years (that 1.-" y(ýars beg inri ng or 1 August of ona, yea: and ending on 31 July of the next--the war havin~g begun for Germany on 1 August 191-4) and tor the period -igust 1918 to the Armistice. S omi.ie conr'.deration is gi* to raatt*.rs of logistics and the war econiomy. ,ical Evaluation and Research Organization (HE2OC) Casualty %,.mtsfor Continoencies (CEC). Report. No. 118. .rfaxVa.: HERO, 1986.

This report examines the L~ttle casualty experience otT troops of the US and US a 11i~ar in 73 selected combat engagements that occurr-ed in conflicts since the en'd of World War 11. The tese~irch performed for the repocrt permnitted the formulation of some important generai~zations about the classification rnd complex naturc cf conflict zince 1945. The z.nalysis cr the data base ot 713 engagements resuit~d in the de-elopm'Žlnt rf tabulations showing aver:age battl.e casualty rates by casualty catr~gory and according to a variet~y of circum.,ýi.antiaI (operational and environimental) factors. 'These tablet; prov'ide usef ul insights for planners and moelIr s.

177

of Surve ._Historical Sized Units in Modern Combat. Va.: HERO, 1982.

Casualties Report No.

in 97.

Different Dunn Loring,

Personnel attrition data in four engagements of US troops in the European Theater of Operations in Wocld War II was collected and analyzed at the level of division, regiment, and battalion and recorded in tabular form showing the strength, both by diy and as an average for the period concerned, and casualties by category, both numerically and as percents of the daily strength, by day and as averages for the period. Total or cumulative casualties by category during the period of are also shown. The report includes detailed narratives the combat experience of the divisions and sub-units in each engagement, their casualty experience, and 30 tables.

-

Physical Damage and Casualties in Conventional rport No. 93.Dunn Loring, Va.: HERO, 1982.

Battle.

The report assesses physical damage and military and civilian casualties in three battles in northern Europe in World War II. It includes narratives of the battles and presents tabular data on physical damage done during the course of each battle, the strengths and losses of the opposing forces in each, and civilian casualties incident to each. Additionally, an was made to relate ammunition ei:penditures (artillery shells and air-delivered bombs) to the level of damage assessed for each battle terrain area selected for damage evaluation. Besides the three case studies the report includes a brief chapter describing physical damage and civilian casualties in metropolitan France generally, and particulariy in the departments of the Manche and Calvados (in Normandy) .

Historical Division, Headquarters, united States Arm%, Europe. Guide to Foreiqn Military Studies, 1945-54. Karlsruhe, Germany, 1954. This is a descriptive catalog and index of manuscripts prepared by former high-ranking officers of the German Armed Studies Forces during 1945-1954 under the Foreign Military The originat USAFEUR. Program of the Historical Division, mission of the program was to obtain informati' " about enemy operations in the European Theater for use in The preparation the official history of the 115 Army in World War II. The of proqram's mission was lat. r changfed to emphasize operational studies and analyses of German nilitary experience in a variety of areas. Thus, th3 man~scripts produced include operatiinal summaries and analy:.ies, unit histories, lessons learned type reports, and monographs or, German experience in a diversity of areas, including organization, administratiu.:9 and tactics. Because of the widespr-ad destructior, of Gonrmi-:n Worlrlud War II ope::ational records, many of the monog. a-Jhb have

I

I

value for tbe attrition resea.cbher. Some of them deal analyses of casualty expe.rienccŽ, and one, MS t P-Oil, cribes the German syrtem of reporting casualties. Livermore, Thomas L. Nu•.ibers & Losses ica: 18ý-65. Eloomfngton, Ind.:

with de~o

in the Civil War in Amerindiana unTli-ers-ity PressF

This is a compilation of data relative to personnel strenqths: and caaualties in the American Civil War that was first

published in 1900 and is considered a classic among works of its kind. The author was a Union army veteran w0-) rose thcough the ranks trom private to colonel and who, sub*.-equent to the war, was a lawyer and businessman. The data was culled from the 129-volume Officiel Records of the War of the Rebel1Lion L'nd from rel1L.bTh-e.5ndary sourcer. 7 -Y. hTTYFalf T of the work is devvted. to the presentatict and explicatio:i of data descriptiuL of the total number ot personnel who served in the opposing armies, total casualties, and a comparison of personnel casualties in similar battles. The second half of the work presev:s personnel stten.th and cesualty data for specific battles. Two tables summarize the battle data. Love, Albert G. War Casualties. 24, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.193ý1 .

The Army Medical F-%ulietin, No. Mi1.di;cl Fi:.J.I $;\Cel choo,,

The purpose of this work was to estimate, based on exper.ercce data, the requirements for medical servsices for f.ront: A.7Ht casualties in a future war. It provides Stzrtisti"A o. the incidence an(. treatment of battle and. nonbattle cais'j.'Lties based wair.ly on the experien.crJ of US forces is Wo'cId W..1. Because of the book's f;'ocus on the treatment of wotrveed, 'o because world W.- I szaiw the widespread employment of .:h::,;cc: weapons, the author !'kaws ;3 useful diffHLenti ztion bz'-.,en,, gas..woun6ed and gunf re-wounedo Li nce the data basa I y;rounde&: mainly in US experience, which occur.:ed lar'jely i•, rthe la.st year oI the war, z" gqas casualti Ies aiL predomina:B.Lly from rtistdrd. Nedl,

Majo:. (k'neral Spurei.ri. Sin Vi eu•ara ,

,1'his

if5-19l.

Meu.icc

Washington,

Li-,,,cirt oV D. C.:

the U.S.

Department of

A:"2ny the

is a monograph in the O ice of the Ci.ie: ot 1, ilitr. Iistory's Vietnam Stud ic.s series. It: disrc'.u:l•s tbh euperIe nce o0 the UcAP ts e 4':t••cf Uepartmint in Vie I uam for. the years 1965-1970. Tho':,;gh cnc,:'erned p. imari y wi tc: the spu!cifics of medica.l or.,eretions in the tel itivivey ,rlque envi;:on,'nnt a'd d circuts..ac•ces of tlhv Vientnam War, It- &,rov.6es also an intcr.est'C 1. :outiparati, stntisi:3tical aniL,';•.1 i of quality' of car,! 0t tho ¾u'0;,3!Cd in World W4ar '1, 1 lort:a, aud VAetnam, toc2finirij •i•

49,

survival statistics and patient care indices. Insights int:a the implications of the Vietnam War casualty experienc. )for other modern conflicts are given in discussions of wound causative agents, the nature of wounds and the mechanics of wounds caused by modern weapons, and medical advances. Peckham, Howard H., ed. The Toll of... Indepeudence: Engagements & Battle Casualties of the American Revolution. Chicago: Un-iversity of Chicago Press, 1974. This book lists 1,331 land, and 218 naval enyag-nments and actions of the Ameri.canRevolotiona.y War and American and hritish battle casualties by category in each. Each engagement is briefly described, and the strencths of the cpposing forces, where known, are given. T'his is o very careful compilation, assembled using pri.mazy and secondary sources by ; research team guided by the director of the Williar, L. C].ementi.. Library at the University of Michigan. The introdvction contains a useful description of the methodolcgy e.ployed in the effort to amass the data and analyze it for reliaý)il ity.

Reizter. r,

arnk A. Battle Casualties arid Medical Statistics: D . C,..h ,0 t:0,Ii rr). the Korean War. $urgeon Geneai., 1.973.

U.S.

r' enc

_

This is a vz.ry sicnificant compiUz'tiori and anal-'sis of data xe\at:ive to the casualty expc-zience of the US Army in the Kctean War, . E:ke the work of )ýe'be and De Mzk..y '0

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TABLE

E:

US ARMY WORLD WAR I BATTLE DEATHS BY BRANCH AND RANK*

Officer

Enlisted

Total

2,822

42,429

45,251

11

49

60

Artillery

142

1,729

1,871

Engineers

86

1,228

1,314

Med.

Dept.

47

363

410

Air

Service

130

172

302

65

1,112

1,177

3,303

47,082

50,385

(6.56%)

(93.44%)

Infantry Tank Corps

Others Total

*Based on Leonard

(100%)

P. Ayres, The War With Germany: Summary, Government Printing Office, Washington, =21,-and Army Almanac, p. 666.

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