improving the quality of service (qos) in wsn routing using trust and ...

IJRIT International Journal of Research in Information Technology, Volume 1, Issue 5, May 2013, Pg. 257-264

International Journal of Research in Information Technology (IJRIT)

www.ijrit.com

ISSN 2001-5569

IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF SERVICE (QOS) IN WSN ROUTING USING TRUST AND ENERGY WEIGHT-AGE 1

1

Mr. Mohammed Fayaz, 2 Mr. Sangamesh Patil

Lecturer, DEP OF E&CE, BTL Institute of technology and Management Bangalore, India. 2

M. Tech (DC&N), BTL Institute of technology and Management Bangalore, India. 1

[email protected], 2 [email protected]

Abstract The multi-hop routing in wireless sensor networks (WSNs) offers little protection against identity deception through replaying routing information. An adversary can exploit this defect to launch various harmful or even devastating attacks against the routing protocols, including sinkhole attacks, wormhole attacks and Sybil attacks. The situation is further aggravated by mobile and harsh network conditions. Traditional cryptographic techniques or efforts at developing trust-aware routing protocols do not effectively address this severe problem. To secure the WSNs against adversaries misdirecting the multi-hop routing, we have designed and implemented TARF (Trust aware routing framework) a robust trust-aware routing framework for dynamic WSNs. Without tight time synchronization or known geographic information, TARF provides trustworthy and energy-efficient route. Most importantly, TARF proves effective against those harmful attacks developed out of identity deception the resilience of TARF is verified through extensive evaluation with both simulation and empirical experiments on large-scale WSNs under various scenarios including mobile and RF-shielding network conditions. Further, we have implemented a low-overhead TARF module in Tiny OS as demonstrated, this implementation can be incorporated into existing routing protocols with the least effort. Based on TARF, we also demonstrated a proof-of-concept mobile target detection application that functions well against an antidetection mechanism.

KEYWORDS: - Multi-hop Routing, WSNs (wireless sensor networks), RF-shielding, Mobile target detection.

Mr. Sangamesh Patil, IJRIT

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1. Introduction Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are ideal candidates for applications to report detected events of interest, such as military surveillance and forest fire monitoring. A WSN comprises battery-powered senor nodes with extremely limited processing capabilities. With a narrow radio communication range, a sensor node wirelessly sends messages to a base station via a multi-hop path. However, the multi-hop routing of WSNs often becomes the target of malicious attacks. An attacker may tamper nodes physically, create traffic collision with seemingly valid transmission, drop or misdirect messages in routes, or jam the communication channel by creating radio interference. Based on identity deception, the adversary is capable of launching harmful and hard-to-detect attacks against routing, such as selective forwarding, wormhole attacks, sinkhole attacks and Sybil attacks. As a harmful and easy-to implement type of attack, a malicious node simply replays all the outgoing routing packets from a valid node to forge the latter node’s identity the malicious node then uses this forged identity to participate in the network routing, thus disrupting the network traffic. Those routing packets, including their original headers, are replayed without any modification. Even if this malicious node cannot directly overhear the valid node’s wireless transmission, it can collude with other malicious nodes to receive those routing packets and replay them somewhere far away from the original valid node, which is known as a wormhole attack. For instance, it may drop packets received, forward packets to another node not supposed to be in the routing path, or even form a transmission loop through which packets are passed among a few malicious nodes infinitely.

2. Related work For a TARF-enabled node N to route a data packet to the base station, N only needs to decide to which neighboring node it should forward the data packet considering both the trustworthiness and the energy efficiency. Once the data packet is forwarded to that next-hop node, the remaining task to deliver the data to the base station is fully delegated to it, and N is totally unaware of what routing decision its next-hop node makes. N maintains a neighborhood table with trust level values and energy cost values for certain known neighbors. It is sometimes necessary to delete some neighbors’ entries to keep the table size acceptable. In TARF, in addition to data packet transmission, there are two types of routing information that need to be exchanged broadcast messages from the base station about data delivery and energy cost report messages from each node. Neither message needs acknowledgement. A broadcast message from the base station is flooded to the whole network. The freshness of a broadcast message is checked through its field of source sequence number. The other type of exchanged routing information is the energy cost report message from each node, which is broadcast to only its neighbors once. Any node receiving such an energy cost report message will not forward it. For each node N in a WSN, to maintain such a neighborhood table with trust level values and energy cost values for certain known neighbors, two components, Energy Watcher and Trust Manager, run on the node. Energy Watcher is responsible for recording the energy cost for each known neighbor, based on N’s observation of one-hop transmission to reach its neighbors and the energy cost report from those neighbors.


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Fig 1: Each node selects a next-hop node based on its neighborhood table, and broadcast its energy cost within its neighborhood.

3. System design 3.1 Logical Design Design for Web Apps encompasses technical and non-technical activities. The look and feel of content is developed as part of graphic design; the aesthetic layout of the user interface is created as part of interface design; and the technical structure of the Web App is modeled as part of architectural and navigational design. This argues that a Web engineer must design an interface so that it answers three primary questions for the enduser: Where am I? – The interface should (1) provide an indication of the Web App has been accessed and (2) inform the user of her location in the content. What can I do now? – The interface should always help the user understand his current options- what functions are available, what links are live, what content is relevant. Design goals – the following are the design goals that are applicable to virtually every Web App regardless of application domain, size, or complexity.

1.Simplicity 2.Consistency. 3.Identity.

Design leads to a model that contains the appropriate mix of aesthetics, content, and technology. The mix will vary depending upon the nature of the Web App, and as a consequence the design activities that are emphasized will also vary. Mr. Sangamesh Patil, IJRIT

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3.2 Physical design

Fig 2: Trust Aware routing Framework System Architecture.

4. Existing system In Existing system, when the file send from base station in that situation hackers aggravated network conditions. A traditional cryptographic techniques effort does not address the severe problems. That time the file could be affected by hackers. So, the network will be damaged. An attacker may tamper nodes physically, create traffic collision with seemingly valid transmission, drop or misdirect messages in routes, or jam the communication channel by creating radio interference. 4.1 Disadvantages of Existing System • • •

In Existing system, next hop selection is based on distance, it will not consider Energy level and Trust level. Since Energy level is not consider, same node is select to transmit the data, which in turn reduce the battery life and that node become dead quickly. If some nodes are attacked by harmful programs, there is no mechanism to skip the node.

5. Proposed system In Proposed System, focuses on the kind of attacks in which adversaries misdirect network traffic by identity deception through replaying routing information. Based on identity deception the adversary is capable of launching harmful and hard to detect attacks against routing, such as selective forwarding, wormhole attacks, sinkhole attacks, and Sybil attacks.


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5.1 Advantages of the Proposed System • • • •

TARF proves effective against those harmful attacks developed out of identity deception. TARF gives High Throughput, Throughput is defined as the ratio of the number of all data packets delivered to the base station to destination station. Energy is saved in TARF, since it is selecting the next hop based on Trust and Energy Level. While selecting the next hop TARF consider energy level and pick the node with high energy level, so that network or single senor node will not come down quickly.

6. Methodology 6.1 Modules 1. Routing the Network. 2. Transfer File. 3. Sinkhole and Wormhole Attacks. 4. Energy Watcher & Trust Manager.

6.2 Modules description

6.2.1. Routing the network In this module, the networks embedded on the physical fiber topology. However, assessing the performance reliability achieved independent logical links can share the same physical link, which can lead to correlated failures. Mainly, we focus on assessing the reliability of energy level and trusted network. 6.2.2. Transfer file In this module, Analysis the Shortest Path algorithm independently routes each logical link on a physical path with the minimum number of hops in trusted network basis. Since we are assuming that every physical link fails with the same probability, the failure probability of path is minimized when it is routed over the shortest path. Hence, under the algorithm Shortest Path, each light- path greedily takes the most reliable route and transfers the file. 6.2.3. Sinkhole and warm hole attacks Prevent the base station from obtaining complete and correct sensing data Particularly severe for wireless sensor networks Some secure or geographic based routing protocols resist to the sinkhole attacks in certain level Many current routing protocols in sensor networks are susceptible to the sinkhole attack Set of sensor nodes continuously.


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6.2.4. Energy watcher and trust manager In this module Cluster-based WSNs allows for the great savings of energy and bandwidth through aggregating data from children nodes and performing routing and transmission for children nodes. In a cluster-based WSN, the cluster headers themselves form a sub-network, after certain data reach a cluster header, the aggregated data will be routed to a base station only through such a sub network consisting of the cluster headers. Our framework can then be applied to this sub-network to achieve secure routing for cluster based WSNs.

7. Algorithms

7.1 Intruder Attack Process Algorithm • • •

Intruder will select one node from the Level 1 and Level 2 nodes randomly. For the selected node Intruder will keep sending the packets and make the node busy. If any legitimate node send any data to compromised node it will not accept the data in turn it will not give any acknowledgement and gradually trust percentage of this node goes down.

7.2 Algorithm - Selection of next hop node (Source) • • • •

Source will select the next hop node from level 1 nodes. Before selecting, source will check the Node weight of each node . The node which is having more node weight that respective node will be selected as a Next Hop Node. Node weight is the combination of Trust Percentage and Energy Percentage of a respective node. Trust percentage is calculated based on the total files received and for each received file it has to acknowledge to source with success message.

7.3 Algorithm - Selection of next hop node (Level 1 Nodes) • • • • •

Level 1 will select the next hop node from level 2 nodes. Before selecting Level 1 will check the Node weight of each node. The node which is having more node weight that respective node will be selected as a Next Hop Node from Level 2. Node weight is the combination of Trust Percentage and Energy Percentage of a respective node. Trust percentage is calculated based on the total files received and for each received file it has to acknowledge to Level 1 with success message. Finally Level 2 will forward the data to destination.

7.4 Energy Watcher algorithm Here we describe how a node N’s Energy Watcher computes the energy cost ENb for its neighbor b in N’s neighborhood table and how N decides its own energy cost EN. Before going further, we will clarify some notations.


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ENb mentioned is the average energy cost of successfully delivering a unit-sized data packet from N to the base station, with b as N’s next-hop node being responsible for the remaining route. Here, one-hop re-transmission may occur until the acknowledgement is received or the number of re-transmissions reaches a certain threshold. The cost caused by one-hop retransmissions should be included when computing ENb. Suppose N decides that A should be its next-hop node after comparing energy cost and trust level. Then N’s energy cost is EN = ENA. Denote EN!b as the average energy cost of successfully delivering a data packet from N to its neighbor b with one hop. Note that the retransmission cost needs to be considered. With the above notations, it is straightforward to establish the following relation: ENb = EN!b + Eb.

8. Conclusion •

We have designed and implemented TARF, a robust trust-aware routing framework for WSNs, to secure multi-hop routing in dynamic WSNs against harmful attackers exploiting the replay of routing information.

•

TARF focuses on trustworthiness and energy efficiency, which are vital to the survival of a WSN in a hostile environment. With the idea of trust management, TARF enables a node to keep track of the trustworthiness of its neighbors and thus to select a reliable route.

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Our main contributions are listed as follows. (1) Unlike previous efforts at secure routing for WSNs, TARF effectively protects WSNs from severe attacks through replaying routing information; it requires neither tight time synchronization nor known geographic information.

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