Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice 2002, Vol. 6, No. 1, 3–16
Copyright 2002 by the Educational Publishing Foundation 1089-2699/02/$5.00 DOI: 10.1037//1089-2699.6.1.3
Intergroup Differentiation in Computer-Mediated Communication: Effects of Depersonalization Tom Postmes
Russell Spears
University of Amsterdam and University of Exeter
University of Amsterdam
Martin Lea University of Manchester Two studies examined intergroup discussions via computer-mediated communication systems. It was hypothesized that depersonalization, in comparison with individuated interaction, would increase the tendency for intergroup differentiation in attitudes and stereotypes. In Study 1, 24 groups communicated internationally over the Internet in a longitudinal design. Interacting groups, based in 2 different countries, were individuated versus partially unidentifiable, and thus depersonalized. Results indicate that depersonalized groups diverge, or bipolarize, when compared with individuated groups. A follow-up study demonstrated that under depersonalized conditions, individual differences are less salient, whereas group memberships are more salient. In addition, stereotypes were more salient in depersonalized conditions. Results support predictions derived from the social identity model of deindividuation effects.
(CMC) systems,1 can and will break down boundaries of nationality, race, language, and ideology. Beyond pragmatic reasons of facilitation, there are social–psychological grounds for arguing that the Internet breaches social boundaries. Electronic communication creates an environment in which individual differences of status, social class, and group membership are less visible, and thus—according to some—insignificant (e.g., Sproull & Kiesler, 1991). In other words, electronic communication is sometimes seen as depersonalized or less individuated in the sense that the presence of individuals with whom one may interact is less visible or visible in a different way than in face-to-face interaction (Hiltz, Turoff, & Johnson, 1989; Jessup, Connolly, & Tansik, 1990; Kiesler, Siegel, & McGuire, 1984). The traditional assumption is that depersonalization may weaken traditional social influences. By implication, interac-
There are good grounds for arguing that the Internet is primarily a social medium. A majority of Internet users rely on the technology for communication, rather less to search for information or for services such as e-commerce (Kraut, Mukhopadhyay, Szczypula, Kiesler, & Scherlis, 1998). Indeed, the Internet has a potential to connect people irrespective of time or place, enabling interactions from interpersonal to mass communication. Both factors contribute to the belief that communication over the Internet, with computer-mediated communication
Tom Postmes, Department of Communication, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, and School of Psychology, University of Exeter, Exeter, United Kingdom; Russell Spears, Department of Social Psychology, University of Amsterdam; Martin Lea, Department of Psychology, University of Manchester, Manchester, United Kingdom. We thank Kim van Baaren, Rachel Croft, and Luuk van Dijk for help at various stages. The comments of Bert-Jan Doosje, Naomi Ellemers, Jolanda Jetten, and Ernestine Gordijn are gratefully acknowledged. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Tom Postmes, School of Psychology, University of Exeter, Exeter EX4 4QG, United Kingdom. E-mail:
[email protected]
1 CMC is an umbrella term that, when taken literally, could mean any form of interaction via the computer. In practice, it has come to describe text-based interaction between users on computer networks. Examples are synchronous “chat” applications for dyads or groups such as ICQ or conferencing systems, e-mail, and bulletin board systems.
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tion via computers may give the individual greater freedom from social strictures. Thus, as we have argued elsewhere in more detail, the relative anonymity2 of CMC has promised reduced intergroup differentiation and increased equality (Postmes, Spears, & Lea, 1998). In contrast, the social identity model of deindividuation effects (SIDE) suggests that the effects of depersonalization are less straightforward than this (Reicher, Spears, & Postmes, 1995). Based on Reicher’s research of collective behavior, the SIDE model argues that depersonalization, as may be caused by anonymity in groups or certain forms of interaction via the Internet, has two distinct impacts on social behavior. On the one hand, depersonalization (in the sense of a lack of identifiability of the self to others) offers the strategic liberty to ignore social pressures and unwanted influences. Thus, similar to the perspectives discussed above, CMC could have a liberating impact under some conditions (especially if people want to escape the surveillance and regulation of others). On the other hand, depersonalization (in the sense of anonymity of others) has cognitive consequences for the perception of individuals and the self (Spears & Lea, 1992). The SIDE model proposes that in contexts in which individuating information is scarce, people are more sensitive to group membership cues (such as gender or nationality) than when individuating information is abundant. The underlying process is that depersonalization makes it less likely that others are perceived as individuals with a range of idiosyncratic characteristics and ways of behaving. They are more likely to be seen as representatives of social groups or wider social categories that may be salient or inferred during interaction. As a consequence, depersonalization also affects how people perceive themselves in relation to this social context, along the lines suggested by social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978) and self-categorization theory (Turner, 1987). In particular, if depersonalization shifts the perception of a social event from being an interpersonal to an intergroup event, this increases the likelihood that people define themselves as group members first and only as idiosyncratic individuals second (Tajfel, 1978). As applied to CMC, the relative anonymity associated with this medium provides a context in which individual differences between group
members are sometimes less visible. As a result, the salience of group memberships is likely to be accentuated in depersonalized settings as found on the Internet, which has consequences for how people perceive in-group members, out-group members, and themselves. In intergroup interactions over the Internet, this means that depersonalized communication via CMC could potentially increase differentiation between groups on dimensions ranging from bias, through stereotyping, to divergence in attitudes (see Postmes et al., 1998; Spears & Lea, 1994). In terms of social identity theory, depersonalized CMC could shift intergroup interactions from defining the situation in interpersonal terms (“me” and “you”) to defining it in intergroup terms (“us” vs. “them”). Thus, depersonalized interactions over the Internet could stimulate our natural tendency for differentiation between social categories (Tajfel, 1978). Indeed, the Internet can be the forum for stereotyped and biased intergroup relations, and the possibility even exists that intergroup boundaries are reinforced rather than breached.
Prior Research Although several studies have provided support for propositions of the SIDE model in intragroup contexts, very few studies have examined its predictions in online intergroup interactions. Several studies have now shown that especially when a strong and preestablished group identity exists, social influence is sometimes greater within depersonalized groups. There is somewhat less evidence for the SIDE model’s prediction that depersonalization reproduces or even accentuates intergroup differences. In nonelectronic settings, demonstrations of in-group favoritism are common under depersonalized conditions. For example, depersonalization increases intergroup differentiation in the minimal group paradigm (see Postmes, Spears, & Lea, 1999, for a review). 2 Absolute anonymity is rare in CMC as on the Internet. It is therefore more correct to refer to relative identifiability, on a continuum from absolute anonymity to identifiability. In the present study we are concerned not so much with anonymity, however, as with depersonalization, which reflects that it is the psychological process of seeing someone as an individual person (individuated perceptions) or not (depersonalized perceptions) that we believe to be of significance in electronic interaction.
SPECIAL ISSUE: INTERGROUP DIFFERENTIATION IN CMC
With regard to the effects of depersonalization on the Internet, survey research, content analyses of online interactions, and experimental evidence have shown that “cyberspace” is not always as egalitarian as one would hope. Despite anonymity in CMC, for example, stereotypes between men and women persist or are accentuated in discussion lists, on bulletin boards, in Internet Relay Chat (IRC), and in newsgroups (Herman, 1999; Thomson & Murachver, 2001). Likewise, there is evidence that status differences remain influential in group decision support systems and synchronous CMC messaging, which may both be anonymous (e.g., Hollingshead, 1996; Straus, 1997). Researchers have also noted the considerable racial biases that may be found in discussions on Usenet News, where contributions may be anonymous or identified (Douglas & McGarty, 2000). Finally, research in classroom settings suggests that “patterns of technology access and use often mirror and reinforce existing inequalities rather than mitigate them” (Schofield, 1999, p. 2). Thus, across a variety of areas and methods, research suggests that online interactions are far from impervious to group memberships: People derogate other groups, and traditional social divisions continue to exert a considerable impact, despite the fact that some of these interactions could be described as depersonalized. However, there is little research directly linking intergroup differentiation in CMC to depersonalization. In part, this is because most studies compare CMC with face-to-face interactions. Although interesting and worthwhile, such comparisons are not suited to causal inferences about why the Internet may have certain impacts. One reason is that the CMC–face-toface comparison confounds factors such as depersonalization with mode and pace of interaction, rather than keeping interaction constant. Because we were interested precisely in investigating the process underlying the persistence and accentuation of intergroup differences on the Internet, we conducted two experiments studying the impact of depersonalization in intergroup interactions via CMC systems. More specifically, we investigated whether depersonalization contributes to intergroup differentiation in attitudes and stereotypes.
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Study 1 This study used the potential of the Internet for communicating across national boundaries. Groups of students in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, discussed several topics with students in Manchester, England, using a text-based computer-conferencing system. During these interactions, participants were either personally unidentifiable (depersonalized condition) or personally identifiable (individuated condition) with respect to the out-group. On the basis of the attitude polarization literature, we expected that groups would accommodate to each other: People converge and polarize toward a more extreme group position (Myers & Lamm, 1976). However, depersonalization should diminish the degree to which accommodation occurs. We predicted that depersonalized interaction would stimulate stronger intergroup differentiation when compared with individuated interaction: Depersonalization should either stop accommodation or even foster bipolarization (i.e., attitude divergence) of groups relative to each other. In addition, we explore whether differentiation and attitude change develop over time.
Method Participants. Dutch participants were University of Amsterdam Business School students, all fluent writers of English. Pilot testing indicated this to be a relatively conservative and traditional group. English participants were psychology undergraduates of the University of Manchester, recruited from a participant pool. Pilot data indicated this to be a relatively progressive population.3 In total, 72 participants (44 female, 28 male; age 22 on average) were divided across 24 groups of 3 and then randomly assigned to conditions. Because 4 participants failed to show up to the second session and 1 participant did not fill in the questionnaires seriously, 67 participants were included in the analysis, and some groups consisted of 2 members. Participants were paid approximately US$25 for participation. 3 We are aware that the reputations of Dutch and English societies are opposite to the political attitudes of these student populations.
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Design and independent variables. The design of the study was a 2 (group: Dutch vs. English) ⫻ 2 (depersonalization: depersonalized vs. individuated) ⫻ 3 (time) factorial design. The factor time was a repeated measure with one pretest (T1) and two posttests (T2 and T3). The factor depersonalization consisted of a depersonalized condition, in which discussants were identified by their initials and a group tag. In the individuated condition, discussants were identified by a group tag, by their first name, and by images taken of them at the end of the first session. They were told that their images would be displayed to the out-group, and they likewise could ostensibly see the images of outgroup members on their screen. In reality, images were randomly drawn from a pool of 8 nonparticipants, matching the gender of real participants to that of the person in the picture. The factor group distinguished between English and Dutch participants. Group membership was identified by means of group tags (a capital A or M) in front of all contributions. Thus, depersonalized participants would, for instance, be chatting with “A_lv,” being “lv” from Amsterdam, while identified participants would, for example, be chatting with “A_lydia.” Apparatus. Participants used a Macintosh PC connected to the Internet. Computers at each location were 3 m apart in one room, such that visual contact was limited. Participants communicated in a synchronous computer conference between all members of the in- and out-group (i.e., 6 people in all, 3 in the Netherlands and 3 in England). IRC servers provided a permanent connection. Participants communicated with a simple conference program providing two windows, one for entering messages into the conference and one for reading the conference (with the ability to scroll back). Messages were shared among in-group and out-group alike, arriving in less than half a second after submission. Individuated participants had a third window with black-and-white images (3 ⫻ 4 cm) of the out-group members and their names. Procedure. The study was conducted in three 1-hr sessions, one week apart.4 During the first session (T1) participants were introduced to the other in-groupers. They were told that the study investigated discursive styles in CMC, and they practiced using the system with their group. Thus, in-group identification was reinforced prior to intergroup contact. They then
completed a pretest questionnaire, and pictures of participants in the individuated condition were taken. Sessions at T2 and at T3 consisted of discussions with in- and out-group members followed by a posttest questionnaire. Participants were presented with three political issues and were instructed to give their opinions and discuss each topic for 10 min via the conferencing system. There was no instruction to reach consensus. All discussions and instructions were in English. After the third session (T3), participants were debriefed, paid, and thanked. Discussion topics were selected on the basis of pilot data. The issues were legalization of drugs, the monarchy, and scientific research into homosexuality. Each issue was introduced by four related statements so that participants could consider different aspects of the issue during discussion. An example of one discussion statement is “Strong legislation against drugs has worsened problems of drug use in many countries.” Pilot data, collected at mass testing sessions, and the pretest (see below) indicated that the business students from Amsterdam were relatively more antilegalization, pro-monarchy, and pro-research, consistent with their more conservative political attitudes. Dependent measures. Questionnaires consisted of 9-point scales (1 ⫽disagree, 9 ⫽ agree) unless indicated otherwise. The pretest consisted of the same attitude statements used for discussion, followed by a 16-item political attitude scale (␣ ⫽ .78). Identification was measured with a four-item scale of social identification with the in-group (␣ ⫽ .83) and a fouritem scale of personal identification (␣⫽ .86; Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995). Computing proficiency was measured with two questions: “How much experience do you have using computers?” (little vs. a lot) and “Have you ever used computer-communication programs (such as Talk, e-mail, or other communication-programs)?” (never vs. often). The posttest questionnaires contained the same questions as the pretest (except for the political attitude scale). In addition, intergroup differentiation was measured with two items 4 The groups met over 4 weeks, but because of technical failures no data were collected from four groups at the last session. It was decided to drop the fourth measurement altogether; this had no effect on the main results of the study.
SPECIAL ISSUE: INTERGROUP DIFFERENTIATION IN CMC
(␣ ⫽ .76; e.g., “To what extent do you yourself differ from the average [out-group: Amsterdam or Manchester] student?”). To control for explanations of results along the lines of deindividuation theory, we assessed participants’ private and public self-awareness using scales developed by Prentice-Dunn and Rogers (1982) with adaptations for CMC (Matheson & Zanna, 1989). Two items (␣ ⫽ .74) assessed private self-awareness (e.g., “I was aware of the way my mind worked”). Two further items (␣ ⫽ .81) assessed public self-awareness (e.g., “During the discussion I wondered about the way I’ve presented myself in comparison to others”). Finally, a manipulation check of depersonalization of the out-group was included: “The people in that group were anonymous to me during the discussion.” English and Dutch questionnaires were back-translations.
Results To eliminate possible interdependence, data were analyzed at the group level. There were six groups per condition: 19 groups of 3 persons, and 5 groups of 2. A possible threat to the independence of our group factor could occur if responses in the two cities were directly related. Using a method recommended by Anderson and Ager (1978), we tested for this possibility by examining the effect of groups as a nested factor in the total design in an analysis of variance (ANOVA) of the attitude scores at T1, T2, and T3. Because this effect was not significant, F(20, 24) ⫽ 1.16, p ⬎.35, we can assume it is safe to treat the factor groups as a between-subjects factor. However, we also report more conservative analyses that control for dependence. The only reliable effect on the manipulation check of depersonalization was a main effect of depersonalization condition, F(1, 20) ⫽ 4.85, p ⬍ .05. This effect confirmed that the outgroup was perceived as more anonymous in the depersonalized condition (M ⫽ 4.86, SD ⫽ 1.54) than in the individuated condition (M ⫽ 3.66, SD ⫽ 1.02). Another check was for computing proficiency, and no reliable condition effects or interactions were found (all Fs ⬍ 1.68). Finally, the assumption that Dutch business students were more conservative than English psychology students was tested. Analysis of the political attitude scale showed only a
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main effect of group, F(1, 68) ⫽ 11.20, p ⬍ .001.5 Dutch students were more conservative (M ⫽ 4.69, SD ⫽ 0.69) than English students (M ⫽ 5.15, SD ⫽ 0.72). Attitude change and the attitude gap between groups. We analyzed the average attitude scores of groups and the gap between groups. The aggregated attitude scores and the average size of the gap between groups are shown in Table 1. There were no significant differences in attitudes at the pretest (T1). The changes from pre- to posttest were analyzed in a repeated measures analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) on the posttests T2 and T3 with the pretest T1 as a covariate and the factors depersonalization and group as between-subjects factors. In this analysis, only the Group ⫻ Depersonalization interaction was reliable, F(1, 19) ⫽ 7.11, p ⫽ .01. As can be seen in Table 1, attitudes changed from pre- to posttest such that depersonalized groups diverged in attitudes, whereas individuated groups converged. A repeated measures ANOVA, with repeated measures contrasts, was carried out to further explore this interaction effect. First, an effect of time was found across all conditions: participants’ attitudes polarized toward a more liberal attitude over time, F(2, 40) ⫽ 8.41, p ⫽ .001. This finding replicates the traditional attitude polarization finding. Contrasts indicated that this time effect was due entirely to a difference between measures at T1 and T2, F(1, 20) ⫽ 12.57, p ⬍ .01. No further shifts occurred between T2 and T3, F(1, 20) ⫽ 0.33, ns. However, the main effect for time was moderated by a three-way interaction between depersonalization, group, and time, F(2, 40) ⫽ 4.48, p ⬍ .05. Contrasts indicated that the interaction was caused by changes between T1 and both posttests combined, F(1, 20) ⫽ 6.53, p ⬍ .02, and that no further attitude changes occurred between T2 and T3, F(1, 20) ⫽ 0.49, ns. Further contrast analysis showed that in the individuated condition there was a nonsignificant tendency for the groups to converge from pre- to posttest, F(1, 10) ⫽ 2.93, p ⫽ .12. In contrast, in the depersonalized condition the predicted effect of bipolarization was reliable from pre- to posttest: The difference between the groups in5 Pretest data were collected before interactions and analyzed at the individual level.
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Table 1 Study 1: Means and Standard Deviations of Attitude Measures and Attitude Gaps by Condition Condition
T1
Depersonalized English M SD
5.54 0.65
Gap
T2
6.17 0.81 0.09
Dutch M SD Individuated English M SD
T3
0.54
5.46 0.54
5.63 0.81
5.61 0.98
5.39 0.47
5.38 0.61
5.38 0.54
4.98 0.22
Gap
6.15 0.91 0.54
0.41 Dutch M SD
Gap
⫺.01
0.17 5.21 0.29
5.39 0.25
Note. n ⫽ 6 for each group. Gaps are computed as mean attitude of the English group minus mean attitude of the Dutch group. Higher scores indicate more liberal attitudes and a bigger gap.
creased reliably, F(1, 10) ⫽ 5.84, p ⬍ .05. None of the other effects approached significance. Analysis of the gaps between groups controls for possible dependence. Repeated measures ANCOVA using the pretest as a covariate and depersonalization as a between-subjects factor showed a reliable main effect of depersonalization, F(1, 9) ⫽ 6.50, p ⬍ .05, corroborating the results reported above with a more conservative statistical test. Ancillary measures. No significant effects of conditions were obtained for in-group identification or for personal identification. Likewise, there was no evidence for the prediction that the perceived difference between participants themselves and the out-group would be greater as a result of depersonalization. However, means differed in the predicted direction, with depersonalized groups differentiating somewhat more (adjusted M ⫽ 5.77, SD ⫽ 0.65) than individuated groups (adjusted M ⫽ 5.35, SD ⫽ 0.61), but the effect failed to reach statistical significance, F(1, 20) ⫽ 2.52, p ⫽ .13. Finally, no reliable condition effects were found for private self-awareness. Importantly, private self-awareness in the depersonalized condition (adjusted M ⫽ 6.29, SD ⫽ 0.67) and that in the individuated condition (M ⫽ 6.58, SD ⫽ 0.42) were not reliably dif-
ferent, F(1, 20) ⫽ 1.74, ns. With regard to public self-awareness, an unpredicted main effect of factor group was found, F(1, 20) ⫽ 11.59, p ⬍ .01. English groups indicated feeling more publicly self-aware than Dutch groups (adjusted M ⫽ 7.37 and M ⫽ 5.54, respectively).
Discussion Across conditions, groups became more liberal over time. This polarization across groups is the typical finding in polarization research (Myers & Lamm, 1976). However, this effect was moderated by an effect of the depersonalization condition: Depersonalized discussions via a CMC system promote differentiation between groups in the form of bipolarization of attitudes. In contrast, individuated discussion showed a tendency for the opposite: attitude convergence between groups. In sum, predictions were confirmed. Thus, we demonstrated that depersonalization stimulates intergroup differentiation in international intergroup discussions via a CMC system. Unfortunately, there was little evidence concerning the underlying process as proposed by the SIDE model. In fact, only one of the process variables showed a reliable effect, indi-
SPECIAL ISSUE: INTERGROUP DIFFERENTIATION IN CMC
cating that Dutch participants were less publicly self-aware than English participants. Because this effect may have been caused by a range of differences between international groups (from the translation of questionnaires to cultural differences) and cannot account for the impact of depersonalization, we believe that it is uninformative with regard to the process we aimed to investigate. A follow-up study should therefore reinvestigate whether depersonalization has an impact on the salience of social categories, by employing different measures of salience than in Study 1. It is interesting to note that there were no major developments of intergroup relations or attitudes as a result of prolonged discussion. Shifts occurred after one discussion and remained stable thereafter. This could signify that information exchange is not necessarily the dominant cause of attitude change (as self-categorization theory has argued), or it could indicate that no new information was exchanged in later discussions. Either way, it appears that the longitudinal design of this study did not provide insights that could not have been achieved in a much simpler pre–post design.
Possible Improvements for a Follow-Up Study In the design of a follow-up study, we took a number of issues into account. In Study 1, for example, the initial differences between English and Dutch groups were fairly subtle and were opposed to what some might have expected of Dutch and English students. A replication could aim to examine similar processes in situations where the intergroup differences are less ambiguous (although moderate intergroup differences may promote intergroup differentiation; Brewer, 1991). In addition, the present study only indirectly tested our prediction that the direction of attitude change is influenced by the position of the out-group. Manipulating an out-group’s position would provide stronger support. Some characteristics of Study 1 introduce alternative explanations for the findings. That interactions were international introduced an imbalance: Participants were better acquainted with in-groupers than with out-groupers. Possibly, the effect of individuation could be due to conformity pressure or interdependence (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955): Identifiability to the
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out-group in the individuated condition may have promoted convergence, making bipolarization less likely. Although such a process is partially consistent with the predictions of the SIDE model, a replication should seek to depersonalize both in-group and out-group; this would be a better test of our predictions. A further problem of Study 1 was that the content of interactions could have differed across conditions. Thus, attitude polarization and differentiation may have been a function of the actual content of communications rather than of depersonalization per se. Thus, a follow-up study should keep the content of communications constant in order to be able to assess the causal impact of depersonalization more directly. Four other issues were identified in dependent measures of Study 1. These were concerned with the local in- and out-group (i.e., they referred to “the people I communicated with”). However, it is possible that depersonalization has an impact on perceptions of the social category as a whole (i.e., stereotypes of and identification with psychology or business students). Second, a follow-up study should include better indices for group salience than Study 1, which relied on measures of group identification. Although salience and identification are related, they are not identical (tapping cognitive and affective dimensions of the person– group relationship, respectively). Third, self-report scales were used in Study 1, but participants may not have been aware of the underlying processes. Especially when assessing group salience, it may be better to rely on implicit measures. All of these considerations were taken into account for developing new dependent measures for Study 2.
Study 2 Psychology students were led to believe they were engaged in an intergroup discussion between 2 other in-groupers and an out-group consisting of 3 business or sociology students. There was no real exchange, however; feedback was provided by the computer. Participants were depersonalized or individuated with respect to both out-group and in-group. Predictions were similar to those of Study 1. Depersonalization should increase the salience of group memberships and should lead to intergroup differentiation and possibly bipolariza-
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tion. Individuated groups, in contrast, should converge. In addition, we manipulated the nature of the out-group, which could be composed of either sociology or business students. These groups were chosen because of the stereotypes about these groups’ political attitudes. Business students are perceived as more right wing and sociology undergraduates as more left wing than the average psychology student. It was expected that the nature of the out-group would moderate the effect of depersonalization on attitude change.
Method Participants and design. Seventy psychology undergraduates (48 female, 22 male; age 20 on average) participated in the study as a partial fulfillment of course requirements. Participants were randomly assigned to experimental conditions. The design was a 2 (out-group: sociology vs. business students) ⫻ 2 (depersonalization: depersonalized vs. individuated) factorial design. Apparatus. Participants received instructions and feedback from a computer program. Participants believed they interacted via a synchronous computer-conferencing system similar to Study 1. However, no actual interaction took place. The system presented participants with an attitude statement to which they could respond by entering an opinion or a comment. As soon as the return key was pressed, the computer simulated opinions or comments that were stereotypical of the in- and out-group; these statements were purportedly entered by the other participants.6 Procedure and manipulations. Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants had their pictures taken, and they were informed that pictures could or could not be used to individuate group members during different parts of the study. Participants were then isolated in cubicles with a Macintosh computer. They were first given six attitude questions (the pretest). These consisted of political attitude statements. Participants then completed two unrelated questionnaires for about 15 min. Subsequently, participants were informed they would be exchanging arguments about the attitude statements with two other psychology undergraduates and with three students from another degree program. Participants were instructed simply to share their ideas about the topics appearing on their screen.
Participants in the individuated condition saw pictures of in-group members on the left of their screen and of out-group members on the right. Each picture was labeled with a username. Participants in the depersonalized condition saw no pictures, only usernames of in-group and outgroup members. All pictures (except those of participants themselves) were randomly chosen from a pool of images of an equal number of male and female undergraduates from a different cohort. Participants were identified not by name but by a username consisting of a group label and a number. Participants were always called “PSY_2,” and they communicated with 2 other “PSY_” participants and either 3 “BUS_” or 3 “SOC_” out-group members. After the exchange of views, the computer proceeded by presenting participants again with the attitude statements, followed by a postexperimental questionnaire. Approximately 2 weeks after the study, participants were debriefed. Discussion topics and feedback. Six political attitude statements were selected on the basis of a pilot study (N ⫽ 40; e.g., “The death penalty is never justified, not even for very serious crimes”). Pilot data collected among psychology students showed that on the basis of these statements the political attitudes of business students were perceived as significantly more conservative than those of sociology students, with psychology students being in the middle (somewhat closer to the position of sociology students than that of business students). During the discussion, participants ostensibly received responses from in- and out-group members. These responses were also selected from the pilot study, which asked participants to write a brief response arguing why they agreed or disagreed with each statement. A second pilot study (N ⫽ 17) assessed the relevance, direction, persuasiveness, and novelty of each of these responses, as well as to what extent they were prototypical of business, psychology, 6 To simulate a real discussion, the computer varied the order and speed with which reactions were presented. Order was randomized, but the position of the participants’ statements in the queue was fixed from round to round, participants being in either second, third or fourth position. The differences in presentation speed were varied such that the last message entered after 30 s. Messages remained on the screen for 10 s more, and the program then proceeded to the next round.
SPECIAL ISSUE: INTERGROUP DIFFERENTIATION IN CMC
and sociology students. Responses were selected that were equally novel, persuasive, and relevant, as well as prototypical for the group they ostensibly came from. Thus, the feedback consisted of two neutral responses ostensibly generated by in-group psychology students and either three conservative responses of business students or three liberal responses of sociology students. Dependent measures. At the pretest, participants could indicate agreement on six political attitude statements (above) by mouse-clicking on a 100-point scale anchored with not at all and very much. The postexperimental questionnaire again assessed attitudes, but on 9-point scales anchored with disagree and agree. In similar fashion, participants assessed the attitudes of the out-group. Attitude scores were computed by averaging the six, such that higher scores indicate more liberal attitudes. The scale had acceptable reliability (␣ ⫽ .71 and ␣ ⫽ .87 for in- and out-group attitudes, respectively). Other responses were recorded on 9-point scales anchored with not at all and very much, unless indicated otherwise. Questions generally referred to in-group and out-group categories. Thus, the same in-group identification scale used in Study 1 now asked participants to indicate to what extent they “identified with psychology students” (␣ ⫽ .78). The same questions were asked with respect to the out-group category, forming a scale of out-group identification (␣ ⫽ .78). With regard to impressions of the out-group, a measure assessed perceptions of homogeneity of the out-group: “[business/ sociology] students differ . . . from each other.” In addition, four 100-point semantic differentials assessed stereotypes of the in-group and out-group on the dimensions kind– unkind, pleasant– unpleasant, easy to deal with–not easy to deal with, and sympathetic– unsympathetic. Stereotypes of both groups (␣s ⫽ .80 and .88) were subtracted, with higher scores indicating more favorable stereotypes of the in-group. As an implicit measure of group salience, we used the “who-said-what” cued recall task (Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978). Participants were presented with six statements from the discussion and had to identify who had sent which message. The number of correct answers indicates how much people attended to personal contributions and is an index of individuation (Festinger, Pepitone, & Newcomb, 1952).
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Moreover, two types of mistakes can be made in this task: intragroup errors, confusing who said what within a group, and intergroup errors, confusion between groups. The extent to which more intragroup errors are made relative to intergroup errors indicates category salience. The number of errors in this task was corrected for the different a priori chances of making a specific type of error (Taylor et al., 1978). Finally, the depersonalization manipulation was checked with two questions asking whether participants felt depersonalized to the out-group and in-group (e.g., “During this task I felt anonymous to the psychology [or business vs. sociology] students I communicated with”). Content analysis. Messages entered by participants were analyzed in two ways. Computerized counts were made of the number of words, characters, and self-references, the last as an implicit measure of private self-awareness (Davis & Brock, 1975). In addition, two coders examined the content of messages. Relevance of messages to the attitude statement was coded (as relevant or not). Direction of the message was assessed on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (disagreement with the statement) to 5 (agreement). One rater was unaware of the design and purpose of the study, and these judgments are analyzed below. One of the authors was the second rater, who coded half of the messages. Raters reached acceptable reliability (there was complete agreement in 83% of the cases for relevance and 78% for direction).
Results Manipulation checks. Participants in the depersonalized condition indicated feeling more anonymous to the out-group (M ⫽ 6.83, SD ⫽ 1.96) compared with individuated participants (M ⫽ 5.41, SD ⫽ 1.81), F(1, 66) ⫽ 10.01, p ⬍ .01. Also, participants in the depersonalized condition felt more anonymous to the in-group (M ⫽ 5.97, SD ⫽ 2.17) compared with individuated participants (M ⫽ 4.32, SD ⫽ 2.08), F(1, 66) ⫽ 10.39, p ⬍ .01. Results indicate that the out-group’s political position was manipulated effectively. The business out-group was perceived as having more conservative attitudes (M ⫽ 4.16, SD ⫽ 0.86) than the sociology out-group (M ⫽ 6.59, SD ⫽ 1.05), F(1, 66) ⫽ 109.20, p ⬍ .001. A repeated measures ANOVA indicated that the
12
POSTMES, SPEARS, AND LEA
out-group attitudes were significantly different from participants’ own posttest attitudes (with differences on the pretest partialed out). Sociology students’ attitudes (M ⫽ 6.59, SD ⫽ 1.05) were perceived to be more liberal than own attitudes (M ⫽ 5.61, SD ⫽ 0.50), F(1, 66) ⫽ 28.42, p ⬍ .01. Business students’ attitudes were perceived to be more conservative (M ⫽ 4.16, SD ⫽ 0.86, and M ⫽ 5.27, SD ⫽ 0.55, respectively), F(1, 66) ⫽ 37.65, p ⬍ .01. Attitude change. Attitudes were not similar across conditions at the pretest, despite randomization. Because this effect occurred before manipulations, it is due to random sampling error. Thus, we examine attitude change in an ANCOVA with the posttest attitude score as a dependent variable and the pretest as a covariate to correct for pretest variation. The main effect of the out-group was reliable. People interacting with business students (adjusted M ⫽ 5.27, SD ⫽ 0.55) were more conservative than those who interacted with sociology students (M ⫽ 5.61, SD ⫽ 0.50), F(1, 66) ⫽ 7.04, p ⬍ .01. This main effect was qualified by the predicted interaction, F(1, 65) ⫽ 6.16, p ⬍.05. Participants in the individuated condition accommodated their opinions to the out-group: Those interacting with business students were significantly more conservative than those interacting with sociology students (M ⫽ 5.18, SD ⫽ 0.57 vs. M ⫽ 5.83, SD ⫽ 0.51, respectively), F(1, 64) ⫽ 14.14, p ⬍ .01. However, this effect was attenuated in the depersonalized conditions (M ⫽ 5.37, SD ⫽ 0.53 vs. M ⫽ 5.39, SD ⫽ 0.40, respectively), F(1, 64) ⫽ 0.02, ns. Group identification and variability. There were no effects of condition for group identification, except for a trend toward a main effect for depersonalization, F(1, 66) ⫽ 3.43, p ⬍ .07. Participants in the depersonalized condition tended to identify more strongly with the ingroup (M ⫽ 5.06, SD ⫽ 1.40) than did those in the individuated condition (M ⫽ 4.48, SD ⫽ 1.15). Similarly, a trend toward a depersonalization main effect, F(1, 66) ⫽ 3.75, p ⫽ .05, was the only effect for estimated homogeneity of the out-group. In the depersonalized condition, the out-group was perceived as more homogeneous (M ⫽ 6.17, SD ⫽ 1.91) than in the individuated condition (M ⫽ 5.26, SD ⫽ 2.02). Stereotyping. When comparing the average stereotype scores of in- and out-group, a reliable
difference between the two was found, F(1, 66) ⫽ 20.64, p ⬍ .01. Unsurprisingly, the stereotype of the in-group was more positive than that of the out-group. However, this pattern of overall in-group preference was moderated by a reliable effect of depersonalization, F(1, 66) ⫽ 5.24, p ⬍ .05. Participants in the depersonalized condition held more negative stereotypes of the out-group (M ⫽ 7.22, SD ⫽ 9.07) than did participants in the individuated condition (M ⫽ 2.62, SD ⫽ 8.93). Also, a main effect of group was found, F(1, 66) ⫽ 4.52, p ⬍ .05. Participants had more negative impressions of business students (M ⫽ 7.12, SD ⫽ 10.42) than of sociology students (M ⫽ 2.62, SD ⫽ 7.43). The interaction was not reliable. Individuation and salience. Overall recall accuracy on the who-said-what task showed only a main effect of depersonalization, F(1, 66) ⫽ 29.76, p ⬍ .001. Participants in the individuated condition achieved 47% accuracy, compared with 26% for participants in the depersonalized condition. For error type, participants overall made more intragroup recall errors (M ⫽ 2.16, SD ⫽ 1.43) than intergroup errors (M ⫽ 1.10, SD ⫽ 0.77), F(1, 66) ⫽ 24.80, p ⬍ .01. Salience was measured by the difference of intragroup and intergroup recall errors (Taylor et al., 1978). A main effect of depersonalization was the only reliable effect, F(1, 66) ⫽ 6.52, p ⬍ .05. The prediction was confirmed: Salience was stronger for participants in the depersonalized (M ⫽ 1.58, SD ⫽ 1.86) than for participants in the individuated condition (M ⫽ 0.51, SD ⫽ 1.60). Content analysis. No condition effects or interactions were reliable for the number of words, characters, or self-references. As for the coded categories, the relevance of arguments did not vary significantly between conditions. The direction of messages showed a pattern comparable to the attitude results. There was a significant main effect of the group condition, F(1, 66) ⫽ 6.63, p ⬍ .05, that was moderated by an interaction, F(1, 66) ⫽ 4.14, p ⬍ .05. Whereas messages converged toward the outgroup’s position in the individuated condition (out-group business, M ⫽ 2.78, SD ⫽ 0.52; out-group sociology, M ⫽ 3.52, SD ⫽ 0.74), F(1, 66) ⫽ 10.65, p ⬍ .01, there were no reliable differences in the depersonalized con-
SPECIAL ISSUE: INTERGROUP DIFFERENTIATION IN CMC
ditions (Ms ⫽ 3.07, SD ⫽ 0.71 vs. M ⫽ 3.15, SD ⫽ 0.74, respectively), F(1, 66) ⫽ 0.11, ns.
Discussion Results partially support the predictions and are consistent with the findings of Study 1. With respect to attitude change, individuated intergroup interaction stimulated convergence. In contrast, depersonalized interaction did not stimulate convergence but led to the maintenance of intergroup differences both in the attitude change from pre- to posttest and in the content analysis of the messages typed by the participants. Unlike in Study 1 there was no absolute bipolarization in the depersonalized condition but rather an attenuation of attitude convergence. That no bipolarization occurred may be due to several factors that may have made the situation less powerful than in Study 1. For example, in-group members were identifiable to each other and were copresent in the first study and may therefore have exerted more influence than in Study 2. Nonetheless, accountability pressures alone cannot explain the findings of Study 2: Participants were equally accountable to in- and out-group members during the discussions and equally unaccountable when they expressed their attitudes in private. Another explanation is that interaction in Study 2 was much shorter, which may have diluted the impact of in-group influence somewhat. Finally, the differences between the groups in Study 2 ostensibly were much bigger to begin with. This may have reduced the necessity for intergroup differentiation, because “optimal distinctiveness” was already achieved (Brewer, 1991). However, irrespective of these conjectures regarding why bipolarization failed to occur, it should be pointed out that the difference between conditions of depersonalization and individuation was central here. The results in two studies were conceptually similar in this regard: Depersonalization was associated with greater attitude differentiation than individuation. The measures of group salience and stereotyping were instructive about the processes underlying these phenomena and showed the expected effects: Depersonalization led to greater salience of group boundaries, and it activated group stereotypes. In addition, there were trends
13
for participants to identify more strongly with their own group in the depersonalized condition and for them to perceive the out-group as more homogeneous. Individuation also had the effect of heightening the salience of personal differences within the group, as evidenced by the recall data. All of these variables point in the same direction and support the idea that depersonalization of in- and out-group members enhances the (relative) salience of group boundaries and stimulates stereotyped impressions of the out-group. Alternative explanations in terms of classical or contemporary deindividuation theory (Postmes & Spears, 1998) would seem unlikely. Crucial in this regard is the impact of anonymity on self-awareness: Deindividuation cannot be inferred without self-awareness effects (Diener, 1980). In a prior meta-analysis, we showed that such a relation has not been established in the literature, suggesting that deindividuating or depersonalizing conditions may actually have no effect on self-awareness (Postmes & Spears, 1998). Indeed, results of neither study suggest that self-awareness or private self-awareness were affected by depersonalization. Consistent with Diener (1980), we conclude that depersonalization most likely did not cause a psychological state of deindividuation in the present research.
General Discussion As proposed by the SIDE model, depersonalization on the Internet does not necessarily have equalizing effects, as is commonly assumed, but may accentuate existing differences between social groups (Postmes et al., 1998; Spears & Lea, 1994). These predictions were confirmed in two studies comparing individuated and depersonalized political discussions via CMC systems. In these studies, depersonalization was achieved by removing individuating information such as portrait pictures and names from the interaction while maintaining identifiability of group memberships (similar to displaying an e-mail address, which sometimes is informative about group memberships such as nationality, but not about individuality). The first study showed that in international intergroup interaction, tendencies for attitude convergence as found in individuated groups may
14
POSTMES, SPEARS, AND LEA
be reversed in depersonalized groups, where bipolarization may occur. A second study showed that under the more controlled settings of an experiment in which electronic intergroup interaction was simulated, depersonalization reduced convergence. The second study also provided insight into the psychological effects of depersonalization. Direct support was obtained for the prediction that depersonalization facilitates a transition from a personal to a social identity (also Turner, 1987). In particular, the recall data showed that pictures helped to individuate communicators and their contributions. In contrast, depersonalization reduces the capacity for differentiation between people. However, depersonalization did not reduce the capacity for differentiation between groups: People recalled equally well from which group messages originated with or without pictures. Thus, depersonalization increases the relative salience of group boundaries. In addition, there were other data illustrating that group membership becomes relatively important in depersonalized settings. For example, depersonalization caused greater stereotyping and perceptions of out-group homogeneity. In addition, the data suggested that identification with the in-group may have been somewhat higher in depersonalized conditions. The implication of these findings is that depersonalization enhances the potentially negative impact that stereotypes about social groups may have because of psychological accentuation of cues to group membership. In some sense, the data presented here could be interpreted as showing that anonymity (vs. identifiability) accentuates intergroup differences by depersonalizing perceptions of the group. However, there is an important caveat to such a conclusion. There are cases in which anonymity completely masks group membership, and it is unlikely that under such conditions, group memberships would still exert an influence (but see Thomson & Murachver, 2001). Conversely, identifiability can make group membership highly visible and salient, as is the case with race and gender, for example. Therefore, the effects of identifiability and anonymity have to be assessed in their social context in order to understand and predict their possible effects on the individuation of in-group and out-group members.
One could say that these conclusions are inconsistent with earlier work claiming, in one form or another, that depersonalized interactions as found on the Internet breach existing boundaries between groups (e.g., Sproull & Kiesler, 1991). As operationalized in these studies, depersonalization indeed does not diminish intergroup differentiation and may even increase it. However, we should take into account that depersonalization was manipulated in a particular way in the present studies, namely so that cues to group membership were unaffected. Although similar circumstances exist when group memberships are apparent from e-mail addresses but individual identity is not, it should be stressed that we believe our conclusions should not be generalized too easily to all encounters on the Internet. Beyond depersonalization, other factors such as normative context, the particulars of the intergroup encounter (competitive vs. cooperative), and prior experiences should be taken into account (Postmes et al., 1998; Spears & Lea, 1994). Second, although the studies presented here speak to the impact of depersonalization, there are many forms of communication on the Internet that are quite individuated and/or interpersonal (such as ICQ, an Internet chat service, and most e-mailing). Communications on the Internet that would appear to be especially susceptible to the depersonalization processes in this article would be (inter)group interactions on bulletin boards, mailing lists, newsgroups, and so forth that either are anonymous or allow participants to hide aspects of their personal identity. In sum, we hope to have illustrated that depersonalization may sometimes enhance intergroup differentiation rather than reduce it. When a common social identity of group members is accessible, a depersonalized encounter in a group may divert attention away from the individual level of interaction and focus attention on the social level, thereby emphasizing the social boundaries of in-group and out-group. This suggests that the very factors that are traditionally heralded as liberating us from social boundaries (depersonalization, anonymity, isolation, and the ability to assume a new or false identity) may ironically have the opposite effect. By increasing group identification, the salience of group memberships, stereotyping, and attitudinal differentiation, these factors may ac-
SPECIAL ISSUE: INTERGROUP DIFFERENTIATION IN CMC
tually reinforce the social boundaries between groups.
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