IPC study on Export Restrictions - Semantic Scholar

Agricultural Export Restrictions and International Trade Law: A Way Forward Robert Howse and Tim Josling*

This paper was made possible through the generous support of the Center for Global Development.

Project Development and Guidance: Charlotte Hebebrand, Chief Executive, IPC Layout: Katharine Shaw, Communications and Program Manager, IPC

* The authors are Professor, NYU Law School and Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, respectively. They would like to thanks participants in the IPC Plenary Meeting, May 19, 2012 for helpful comments. The study was requested as a contribution to the CGD project on the role of the Rome-based Agencies in Food Security. The legal analysis in the study draws on a draft paper by Howse presented at the Future of the WTO Conference, Stanford University, April 25-26 2012. Howse would like to thank participants in the conference for their helpful reactions to some of the ideas that are also explored in this study.

Foreword Rising and more volatile commodity prices are causing understandable nervousness about exposure to international markets. Yet, rather than trying to insulate oneself from international markets in the name of national food security, IPC members believe that it is important to ensure better functioning markets in order to promote both national and global food security. Markets should continue to serve as transmitters of price signals, which are vital for triggering increased production. But distortions in the global agricultural trading system, which can exacerbate price fluctuations and volatility, need to be reduced and eliminated. Although international trade disciplines mostly address import barriers, there are rules applicable to export restrictions. The robustness of these disciplines has often been questioned: IPC’s earlier paper on export restrictions, for example, argued that “export restrictions are not subject to meaningful trade disciplines.” But WTO law evolves over time. We are pleased to present a new paper “Agricultural Export Restrictions and International Trade Law: A Way Forward” by Professors Robert Howse and Tim Josling, which significantly modifies the view that the WTO rules governing export restrictions are necessarily ineffective. By exploring the implications of recent WTO jurisprudence, primarily in the China-Raw Materials case, the authors conclude that: “…a country may not respond to a food crisis in a manner that is indifferent to the food security impacts on import-dependent countries.” The paper makes a compelling case for a procedure that involves an internationally recognized and respected food security institution or initiative to help determine, from a food security perspective, whether in any particular situation export restrictions can or cannot be justified. This procedure would evaluate the likely impact on individual importing countries, considerations that are clearly beyond the WTO’s remit. Given concerns about reduced agricultural productivity and the increased likelihood of both supply and demand shocks, questions pertaining to global food security governance have justifiably become more pressing. Efforts to streamline food security governance must also consider how to ensure that trade disciplines on export restrictions are implemented in order to enhance rather than threaten food security both at the national and global levels.

Carlo Trojan IPC Chairman 2

Charlotte Hebebrand IPC Chief Executive

I.

Introduction

Export restrictions imposed by countries in an effort to keep domestic prices low in the face of international commodity price spikes have been shown to significantly exacerbate those price spikes. Price insulating behavior on the import side can also add to the magnitude of price swings through measures that attempt to maintain or even increase imports when world prices are high. Such price insulating measures pose a systemic problem for the multilateral trade system as they undermine confidence in the role of trade in meeting food needs. If the challenge of food security is to be met, open trade has to play a major part in transmitting incentives to producers and in distributing food to consumers. Price insulating measures can reduce the effectiveness of trade and in particular can weaken its ability to prevent shocks to the food system from adversely impacting poor consumers. Any discussion on international coordination on food security matters therefore must grapple with how best to approach the topic of export restrictions and other types of price insulating behavior. This paper considers the effects of price insulating behavior during price spikes from the viewpoint of the functioning of the global trade system and provides a legal analysis of relevant WTO trade rules,1 with a particular focus on export restrictions. Although conventional wisdom has held that existing WTO rules on export restrictions are weak, recent WTO jurisprudence points towards a different interpretation of these rules: namely that a country may not respond to a food crisis in a manner that is indifferent to the food security impacts on import-dependent countries. The WTO itself is unlikely to be able to determine the likely impacts of one country’s price insulating measures on the food security of other countries, and this paper will argue that there is scope for the WTO to collaborate with an international organization that is primarily focused on questions pertaining to international and national food security. After a brief review of the price spikes for agricultural products of the past five years, and of the nature of subsequent government efforts to restrict exports, the paper reviews the attempts to provide intergovernmental support and guidance on this sensitive topic to the multilateral agencies concerned. The paper then provides a legal analysis of relevant WTO trade rules governing such actions, focusing in particular on the recent China-Raw Materials case, in which the WTO Appellate Body set out a framework for applying the GATT exception to export restrictions "temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or other products essential to the exporting contracting party." The paper argues that this framework could have serious implications for the use of export restrictions for purposes of domestic food security. The paper concludes with a number of recommendations on how to make progress on

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An earlier report from the IPC examined the impacts of the export restrictions of 2008 on welfare and the international trade rules (Mitra and Josling, 2009). This paper updates and expands the earlier analysis, particularly by considering the 2010 price spike; incorporating recent legal developments with respect to the treatment of export restrictions under the WTO, and discussing multilateral actions that have been and could be taken to alleviate the problem.

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this topic, with a particular focus on how the WTO and associated trade rules interact with the activities of other agencies and their food security agendas.

II.

The Price Spikes of 2008 and 2010

After several decades of decline, food prices began to rise in 2003, in an environment characterized by lower stock levels, rising demand and higher oil prices. This rise accelerated in 2007 when poor weather conditions cut harvests in several countries. Prices peaked in 2008 before declining in 2009, but rose sharply again in 2010 and reached a plateau in early 2011. The FAO Food Price Index (FFPI) reflects these movements.2 The price index reached a level of 200 in 2008 (a doubling of prices since 2002-04) and rose to a high point of 235 in April 2011: it currently stands at 214. The return of more “normal” market conditions for cereals has alleviated the situation somewhat in recent months, although supplies of oilseed are tightening up this year, following poor harvests in Latin America. Price volatility appears to have increased over the past decade. After the extreme price movements of the 1970s such volatility had declined. The World Bank estimates that price volatility in major agricultural commodity markets has doubled since 2000 and now mirrors that of the 1970s (WB, 2011). Some observers have argued that the price level rather than price volatility is the key issue for food security policy (Barrett and Bellarmare, 2011), but it is apparent that the greater variability of prices at times of tight commodity markets leads to more abrupt and serious policy reactions. Others have suggested that the variability is largely a result of the government responses themselves, and that price spikes are therefore a “self-fulfilling prophesy” that can be remedied by behavioral change (Paarlberg, 2012). Paarlberg’s argument is that governments bring the price spikes on by panicking when supplies are tight. This is consistent with our interpretation, though this does not relieve the international community of the obligation to change the circumstances to avoid such behavior. The magnitude of the price increases for food commodities and their several causes have been discussed at length elsewhere.3 Bad weather, high demand from emerging economies, low stocks of grain, diversion of food grains into biofuels production, increased cost of energy and particularly fossil fuels uses as fertilizer feed-stocks, macroeconomic conditions and an influx of speculative capital have each been identified as key factors, though considerable disagreement still exists as to their relative weights.4

The FFPI includes international prices for 55 products aggregated into five export-weighted groups of commodities (meat, dairy, grains, fats and oils, and sugar) and is based on the 2002-04 period. The World Bank also publishes a Food Price Index: this reached a peak in early 2011. 2

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Detailed surveys include the Foresight Report, undertaken for the UK Government (2011), and the FAO and OECD (2011) report on price volatility and government responses. 4

As an example, the contribution of speculation to the price increases in 2008 is still unresolved, with some analysts giving this factor a major role (Gilbert, 2011) and others relegating it to a role as a minor contributor (Sanders and Irwin, 2010).

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III.

Export Restrictions as Reactions to the Price Spikes

The natural reaction of many governments to these price spikes has been to attempt to minimize the impact on domestic prices. These attempts however, in turn, further exacerbate the price spikes. Martin and Anderson (2011) attribute 45 percent of the price rise in rice and 29 percent of the increase in wheat prices in 2008 to actions by countries to insulate domestic markets. This paper focuses on actions taken by exporters to restrict their exports in an effort to hold down domestic food costs, but it is important to also acknowledge the effects that measures taken by importers can have (see box). IMPORTER MEASURES The reactions of importers to price increases can be of systemic importance to the trade system, by adding to the magnitude of price swings. If a government has been taxing consumers of food through tariffs and chooses a period of high international prices to relax those taxes, there will be a negative impact on world price variations. Such impact is likely to be minor compared to the positive benefits for domestic consumers and for exporters of the reduction in protection levels and it would therefore not make sense to develop rules that inhibited countries from making use of imports when domestic production is uncompetitive. Any spill-over effect on other importers is a small price to pay for the ratcheting down of trade barriers at times of high prices. In this sense the argument of Barrett and Bellamare (2011) that price levels are more important than price variability is appropriate: reducing regressive taxes on food imports at the border is in the longrun interest of economic development and the well-functioning trade system. However, if the tariffs on imported food are raised again when world prices fall then the actions together constitute price insulation and will not have the same positive effect. So the issue is whether the importer behavior is designed to use tariff rates as a temporary market-stabilizing device or as part of a decision to reduce the burden of regressive “hidden” taxation on foodstuffs. There is a difference, however, between reducing tariffs to allow consumers to purchase supplies from overseas and introducing subsidies to encourage such imports. Developing countries rarely have the funds to subsidize imports directly, but may do so through such means as covering the losses of food importing agencies at times of high prices. Though it is unlikely individual developing countries will have much effect on world markets through such action, similar policies by many small countries could have such an effect. But the problem would be more serious if one or more large importers gave subsidies to importers in high price periods.5 Subsidies can also be given implicitly by maintaining an overvalued exchange rate: imports would be encouraged and exports discouraged by such an exchange rate regime.6

In fact, some developed countries found themselves in this position in the 1970s, when their import subsidies had an impact on world price behavior. 5

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Charges that China has maintained an undervalued exchange rate in the past few years would, if correct, suggest that China’s food imports would be even higher if that were to be corrected.

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When world prices for food commodities rise sharply, exporting country governments are tempted to hold down domestic food costs by restricting exports. Most commercial contracts have “force majeure” clauses that void the obligations under conditions such as an export ban. Importers have to search for alternative supplies, usually at a higher price. The impact of the ban quickly spreads to all parts of the world market and encourages activity on the futures markets, both from those betting on further price increases and those needing to hedge against such increases. The “self-fulfilling” nature of the price spike that Paarlberg notes is that importers drive up the price against themselves in an effort to avoid domestic shortages and hunger. The price of these commodities will tend to come down quickly after the export bans are lifted and importers will be able to return to normal purchases. The residual impact on the market may be to cause importers to be more wary about relying on suppliers from countries prone to export bans.7 At the time of the 2008 price spike, the number of developing countries, both importers and exporters, which reacted with price insulating measures was significant. Among 60 low-income countries surveyed by the FAO in 2008, around one-quarter had some form of export restriction in place on food-related agricultural products. East Asia and South Asia led in terms of export restrictions, with around 40 percent of the countries surveyed implementing these measures, but Europe and Central Asia were not far behind at close to 35 percent. Africa, Latin America and Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa exhibited more or less similar values of close to 20 percent. India, Vietnam, China and 11 other countries limited or banned rice exports. India banned non-Basmati rice exports in November 2007 and Basmati rice exports in April 2008, and then allowed exports of top grade aromatic rice from mid-October 2008, but at a minimum price of $1,200/ton. In the case of wheat, fifteen countries, including Pakistan and Bolivia, also capped or halted wheat exports. Russia (not a WTO member in 2008) stopped shipments of wheat in order to ensure adequate domestic supplies. Kazakhstan also suspended wheat exports in April 2007, but then opened them again in summer 2008. Soybean markets were also disrupted. Argentina banned soy exports, to go along with a series of export taxes that had been set in place the year before. Kazakhstan also banned soybean and sunflower seed exports. More than a dozen countries have limited corn exports (Mitra and Josling, 2009). By contrast the reactions of governments to the 2010 market situation have been more muted. The most significant of these interventions was in August 2010, when Russia announced an export ban on grains in the light of a disastrous harvest caused by hot dry weather and widespread fires.8 Ukraine introduced shipment quotas on exports at that time. These events combined with poor harvests in Canada and in Eastern Europe to cause wheat prices to double in 2010. How much of the price rise is due to the Russian export ban is still unclear, but one report has indicated that the Export taxes, if introduced or raised in times of shortage, pose less problems. The incidence of the tax is likely to vary from case to case: passing the tax burden to the importing country may not be possible if other supplies are available. But high taxes can act much like a ban on exports, though they may not have the same contractual significance. 7

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The ban was lifted in July 2011, as adequate supplies and replenished stocks allowed for a return to the export market.

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benefits to Russian consumers of this action were negligible (Welton, 2011). Consumer prices for grain-based foods continued to climb even after the export ban. The major impact was on importers of Russian wheat, who had to replace those imports with more expensive supplies from other countries, and the beneficiaries included Russian livestock farmers who did not have to run down herds in the face of feed shortages. Welton suggests that a better response may have been to import more meat rather than keep meat prices high in order to compensate livestock farmers for high feed costs. Reactions in importer countries to the events of 2010 varied significantly. Main markets for Russian wheat included Egypt, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, Syria and Iran. In Egypt the government attempted to buy supplies from elsewhere but had to increase domestic subsidies to prevent increases on sensitive food products. The Egyptian dilemma over food prices was playing out over this period against the backdrop of the political crisis, making food import decisions particularly sensitive.9 Pakistan allowed the higher wheat prices to be passed through to consumers, at a political cost (Welton, 2011). Indeed the importer reactions to the ban on Russian wheat illustrate the range of options available to governments ex post as well as providing a scenario for judging ex ante precautions. What appears to be different from the 2008 price spike is the narrowness of the response by importers and exporters alike. Though prices of several products went up along with wheat, no defensive actions were observed in these other markets. Given that the magnitude of the rise in food prices was greater in 2010 than in 2008 it is somewhat encouraging that the same defensive reactions were largely absent. Perhaps the main difference was that stocks, though low in 2010 relative to consumption, were not at a crisis level.

IV.

Declarations on Export Restrictions

The period since 2008 has seen a flurry of activity in multilateral agencies and numerous intergovernmental meetings on the matter of food security, which is set forth in Annex 1 of this paper. Much of the discussion has been about the need to invest steadily and consistently in developing country agriculture, to improve smallholder productivity, and to improve the access to food by the world’s poorest consumers, but the topic of export restrictions has also figured prominently. The broader context certainly acknowledges countries’ rights to protect their vulnerable populations from steep price increases and the reality that some countries lack the means to implement alternative measures to protect vulnerable populations from price spikes, but considerable concern has been expressed about export restrictions further exacerbating price spikes as demonstrated by the multitude of declarations on the need to curb the use of export restrictions.

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In Tunisia the price of food was among the sources of political discontent that undermined the regime.

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The High Level Task Force Comprehensive Framework for Action (HLTF CFA) The High Level Task Force (HLTF) Comprehensive Framework for Action (CFA), under the heading of “Trade and Tax Policy to be Adjusted”, states that food exporting countries should: Minimize use of export restrictions which in food crisis situations may increase volatility of international prices, depress incentives for farmers to invest in food production, encourage smuggling, and undermine progress towards multilateral trade reforms and freer trade in the agriculture sector. (HLTF, 2008)10 The G-20 Action Plan The Action Plan agreed by the G-20 Agriculture Ministers in June 2011 also addressed the issue of food export restriction, specifically in the context of food aid. The relevant paragraph of the Action Plan states that: We recognize that the first responsibility of each member state is to ensure the food security of its own population. We also recognize that food export barriers restricting humanitarian aid penalize the most needy. We agree to remove food export restrictions or extraordinary taxes for food purchased for non-commercial humanitarian purposes by WFP and agree not to impose them in the future. We will seek support within the United Nations agencies and will also recommend consideration of the adoption of a specific resolution by the WTO for the Ministerial Conference in December 2011. (Action Plan, para 40) It is important to add that WTO members did not agree on an exemption from export restrictions for humanitarian purchases during the 2011 WTO Ministerial, this G-20 declaration notwithstanding. Following the G-20 request to combine the efforts of the main analytical, policy and statistical agencies, the FAO, the OECD and eight other institutions cooperated in an analysis of the food security situation and the possible policy reactions.11 The paper on “Price Volatility in Food and Agricultural Markets: Policy Responses” from the combined agencies addresses the matter of export restrictions directly. With respect to export restrictions nations have agreed to commit to make humanitarian exemptions, first, at the G8 Summit in L’Aquila in July 2009, and then at the World Summit on Food Security in Rome in November 2009, where all FAO member states agreed to “remove food export restrictions or extraordinary taxes for food purchased for non-commercial humanitarian purposes, and to consult and notify in advance before imposing any such new restrictions”. If honored these commitments would allow food to be shipped rapidly to where it is needed in an emergency. (FAO and OECD, 2011)

The Updated CFA reproduces the same points in Annex C: Main Actions by the United Nations and Bretton Woods Institutions to Address Food and Nutrition Security (HLTF, 2011). 10

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The other institutions included the IMF, IFAD, IFPRI, UNCTAD, WFP, WB, WTO and the HLTF.

Recommendation 4 (in part) reads: Taking existing WTO rules into account and the state of play in the DDA negotiations G-20 governments should: develop an operational definition of a critical food shortage situation that might justify consideration of an export restricting measure. An export ban would be defined as a timelimited measure of last resort, allowed only when other measures, including triggering domestic safety net measures for the poorest, have been exhausted, and taking into account, in particular, the food security needs of least developed countries and net food importing developing countries. widen, strengthen and enforce consultation and notification processes currently in place at the WTO. The intention to impose an export restriction would have to be notified in advance of the action being applied and a “fast track” consultation process could be put in place to discuss whether the measure can be avoided and how. Consultation should be ongoing and regular with a view to ensuring that the measure, once in place, is removed at the earliest possible moment. Recommendation 5 reads: G20 governments strengthen the commitments made at the L’Aquila and Rome Summits, calling on all nations to allow purchases of humanitarian food, especially by WFP, to be exempted from food export restrictions and/or extraordinary taxes, so that humanitarian food can be purchased, exported and/or transited regardless of any prohibitions, restrictions or extraordinary taxes imposed; and resolve to bring this commitment and call to the UN General Assembly and to the WTO (FAO and OECD, 2011). Committee on Food Security Global Strategic Framework (CFS GSF) The primary “deliverable” from the Committee on Food Security (CFS) has been the articulation of a Global Strategic Framework (GSF) of which a first draft was considered in 2010 with a second draft due in May 2012. The GSF specifically mentions actions to reduce price volatility, including measures to: Acknowledgement of the need for countries to better coordinate responses in times of food price crises, through both regional and international institutions, including the regional AMIS Rapid Response Forum; Improvements in transparency, regulation and supervision of agricultural derivative markets; Noting that a transparent and predictable international trade in food is crucial for reducing excessive price volatility, continuing focus on building an accountable and rulesbased multilateral trading system taking into account food security concerns, in particular those of the least developed and net food importing developing countries. In that context,

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support for an ambitious, balanced fair and comprehensive conclusion of the Doha Development Round.

V.

Taking the WTO Rules on Export Restrictions Seriously

As has been made amply clear in the foregoing sections, there have been many sub-optimal responses to the food crises of 2007-08 and 2010 involving restrictions on trade in various staples, leading to calls for greater restraints on export restrictions by various food security related initiatives and declarations. From the perspective of international trade regulation, the enactment of these restrictions and the subsequent calls for greater restraint have driven a renewed interest in means of strengthening trade disciplines on food and agricultural export restrictions particularly by importing nations. The so far unheeded calls for improved trade disciplines on export restrictions have led to a sort of conventional wisdom that existing disciplines are largely meaningless or even non-existent12 (with some exceptions such as China’s Protocol of Accession to the WTO). FOOD SECURITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW The emergence of the concept of food security13 in international law and policy has led to a debate about the role of trade and comparative advantage in relation to each state’s international legal obligation to fulfill the right to food for its people. The legality and legitimacy of export restrictions bears directly on this debate. The UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier de Schutter, has endorsed the notion that states should seek food security through selfsufficiency in food production.14De Schutter’s perspective has been strongly criticized by WTO Director General Pascal Lamy and by the WTO Secretariat. Perhaps rather pointedly, de Schutter’s report made no reference to export restrictions. De Schutter’s point of view is questionable from a human rights perspective: seeking selfsufficiency in food regardless of geographic, climatic, demographic, economic or political circumstances in a country could result in the violation or non-fulfillment of many other rights. It could be harmful to sustainable development and entail displacing existing populations, derailing industrial and other economic development policies and using technologies and chemicals with

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For an explanation of the evolving concept of food security and its foundations in the Right to Food, see “Committee on World Food Security and Nutrition”, First Draft, 2010.The definition of food security is as follows:“Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. The four pillars of food security are availability, access, utilization and stability.”(p. 5) This definition is based on the interpretation by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of the right to adequate food mentioned in Article 14 of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Olivier de Schutter, “The World Trade Organization and the Post-Global Food Crisis Agenda: Putting Food Security First in the International Trading System”, Office of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, November 2011. In the long run, this view implies that, from a human rights or global justice perspective, no state would have any claim on food security grounds to import food produced elsewhere. 14

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significant risk to human life or health.15 The relevant UN human rights instruments require de Schutter to consider the right to food in relation to other rights both civil and political including economic, social and cultural rights. The Right to Development makes this particularly clear.16 If we then believe that trade in food and agricultural products may well be necessary to discharge a state’s responsibility to provide food security for its own people in a manner that does not violate or put at risk the fulfillment of other rights, this implies some duty of cooperation on the part of exporting states to avoid limiting their supplies to importing states, while recognizing at the same time that exporting states also have a primary responsibility to provide food security to their own citizens. In this respect, it is important to consider Article 2(1) of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: “Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.” Yet there are clear indications of an emerging norm that it is not appropriate for a state to respond to a food crisis in a manner that is simply indifferent to the effects of its actions on the food security of other states, regardless of how vulnerable the populations of the importdependent countries are. Moreover, it can be argued that existing WTO disciplines can serve as an important constraint on a WTO Member responding to a food crisis in a manner that is indifferent to the food security impacts on import-dependent Members, in particular in light of recent WTO jurisprudence (China-Raw Materials), but also when examining the potential applicability of the GATS to export restrictions. The WTO rules address the issue of export restrictions directly. Quantitative restrictions on exports, including agricultural goods, are explicitly banned in the GATT: Article XI:1 states that there shall be “no prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges...on the exportation...of any product” destined for another WTO member. However, Article XI:2(a) makes an exception for quantitative restrictions “temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or other products essential to the exporting contracting party.” It has been relatively easy, therefore, for countries to justify export restrictions as a means of relieving critical food shortages. No definitions exist as to what is “temporary,” “critical” or what constitutes a

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An illustration of this, described by Ewing-Chow and Villarasau-Shade (2010), is Saudi Arabia’s failed effort to create selfsufficiency in wheat production through turning desert into farmland, which “drained the aquifers which are Saudi Arabia’s natural water supply.” In effect, by pursuing a self-sufficiency approach to food security, Saudi Arabia put at risk its capacity to fulfill the right to water. See Howse and Teitel (2007) and UN (2004). (This UN document may be found in the UN Official Document System (ODS) at http://documents.un.org/simple.asp.) 16

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“shortage.” Such exceptions in the agreement make the rules difficult to interpret and enforce. There are no prohibitions on export taxes, so one would imagine that a prohibitive export tax could substitute for a ban if needed (see later section on export taxes). A further basis for imposing export restraints is found in Article XX, the “general exceptions” provision of the GATT. Article XX(g) of the GATT allows for export restrictions “in relation to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.” Paragraph (h) allows an exemption (from other disciplines in the GATT) “undertaken in pursuance of obligations under any intergovernmental commodity agreement which conforms to the accepted conditions of such agreements.” Paragraph (i) allows an exemption if the product in question is a (raw) material used in domestic processing and the domestic price “is held below the world price as part of a governmental stabilization plan.” Even more generally, paragraph (j) allows restrictions that are “essential to the acquisition or distribution of products in general or local short supply.” Though aimed at nonagricultural raw materials, it would seem on the face of it that this article could provide an argument that restrictions on food exports are allowed under the general exceptions rule. The Agreement on Agriculture elaborates on the matter of disciplines on export prohibitions and restrictions: Article 12 stipulates that when a member institutes new export restrictions “in accordance with paragraph 2(a) of Article XI of GATT 1994,” the member shall observe the following provisions: (a) “give due consideration to the effects of such prohibition or restriction on importing Members’ food security; (b) give notice in writing, as far in advance as practicable, to the Committee on Agriculture comprising such information as the nature and the duration of such measure; and shall consult, upon request, with any other Member having a substantial interest as an importer with respect to any matter related to the measure in question.” DOHA ROUND EXPORT RESTRICTIONS PROPOSALS The food crisis of 2008 revived the issue in the context of the agricultural negotiations, particularly when significant exporters began to limit international sales. The need to address the issue of export bans and taxes was pushed once more by Japan and Switzerland. In an informal paper in April 2008, they proposed constraining countries’ ability to restrict food exports and requiring them to consider how such policies affect countries that depend on food imports. Specifically, they called for a Doha Round agreement to require “any new export prohibition or restriction [to] be limited to the extent strictly necessary” for the country imposing it, in light of production, stocks, and domestic consumption. The proposed rules would oblige countries seeking to restrict exports to give “due consideration” to importers’ food security, and look at how trade would have flowed in the absence of restrictions. They would also have to show how food aid for net food-importing developing countries would be affected. Countries would be required to notify the WTO Committee on Agriculture before instituting export restrictions, explaining the 12

nature, duration, and reasons for the measures. Furthermore, governments would be required to consult with importers about “any matter related to the proposed” export restriction, with the implementation of the planned measure stayed pending the consultations. The Draft Modalities of December 2008 did not go as far as Japan and Switzerland would have preferred(WTO, 2008). Based on a proposal from the G-20 group of developing countries, the latest modalities text would require the WTO to be notified within 90 days after — not before — the imposition of export restrictions. It calls for export restrictions to normally last no longer than one year, with importers’ consent required for measures that last longer than 18 months. The modalities also include an exemption from these requirements for least-developed and net foodimporting countries. Given the impasse of the overall negotiations, these modalities have not yet been agreed. Much of the commentary on Article 12 characterizes these provisions as “soft law” that has not had and is unlikely to have a real constraining effect on the use of export restrictions. The practical effect of Article 12 has been to allow a continuation of export bans and taxes without effective limits. While Article 12 requires members to notify the WTO when they restrict food exports, there are no penalties for ignoring the rule. WTO Jurisprudence on l Export Restrictions: The Significance of the China-Raw Materials Report The possibility that the WTO disciplines properly interpreted are not as meaningless or ineffective as the conventional wisdom has suggested is strongly supported by a recent ruling by the Appellate Body in the China-Raw Materials dispute.17 In that case the Appellate Body interpreted rather strictly Article XI:2(a) of the GATT, which allows for export restrictions to prevent or relieve a “critical shortage” of an essential product, holding that the restrictions and their surrounding circumstances must be scrutinized to determine that in fact, objectively, all of the criteria of Article XI:2(a) are met. While in China-Raw Materials, the export restrictions were imposed on non-agricultural products, the logic of the AB’s approach arguably breathes more life into the requirements in Article 12 of the Agreement on Agriculture that, inter alia, “due consideration” be given to the effects on the food security of importing WTO Members before new export restrictions are imposed. Finally, it will be argued, the disruption to economic activity from export restrictions may cross the divide between trade in goods, trade in services and foreign direct investment, with implications for GATS disciplines and the rights of investors under bilateral investment treaties. Given demonstrated international concern about the impact of export restrictions on food security, these implications deserve at last to be given some consideration in the search for adequate disciplines. Defining “Critical Shortages” in WTO Law In China-Raw Materials, the Appellate Body addressed the meaning of the exception in Article XI:2(a) of the GATT for “prohibitions or restrictions temporarily applied to prevent or relieve

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China-Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, WT/DS394/R, WT/DS395/R, and WT/DS398/R.

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critical shortages of foodstuffs or other products essential to the exporting Member.” Further, the Appellate Body also addressed the relationship between this exception within Article XI and the exception in Article XX (g) of the GATT for measures “in relation to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources” as well as, to some extent, the exception in Article XX(j) for measures “essential to the acquisition or distribution of products in general or local short supply.” While in China-Raw Materials, the export restrictions were imposed on bauxite, a mineral not a food or agricultural product, the interpretative approach of the Appellate Body in this recent decision has very important implications for the debate about export restrictions and food security. The AB’s approach suggests that the invocation of GATT exceptions to justify export restrictions as a response to the scarcity of essential commodities must be carefully policed and circumscribed through the case-by-case application of the legal rules by the dispute settlement organs. Those who favor domestic self-sufficiency as the way to realize the right to food or who believe that international law contains a strong notion of national sovereignty over natural resources will not be happy with the AB’s approach. Conversely, as this paper argues, the AB’s approach is consistent with evolving “soft law” that suggests the unacceptability of taking an intransigently beggar-thy-neighbor response to the scarcity or finitude of natural resources, while at the same time recognizing that a state can legitimately put the pressing needs of its own citizens first in a time of crisis. Crucial to the way in which the Appellate Body reads both Article XI:2(a) and Article XX(g) and (j) is the notion of a division of labor between them. According to the Appellate Body: “Articles XI:2(a) and XX(g) have different functions and contain different obligations. Article XI:2(a) addresses measures taken to prevent or relieve "critical shortages" of foodstuffs or other essential products. Article XX(g), on the other hand, addresses measures relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources. We do not exclude that a measure falling within the ambit of Article XI:2(a) could relate to the same product as a measure relating to the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource. It would seem that Article XI:2(a) measures could be imposed, for example, if a natural disaster caused a "critical shortage" of an exhaustible natural resource, which, at the same time, constituted a foodstuff or other essential product. Moreover, because the reach of Article XI:2(a) is different from that of Article XX(g), an Article XI:2(a) measure might operate simultaneously with a conservation measure complying with the requirements of Article XX(g)."(paragraph 337) In addition, the AB noted that: “Contrary to Article XI:2(a), however, Article XX(j) does not include the word "critical" or another adjective further qualifying the short supply. We must give meaning to this difference in the wording of these provisions. To us, it suggests that the kinds of shortages that fall within Article XI:2(a) are more narrowly circumscribed than those falling within the scope of Article XX(j).” (Paragraph 325) According to the AB, which reads the expressions “critical” and “temporarily” in light of one another, Article XI:2(a) has a quite narrow function, which is to enable responses to “extraordinary conditions” or “bridging passing needs.” Thus, (contrary to the panel’s 14

interpretation) the export restrictions must be temporary, not in the sense of having to end at some arbitrary fixed point of time in the future but in the sense that they are to address a situation that is temporary (a crisis or emergency), and thus they would need to be removed when the situation has passed (and when there is not an evident risk of recurrence).18 Perhaps a more fundamental difficulty with the restrictive approach to Article XI:2(a) is how to account for the fact that Article XI:2(a) extends to measures to prevent critical shortages. Could indefinite export restrictions not be a means of ensuring sufficient domestic supply so as to prevent critical shortages? But here the word “prevent” must be interpreted consistently with the word “temporarily.” Thus, situations where a Member invokes Article XI:2(a) to prevent a critical shortage would be those where it is reacting to specific warning signals that a crisis may be coming. The Agreement on Agriculture and “Due Consideration” As the Appellate Body was not dealing with food or agricultural export restrictions in China-Raw Materials, it had no occasion to consider how its general approach to Article XI:2(a) would interact with Article 12 of the Agreement on Agriculture in a case that did concern food or agricultural export restrictions. But the linkage is significant: the notion that Article 12 is “soft law” should be reconsidered in light of the Appellate Body’s restrictive approach to Article XI:2(a) itself. A preliminary observation is that the general operative language in Article 12 (a Member “shall observe the following provisions” if it imposes new export restrictions based on Article XI:2(a)) indicates that the provisions of Article 12 are not simply additional, stand-alone obligations. Rather, we would argue, unless Article 12 is observed, a WTO Member cannot lawfully invoke Article XI:2(a) with respect to new export restrictions. In this sense, Article 12 modifies the application of Article XI:2(a) itself. This is clearly a hard law effect, and this alone entails that a determinate legal meaning be given to what is required by Articles 12(1)(a) and (b). In the case of Article 12:1(a), what could be the determinate legal meaning of giving “due consideration” to the food security of importing WTO Members? The weakest reading of this provision is that it is purely procedural: the export-restricting Member need only show that it has taken into account in making its decision the food security of importing measures; there is no substantive evaluation of the actual resulting measures to determine whether their design reflects “due consideration” of the food security of importing WTO Members. There are at least two factors that would suggest one should think twice about giving a purely procedural interpretation to the “due consideration” requirement. The first concerns the interaction of Article XI:2(a) and the MFN obligation in Article I of the GATT. Article XI:2(a) on

The AB also suggests that Article XI:2(a) does not really function as an exception to Article XI obligations, because it in fact defines the scope of the Article XI obligations in the first place. This presumably has some implications for the burden of proof. 18

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its face provides no exception to or modification of the Article I MFN obligation. Proper application of the MFN obligation in the context of food security may require different treatment of different importing states based upon their food security needs. It is well established in the jurisprudence of the Appellate Body on non-discrimination norms in the GATT that “treatment no less favorable” need not entail identical treatment and indeed may require different treatment of countries where different conditions prevail (see the interpretation of the “chapeau” of Article XX in US-Shrimp (Shrimp/Turtle).19 As the Appellate Body held in Canada-Wheat Exports and Grain Imports: When viewed in the abstract, the concept of discrimination may encompass both the making of distinctions between similar situations, as well as treating dissimilar situations in a formally identical manner. The Appellate Body has previously dealt with the concept of discrimination and the meaning of the term “non-discriminatory”, and acknowledged that, at least insofar as the making of distinctions between similar situations is concerned, the ordinary meaning of discrimination can accommodate both drawing distinctions per se, and drawing distinctions on an improper basis. Only a full and proper interpretation of a provision containing a prohibition on discrimination will reveal which type of differential treatment is prohibited. In all cases, a claimant alleging discrimination will need to establish that differential treatment has occurred in order to succeed in its claim. (Paragraph 87) Further, in the EC-Tariff Preferences (GSP) case the Appellate Body read the non-discrimination provision in the Enabling Clause, which governs preferences to the developing countries, as including a notion of positive discrimination based on the differing development needs of different countries.20 Thus, arguably, giving “due consideration” means varying the application of export restrictions depending on how the restriction may affect the food security of each importing Member. This in turn gives very specific significance to the requirement of notification and consultation in Article XI:2(a). This brings us to the second factor that suggests a substantive reading of “due consideration.” As outlined in previous sections, in response to the imposition of export restrictions in the 2008 food crisis, the international community has moved towards the principle of exemption of “humanitarian” food shipments from export restrictions. As the Appellate Body suggested in the EC-Tariff Preferences (GSP) case, in determining what kinds of different treatment of different countries may be entailed in non-discrimination norm, “multilateral instruments adopted by international organizations” might serve as standards or benchmarks, including not only treaties or conventions but also resolutions (paragraph 163 and footnote 335).

Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, DSR 1998:VII, 2755 19

Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/AB/R, adopted 20 April 2004, DSR 2004:III, 925 20

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The treatment of export taxes It might be argued that the attempt to develop the AB’s approach to Article XI:2(a) in the direction just described is largely futile given the lack of Article XI discipline on export taxes. Would the outcome not just be the substitution of export taxes for export quotas or bans resulting in the same effect? It is arguable that the definition of “taxes” in Article XI should be read in the context of the Agreement on Agriculture and in the particular the concern in Article 12 with the impact of export restrictions on food security. Should export taxes that are designed to have the economic impact of the kinds of measures clearly disciplined under Article XI be viewed as exempt “taxes?” Or rather should the expression “taxes” be read in light of the context, object and purpose of Article XI as a whole, and indeed of the GATT as well as the Agreement on Agriculture, so as not to defeat the fundamental purpose and effectiveness of core disciplines on export restrictions and prohibitions? Article VIII of the GATT allows the use of “export duties” (but not other kinds of fees charges) to tax exports “for fiscal purposes.” This clarifies that the disciplines in Article VIII on fees and charges do not prevent the use of export taxes as permitted by Article XI, but it also suggests that what was understood by an export tax was a measure imposed for fiscal (e.g. revenue-raising) purposes not trade restricting ones. This is broadly consistent with the general jurisprudence on Article XI, which suggests that not only the form but also the purpose and effect of a measure should be taken into account in determining whether it is covered by Article XI disciplines. The broad scope of Article XI as identified in the jurisprudence (India-Autos, report of the panel21) and the application of purposive interpretation to Article XI (also endorsed in India-Autos) provides a basis for interpreting the meaning of export taxes narrowly, excluding those with predominantly traderestricting as opposed to revenue-raising purposes. In other words, whether a measure is classified as a “tax” or fiscal measure within the meaning of a specific provision of the GATT depends not only on its form but also on the relation of the purpose of the measure considered in light of the purpose, object and context of the GATT provision in question. Thus, the panel in the US-Tobacco case found that an assessment that had the form of a fiscal measure should not be characterized as a tax or charge under Article III of the GATT because its underlying purpose or function was to influence behavior through serving as a means of enforcement of a regulatory measure. Looking to the wording and structure of the measure and to the overall government policy being implemented, the panel was able to characterize the measure as essentially subservient or subordinate to a non-fiscal policy goal and not an autonomous fiscal measure.22 Analogously, determining where export taxes and duties are autonomous fiscal measures or rather subordinate to an overarching policy of restricting or prohibiting exports that is contrary to the object and purpose of Article XI as a whole will be a highly contextual inquiry. What is clear is

Panel Report, India – Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector, WT/DS146/R, WT/DS175/R and Corr.1, adopted 5 April 2002, DSR 2002:V, 1827. 21

United States-Measures affecting the Importation, Internal Sale and Use of Tobacco, Report of the Panel, DS/44/R, adopted 4 October 1994, paragraphs 75-82. 22

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that Article XI preserves policy space for export taxes that are genuine fiscal measures with revenue-raising purposes. Finite Resources and GATT Article XX (g) Under what conditions might a WTO Member be able to justify using export restrictions as part of a long term strategy to deal with food scarcity or the finiteness of agricultural resources (along the lines of the self-sufficiency approach advocated by de Schutter)? As noted, the Appellate Body suggested in China-Raw Materials that, in principle, Article XX(g) might apply to the same products to which Article XX:2(a) applies, where they are being considered not as products of which there is a temporary critical shortage but as exhaustible or finite natural resources. As previously noted, the export restrictions in China-Raw Materials concerned minerals. However, in the US-Shrimp (Shrimp/Turtle) case, the Appellate Body held that “living species, though in principle, capable of reproduction and, in that sense, "renewable", are in certain circumstances indeed susceptible of depletion, exhaustion and extinction, frequently because of human activities. Living resources are just as "finite" as petroleum, iron ore and other non-living resources” (paragraph 128). There is no reason why these observations would not apply equally to crops and plants as to animal species. What is important here is that Article XX (g) has features that require a degree of evenhandedness between the needs of the domestic population and those of the populations of other WTO Members. Thus, to be justified under Article XX (g), measures in relation to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources must be taken in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption. One of the issues that should be addressed by international organizations and agencies with food security responsibilities is what kind of restrictions on domestic production or consumption could be appropriate where a Member is resorting to export restrictions. The WTO text and jurisprudence leave essentially undefined what these domestic restrictions need to be or need to accomplish. In the US-Reformulated Gasoline case, the Appellate Body simply referred to a general notion of evenhandedness.23 In addition, the chapeau of Article XX imposes additional conditions that relate to equity among different WTO Members. To be justified under Article XX, measures must be applied so as not to constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail or so as to constitute a disguised restriction on international trade. As noted earlier in the discussion of MFN, in US-Shrimp, the Appellate Body interpreted the relevant concept as also entailing an obligation not to treat countries the same where different conditions prevail. Thus, arguably, the chapeau would require a WTO Member maintaining export restrictions to give consideration to the food security situations of different importing countries in the manner in which it applies export restrictions being justified under Article XX (g); thus, one can see in the

Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996, DSR 1996:I, 3. 23

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relationship between the chapeau and Article XX (g) a parallel balancing of rights as that which is the case for Article XI in relation to MFN and Article 12 of the Agreement on Agriculture. Short Supply and GATT Article XX(j) As noted above, the Appellate Body premised its reading of Article XI:2(a) of the GATT in ChinaRaw Materials on the notion that Article XI:2(a), Article XX(g) and Article XX(j) serve different functions. Apart from suggesting that Article XX(j) might be less strict or narrow than Article 11:2(a) in what it permits, given the absence of the “critical shortage” wording, the AB did not really give a sense of what it regarded as the proper function of Article XX(j). Again Article XX(j) provides an exception for measures: “essential to the acquisition or distribution of products in general or local short supply; Provided that any such measures shall be consistent with the principle that all contracting parties are entitled to an equitable share of the international supply of such products, and that any such measures, which are inconsistent with the other provisions of the Agreement shall be discontinued as soon as the conditions giving rise to them have ceased to exist. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall review the need for this sub-paragraph not later than 30 June 1960.” The reference to review no later than June 1960 suggests that this provision was intended to address specific post war situations where many countries faced simultaneously the challenge of rebuilding economies devastated by war and where many essential products were in short supply. Even if it is relevant to some circumstances today or in the future, and if it in some respects is more permissive than Article XI:2(a), it should be noted, first of all, that this provision is also subject to the requirements of the Chapeau of Article XX and contains its own additional concept of “an equitable share of the international supply” of the products in question, and secondly, that it is clearly drafted to deal with a set of conditions that are supposed to be of limited duration (thus the measures are to be discontinued “as soon as the conditions giving rise to them have ceased to exist”), hence Article XX(j) is not a basis for justifying long-run policy responses to the finitude of agricultural resources. The Applicability of the GATS to Export Restrictions Today a significant amount of agricultural trade occurs not through spot or contractual purchases from domestic producers by foreign buyers but through foreign distributors and/or retailers who contract with producers in the exporting country to distribute and/or retail the agricultural products globally.24 Intermediaries of this kind can be understood as providing services both to the producer in country A (bringing a product to market) as well the ultimate consumer in country B (offering the product on the shelf). A measure may in different aspects fall under the GATT or the GATS (EC-Bananas25; China: Publications and Audiovisual26). The General Agreement 24

See for example, Linda Young and Jill Hobbs (2001) and Benoit Daviron and Peter Gibbon (2002).

25

Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted 25 September 1997, DSR 1997:II, 591.

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on Trade in Services applies to measures that affect trade in services; one modality of trade in services “is the supply of a service… from the territory of one Member into the territory of any other Member”(GATS, Article I:2(a)) known as Mode 1. There is little question that global agrifood suppliers are service suppliers within the meaning of GATS and that their operations entail “the supply of a service…from the territory of one Member into the territory of any other Member.” There is also little question that export restrictions and export taxes can affect such trade in services inasmuch as such measures disrupt supply contracts and increase the transaction costs of operating global supply and retailing networks that provide services both to the producer of the product and the ultimate consumer. Thus, in principle, export restrictions and export taxes could come under GATS disciplines as measures that affect trade in services.27 It is thus surprising that almost no attention has been paid to the potential GATS issues raised by export restrictions and export taxes. Where wholesaling and or retailing are bound sectors in an exporting WTO Member’s schedule of commitments under GATS (and assuming no exceptions apply to Mode 1), it will be required to respect the National Treatment and Market Access obligations in GATS in its treatment of service suppliers from other WTO Members. The National Treatment obligation in GATS (Article XVII) reads as follows: 1. In the sectors inscribed in its Schedule, and subject to any conditions and qualifications set out therein, each Member shall accord to services and service suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of services, treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own like services and service suppliers. [footnote omitted] 2. A Member may meet the requirement of paragraph 1 by according to services and service suppliers of any other Member, either formally identical treatment or formally different treatment to that it accords to its own like services and service suppliers. 3. Formally identical or formally different treatment shall be considered to be less favourable if it modifies the conditions of competition in favour of services or service suppliers of the Member compared to like services or service suppliers of any other Member. It is noteworthy that, unlike the National Treatment obligation in GATT (Article III), which requires only National Treatment of imported products, GATS Article XVII applies generally to

Appellate Body Report, China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/AB/R, adopted 19 January 2010. 26

27The Appellate Body has held that, especially where a measure also affects goods, it must be shown not merely presumed that it has effects on specific service suppliers as service suppliers in order for the GATS to apply in any given case. Canada-Autos, paragraph 165.Appellate Body Report, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R, adopted 19 June 2000, DSR 2000:VI, 2985. Thus, we are here merely suggesting that attention should be paid to the way in which export restrictions and taxes affect service suppliers, not that they can be simply assumed to violate GATS.

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“services and service suppliers” of other Members, not just to services they are importing into (i.e. supplying the domestic market of) the regulating Member. Also, Article XVII applies not just to “internal laws, regulations and requirements” as does Article III:4 of the GATT but “in respect of all measures affecting the supply of services.” Finally, Article XVII:3 clearly indicates that formal identical treatment may violate the National Treatment obligation if it gives a competitive advantage to either like domestic services or domestic service suppliers. Where domestic suppliers are primarily or exclusively providing producers with distribution and retailing services in domestic markets, and foreign suppliers are primarily providing producers with distribution and retailing services in global markets, it is clear that export restrictions or taxes will systematically advantage domestic service suppliers. Since their activities generally do not require an export transaction they will not face a barrier or cost that the foreign suppliers will face given that the economic logic of their structure and activities as service providers depends upon being able to export products to their global networks. In GATS, there is no exception for export taxes of the kind to be found in GATT Article XI, even though, obviously, such taxes as explained may affect the operations of service providers. Article XVI of the GATS, which addresses quantitative restrictions on trade in services, may also provide some discipline on export restrictions and taxes. Thus, Article XVI:2(b) prohibits, in sectors where a Member has bound commitments, “limitations on the total number of service operations or on the total quantity of service output expressed in terms of designated numerical units in the form of quotas.” In the US-Gambling case28, the Appellate Body interpreted the language “in the form of” in XVI:2 (a) of GATS quite broadly, implying that any restriction of a quantitative nature, i.e. that could be expressed in numeric terms, would be covered, even if the legal form of the measure was not a numerical quota. Clearly, both export restrictions and taxes are quantitative in this sense. They constrain the amount of the service that foreign service suppliers can supply to producers in the restricting country through taking their products and distributing and/or retailing them globally. Finally, it is of course possible that some export restrictions or taxes, especially those imposed in the kinds of critical or emergency situations contemplated in Article XI:2(a) of the GATT, would be justifiable under one or more of the general exceptions in GATS, for example as necessary for to maintain public order, e.g. avoiding panic or unrest due to food shortages or fear of them (GATS XIV (a)) or to protect human life or health (GATS XIV(b)). PROVISIONS ON EXPORT RESTRICTIONS IN REGIONAL AND BILATERAL ACCORDS Although this paper focuses on WTO rules, consideration also needs to be given to the disciplines that currently exist in regional trade agreements and bilateral investment treaties. In the case of Pope & Talbot v. Canada, for example, Canada’s administration of export restrictions and taxes under the Canada-US Softwood Lumber Agreement was considered by the tribunal to be a

Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted 20 April 2005, DSR 2005:XII, 5663 (Corr.1, DSR 2006:XII, 5475) 28

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measure affecting an investment, since it had major repercussions for the operations of an American company with an investment in Canada, which engaged in integrated activity across the Canada-US border. The tribunal found a violation of fair and equitable treatment under the NAFTA. Thus, the tribunal held that the Canada’s administration of softwood lumber export restraints was subject to the investment disciplines of NAFTA Chapter 11. Along similar lines, in Cargill v. United Mexican States, the Mexican government’s application of an import tax and permit system to a supplier of high fructose corn syrup (HFCS) from another NAFTA party to the Mexican market was held to be a measure affecting an investment and to have violated Mexico’s obligations under the NAFTA. Assessing the wide range of regional and bilateral agreements containing direct or indirect disciplines on agricultural export restrictions is a large task, however, and one for another paper.

VI.

Future Directions for Policy within a WTO Context

The fact that export restrictions have been widely used at times of high prices suggests that access to food is still vulnerable to disruption by the trade policies of exporting countries. Despite the flurry of diplomatic and agency activity over the past four years, little in the way of substance has been agreed that would prevent future trade policy responses of the kind that exacerbated the price increases in 2008 and 2010. Yet our argument in this paper is that existing rules actually go some way to contributing to food security, as well as to the security of supplies of other essential traded items, in particular when taking into account recent WTO jurisprudence (China-Raw Materials). The significance of the China-Raw Materials AB decision can be summarized by the following: By setting out a framework for applying the GATT exception to export restrictions "temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or other products essential to the exporting contracting party," in the China Raw Materials case, the Appellate Body signals that a country may not simply self-judge what constitutes a critical shortage. In fact, restrictions taken and the surrounding circumstances should be carefully scrutinized to determine whether they meet the criteria for the exception. The case arguably shows URAA Art.12 AoA “due consideration” in a new light. It is possible to see these provisions as conditions to the proper invocation of the exception in the GATT itself. Countries may well be obliged to vary the application of export restrictions depending on how various countries are affected. Where export restrictions are imposed to deal with finite resources, rather than a demonstrated immediate critical shortage, these have to be justified under a different provision of the GATT, Article XX (g), which requires “even-handedness”-the burden imposed on importing countries must be accompanied by rationing to domestic producers or consumers of the finite resource, or other domestic measures to address the problem of long-term scarcity. 22

Furthermore, this legal analysis argues that export taxes could well qualify as export restrictions and thus be covered by WTO rules, and that there may also be some applicability of GATS rules to food and agricultural export restrictions. Should a WTO case ever be brought against a country’s food and agricultural export restrictions, it is highly likely that a WTO panel would seek the advice of food security experts when scrutinizing whether a country was justified in imposing export restrictions and when trying to understand the impact that such restrictions have for other countries. Use of exports in this way is already provided for in Article 13 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding. There is also precedent in the WTO for using multilaterally agreed definitions and criteria from international organizations to interpret the meaning and scope of exceptions, and for basing national trade measures on the findings on multilateral instruments adopted by international organizations (or on using multilaterally agreed definitions). It is also interesting to refer to food aid related provisions in the (not yet agreed) DDA Agricultural Modalities. Given concerns that food aid could serve as a means of surplus disposal, and have a disruptive impact on local markets, cash based food aid is presumed to be in conformity with the proposed disciplines. Recognizing that the disciplines might “unintentionally impede the delivery of food aid provided to deal with emergency situations,” a “safe box” is proposed for in-kind food aid in instances where there has been a declaration of emergency by the recipient country or the Secretary General of the UN, or an emergency appeal has been made from a country or a relevant UN agency, regional or international body, or a widely recognized NGO humanitarian organization (December 2008 Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture, TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4 Annex L). In our view, there is scope therefore to use existing WTO disciplines on export restrictions in a more purposive way. It is not too far afield to envisage a process that obliges countries to either meet a multilaterally agreed definition or to secure a multilaterally recognized expert opinion on food security – both to verify whether a country is truly facing a food security crisis to justify putting export restrictions into place, but also to determine the likely impacts of such measures on its trading partners, taking into account market conditions, and to adjust them accordingly. The AB’s approach in China-Raw Materials suggests no particular deference to the regulating Member’s own judgment that a shortage is “critical.” An agreed procedure to evaluate and recognize a critical shortage could take different forms and involve different organizations. We note that the joint report (FAO and OECD, 2011) recommended that the G-20 should seek to develop an international definition of “critical shortage” with a view to the effective application of the disciplines of GATT Article XI in light of food security concerns. Actual evidence of the existence of a crisis, or of the temporary or passing nature of the situation, would have to be evaluated by a WTO panel in the event of a dispute or demonstrated prior to imposing export restrictions. An agreed mechanism for identifying these situations would be constructive. As the WTO is not equipped to either undertake or evaluate extensive data collection pertaining to food security, it should partner with an international 23

organization that is solely focused on food security. We do not presume to know which organization is the appropriate partner, and only provide some examples of what such a collaboration might entail. Needless to say, the partnership and procedure would have to be agreed to multilaterally. The World Food Program’s definition of a food “emergency” may be an appropriate starting point: “For purposes of WFP emergency projects, emergencies are defined as urgent situations in which there is clear evidence that an event or series of events has occurred which causes human suffering or imminently threatens human lives or livelihoods, and which the government concerned has not the means to remedy; and it is a demonstrably abnormal event or series of events which produces dislocation in the life of a community on an exceptional scale.” WFP/EB.1/2005/4-A. Further, the WFP’s Emergency Food Assessment Handbook provides detailed guidelines as to how to distinguish between chronic and transitory food insecurity when determining whether an “emergency” exists. Limiting recourse to Article XI:2(a) for food security reasons to situations that have been or could be assessed as emergencies under WFP principles and methodologies would produce a significant discipline on the resort to export restrictions, one that is supported by carefully thought-through multilateral standards.29 A further avenue for multilateral action would be to develop constructive cooperation in the area of market information with the FAO and other agencies responsible for the Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS) in order to better define food security emergency situations in countries considering to impose export restrictions and to evaluate their likely impact on other vulnerable countries. Information and the ability to process this information are essential to a well-functioning world food market. In this context, the joint FAO-OECD report also recommended strengthening early warning systems in the wake of the experience of the 2008 food crisis. The Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS) of the FAO and the Vulnerability and Mapping initiative of the World Food Program could provide benchmarks for the determination of when certain policy responses may be required to “prevent” a “critical shortage. It is important to manage the spillover from the policies of exporters to consumers (particularly to vulnerable groups) in the importing countries. In other words, the concept of “due consideration” needs to be clarified and codified. The WTO, along with the Rome-based Agencies, could play a constructive role in elaborating on the steps that would be involved in giving “due consideration” to the food security of importing Members.30 This would include addressing the relevant information and indicators

Determining whether in fact a given food problem is a temporary situation of the kind to which Article XI:2(a) applies may not always be easy. It has been noted that there is a group of African countries that repeatedly and predictably suffer crisis-like events, such as irregular rainfall, drought, flooding and other weather-related challenges. 29

A recent FAO study noted in this regard: “the current state of information provision and consultation is very poor. This is one area for improvement.” (Sharma, 2011) 30

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that would need to be brought into the consultation process required under Article 12:1(b), to ensure that there is in fact “due consideration.” The WTO Committee on Agriculture is the appropriate location for discussions about the compliance with Article 12. This path towards the integration of trade rules and food security aims requires a fresh perspective from countries and the institutions through which they formulate rules and obligations. It would require countries to recognize that a WTO Member has an obligation to ensure that it manages its domestic food security in a manner that minimizes the negative impacts of a food crisis on other WTO Members. For example, the FAO Voluntary guidelines to support the progressive realization of the right to adequate food in the context of national food security suggest principles that might be used to assess whether a Member has fulfilled the condition in Article XX(g) of having taken at the same time measures to restrict domestic production or consumption.31 A more limited option to pursue would be to consolidate the commitment made at the G-20 Agricultural Ministers Meeting in Paris not to impose export bans on food going under aid programs. Ideally this should be high among the priorities of WTO ministers, and could be agreed as a side-deal to help restart the Doha Round process. But if that is not achievable then it should be possible with a plurilateral agreement that does not require completion of the Doha Round. It could, for instance, be part of a Code of Conduct on Export Restrictions that could be voluntarily adopted by the major food grain exporters. Or it could be a stand-alone agreement that codified the G-20 commitment without any obligation for other countries. Alternatively the initiative could be pursued in the context of the Food Aid Committee, which includes the major grain exporting countries. This path would link the development of more effective WTO or plurilateral rules on export restraints with the needs of the WFP to be responsive to food crises in times of generally high price levels. Given the resort to export restrictions in periods of high prices and their tendency to further exacerbate price hikes, any attempt to streamline the international institutions devoted to food security must grapple with how best to establish a procedure that ensures that countries cannot undertake such measures without due consideration to their impact on other countries. WTO rules, in particular when seen through the lens of recent WTO jurisprudence, clearly foresee such an eventuality.

Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, Voluntary Guidelines to Support the Progressive Realization of the Right to Adequate Food in the Context of National Food Security, adopted by the 127th Session of the FAO Council, November 2004. Voluntary Guideline 8E refers also to sustainability: “States should consider specific national policies, legal instruments and supporting mechanisms to protect ecological sustainability and the carrying capacity of ecosystems to ensure the possibility for increased, sustainable production for present and future generations, prevent water pollution, protect the fertility of the soil, and promote the sustainable management of fisheries and forestry.” From a food security perspective, domestic policies restricting domestic production or consumption might well be examined, at least in part, in light of whether they serve the purpose of sustainability within the meaning of Guideline 8E, allowing for “increased, sustainable production for present and future generations” thus assuring that long run responses to the finiteness of agricultural resources do not unduly impair the food security of other WTO Members. 31

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References Balisacan, A., M. Sombilla and R. Dikitanan (2010). “Rice crisis in the Philippines: Why did it occur and what are its policy implications?” in D. Dawe (ed.) The Rice Crisis: Markets, Policies and Food Security, London: FAO and Earthscan. Barrett, Christopher B. and Marc F. Bellemare (2011). “The G-20’s error: Food price volatility is not the problem”, Foreign Affairs, July. Bouet, A. and David Laborde (2010). Economics of export taxation in a context of food crisis, IFPRI Discussion Paper 994, IFPRI, Washington DC. Ciezadlo, Annia (2011). “Let Them Eat Bread: How Food Subsidies Prevent (and Provoke) Revolutions in the Middle East”, Foreign Affairs, March 23 Committee on World Food Security (2009). Reform of the Committee on World Food Security. Final Version. CFS:2009/2 Rev.2. Rome: FAO. FAO and OECD (2011). “Price Volatility in Food and Agricultural Markets: Policy Responses”, Policy Report including contributions by FAO, IFAD, IMF, OECD, UNCTAD, WFP, the World Bank, the WTO, IFPRI and the UN HLTF, 2 June Foresight Report (2011). The Future of Food and Farming. The Government Office for Science, London. Gilbert, C. (2010). “How to understand high food prices”, Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 61, Gilbert, C. (2011). An Assessment of International Commodity Agreements for Commodity Price Stabilization. A. Prakash (Ed.), Safeguarding Food Security in Volatile Markets, Rome, FAO. High-Level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis (2008). Comprehensive Framework for Action. New York, United Nations. Josling, Tim, (2011). Global Food Stamps: An Idea Worth Considering? ICTSD, Geneva. Martin, W. and K. Andersen (2010): Export Restrictions and Price Insulations during Commodity Price Booms. American Journal of Agricultural Economics (forthcoming) Mitra, Siddhartha and Tim Josling, (2009). “Agricultural Export Restrictions: Welfare Implications and Trade Disciplines”, IPC Position Paper, Washington D.C. January 2009. OECD, (2009?). The Economic Impact of Export Restrictions on Raw Materials, OECD Publishing. Paarlberg, R., (2010). ‘How Grain Markets Sow the Spikes they Fear’, The Financial Times, August 19. Sharma, Ramesh, (2011). “Food Export Restrictions: Review of the 2009-2010 Experience and Considerations for Disciplining Restrictive Measures”, FAO Commodity and Trade Policy Research Working Paper No. 32, Rome, May.

Robles, M., M. Torero, and J. von Braun, (2009). “When Speculation Matters”, Issue Brief 57, Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute, www.ifpri.org/pubs/ib/ib57.asp Sanders, D.R. and S. Irwin, (2010). “A Speculative Bubble in Commodity Futures Prices? Cross Sectional Evidence,” Agricultural Economics, Vol. 41, pp. 25-32 Timmer Peter, (2010). “Management of rice reserve stocks in Asia: Analytical issues and Country experience”, FAO Commodity Market Review 2009-2010. Von Braun, Joachim, (2010). “The system that oversees global agriculture and food security needs an overhaul,” Nature 465, 548-549 (3 June) Welton, George, (2011). The Impact of Russia’s 2010 Grain Export Ban, Oxfam Research Reports, 28 June World Bank, (2011). “Responding to Global Food Price Volatility and Its Impact on Food Security,” paper prepared for the Development Committee Meeting, April 16. Wright, B. (2009), “International Grain Reserves and Other Instruments to Address Volatility in Grain Markets”, The World Bank. Policy Research Working Paper 5028, August. Wright, B. and A. Prakash, (2011). “The Fallacy of Price Interventions: A Note on Price Floor and Bands and Managed Tariffs,” in A. Prakash (Ed.), Safeguarding Food Security in Volatile Markets, Rome, FAO. Ewing-Chow, Michael and Melanie Villarasau-Shade, (2010), “Food Security: From Self-Sufficiency to Production Diversification and Regional Cooperation-A Case Study in Rice Security,” Unpublished Manuscript, University of Singapore, 2012. Howse, Robert and Ruti Teitel, (2007). Beyond the Divide: The Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and The World Trade Organization, Occasional Paper no.30, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Geneva, April. United Nations (2004). Mainstreaming the Right to Development into International Trade Law and Policy at the World Trade Organization: Note by the Secretariat, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/17, 3-20. Geneva: United Nations. Young, Linda and Jill Hobbs, (2001) “Vertical Linkages in Agri-Food Supply Chains: Changing Roles for Producers, Commodity Groups, and Government Policy”, Review of Agricultural Economics 24(2), 428-441; Daviron, Benoit and Peter Gibbon, (2002) “Global Commodity Chains and African Export Agriculture”, Journal of Agrarian Change 2(2), 137-161.

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Annex 1: Multilateral Declarations on Export Taxes The period since 2008 has seen a flurry of activity in multilateral agencies and numerous intergovernmental meetings on the matter of food security (see Annex 2 for a glossary). Questions of export restrictions and other types of price insulating behavior need to be put into the framework of this broader debate. Much of the discussion is about the need to invest steadily and consistently in developing country agriculture, to improve smallholder productivity, and to improve the access to food by the world’s poorest consumers. The broader context also includes the reality that some countries lack the means to implement alternative measures to protect vulnerable populations from price spikes. A subtext of this debate is about whether food security is furthered or hindered by open markets. Given this context it is useful to assess these debates from a broad institutional perspective, examining the relationship between the WTO and other international institutions and agencies with responsibilities related to food security, such as the Rome-based agencies (FAO, IFAD, WFP) as well as other bodies such as the G-20, the OECD. The sharp rise in food prices in 2007-08 set off a chain of multilateral meetings each one calling for coordinated action to prevent such events from adding to the problem of hunger and poverty. The United Nations took the initiative in many of these actions. The elimination of extreme poverty had been built into the Millennium Development Goals (MDG 1) and acts as a source of legitimacy for multilateral action, subject always to UN sensitivities in terms of interfering in domestic decisions. Many UN agencies had already begun to emphasize food security and its related links with poverty and hunger in their agendas. The Secretary-General proposed a Highlevel Task Force (HLTF) to coordinate the actions of these separate agencies, and this was established in 2008. The HLTF has met to consider coordination strategies and has promised a “robust and consistent” response to the food security crisis from the included agencies and organizations. Among its major outputs at the present time is a Comprehensive Framework for Action (CFA) produced in July 2008, followed by an Updated Framework for Action (UCFA) in 2010. The CFA takes a twin-track approach to the problems associated with food security, emphasizing the need to meet the immediate needs of vulnerable populations as well as the longer term goal of putting in place social safety nets and stimulating investment in sustainable agricultural production. The fact that the UN agencies in New York and Geneva (UNGA, UNCTAD, ILO, UNDP, etc.) have taken such an active role in coordination of multilateral policy response has presented a challenge to the Rome-based agencies that have traditionally had the main responsibility in such matters. The Rome-based agencies include the FAO, also part of the UN system but claiming a mandate that predates the establishment of the UN, together with the World Food Program (WFP) and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). Activity in the FAO has focused on monitoring and policy advice, and significant resources have been devoted to the development of early warning systems and the agency is now responsible for implementing an Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS) to coordinate market intelligence and share advance warnings about commodity shortages. The FAO Initiative on Soaring Food Prices (ISFP) aims to

help governments find better ways of dealing with price shocks. The WFP has been considering the establishment of an emergency humanitarian food reserve system, as well as improvements to food aid through advance purchases and pre-positioned supplies. IFAD has been given a boost by the focus during the food security crisis on the role of small farmers in meeting local needs. The body most directly mandated to coordinate food security actions gained a new lease of life from the 2008 food security crisis. The Committee on World Food Security (CFS), a child of the 1974 World Food Conference, had seen its relevance wane over time. The original mandate of the CFS was to follow up on the resolutions of the World Food Conference but its effectiveness was limited. Later its role was redefined to monitor the outcomes of the World Food Summits of 1996 and 2002, again with little apparent success. However, it was drastically “reformed” in 2009 to give it a broader mandate and a clearer focus. The G-20 Agricultural Ministers meeting in Paris in June 2011 declared their support for the (reformed) CFS. Currently the CFS has 127 member countries and many participating institutions including the UN agencies, IFIs, private sector groups and other NGOs representing civil society. In addition there are observers (mainly regional bodies) allowed to participate in meetings by agreement. Only the countries however can vote, though all participants can join in discussions and present papers. Each plenary session (the next one is in October 2012) considers specific topics: price variability was chosen as a key issue for the thirtysixth plenary session held in 2011. Current activity is focused on the establishment of Voluntary Guidelines to coordinate “country-owned” food security plans. The reform of the CFS in 2009 was an attempt (so far successful) to rescue the Committee from the cutting room floor. The main drivers for the reform were NGOs, supported by several governments, who saw the Committee as a way of establishing voice in the discussion of food security. The UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier de Schutter, welcomed the new organization as “a new breed of global governance in which civil society are co-authors of international law” along with governments and international agencies. The civil society organizations and the community based organizations that were to be part of this new type of body welcomed the CFS as being concerned with “food security, nutrition, food sovereignty and the right to food”. The price paid for inclusiveness was the expansion of the agenda to embrace a range of social issues that could hamper the ability of the CFS to get agreement on specific actions. In particular the active participation of representatives of smallholders is likely to dilute any recommendations for action on trade issues. The CFS is supported by a Bureau, an Advisory Group and a Secretariat, currently hosted by the FAO in Rome (though by its constitution it could rotate to the IFAD and the WFP over time). It is therefore closely integrated with the Rome-based Agencies, though with active links to the HLTF (of which it is a member) and hence to the other UN bodies. Political support for these activities at the UN and the Rome-based agencies has been a feature of the reaction by national leaders to the 2008 crisis and to a lesser extent the 2010 price increase. Successive G-8 and G-20 meetings have declared their support for international efforts to tackle food insecurity, including those linked to price spikes. These have been accompanied by specific meetings at the ministerial level often at the initiative of particular countries. The G-8 meeting in 29

Japan in July 2008 discussed the food crisis as it was then developing; the 2009 L’Aquila G-8 Summit announced a “pledge” on food security assistance and launched the L’Aquila Food Security Initiative (AFSI). The September 2009 G-20 summit in Pittsburgh promoted a global food security program and the November 2009 World Summit on Food Security adopted five “Rome Principles” for Sustainable Global Food Security. A Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP) was established as an “early element” of the AFSI in 2010; the November 2010 G-20 Summit in Seoul called for the inclusion of food security in a multi-year action plan on development. They also requested a report on Price Volatility, to be produced by the main secretariats responsible for statistics and analysis. The FAO and the OECD took the lead and produced a report in June 2011. The June 2011 G-20 meeting in Paris included a discussion among the Agricultural Ministers from the G-20 countries, and formulated an Action Plan on Food Price Volatility and Agriculture (Action Plan), as well agreeing to the establishment of the AMIS mentioned above. Among other agencies that deal with such matters the Washington-based agencies (the World Bank Group and the IMF) have been key participants in the discussions over food security and key actors in facilitating the funding of initiatives. The WB initiated a Global Food Crisis Response Program (GFCRP) in 2008 that provided the possibility to inject funds quickly to needy countries in times of food price stress. In 2010 the Bank set up the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP) that was seen as a part of the AFSI. These initiatives complement those of other bodies, though still require funding decisions by major countries. The IFC has followed up with a Global Agricultural Price Risk Management Facility (GAPRMF) to facilitate the use of risk management tools in developing countries. The IMF has also been active in reviewing its food financing facility.

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Annex 2: Partial Listing of Multilateral Agencies and Initiatives on Food Security since 2007 Acronym

Agency/Initiative

Comment

High level Meeting on Food Security for All

Madrid, January

G-8 Expert Group on Global Food Security

Chaired by Japan

Action Plan

Action Plan on Food Price Volatility and Agriculture

Agreed by G-20 Ministers of Agriculture, Paris, June 2011

AFSI

L’Aquila Food Security Initiative

Created in 2009 as follow up to the L’Aquila G-8 Summit pledge on Food Security

AMIS

Agricultural Market Information System

Includes Rapid Response Forum (RRF). Supported by G-20 Ministers of Agriculture, Paris, June 2011. Based in FAO

CFS

Committee on Food Security

Established at the World Food Conference, 1974: reformed in 2009

EU-FSF

EU’s Food Security Facility

Fund set up with savings from CAP in high price period 2008/09

FAO

Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations

Established 1945: provides technical advice, policy advice, and statistical monitoring

FEWSNET

Famine Early Warning System Network

Set up by USAID to identify cases of food insecurity

FFPI

FAO Food Price Index

FS-ATMIS

Food Security Activity Tracking Management Information System

G-20 Meetings

Statements from G-20 Leaders, G-20 Finance Ministers, and Agricultural Ministers

Seoul Multi-year Action Plan for Development includes Food Security pillar 2011; Pittsburgh 2009

G-8 Summits

Statements from G-8 leaders

Japan, July 2008; L’Aquila, 2009

Acronym

Agency/Initiative

Comment

GAFSP

Global Agriculture and Food Security Program

Fiduciary Intermediary Fund established by the WB April 2010: “early element” of AFSI

GDPRD

Global Donor Platform for Rural Development

GFCRP

Global Food Crisis Response Program

Set up by WB in 2008

GPATSN

Global Partnership for Agriculture, Food Security and Nutrition

Emerged from June 2008 Rome meeting of the HLCFSCC; supported by G-8

GSF

Global Strategic Framework

Agreed at the 36th CFS in 2010

HLCFSCC

High Level Committee on Food Security and Climate Change

HLTF

High Level Task Force

Established by the UN in 2008: representatives of 22 UN bodies plus International Financial Institutions and WTO

IFAD

International Fund for Agricultural Development

Established in 1978 to attract new funds into agricultural development: focus on small farmer issues

IFC

Global Agricultural Price Risk Management Facility

Financial assistance for national risk management instruments

ISFP

FAO Initiative on Soaring Food Prices

Includes “Guide for Policy and Pragmatic Actions” 2011 with detailed policy advice for governments

MDG1

Millennium Development Goal 1

UN Agreed Target for Eradication of Extreme Poverty and Hunger

OECD

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

Monitors aid flows through Development Assistance Committee (DAC)

SUN

Framework for Scaling Up Nutrition

Launched by WB in 2010, coordinating actions by 100 governmental and non-governmental organizations

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Acronym

Agency/Initiative

Comment

UCFA

Updated Comprehensive Framework for Action

Adopted by UNGA in Sept 2010 (to replace original CFA agreed July 2008) as framework for HLTF

WFP

World Food Program

Created in 1978 as an agency to administer Multilateral Food Aid; includes program on Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping

World Food Summit

World Summit on Food Security, Rome, 2009

Agreed to “Five Rome Principles for Sustainable Global Food Security”

Source: Authors’ compilation

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